WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006500020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 14, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
45
State Dept. review completed
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(Information as of noon EDT, 13 June 1968)
VIETNAM
There is still no break in the Paris talks, with the
North Vietnamese maintaining their position on the
bombing issue in very hard-line terms. Street fight-
ing in Saigon suburbs has subsided, but the Commu-
nists continue their pressure on the capital through
a series of intense rocket bombardments. President
Thieu has replaced General Loan, a key supporter of
Vice President Ky, as chief of the national police.
MAOISTS RENEW DEMANDS FOR "REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE"
The violent fighting that continues to plague some
areas of China seems to be fueled by current propa-
ganda exhortations to "arouse the masses" against
enemies of the state.
NEW INDONESIAN CABINET WILL FOCUS ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY
President Suharto's new cabinet, installed on 10
June, has been charged with developing and executing
a five-year economic plan and preparing for general
elections in 1971.
Europe
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NEW EAST GERMAN CHALLENGE OVER WEST BERLIN
With the introduction of new controls on West German
travelers and goods transiting East Germany, the U1-
bricht regime has taken its most serious step against
Berlin since the building of the Wall in 1961.
DISORDER GROWING IN FRANCE
Although over 9 million of the 10 million striking
workers have returned to their jobs and the general
strike has thus virtually ended, the danger of seri-
ous disorders has increased during the past week.
CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET RELATIONS REMAIN UNEASY
The fragile "understanding" between Moscow and Prague
was jarred this week when the Soviet Foreign Ministry
for the first time formally protested an article that
had appeared in a Czechoslovak newspaper.
ECONOMIC REFORM LAGS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The Dubcek regime has had to weather the initial
phase of the political storm before it could begin
to focus on the problems of economic reform.
NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE FOR NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
Negotiations for renewal of the coalition between the
Christian Democrats and the Unified Socialist Party
seem likely to be prolonged, and Italy may be without
decisive government at a time of increased internal
strains caused by the crisis in France.
TITO ENDS RIOTS, PROMISES REFORMS IN YUGOSLAVIA
Tito's promise on 9 June to satisfy student demands
for jobs and social reform probably will cause fur-
ther party dissension and temporarily slow up his
economic reforms.
NEW TRIBAL UNREST THREATENS EASTERN INDIA
Hill tribe pressure is forcing the government to con-
sider establishment of a largely autonomous hill state
in eastern India. The government, faced with the
still festering Naga and Mizo rebellions, can ill
afford further disruption in the region.
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GREEK "REVOLUTION" PLODS FORWARD 20
A cabinet shift may be in the offing
Little resistance
activity has been noted and some Greeks are even tak-
ing comfort in the stability of life under the mili-
tary regime.
SOMALIS REFOCUS THEIR ATTENTION ON DJIBOUTI
The French Territory of Afars and Issas, the former
French Somaliland, may be edging into the political
spotlight again as Mogadiscio leaders consider the
implications of recent reports of possible "repercus-
sions" of the French crisis.
UN INCREASES SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA
The new UN call for expanded economic sanctions is
not likely to trouble Rhodesia's economy in any sig-
nificant way, and there is hardly any chance that it
will bring down the Smith regime.
Western Hemisphere
POLITICAL CRISIS IN COLOMBIA NOT RESOLVED
The Senate's refusal on 12 June to accept President
Carlos Lleras' resignation has not ended the contro-
versy over his constitutional reform program.
SHOWDOWN TEMPORARILY AVERTED IN BOLIVIA
President Barrientos seems again to have managed to
outmaneuver his opposition in the face of serious
economic and political problems.
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CHILEAN COMMUNISTS CONTINUE POLITICAL MANEUVERING
The Communist Party has renewed its call for a broad
leftist front to contest the 1970 presidential elec-
tions, but it hinted that it might abandon its tra-
ditional Socialist allies if they continue their
present extremist tactics.
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The North Vietnamese are continuing to take a hard official line on
the bombing issue at the Paris talks and elsewhere. There are a number of
indications that they plan to intensify propaganda efforts in support of
their position, with a particular view toward influencing American public
opinion.
The ground war in South Vietnam slackened noticeably during the
week, but rocket attacks on Saigon increased. Skirmishing around Khe
Sanh continued amid indications that the Communists intend to raise the
stakes in that area by augmenting their forces. In the western highlands,
Special Forces camps remain likely targets for possibly major enemy
attacks.
In Saigon, Vice President Ky has responded to the latest blow to his
power position-General Loan's removal as national police chief--by an-
nouncing his resignation as director of the People's Self-Defense Force.
Seemingly persuaded that President Thieu will bypass him on all matters
of importance anyway, Ky appears resigned to staying in the background
at least until some issue presents itself on which he might be able to rally
the senior generals against Thieu.
In China, the Cultural Revolution has received new impetus from a
set of "instructions" by Mao Tse-tung published jointly by People's Daily
and the Liberation Army Journal on 2 June. Subsequent exhortations to
army officers and veteran party bureaucrats, who now dominate provincial
governments, to protect the "masses" and respect their "revolutionary
zeal" are adding further fuel to the violent fighting that continues to
plague some parts of the country.
Indonesian President Suharto has put together a new cabinet which,
while giving a nod to the political parties' persistent calls for greater
representation, preserves army control over key security ministries and has
more of the technical expertise vital for getting on with the government's
first order of business-economic rehabilitation and development.
