"REVIEW OF IIM, 'THE CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA'"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002500100001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 30, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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National Intelligence Officers
MORI review(s)
completed.
30 June 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: The NFIB Representatives
SUBJECT Review of IIM, "The Conflict in the Western Sahara"
REFERENCE : NI IIM 77-008J of June 1977
1. When we reviewed the referenced Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
in December 1977 and found it still current it was agreed that we would
consider it again six months later. However, a review of the principal
judgments of the IIM indicates to me that the situation in the Western Sahara
has not changed significantly in the past 12 months and that the conclusions
of our IIM are not only valid today, but that they will probably remain valid
at least to the end of 1978.
2. I therefore propose that we defer a meeting to review the IIM until
December 1978. Please telephone your concurrence, disagreement, or comments
on this proposal to by Friday, 14 July 1978.
25
National Intelligence icer tor e
Near East and South Asia
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Top Secret
Interagency
Intelligence
1111,14
The Conflict in the Western Sahara
Top Secret
NI IIM 77-008C
June 1977
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CONTENTS
Page
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS ...................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 2
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
Who Owns the Sahara? ....................................................................................... 5
Algeria's Motives ................................................................................................... 5
Origins of the POLISARIO ................................................................................ 5
The Guerrilla Campaign ...................................................................................... 6
POLISARIO Politics .............................................................................................. 6
The POLISARIO's Military Advantages and Successes ................................. 6
The Moroccan-Mauritanian Military Alliance .................................................. 7
Guerrilla Limitations ............................................................................................ 8
Political and Economic Consequences of a Protracted Guerrilla War ..... 9
Morocco ............................................................................................................... 9
Mauritania ........................................................................................................... 9
Algeria .................................................................................................................. 10
Military Developments ......................................................................................... 10
The Moroccan Response .................................................................................. 10
Algeria Upgrades Conventional Forces ......................................................... 10
Restraints Against a Moroccan-Algerian War .................................................. 11
Moroccan Deliberations ..................................................................................... 11
Algerian Limitations ......................................................................................... 12
Terrain and Logistic Restraints ..................................................................... 12
Projected International Reaction to the Advent of Hostilities .................... 13
Arab Reactions ................................................................................................... 13
Soviet Role ......................................................................................................... 13
French Interests ................................................................................................. 14
US Strategic and Economic Interests in Northwest Africa ......................... 15
Prospects for a Settlement .................................................................................. 16
Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 18
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CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
Morocco and Mauritania are tenaciously maintaining their hold on
the former Spanish Sahara despite persistent harassment by the
guerrillas of the POLISARIO front. Algeria refuses to recognize the
Moroccan-Mauritanian annexations, advocates self-determination for
the Sahara, and gives substantial material support to the POLISARIO
insurgency. In the short term, there appears to be little chance of a
negotiated settlement of this conflict.
The POLISARIO movement has caused a significant amount of
Moroccan and Mauritanian resources to be used for countering
guerrilla activity. As long as the flow of Algerian military supplies is
continued and their Algerian safehaven is maintained, the guerrillas
should be able to operate almost indefinitely. Numbering only some
3,000 to 5,000 combatants, however, and hampered by logistic
constraints and their heavy dependence on limited sources of external
military support, they do not pose a strategic military threat to either
Morocco or Mauritania. Nor do we believe that the POLISARIO can,
at its own initiative, significantly upgrade its existing military force.
During the next two years, the current situation will probably
continue:
Morocco and Mauritania will strive to consolidate their political
control over the territory, alleging that integration of the Sahara
fulfills the desires of the Saharan people, but avoiding any
referendum. They will control the principal population centers
but will not be able to eliminate the guerrilla movement so long
as it is sustained by Algeria.
the POLISARIO will continue to move through the countryside
harassing Moroccan and Mauritanian forces, and on occasion
scoring minor military successes, some of considerable propa-
ganda value.
Algeria will continue its support of the POLISARIO and will try
to keep the issue before international forums. Algeria will not,
however, seek outside help other than diplomatic support as it
does not wish to dilute its influence over the POLISARIO.
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- Internationally, most countries, while withholding formal
recognition, will regard the Sahara annexation by Morocco and
Mauritania as a fait accompli. There is little likelihood that the
Soviets will become involved in the conflict on a large scale,
since they do not want to jeopardize their relations with
Morocco by providing direct support to the POLISARIO.
Prospects for a reduction in tension in the short run are dim because
of the lack of negotiating flexibility exhibited by all parties, which in
turn results partly from the moderate military losses being inflicted on
either side. Serious political, economic, and military restraints, however,
will probably keep the conflict from escalating into a conventional war
between Algeria and Morocco.
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BACKGROUND
The coup in Portugal in April 1974 and Lisbon's subsequent
decision to grant its African territories independence prompted King
Hassan II of Morocco to press Madrid to pull out of the Spanish
Sahara. Rabat was convinced that Spain would not wish to remain long
as the only significant colonial power in Africa.
On 20 August 1974, Spain notified the UN Secretary General of its
intention to hold a referendum on self-determination in its overseas
province. Morocco seized upon the announcement to reassert its claims
to the phosphate rich territory. Rabat argued that in the precolonial era
Moroccan rulers intermittently exercised varying degrees of control over
much of this territory, as well as portions of western Algeria,
Mauritania, and parts of Mali.
Indeed, it was not until 1970-14 years after achieving its own
independence-that Morocco recognized Mauritania and dropped its
claims to that country. Rabat's feud with Algeria over the region
stretching from the area south of Bechar and including Tindouf was the
cause of a brief border war in 1963. Both countries signed an agreement
in 1972 delineating a common boundary, but Rabat has not yet ratified
the accord.
In conjunction with Rabat's aggressive political campaign to
recover the Sahara in 1974, Mauritania took the occasion to voice its
own territorial claims. The former Spanish Sahara has no natural
frontiers and shares its southern and virtually all of its eastern border
with Mauritania. The nomadic tribes of the Sahara have traditionally
roamed across those borders, as well as across into Morocco.
Mauritania's assertion of its own territorial ambitions resulted in a
brief period of tension with Morocco. A reconciliation was effected by
September 1974 when the two countries agreed to submit their case to
the International Court of justice for a legal opinion. By the end of the
year, Rabat and Nouakchott agreed in principle to partition the
territory.
In May 1975, Madrid announced it was prepared to transfer
sovereignty of the territory. Five months later the International Court
of justice concluded that, although certain ties of allegiance existed
between Morocco/Mauritania and the Western Sahara prior to Spanish
colonization, these did not support a claim of territorial sovereignty for
either party. The principle of self-determination was upheld.
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Algeria, for its part, sought to secure an independent Spanish
Sahara amenable to Algerian influence. Algiers was concerned that
Rabat's acquisition of additional territory would enhance Morocco's
role in North Africa at the expense of Algerian interests.
Nevertheless, Rabat moved ahead with its plans for annexation by
organizing the "Green March" into the Sahara by some 350,000
unarmed civilians in early November 1975 while Spain remained in
control. This compelled Madrid to agree to a phased transfer of
administrative responsibility, but not sovereignty, to Morocco and
Mauritania. Spain withdrew from the Spanish Sahara in February
1976, advocating a self-determination for the Saharan people-a stance
it has continued to maintain. On 14 April Morocco and Mauritania
formalized their annexation of the Sahara by announcing new
boundaries; Rabat gained the phosphate-rich northern two-thirds.
