WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE CHILEAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007200080002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 15, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Chilean Military Establishment
Secret
N?_ 38
15 August 1969
No. 0383 / 69A
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Chile's armed forces are reputed to be among the most apolitical i Latin America. They
have not actively intervened in the government since 1932; a record equaled` in few other
countries in the hemisphere. The armed forces as well as the police are respected for their
professional attitude and capability, although deficiencies in training and equipment are
becoming more pronounced.
Asa result of its-financial difficulties, the government has not provided much modern
equipment for the armed forces. Some officers are beginning to view this as an indication that
the civilian government is indifferent to the military requirements of the country and of the
fighting forces. Furthermore, some conservative officers are concerned that a Cz mmunist-sup-
ported candidate may be elected in the presidential election next yea
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
During colonial times the army was' the
mainstay of the government. Because of the
army's small size, a militia was developed to sup-
plement the regular army. Most of the militia
officers were young native-born colonials, and the
militia was an important factor in the struggle for
independence.
Chile maintained a relatively democratic po-
litical system until 1924. At that time, disgusted
with the country's economic situation and with
extensive political bickering, a group of conserva-
tive generals dissolved Congress and forced the
resignation of the president, Arturo Alessandri.
Early the next year a more liberal group, led by
Colonels Carlos Ibanez and Marmaduke Grove,
led a coup against the conservative junta and
brought Alessandri back to serve out the re-
mainder of his term. During 1926 and 1927
Ibanez became concerned about the inefficient
way the government was being run, and in the
1927 election he managed to win the presidency.
Coping with the effects of the depression, which
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hit Chile very hard, was too much for him, how-
ever, and he resigned in 1931. A spokesman for
the oligarchy was elected to replace him. In June
1932 Grove, by now head of the air force, led a
coup that established a "socialist republic."
Twelve days later he was overthrown by a con-
servative military group. An election was held in
October, and Arturo Alessandri was again elected
president. After this time, the military remained
out of politics. In fact, a "republican militia"
backed by respected elements in society and pol-
itics was formed to make sure that the armed
forces confined new activities strictly to military
matters.
Since the 1930s the Chilean armed forces
have been concerned primarily with what they see
as a threat from Argentina and with improving
their internal security capability. Only in recent
years have salary difficulties and increasing in-
ternal security problems caused them to renew
their active interests in politics. Many Chileans
look upon the 1927-32 period as one of aberra-
tion in the face of economic disaster and believe
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that an apolitical military establishemnt is the
only possible system for their country.
COMPOSITION AND CAPABILITIES
The Chilean armed forces are among the
most competent and professional in Latin Amer-
ica. There are 23,000 men in the army, 14,000 in
the navy, and 10,000 in the air force. The carabi-
neros, or national police force, have 24,000 men.
The armed forces' equipment, however, is for the
most part obsolescent. This situation is responsi-
ble for some of the most bitter complaints
against the government. They see
the Argentine armed forces receiving modern
weapons and fear that these weapons may one
day be turned against Chile.
The air force in 1966 began a program of
purchasing subsonic Hawker Hunter aircraft from
Great Britain. The air force would like to buy
F-5s from the United States, bait budgetary con-
siderations and the prospect of a cutoff of US
economic aid if such equipment is bought have
delayed any such negotiations.
The navy, too, is plagued by aging equip-
ment. Although it carries two submarines in its
inventory, one is in overhaul and the other is in
only slightly better condition. Argentina's pur-
chase in 1968 of an aircraft carrier of World War
II vintage triggered considerable uneasiness in the
Chilean Navy.
The carabineros are a professional national
police force of extremely high standards. They
probably would be able to contain civil disturb-
ances, even if these were widespread. If the unrest
continued over a long period, however, they prob-
ably would be forced to call on the army for help.
The army recently has been increasing its internal
security capability, but it is still likely to rely
more on firepower than on less drastic riot-
control techniques.
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Although the armed forces have remained
out of the political mainstream, they are very
much a part of Chilean life. They are entitled by
law to a percentage of the revenues from the
copper industry. Many military officers are bitter
because they claim that they have not been re-
ceiving this money and that, in fact, the govern-
ment owes the armed forces a great deal of
money.
