ANTI-US PROPAGANDA IN YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A002000010080-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: May 1, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

Approve or Release MK4kP79B"737AO02000010080-1
1 May 1973
SUBJECT: Anti-US Propaganda in Yugoslavia
SUMMARY
Over the past six months, Yugoslav propaganda
media have taken an increasingly anti-US line, and
Belgrade has undertaken several diplomatic initiatives
detrimental to good relations, The motivation for
these moves Zies outside the realm of bilateral
-relations--which have improved significantly over
the past few years--but the policy imperatives
behind them are nonetheless real. Yugoslavia is
purposely seeking to give its foreign policy a
more "revolutionary" cast calculated to increase
its prestige among its nonaligned allies and its
Warsaw Pact neighbors. Tito wants to swing the
pendulum away from his westward orientation of
the past few years, and criticism of the US appears
to carry the least penalties in achieving this goal.
Tito does not, however, wish a total freeze in
formal relations with the US. Loss of high level
sympathy in Washington for Yugoslavia's plight
would be a crushing blow to the regime and would
have serious implications for stability in the
succession period.
Last fall, Tito made several public statements about
the harmful aspects of visits to the US by party leaders
and university professors. The thrust of. these statements
was to warn Yugoslavs against ideological contamination
by the leader of the capitalist world. The vigilance theme
was picked up by the press, which ran several long articles
on subversive American propaganda tactics--specifically
mentioning US psy-war acts in Vietnam. Toward the end of
the year, Yugoslav newspapers developed an increasingly
harsh tone in rebutting Western press speculation about
Tito's internal problems and his alleged drift toward Moscow
State Dept. review completed
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in foreign policy. In early 1973, the press turned on the
US with a vengeance, alleging improprieties in the actions of
Embassy personnel who questioned nominees for a youth exchange
program, and widely publishing false charges that USIA was
being used by hostile emigres in the US.
The internal press campaign was designed to divert popular
attention from the regime's problems by raising the specter of
inimical foreign activities. In private, Yugoslav officials as-
sured their US contacts that Belgrade wanted no break in good
formal ties, and the propaganda campaign did not affect the
level of official contacts. No serious explanations for the
anti-US line were offered, but in early February Tito him-
self stated that relations with the US remained good because
Washington never made an issue over Yugoslav criticisms. We
believe Tito's expression of confidence in the US tolerance
of propaganda played a direct role in the sharp press attacks
that ensued.
Belgrade has also trod on US toes in the foreign policy
arena, intervening in the Security Council deliberations on
Panama and on the Israeli raid on Beirut. In both cases,
Belgrade clearly considered the opportunity to enhance its
prestige in the nonaligned world too valuable to pass up.
It may also have underestimated the reaction from Washington.
The strong US diplomatic protests that resulted have shaken
the belief, partially inspired by Tito, that the US can be
crossed with impunity.
Tito's major speech to regime leaders on 23 April showed
that the protests had a sobering effect. He only mentioned
the US twice, both times praising its foreign policy toward
the USSR and China, and he surprisingly made no mention at all
of the US role in Southeast Asia. Other Yugoslav leaders are
also concerned that the core of understanding between Belgrade
and Washington has been dangerously eroded by the anti-US line.
As we see it, Yugoslav foreign policy is dominated by two
concerns. The first is the need to strengthen national
security, and the second is to improve Yugoslavia's inter-
national support in preparation for an eventual succession
crisis. Belgrade will require a favorably disposed US in
both circumstances, and will almost certainly strive to
avoid any serious breach with Washington. At the same time,
it will pursue good relations with Moscow in an attempt to
offset the hostility of the past few years. Belgrade may not
bend over backwards to refurbish its ties with the Soviets,
but Tito does not want his heirs to face the succession period
with Moscow ill-disposed toward them.
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We believe that Belgrade is fully aware of the dangers
implicit in closer ties with Moscow. The judgments on what
constitutes safe limits in relations with the Soviets are
exceedingly complex, and will be more difficult to deal with
after Tito dies. His successors will be less capable of
commanding national obedience and will have problems in adjusting
policy. Tito is thus trying simultaneously to reassert Yugoslav
dedication to nonalignment and to revive the movement as a
force capable of international action in defense of a founding
member state. (The latter is of course something of a pipe.
dream.) Belgrade is also making it plain, by avoiding sharp
criticism of the key Western European states, that their
friendship could be another basic prop against any undue
Soviet pressure.
Washington's traditional role of friend in periods of
crisis is still a significant factor in Yugoslav strategic
thinking. Over $3 billion in various forms of aid have
bailed Tito out of past troubles and, even more importantly,
have given him a trump card in his dealing with Moscow. The
current chill, if Tito mishandles it to the extent that this
relationship is terminated, would shake domestic confidence
in Belgrade's ability to stave off the Soviets and complicate
the regime's efforts to achieve national unity.
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