WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 7, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A0069000~e0Cret
]DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Department review completed
Secret
~~
7 February 1969
No. 0356/69
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(Information as of noon EST, 6 February 1969)
VIETNAM
The Conununists used the Paris meetings on 30 January
to warn the US that there could be no resolution of
specific military problems without simultaneous con-
sideration of related political. issues. Meanwhile,
regional antagonisms within the Saigon government
appear to be increasing in virulence. There was
little significant fighting as many of the enemy's
combat forces remained preoccupied with preparations
for renewed offensive activity.
COMMUNIST PRESSURE CONTINUES IN SOUTH LAOS
An extensive enemy offensive may be unfolding in
south Laos.
Europe
Page
1
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE ~
SOV]:ETS FOSTER ANXIETY ABOUT BERLIN ELECTIONS
Moscow's line suggests that it has some hope for a
relocation of the election or, failing that, of ex-
tracting West German concessions in other fields.
USSR PUSHES INTERNATIONAL FISHING OPERATIONS
The rapid and successful expansion of the Soviet
fishing fleet into many traditional fishing grounds
of the free world may be tempered by international
reaction as well as by domestic processing and dis-
tribution problems.
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FP.CTIONALISM SHARPENS IN CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY HIERARCHY
Factional infighting among the Czechoslovak leader-
ship intensified as pro-Soviet conservatives stepped
up their efforts to gain greate:r influence in the
central committee.
RL~MANIAIdS AND YUGOSLAVS STEP OF COOPERATION
Rumania and Yugoslavia drew a bit closer as a result
of the meeting between party leader Ceausescu and
President Tito on 1 and 2 February.
MLNORITY UNREST PERSISTS IN YUGIOSLAVIA
Violent disturbances late last year in Yugoslavia's
Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Republic of Mace-
donia are symptomatic of th.e country's omnipresent
problem of nationalist rivalries.
DE. GAULLE PROMISES FRENCH REFERENDUM THIS SPRING
'I'he referendum that De Gaulle recently announced
would be held this spring officially will be on
changes in the Senate and regional government, but
many Frenchmen will see it as a chance to vote for
or against their President. It will almost cer-
tainly be approved.
PF,KISTAN'S PRESIDENT AYUB PROPOSES 'PACKS WITH OPPOSITION
Pakistan's three-month-old political crisis is un-
likely to be resolved by President Ayub's announce-
ment that he will soon invite "responsible" opposi-
tion leaders for talks. Opposition leaders have not
formally responded to the offer but are generally
pessimistic that discussions can produce a workable
compromise.
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JORDAN ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN AIR DEFENSES
Jordan is attempting to improve its air defenses in
the face of almost daily Israeli reconnaissance
flights, but it is unlikely that these measures
will be effective against an Israeli attack.
ARMY DISCONTENT RISING IN CONGO (KINSHASA)
Army discontent appears to be increasing in Congo
(Kinshasa), but the troops are unlikely to trans-
form their complaints into actions in the near
future.
SOUTH AFRICA'S AFRIKANERS AGITATED ABOUT APARTHEID
A growing criticism of South Africa's racial poli-
cies by Afrikaner intellectuals may eventually stim-
ulate a more realistic appraisal of the shortcomings
of apartheid.
Western Hemisphere
PERU-IPC DISPUTE INTENSIFIES
The military government has just set the US company's
"debt" to the state at slightly more than $690 million.
UNREST INCREASES IN CHILEAN COUNTRYSIDE
Farmers in southern Chile, already beset by the
worst drought in forty years, are becoming increas-
ingly disturbed over low prices for their crops and
the threat they see from the government's agrarian
reform program.
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GROWING RAPPORT BETWEEN ANDEAN AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 24
Since Colombia and the USSR re~-established relations
in January 1968, there has been a flurry of Eastern
European visitors, announcements of commercial nego-
tiations and agreements, a.nd probings by the Andean
countries toward diplomatic recognition.
INDEPENDENCE CONFERENCE ON BRI'T'ISH HONDURAS DELAYED
Premier Price's request to postpone the constitutional
conference set for Marcn has temporarily reduced ten-
sions and provides additional time for negotiation
between Britain and Guatemala on Guatemala's century-
old claim to :British Honduras.
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Conflicting approaches in the Paris talks on the key issue of the
relationship between political and military questions hardened last week.
The North Vietnamese and the Liberation Front delegates insisted that
military questions cannot be resolved without a political settlement. Vice
President Ky, on the other hand, implied that the South Vietnamese will
refuse to discuss political issues in Paris until military problems are settled
and insisted on a prior withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces.
The provinces ringing Saigon continue to be the focal point of enemy
troop shifts, and over the past few months the Communists have assembled a
formidable fighting force in the area. The Communists have probably con-
cluded that continued pressure in this strategic, heavily populated area is
likely to have the greatest impact on both the US and the South Vietnamese.
Recent fighting in southern Laos has centered on the government base
camp at . Thateng, but there are continuing reports of an enemy buildup in
other areas of the Bolbvens Plateau. Without significant reinforcement from
other regions, and given their state of near despair, the southern military
leaders might abandon important positions to the Communists, including the
politically sensitive provincial capitals of Saravane and Attopeu.
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V}:ETNAM
The Communists used the Pari:.
meetings on 30 January to warn thE~
US tYiat there could be no resolu-
tion of specific military problem:
without simultaneous consideratior::
of rE:lated political issues. Ha-
noi ' :~ delegate , Xuan 'Phuy , e x-
plicitly rejected US proposals
that the first order of business
be nE:utralization of the Demili-
tarised Zone and mutL,al troop
withdrawal. The Communists want
the L1S to accept at least the
broad principles of their four ancl.
five points for a political set-
t1emE:nt before they will discuss
any de-escalation of the military
conflict.
Both the North Vietnamese ancl.
Liberation Front delegates were
careful, however, to hedge their
outright rejection of allied pro-
posals with hints that the two
sides were not as far apart on po-
litical issues as it might appear.
