WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007000070002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 2, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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D
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
India's Divided Communists
Secret
Np 44
2 May 1969
No. 0368/69A
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 political fragmentation in the country and tries to arrest the
decline of the ruling Congress Party. Kerala, where a Commu-
nist-led government took control in 1967 for the second time
in a decade, is a small and relatively insignificant state in
India's extreme south. But West Bengal--headed by a Com-
munist-led front since February 1969-is vital economically
and is the key to the security of India's strategic eastern
region. New Delhi's ability to intervene against the Commu-
nists in these states is limited by the local unpopularity of the
Congress Party and by the increasing symoathy all over India
for guarding states' rights against the central government.
lems for the central government as it deals with increasing
INDIA'S
DIVIDED
COMMUNISTS
The Indian Communist movement dominates coalition
governments in two of India's 17 states, posing serious prob-
Outside of Kerala and West Bengal, however, Commu-
nism in India is not strong. This is partly because of endemic
divisions among the Communists that in 1964 caused a split
in their ranks from which the Communist Party of India
(CPI) and the Communist Party of India/Marxist (CPI/M)
emerged. Neither party threatens to take! power in another
Indian state or to win a majority in the rational parliament.
Both are presently incapable of mounting sustained, nation-
wide revolutionary agitation, nor are they likely to attempt it
for fear of being totally suppressed by India's effective secu-
rity forces. Communist extremists, who oppose CPI and
CPI/M participation in the constitutional system, talk of
rebellion, but they, too, are divided into several groups and
have thus far undertaken only minor actions.
The CPI and CPI/M may win a more important role
nationally if the decline of the Congress Party continues. The
greatest gains made at the expense of Congress in recent
elections were by the nonideological regional parties, but the
CPI and CPI/M could succeed in arranging alliances with
regional groups to do further damage to the Congress Party's
prospects in the 1972 general elections. I f Congress fails to
win a majority in parliament in 1972-a serious possibility-
the Communists may influence the complex postelection
negotiations that would be necessary to form a national
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AMMU
AND
KASHMIR
Congress Party government
Congress Party-led government
Non-Congress Party government
Communist-led government
NEPAL " ,
__.,Kathmandu*
Madras
0CPON DI CHERRY
(PONDICHERRY
NADU
Special Report
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ANDHRA',
PRADESH',
2 May 1969
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The Political Situation in India
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THE INDIAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
TODAY
The Indian Communists' domination of coa-
lition governments in Kerala and West Bengal
makes them the only third-world Communist
movement to have achieved even this limited
power through the democratic process.
The Communists have enjoyed wide popular-
ity in these two states ever since independence,
consistently winning 30 to 40 percent of the vote
in Kerala and 20 to 30 percent in West Bengal.
New Delhi has intervened twice in the past to
thwart Communist-led coalition governments, in
Kerala in 1959 and in West Bengal in 1967, but
these moves have only served to increase Commu-
nist popularity. In Kerala, the present Commu-
nist-led united front holds 117 of the 133 legisla-
tive assembly seats; in West Bengal, where special
mid-term elections took place in February 1969,
the united front has 214 of the 280 seats.
The Communists have made little progress
elsewhere in India despite the country's wide-
spread poverty and its great linguistic, cultural,
and social divisions. When the Congress Party
suffered losses in the 1967 general elections,
dropping from 44.7 percent to 40.9 percent of
the popular vote, it was not the Communists who
gained the main benefits but the conservative
Swatantra Party and essentially regional parties
like the Hindu-nationalist Jan Sangh and the Ta-
mil Nadu - based Dravida Munnetra Kazagham.
The Communists gained locally in Kerala and
West Bengal-in part because they effectively ex-
ploit regional sentiment in these states-but they
were displaced by the Swatantra Party as the
largest opposition group in the national parlia-
ment. Their percentage of the national vote actu-
NATIONAL PARLIAMENT ELECTION RESULTS
Congress Party
Swatantra Party
Jan Sangh
CPI
CPI/M
Samyutka Socialist Party
Praia Socialist Party
Dravida Munnetra Kazagham
Other parties and independents
ally dropped slightly between 1962 and 1967,
from 9.9 percent to 9.4 percent. In most Indian
states, the Communist vote has remained below 7
percent and, except for Kerala and West Bengal,
the Communists have not threatened to take
power.