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DISCUSSION
Who Owns the Sahara?
1. Morocco and Mauritania exercise de facto
control over most of the former Spanish Sahara.
United Nations General Assembly resolutions have
upheld the right of self-determination of the Saharan
people, but both governments claim that the convoca-
tion of the Saharan territorial assembly in February
1976 and the vote of some 60 of its original 102
members to integrate the Sahara into Morocco and
Mauritania constituted compliance. They further cite
the participation of the Saharans in the Moroccan and
Mauritanian elections during the past year. Neither
Spain nor the UN has accepted Rabat's gambit to
dispose of the troublesome consultation process.
2. Algeria has remained adamant in its opposition
to the takeover. It has supplied both political and
military support to the POLISARIO, a guerrilla
movement aimed at liberating the Western Sahara
from foreign-i.e., Moroccan and Mauritanian-
control. Algiers has effectively used the POLISARIO
to undermine such control while keeping the dispute
before various international forums.
3. Most nations would prefer to side-step this
political and legal quagmire. Algerian efforts to
convene an extraordinary session of the Organization
of African Unity have proved fruitless, although talk
of such a meeting continues. Arab mediation initia-
tives likewise have failed thus far. For the most part,
the Sahara annexation appears to be viewed interna-
tionally as a fait accompli, although formal recogni-
tion has been withheld. In the present circumstances,
Morocco and Mauritania retain the upper hand.
Algeria's Motives
4. Algeria's interest in the Western Sahara stems
from geopolitical considerations. Although Algeria's
stated support for the independence struggle of the
Saharan people is indeed a factor, its historical
competition with Morocco for predominance in
northwest Africa is the primary motivation. The
ideological hostility of socialist, revolutionary Algeria
toward the traditionalist and pro-Western regime of
King Hassan II has intensified the geopolitical
competition.
5. Algeria's objective in the dispute is the establish-
ment of an independent Saharan republic in which it
expects to have a predominant influence. This would
deny to Morocco the territory's significant economic
wealth (phosphates, iron, fishing), and stymie Moroc-
can efforts to close off future Algerian access to the
Atlantic, which might make exploitation of Algeria's
rich iron ore deposits near Tindouf economically
feasible. President Boumediene, in short, opposes
Moroccan assimilation of the Western Sahara because
this could reduce Algeria's dominant role in North
Africa.
6. Although Algeria has sought to avoid a direct
military conflict with Morocco, the Boumediene
regime is not likely to accept defeat without making
an extended effort to render the Moroccan occupation
costly and difficult. Nor will it be willing to agree
to a settlement without substantive concessions by
Morocco on the principle of self-determination and on
the long-standing Algerian-Moroccan border problem.
Boumediene is probably currently content to continue
a war by proxy, using the POLISARIO to undermine
Moroccan and Mauritanian control of the territory.
He probably hopes that military discontent resulting
from a protracted guerrilla war will eventually lead to
a change in leadership or, at least, tie up both
Morocco's and Mauritania's energies and resources for
a long time.
Origins of the POLISARIO
7. In 1968, a small group of Saharan students, who
had been brought together by conservative Islamic
views, formed the Saharan Liberation Front in Rabat.
On 17 June 1970, the group staged a political
demonstration in El Aaiun, the capital of the Spanish
Sahara. Action by the Spanish police to break up the
demonstration, in which several persons were killed, is
said to have inspired the Front to organize the desert
nomad. populace, and in 1972 these individuals began
to build a guerrilla organization. At its first congress
on 10 May 1973, the Saharan Liberation Front
became the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de
Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro! (Frente POLISARIO).
' Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro were the former names of the
two regions comprising the Spanish Sahara.
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During the first year of its existence, the movement
received most of its military aid from Libya. Once
Morocco's King Hassan intensified his efforts to annex
the Sahara, however, Algeria began supplying the
guerrillas with military equipment while also initiat-
ing a political campaign in support of the movement.
8. Sporadic POLISARIO actions against isolated
Spanish outposts in the Sahara continued through
1974 and 1975. Following the Madrid agreement
which provided for a phased turnover of the territory
to Morocco and Mauritania, Spanish forces gradually
withdrew to a 70-mile defense perimeter around El
Aaiun. The guerrillas moved into the resulting
vacuum and operated in much of northeastern and
southern Sahara. As first Moroccan, and later Mauri-
tanian, troops moved into the Sahara, POLISARIO
guerrillas began to attack these forces.
The Guerrilla Campaign
9. Some 20 months after the POLISARIO began
these operations, the guerrilla war continues. Moti-
vated by the desire to liberate the area under
Moroccan and Mauritanian de facto control, the
POLISARIO has demonstrated a cohesiveness and
staying power which will enable it to pursue its war of
attrition so long as Algeria continues to provide
military supplies.
10. Estimates of guerrilla strength vary from 3,000
to 5,000 combatants. The core of the movement is
drawn from the Reguibat tribe, a nomadic group
which has traditionally roamed through vast areas of
the former Spanish Sahara, Algeria, Morocco and
Mauritania. Historically, these people have resisted
foreign control; they are renowned in the region for
their fighting capability. Included in their numbers
are some of the 2,500 Saharans, largely Reguibat, who
served with Spanish troops during Madrid's occupa-
tion of the Sahara and shifted their allegiance to the
POLISARIO after Spain disbanded its territorial force.
Trained by the Spanish, versed in military operations,
and familiar with the terrain, water holes, and local
population, these personnel are particularly effective
fighters.
11. In addition, large numbers of Saharan refugees
are concentrated in the Tindouf region of Algeria.
Estimates of their numbers vary, but we judge that
there are between 30,000 and 45,000, or about half of
Western Sahara's previous population. This exiled
population base, frustrated and becoming politicized,
provides the movement with a source of manpower for
its guerrilla units. The refugees are reportedly under-
going political and military training, geared to the
theme of their return to the Western Sahara and the
creation of an independent Saharan state. In addition,
the POLISARIO can be expected to try to recruit from
tribes in northern Mauritania. According to Moroccan
sources, the POLISARIO's political programs have
raised the refugees' morale, and new Saharan recruits
fighting with guerrilla units are highly motivated.
POLISARIO Politics
12. On 27 February 1976, the day following Spain's
withdrawal from the territory, the POLISARIO
political arm established a government-in-exile-the
Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR). The
SDAR consists of a nine-man cabinet of little-known
figures, a revolutionary council, and a legislative
authority. Its political orientation reflects the socialist
policies of the Algerian government. Only nine
African countries plus North Korea have extended
official recognition.
13. Although efforts to obtain diplomatic recogni-
tion have had little success, POLISARIO leaders have
skillfully exploited the international press. Journalists
have been given carefully structured tours of POLI-
SARIO refugee camps near Tindouf, have been taken
along on guerrilla raids deep into the Moroccan and
Mauritanian zones, and have commented favorably
on the effectiveness, valor, and determination of the
guerrillas. Such dramatic psychological victories as an
attack on Nouakchott in June 1976 and a recent raid
on Zouerate serve to highlight the POLISARIO
movement and bring it international attention. If the
press campaign continues to attract widespread public
sympathy from Morocco's principal Western backers,
in the US and France in particular, it could
undermine support for Moroccan and Mauritanian
positions over the longer run.