Xuan Thuy used some of the most
attractive language in the Commu-
nist lexicon to discuss the role
of th.e Liberation Front= in post-
war Vietnam, strongly suggesting
that this sticky issue was open
to negotiation. He played down
earlier demands for a settlement
"in accordance" with tYie Front's
program and an immediate impor-
tant share of political power for
the Communists. Instead, he asked
for solutions based on "self-de-
termination" and an acknowledge-
ment of the Front's "existence."
The Liberation Front spokesman
concluded his lengthy harangue
with the promise that if the con-
ference could agree to accept the
Front's five points as a basis
for settling the war, "it would
create favorable conditions for
t:he settlement of all substantive
questions."
Vietnamese Communist propa-
ganda this week also reacted for
the first time to reports that
the US gradually plans to scale
down its role in Vietnam before
any political accommodation with
tie Communists has been reached.
I:n a broadcast on 2 February, Ha-
noi ridiculed the idea of "de-
Americanizing" the war. The Com-
munists obviously would like to
see the US withdraw its forces
unilaterally and completely with-
out making the Communists pay a
price in return. They seem to
fear, however, that the US is
only considering a gradual with-
drawal tied to the abilities of
the South Vietnamese to take over
the main part of the job them-
sE~lves. They probably realize
that if this were successfully
e:~ecuted, even in part, it would
undercut much of the pressure on
the US to make political conces-
sions to the Communists in order
to end the war.
Political Developments
in South Vietnam
Regional antagonisms appear
to be increasing in virulence.
Supporters of Vice President Ky
ar_e involved both on the political
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front against Prime Minister Hu-
ong's entourage and within the
military against President Thieu's
supporters.
The. Ky-Huong rivalry--both
personal. and professional--is in
large-part drawn along north-south
lines. Extremist southerners,
many of whom hold influential gov-
ernment positions, have begun a
campaign to oust northerners from
the bureaucracy. They claim that
when Ky was prime minister, he
dismissed many southerners from
their government posts and that
all key ministerial positions on
the subcabinet level are con-
trolled by northerners. Huong
disapproves of this vendetta, but
his close associates, southerners
all, believe it is justified.
To add to this suspicion and
conflict, rumors of cabinet
changes are again rampant in Sai-
gon. Ky is returning from Paris
to Saigon, where he reportedly 25X1
hopes to influence Thieu to place
his own supporters in primary po-
sitions. Ky still believes that
only he can lead the country safely
through the peace negotiations and
into successful political competi-
tion with the Communists.
Military Developments
in South Vietnam
Many of the enemy's combat
forces remain preoccupied with
preparations for renewed offensive
activities in key sectors of South
Vietnam and little significant
ground fighting was initiated by
the Communists. Most fighting,
generally small-unit actions, de-
veloped in reaction to aggressive
allied operations aimed at disrupt-
ing the enemy's preparations for
battle. Enemy gunners did, how-
ever, launch mortar and rocket at-
tacks against allied military po-
sitions and installations in wide-
spread sections of the country,
none of which accounted for major
damage or casualties.
The provinces ringing Saigon
continue to be the focal point of
enemy troop shifts to enhance their
military posture. Over the past
few months, the Communists have
amassed a formidable fighting
force in the III Corps - Saigon
area. At least four first-line
infantry divisions are currently
deployed in the outlying provinces
of the corps, while the equivalent
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AN
;i 43 YEN
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CAM
',MANH
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of an additional eight regiments
is operative in the subregions im-
mediately surrounding Saigon. The
enemy also has sizable artillery,
specialized combat, and local and
guerrilla force assets in the
area.
The magnitude of such a
buildup suggests that the III
Corps - Saigon area remains of
overriding importance to Commu-
nist war planners and that it will
be the scene of intensified combat
over the next few months. The
Communists have probably concluded
that continued pressure in this
strategic, heavily populated sec-
tor is likely over the long haul
to have the greatest impact on
both the US and the South Viet-
namese.
Communist battle preparations
continue in other parts of the
country, but at a slower pace and
with varying degrees of apparent
urgency. The increasing threat
in north and central South Viet-
nam suggests that a new round of
hostilities will include at least
limited action on more than one
front. Furthermore, it is becom-
ing increasingly evident that the
Communists are struggling to coun 25X1
ter stepped-up allied pacification
efforts to assume more control of
controversial areas.
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COMMUNIST PRESSURE CONTINUES IN SOUTH LAOS
An extensive enemy offensive
may be unfolding in south Laos.
On 2 February, North Viet-
namese forces renewed their of-
fensive against the government
base camp at Thateng along the
northeastern rim of the Bolovens
Plateau. Although the 400-man
garrison beat off several ground
probes, much of the base's perim-
eter defense has been destroyed.
There are presently some five
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese
battalions encircling the camp,
which has made aerial resupply of
the base extremely difficult.
It is doubtful that the defenders
could hold out against an all-out
assault.
Most recent fighting has
centered on Thateng, but there
are continuing reports of an
enemy buildup in other areas of
the Bolovens Plateau.
The deteriorating situation
at Thateng and the prospect of
Communist moves elsewhere are
wearing down the already slender
resolve of the government's mili-
tary commanders in the south.
Without significant reinforcement
from other regions, and given
their state of near despair, the
southern leaders might abandon im-
portant positions to the Commu-
nists, including the politically
sensitive provincial capitals of
Saravane and Attopeu.
In the north, meanwhile,
there has been no new major fight-
ing. Military activity has been
limited to enemy ground probes of
the outlying defenses of General
Vang Pao's headquarters at Long
Tieng, and the exchange of iso-
lated outposts southwest of Route
4 in the Muong Om area. The Na
Khang area, site of a key govern-
ment guerrilla base, remains quiet.
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Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMAI~Y 7 Feb 69
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Kremlin watchers were more intrigued than usual this week. This was
partly because of the still cloudy shooting incident in Moscow last month
and the treatment of sensitive issues in the Soviet press in ways that
suggested controversy in the leadership. Kosygin was noted in public, how-
ever, for the first time since late December. At week's end it was too early to
tell if the total import of these matters equaled the apparent sum of their
parts.
