WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006900040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 20, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
41
State Department review completed
20 February 1969
No. 0358/69
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(Information as of noon EST, 19 February 1969)
Far East
VIETNAM
The Communists have now focused on US troop with-
drawal as the first order of business in the Paris
talks, while the Saigon government is apparently
trying to develop a more positive line to counter
local Communist peace propaganda and agitation.
Military action was generally light over the Tet
holiday, and the sustained pressure of allied opera-
tions continues to thwart Communist attack prepara-
tions.
THAI GOVERNMENT PARTY WINS NO MANDATE IN ELECTIONS
The government's failure to win a majority in the
lower house elections is!embarrassing for the mili-
tary leadership, but it will not result in any drama-
tic changes in the way Thailand is ruled.
Page
1
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 5
TENSION RISES OVER BERLIN
The Soviets have contributed to the increase in ten-
sions surrounding the West German presidential elec-
tion in West Berlin on 5 March, but they have of-
fered private assurances that Allied rights in the
city will be safeguarded.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA IMPROVES RELATIONS WITH INVADING POWERS
There has been a discernible effort on the part of
the Dubcek regime to improve relations with the
states that invaded Czechoslovakia in August. These
gestures have been partially reciprocated, probably
because most of the governments involved want at
least the appearance of "normalization" in hopes
that the reality will follow in due course.
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ITALIAN COMMUNISTS DEFY MOSCOW
At last week's 12th party congress, the Italian Com-
munists reiterated their condemnation of the inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia, thus taking another step
toward establishing themselves as a normal democratic
party in Italian eyes.
25X1
SOVIET OIL SALES DECLINE EAST OF SUEZ
Soviet exports of oil to free world Asian markets
are declining primarily because of high transport
costs arising from. the closing of the Suez Canal.
USSR MAY SEEK AFFILIATION WITH INTELSAT
Soviet attendance as an observer at the International
Telecommunications Satellite Consortium's conference
next week may indicate an interest on Moscow's part
in joining the consortium.
EUROPEAN CENTRIFUGE PROJECT SHOWS PROGRESS
Britain, the Netherlands, and West Germany appear to
be making progress toward an agreement for construct-
ing a gas centrifuge to produce enriched uranium,
but they have substantial problems to solve before
they can reach final agreement.
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Middle East-Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
15
INDIA'S
RULING PARTY SUFFERS REVERSALS IN STATE ELECTIONS
16
The
term
Congress Party suffered a severe setback in mid-
elections in West Bengal and did not do as well
as Congress leaders had anticipated in three other
states in north India, making continued instabil-
ity likely in this politically important and heavily
populated area. Mrs. Gandhi, meanwhile, appears to
have strengthened her hand by reshuffling the central
government cabinet.
PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION TALKS POSTPONED
The long-awaited government-opposition talks, sched-
uled to open on 19 February, were postponed at the
last minute after six important opposition leaders
refused to attend. If the negotiations ever do get
under way, they are unlikely to end public disorders,
nor will they produce a satisfactory compromise.
JORDAN AND EGYPT STILL FACE PROBLEMS WITH TERRORISTS
The Jordanians are probably encouraged by private
Egyptian assurances of cooperation and assistance
in containing Palestinian terrorism, but popular
support for the movement in both.countries remains
a major bar to effective government action.
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Pa e iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Feb 69
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SOUTH AFRICA MOVING TO INCORPOPU%TE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
Despite anticipated world criticism, the South Afri-
can parliament is about to adopt new legislation
that will convert the mandated territory of South-
West Africa into a virtual -province of South Africa.
Western ]Hemisphere
PERUVIAN-US TENSIONS AGGRAVATED
Peru's seizure of a US tuna boat has compounded the
strains caused by the controversy over expropriation
of a US oil company.
COLOMBIAN CHURCH DISSENSION POSES GC)VERNMENT DILEMMA
A revolt by socially conscious priests against a re-
actionary church hierarchy that is closely identi-
fied with elements of the country's governing elite
is becoming a national issue that raises serious
problems for President Lleras.
CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION (HINGES ON JAMAICA
Leaders of the Commonwealth Caribbean have apparent-
ly again failed to secure Jamaican participation in
a regional development bank, which may mean the end
of the Caribbean free trade association.
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There was no forward movement in the Paris talks again this week.
Communist negotiators and propaganda concentrated on the Communists'
demand that US troops withdraw immediately and unconditionally from
Vietnam. They also continued to insist that military questions cannot be
resolved without a political settlement.
In several key sectors of South Vietnam, the sustained pressure of allied
operations continues to thwart Communist attack preparations. Saigon and a
number of provincial capitals continue, however, to face a substantial threat
from possible Communist artillery and mortar attacks, as well as limited
ground probes.
The Thai government party's failure to win a majority in the lower
house elections on 10 February is embarrassing for the military leadership,
but it will not result in any dramatic changes in the way the country is ruled.
The government party won a slim plurality that presumably will provide
enough justification for the present cabinet to be reconstituted, possibly
with some changes, as the new government. Without a clear mandate from
the electorate, however, the country's leadership will be more solicitous of
opposition views than they would have been otherwise.
The Communist Chinese have indefinitely deferred meeting with the US
in Warsaw. The decision, announced on 18 February, to call off a scheduled
meeting appears to have been a sudden one and may reflect new disagree-
ment among the leadership in Peking. The Chinese used the defection of the
former Chinese charge in The Hague as a pretext for not meeting with the
US. Recent Chinese actions have suggested that Pekin is not interested in
any significant improvement in Sino-US relations.