Several factors have inhibited the growth of
the Communist movement. Ideological infighting
and personality clashes have hurt the Communists
since the movement was formed in the 1920s, and
these factors caused serious divisions in the late
1950s. In 1964, the Communists finally split into
two separate parties, the Communist Party of
India and the Communist Party of India/Marx-
ist.* The parties have cooperated occasionally
since the split-for example, they participate
jointly in the Kerala and West Bengal coalition
*These party names conform to Indian usage and are now used by cll US Government agencies. Previously, the CPI
was often called the Communist Party of India/Right (CPI/R) and the CPI/M was known as the Communist Party of
India/Left (CPI/L).
Special Report
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path to power. CPI/M leaders now call themselves
independent Communists, as distinct from the
still pro-Soviet CPI, and they criticize both the
Soviets and Chinese. Peking has switched its prop-
aganda backing to some of the extremist groups,
and it attacks the CPI/M-led government in West
Bengal.
Nationally, the CPI and CPI/M are about
even in strength-the CPI has about 55,000 active
members and the CPI/M 65,000-but the CPI/M is
much the stronger party in Kerala and West Ben-
gal, where the Communists are a political threat.
Of the 110 Communists in the West Bengal assem-
bly, 80 are from the CPI/M; in the Kerala assem-
bly, there are 52 CPI/M members to 19 for the
CPI. The CPI is stronger in most other states, and
won 23 seats in the national parliament elections
of 1967 to 19 for the CPI/M, but nowhere is it a
serious contender for power.
WEST BENGAL
The CPI/M-led government in West Bengal
poses an unprecedented dilemma for New Delhi.
It cannot be toppled easily, as was the case with
the bare majority coalition in 1967, and, unlike
Kerala, West Bengal is vital to India, economically
and strategically. It produces one third of India's
metal products, 40 percent of its iron and steel,
and at least 25 percent of its transport equip-
ment, engineering tools, electrical machinery, and
scientific equipment; Calcutta handles 41 percent
of the country's export trade and 28 percent of
its imports. West Bengal forms India's eastern
frontier with Pakistan and is the only link to
Assam, where India has a long and vulnerable
border with China and where eastern tribes are in
rebellion.
The CPI/M has moved decisively to domi-
nate the West Bengal government. Ajoy Mukerjee,
ho heads a
group o Congress ar y e ec ors-the Bangla
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Congress-is chief minister, but the CPI/M has
taken nearly all other important government
posts. Jyoti Basu, one of the CPI/M's most skillful
and pragmatic leaders, is deputy chief minister
with responsibility for the police and general ad-
ministration divisions of the Home Ministry.
Other party leaders have the labor, education,
excise, land revenue, and relief and rehabilitation
portfolios, areas vital to the CPI/M's efforts to
increase its support among laborers and peasants.
The government will probably
retain incumbent senior civil servants who hold
top administrative posts in government depart-
ments, but it is expected to employ reliable
West Bengal's Chief Minister Ajoy Mukerjee (right)
and Deputy Chief Minister Jyoti Basu
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sympathizers in second-level posts and in many of
the other 250,000 jobs in the state bureaucracy.
To deny New Delhi a clear pretext to inter-
vene, the CPI/M will probably try to avoid the
widespread disruption that brought economic
havoc during the first united front government.
The party may want a prolonged period of power
to establish a grip
ing to poor, landless tribesmen in the Naxalbari
region of north Bengal.
The extremists may, nevertheless, be more
of a nuisance in the cities than in the rural areas.