Whatever the case, Moscow moved ahead on a number of diplomatic
fronts. It welcomed President Nixon's action on the nonproliferation treaty
and prepared for possible meetings of the four powers in New York on the
Middle East. Articles in both Izvestia and Pravda reiterated Soviet readiness
to talk on strategic arms limitation.
In Czechoslovakia, with a party plenum scheduled for next month,
factionalism and political bargaining are sharpening. The most powerful
conservative figure, Husak, leader of the Slovak party, is moving to unseat
Dubcek. He needs the votes controlled by Lubomir Strougal, leader of the
Czech party, who so far does not seem to have been lured away from
Dubcek. This may only mean the price is not right.
A high-level Czechoslovak delegation led by national front chairman
Erban was received in Moscow by all the top Soviet leaders during afour-day
visit. Erban, a moderate supporter of Dubcek, is the highest ranking Czech-
oslovak leader to visit Moscow since the fateful Kiev meeting last December.
Rumania's Ceausescu anal Yugoslavia's Tito met in a Rumanian border
town last weekend to consider conunon responses and tactics if Moscow puts
the heat on in the spring. This is the sixth such comfort session the two
Ba}kan leaders have had since January 19C>6.
In Italy, continuing worker and student demonstrations preoccupied
both the government and the Communists. Some leaders at the 12th Com-
munist Party congress, opening on 8 February in Bologna, will want to back
the demonstrators, but the party will probably avoid open endorsement in
view of its policy of pursuing a peaceful road to power.
West Germany's Gerstenmaier affair drew to a close. The veteran
Bu:ndestag president stepped down on 31 January, victim of a public outcry
over lus acceptance of a reparations payment stemming from the Nazi era.
Re:fu ee Minister von Hassel was elected as his successor.
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S_F.CF':ET
JOVIETS FOSTER ANXIETY ABOUT BERLIN ELECTIONS
Soviet diplomats are fos-
tering anxiety among some West
German officials in an effort to
get Eonn to reverse its choice
of West Berlin as the site for
electing the next federal presi-
~3ent on 5 March. While its pros-
pects appear slim, Moscow's line
suggests that it has same hope
for a. relocation or, failing
that, of extracting other West
German concessions.
economic and foreign affairs in
Bonn's coalition government.
Moscow clearly is appealing
to party leaders and others who
hope for achievements they can
point to before West Germany's
general elections later this
year. Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin
has scheduled another meeting
with Foreign Minister Brandt,
who the Soviets may expect to
be susceptible to this tactic.
:4n a conversation on 31 Jan-
!aary with Major Schuetz of West
3erlin, the USSR's ambassador to
,Fast Germany strongly urged that
the election be held in West Ger-
rnany. He also said that Soviet
;~atie:nce is exhausted and that
Serious countermeasures might be
~xpecaed, although, as ususal,
these: were not specified. Schuetz
1ateY? told the British ambassador
that the Soviet comments implied
a stronger reaction than he had
thought likely.
Other Soviet officials have
sought to play up differences
among West German politicians by
combining blandishmer.~t with the
thre~its . For instance , the So-
viet:~ have left the impression
that the fate of possible agree-
rnent:~ between Bonn arad Moscow on
civi:L air routes, cultural and
commercial exchanges, and the re-
nunc~.ation of force could rest
on Bonn's decision about the elec-?
tion?? This is tailored especiall~~?
for f:he Social Democz?ats, who
have the ministries of transport
and all-German affairs as well as
This approach costs Moscow
nothing and may reap benefits
even though Bonn stays with its
decision. By fanning contro-
versy over the election, the So-
viets seek to implant the notion
that West Germany should at least
t:ry to mollify the USSR by cutting
back future activities in Berlin
o:r by making concessions on other
bilateral subjects. The West
Germans have defended their orig-
inal decision, but at the same
time have hinted they might be
willing to reconsider if the So-
viets would grant concessions
affecting the viability of Berlin.
Such major Bonn figures as
Chancellor Kiesinger and All-Ger-
man Affairs Minister Wehner con-
tinue to have reservations about
the Berlin site. Their objec-
tions center on the risk of So-
viet and East German harassment
and on the possible damage to
Bonn's efforts to talk with Mos-
cow on a broad range of issues.
At present, however, the decision
to hold the election in Berlin
appears firm. 25X1
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USSR PUSHES INTERNATIONAL FISHING OPERATIONS
The continued expansion of So-
viet commercial fishing operations
has enabled the U5SR to penetrate
many traditional fishing grounds
of the free world. Strang protests
by nations fearing Soviet exploita-
tion of their marine wealth as well
a.s the extension by some South Ameri-
can countries of their territorial
limits from l2 to 200 miles, how-
ever, may- push Moscow toward greater
international cooperation in fish-
ing on the high seas.
The Soviet fishing fleet--un-
questionably the world's largest
and most :modern--regularly operates
in international waters of the At-
lantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans
as well as tYiie Caribbean Sea and
African waters. Tn recent years, the
movement of Soviet ships beyond
their traditional fishing waters
of the North Atlantic and the North
Pacific. has-been facilitated by
agreements that the USSR has reached
with 14 underdeveloped countries. to
develop their fishing industries.
While providing for Soviet aid in
establishing indigenous fishing
fleets, parts, and canneries, these
agreements also have provided fish-
ing facilities for expanded Soviet
activity in nearby waters. In re-
cent months, Moscow has signed pacts
covering fishery aid with Algeria,
Chile, Iraq, and Pakistan, and a
similar agreement is probable soon
with Southern Yemen.
Moscow also has cooperated with
the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO) in setting up seminars
on various aspects of commercial
fishing. Vast November, for example,
trainees from Asian, African, and
East European countries partici-
pated in a four-week study cruise
h aboard a Soviet oceanographic ship
during which Soviet and other FAO
experts gave lectures and demonstra-
tions in marine biology and oceano-
graphic science.