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VI ETNAM
The Communists have now
focused on US troop withdrawal as
the first order of business in the
Paris talks. Their negotiators
and propaganda last week described
withdrawal of US forces and re-
moval of US military bases as
"fundamental" to an over-all
settlement. The Communists, how-
ever, have not abandoned their
position that military and polit-
ical issues must be treated to-
gether, but they may hope to use
the withdrawal question as a way
to get into broader issues.
Hanoi's view of the with-
drawal question was expressed
most authoritatively in a Nhan
Dan commentary on 12 February
which demanded an immediate and
"unconditional" withdrawal of US
forces. This presumably means
that the Communists will try for
a while to avoid discussing mutual
withdrawals. The Front's radio,
in its usual hard-line manner,
explicitly stated that there is
"no question of mutual withdrawal,"
This propaganda position
clearly is for the record as Ha-
noi is well aware that any US com-
mitment to withdraw will only re-
sult from bargaining and that the
Communists will have to recipro-
cate by pulling out North Viet-
namese forces. They probably
hope that this reciprocity can
remain undeclared, as it was on
the bombing halt. They even-
tual=_y may try to use unacknowl-
edged, unilateral withdrawals
of some North Vietnamese units
as an incentive for movement on
this issue.
Political Developments in
South Vietnam
The Saigon government is
apparently trying to develop a
more positive line to counter
Communist peace propaganda and
agitation by such groups as the
militant Buddhists. In his Tet
message to the nation on 16
February, President Thieu empha-
sized his own desire for peace
and pledged his determination to
see it achieved as soon as pos-
sible. He stressed, however,
that the people's sacrifices
could not be wasted by allowing
a Communist political victory.
He appealed to the people not to
be gulled by "a minority of Com-
munist lackeys" who advocate
coalition with the Communists
and thereby betray the nation.
The government has accepted
some criticism by the press and
has adopted a softer tone in its
warnings to the Buddhists. Thieu
has said that he will reconsider
the ban on a popular songwriter's
antiwar compositions after the
ban aroused considerable protest
in the local press. Moreover,
as a follow-up to its earlier
public warning to Buddhist leader
Thich Thien Minh for his antigov-
ernment peace campaign statements,
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the government on 14 February
issued a communique merely
"urging" rather than demanding
that religious leaders limit
their ceremonies in order to
prevent Communist exploitation
of them. Although the govern-
ment is taking a less heavy-
handed approach, it neverthe-
less is keeping the Buddhists
on notice that their activities
are being watched.
Military Developments
In several key sectors of
the country, the sustained pres-
sure of allied operations con-
tinues to thwart Communist at-
tack preparations. The capture
of large quantities of enemy
munitions and food stores,
coupled with intensive bombing
of known troop concentrations,
has presumably upset the enemy's
plans and in some cases may have
actually prevented attacks.
Meanwhile, military action
throughout most of South Vietnam
was generally light just prior
to and during the three day Tet
holiday (17-19 February). For
the most part, the majority of
the Communist forces heeded at
least the opening days of their
seven-day cease-fire period that
began on 15 February. Eight
Americans were killed and another
84 wounded during the 24-hour
allied standdown on 16-17 Feb-
ruary. Most casualties resulted
from scattered clashes between
allied reconnaissance patrols
and small enemy forces.
Communist actions during the
Tet holiday included a ground as-
sault on a US Marine artillery
base in the A Shau Valley area.
Other incidents included attacks
in northern Tay Ninh Province
and the downing of three US heli-
copters in the same area.A 7~ 5X1
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THAI GOVERNMENT PARTY WINS NO MANDATE IN ELECTIONS
The government's failure to
win a majority in the lower house
elections on 10 February is em-
barrassing for the military lead-
ership, but it will not result in
any dramatic changes in the way
Thailand is ruled.
The government's Saha Pracha
Thai Party won only some 35 per-
cent of the seats in the lower
house. Independent candidates,
many of whom have ties with the
government party, took about 32
percent. The opposition Democratic
Party won 26 percent, and the re-
mainder went to splinter parties.
There were no major surprises
in the voting. The government
fared less well in isolated areas
than had been anticipated, how-
ever, and two leading leftists
were beaten in their northeast
baliwicks. The number of new-
comers elected over well-known
old-time politicians suggests
that the sentiment for change
among the electorate was fairly
strong. The voting itself went
smoothly, with no significant in-
cidents or irregularities re-
ported.
The government party's slim
plurality presumably will pro-
vide enough justification for
the present cabinet to be recon-
stituted, possibly with some
minor changes, as the new gov-
ernment when parliament convenes
next month.
The government should have
little difficulty bringing into
line enough independents to form
a working majority in the lower
house. Thailand's military-
dominated leadership had made it
clear, however, that it will re-
sist opposition efforts to amend
those sections of the constitu-
tion that severely limit the
powers of the lower house. The
senate, whose members are picked
by the government, has virtual
veto power over important legis-
lation.
The election will, however,
influence to some extent both the
future policies and make-up of
the military leadership. Al-
though they will have to tread
lightly, opposition elements for
the first time in over ten years
have a legitimate forum in which
to express political dissent.