Despite numerous rumors of impending rural up-
risings, none has occurred since the one in Naxal-
bari in mid-1967, and in late 1968 the most able
of the extremist rural organizers was captured by
security forces. Urban student groups, however,
particularly in Calcutta, have been able to mount
violent demonstrations, such as the one during
World Bank President McNamara's visit last No-
vember. Several recent clashes have been reported
in Calcutta between extremist students and
CPI/M activists, and these will probably increase.
and to loosen the central governmen s
influence, especially the hold New Delhi still has
on the bureaucracy after 20 years of Congress
rule in the state.
Long-term stability is unlikely, however. In-
terparty rivalry may weaken the front despite its
large majority and could bring the government
down. The -Bangla Congress, the Samyukta Social-
ist Party, and the CPI have already expressed
alarm at the CPI/M's aggressive take-over of the
key government ministries. The Bangla Congress
and CPI, with 33 and 30 seats respectively, could
jeopardize the government by withdrawing, but
this is not a step they will take lightly. Neither
party wants responsibility for undermining the
popular coalition, and no alternative government
is possible unless front members should decide to
work with the discredited Congress Party.
The Communist extremists are another
threat to stability, as they were during the period
of the first front government. There are at least
five different factions in the state, divided as
much by personality clashes as by ideological
differences, but all plan to use terrorism to dis-
rupt the CPI/M-led government.
Most of the extremist leaders are urban-
based students or would-be intellectuals, but they
talk mainly about fomenting rebellion in the
countryside. They have pockets of support among
peasants in the area south of Calcutta and may
have provided light arms and some guerrilla train-
Special Report
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The CPI/M in West Bengal may be unable to
avert an all-out confrontation with New Delhi. In
early April, the front organized a one-day general
strike to protest the killing of five workers by
security guards during labor demonstrations out-
side a central government - run munitions factory.
The successful strike against a central government
entity provoked a hostile reaction from Congress
members in parliament, especially since it stopped
operation of such central government services as
trains and airlines. This could well be a harbinger
of tense incidents that probably will occur period-
ically.
Tension among the parties in the front, pro-
tracted difficulties with the extremists, arld lack
of progress in solving the state's overwhelming
social and economic problems will encourage the
CPI/M to divert local political attention by main-
taining tension with New Delhi. Left-leaning
CPI/M members are urging further agitation, os-
tensibly to counter the appeal of extremists
among students and other young people. The
front won power on an anti-Congress, anticenter
platform, and pressure to dramatize this issue will
increase if cracks appear in the state government
or if popular support appears to be waning.
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KERALA
The Communists in Kerala have been in
power or have been a serious threat to take power
for more than a decade. The state is a small,
overpopulated coastal area in the extreme south
of India, however, and is virtually ungovernable.
It has a serious and persistent rice deficit, large-
scale unemployment, and a diverse population,
including significant Muslim and Christian minor-
ities.
New Delhi has treated Communist strength
in Kerala as a nuisance, viewing it as an isolated
phenomenon caused by the state's unusual prob-
lems and not as a threat to the country nation-
ally. The government's fears that the victory in
1957 was a forerunner to increased Communist
strength elsewhere-especially in other states of
south India-largely subsided as divisions devel-
oped in the movement and the Communists failed
to make other electoral gains.
The present united front government,
elected in 1967, enjoys an overwhelming major-
ity, but it has been less reform-minded than its
predecessor. It has maintained a costly rice sub-
sidy, made a few gestures in the direction of land
reform, and cut down on the use of police to
break up illegal strikes and demonstrations; it has
accomplished little else. The moderate chief min-
ister, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, a veteran CPI/M
leader who led the government in 1957, has been
hard pressed to hold the coalition together, espe-
cially in the face of squabbles between CPI/M and
CPI ministers. Concessions have been made to the
Muslim League, another member of the coalition,
in order to maintain the support of the Muslim
community.
Center-state agitation has been stirred up
sporadically but Namboodiripad has generally
kept anticenter agitation under sufficient control
to avoid a showdown with New Delhi. He did give
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New Delhi a legal pretext to intervene in Septem-
ber 1963, when the Kerala government refused to
provide police protection for central government
property during an illegal nationwide government
employees' strike, but both sides temporized.