The Soviet fishing fleet, which
now includes more than 3,500 ocean-
going fishing and support ships, is
still being augmented. Recent ac-
quisitions from Denmark include two
trawler-training ships that will
serve as floating schools to help
meet the USSR's need -for profes-
sional. seamen.. Each ship has ac-
commodations for about 110 appren-
tices plus classrooms for navigation
and radio instruction. With the
delivery of three more identical
ships still on order, the USSR soon
will be able to train 550 appren-
tices at one time. Moscow also has
placed orders for 40 fish-factory
and refrigerator ships in Western
countries as well as sizable. can-
tracts for trawlers .with Poland
and East Germany.
In 1967, the Soviet fishing
fleet brought in 5.8 million tons
of fish--the third largest world
catch for that year after Peru and
Japan. Despite the modernization
of the Soviet fleet and improvement
in fishing techniques, however, the
total fish catch of 8.7 million tons
planned for 1970 probably is overly
optimistic. The preliminary plan
for 1971-75 calls for an increase
of the total catch to only 9.5 -mil-
lion tons in 1975, a projection of
the annual average increase achieved
since 1960. This rate of growth prob-
ably reflects domestic inadequacies
in fish-processing and refrigerating
facilities as well as distribution
problems. 25X1
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FACTIONALISM SHARPENS IN CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY HIERARCHY
Factional infighting among the
Czechoslovak leadershi~~ intensi-
fied as the pro-Soviet conserva-
tives stepped up their efforts
to gain greater influe:zae in the
central committee.
The conservatives are try-
ing to put together a majority
in the central committee before
the party plenum next month. Slo-
c?ak pasty leader Gustav Husak has
solidified the Slovak group and
is no~n~ trying to seduce Czech
party boss Lubomir Strougal, who
controls a key number of votes.
e~ny cooperation between these two
rnoder~ite-conservatives will be
-ragi~.e at best, as both are guided.
by thE:ir own ambitions and must
also k~e responsive to the differ-
ing interests of their constituen-
:ies .
The progressives,, their co-
hesiveness apparently declining,
are hoping to strengthen their
position by forcing an early party
congr~ass while they s1=i11 have a
majority. The Russians, however,
probably will not permit a con-
gress until they can lie sure that
a majority of delegates will sup-
port the conservatives and mod-
erates most responsive to Soviet
objectives. Some pro~z?essives
and moderates are now reassessing
their positions as a result of
the growing influence of the con-
servatives, and a sizable defec-
tion into Husak's camp could turn
the tide against Dubcel~:. On 5
February, Dubcek tried to reas-
sure his wavering progressive sup-
portE:rs that he would. appose con-
servative attempts to dominate
the ~>arty as well as "extremist"
efforts to create another crisis
situation.
Encouraged by the growing in-
fluence of conservatives at the
top levels of the party, pro-So-
vie:t hard liners in the Ministry
of Interior are becoming increas-
ingly active.
Meanwhile, the Dubcek leader-
ship has responded to Soviet in-
sistence to crack down on the out-
spoken mass media. Party official:>
have allegedly given editors an
expanded list of censorship restric-
tions, and some uncompromising
radio and television personalities
have been shifted. The regime also
intends to transfer or demote more
dissident journalists and to in-
stitute pre-censorship for such
anti-Soviet weeklies as Reporter,
tl-ie Prague version of Time .
The Soviets continue to find
ways to make their requirements
known to Czechoslovak officials on
all levels of the party and govern-
me:nt. Three more Czechoslovak dele-
gations were in Moscow last week,
including a national front entourage
lE.d by presidium executive committee
member Evzen Erban and including the
heads of major mass organizations
a:nd "puppet" political parties. In
addition, Foreign Minister Jan Marko
made a familiarization trip to the.
USSR on 5 February.
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RUMANIANS AND YUGOSLAVS STEP UP COOPEaATION
Rumania and Yugoslavia drew
a bit closer as a result of the
meeting between party chief Ceaus-
escu and President Tito on 1 and
2 February. They probably agreed
on common tactics in response to
Moscow's efforts to force them
into greater cooperation with the
Soviet bloc.
The two leaders may be look-
ing ahead a few months to what
they consider will be a time of
troubles with their Communist
neighbors. Rumors are rife in
Eastern Europe of forthcoming
summit meetings where basic changes
will .be attempted in the Warsaw
Pact and the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CEMA). Mos-
cow is said to be driving for a
tighter command structure and
greater standardization of forces
within the pact. Greater integra-
tion of the economies of Communist
Europe would probably be on the
agenda of a CEMA summit.
Bucharest has consistently
opposed measures of this sort on
the grounds that they would in-
fringe on its sovereignty. In
light of the USSR's demonstrated
willingness to use force in East-
ern Europe, Rumania apparently
fears it may be forced to accept
Soviet demands in both CEMA and
the pact or risk being isolated
from the inner workings of each
organization, or worse.
mania. Details such as timing
and location are yet to be set-
tled. Because the maneuvers will
in effect put pressure on Yugo-
slavia as well, Tito would want
to know Rumania's options and
contingency plans if the USSR de-
parts from the terms of the agree-
ment on the maneuvers. In their
communique, the two leaders em-
phasized the UN resolution on
friendly relations among European
states, and may have been attempt-
ing to direct attention to the
possibility of heavy-handed Soviet
tactics.
They probably also discussed
what attitude Rumania would take
at working groups to prepare for
an international Communist con-
ference--both leaders have criti-
cized plans to hold such a confer-
ence. Yugoslavia stands by its
previous position not to attend
the meeting, but Rumania will have
representatives present when the
next working group convenes this
month in Budapest.
The two leaders announced
an important agreement for ex-
panded collaboration on indus-
trial, scientific, and technical
matters. Such collaboration is
mainly intended to reduce the
two countries' dependence on Mos-
cow in these areas.
