WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT BIAFRA TWO YEARS AFTER SECESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007100040002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 29, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A007100tet
D
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Biafra Two Years After Secession
Secret
N4 4 2
29 May 1969
No. 0372/69A
Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100040002-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100040002-0
Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100040002-0
 Approved For Release AhEU&Eff CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100040002-0
"If peace is rejected by our enemy, then I will fight him with the best1 have. I will harass
him and make his life unbearable for as long as there is breath within me. To the last man, to
the last inch, I will fight him until he leaves my people alone. "
General Ojukwu, 1 May 1969
Biafra Two Years After Secession
to nearly 23 months of civil war, Biafra-originally conterminous with
Nigeria's former Eastern Region-has been reduced in size to less than
one fifth the territory Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu led into secession
on 30 May 1967. The inland enclave now controlled by the Biafrans includes
only two towns of any size and would not be viable as an independent
entity. Nevertheless, the will to resist is as strong as it ever was among the
five toseven million predominantly Ibo tribesmen now in Biafra. Despite the
loss of Umuahia, the secessionists' provisional administrative center, govern-
ment administration continues from dispersed locations, arms and other
supplies flow in via the hazardous airborne lifeline, and a highly motivated
lbo tribe is finding new and ingenious ways to manufacture war materiels
and improvise substitutes for imports. Organized resistance by the Biafran
Army, `which numbers about 30,000 compared to the much better-equipped
85,000-man Federal Army, will almost certainly continue as long as the
means are available. Even if the secessionists are defeated in the conventional
war,, the lbos will probably continue the struggle in some form of guerrilla
warfare.
BIAFRA TODAY
Biafra has managed to maintain relatively
intact most of its governmental machinery. From
central government ministries down to local au-
thorities, day-to-day business goes on, with even
the judicial system still functioning. Biafra's par-
liament, the Consultative Assembly and House of
Chiefs, whose membership is predominantly Ibo,
but which does include some minority tribesmen,
Special Report
meets fairly regularly to approve major policy
decisions made by General Ojukwu, the head of
state, and commander in chief of the armed
forces.
Ojukwu controls all aspects of government
and the military, and evidently enjoys the over-
whelming support of the Biafrans. It is not known
where Ojukwu established his headquarters when
29 May 1969
Approved For Release MQ,Sff CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100040002-0
 Approved For Release 2006/05/24: gLA(M -00927A007100040002-0
he evacuated the former secessionist administra-
tive center of Umuahia last month, but he is
believed to be operating from the vicinity of Orlu,
where many of the government offices and
foreign relief headquarters have been relocated.
Considerable disruption occurred when Umuahia
was evacuated, and the Biafrans have apparently
now decentralized their civilian administration to
avoid another disruption if they lose Orlu. The
Biafran Army has decentralized its supply system,
possibly in preparation for an eventual guerrilla
war.
Ojukwu's style of governing is highly per-
sonal, but he does rely on advice from a number
of close associates and is sensitive to the counsel
of various elements of Ibo society. Chief among
his advisers is Home Affairs Commissioner Chris-
topher Mojekwu, who was instrumental in gaining
Portuguese and French assistance and who is
probably the leading exponent of continuing the
war no matter what the cost. Others who have
been influential in gaining foreign support for
Biafra's cause are Francis Ibiam, the former gover-
nor of Eastern Nigeria, Kenneth Dike, former vice
chancellor of the University of Ibadan, and
Michael Okpara, former Eastern Region premier.
Other advisers normally work through the Execu-
tive Council, a body of 20-25 men which report-
edly meets weekly with Ojukwu. The two top
military leaders are Generals Alex Madiobo, an
Ibo, and Phillip Effiong, a minority tribesman.
Ojukwu himself plays the key role in directing
military strategy and tactics, however, and has
even assumed direct command of field troops in
critical situations.
Although Biafra's survival thus far owes
much to Ojukwu's leadership, there is no reason
to believe that the Ibos' fight for independence
would collapse if Ojukwu were no longer on the
scene. The traditional leaders of the Ibo tribe
have consistently backed the independence pol-
Special Report
icy, and although individual Ibos have chosen to
give up the fight, the tribe as a whole, and prob-?
ably most minority tribesmen in Biafran-held ter--
ritory, remain committed to the struggle for a
separate existence. This commitment results in
large measure from a genuine fear on the part of
the Biafrans that. the "northern hordes" are bent
on exterminating them.
Biafra's active foreign policy has been one of
the key factors in the prolongation of the civil
war. Ibo diplomats, who had formed the core of
the Nigerian Foreign Ministry, used their estab-
lished contacts to good advantage in getting for-
eign support. These Biafrans were instrumental in
gaining recognition from Tanzania, Ivory Coast,
Gabon, Zambia, , and recently Haiti, as well as in
turning French sympathies for Biafra into positive
moral, financial, and military support.