Without a clear mandate from
the electorate, the country's
leadership will be more solici-
tous of such views than they would
have been otherwise. The gov-
ernment party's poor showing,
particularly in Bangkok where it
won no seats, may also aggravate
factional disputes within the
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The East Germans with Moscow's backing have begun to put the heat
on West Germany by interfering with passenger and vehicle traffic on the
land routes to Berlin. Although the Soviets have contributed to the buildup
of tensions surrounding the West German presidential election in Berlin on 5
March, they have given assurances that allied rights will not be jeopardized
and give no sign of wanting a crisis.
In Czechoslovakia, a new confidence-well-founded or not-seems to
pervade the atmosphere. Typical perhaps of the mood of the times was the
arrest by Czechoslovak police of a Czechoslovak news vendor for peddling
the Soviet's Czechoslovak-language occupation newspaper Zpravy. There has,
however, been a clear effort on the part of the Dubcek regime to improve
relations with those states whose forces invaded only six months ago.
Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact,
arrived in Rumania this week, presumably for final review of plans for
Rumanian participation in Warsaw Pact training exercises this year. Yaku-
bovsky, who had just chaired a major Warsaw Pact planning session in East
Berlin, was accompanied by Soviet trouble shooter Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov.
In Western Europe, as preparations neared completion for President
Nixon's visit, the political rivalry between France and Britain came to the
forefront. France, objecting to British efforts to establish political consulta-
tion with the Five in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU),
announced that it would boycott WEU council meetings until further notice.
The Italian Communist Party made progress last week toward establish-
ing itself as democratic in the eyes of the electorate. At its 12th congress, it
defied Moscow's threats of retribution and reiterated its condemnation of
the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The party is now preparing for a cut of
about $1.5 million in the annual Soviet subsidy.
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TENSION RISES OVER BERLIN
The Soviets have contributed
to the increase in tensions sur-
rounding the West German presi-
dential election in West Berlin
on 5 March, but they have offered
private assurances that Allied
rights in the city will be safe-
guarded. These assurances do not
go so far as to exclude steps be-
yond those already -taken by the
East Germans to harass West Ger-
man access to the city or some
form of Soviet - East. German mil-
itary display. The Russians have
given no sign of wanting a crisis,
but they are undoubtedly under
pressure from Pankow to demon-
strate their support of East Ger-
many's claim to sovereignty.
The Soviets have strongly
backed the East German ban on the
travel of West German officials
to Berlin and have condemned
Bonn's decision to hold the elec-
tion in the divided city. The
Soviets also appear to be behind
stories from various sources over
the past week that severe harass-
ment measures were __n the offing,
Most of Moscow's fire has been
concentrated directly on the Bonn
government, which was given a
protest note on 13 February that
was considerably harsher in tone
than those presented to the Al-
lies last December.
On the other hand, Moscow
has taken a rather moderate ap-
proach when discussing the matter
with Western officials. Ambassa-
dor Dobrynin said privately on
13 February that the USSR would
do nothing to jeopardize Soviet
relations with the new adminis-
tration. He specifically as-
serted that no measures would be
directed against President Nixon
during his stay in Berlin.
This Soviet posture leaves
the way open for the East Germans
to instigate "traffic control"
measures to harass the West Ger-
mans. Such actions began on 18
February when East German check-
point officials delayed the proc-
essing of vehicles leaving West
Berlin on the major access route,
the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn.
This slowdown was in effect for
about 12 hours. Pankow probably
will resort to similar and per- 25X1
haps stronger measures as the
date for the election draws
nearer.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA IMPROVES RELATIONS WITH INVADING POWERS
There has been a discernible
effort on the part of the Dubcek
regime to improve relations with
the states that invaded Czecho-
slovakia in August. These ges-
tures have been partially recip-
rocated, probably because most of
the governments involved want at
least the appearance of "normali-
zation" in hopes that the reality
will follow in due course.
Contacts on the diplomatic,
party, military, economic, and
cultural levels have steadily in-
creased since December. Last
week, Prague began to cast its re-
lations with its socialist "al-
lies" in a more favorable light.
The improved atmosphere apparently
stems from recent visits to the
Soviet Union by Czechoslovak party
presidium member Evzen Erban and
Foreign Minister Jan Marko, who
were given red carpet treatment
and accorded favorable commentary
in the Russian press. Their vis-
its also appear to have set the
stage for substantive talks.
In a televised report on his
trip last week, Marko advanced
the old Soviet line that the world
is divided into capitalist and
socialist camps, and that Czecho-
slovakia has no choice but to ad-
here to the socialist system and
to strengthen bilateral coopera-
tion within it. This is a sig-
nificant retreat from last year's
view that a reformed Czechoslo-
vakia could bridge the gap between
the contending forces. The lead-
ership probably hopes that this
concession will be a quid pro quo
for less Soviet and Eastern Euro-
pean interference in domestic af-
fairs.
Marko also said that the for-
eign ministers of the Soviet bloc
countries would soon be coming to
Prague. On 19 February, Polish
Foreign Minister Jedrychowski ar-
rived there to discuss bilateral
cooperation.
The Soviet bloc press appears
to have toned down its anti-Czech-
oslovak bias in recent weeks, in
part to convey the impression to
domestic audiences that the situ-
ation is under control and that
the intervention was correct and
successful. Soviet commentary
also contained a minimum of anti-
"progressive" material last week,
but this may at least partially
reflect Moscow's preoccupation
with the Berlin problem.