Ceausescu and Tito probably
thoroughly reviewed the question
of the Warsaw Pact maneuvers to
be held later this year in Ru-
This is the sixth time the
two leaders have met since Janu-
ary 1966; they last met in August,
to discuss and express their op-
position to the invasion of Czech-
oslovakia. 25X1
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SLOVENIA
JJr,
BOSNIA
AND
HERCEGOVINA
Albanian National Minority in Yugoslavia
' Albanian minority group
---- Republic boundary
-- - Autonomous province boundary
MDN7H AND SITES 4F R)OTING
November
~, Kp SO V O
Poduje~
`"'
~.}
. i+ec r, .
Pristina .~-
Suva .Gnjilane
Reka, ,
-"
Uroseva8
QCYE'n ~'
.
7etovo
r31.T3l~NIt1
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 Approved For Release 2006/~~~~7~'-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6
MINORITY UNREST PERSISTS IN YUGOSLAVIA
Violent disturbances late
last year in Yugoslavia's Auton-
omous Province of Kosovo and Re-
public of Macedonia are sympto-
matic of the country's omnipres-
ent problem of nationalist rival-
ries.
Belgrade blamed "irredent-
ists" and foreign intelligence
activists for the riots but ad-
mitted that its liberal minority
policy had led to rising expecta-
tions that could not be quickly
satisfied. The economic bac}c-
wardness of the area is at the
base of the unrest.
The demonstrators were a
small but significant part--in-
tellectuals, teachers, and stu-
dents--of Yugoslavia's Albanian
minority of about one million.
They want republic status within
the federal system for Kosovo.
A few extremists called for union
with Albania but apparently at-
tracted little, if any, popular
support. The only real evidence
of a de:~ire for boundary changes
was seen during the late Decem-
ber riots in Tetovo, Macedonia,
when a number of Albanians there
carried placards asking for the
inclusion of that area in Kosovo.
These. is no evidence to sub-
stantiate the regime's claims of
foreign involvement, but the po-
tential is there. A Hungarian
official recently hinted that
Budapest may exploit Yugoslavia's
nationality problems unless Bel-
grade tempers its stand on Czech-
oslovakia. Belgrade has already
complained about Hungarian broad-
casts into Yugoslavia. Moreover,
there i:~ the ever-present con-
cern in Belgrade that Moscow
might attempt to use Yugoslavia's
nationality problems to counter
Belgrade's criticism of Soviet
policies. Albania periodically
condemns Belgrade's "oppressive"
policies in Kosovo.
The. demonstrations occurred
at a time when considerable at-
tention is being placed on rais-
ing the status of Yugoslavia's
national minorities; Tito him-
self has indicated sympathy with
the Albanian cause. The regime
has granted the Albanian minor-
ity the right to display its na-
tional flags and emblems and to
celebrate national holidays.
Opposition to the Albanian
demands by Serbs and the conser-
vative opposition within the
Serbian Republic party has gained
strength since the riots. In
several instances, the Serbs
elected delegates to the forth-
coming ninth Yugoslav Communist
Party .congress who were opposed
to the regime's liberal minority
policy. Only with great diffi-
culty was the party able to annul
the returns and elect more moder-
ate candidates.
Despite the rioting, regime
officials indicate they intend
to continue their liberal policy
toward Kosovo. The problem is
far from settled, however, and
national rivalries could be a dis-
ruptive factor during the party
congress, scheduled to convene
on 11 March. Furthermore, any
concessions to the Albanian mi-
nority could set a precedent for
demands of the Hungarian minor-
ity in the Vojvodina Autonomous
Province, also a part of the
Serbian Republic.
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DE GAULLE: PROMISES FRENCH REFERENDUM THIS SPRING
The referendum that President
de Gaulle recently announced woLi.ld
be held this spring officially
wi:.l be on chancres in the Senate:
and regional government. Many
Frenchmen, however, will see it
as a chance to vote for or agair:.st
De Gaulle . He him~.e.lf would prob-
ab'~y interpret a large "yes" vote
on the referendum as a convincing--
if indirect--endorsement of his
st~~tement last month that he
pl~~nned to serve until his term
ex~~ires in Decembes~ 1972.
The referendum, the first
since the one in October 1962
that established direct elections
for the presidency ,. wi 11 provide,:
for a radical overhaul in Frenerc
local government ar-d will strip
the Senate of most of its few re-
maining powers. Councils will k.>e
created for each of` the country"s
21 regions, and a ]_arge part of
the. regional administration cur-~
rer~tly conducted iri Paris will
be transferred to these councils.
They will be compo:~ed of local
councilors, deputies to the Na-
tional Assembly, and representa--
ti~~es of labor, farmers, and
business organizations as well
as of the universii:ies.
The Senate, a traditionali::~t
body that has tendE:d to be host:~_le
to Gaullist programs, will become
purely consultativE:. It will
"e:xamine" all economic and plan--
ni:ng legislation before submiss:'Lon
to the National Assembly. De
Gaulle has long contended that
the Senate, heavily weighted in
favor of rural areas, has ceased
to be representative,
Calling voters to the poll;
at a time when labor and studenl~
unrest continues and the econom:~c
outlook is still uncertain carr:i.es
the risk of a high abstention
rate. If the vote is in March,
which many observers are predici:-
ing, it will coincide with a
scheduled round of wage talks
between unions and employers--
a potential source of serious
industrial trouble. De Gaulle,
however, may reason that condi-
tions will be even less auspi-
cious later in the year,
There is discontent over
the austerity program designed
to save the franc and oppositio~z
to the embargo De Gaulle recently
imposed on arms to Israel, but
his popularity rating has re-
mained relatively stable. In
polls taken late last month by
the reputable French Institute
of Public Opinion, 53 percent of
those queried said they were
satisifed with the President.
His personal popularity, coupled
with the favorable attitude to-
ward regionalization that even
many Gaullist critics have, would
seem to ensure a referendum vic-
tory. Centrist political lead-
ers are predicting that between
55 and 65 percent of those who
vote will a rove the referendum.