The Sato government in Japan, which faces upper house elections
early next month and is aware of recently emerging, widespread popular
concern with the US military presence, has abandoned its usual silence on
the delicate issue of US bases. Official statements last week cautiously
criticized some aspects of US operations but did not question basic
US-Japanese security relationships, which Sato himself has reaffirmed in a
campaign speech.
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VIETNAM
No break in the Paris talks
developed during the week as North
Vietnamese spokesmen continue to
portray their position in very
hard-line terms. Newly arrived
politburo member Le Duc Tho told
CBS' Charles Collingwood that no
progress in the talks could be
expected until the US dropped the
reciprocity issue and agreed to
an unconditional cessation of the
bombing.
On the propaganda front,
Hanoi is reported to be undertak-
ing a number of steps to strengthen
support for its negotiators in
Paris. Among them is a plan to
have such Communist-dominated
groups as the World Peace Council
organize speaking tours of the
US. Hanoi is also trying to ar-
range rallies in Paris and other
.capitals.
Meanwhile, Vietnamese Com-
munist propagandists are becom-
ing more active in defending the
right of all Vietnamese to fight
anywhere in their country against
the allies. US charges of Hanoi's
troop involvement in the South
have pushed them into a more
openly defensive stance on this
issue.
The Communists may also be
attempting to pressure the
northern populace for even greater
sacrifices in support of the war
in the South. A Liberation Front
statement of 11 June affirmed that
the South Vietnamese people, while
relying mainly on their own
strength, also "have the right
to receive assistance in all as-
pects from their kith and kin
northern compatriots." The state-
ment claimed, in addition, that
the "South Vietnamese people to
date have reserved the right to
appeal for and receive assist-
ance in all aspects from their
friends in the world, including
assistance in weapons and volun-
teers.
Political Developments in Saigon
President Thieu, in a major
move against Vice President Ky
and his followers, replaced the
still-hospitalized General Loan
as chief of the National Police
Force on 9 June. Although Loan
has long been an obvious target
in Thieu's systematic campaign
to cut Ky down to size, most ob-
servers in Saigon had not expected
Loan's ouster to come this soon.
Thieu's action may have been
spurred in part by the urgings
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of General Khiem, the new interior
minister, but its main inspiration
was probably a determination by
the ever-cautious President that
Ky was not as strong as Thieu,
had previously supposed. Ky's
failure overtly to oppose Thieu's
maneuvers in connection with
the establishment of the new
Huong government may have helped
the President to reach this con-
clusion.
Ky thus far seems to have
accepted quietly this latest blow
to his political fortunes. On
12 June, he resigned as director
of the people's self-defense
force
Ky will probably
bide his time, looking for a
clear-cut issue--possibly the peace
issue--on which he can rally the
senior generals against Thieu.
Ky has been careful to avoid
direct comment on the Paris talks,
but he has on a number of occa-
sions emphasized his opposition
to any compromise with the Com-
munists.
Colonel Tran Van Hai, com-
mander of the Vietnamese Rangers,
has been named to succeed Loan.
Hai is described as an able,
apolitical officer
The mayor of
Saigon, wounded in the accidental
attack on the police command head-
quarters last week, has also been
replaced. In addition, a new
commander has been installed for
the Capital Military District, a
position previously held by Gen-
eral Le Nguyen Khang along with
his command of III Corps. Khang
has offered Thieu his resignation
as III Corps commander, but Thieu
has not yet acted on it.
Saigon civilian politi-
cians are beginning to talk more
openly about possible negotia-
tions with the National Libera-
tion Front. Former deputy prime
minister Tran Van Tuyen, in a
letter to a Saigon paper, has
declared that the Front, although
an instrument of the North Viet-
namese Communist Party, posses-
ses an army, controls part of
the country, and must be acknowl-
edged as a political reality. He
reiterated proposals, which he and
others first put forward some
months ago, calling for a mili-
tary conference between Saigon
and the Front to arrange a truce,
to be followed by an interna-
tional political conference to
settle the war within a broader
framework of peace in Southeast
Asia.
Tuyen's statements follow
similar remarks made in the US
by newly appointed Minister of
State Phan Quang Dan, who said he
favors talks with the Front aimed
toward a cease-fire, if not toward
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an eventual coalition. His com-
ments have caused considerable
consternation in Saigon and could
cost him his job when he returns
unless he revises them to fit
the harder government line.
These issues previously were
taboo and their open discussion
caused some persons to be arrested.
One impetus toward a more candid
public consideration of talks with
the Front is almost certainly the
widespread concern over the pos-
sible direction of bilateral talks
between Washington and Hanoi and
the conviction that the South
Vietnamese themselves must be
primarily responsible for deter-
mining their own future. Another
stimulus may be the trend toward
a greater civilian voice in the
government, which many local
politicians have long considered
to be the prerequisite for ending
the war through negotiations.
The War in South Vietnam
House-to-house fighting in
Cholon and Gia Dinh has subsided,
but the Communists continue to
subject the Saigon area to a
heavy rocket bombardment. The
rain of rockets, some of which
are falling perilously close
to key installations in the
main government and business
part of Saigon, is beginning
to excite demands by South
Vietnamese politicians for re-
taliation against Hanoi.