The POLISARIO's Military Advantages
and Successes
14. Familiar with the terrain and accustomed to the
harsh desert climatic conditions, the guerrillas have a
physical as well as psychological advantage, and have
been able to remain on the offensive and evade the
conventional forces of Morocco and Mauritania.
Initially the guerrillas relied almost entirely on small-
scale harassing tactics capitalizing on their small
numbers by utilizing the element of surprise and the
terrain to their advantage. Rather than attempting to
gain control of population centers, they concentrated
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on quick, sharp attacks on targets of opportunity, after
which they disappeared into the desert. The use of
Land Rovers has contributed to their ability to move
long distances over rugged terrain. Weapons in their
inventory include small arms, mortars, machine guns,
grenade launchers, and the SA-7 Grail surface-to-air
missile. Land mines have also been effectively used,
particularly in Moroccan-controlled territory, to dis-
rupt military supply columns.
15. The guerrillas continue to move virtually at will
throughout southern Morocco, Mauritania, and the
Western Sahara. Recently they have also operated
from northern Mali, thereby generating closer cooper-
ation between Mali and Mauritania. They have
apparently established well-camouflaged supply de
pots from which they can attack such areas as Nema
in southeast Mauritania and Dakhla on the Atlantic,
far removed from their sanctuary and primary supply
base at Tindouf. Recent information indicates that
their ability as a fighting force may be improving as
their tactics change. They are increasingly engaging
Mauritanian forces directly, probably because they
realize that Mauritania is a more poorly defended
target.
16. In Mauritania, the guerrillas appear willing to
use large groups in sustained combat-a tactic not
generally employed against the stronger Moroccan
forces. On 1 May they initiated one of their most
effectively planned, coordinated, and executed oper-
ations in an attack on Zouerate. Using a force
reportedly numbering some 500 men with 110
vehicles, the POLISARIO hit Mauritanian and
European sectors of the city, the airport, and the iron
ore mining facilities. The POLISARIO took some
hostages, destroyed two aircraft, and destroyed or
damaged a fuel depot, the power station, and
conveyor belts at the mine.
17. Mauritania is continuing to augment its army
and improve its combat capability to counter guerrilla
operations. However, its 7,000- to 10,000-man army
lacks the capability to effectively patrol and secure
over 1,240,000 square kilometers of territory, most of
which is desert. The guerrillas, operating beyond the
observation of the Mauritanian armed forces, hold the
initiative, while the Mauritanians must react to,
rather than initiate, offensive operations.
18. In Morocco, the emphasis has been on attacking
patrols and convoys and small-scale hit-and-run
operations. Precise data on Moroccan casualties is
lacking, but we
can deduce that the minimum monthly casualty rate
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approximates 10 to 20 killed in action. In any event,
at this time the casualty rate appears to be acceptable
to the Moroccan o ul 25X
f 25X
while the numb
er o
arassing attacks has decreased since last October,
there have been more assaults on convoys.
19. This change in guerrilla tactics may be a result
of a diversification in Moroccan strategy. Over the
past several months the army has been involved in
extensive sweep operations, utilizing smaller units for
patrols, establishing companies of native Saharans,
and engaging in coordinated search and destroy
operations. While these more aggressive tactics have
not pinned down and eliminated pockets of guerrillas,
they have lessened the vulnerability of large groups of
stationary Moroccan forces.
20. There are indications that Moroccan patrols
posing as irregular forces have crossed the Algerian
border, probably with the intent of mining routes the
POLISARIO uses for infiltrating Morocco. This tactic,
if employed regularly, would considerably up the ante
in terms of drawing an Algerian military response. As
yet, however, Algiers has not reacted verbally or
militarily, indicating the Moroccans are carefully
avoiding deep penetrations or direct confrontations.
The Moroccan-Mauritanian Military Alliance
21. Although the relationship between Morocco
and Mauritania has been uneasy for historical reasons,
the common guerrilla threat has resulted in increased
diplomatic, political, and military cooperation. A
Moroccan military liaison group has been established
at Nouakchott, reportedly to coordinate military
operations as deemed necessary, as well as to
coordinate training and assistance programs. In
addition, some 250 Moroccans stationed at Bir
Mogrein provide artillery and armor support to the
Mauritanian army. Elements of the Moroccan 15th
Infantry Battalion are at Dakhla and some Moroccan
troops are also in Mauritania in the far northern
border region. More importantly, the two countries
have recently engaged in coordinated sweep
operations.
22. Between 1 and 8 January at the request of
Nouakchott, about four Moroccan battalions con-
ducted a sweep operation through northern Mauri-
tania to cut off the retreat of an estimated 400
guerrillas operating near Motlani. The maneuver
reportedly resulted in 12 Moroccans and 110 to 130
POLISARIO guerrillas killed. The operation was well
planned, coordinated, and executed, but even more
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significantly it underscored King Hassan's commit-
ment to ensuring the internal security of Mauritania.
23. While Mauritania has recently been the hardest
hit by guerrilla activity and its small army could
become overtaxed, we believe that should Mauritania
be seriously threatened, Morocco would provide the
necessary military aid. The exchanges of high-level
delegations between Morocco and Mauritania dur-
ing March following two of the POLISARIO's most
successful engagements and also following the Zouer-
ate raid last May portend further military coopera-
tion. A Moroccan logistic supply route now includes
two air bases in Mauritania-Dakhla and Bir
Mogrein-and another at Bir Enzaran near the
newly demarcated border. The possibility of station-
ing a T-6 ground attack strike force in northern
Mauritania is also under consideration. Such in-
creased cooperation could eventually ease the Mauri-
tanians' burden of fending off continuing guerrilla
activity.
24. While accepting the need for Moroccan help,
the Mauritanian leadership is concerned at the
possible political implications of the increasing Mo-
roccan presence in Mauritania. Nouakchott is not
likely to forget that Rabat's historical claims also
include Mauritanian territory and that this claim was
official Moroccan policy as late as 1969. However,
Morocco appears to be fully aware of this Mauri-
tanian concern, and we believe that the commonly
perceived need to coordinate military activity as well
as to present a common political position should, in
the near term at least, prevent any flareup of old
antagonisms.
25. The POLISARIO has proved a resilient fighting
force capable of diverting a significant amount of
Moroccan and Mauritanian resources. At the same
time, however, its lack of trained manpower, its
logistic restraints, and heavy dependence on outside
military support reduce its ability to improve substan-
tially its military posture.
26. There are severe limitations on the POLI-
SARIO's outside support. Although Algeria, its prime
benefactor, is committed to backing the POLISARIO
politically and providing sufficient weapons, materiel,
and training to maintain guerrilla activity, there has
been no indication that Algerian military units have
been involved in POLISARIO activity outside Algeria
since the clashes around Amgala in early 1976. Libya,
which also provides small arms and ammunition and
generally supports Algeria on the Sahara issue, has not
extended recognition to the POLISARIO government-
in-exile.
27. Rumors that Cubans are training the POLI-
SARIO in Algeria have frequently surfaced. We
cannot confirm the presence of Cubans but neither
can we rule out the possibility that a token number
may be involved in guerrilla training within Algeria.
Boumediene's strong nonaligned position and Alge-
rian capability to provide effective training would
tend to rule out any more than symbolic Cuban
assistance. Moreover, according to an untested source,
Boumediene criticized Castro during his recent visit to
Algeria for Cuba's "growing role in the polarization of
Africa," indicating a possible rift between the two
heads of state.