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The Arab states and Israel focused their attention on US discussions of
the Middle East and a possible favorable US response to the French proposal
for four-power talks. The Arab states were hopeful that such talks would
begin, but Israeli leaders viewed this possibility as the beginning of an
eventually imposed solution.
The Iraqi Government, after considerable diplomatic pressure from
many nations, released an American oilman imprisoned on trumped-up
charges of espionage. The release was portrayed as a magnanimous gesture,
perhaps to counter world-wide indignation over the recent public hanging as
alleged Israeli spies of 14 Iraqis, nine of whome were Jews.
In Pakistan, President Ayub invited opposition leaders to meet with
him on 17 February and he asked the spokesman for the opposition
coalition to select the invitees. Reaction to the proposal has been lukewarm,
and many opposition leaders believe that Ayub must make some significant
conciliatory gestures before discussions can get under way. Even if the
meeting takes place, there is little hope that it will end the turmoil or resolve
the political crisis.
Prospects for Congress Party gains in northern India are poor as the
midterm state assembly elections get under way. The earlier trend toward
Congress in West Bengal apparently has been arrested. In Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh, Congress probably will fail to gain enough seats to form stable
governments. Congress appears a sure loser in the Punjab, where a local Sikh
communal party and the Hindu nationalist Jan Sangh have come on strong.
~Jigerian federal leaders are showing increasing signs of frustration as
they prepare for another offensive. The Biafrans are again apparently re-
ceiving considerable amounts of arms over the nightly airlift and appear
capable of at least maintaining the military stalemate.
Eduardo Moncilane, leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front
(FRELIMO) and the strongest voice for moderation, was assassinated on 3
February. The Front has been beset by dissension, and Mondland may have
been killed by members who advocate a more militant policy.
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RAWALPINDI
17 January
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dots
and
Demonstrations
in
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PAKISTANIS PRESIDENT AyLJB PROPOSES TALKS KITH OPPOSITION
President Ayub's announce-
ment that he will invite "respon-
sible" opposition parties for
talks has temporarily placed a
damper on antigovernment vio-
lence, lout it appears unlikely
to resolve the country's three-
month-old political crisis.
In his eagerly awaited first-
of-the-month broadcast, Ayub
indicated that he is ready to
discuss opposition proposals
and will "have no hesitation in
agreeing to any settlement that
is arrived at through mutual dis-
cussions." He emphasized that
the 1962 Constitution--which he
has stolatly defended in previous
speeche:~--can be amended. He
did not enumerate specific as-
pects of the constitution that
he considers negotiable, however,
and did not suggest that he would
meet key opposition demands for
a parliamentary system of gov-
ernment and direct elections.
All major opposition parties,
except ex - foreign minister Bhut-
to's leftists and the pro-Peking
extremists, will reportedly be in-
vited to participate. Independ-
ent government critics with no
party affiliation, such as Asghar
Khan, will apparently not be in-
cluded.
Most opposition leaders are
far from optimistic about talks.
The few who have commented on
the proposal are skeptical of
Ayub's motives and suggest that
he is only trying to divide the
opposition. The new opposition
coalition has said that its
"collective opinion" will be
expressed in due course. Thus
far, however, Ayub has done
nothing to create a favorable
climate for a meeting--such as
ending the state of emergency
or releasing political prisoners--
and there is considerable feeling
that he must make some such
gesture before talks can begin.
Some leftist leaders and
dissident students have already
rejected Ayub's offer and de-
manded that troops be withdrawn
from all cities. In both East
and West Pakistan, students are
continuing to defy the govern-
ment and to press their demands.
They will probably refuse to
accept any compromise whatever.
Opposition plans are as yet un-
clear, but a "negotiate and
fight" strategy seems most likely--
conferring with the regime for
immediate gains but maintaining
an activist stance to force
further concessions.
President Ayub is probably
also pessimistic about the out-
come of the talks. If they
fail, he will be faced with the
unpleasant choice of far-reach-
ing concessions or more repres-
sive measures, with martial law
as a last resort. He could
justify harsh tactics by point-
ing out that he had first tried
conciliation. Many observers
continue to believe that the
turmoil can only be brought to
an end if Ayub steps down, Al-
though such a move would be out
of character for him, the possi-
bility cannot be completely dis-
counted.
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ARMY DISCONTENT RISING IN CONGO KINSHASA)
Army discontent appears to
be increasing in Congo (Kinshasa).
In its new mood, the Congolese Na-
tional Army (ANC) belatedly joins
other sectors of the population
that have suffered a decline in
living standards while the regime
seemingly ignores their plight.
The troops are unlikely, however,
to transform their complaints into
actions in the near future.
The ANC in the past has fared
better than other groups because
it forms the base of President
Joseph Niobutu's power structure,
and Mobutu has paid it special
attention. Junior officers have
long been unhappy with the army
hierarchy, which is studded with
incompetent and often semiliterate
veterans who served in preinde-
pendence~ days and got their posts
only thY~ough seniority. Mobutu
still depends upon the continued
loyalty of tYiese men, and his de-
cision t:o keep them in command po-
sitions rather than retire them
is based on political and not mil-
itary considerations.
Several recent events, how-
ever, have further irritated the
already disgruntled troops. The
military pay raise on 1 January
was far short of what was antici-
pated and what junior officers
January two widely respected colo-
nels were dismissed and replaced 25X1
by cronies of the notoriously un-
popular ANC commander, Louis Bo-
bozo. Morale at ANC headquarters
sank to a new low, and antigovern-
ment handbills began circulating.
The military is not really
out of line in voicing displeasure.
Since the 1967 monetary reform,
prices have gone up freely while
wages were controlled, and the
average Congolese has experienced
a one-third decrease in his stand-
ard of living. Yet, when money
is tight and the government sup-
posedly operating on an austerity
budget, Mobutu has been extrava-
gant with his personal spending
and his handouts to friends and
allies. Moreover, Mobutu cur-
rently is preoccupied with intra-
African affairs and has neglected
serious domestic problems.