New Delhi feared the impact of intervention on
the Congress Party's chances in the mid-term elec-
tions in February in four north Indian states,
especially since neither Congress nor other Kerala
parties had enough support to form an alternative
government.
Namboodiripad's government may now last
until 1972, but intermittent turmoil can be ex-
pected as the disparate parties in the front fumble
E.M.S. Namboodiripad, Chief Minister of Kerala
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with the state's manifold problems. Periodic vio-
lence will be caused by Kerala's several Commu-
nist extremist groups and by clashes between
Communist and opposition vigilante squads. Anti-
center agitation is likely again, and may be coor-
dinated with CPI/M action in West Bengal. A top
CPI/M official from Kerala met with West Bengal
leaders shortly after the February election victory
to try to coordinate policy in the two states.
TILE NATIONAL SCENE
By itself, neither the CPI/M nor the CPI
constitutes a threat to take national power in
India. Even if the parties should change policy
and decide to organize violent revolution, neither
has the capacity nor the popular support for the
sustained and coordinated nationwide disruption
that would be needed to endanger existing politi-
cal institutions. The labor agitation they have
inspired has been largely hit-and-run, and they
have had little success in periodic efforts to influ-
ence or take over local separatist groups or even
to capitalize on separatist-inclined agitation. Ex-
tremist leaders may influence some tribal groups
in southern Bihar state and other parts of central
India, but agitation by these groups has been very
limited.
The Indian security forces, including the
army, are loyal and have taken firm action against
Communists during periods of serious unrest.
They made numerous arrests under emergency
and preventive legislation during the Chinese
threat of the early I 960s and again when disor-
ders threatened after the fall of the united front
government in West Bengal in 1967.
If necessary the army
could rapidly impose order on West Bengal.
The CPI/M and CPI may profit through the
constitutional approach, however, if the decline
Special Report
of the Congress Party continues. Since 1967, Con-
gress has had firm control of less than half of the
state governments and the loss of patronage may
so hamper the party machinery that it will lose
control of the national parliament in 1972. The
Communists may therefore be maneuvering to
capitalize on the need for a multiparty national
government if Congress loses its majority.
PROSPECTS
Despite their rivalry, both the CPI/M and the
CPI are calling for a nationwide leftist front as an
ideological alternative to Congress. Both parties
envisage the other as being part of the front,
together with the Samyukta Socialist Party and
smaller leftist parties. In addition, arrangements
will undoubtedly be attempted with regional par-
ties that might identify with the Communists'
strong policy of defending state interests against
the center. Both parties have previously joined in
electoral alliances with regional groups at the
state level.
Such a front presumably could not win a
majority in the national parliament, but it would
reduce the number of multiparty contests in the
1972 elections-thus hurting Congress, which,
with only a plurality of the national vote, usually
profits most from multiparty fights. Participation
in a front would enhance the Communists' dance
to have a say in the formation of the national
government after the next elections, especially if
Congress is far short of a majority and cannot
arrange a coalition government of its own.
The Congress Party is stumbling as it reacts
to its declining fortunes. After the mid-terns elec-
tions in February 1969, it formed in Bihar the
first Congress-led state coalition government, but
the attempt provoked a crisis in the national
party hierarchy when it became necessary to so-
licit support from the followers of a corrupt feu-
dal politician.
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In the short run, New Delhi will probably
tolerate the united front government in West Ben-
gal and hope that intraparty friction will pull it
down. If the front holds on, Congress may then
hope that popular support will wane as the front
proves unable to fulfill election promises. New
Delhi may even permit extended disruption in an
attempt to give the West Bengalis a lesson in the
wages of Communist government.
Special Report
Premature central government intervention
in West Bengal could finish Congress in the state
and could have serious repercussions in other
states, especially where non-Congress govern-
ments rule. Democracy and legality have a strong
hold on educated Indians, and pressure for in-
creased states' rights in the Indian federal system
is on the upswing. New Delhi's patience will be
tested, but it will probably avoid intervention
unless West Bengal's economy is seriously threat-
ened or the front's assault on the police and
intelligence services clearly endangers security in
the state and the rest of the eastern region.
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