28. Despite periodic guerrilla attacks on economic
targets such as the Bu Craa phosphate conveyor belt
in Moroccan-controlled territory and the iron ore
mining facilities and rail line in Mauritania, the
POLISARIO has not succeeded in seriously disrupting
foreign exchange earnings from these minerals. When
the phosphate conveyor belt was cut, the Moroccans
trucked the phosphate to port facilities. Although this
is not a totally effective alternative, the depressed
world phosphate market has lessened the significance
of the reduction in phosphate exports from the Sahara.
Rabat has a substantial unsold surplus at home. The
Mauritanians have prepared for the possible disrup-
tion of iron ore mining operations by stockpiling ore;
they are trying to maintain about 1.5 million tons at
Nouadhibou Port. We estimate that the guerrillas
would have to put the rail line out of operation for
several weeks before damaging the Mauritanian
economy. If French managerial personnel at the
mines become intimidated and depart, however,
production would be sharply curtailed.
29. We anticipate no conclusive military victory in
the ongoing conflict. While the POLISARIO is
currently unable to pose a sustained threat to strategic
targets or gain control of populated areas, Moroccan
and Mauritanian forces likewise are unable to
eliminate the mobile and evasive guerrillas. Barring
any unforeseen increase in military support for the
guerrillas or large-scale recruitment, the situation will
remain stalemated
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Political and Economic Consequences of a
Protracted Guerrilla War
30. The stability of King Hassan's regime is closely
linked to the success of his Saharan venture. The
popularity of his actions to date leaves him little room
to make concessions, and puts pressure on him to
continue to prosecute the war against the POLI-
SARIO, even if it means increasing support for
Mauritania in the event that Nouakchott is unable to
hold up its end of the alliance. A continuation of the
war at about the current level poses two potential
threats to Hassan. Although we judge these threats to
be relatively minor at present, they both will become
more serious over time.
31. The inevitable strains of an inconclusive conflict
have probably led to some degree of dissatisfaction
within the military. The army has suffered from low
morale, poor discipline, lackluster leadership at the
local level, and a poor logistics system. These
shortcomings have compounded the frustration of
troops engaged in a no-win situation in the desolate
Sahara. Additionally, various reports have indicated
some dissatisfaction within the military with Hassan's
policy of avoiding direct attack on POLISARIO bases
in Algeria. Hassan appears to be in full control of his
military, however, and that situation is unlikely to
change during the coming year. Having capitalized
on the Sahara issue to increase his popularity, he now
appears to be in his strongest position vis-a-vis the
military since the abortive coups of 1971 and 1972.
Morocco's successful intervention in Zaire should
further boost his prestige with the military.
32. A more serious difficulty is the possibility that
the economic burden of the Saharan conflict could
lead to increased social unrest. Though we cannot
measure precisely the war's cost, military expenditures
are partly responsible for the current strains in the
Moroccan economy. The inflation rate is approaching
20 percent, the government has halved its program of
subsidies for consumer goods, and unemployment is
rampant in urban areas. Politically aware elements
increasingly believe that the Saharan operation and
the related support for Mauritania are major causes
for high inflation, unemployment, and shortages of
consumer items.
33. Morocco's overall economic situation in 1977,
however, appears relatively more favorable than it
was last year. Massive loan commitments and grants
this year, perhaps eventually totaling $775 million,
from oil-rich Arab states will largely cover its Saharan
expenditures. In addition, the current trend toward
political liberalization, including the reduction of
press censorship and the election of a new parliament,
could serve as a safety valve for dissatisfaction over
economic issues. On balance, given widespread
popular support for Hassan's Saharan policy, the
present level of conflict probably will not cause serious
problems for the Moroccan regime within the next
two years, barring an unforeseen termination of the
country's foreign subsidies.
34. Mauritania, the weakest party to the Sahara
dispute, is in the most vulnerable position and the
POLISARIO has tried to exploit this. Algeria has also
exerted pressure on Nouakchott through caustic
propaganda attacks and hostile economic actions,
including the distribution of counterfeit banknotes in
Mauritania. These tactics are clearly intended to drive
a wedge between Rabat and Nouakchott and ulti-
mately to force Mauritania to abandon its role in the
Sahara.
35. It is conceivable, though hardly likely if present
circumstances continue, that Mauritania might at
some point, under strong pressure, decide that the
effort to retain its share of the Western Sahara is too
costly in both domestic political and economic terms.
Mauritanian frustration with the seemingly endless
guerrilla war is growing and serious domestic discon-
tent may eventually develop, especially among
Mauritanian blacks, who constitute the bulk of the
army's rank and file and who have little enthusiasm
for what in their view is essentially an Arab conflict.
36. From a diplomatic and geopolitical standpoint,
Mauritania's position is crucial to Morocco. Should
Mauritania give up its claims to the Sahara, Morocco
would be placed in an embarrassing situation interna-
tionally and the credibility of its claims to the Sahara
undermined. Conversely, Algeria's position would be
considerably strengthened in such forums as the OAU
and the UN. Militarily, though Morocco would be
able to continue the conflict, a Mauritanian with-
drawal would increase the strain on Moroccan forces
in its portion of the Sahara. The POLISARIO's ability
to harass Moroccan troops would increase consider-
ably, however, if Mauritania turned a blind eye to
POLISARIO transit through Mauritania.
37. The POLISARIO and Algeria are not likely to
succeed in forcing a Mauritanian withdrawal in the
absence of sustained, significantly increased military
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pressure and as long as Moktar Ould Daddah retains
his leadership in Nouakchott. Although the guerrilla
campaign has strained Mauritania's limited economic
resources, loans and grants from wealthy Arab oil
producers-which may amount to about $200 million
in 1977-will ease the burden. With continued Arab
financial backing, the Mauritanians can probably
bear the Sahara-related costs without serious economic
dislocation. At least in the short run, Nouakchott will
continue to follow Rabat's lead in the hope of
retaining its share of the Western Sahara. Military
cooperation between the two sides has increased and
the Moroccans are determined to provide the neces-
sary support to keep Mauritania on its side.
Algeria
38. The Boumediene government can continue to
support the present low level of guerrilla activity in
Western Sahara without serious political repercus-
sions. The Algerians believe that time works in favor
of liberation movements and hope to keep the
Moroccans and Mauritanians bogged down fighting a
long and costly insurgency. Although Boumediene has
suffered a loss of prestige as a result of his failure to
prevent the takeover of Western Sahara, his domestic
position still appears secure. Boumediene is likely to
continue supporting the POLISARIO guerrillas so
long as they remain willing to fight and Morocco is
unwilling to seek a face-saving compromise.
39. Algeria will be able to sustain its commitment at
a relatively small cost. Financing the insurgency is not
a significant drain on Algerian resources and has not
interfered with economic development, Algeria's
number one priority.