At this time, no civilian is
in a position to challenge Mobutu,
and army malcontents seem unpre-
pared to carry their threats
through. They have no leaders of
sufficient stature to replace Mo-
butu should they attempt a coup.
There is no indication that the
discontent extends to the key para-
military units who are personally
responsible--and resentl to al-
to Mobutu.
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SOUTH AFfZICA~S AFRIKAfJERS AGITATED ABOUT APARTHEID
apartheid in South Africa is
being questioned anew not only by
tradi~~ional opponents of Pretoria':
segregationist policies, but also
by Afrikaner intellectuals and
other influential memk~e:rs of the
rulinq_ Afrikaner community. Crit-
icism from within the Afrikaner
~~itadel will not induce major
=changes in the government's policy,
but it: may eventually force the
Nationalist Party leaders to deal
more realistically with the imprac-?
ticali_ties of apartheid.
1~Tuch of the recent criticism
of apartheid comes from the Afri-
kaans press despite th.e fact that
each of the major Afrikaans-language
newspapers has at least two cabinet,
members on its board of directors.
One of the more influential, con-
servative Afrikaans papers has
states. "that the whites of South
Africa. are not spiritually prepared.
for th.e great undertaking of sepa-
x-ate d.evelopment," and that most
whites are enthusiastic "segregation
talkers" but lukewarm "segregation
doers." Another, more liberal Afri-
kaans paper has expressed consider-
able concern over the government's
failure to even come close to the
minimum goals for Bantustan develop-
ment. One of the more independent
~~f the Afrikaner-run papers went so
far as to warn its readers that the
white community cannot expect to
=xominate the black maj~arity indefi-
:~itely.
Among the recent ?~ritics of
apartheid has been an ~=m.inent
Afrikaner sociologist :From Pre-
toria University who evoked wide-
spread reaction by his statements
tr.at the ideals and goals of apart-
hEid will never be reached, and
tYerefore should be abandoned.
TYis same professor has supported
tre call of several key Afrikaner
newspapers for the holding of a
"volkskongres'' of representative
whites to reflect on the basic
ccncepts of apartheid.
The administrator of Natal
Province, an Afrikaner reputed to
be something of a Nationalist
Party renegade, has also been
notably frank in his criticism of
apartheid. His primary message
has been to the effect that apart-
heid cannot work without major
:ne;~ sacrifices--in terms of money,
confort, and effort--by the whites
to ensure the success of the Afri-
can homelands program. Further,
he has said that at '?five minutes
to twelve" the South Africans can
no longer proceed at a leisurely
ox-cart pace in the implementation
of apartheid.
Such criticism of apartheid
doriation of all of the Interna-
tional Petroleum Company's (IPC)
holdings, the government has an-
nour~ced that the company's "debt"
to t:he state has been placed at
more than $690 million. In a
speech on 6 February, President
Vel~~.sco said measures were being
ado~~ted to assure payment of the
huge: debt and criticized the US
for its threatened use of eco-
nomic sanctions against Peru.
IPC failed to ma}~:e payment
on t February as demanded on an
alleged $15 million debt to the
state oil company for refined
oil products drawn from the ex-
proP~riated Talara refinery and
used. in IPC's distribution out-
lets. The state oil company has
threatened to confiscate IPC's
remaining assets and auction them.
off to fulfill the obligation.
Although the finance minister
promised IPC's president that
the company would be given an ex-
tension to 8 or 9 February, there
is no assurance that he can de-
liver on this promise.
Meanwhile, Peru established
diplomatic relations with the So-
viet Union on 1 February amidst
great fanfare and high-sounding
speeches, The event received
broad coverage in the local press,
with most publications supporting
'the move. Only the conservatives,
whose original support for the
military government has been
wavering anyway, expressed dis-
approval,
In addition, a Soviet com-
mercial mission arrived in Lima
on 5 February. The Soviet am-
bassador to Chile, in Peru for
the exchange of notes on 1 Feb-
ruary, is reported by the Peru-
vian press as stating that the
i:TSSR could supply Peru with ma-
chinery and equipment for its
oil industry, as well as heavy
:Farm equipment and assencer
airplanes,
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UNREST INCREASES IN CHILEAN COUNTRYSIDE
C~-1ILE
Area Severely
acted by Drought
'~ Area Moderately
Affected 6y Urought
Farmers in southern Chile are
becoming increasingly disturbed over
low prices for their crops and the
threat they see from the agrarian
reform program. Their grievances
are complicated by the damage caused
by the current drought, the worst
in more than forty years.
On 15 and 18 January, land-
owners demanding higher government
prices for wheat erected roadblocks
at several strategic points along
the Pan American Highway in south-
ern Chile. More than forty persons
were arrested, including the pub-
lisher of a rightest newspaper.
Because of the drought, over-
all agricultural output is expected
to be 20 to 30 percent less this
year than last. In addition to the
immediate serious effects on crop
output and livestock herds, the
drought is causing landowners to
lay off some of their employees,
These peasants, encouraged by some
Socialist members of parliament,
have invaded farms, and police force
has been needed in some cases to
dislodge them.
The landowners also are appre-
hensive about the impact of the gov-
ernment's agrarian reform program,
fearing that their lands will be
seized without ade uate com ensa-
tion.
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S]~JCR]E'I'
GROWING RAPPORT BETWEEN ANDEAN AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Peru's renewa.L of relation;:
with the USSR on 1 February fol-
lo~~rs a year of increasing contacas
between the Communist nations oa`
Europe and the countries of north-
ern and western South America.
Since Colombia and the USSR re-
esi;ablished relations in Januar~~
19Ei8, there has been a flurry of'.'
Ea::tern European visitors, an-
nouncements of commercial negotia-
tions and agreements, and prob-
ings by the Andean countries to-
waz~d diplomatic recognition.