Minor skirmishes with
enemy troops continue to be
reported on the outskirts of
Saigon. These engagements
largely involve Viet Cong
local and main force units
charged with keeping up pres-
sure by mortar and rocket
fire and successive ground
probes. These troops are be-
ing supported by an outer ring
of units from the three major
Communist divisions in the
area, the 5th, 7th, and 9th.
Their apparent mission is to
conduct harassing attacks
against outlying allied bases
to screen the flow of munitions,
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food, and replacements to the
Viet Cong units nearer the Jvu I I I V I L I IvnlvI
city.
From the time this latest
Communist campaign of harass-
ment in the Saigon area began
on the night of 4-5 May until
10 June, civilian casualties
resulting from the shellings
and the street fighting have
been placed at 433 killed
and 3,660 wounded. In addi-
tion, the government's refu-
gee burden has been increased
by over 160,000. The enemy
paid a heavy price, losing an
estimated 10,000 killed in the
Saigon area during the month
of May.
.Doug Hai
NORTH
"~ VIETNAM
Z, Demilitarized Zone
KheSanh
--rING TRI
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3 HUA THIEN \ -
-?.._..~ ~r _11'Da Nang
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Chu Lai
Elsewhere in the country,
ground fighting was relatively
light during the week. In the
Khe Sanh area, however, skirm-
ishing and Communist probing
actions continued amid indica-
tions that the enemy force
structure may be augmented to
the equivalent of two divi-
sions. In the western high-
lands, Communist forces con-
tinued their attempt to isolate
the US Special Forces camps at
Oak Pek and Polei Kieng through
harassment of access routes and
-"~-~ ~Quang Ngai
r 1 -
allied fire-support bases. In
Quang Nam Province, vigorous
allied countermeasures during
recent weeks appear to have re-
duced the threat of early and
large-scale enemy offensive ac-
tion. F_ I
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MAOISTS RENEW DEMANDS FOR "REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE"
The violent fighting that
continues to plague some areas of
China seems to be fueled by cur-
rent propaganda exhortations to
"arouse the masses" against ene-
mies of the state. This propa-
ganda line stems from a set of
"instructions" by Mao Tse-tung
published jointly by''Peop'le's
Daily and the' Liberati-oF -Army
Journal on 2 June.
Recent broadcasts from Peking
and several provinces insist that
the "masses" be given a larger
role in the Cultural Revolution.
Army officers and veteran party
bureaucrats who now dominate pro-
vincial governments are being told
to protect the "masses" and to re-
spect their "initiative" and "revo-
lutionary zeal." On 7 June, Peking
radio even spoke of "organizing and
arming the masses."
feuding Red Guard factions are
fi htin more openly and violentl
there have been clashes involv-
ing large numbers of armed stud-
ents and workers nearly every day
since late May in Canton or nearby
cities. Two dormitories at the
large Chungshan University have
burned down. In nearly every in-
cident the army has taken no ac-
tion except to prevent bystanders
from approaching the trouble zone.
A curfew has been imposed in Canton
covering the Chungshan campus and
other major trouble spots.
The problem of maintaining
order in Canton is complicated by
the influx of thousands of refu-
gees from the adjacent province
of Kwangsi, where fighting and
burning in several large cities
have forced residents to flee.
The new propaganda line has
already had an inhibiting effect on
efforts by the army to maintain or-
der in some areas, and as a result
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NEW INDONESIAN CABINET WILL FOCUS ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY
President Suharto's new cabi-
net, installed on 10 June, has
been charged with developing and
executing a five-year economic
plan and preparing for general
elections in 1971.
In constructing the cabinet,
Suharto has balanced the demands
of his various critics against
his own desire for expertise and
has produced a government that
is more competent than its prede-
cessor. Suharto reduced the num-
ber of military members, slightly
increased party representation,
and put most technical posts in
capable nonparty hands.
The new government, which
has thus far drawn little criti-
cism, is composed of six military
officers and 17 civilians. Eight
of the civilians are party repre-
sentatives, but four of them hold
nonportfolio posts that appear
to carry little influence. The
army retains the key security
posts of defense and internal af-
fairs.
An able member of Suharto's
staff of economic advisers has
been given the finance portfolio.
Newly appointed Trade Minister
Sumitro, a political exile dur-
ing much of the Sukarno era, is
also a trained economist. Adam
Malik remains as foreign minister.
toward economic recovery is es-
sential for political stability
and that further improvement must
be achieved by 1971 when elected
government is to be reinstituted.
They hope to initiate a five-year
development plan next year empha-
sizing increased agricultural
production and a rehabilitated
and expanded infrastructure.
Work on the five-year plan
apparently has already begun under
the direction of Widjojo, the
head of the National Planning
Board. Suharto's appointees to
the financial and economic min-
istries and related bureaus have
been working well together for
some time and the development
plan should go forward relatively
unhampered by interdepartmental
feuding.
It now appears that Indo-
nesia will not receive all of the
$325 million in economic assist-
ance from non-Communist donors
which it had requested for 1968.
Western Europe and Japan have
been less generous than origi-
nally hoped. Suharto and Widjojo,
who earlier had reacted with near
panic when they realized all re-
quested aid would not be forth-
coming, now appear to be adjust-
ing their plans and to be set-
ting their economic sights on
1969--the year to move from sta-
bilization to rehabilitation.