On 13 February, Radio Vltava,
the Soviet-backed station that had
beamed propaganda into Czechoslo-
vakia from East Germany since
shortly after the invasion, ceased
broadcasting. This was a double-
edged gesture by Moscow. Although
it could not help but better rela-
tions a bit with the Czechoslovaks,
it also enabled Czechoslovak pro-
Soviet conservatives to claim
credit for the move. They say one
of their leaders, party secretary
Vasil Bilak, negotiated Vltava's
demise during a recent visit to
East Berlin. Moreover, the fre-
quency that Vltava used was turned
back to the East Germans--whose
propaganda against Czechoslovak
reforms is still tough and uncom-
promising--for their Radio Berlin
International program, which in-
cludes broadcasts in Czech and
Slovak.
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Italian Communist Leader Luigi Longo Condemns Soviet Action in Czechoslovakia
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ITALIAN COMMUNISTS DEFY MOSCOW
At its 12th party congress
last week, the Italian Communist
Party defied Soviet threats of
retribution and reiterated its
condemnation of the intervention
in Czechoslovakia, thus taking
another step toward establish-
ing itself as a normal democratic
party in Italian eyes.
The disunity in Eastern
Europe stemming from the inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia was
further exposed at the congress.
Yugoslav and Rumanian speakers
drew enthusiastic applause for
restating their opposition and
for rejecting Moscow's doctrine
of "limited sovereignty." The
speeches of the other Eastern
European representatives varied
from Bulgaria's clear-cut de-
fense of the intervention to
Hungary's vaguely expressed for-
mulation about the need to "guard
against. counter.-revolution."
An additional setback for the
Soviets occurred when 46-year-old
Enrico Berlinguer was confirmed
as secretary general Luigi Long's
heir-apparent. Berlinguer has been
one of the foremost critics of the
Soviet intervention. In his ad-
dress to the congress, however, he
said, "Anyone who expects us to
break with the Soviet Union has al- 25X1
ways been and will be disappointed."
Although the USSR's chief
delegate to the congress asserted
that the Soviet duty was to help
defend Socialist victories and
that the Warsaw Five had helped
Czechoslovakia, Moscow's public
reaction to the criticism has
been restrained and the Soviet
press has focused on the more
agreeable aspects of the meet-
ing. The Soviet response was
probably tempered by the Italians'
willingness to attend the World
Communist Conference next May
and by Moscow's desire not to
disrupt preparations for the
conference by a shouting match.
Over all, the 12th congress
was a distinct success for the
Italian Communists in their ef-
fort to persuade the Italian pub-
lic that theirs is a normal po-
litical party fit to play a gov-
erning role. Even Adolfo Battaglia,
a leader of the Republican Party,
the smallest but most strongly
anti-Communist partner in the gov-
ernment coalition, was moved to
offer his personal impression that
"the Communist Party has made
enormous and perhaps conclusive
steps forward toward its estab-
lishment as a democratic Dart v."
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SOVIET OIL SALES DECLINE EAST OF SUEZ
Soviet exports of oil to
free world Asian markets are de-
clining primarily because of high
transport costs arising from the
closing of the Suez Canal during
the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967.
Moscow's petroleum sales to
its major Asian customers--Japan,
India, and Ceylon--totaled less
than $50 million last year, a
decline of more than one third
compared with 1966, the last
full year the canal was in op-
eration. Sales to these three
countries are expected to decline
still further this year even
though Moscow has arranged with
several Western firms to swap
some Black Sea oil for delivery
to their European customers in
return for equivalent deliveries
from the Persian Gulf to Soviet
customers in Asia.
Three swap deals were ar-
ranged with Western firms last
year for the delivery of about
2 million tons of Middle East
crude to Japan in 1968-69; 800,-
000 tons were reported delivered
in 1968.
DECLINE IN SOVIET PETROLEUM EXPORTS TO THE FAR EAST, 1966 and 1968
Million Metric Tons
Dollar values in Millions
3.17
($33.61;
1.4
($17.2)
($2,41 1.2
($22.1)
1.6
(06.4)
1966 1968 1966
4
($8.01
Ceylon
.6
($10.2)
.3
($5.4)
1968 1966 1968
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Even if these swap deals
should take place, however, Japa-
nese officials predict a further
decline in their imports of So-
viet petroleum this year because
of higher transport and crude
oil prices. Soviet sales to In-
dia and Ceylon in 1968, consist-
ing wholly of petroleum products
originating from the Black Sea
dropped by almost two-thirds and
one half respectively, compared
with 1966.
Prospects remain dim that the
Suez Canal, which provides the
only economic route for the move-
ment of Soviet oil from the Black
Sea to Asia in the relatively
small tankers required by Soviet
port facilities, will be reopened
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USSR MAY SEEK AFFILIATION WITH INTELSAT
Soviet attendance as an ob-
server at the International Tele-
communications Satellite Consor-
tium (Intelsat) conference, which
opens on 24 February, may indi-
cate an interest on Moscow's
part in joining the consortium.
Until recently, the USSR has been
hostile toward the US-dominated
Intelsat, and in August 1968 it
announced an intention to form a
competing organization, Intersput-
nik.
The 64 member nations of In-
telsat are meeting to draw up a
permanent charter for the organi-
zation, which has been operating
under an interim arrangement since
1964. Ownership and voting
strength are based upon a mem-
ber's share of international com-
munications traffic with the re-
sult that the US holds the con-
trolling interest.
The "one nation-one vote"
provision of Intersputnik was de-
signed to appeal to all nations,
including members of Intelsat.
Only eight countries--all Commu-
nist--have approved the Soviet
proposal, however, and it remains
an essentially paper organiza-
tion. The Soviets have only two
full-range ground stations, but
have installed more than 20 other
stations that receive only TV.