Peru noticeably increased
contact with Eastern Europe dur-
ing 1967 and 1968. Growing mar-
kets in the bloc fo:r its major
export, fishmeal, led. to the dis-
patch in mid-1968 of a large dele-
gation that negotiated commercial
or ~~onsular agreements with the
USS:E2, Czechoslovaki~~, Poland,
Hun~~ary, and Rumania. Since
President Belaunde':c ouster on 3
October, the military government
has moved quickly to establish
dip~~.omatic relations with Rumani~~.,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and
the USSR, and to ratify some of
the agreements that had been pend-
ing. The Peruvian foreign minis-
ter announced that scientific and
technical as well as economic as-
sistance will be sought from the
USSR. and implicitly accused the
US of a lack of interest in the
development of Peru.
rity but without overstepping t]ze
very correct image they are car~a-
fully cultivating in the Andean
nations. Soviet propaganda has
praised the Peruvian junta for
its expropriation of US oil hold-
ings but the U55R will probably
withhold final judgment until it:
is more certain of the lasting
nature of the military govern-
ment's "anti-imperialist" pos-
ture. The Soviet economic mis-
sion that arrived in Lima on 5
February will probably be will-
ing to extend economic credits
to Peru, but whether such credits
will lead to any more actual
economic benefit to Peru than has
yet been the case for Chile re-
mains to be seen. Among the ma-
terials suggested by the mission,
according to the Peruvian press,
was equipment for exploiting
petroleum deposits.
Venezuela has resumed a di.s--
cussion of renewed relations with
the US5R that was interrupted by
the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Caracas presently has diplomatic
ties with Poland, Rumania, and
Yugoslavia, and is moving toward
:resumption of relations with the
175SR and Hungary, possibly be-
:Eore President Leoni leaves of-
:Eice in early March. President-
elect Caldera also favors rela-
tions with all countries, includ-
ing Eastern Europe and the US5R.
The Soviets , ob~aious 1y
pleased by the Peruvian Govern-
ment's defiant attit~xde toward
the TJS, have respondE:d with alac-
The Ecuadorean Government ex-
pects a Soviet delegation--appar-
ently the one now in Lima--on
1.5 February to discuss both the
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SECRET
exchange of ambassadors and "for-
malization" of commercial rela-
tions. Ecuador's expectations
have been raised by cocoa sales
for $12 million cash to the U5SR
in 1968 and prospects of selling
a large and economically criti-
cal crop of bananas of a type un-
wanted in Japan, the US, or
Western Europe. In return it
has accepted offers from the
U5SR, Poland, Rumania, and Czech-
oslovakia to sell electrical in-
stallations, machinery, cement,
vehicles, and other products. ~-
Bolivian President Barri-
entos' recently reiterated in-
terest in seeking credits from
the U55R is apparently a combina-
tion of reluctance to be left be-
hind and a drive to pique US at-
tention.
The likelihood that Eastern.
European countries and the So-
viet Union can contribute sub-
stantially to increased markets
or economic development of the
Andean countries is not great.
More important is the opportun-
ity to establish Communist mis-
sions as an accepted and inte-
gral part of the local scene in
these countries. Thus far, the
Communist representatives have
been careful not to give grounds
for any suspicion of their ac-
tivities. The rapid growth of
the Soviet Embassy in Colombia
to 23 officials indicates, how-
ever, an intent to establish a
strong presence. Columbia has
three representatives in Moscow.
INDEPENDENCE CONFERENCE ON $RITISH HONDURAS DELAYED
British Honduran Premier
Price's request to postpone the
constitutional conference set for
March has temporarily reduced ten-
sions acid provides additional time
for negotiation between Britain
and Guai~emala on Guatemala's
century--old claim. A basis far
settlemE~nt is not yet clear, how-
ever, and the pressure for indE-
pendence will continue to build.
The impasse stems from Gua-
temala's demand for hegemony over
British Honduras and Britain's
refusal to accede to any agree-
ment that would be unacceptable
to Belize. Guatemala contends
that resolution of its territorial
claim to the colony must be a pre-
condition to any movement toward
independence and that any prior
announcement of a constitutional
conference would virtually destroy
hope of a negotiated settlement.
Guatemala has rejected the British
offer of~two million pounds to
settle the dispute, however, and
SECRET
Approved Foar~'2e~e5ase~~/'~bu: GIA-RDP79-00792E1PA-D0~900020001-6
 Approved For Release 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6
SECRET
British Honduras: Territorial Claims
>~ ~-M idClleseX~
BRITISH
HONDURAS
X11
~~~
t~
~Starin Creek
GLJA'I'E~~I~A,;?
:a$ io ~;
Puerto
Corte$
ua~r~u1Y
e- r~~
Area claimed by M exico(In abeyance
unless Guatemala gains territory)
Area claimed by Guaeemala
25 50
_ STATUTE MIL E9
HRITIS H:
HONDURAS
93789 2.69 CIA
appears to be holding out for some
control over British Honduras' de-
fense and foreign affairs.
Price regards his party's
overwhelming victory in the 1965
election as a mandate to proceed
with independence, and he is de-
termined to achieve it before the
next general election which must
be held no later than March 1970.
His. request to Britain for a post-
ponement of the constitutional
conference appears to have been
a political move rather than the
be inning of a new polic
Thus, rel-
atively little time remains for a
settlement to be negotiated which
would preclude. the need for a
British defense guarantee. The
British, thus far, have been re-
luctant to extend such a commit-
ment but in :the absence of a set-
tlement of the Guatemalan claim
they would probably have to in-
clude this guarantee as part of
the independence agreement.
The opposition National Inde-
pendence-Party fears that its
chances of toppling Price would
be slim if independence is granted,
and-are. therefore strongly in fa-
vor of delay until after new elec-
tions. Should-.the oppoosition do
well in the city council elections,
its contention that Price does not
have a- mandate to lead the country
to independence will be stronger.
In that event, the British might
be able to gain additional time
for negotiations by pressing-Price
to delay until after new elections.
SECRET
Approved.:Fp~~~Re~~ase~~rR/~3/~~~~tDP79-0~9~~~-0$~900020001-6
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6
 A~aor Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6
Secret
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020001-6