The Biafrans' technical ingenuity has also
made a considerable contribution to the war ef-
fort. Soon after secession, Ojukwu established the
Science Group, staffed with Western-trained Ibo
scientists and technicians. This group kept the
Port Harcourt oil refinery operating after all for-
eign technicians. had left, manufactured home-
made armored cars using sheet metal, built crude
rockets tipped with grenades to fire at federal
planes, and constructed antipersonnel and anti-
vehicle mines. After the loss of the Port Harcourt
refinery, the Biafrans constructed backyard refin-
eries that continue to provide diesel fuel, kero-
sene, and even low octane gasoline.
Biafra's internal economy continues to func-
tion, although mainly at a subsistence level. A few
substitute industries have been developed to
replace imports. 'I Relief organizations operating in
Biafra have spent considerable amounts of foreign
exchange on local food and services, and the
Biafrans have b$en able to use at least some of
this to purchase munitions.
2 _ 29 May 1969
Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A007100040002-0
SECRET
 Approved For Release 20065Q161E-RDP79-00927A007100040002-0
THE WAR
Biafra's ability to hold off further federal
advances into the densely populated Ibo heart-
land would seem to depend primarily on how well
the supply of arms to the secessionists can be
continued. Throughout the war the secessionists
have captured considerable amounts of arms from
the Nigerians, but it was a marked increase in
arms supplies from abroad last September-as a
result of the French decision to provide military
assistance-that enabled the Biafrans to halt a
federal drive which at that time seemed certain to
end in military victory in a matter of weeks.
Beginning in September a stalemate prevailed in
the war until April, when a drive by the federal
1st Division along an unexpected route forced the
secessionists to evacuate Umuahia. Shortly there-
after the Biafrans recaptured the important road
junction town of Owerri on the southern front.
The 1st Division has become bogged down in
Umuahia, however, and the Biafrans, although
still on the offensive in the south, do not appear
capable of any significant gains in the immediate
future.
The Biafrans have had some success recently
in operations across the Niger River in the Mid-
west State in an area in which small units have
operated almost continuously since late 1967.
Although these latest incursions have so far been
mainly harassing actions, they have kept the fed-
eral 2nd Division off balance. Ojukwu's general
war strategy continues to be simply to hold out
against the federal forces in the hope that the
Lagos regime will fall apart as a result of local
tensions.
"This war is only just beginning. As I
stand here, I see the goal approach. I see
the emergence of a strong and prosperous
Biafra from the ruins, wrecks, and carnage
of the past. I see the darkness of the past. I
see the golden dawn, the rising sun rending
the firmament, pure and bright, emerging
from the cauldrons of an oppressed past to
the glory of Africa, yea, to the glory of the
Blackman everywhere. "
General Ojukwu, 1 May 1969, Owerri
Special Report
29 May 1969
Approved For Release 2006/g f p9 RDP79-00927A007100040002-0
 Approved For Release 2006/05/ 927A007100040002-0
%Onitsha
3rd Federal
Division
Enugu .Abakaliki
1st Federal
Division
Afikpo'
refinery
AM ROON
Santa Isabel
EQUATORIAL GUIt
FERNANDO P~
2nd Federally
Division
PRINCIPE j
(Portugal) ` ?
SAO TOME Sao Tome
(Portugal)
EQUATORIAL GUI
RIO MUNI,
Bata
GAN
Special Report -4- 29 May 1969
Approved For Release 2006/05/2t ~C_IA-IT 9-00927AO07100040002-0
 Approved For Release 20&MAi4ETIA-RDP79-00927A007100040002-0
Ojukwu maintains that he favors a negoti-
ated settlement of the war, but has so far refused
to agree in advance that such a settlement be
worked out within the context of a united
Nigeria. This is a precondition on which the fed-
eral government insists. Biafran and Nigerian dele-
gates were present in Monrovia last month when
the Organization of African Unity Committee on
Nigeria made another in a series of mediatory
efforts, but the conference broke down when the
Biafrans would not negotiate on the basis of "one
Nigeria." Ojukwu has thus far insisted that a
cease-fire or truce precede negotiations, or at least
that one or the other be the first item on the
agenda. Lagos maintains it will agree to a cease-
fire only if Biafra renounces secession. Even if
serious negotiations do eventually materialize,
major, perhaps insurmountable, problems will
arise over basic substantive issues, such as the
question of who will be responsible for the secu-
rity of the Ibos. Lagos will almost certainly de-
mand that federal troops be stationed in Biafra,
and Ojukwu has consistently rejected this.