The Soviet program has proven to
be expensive, mainly because
their satellites have a short
lifetime. Moreover, the Soviet
satellite's highly elliptical
orbit is ill-suited for coverage
of Africa, Latin America, and
much of Asia.
In contrast, Intelsat now
operates 23 ground stations in
15 countries, with about 70 ground
stations in over 50 countries sched-
uled for operation by 1972. The
consortium's satellites, moreover,
are long-lived and move in an orbit
well-adapted for global coverage.
Although the realization that
Intersputnik does not pose a real
threat to Intelsat probably moti-
vated the USSR to seek some sort
of accommodation, the existence
of even a faltering separate or-
ganization improves the Soviet
bargaining position. Moscow must
be aware that its voting formula
is impractical, but it probably be-
lieves that a compromise can be
reached that would result in some
reduction in US hegemony. Also,
the Soviets are expected to favor
the inclusion of a provision for
regional systems in the Intelsat
charter, a position already favored
by the French and Japanese.
The Soviets have much to gain
from affiliation with Intelsat's
viable, high-performance interna-
tional network. Benefits would
include access to advanced tech-
nology and the experience of par-
ticipating in a global system based
on uniform technical and operating
standards. Aware of this, almost
all of the members of Intersputnik
will attend the conference.
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EUROPEAN CENTRIFUGE PROJECT SHOWS PROGRESS
Britain, the Netherlands,
and West Germany appear to be
making progress toward an agree-
ment for tripartite cooperation
in the production of enriched
uranium by the gas centrifuge
(ultracentrifuge) method. Several
substantial problems have yet to
be .solved, but if the project is
successful, the three countries
could manufacture enriched ura-
nium by a method potentially
cheaper than the gaseous diffu-
sion process the US,. UK, and
France now use. Moreover, it
cou.Ld have important. implications
for future political., as well as
technological, relations between
London and the continent.
Ministers of the three na-
tions met recently in Bonn and
agreed in principle to establish
tripartite organizations to con-
struct and manage centrifuge
plants, to integrate all research.
and development on enrichment
processes, and to create a cen-
tral. political body to make all
essential administrative deci-
sions for the three governments.
At least in concept, it appears
that the association would be more
genuinely integrated than previous
Western European scientific organ-
izations and consequently more
immt.ne from the usual political
obstacles.
There has been no agreement,
however, on the size, site, or
timing of construction of the
first plants, precise organiza-
tional structure and financing,
or the imposition of safeguards.
F__ I
Ministers of the three gov-
ernments will meet again on 11
March to discuss these problems.
There is no assurance that they
can be solved soon, but the Brit-
25X1
ish hope for an agreement by sum-
mer.
ua y, the French are probably
less afraid of German possession
of nuclear materials--they earlier
sought German cooperation for
French nuclear production--than
they are of being shut out of the
rapidly growing European uranium
market. If the new partnership
can produce enriched uranium by
the centrifuge process at a cost
significantly below that produced
by gaseous diffusion, France will
find it impossible to.attract for-
eign investment for a new gaseous
diffusion plant. Moreover, the
French are aware that the new
partnership would significantly
increase British industrial co-
o eration with EC members.
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The Israelis have publicly named both Lebanon and Jordan as possible
staging points for the terrorist squad that shot up an El Al airliner in Zurich
on 18 February. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has
claimed credit for the incident-as it did for the December 1968 attack on an
El Al plane in Athens. The Front maintains its military headquarters in
Amman but uses Beirut as a headquarters for its public utterances. A reprisal
against almost any Arab capital or installation is nevertheless possible.
The sudden arrival in Guinea on 15 February of four Soviet naval ships
for an official visit is without precedent in West Africa and may presage calls
at other West African ports. This "show of the flag" by the Soviets may also
be related to Ghana's stubborn refusal to release the two Soviet trawlers and
their 52-man crews detained since October for suspected "subversive activi-
ties. "
In the Nigerian civil war, fighting has intensified with the Biafrans on
the attack on the southern front and the federal forces keeping up pressure
in the north. Neither side has yet scored any major gains, however.
Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith has won overwhelming party support
for a constitution intended to satisfy many party regulars who insist on
"separate development" and want to push on with a new constitution.
Smith, however, still hopes for a favorable settlement with the UK.
Tanzania's President Nyererc informed Ottawa on 17 February that its
military training programs for the Tanzanian Army and Air Force will be
terminated in 1970. The timing of Nyerere's decision-following a Commu-
nist Chinese survey of local airfields-suggests strongly that he expects
Peking to fill the vacuum.
Internal disturbances continue to wrack Pakistan. As of 19 February,
President Ayub's recent concessions to his opposition had failed to elicit
their participation in his proposed conference to resolve the present crisis.
In India, Congress Party leaders are trying to reassess the political scene
in the north following the party's poor showing there in last week's election.
The outlook is for more political instability in the area. Meanwhile, Mrs.
Gandhi's cabinet reshuffle appears to have strengthened her position in the
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INDIA'S RULING PARTY SUFFERS REVERSALS IN STATE ELECTIONS
India's ruling Congress
Party suffered an unexpectedly
harsh setback in the West Bengal
mid-term election, and emerged
with reduced representation in
two of the other three state as-
sembly elections held last week
in north India. Congress could
take some satisfaction from un-
official returns indicating that
the party slightly increased its
popular support in at least two
states, but its failure to gain
assembly, majorities probably
presages another period of polit.-
ical instability across India's
northern tier of states.