Suharto and his colleagues
believe that visible progress
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The seeds of a new Berlin crisis were sown during the week by East
Germany. The East German parliament passed a series of laws designed to
underscore Pankow's sovereignty and to solidify West Berlin's status as a
third political entity. These actions were undoubtedly coordinated in
advance with Moscow. Passport and visa requirements for West Germans
desiring to enter East Germany also are intended to emphasize that the
Federal Republic is a foreign state rather than part of a divided nation.
These measures will be viewed in Bonn as a further challenge to West
Germany's claim to represent all Germans. They could affect the Allied
position in Berlin, which would be weakened in proportion to the degree
of authority over access assumed by the East Germans.
President Tito has temporarily defused the student revolt in Yugo-
slavia, but party factionalism and economic priorities may interfere with
his attempts to meet "justified" student demands.
In Belgium, the four-month-old government crisis appears to have
been resolved following agreement earlier this week between the Social
Christian and Socialist parties on a program for a new coalition govern-
ment. It is likely to be headed by Gaston Eyskens, a former prime
minister and veteran Social Christian leader. The outlook for the new
coalition is not bright, however, because of the persistent tensions arising
from the unresolved linguistic dispute.
The UN General Assembly overwhelmingly approved on 12 June a
resolution endorsing the nonproliferation treaty and requesting that it be
open for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. The US
and USSR hope to call a meeting of the Security Council in the next few
days to consider security assurances for nonnuclear countries.
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NEW EAST GERMAN CHALLENGE OVER WEST BERLIN
With the introduction of new
controls on West German travel-
ers and goods transiting East
Germany, the Ulbricht regime has
taken its most serious step
since the building of the Wall
in 1961.
The imposition of passport
and visa controls for West Ger-
mans and West Berliners is de-
signed further to underscore East
German sovereignty and at the
same time to enhance the claim
that West Berlin is a third po-
litical entity.
The new regulations require
West Germans and West Berliners
to procure East German visas to
transit or visit East Germany.
After 15 July,. West Germans will
also be required to produce pass-
ports for such travel. These
documents may not include any
reference to Bonn's claim to rep-
resent all Germans. The East
Germans began issuing visas on
12 June.
West German Chancellor
Kiesinger told Allied ambassadors
on 12 June that the situation is
serious and that "not just pro-
tests but countermeasures are
needed." At the same time he
said that it is necessary to pro-
ceed with caution and realism.
The chancellor also noted that
his government had not yet de-
cided what countermoves could be
taken by West Germany and the
Allies.
In light of recent upheavals
in Eastern Europe--especially in
Czechoslovakia--where important
Soviet interests are at stake, the
Soviets have been more inclined
to back Pankow's assertion of
sovereignty at Bonn's expense than
they might otherwise have been.
Soviet diplomats, in endorsing
East Germany's previous moves to
increase its control over West
German travel, have sought to
dampen any suggestion of tension,
instead linking the moves to al-
leged West German "provocations"
and emphasizing that Allied ac-
cess to Berlin will not be af-
fected.
Soviet commentary has soft-
pedaled the latest and boldest
East German action, characterizing
the passport and visa requirement
as a "routine" measure "fully in
line with the norms of interna-
tional law and practice." Pravda
on 13 June defended the controls
as a justified and inevitable re-
sponse to the pending West German
emergency legislation.
The East Germans may have
been encouraged when the West
failed to make a strong response
to earlier bans against travel in
East Germany by members of the
right-wing National Democratic Party
and senior Bonn officials. The
extent to which they implement the
new regulations may be related to
the intensity of Western reaction.
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DISORDER GROWING IN FRANCE
Over 9 million of the 10 mil-
lion striking workers have re-
turned to their jobs, and the gen-
eral strike has thus virtually
ended. The danger of serious dis-
orders, however, has increased
during the past week. The deaths
of two workers and a student in
clashes with police attempting to
clear strike-bound plants have
raised tension anew after a period
of relative calm.
In the wake of violent dem-
onstrations protesting police
"brutality," the government on
12 June banned all public protests
until after the parliamentary
elections and ordered the disso-
lution of seven extreme leftist
groups under a 1936 law prohibit-
ing the formation of combat groups
and private militia. These re-
pressive government moves could
make the situation even more ex-
plosive.
Instead of trying to concil-
iate the rebellious students and
workers, the government is con-
centrating on winning the June
elections by following a tactic
of deliberately polarizing po-
litical forces. This increases
the possibility of violent con-
frontations between the right and
left, and will make even more dif-
ficult the solution of basic so-
cial and economic problems. De
Gaulle's strong emphasis on the
dangers of the "totalitarian en-
terprise" of Communism together
with the government's mobilization
of "civic action" committees and
the Committee for the Defense of
the Republic--a group of World War
II resistance veterans--have given
new impetus to right-wing forces.
the government's agreement to
submit a bill to reimburse those
whose property in Algeria was na-
tionalized are intended to rally
extreme rightists to the regime.
The French Communist Party
(PCF) is giving the Gaullists am-
munition for their anti-Communist
campaign by reiterating the call
for a "popular front" government.
The Gaullists contend that the
PCF's goal has been to install
itself in power and that it has
used the crisis to push toward
that end. The party, however,
initially was largely preoccupied
with limited economic and politi-
cal aims. Only when the crisis
mushroomed and De Gaulle appeared
unable to control it did the PCF
escalate its demands and thus open
itself to charges of aiming at
revolution.