Military Developments
The Moroccan Response
40. In order to meet the requirements of controlling
the additional Saharan territory as well as to maintain
a state of preparedness in the event of hostilities with
Algeria, Morocco augmented its army by some 10,000
men in 1976. Out of a total of some 82,000 army
personnel, 29,000 combat troops plus service and
support elements are now deployed from Agadir
southward. Major concentrations of Moroccan troops
in Western Sahara include at least one infantry
regiment at Semara, one infantry regiment at El
Aaiun, and one infantry regiment at Bu Craa, plus
one artillery and nine infantry battalions deployed in
various other locations. The southern military zone
has been divided into two sectors. One sector
headquarters has already been established at El Aaiun
and there araplans for an additional one at Zaag. This
move may `alleviate discontent by some military
personnel in the Sahara who resented being under the
operational command of officers headquartered at
Agadir far from the harsh conditions of the Sahara
and the ongoing guerrilla campaign. The establish-
ment of a separate military region at Zaag would also
stress Rabat's concern over Algerian troop concentra-
tions at Tindouf.
41. Additional efforts are being made to improve
the combat effectiveness of the army. A major
reorganization of the army's logistical and mainte-
nance system, including the establishment of addi-
tional maintenance and repair battalions, is under-
way. The promotion of over 200 officers in 1976, the
replacement of 30 commanders of battalion-size units,
and the establishment of a regimental command
structure should improve both morale and command
and control. In addition, large quantities of transport
vehicles and armored personnel carriers have been
obtained from Western sources, and some 50 Mirage
F-1 aircraft are on order from France. Arms purchases
have been primarily financed by Arab countries;
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates
have been the most forthcoming. In addition, South
Korea has agreed to provide counterinsurgency train-
ing for Moroccan army NCOs and officers.
Algeria Upgrades Conventional Forces
42. Concerned over Moroccan expansion in the
Sahara and fearing that Rabat might eventually press
old claims to the Algerian southwest border region, the
Algerian government began plans for upgrading its
armed forces in the fall of 1975. By maintaining a
superior military inventory, Boumediene presents a
show of force certain to have a restraining effect on
Morocco.
43. The Soviet Union, Algeria's primary supplier of
military hardware, contracted with Algiers for some
$500 million in equipment in 1975. Estimated
deliveries have thus far included: at least 6 MIG-23
and 47 MIG-21 aircraft, 16 MI-8/Hip helicopters, 70
T-62 tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and air defense
equipment. Algeria has also received at least 30 T-62,
tanks and 30 armored vehicles of Soviet origin from
Libya.
44. Algeria has also augmented its army by calling
15,000 to 20,000 reservists to active duty in late 1975.
Algerian forces are concentrated in the more densely
populated northern one-third of the country, but as a
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result of Morocco's actions in the Sahara Algeria has
also augmented its forces at Tindouf. Prior to the rise
in tensions with Morocco the equivalent of one
infantry brigade was deployed at Tindouf. Current
estimates indicate the presence of major elements of 3
brigades. MIG-15 and MIG-17 fighter aircraft are
normally deployed at the Tindouf airfield. In
February 1976 when tensions peaked, MIG-21s were
also deployed there, but they have since been
withdrawn. The deployment of additional units to the
Tindouf region serves as a show of force to deter a
Moroccan offensive as well as to defend the territory
should it come under attack.
46. Occasional reports have surfaced indicating
strong sentiments within the Moroccan military for
direct strikes against POLISARIO sanctuaries in
Algeria, even at the risk of war. King Hassan,
however, is unlikely to initiate direct hostilities against
Algeria. He no doubt fears that a humiliating defeat
or even an inconclusive standoff could cost him his
throne. In addition, both Hassan and his senior
advisers recognize that an overt military move into
Algeria would undercut the diplomatic support
Morocco has laboriously worked to achieve in
international forums and particularly in the Arab
world.
Restraints Against a Moroccan-Algerian War
45. Both Morocco and Algeria are strengthening
and modernizing their armed forces, wary of the
possibility that continued animosity may one day
erupt in hostilities. We expect, however, that current
diplomatic, political, economic, and military factors
will act as deterrents to the outbreak of a conventional
war.
47. Algeria's numerical advantage in major items of
military equipment, particularly tanks, APCs and jet
fighters, will weigh heavily on Moroccan consider-
ations of a conventional war (see Table 1). Although it
would be hard pressed to cope with a major threat to
the entire border area, the Moroccan army is capable
of containing an Algerian attack at any one point
along the border for a few days. A Moroccan attack
Comparison of Military Forces
Personnel
Army
82,000
80,000
Navy
4,150
3,800
Air Force (pilots/jet-qualified)
7,000
(100/45)
5,000 (250/125)
Selected Armaments
Tanks
Medium
90
440
Light
125
0
APCs
200
610
Artillery & mortars (over 100 mm)
595
430
Air defense artillery
170
445
SAMs
18 SA-2 launchers (32 missiles)
Light bombers
0
SA-6 missile systems'
23
Transports
25
10
Jet fighters
41
190
Transport helicopters
16
55
Missile patrol boats
0
11
Foreign military advisers
France
177
USSR
10
500-600
Iran
10
Italy
9
' Unknown number of shoulder-fired SA-7/Grail SAMs in country.
2 Unknown quantity of equipment (minimum of one battalion).
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against the disputed Tindouf region, however, would
leave the strategic northern region susceptible to an
Algerian counteroffensive. Moroccan defenses from
Oujda to Zagora and as far west as Errachidia
(formerly Ksar es Souk) include 15 battalions, only
two of which are currently equipped with tanks.
48. In terms of diversion of economic resources, a
war lasting two to three weeks would probably not
have much of an effect. Last year Morocco's economy
recovered smoothly from the 1974-75 recession, partly
because of a better harvest and an improving-but
still depressed-phosphate market. Nevertheless, the
economy remains precarious and the country has
serious balance-of-payments problems; major addi-
tional strains-such as a long war-would interfere
with development plans and exacerbate existing
difficulties.
49. Rabat is entering into the last year of a five-year
plan, 1973-77, and is formulating new plans that will
cost over $300 million to develop the Saharan
territory. Rabat hopes to obtain financing from
various Arab sources for more development of its
domestic mineral resources-especially phosphates.
Hassan has also been promoting the formation of an
Arab mineral exporting bloc similar to OPEC. A long
war with Algeria would destroy attempts at regional
cooperation and jeopardize Moroccan efforts to
obtain Arab and Western financing.
Algerian Limitations
50. The Algerians do not want a direct military
confrontation with Morocco and they probably expect
the POLISARIO, following the Algerian example, to
bear the brunt of its own struggle for independence.
Inasmuch as Algiers has maintained that it has no
territorial claim to Western Sahara, it would be
difficult to justify at home and abroad the initiation
of hostilities with Morocco. The Algerians would
respond, however, if the Moroccans provoke them
with conventional military raids.
51. Domestic considerations argue against Boume-
diene's pressing the dispute with Morocco to the point
of open military confrontation. Some of his key
advisers have criticized his handling of the Sahara
problem and would almost certainly oppose direct
military action against Morocco. Moreover, it is
unlikely that many Algerian soldiers have much taste
for playing a dominant role in a struggle that they do
not consider their own.
52. Over the past year, Boumediene has devoted the
bulk of his attention to domestic problems, not the
Sahara. Faced with growing popular disillusionment
and criticism of his policies, he has sought to
consolidate his control and place a stamp of legiti-
macy on his authoritarian regime. Having recently
completed the first major cabinet shakeup since 1970,
Boumediene is likely to continue to focus his attention
on domestic politics over the near term.