For two decades prior to the
fourth general elections of 1967,
Congress was able to translate
popular vote pluralities into
sweeping majorities in state as-
semblies because of the multi-
plicity of opposition parties.
In 1967, however, and to an even
greater degree in the recent elec-
tion in West Bengal, disparate
opposition parties were able to
form electoral coalitions that
limited the number of contestants
and drastically reduced the num-
ber of Congress winners. In West
Bengal, the Left Communist - dom-
inated coalition won 214 out of
280 seats. Although Congress in-
creased its popular vote by more
than one percent over the 41 per-
cent obtained in 1957, its repre-
sentation in the West Bengal as-
sembly plummeted from 127 to 55.
In the Punjab, where Congress
won a plurality of seats in 1967,
it has now slipped to second place.
A new government has been formed
by a Sikh communal party in col-
latoration with the right-wing
Hindu nationalist party, Jan
Sangh. In Bihar, Congress won a
few seats less than in 1967 but re-
mains the largest single party
in the legislature. Only in Uttar
Pradesh did Congress increase its
representation; it may have a
paper-thin majority when all votes
are counted.
The results of the elections
in the Punjab, Bihar, and Uttar
Pradesh indicate the likelihood
of more governmental instability,,
not unlike that which plagued
these states after the elections
of 1967. In West Bengal, the
ruling United Front coalition,
dominated by the Left Communists,,
would appear to have sufficient
seats to remain in power even if
some of the parties in the coali-
tion should defect. The assump-
tion of power by the United Front
could lead to new economic and
political turbulence in Calcutta
and the rest of West Bengal, com-
parable to that which developed
during the previous period of
coalition rule in 1967. Mean-
while, Congress politicians in
New Delhi reportedly are examin-
ing possible ways to bring down
the United Front and reimpose
direct central government rule on
West Bengal.
Mrs. Gandhi, in the midst of
the election post-mortems, sud-
denly announced a major cabinet
reshuffle. No new faces were
added and no members were dropped,
but the over-all result of the
changes appears to strengthen
the prime minister's position in
the cabinet. One of her closest
friends, Dinesh Singh, has be-
come minister of external affairs.
Singh has a reputation of being
sympathetic to Soviet policies
and frequently has been difficult
in his dealings with Westerners.
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PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION TALKS POSTPONED
The long-awaited government-
opposition talks, scheduled to
open on 19 February in Rawalpindi,
were postponed at the last min-
ute after six important opposi-
tion leaders declared their inten-
tions to boycott the meeting.
The postponement was re-
quested by the moderate opposi-
tion coalition which had finally
agreed last Sunday to meet Presi-
dent Ayub after major government
concessions that met virtually
all the coalition's pre-condi-
tions for talks. Ayub had re-
leased several hundred political
prisoners, including fiery ex -
foreign minister Z.A. Bhutto, and
had lifted the controversial
three-year-old state of emergency.
In other conciliatory gestures,
Ayub had invited non-coalition
opposition leaders to participate
in the talks and had paroled
popular East Pakistani opposi-
tion leader Mujibur Rahman--on
trial for treason--so that he too
might attend.
The stumbling block arose
when Mujibur announced on 18 Feb-
ruary that he would go only if he
were freed unconditionally and
the entire conspiracy case with-
drawn. Other leaders of Mujibur's
party--the largest and most im-
portant component of the coali-
tion--refused to attend without
him. Pro-Peking leftist Maulana
Bhashani, Bhutto, and three in-
dependents including ex - air
force chief Asghar Khan also de-
clined Ayub's invitation. After
much deliberation, the remaining
members of the coalition decided
they could not negotiate without
Mujibur and his party and re-
quested the postponement.
Continuing violence and army-
imposed curfews following a 24-hour
nationwide strike on 14 February
also figured in the postponement.
Bhutto declared that there could
'tee no talks under such conditions.
If the talks are rescheduled
and do get under way, it is un-
likely that they will end all dis-
orders or result in a satisfactory
compromise. Student demonstrators,
for instance, are continuing to
denounce all plans for opposition-
government negotiations. As the
price'for his participation in
talks, Bhutto has enunciated ten
"suggestions" for gover ment ac-
tion and he is also - )sing that
Ayub step down in favu, of an in-
terim government.
Ayub is apparently anxious
for discussions but, although he
is probably willing to make im-
portant constitutional changes
with some curtailment of execu-
tive powers, he seems sure to in-
sist on retention of the indirect
system of presidential election.
Because this arrangement would
almost certainly be unacceptable
to the leftists, Ayub's strategy
may be to try to split the opposi-
tion and work something out with
the moderates and conservatives.
The antigovernment cause has
gained such widespread support
in recent weeks that a return to
the pre-November 1968 system dom-
inated by Ayub is now impossible.
Ayub appears aware of this and
has probably made contingency plans
in case discussions--if they ever
come about--reach an impasse and
security forces are unable to quell
the increasingly serious disturb-
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SE(:~RE,r
JORDAN AND EGYPT STILL FACE PROBLEMS WITH TERRORISTS
King Husayn's fears that
Egyptian President Nasir had jet-?
tisoned Jordan's interests have
probably been allayed as a re-
sult of a recent visit to Cairo
by Prime Minister Talhouni and
Foreign Minister Rifai. Nasir
apparently reaffirmed his adher-
ence to the mutual defense pact
concluded between the two coun-
tries shortly before the June
1967 war.