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Now that De Gaulle again ap-
pears to be in command, the Commu-
nists are being more circumspect.
At this juncture, the PCF appar-
ently does not expect the left to
win a majority in the elections
but it hopes to capture the lead-
ership of the left by obtaining an
impressive margin on the first bal-
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CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET RELATIONS REMAIN UNEASY
The fragile "understanding"
between Moscow and Prague was
jarred this week when the Soviet
Foreign Ministry for the first
time formally protested an ar-
ticle that had appeared in a
Czechoslovak newspaper.
Moscow's note objected to
the reprinting of a New York
Times article which alleged that
Soviet military officials were
involved in General Sejna's es-
cape from Czechoslovakia. The
note accused the newspaper of re-
printing the article with the
"one aim" of disturbing friendly
relations between the USSR and
Czechoslovakia. Virtually de-
manding the reimposition of cen-
sorship controls, the note ex-
pressed the "conviction" that
the "appropriate Czechoslovak
organs will take the necessary
measures" to prevent the appear-
ance of similar reports.
The Soviet decision to re-
vive the issue of press freedom
at the intergovernmental level
indicates Moscow's continuing dis-
satisfaction with the Dubcek re-
gime's determination to use only
informal controls on the press.
The Soviet note was delivered al-
most simultaneously with the ar-
rival in Moscow of a Czechoslovak
economic delegation led by Deputy
SECRET
Premier Strougal to continue nego-
tiations on a large Soviet loan.
The fact that the delegation left
two days later without a Soviet
commitment for immediate aid tends
to confirm reports that Moscow is
using the prospect of economic as-
sistance to force a retreat on the
issue of press freedom as well as
to exert influence on the course of
other reforms.
As yet, the Soviet press has
made no move to resume the war of
words that ended during Kosygin's
stay in Czechoslovakia. Soviet re-
porting of developments in Czecho-
slovakia continues to be biased, but
without direct criticism.
The Soviets continue to exert
other psychological pressures, how-
ever. Preparations may now be com-
plete for a Warsaw Pact command-
staff exercise in Czechoslovakia.
The exercise was announced three
weeks ago. The Czechoslovak Defense
Ministry has issued numerous press
statements intended to allay do-
mestic fears that the USSR will use
the exercise to cover military in-
tervention. These statements stress
that only a "minimum" number of So-
viet troops will take part and that
they will leave Czechoslovakia on
conclusion of the exercise, which
is to last several days.
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ECONOMIC REFORM LAGS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The Dubcek regime has had to
weather the initial phase of the
political storm before it could
begin to focus on the problems of
economic reform.
Dubcek cannot yet afford to
identify himself with an economic
program that may risk alienation
of any of his supporters, however.
The Czech political situation has
not yet been stabilized, and the
economic future is so uncertain
that he would be foolish to tie
his hands with a detailed program.
Central to Czechoslovak eco-
nomic plans is the question of
the availability of foreign cred-
its. Czechoslovakia continues to
seek credits primarily for the
purchase of Western technology
and for short-term assistance in
maintaining the consumers' stand-
ard of living. Amid constant re-
ports of credit feelers in the
West, Czechoslovak Deputy Premier
Lubomir Strougal went to Moscow
10 June for a continuation of
talks on long-term Soviet-Czecho-
slovak economic cooperation. A
major topic of discussion prob-
ably will be a sizable foreign
currency credit that Prague is
seeking from Moscow.
Meanwhile, the impatient re-
formers led by Deputy Premier Ota
Sik continue to complain about
the slow progress in spelling out
a new economic policy. They cite
the failure to phase out ineffi-
cient firms and to do away with
central control of the economy.
The comprehensive study of the
economy promised by Dubcek's ac-
tion program has yet to be pub-
lished, nor has a progress report
been made.
Nevertheless, two major deci-
sions have been made recently,
neither of which had been included
in the original economic reform
of the Novotny regime. The first
involves the establishment of
workers' councils, which are to
manage certain enterprises. The
second downgrades the role of the
industrial trusts, which had been
deemed central to administrative
efficiency and the success of the
original economic reform. Now,
however, enterprises and firms
will not be obligated to associate
with the trusts.
Other limited measures toward
economic reform also have been
taken this year. These include
the continued closing down of un-
economic mining operations, the
introduction of new management
principles in agriculture, and the
recent cutback in 1980 goals for
the production of electric power,
steel, and coal. In a related de-
velopment, labor unions are slated
to have "real" power to represent
workers' interests: they will
elect candidates for political of-
fices and will promote legislation
beneficial to workers.
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NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE FOR NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
Negotiations for renewal of
the coalition between the Chris-
tian Democrats, Italy's largest
party, and the Unified Socialist
Party (PSU), which has been the
junior partner in recent years,
seem likely to be prolonged.
Italy may thus be without deci-
sive government for some months
at a time of increased internal
strains caused by the crisis in
neighboring France.
The PSU decided to withdraw
from the government after suffer-
ing losses in the parliamentary
elections of 19-20 May. Both
the Christian Democrats, the co-
alition leaders, and the Commu-
nists, the chief opposition
party, gained seats. Although
the PSU right wing did better
than the left wing in the elec-
tion., the left wing has acquired
leverage as a result of threats
by some of its leaders to force
a party split. These leaders
insist they will leave the PSU
unless it gets convincing com-
mitments from the Christian Demo-
crats for action on long-promised
reforms involving the universi-
ties, taxation, and administra-
tive red tape before joining any
new coalition.