53. Another constraint against Algerian-initiated
hostilities may be the vulnerability of its liquefied
natural gas (LNG) plants. LNG plants are among the
most vulnerable industrial plants being operated
anywhere in the world. They contain volatile gas
under intense pressure and any rupture is likely to
cause a violent explosion that would destroy the whole
plant and surrounding facilities. Algeria is counting
heavily on future sales of gas to help finance its
economic development program and provide foreign
exchange. One operational plant is located at Arzew,
less than 200 kilometers from the Moroccan border;
another one, partially operational, is at Skikda in
eastern Algeria. Additional plants are in various stages
of planning or construction at these sites and at a third
location east of Algiers.
54. A short conventional war would impose little
strain on Algeria. If a war continued for some time,
however, some economic strains would occur. If
technicians and other skilled workers-who are in
short supply-were drafted, this could affect oil and
gas production, the lynchpin of the economy. In
addition, Algeria would not want a long war which
would frighten away potential Western lenders and
interfere with development plans. Algeria is also
anxious to obtain Western technology for various
industrial and LNG projects and is borrowing heavily
on world markets to finance them.
Terrain and Logistic Restraints
55. Terrain and logistic considerations would also
deter sustained conventional operations. In the north-
ern Moroccan/Algerian border region there exists only
one favorable avenue of approach into Morocco.
Algerian forces advancing through the Oujda area
could move relatively freely up to the city of Taza;
west of Taza, however, the terrain becomes more
rugged, with movement obstructed by steep hills,
mountain slopes, and narrow valleys. This route
would permit only localized off-road movement and
forces would be channelized except in the limited
plains areas near Oujda and east of Taza.
56. In the rolling plains and scattered mountainous
areas south of Oujda, there are no major avenues of
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approach from Algeria to strategic Moroccan posi-
tions. Movement westward would necessitate crossing
the rugged Atlas mountain range. Routes through the
area are narrow and winding, and forces would be
confined. to a single road which could be easily
interdicted.
57. Algeria's strategic areas are much closer to the
border than are Morocco's. But Moroccan forces
would have to move through difficult terrain to reach
either the commercial port of Oran or the LNG plant
at Arzew. From the plains surrounding Oujda to the
Oran/Arzew area the road passes through rugged
terrain where off-road movement would be limited.
The road in the plains area is bordered by salt flats.
Movement farther eastward would be confined to a
very narrow valley within the Atlas Mountains, again
limiting the potential for cross-country movement.
58. Cross-country movement in the rolling plains
and plateaus of the border area near Tindouf would
face no significant obstacles for a limited distance.
Movement in and out of this region would be
impeded, however, by the adjacent rugged terrain,
especially on the Moroccan side. In the Saharan
territory, rough terrain dissects the western sector and
would make large-scale troop movements slow and
laborious. The region provides little concealment from
air observation and only localized cover from ground
f ire.
59. Poor logistic and transportation networks would
hinder the resupply of both Moroccan and Algerian
conventional forces fighting in the southern border
area. The principal storage and supply depots of the
Moroccan armed forces are concentrated in the
northern regions of the country, and Algeria's are
situated in around the capital. Rail transport systems
could move materiel only part way; there are no rail
lines south of Bechar in Algeria, and Morocco's
southernmost railhead is at Marrakech. Highways in
both countries are located mainly in the coastal
regions. A single paved road extends northward from
Tindouf, and there is only one major highway south
of Agadir in Morocco. The Moroccans have a better
air transport capability, but the number of airfields in
the south able to handle transport aircraft is compara-
tively limited.
60. While terrain and logistic restraints will act as a
deterrent to a conventional war in northwest Africa,
the possibility of border clashes by overzealous troops
cannot be excluded. However, due to the inability of
either side to gain access to strategic targets, such a
conflict would prove inconclusive and undoubtedly
provoke persuasive appeals for a cease-fire from Arab
and African nations.
Projected International Reaction to the
Advent of Hostilities
61. The Arab states will continue periodic efforts to
mediate the dispute and would step in quickly to
negotiate an end to any hostilities between Morocco
and Algeria. No matter what course the Sahara
dispute follows, however, including even major
hostilities, it is likely to have few repercussions
elsewhere in the Arab world.
62. The dispute seems to be regarded by the other
Arabs more as a distraction than as an opportunity for
advancement of a cause, and the large majority of the
Arabs simply wish the problem would go away. Few
Arabs support either side with particular enthusiasm,
and the dispute has not polarized the Arab states.
Thus, Syria, remembering Rabat's participation in the
1973 Golan fighting, backs Morocco as does Iraq,
which has territorial claims of its own. The Arabs, in
short, are unlikely to allow their broader policies to be
affected by their Moroccan and Algerian colleagues'
problems.
63. The Soviet Union has sought to avoid direct
entanglement in the Sahara conflict because it does
not want to have to choose between Morocco and
Algeria-two states with which it wants to maintain
good relations. Nevertheless, the Soviets do tend to
place more importance on their relationship with
"progressive" Algeria than they do on ties with the
pro-US monarchy in Rabat. They view Algeria as an
important leader among the Arab and nonaligned
states. They have long-standing military assistance
programs, a substantial economic aid program, and
significant trade ties with Algeria.
64. Even so, Algiers has been an inconsistent friend
for Moscow. It has publicly attacked Soviet aspira-
tions in the Middle East and has rejected a special
Soviet role among the nonaligned. Boumediene has
also called periodically for the removal of the Soviet as
well as the US Navy from the Mediterranean. The
Soviets have apparently decided that they would have
little to gain by more forthright support for Algiers
although they remain a reliable source of military
supplies. They recognize that Algeria wants to remain
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the principal foreign backer of the POLISARIO and is
unlikely to grant Moscow substantial concessions in
return for its support. The Soviets, who do not want to
be drawn into a regional war, will probably keep
Algeria uncertain about Soviet backing in the event of
hostilities.
65. The POLISARIO guerrillas currently count for
little in Moscow's calculations. The Soviets are
undoubtedly aware of the movement's potential value
but, unlike the situation in Angola, where the Soviets
had long-standing ties with the MPLA, Moscow has
so far had few if any contacts with the POLISARIO
and does not recognize the SDAR. Further, they have
not provided the guerrillas direct military support.
The Soviets apparently believe that the POLISARIO
faces a long, uphill struggle. This too is in contrast to
the situation in Angola, where the Soviets saw the
possibility of a quick MPLA victory once the
Portuguese withdrew.
66. As for Morocco, the Soviets have important
reasons for wanting to remain on good terms with
King Hassan. With an eye to Morocco's strategic
location, Moscow has for several years quietly sought
to woo him away from total dependence on the West.
At the least, the Soviets do not want to push Morocco
closer into the arms of the US.
67. Moscow also has significant commercial deal-
ings with Rabat. Of long-term importance is the deal
Moscow has been trying to negotiate for development
of the Meskala phosphate deposits. This 20-year
arrangement would be the largest single accord
Moscow has ever negotiated with a Third World
country. It probably demonstrates the importance to
the Soviet agricultural program of developing a stable
source for this critical fertilizer component. Recent
evidence indicates a tentative deal on this project has
been reached but final agreement may be linked to
Soviet good behavior on the Sahara. Moscow has also
supplied minor amounts of military equipment.
68. If the current pattern of sporadic skirmishing in
the Sahara continues, the Soviets are likely to try to
pursue their balancing act. In order to retain their
credentials in Algiers, they may establish some low-
level contacts with the POLISARIO movement and
expedite deliveries of arms to Algeria promised under
the 1975 agreement, but they would probably couple
this with intensifed efforts to assuage Rabat.