Indeed, the question of who would be responsible
for the security of the Ibos was probably the
single most important reason the Biafrans seceded
in the first place.
THE ARMS AIRLIFT
Although the arms airlift has operated vir-
tually without interruption since September, it
continues to be dependent on a number of fac-
tors, any one of which could quickly change and
disrupt the whole supply operation. Federal
ground forces are only some 15 miles from Ihiala
airstrip. At one point last fall they advanced to
within artillery range before they were driven
back. The airstrips are very vulnerable to air at-
tack. Ihiala is defended by two Bofors guns which
have apparently struck terror into the hearts of
the Egyptian and Nigerian pilots of the federal air
force. The airlift is carried out for the most part
on overworked, rickety aircraft, and the seces-
Special Report - 5 -
sionists are often hard pressed to come up with
the money to pay the crews.
An equally serious threat to a continued
flow of arms to Biafra at the current rate lies in
the uncertainty of French support following De
Gaulle's resignation. Ivory Coast's Houphouet-
Boigny appears deeply committed to Biafra and
willing to spare no effort to ensure that arms are
available. If French support is lost, however, there
would be a significant reduction in the arms air-
lift, a development which might lead to an early
end to the conventional war. Aid has continued,
and may even have been increased, under the
interim French Government. No final policy
decision toward Biafra will be made until after
the French presidential election is decided.
THE RELIEF PROBLEM
A food shortage persists in Biafra where
some two to three million people have been dis-
placed by the civil war, including approximately
500,000 who fled Umuahia in April. Malnutrition
remains a serious problem, but the general food
situation, which was probably at its worst last
October, has improved recently, and widespread
death by starvation no longer appears an im-
mediate danger. The improvement is mainly due
to the efforts of the International Red Cross and
a number of religious relief organizations, which
are presently feeding an estimated 1.5 million
Biafrans; these agencies are currently flying in
relief supplies from Dahomey, the Portuguese is-
land of Sao Tome, and Equatorial Guinea. In
addition, the Biafrans themselves have made a
major effort to increase food production, and a
large harvest is expected to begin in early June.
Biafran relief remains a political issue, with
both sides in the civil war showing little inclina-
tion to compromise important military and politi-
cal considerations in the interest of the refugees.
The Biafrans have always recognized the
29 May 1969
Approved For Release g , 6/ffi CIA-RDP79-00927A007100040002-0
 Approved For Release 2006/05/24: GgaT`00927A007100040002-0
propaganda value of the refugee situation, and
they probably will continue to reject any arrange-
ments, such as a land relief corridor, that could be
used by Nigeria for military advantage. The seces-
sionists are also opposed to any relief measures in
which Nigeria would participate. Federal leaders
have become more aware of the propaganda value
of appearing willing to aid Biafran refugees, but
Lagos remains basically suspicious of all foreign
relief agencies and probably prefers that no relief
at all go to the secessionists. At any rate, it now
appears that the Biafrans will be able to hold the
refugee problem within manageable proportions
in the foreseeable future, provided foreign relief
continues somewhere near its present scale.
OUTLOOK
Biafra's only chance to establish its sovereign
existence would seem to lie in an eventual victory
by default as a result of the disintegration of the
federal regime. Assuming federal forces maintain
their cohesion, the secessionists are unlikely to
regain much more of the former Eastern Region;
nor do they appear to have the weapons to retake
Port Harcourt. On the other hand, a federal mili-
tary victory is not within sight either. Neither side
in the civil war appears inclined to alter its basic.
position on a negotiated settlement; Lagos insists
that Biafra renounce secession, and Biafra is un-
willing to do so. Ojukwu is convinced that the
Lagos regime will fall apart from internal pres-
sures if only he can hold out long enough. He
probably is right, although he may have to hold
out much longer than he thinks. To prevent sig-
nificant federal advances, Biafra will almost cer-
tainly have to continue to receive arms close to
the present rate, a factor over which Ojukwu has
very little control.
If the Biafran arms supply were drastically
reduced, either by the withdrawal of French sup-
port or by interdiction of the secessionist air-
strips, it seems. likely that federal forces would
win the conventional war within months. There
would then follow a long, drawn-out resistance,
including some type of guerrilla warfare sup-
ported by the overwhelming majority of the Ibos.
If the arms supply continues at its present level,
the prospect over the next several months is for
the conventional war to drag on inconclusively,
with federal forces chipping slowly away at what
remains of Biafra but unable to deliver the coup
de grace.
Special Report
.. 6 - 29 May 1969
Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CI B.Qp 9 1j$ 27A007100040002-0
 Simard For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100040002-0
Secret
Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100040002-0