The Jordanians,, vitally af-
fected by Nasir's positions vis-
a-vis Palestinian terrorism and
the over-all issue of a peaceful
settlement with Israel, had ear-
lier become suspicious that Cairo
was undercutting their efforts
to restrict terrorist activity
out of Jordan while working to-
ward a Soviet-model peace settle-
ment without first consulting
Amman.
Leaders in both Jordan and
Egypt are still under obvious
pressure to support the terror-
ist movement in public, however.
Pre-
sumably in deference to popular
feelings, the Jordanian prime
minister issued a strong state-
ment of support for the movement
only a few days after his return
from Cairo this week, pledging
that Jordan will continue to sup-
port Palestinian resistance against
Israel even if a settlement with
the Israelis is achieved.
Enthusiastic Egyptian state-
ments of support for the terror-
ists are probably almost as hol-
low.
Nasir is susceptible to the
pressures of domestic public opin-
ion, but Husayn is considerably
more vulnerable to Israeli re-
prisals against terrorist activ-
ity. Should he finally decide
to clamp down on the terrorists
for good, he faces the twofold
problem of convincing Israel of
his sincerity without bringing
upon himself the active hostility
of his own people. He will cer-
tainly chart a careful course and
would probably try to move slowly,
picking off the various terrorist
organizations one by one. Whether
or not he can manage this, how-
ever, is still highly uncertain.
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SOUTH AFRICA MOVING TO INCORPORATE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
South Africa is about to
complete passage of new legis-
lation that will formally sub-
ordinate the South-West Africa
mandated territory to almost to-
tal South African control. The
promulgation of this legislation
will undoubtedly provoke vehement
criticism at the United Nations
and throughout the world, partic-
ularly by those who contend that
South Africa's authority under
the mandate has been revoked.
This criticism will not impede
Pretoria's action, however.
Since 1963, when South Af-
rica's intentions toward South-
West Africa were made clear in
the so-called "Odendaal Report,"
Pretoria has been moving warily
but steadily toward "administra-
tive rearrangements" that will
in essence reduce the trust ter-
ritory to provincial status. The
South Africans justify their ac-
tions by the terms of the League
of Nations mandate, which gave
them authority to administer the
former German colony as though
it were an integral part of South
Africa. Strong external pres-
sures from other countries--in-
cluding the US and the UK--de-
layed implementation of South Af-
rican plans for several years,
however, while an appeal for revo-
cation of the mandate was under
review by the International Court
of Justice. The court dismissed
the case in mid-1966 on the grounds
that the plaintiffs--Ethiopia
and Liberia--had no legal right
to bring suit in the matter.
Within South-West Africa, the
effect of South Africa's formal
take-over of authority will not be
great, because South African of-
ficials in advisory roles have
long controlled all important gov-
ernmental functions. The dominant
white minority in the territory
generally accept the inevitabil-
ity of the take-over as a quid pro
quo for Pretoria's protection
against the external forces that
might threaten their privileged
position. The non-whites, what-
ever their views, have been given
no opportunity to express their
opinions except through their
tribal chiefs' organization, which
is little more than a tool of
South African officials.
The most vociferous complaints
about South Africa's formaliza-
tion of its control will almost
certainly occur at the United Na-
tions and in the meetings of the
Organization of African Unity.
The pending legislation will give
further impetus to efforts al-
ready begun by the African states
to raise the issue in the Secu-
rity Council in the very near
future.
Regardless of any pressures
generated at the UN or elsewhere
by opponents of South Africa's
racist policies in South-West
Africa, there is little likeli-
hood that any practical means
can be found that would deter
Pretoria from its stated pur-
poses. Despite their recogni-
tion of South-West Africa's "spe-
cial international status," the
South Africans do not intend to
relinquish control over the ter-
ritory.
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Relations between Peru and the United States became even more
strained this week following Peru's seizure on 14 February of a US tuna boat
that was allegedly fishing illegally within Peru's 200-mile territorial sea.
Another boat was fired upon but escaped, only to be accused later by
Ecuadorean authorities of illegally fishing in its waters last November.
A number of other Latin American countries also claim a 200-mile limit
either of the territorial sea or of fishing rights. Peru and Ecuador, however,
have enforced their claim more vigorously than the others because some of
the best tuna fishing in the world is off their coasts.
Peru's expropriation of the International Petroleum Company has
drawn considerable comment throughout the hemisphere. For the most part,
the news media and the general public believe that the expropriation is
justified and defensible. Nearly all government officials, on the other hand,
have taken a neutral or generally noncommittal attitude on the subject.
Some governments-notably Argentina and Brazil-have discreetly indi-
cated their willingness either to mediate the dispute or to help work toward
a solution of the problem through "diplomatic conversations."
Elsewhere in Latin America, there were no developments of significance
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PERUVIAN-US TENSIONS AGGRAVATED
Peru's actions against US
fishing vessels last week, in
which one ship was seized and an-
other damaged by machine-gun fire,
have added to the strains in re-
.ations resulting from the con-
troversy over Peru's expropria-
tion of a US oil company. The
latest incident has produced a
new wave of nationalistic reac-
tion against the US, although the.
Peruvian Government has tried to
play it down.
The attack on t:he small US
tuna fleet on 14 February is be-
lieved to have resulted from a
Peruvian Navy lieutenant's over-
reaction to the US boats' delay
in answering a request for in-
spection of documents. The lieu-
tenant had apparently been over-
heard saying that he was "fed up"
with seeing the large number of
foreign ships in "Peruvian waters"
with the navy's acgt,iescence. UE
officials in Peru expect further
trouble if disciplinary action
is not taken against. the responsi-
ble officer.