Christian Democratic Secre-
tary General Mariano Rumor on
11 June failed in what Socialist
sources described as his final
attempt to persuade the PSU to
join a new coalition. A minority
government now may be formed
with Rumor or another leading
Christian Democrat as premier to
govern at least until the PSU
congress next October. Such a
government would need PSU par-
liamentary support because the
Christian Democrats would find
the alternatives of extreme
rightist or extreme leftist sup-
port politically infeasible.
The formation of even a minority
government may take some time
because the Socialists are likely
to seek the maximum possible
Christian Democratic commitment
to reform before promising their
support.
Meanwhile, widespread stu-
dent agitation, which began last
November and has been fostered
by the recent unrest in France,
is continuing. It is still pri-
marily directed toward reform of
the archaic education system,
although it has had some politi-
cal overtones.
The students in Italy, how-
ever, unlike those in France, are
not likely to find effective al-
lies in economic interest groups.
Italy's orthodox Communists, more-
over, are generally unwilling to
endorse student agitators. Never-
theless, the unrest in the univer-
sities could spread to social and
political groups if effective re-
forms are delayed by protracted
Christian Democrat - Socialist
negotiations.
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TITO ENDS RIOTS, PROMISES REFORMS IN YUGOSLAVIA
Tito's promise on 9 June to
satisfy student demands for jobs
and social reform probably will
cause further party dissension.
In order to deliver on his promise,
Tito will somehow have to reconcile
the competing interests of older,
ill-educated party members and the
students who want their jobs. A
review of existing investment prior-
ities will be necessary and, if stu-
dent demands for jobs are to be met
quickly, a temporary slowdown in
the economic reform may result.
The riots of 2 and 3 June
broke out following student accusa-
tions of police brutality during a
minor fracas in Belgrade. By the
time the riots stopped, some 60
persons had been injured, some
$120,000 in property damage had
occurred, and the students had oc-
cupied numerous university premises.
Regime efforts to regain control
through party organizations and
fronts were successfully countered
by the students, who set up ad hoc
student action committees and vowed
to sit in until their demands were
met. The regime managed, however,
to prevent the students from making
common cause with workers harboring
economic grievances.
The student demands originally
were relatively narrow and included
greater participation in adminis-
tering the university, more finan-
cial aid to education, and improved
employment prospects after gradua-
tion. The protests soon took a
political turn, however, and widened
to embrace social inequality, the
income gap between workers and
administrators, the lack of democ-
racy, and the incompetence of
many officials. The rebels also
called for the dismissal of those
responsible for permitting alleged
police brutality.
Tito's speech on 9 June
acknowledged the legitimacy of
most of the students' grievances
and promised that a party program
dealing with them as well as cur-
rent economic problems would soon be
forthcoming. Despite his concilia-
tory approach, however, Tito was
firm in stating that no opposition
to the new program would be toler-
ated. His implication that he and
other leaders should quit if they
could not solve Yugoslavia's prob-
lems probably was meant more as a
warning to others in the party
hierarchy than as a personal threat
to resign. Tito also warned the
students to beware of efforts to
infiltrate their movement by Ran-
kovic conservatives, Djilas lib-
erals, and followers of Mao Tse-
tung.
The crisis further dramatized
the divisions within the already
badly fractured Yugoslav Communist
Party. Conservative hard liners,
particularly in the Serbian party
and police apparatus, adopted a
tougher stance toward the students
than did the rest of the regime.
Tito undoubtedly will intensify ef-
forts to remove some of these hard
liners from the middle and lower
levels of the party, and the secu-
rity chiefs in Belgrade and Serbia
may be sacrificed to placate the
students. Widespread changes in
the party and government leader-
ships probably will await the 9th
party congress in December, how-
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As fighting continues in the Nigerian civil war, domestic pressures are
mounting on the UK to halt arms shipments to Lagos. Arms shipments
have already been suspended by the Netherlands. The British Government
is resisting these pressures while trying to persuade federal and Biafran
representatives now in London to reopen peace talks. Lagos, however, has
reacted to the possibility of a decreasing availability of arms by stepping
up air and sea shipments in an effort to create a large stockpile of
munitions and equipment.
Tanzania and Zambia were the only UN members besides Albania and
Cuba to vote against the nuclear nonproliferation treaty this week. Their
position was undoubtedly affected by Communist China's agreement to
construct the Tan-Zam railroad. Tanzania's vote will also ensure a red-
carpet reception next week when President Nyerere visits Peking again in
search of additional military and economic aid.
Israeli and Jordanian forces continue to exchange shots across the
Jordan River almost daily. Jordanian officials are fearful of an Israeli
strike against the East Bank and have charged that the Israelis are massing
troops along the cease-fire line. There is no evidence to support this
charge, but if Jordanian fire kills more Israeli civilians a retaliatory strike
could be mounted with little or no warning.
Saudi King Faysal has agreed to finance a $36-million Jordanian arms
purchase from Britain.
The Indian Government, unable to put down the Naga and Mizo
tribal insurgency in eastern India, is now being forced to come to terms
with demands for local autonomy by the hill tribes of Assam. Concessions
in Assam could, however, encourage further tribal and linguistic frac-
tionalization.