In addition to these budgetary privileges, the
military courts have certain judicial prerogatives
that are regularly exercised. Military courts have
jurisdiction over civilians who abuse the military
as an institution, abuse individuals because they
are members of the military, or insult the national
flag. They also have jurisdiction over crimes
against the military whether committed by mili-
tary or civilian personnel. In 1968, a Socialist
senator was convicted of insulting the military
and was jailed for some time. A newspaper direc-
tor was also jailed briefly. Such actions do not
cause much outcry, even among Chileans who are
most conscious of their civil liberties.
CHANGING POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE
Although the armed forces have become in-
creasingly sensitive to the political situation in
Chile, they have not yet broken with their tradi-
tional stance of avoiding unconstitutional acts
and direct political involvement. A substantial
number believe, how-
ever, that extraconstitutional change will become
necessary to break the current stalemate between
the executive and legislative branches. They also
believe that the military should be given a greater
voice in the formation of foreign policy.
Another important factor contributing to
the military uneasiness is the possibility that a
Communist-supported candidate such as pro-
Castro Socialist Salvador Allende could win the
presidential election scheduled for September
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1970. It is possible that if the Socialists, Com-
munists, and Radicals could combine in an elec-
toral coalition, and if the candidate of this coali-
tion were clearly leading the field, the military
might undertake a coup. Such a move would be
most likely to come before the election, to avoid
the appearance of deliberately flouting the popu-
lar will.
This sentiment for action against a leftist
government is by no means held universally
within the armed forces. Many officers are reluc-
tant to undertake the task of government them-
selves. In addition, they believe that they could
not be much worse off under a leftist government
than they are now. Military men holding such
opinions probably would take a wait-and-see atti-
tude toward the government. Younger officers, in
particular, are more likely to respond to leftist
ideology and thus would be more willing to ac-
cept a leftist president unless he ignored the sad
state of equipment and training in the Chilean
armed forces or moved overtly against military
institutions and traditions.
Events in neighboring countries are having
an influence in Chile. The military take-overs in
Brazil, Argentina, and Peru have given many Chil-
ean officers food for thought. They see these
governments attempting reforms without being
hampered by political bickering; they wonder if
similar methods might work in Chile.
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might well feel compelled to take direct action.
neros very seriously. Should there be any wide-
spread breakdown of public order, the military
Strikers Repelling Carabineros With Stones
INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS
The increase in terrorism and violence has
begun to worry both the military and the carabi-
Many military officers believe that former
president Jorge Alessandri would be an excellent
person to head a military backed government.
Alessandri is presently in a very strong position
with respect to the presidential race and could
win a plurality of the votes next year. If no
candidate wins a majority, however, congress de-
cides between the two top vote-getters. Should
Allende be the runner-up, the leftist congressmen
might vote for Allende. Under these conditions,
the military well might step in to install Ales-
sandri as president.
A restraining factor in any military action
against the goverment is the lack of strong leader-
ship at the top. In addition, the assistance, or at
least the acquiescence, of the carabineros would
be essential to any successful coup.
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During the past 12 months subversion, in-
cluding both street riots and isolated acts of ter-
rorism, has risen markedly. Opposition elements
have increased their ability to create civil dis-
orders. These activities have been led by the
youth wings of the Communist and Socialist par-
ties and the extremist Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left, which is suspected of being the
paramilitary arm of the Socialist Party.
In June two terrorist bases were discov-
ered-a "guerrilla training school" in the Santiago
area and an arms cache farther south. Bombs,
weapons, and maps of military bases and other
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strategic locations were found at both sites along
with evidence that the Socialist Party was heavily
involved.
This development would increase the armed
forces' concern-and possibly their willingness to
intervene-if the Socialist candidate appears to be
winning the presidential election.
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Violence will continue to be a problem, es-
pecially if the government attempts to hold down
on wage increases to combat the soaring inflation.
In addition, Socialist provocateurs could take ad-
vantage of rural grievances over land reform de-
lays to carry out more "invasions" of land hold-
ings. It was under similar circumstances that eight
people were killed last March in Puerto Montt,
causing serious political repercussions.
granted.
The provocation for a coup in Chile would
have to be relatively grave, considering the weight
of tradition that is on the side of constitutional-
ity. Nevertheless, the apolitical nature of the Chil-
ean armed forces can no longer be taken for
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