69. Should large-scale fighting break out, the
Soviets would offer political backing' to Algeria and
might make at least a limited effort to resupply
Algerian arsenals. This might consist of a few token
resupply flights and an increased flow of seaborne
arms deliveries. The Soviets might also seek to increase
use of Libya as an intermediary for arms transfers.
Nevertheless, Moscow is not likely to underwrite an
all-out Algerian military effort against Morocco.
70. The attitude of the United States toward a
Moroccan-Algerian conflict would have an important
bearing on Soviet policy. The Soviets do not currently
view the Sahara issue as a superpower contest. But if
the United States moved dramatically to increase
military shipments to Rabat, the Soviets would be
under greater pressure to increase their aid to Algeria.
71. France has taken a pro-Moroccan stand on the
Western Sahara issue, because of its economic interests
and arms relationship with Morocco and their mutual
security interests elsewhere in Africa. Paris also wants
to remain on good terms with Algeria, and hopes to
preserve its important trade relations with both
countries. The French recognize the prominent role
Algeria plays among developing countries-a group
with which they want to develop closer ties-but they
do not want Algeria's influence strengthened, espe-
cially at Morocco's expense. At the moment, in the
aftermath of the 1 May POLISARIO raid on Zouerate
during which two French citizens were killed and six
kidnapped, French-Algerian relations are at a low
point. The French Foreign Minister's accusations of
Algerian complicity provoked sharp diplomatic and
propaganda attacks by Algeria.
72. Paris is primarily concerned that Hassan's
moderate government might be replaced by a
"progressive" regime as difficult to deal with as
Algeria. French officials are worried that the current
situation will eventually deteriorate into open warfare
and periodically suggest that Western governments
should encourage Arab mediation efforts.
73. Although France would prefer to avoid involve-
ment in the dispute, in early 1976 President Giscard
d'Estaing offered to play a mediating role if asked by
both sides. If serious fighting develops between
Morocco and Algeria, Paris is likely to repeat its offer.
The French probably would also expedite delivery of
previously ordered equipment to the Moroccans and
might send some additional military advisers.
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US Strategic and Economic Interests in
Northwest Africa
74. The US has important economic and strategic
interests in northwest Africa which could be affected
by the Western Sahara conflict
75. The logistic asymmetries of US and USSR naval
forces are less apparent in the Mediterranean than in
other areas of the globe because of the relative
closeness of Soviet shore bases. Nonetheless, the
Soviets lag in developing a full range of mobile
support capabilities and seek repair facilities both to
ease the overcrowded Soviet Northern Fleet bases and
to allow Soviet submarines to linger longer in the area,
This has led them to continue to seek access to
Mediterranean ports. They have intensified their
search for facilities since they lost their support and
repair base in Alexandria. So far, the Soviets have
been unable to obtain major base rights in the western
Mediterranean, but Morocco and Tunisia have
permitted limited numbers of routine port calls and
Algeria has recently begun to allow light repairs and
maintenance of submarines alongside Soviet auxil-
iaries anchored at Annaba. Algeria has, however,
steadfastly rebuffed Soviet attempts to obtain repair
facilities and wider access to installations in Algiers
and Mers el Kebir.
76. By comparison, the US position is relatively
favorable. In addition to its base rights in Western
Europe, the US Sixth Fleet, including nuclear-
powered vessels, is welcome in ports in historically
pro-Western Morocco and Tunisia. In a more general
way, Morocco has provided the US a two-way conduit
for information and contacts, and frequently has
given public and private support to US initiatives in
the Middle East and elsewhere.
rent US investment in Morocco totals about $70
million and at some point in the future Morocco's
enormous phosphate reserves may also stimulate
increased American interest.
Cu
77. The US has only limited interests in Mauritania,
and has no important treaties or agreements with
Nouakchott. Mauritania is a useful channel into
Third World councils, however, and over the past year
the Mauritanians, recognizing the importance of US
technology and resources for economic development,
have occasionally supported the US on multilateral
issues.
78. The US has significant economic interests in
Algeria. Algeria imports large quantities of capital
goods and technical services from the US. American
companies presently have contracts totaling over $6
billion, with prospects for $10 billion more. Algerian
exports to the US amounted to over $2.3 billion in
1976, including crude oil which accounts for approxi-
mately 8 percent of total US oil imports. In addition,
Algeria has the world's fourth largest reserves of
natural gas and wants to export about half of its
output in a liquefied form to the US. Algeria has
shown itself to be a responsible business partner and
has recently expressed a desire for a stable economic
relationship with the US. Over the longer run this
could result in more cooperative US relations with
what appears to be the most important state in
northwest Africa.
79. The present situation in the Western Sahara
does not prevent the development of stable, mutually
beneficial US Algerian relations within the context of
ongoing US military aid to Morocco. Thus far Algeria
has not let the pro-Moroccan "neutrality" of the US
on the Western Sahara stand in the way of its search
for more stable economic relations with the US.
Morocco, for its part, is grateful for continued US
military aid and tacit support for its Saharan claims.
It probably will continue to favor US positions in the
Middle East and in international forums so long as
the US-Algerian economic relationship does not lead
to a weakening of US support for Morocco's Western
Sahara policy.
80. Any major escalation of the Saharan conflict, on
the other hand, would pose significant problems for
the US by greatly enhancing the potential for
internationalization of the conflict. Algeria's depend-
ence on the Soviet Union as its major arms supplier
would be increased and the influence Moscow
obtained from this role might persuade the Algerians
to give the USSR greater access to Algerian port
facilities. Morocco would expect accelerated arms and
munitions deliveries from the US, as well as visible
American identification with Morocco in the dispute.
Taking sides, however, would jeopardize the substan-
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tial US economic interests in Algeria. Given the more
likely case of a continuation of the guerrilla war at its
present level, the present US policy of honoring its
long-standing military aid commitments to Morocco
(see Table 2) and providing it with limited diplomatic
support, while responding to Algerian overtures for
more permanent US-Algerian economic relations,
minimizes the risk to our interests. While prospects for
a negotiated settlement of the dispute are not
currently promising, the encouragement of mediation
efforts by third parties should not be ruled out as a
means of keeping the dispute within bounds, if not of
reaching a settlement.
Prospects for a Settlement
81. Settlement efforts have not progressed during
the past year. Neither Morocco nor Algeria has yet
shown a willingness to back away from its basic
position. While there are some indications that
Boumediene has become interested in a face-saving
way out of the Sahara problem, he continues to insist
on some form of genuine Saharan self-determination,
which the Moroccans and the Mauritanians categori-
cally refuse to consider. Continued resistance by
elements of the Saharan population, as well as the
presence of large numbers of refugees in Algerian
territory, provides Algiers with the means for continu-
ing to challenge the legitimacy of Moroccan and
Mauritanian control. Although Boumediene's ap-
proach to the Sahara issue does not enjoy widespread
support in Algeria, where many think it an unneces-
sary diversion of Algerian resources, his personal
commitment, both public and ideological, is likely to
preclude abandonment of the POLISARIO cause.