In Turkey, some 30,000 students this week launched a strike to
demand reforms in the educational system, taking over several university
buildings in the process.
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EASTERN INDIA
BrahmaPUtYa
G xis . Shillong.
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NEW TRIBAL UNREST THREATENS EASTERN INDIA
After two years of equivoca-
tion, the Indian Government is
giving urgent attention to the
possibility of establishing a
largely autonomous hill state
within the State of Assam. Fur-
ther delay in reaching a decision
could result in new disorders in
the already embattled eastern re-
gion.
Pressure for the hill state
comes from the moderate-led All
Parties Hill Leaders Conference,
representing tribes in the Garo
and Khasi-Jaintia districts. The
tribes resent domination by the
Hindu population of the Assam
Valley, which largely controls
the state government.
Unhappy with the government's
continued vacillation, the con-
ference recently withdrew its
nine members from the Assam state
assembly. It has also threatened
to launch a nonviolent action cam-
paign, which could get out of con-
trol. More extreme elements, who
may be responsible for recent
bombings of Assam government build-
ings in Shillong, threaten to take
over the present conference lead-
ership if prompt steps toward
autonomy are not forthcoming.
The government can ill af-
ford disorder in the hill dis-
tricts. The Naga and Mizo re-
bellions, in the mountains and
valleys to the south and east
of the Assam Valley, already tie
down some 70,000 Indian troops
and paramilitary personnel. Des-
pite an occasional hopeful sign,
such as recent evidence of divi-
sion in the Naga underground,
there are no prospects for an
abatement of these rebellions.
There is thus far no evi-
dence of Chinese help to other
tribes, although the Chinese do
give propaganda support to both
the Naga and Mizo "struggles for
independence" and to tribal op-
position to Indian domination
in the Assam Valley. Several
members of the Indian Communist
Party (Left) have been arrested
in the Jorhat area for working
with Nagas in sabotage activity.
The Mizos may get some arms as-
sistance and training in East Pak-
istan, and they depend on the Chit-
tagong Hill Tracts for a sanctuary.
The government must weigh
the need to forestall new dis-
ruption in the eastern region
against the effects of further
fractionalizing India's states.
Within Assam, the government's
willingness to consider autonomy
for the hill tribes has encour-
aged similar aspirations by tri-
bal groups in the plains. In-
creased unrest among the plains
tribes was manifested recently 25X1
when a mob of 4,000 Boro tribes-
men attacked a police post in the
Kokrajhar subdivision.
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GREEK "REVOLUTION" PLODS FORWARD
A long-rumored cabinet shift
may be the next step in the slow
pace of political movement in
Athens.
The junta government appears
capable of moving swiftly to
counter any threat to its rule,
and had no trouble spotting and
apprehending two groups of left-
ist and centrist plotters. Former
premiers Papandreou and Kanello-
poulos and other political figures
remain under close guard. Arch-
opponent Andreas Papandreou's
campaign to arouse opposition to
the regime abroad has had no ob-
servable effect on the domestic
scene.
Some 53 persons were released
from detention in late May, for
good conduct and as a gesture of
leniency, but over 2,000 accused
Communists still remain in island
prisons.
The government has taken some
steps in an obvious effort to
curry favor with various special
groups. A large number of agri-
cultural debts have been canceled,
apparently gaining the government
some support among the rural pop-
ulation--perhaps to the detriment
of future budgets. In addition,
there has been a relaxation of the
controls on the domestic press, a
move that has had a mixed recep-
tion. Some editors and publishers
seem to prefer imposed guidelines
on what they may print rather than
risking punishment for articles
subsequently deemed uncomplimen-
tary to the regime. Moreover,
articles of the 1952 constitution
dealing with the right of assembly
and association have been reinsti-
tuted, a move designed to win over
both domestic and international
labor circles.
The junta may have reaped a
windfall from the civil disorders
afflicting France, the US, and
other countries. Some Greeks
appear to be taking comfort and
even pride from the conclusion
that military rule has spared
them similar disorders.
The regime is still frus-
trated and dissatisfied with its
failure to win full restoration
of US military aid, but it seems
able to view its domestic situa-
tion with equanimity as it pro-
ceeds stolidly toward the achieve-
ment of its design for a new
Greece.
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SOMALIS REFOCUS THEIR ATTENTION ON DJIBOUTI
After more than a year of
preoccupation with other political
problems, the Somali Government
seems to be shifting its attention
again to the French Territory of
the Afars and Issas (FTAI), the
former French Somaliland. Somalia
is constitutionally committed to
bringing the large Somali popula-
tion of the FTAI--the Issas--into
a "greater Somalia." Somali Prime
Minister Egal's government has
nevertheless largely ignored the
territory since the referendum of
March 1967 in which the majority
Afars "voted" to keep the FTAI
under French control.
The political crisis in
France, however, has apparently
raised fears in Mogadiscio that
should the French grip on the
FTAI weaken, the dominant Afars--
possibly with Ethiopian backing--
might take the opportunity to
seize political control to the
detriment of the territory's
Somali inhabitants. Senior gov-
ernment leaders met in Mogadiscio
in late May to consider the impli-
cations of recent reports of pos-
sible "repercussions" of the
French crisis in the FTAI.
The long-standing tensions
between Ethiopia and Somalia over
the FTAI had largely subsided as
a result of Egal's efforts to reach
a detente with Ethiopia and Kenya.