This is only the most recent
of a long list of such incidents
in which US fishing boats have
been seized by both Peru and Ecua.-
dor for fishing within the 200-
milEe limit claimed by several
Latin American countries. Peru
first claimed that its territory
extended 200 miles out to sea
in 1947 and since than has sought.
to exert its sovereignty over the
"natural resources" off its
coast. The issue has now become
emotional and nationalistic, and
no Peruvian or Ecuadorean govern-
ment could afford any action that.
could open it to charges that it
was not protecting national sov-
ereignty in this matter.
Meanwhile, the political sit.-
uation inside Peru is heating up.
Haya de la Torre, founder and
chief of APRA, the country's larg-
est political party, is expected
to return from voluntary exile in.
Europe for the celebration of
his 74th birthday on 21 February.
Haya is a long-time enemy of the
military and there is widespread
speculation that the public cele-
bration of his birthday will not
be allowed.
The government has also come
under attack in the Lima press for
its expulsion from the country
of a well-known news commentator
and a political leader, both of
whom had criticized the govern-
ment publicly. The increasing
unrest in Peru could be made to
order for Prime Minister Montagne
and his moderate backers in the
government and military, if he
is doing anything more than talk-
ing about ousting President Velasco.
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COLOMBIAN CHURCH DISSENSION POSES GOVERNMENT DILEMMA
Growing dissension within
the Roman Catholic Church in
Colombia. is becoming a national
issue that poses a serious di-
lemma for President Lleras. The
heart of the problem is a revolt
by socially conscious priests
against a reactionary church
hierarchy that is closely iden-
tified with elements of the coun-
try's governing elite. President
Lleras, anxious to avoid public
disorders as well as trouble with
the politically potent hierarchy,
has criticized priests who sup-
ported strikes last month, and
has apparently not interfered
with security action to curb "Com-
munist" priests. Continuation of
this attitude risks further al-
ienation of restive lower classes
whose grievances are being ef-
fectively articulated by the dis-
sident priests.
The revolt became public
last December when fifty activ-
ist priests led by Colombia's
most forward-looking prelate, the
archbishop of Buenaventura, is-
sued a declaration calling for
a militant effort to change the
socioeconomic and political
structure of Colombia. The dec-
laration urged the clergy to
ally itself with all those who
fight for such a change. It also
criticized the two governing
political parties and described
the military as repressive.
The activist clergy have
gained wide support in western
Colombian cities among the ur-
ban poor whose economic situation
is particularly bad. Thousands
of followers who rallied behind
a parish priest ousted by his
superior on charges of Communist
activity reportedly have been
threatened with excommunication.
Other charges by conservative
prelates and politicians of Com-
munist influence among the clergy
have raised strong public reac-
tion. The attacks are given some
substance by the fact that ex-
treme leftists are exploiting
the efforts of priests who are
increasingly defying the church
hierarchy and the government on
behalf of the lower classes.
The acting primate of Colom-
bia has announced that he has no
proof of the charges of Communist
infiltration and has called for
an "objective study" to distin-
guish between priestly activities
on behalf of social justice and
Communist efforts. Unless Presi-
dent Lleras seeks the same dif-
ferentiation and directs Colom-
bian security forces to do the
same, the activist priests may
conclude that they have no choice
but extremism to prove their
point. _I- I
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CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION HINGES ON JAMAICA
Leaders of the Commonwealth
Caribbean, meeting in Port of Spain
from 3 to 7 February, apparently
again failed to remove the major
obstacle to further economic in-
tegration. Despite the creation
of a Caribbean free trade area
(CARIFTA) almost a year ago, ef-
forts to establish a regional de-
velopment bank have been thwarted
by Jamaica's reluctance to par-
ticipate.
Jamaica did not join CARIF'PA
until last August, and it is still
undecided about joining the pro-
posed Caribbean Development Bank
(CDB). As the most economically
advanced of the Caribbean states,
Jamaica apparently fears that its
development would be hampered by
involvement in a cooperative eco-
nomic endeavor with its poorer
neighbors. During the conference,
several Jamaican Government of-
ficials stated that the main ob-
stacle to Jamaica's participation
in the bank is the lack of avail-
able financial resources. This
factor has not been raised in
previous Caribbean meetings and
probably constitutes a new delay-
ing tactic.
If Jamaica does not agree
to participation before 31 May,
a deadline set by the recent con-
ference, it may mean the end of
CARIFTA. Several leaders have
complained about the delays en-
countered in establishing the bank,
which they believe is the only
CARIFTA entity that would benefit
their economic development.
Britain, Canada, and the US
have indicated they will support
the CDB with or without Jamaican
participation. Nevertheless, they
have favored Jamaican entry because
this would facilitate the bank's
acquisition of $65 million in
capital assets, the amount rec-
ommended by the charter meeting
in March 1968.
Jamaica would also serve as
a drawing card for other Caribbean
islands that are now outside the
free trade area. Prime Minister
Pindling of the Bahamas has said
that he will join the bank if
Jamaica does, and officials in
Haiti and the Dominican Republic
are expressing interest. Puerto
Rican officials had said last
year that they would like to par-
ticipate, if legal arrangements
could be made with the US, but
the government elected in Novem-
ber has taken no position on the
question.
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