82. The Moroccans, for their part, consider the case
closed on the Saharan issue. They are fully convinced
that their claim is just and are willing to bear the costs
of the guerrilla war, including an increased level of
support for Mauritania. As noted earlier, the close
linkage between the success of Hassan's Saharan
policy and his internal popularity leave him little
room for maneuver.
83. Pacification of the Saharan population, leading
to its acceptance of Moroccan and Mauritanian
assimilation of the Western Sahara, seems to be the
key to eventual peace in the region. Both Morocco
and Mauritania have consolidated their administra-
tive control of their zones, at least in the major
population and resource centers, and both have
attempted to mobilize popular support through
development projects and by allowing Saharans to
vote in nationwide elections. Nonetheless, Mauri-
tanian relations with local inhabitants remain consid-
erably better than those of Morocco.
84. The Moroccans deeply alienated the Saharan
tribesmen by their harsh treatment of the local
population during their initial occupation of the
northern zone. This has undermined Rabat's appeals
to the refugees to return to their homes in the
Moroccan-controlled zones. Aware of the problems
posed by this alienation, Morocco is now attempting
to win the allegiance of the approximately 40,000
civilians remaining in its zone, some of whom may be
inhabitants of Morocco who have moved southward
to fill the vacuum left by the departure of large
numbers of Saharans. It has cultivated tribal leaders,
has undertaken an economic development program
for the Saharan provinces, and has begun to appoint
Saharans to administrative positions, including one to
a ministerial post in the national Cabinet. Neverthe-
less, mistrust and dislike continue to characterize the
relations between Morocco and most of the Saharan
population.
85. Mauritania has encountered less opposition
from the local population in its attempt to assimilate
its portion of the Sahara. Mauritanian troops were
relatively restrained in their occupation of the territory
and did not, for the most part, alienate the
inhabitants. In addition, southern Saharans have close
ethnic and linguistic ties with the Mauritanians and
have, therefore, had less difficulty in accommodating
themselves to their new rulers. Eight Saharan repre-
sentatives currently hold seats in the Mauritanian
National Assembly.
86. The wide divergence in the fundamental
objectives of Morocco and Algeria impedes attempts
by international organizations and third parties to
mediate the dispute. The UN General Assembly has
avoided taking a stand on the issue, and the July 1976
OAU Summit postponed a decision until a special
session could be convened in 1977. The special
summit, if it convenes, would have little chance of
success. The most promising mediation effort to date,
begun by Saudi Arabia in late 1976, has made no
progress, but diplomatic contacts are continuing. No
settlement is likely to be achieved without outside
assistance, especially from the Arab world.
87. We believe that any solution would have to
contain the following elements:
- recognition by Algeria of Moroccan-Maurita-
nian sovereignty in the Western Sahara;
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-a face-saving formula for Algeria, involving a
token "consultation" of the Saharan people,
acceptance of Saharans who voluntarily return
from Algeria together with some economic
assistance for their resettlement, and possibly a
limited, symbolic form of regional autonomy to
satisfy the POLISARIO;
- economic inducements for the protagonists,
including financial aid from outside parties
(Saudi Arabia, for example), and possibly limit-
ed joint exploitation of the Sahara's mineral
wealth and a guarantee to Algeria of access to
the Atlantic; and
- ratification by Morocco of the 1972 border
agreement.
88. We see these points as a skeletal outline for a
negotiated settlement. Hassan's Sahara policy is tied
to retaining the Sahara. We, therefore, see no
likelihood that Rabat would consider any settlement
that would substantially dilute Moroccan and Mauri-
tanian control. Furthermore, we have no indication
that Hassan plans to back down on other issues
necessary to come to terms with Algeria-including a
token consultation on self-determination.
89. Algeria's attitude is similarly unbending. Algiers
alone is capable of exerting the pressure necessary to
force a compromise from the POLISARIO, but
Boumediene has both the will and the means to resist
pressure-from without as well as within-for a
compromise. Given the continued resilience and the
growing military capability of the POLISARIO,
Military Assistance to Morocco*
(1975 to May 1977)
Equipment Ordered
Chaparral surface-to-air-missile
37 launchers
504 missiles
37 M-730 carriers
TOW antitank guided missile
101 launchers
1,878 missiles
Dragon antitank guided missile
428 tractors
8,620 guided missiles and launchers
389 M-113A1 armored personnel carriers
54 M-48A3 tanks
54 M-48A5 tanks
155-mm howitzers (value of contract-
$19.8 million)
Vulcan air defense system (value of con-
tract-$88.7 million)
300 AML-90 armored cars
50 Mirage F-1 fighter aircraft
West Germany 75 Ur 416 armored cars
Iran 6 F-5As
Spain 1,550 Land Rovers
1,200 mortars
200 rocket launchers
250 106-mm recoilless rifles
Belgium 150,000 7.62-mm rifles
USSR ZSU-23-4 AA guns
ZU-23 AA guns
BM-21 rocket launchers
Antitank weapons, SA-7s and RPG-7s
Jan 78 - May 78
Jan - Jun 78
Delivery completed
10 launchers/96 missiles delivered
in July 1976; balance to be
delivered May 77 - Mar 78
Jan - Jun 79
Jan - Jun 79
55 delivered; 334 to be delivered
Jun - Dec 77
All delivered
Scheduled July 77
Jan - Mar 79 (36 systems)
Jan - Sept 78 (60 M-163 AA
guns)
25 delivered
Delivery schedule unknown
All delivered
All delivered
All delivered
1,100 delivered
All delivered
All delivered
All delivered
4 delivered
76 delivered
12 delivered
Unknown number
* Selected items of equipment. US military assistance is designed to equip two mechanized infantry
brigades. Morocco is also procuring large numbers of vehicles, army and air force munitions, and a
Westinghouse air defense radar system.
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Algeria has no reason to retreat. Boumediene un-
doubtedly believes that time, as it was during
Algeria's own revolution, is on the side of the
guerrillas. He probably will insist upon a settlement
that gives Algeria an honorable way out of the dispute
(as outlined above) and some form of economic gain.
90. Saudi Arabia's economic leverage, especially
with Morocco and Mauritania, could possibly induce
some flexibility. Mauritania could be forced by the
threat of withdrawal of this Saudi support to
demonstrate some give in negotiations. It is doubtful,
however, that the Moroccans could be intimidated
into making significant concessions to Algeria or the
POLISARIO. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the
Saudis would suspend financial assistance in order to
impose a compromise. Even so, Riyadh has probably
offered financial inducements to Algeria during its
mediation efforts and could offer additional aid to
tempt Morocco to be more forthcoming. We have no
substantive information, however, on the occasional
meetings between senior officials of Morocco, Mauri-
tania, and Algeria held under Saudi auspices.
Approve
91. Barring any settlement package, relations
between Morocco and Algeria will remain strained
and the risk will persist that cross-border operations
could lead to an unintended escalation of tensions.
Prevailing political, economic, and military factors,
however, will dissuade both parties from embarking
on the irrevocable course of a conventional war in the
near term.
92. The POLISARIO movement has demonstrated
success in diverting a significant amount of Moroccan
and Mauritanian manpower and economic resources.
Its lack of significant numbers of combatants, logistic
restraints, and heavy dependence on limited external
military support, however, prevent it from substantial-
ly improving its military capabilities. Morocco and
Mauritania can contain, but not eliminate, the
POLISARIO. A protracted guerrilla war, therefore,
appears inevitable in the absence of major interven-
tion by outside parties.
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