Although relations with Ethiopia
have improved somewhat, the future
status of the FTAI and its Somali
population, should the French de-
cide to depart, remains one of the
most potentially damaging stum-
bling blocks in Egal's policy.
Unlike his predecessor, Egal
has avoided entangling himself
with promises to the Somalis of the
FTAI. He has preferred the French
presence there until relations
with Ethiopia reached a firm foot-
ing on which some accommodation
between the two governments might
be worked out. He has been
Although the Somalis' fears
seem wholly unjustified by events,
they have been reinforced by a
report that Emperor Haile Selassie
during his brief refueling stop
in Djibouti early in May, met with
the pro-French Afar leader of
the FTAI Government, Ali Aref
Bourhan. Although there is no
confirmation that such a meeting
took place, the fact that Haile
Selassie stopped in Djibouti ap-
parently was enough to alarm the
Somalis and increase their sus-
picions of Ethiopian intentions.
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criticized in Somalia for ignoring
the FTAI in his detente efforts.
To counter this criticism, he may
have hoped to gain some concessions
from President de Gaulle in May,
but his trip was postponed because
of conditions in Paris.
Egal may have to take on the
FTAI problem sooner than he would
like. Elections to the Chamber of
Deputies in Djibouti are scheduled
for November 1968. The Ethiopians
are likely to work behind the
scenes to ensure an Afar victory
as they did during last year's
referendum. This in turn will
probably produce an appeal from
the Somali population for assist-
ance from Mogadiscio. Egal's re-
sponse will be carefully watched
by his opponents, who will be look-
ing for ammunition to use against
him in the Somali parliamentary
elections set for March 1969.
UN INCREASES SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA
On May 29 the UN Security Coun-
cil unanimously passed a resolution
calling for expanded economic sanc-
tions against Rhodesia. The move,
prompted by increasing African pres-
sures for actions to bring down the
Smith regime, follows more than two
and one-half years of selective
sanctions that have so far failed
to force Salisbury to relinquish
its independence.
The resolution's key measure
enjoins UN member states, and calls
upon nonmember states, to end all
trade with Rhodesia except for mi-
nor items such as medical supplies
and educational materials. The
resolution also prohibits UN members
from providing investment capital
to Rhodesia. Rhodesian passports
will no longer be recognized, and
states are urged to end all con-
sular relations with Salisbury.
The UN action is unlikely to
have a significant impact on Rho-
desia's economy and will almost
certainly fail to bring down the
Smith regime. Earlier sanctions
have slowed economic growth but
have not caused any major disrup-
tions. Previous embargoes had
already targeted most of Rhodesia's
potential exports; the blanket
sanctions now imposed will there-
fore not have much additional ef-
fect.
Theoretically, the new meas-
ure's greatest impact will be on
Rhodesian imports, which until now
have been only partially covered
by sanctions. Rhodesia should be
able to purchase most of its needs,
however, because suppliers will
probably continue to sell suffi-
cient quantities of goods, either
covertly or in open defiance of
the Security Council.
The Zambian Government can-
not participate fully in the sanc-
tions effort without inviting eco-
nomic disaster. Without Rhodesian
coal, Zambian copper production
would have to be cut back drasti-
cally. Rhodesia can also retali-
ate by denying Zambia electric
power or transport for its imports
and exports, services on which the
Zambian economy is dependent. Al-
though the UN resolution calls upon 25X1
member states to assist Zambia,
there is little they can do to sup-
ply even minimal needs.
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Increasing student unrest and continuing political maneuvering related
to recent national elections preoccupied the governments of several Latin
American countries last week.
Widespread student strikes and demonstrations are again under way in
Brazil. Police and students clashed in Rio de Janeiro on 11 June, resulting
in a few minor injuries, and further incidents are likely. In Uruguay,
Communist-led labor groups joined with students in protesting alleged
"police brutality" in connection with a police-student confrontation on 6
June. More serious disorders are possible, and President Pacheco has
imposed a limited state of siege.
Argentine students are also disturbing public order. As is the case
elsewhere in Latin America, the Argentine students are mainly protesting
what they consider to be antiquated facilities and insufficient provision for
student participation in school and university government. These com-
plaints are being used for their own ends by Communists and other leftist
extremists. In Chile, for instance, such elements have recently strengthened
their bid for influence within the university reform movement by gaining
control over a newly formed association of teaching and administrative
personnel.
Political restlessness remains high in the aftermath of recent presiden-
tial and legislative elections in both Panama and Ecuador. Ballot counting
to determine the composition of Panama's 42-member unicameral legisla-
ture is slowly going forward amidst an atmosphere of confusion and
behind-the-scenes attempts to rig the count. In Ecuador, a delay in
officially confirming the outcome of the presidential race has led the
apparent victor, Jose Maria Velasco, to warn that "civil war" will result if
he is denied the presidency.
In Guatemala, dissension within the Communist Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR) over commander Yon Sosa's decision to await the completion of
current training and resupply activities before resuming guerrilla warfare
operations may provoke their resumption at an early date.
Guerrillas in western Venezuela ambushed an army convoy on 8
June, inflicting heavy casualties. News of the encounter, which was the
first major one in over a month, may be especially embarrassing to the
Leoni government, which has widely publicized its successes in recent
operations against such insurgents. 25X1
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