WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006200060001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 19, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Ir~IRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
4 i~
State Dept. review completed
19 January 1968
No. 0003/68
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(Information as of noon EST, 18 January 1968)
VIETNAM
Enemy aggressiveness has continued to increase during
the first weeks of the year. The government in Sai-
gon settled the electrical workers strike, but its
heavy-handed tactics created widespread popular re-
sentment. Hanoi, meanwhile, is trying to maintain
the political initiative by stressing the favorable
impact of its latest gesture on talks with the US.
CAMF3ODIA?S SIfiANOUK CLAIMS VICTORY IN TALKS WITH US
Prince Sihanouk is taking a moderate line in the
wake of his talks with Ambassador Bowles, but his
determination to take meaningful steps toward limit-
ing Vietnamese Communist use of Cambodian territory
is far from certain.
COMMUNISTS STEP UP MILITARY OFFENSIVE IN LAOS
The Communists, maintaining pressure on government
forces in northern Laos, have captured Nam Bac in
the most significant success of their current dry-
season offensive.
FACTIONAL SPLITS DEEPEN IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The factional fighting taking place throughout China
continues to be ignored in Peking broadcasts but many
provincial radio stations have begun to carry shrill
denunciations of unnamed "chieftains" who are foment-
ing the disorders.
SINC;APORE AND MALAYSIA REACT TO BRITISH WITHDRAWAL PLAN 10
Singapore and Malaysia are seriously concerned over
the economic and military implications of Britain's
accelerated withdrawal plans.
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Europe
T'.;iE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 11
HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET (;ONSULTATION ]:N EASTERN EUROPE
Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgarny took an unusual
although not unprecedented grip to Eastern Europe
this week, visiting Warsaw and East Berlin; the
presence of a:L:L three top leaders is evidence of
the trip' s im~~ortance .
PARTY PURGE UNDER WAY IN YUGOSL~IVIA.
The dismissal of 400 Belgrade city party members
was the first step by supporters of Tito's reform
program to eliminate their opponents in the ;party
before its ninth congress convenes next December.
US AND USSR REACH ,?AGREEMENT ON i1PT TEXT
The new text-?-a result of 11th-hour US-Soviet nego-
tiations and compromises--has been placed before
the disarmame:zt conference that. reconvened in Gen-
eva this week.
Middle East -~ Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 15
MAKARIOS SEEMS TO .MODERATE STANCE ON CYPRUS DISPUTE
The Cypriot President advised Creek Cypriots that
enosis is unrealistic at: present, and made concili~~-
tory references toward the `Purkish minority, but
this may only be an attempt to strengthen his role
in any future settlement.
GREEK REGIME TROUBLED BY DOP2ESTIC AND FOREIGN PROBLEMS
Extremists within the junta arE~ pressing Premier
Papadopoulos far a less moderate attitude toward t:ze
exiled King and for a diplomat_~c confrontation with
the country's allies over their failure to recognize
the regime.
]ISRAEL TO REVAMP ITS NAVY
Because of a longer coastline ~~nd the sinking of the
Eilat, Israeli defense officia:Ls are reshaping naval
strategy around two new submar:Lnes, amphibious land-
ing craft, and. missile-equipped patrol craft:.
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ARAB-ISRAELI IMPASSE CONTINUES
No progress has been made in negotiating Arab-Israeli
differences, and exchanges of fire continue along
the Israeli-Jordanian border.
IMPROVED PROSPECT FOR MODERATION IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)
Last week's cabinet shake-up was a significant gain
for relatively moderate President Massamba, but there
probably will be no early reduction in the govern-
ment's strident anti-Americanism or in the large Com-
munist presence.
CONGO (KINSHASA) BREAKS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH RWANDA 22
Although Congolese motives in breaking diplomatic
relations with Rwanda remain unclear, the action may
be a subtle attempt by Mobutu to disengage his regime
from the problem of the mercenaries interned in
Rwanda.
POLITICAL UNREST RISING IN ZANZIBAR
Economic stagnation and political tension are in-
creasing after four years of Communist aid and advice
and Zanzibari mismanagement.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 25
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO CUBA CONTINUES AT HIGH LEVEL
Despite the apparent friction between the two coun-
tries, the USSR's military aid to Cuba has continued
at the increased rate that began in the fall of 1966.
HAVA:LVA CULTURAL CONGRESS CLOSES
The conference delegates endorsed all anti-US resolu-
tions and applauded Fidel Castro's bitter attack on
"US imperialism."
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EC'UADOREAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN FINALLY IGNITES
'I'he campaign for presidential e_Lections on 2 June
has been thrown into turmoil by ex-president Carlos
Julio Arosemena's announcement that he supports the
man he ousted from the presidency in 1961, Jose
Maria Velasco.
GLfYANA-SURINAM BORDER TROUBLES FLARE UP
The sudden rekindling of an old dispute is disrupting
the usually tranquil relations ]~etween Guyan~~ and
Surinam.
IDICREASED VIOLENCE BREAKS OU'.C IN GU~~TEMALA
Two US military officers were k:Llled and two were
wounded in an outbreak o.f Communist terrorism on 16
January that ha.s caused the Guatemalan Government to
declare a 30-da.y "state of alarm."
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FAR EAST
Hanoi's latest statement on talks with the
US continues to dominate the political stage,
North Vietnamese propaganda claims that Foreign
Minister Trinh's statement of 30 December has
become the "focus of world public opinion,"
Hanoi is trying to sustain the momentum of this
political offensive by insisting that the ball is
now in Washington's court and pointing out that
the US so far has not responded to Trinh's ges-
ture.
In Saigon, President Thieu has attempted to
counter Hanoi's move and to reassure South Vietnam-
ese who have shown growing uneasiness over the
possibility of unilateral US peace initiatives.
In a major speech on 15 January, Thieu attempted
to gain greater leverage on US decisions by in-
sisting that South Vietnam should have the "cen-
tral role" in any peace moves. Thieu also re-
affirmed the right to pursue Communist forces if
they continue to use staging areas in Cambodia.
Sihanouk, meanwhile, has tried to represent
his talks with Ambassador Bowles as an "enormous
success" over "US hawks" advocating hot pursuit
into Cambodia. He has emphasized the US pledge
in the communique to do everything possible to
avoid "acts of aggression" against Cambodia and
has criticized Washington's move to set the record
straight on the issue of hot pursuit, Although
the Cambodians sent a formal request to the Inter-
national Control Commission (ICC) that it strengthen
its surveillance of the border, Sihanouk appears
to have no illusions about the prospect of more
effective ICC operations.
Laotian Communist forces achieved their most
significant success in the current dry-season
fighting with the capture of the important govern-
ment base at Nam Bac. Although this is a severe
setback to government efforts to expand control
in northern Laos, there are no signs that this ac-
tion foreshadows a eneral Communist offensive.
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SECRET
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VIETNAM
Military Situation
In South Vietnam
can casualties totaled 89 in the
ensuing five-hour battle.
The tempo of Communist mil-
itary activity in South Vietnam
has increased markedly in the
first weeks of 1968. The ac-
tivity, moreover, has been wide-
spread, with heavy pressure
against both South Vietnamese
and US units. This pressure has
included mortar and rocket at-
tacks--often followed by ground
assaults--and increased ambushes
of patrols and convoys.
The increased enemy aggres-
siveness is also reflected in
key statistical indicators.
Enemy personnel losses reportedly
reached nearly 5,100 during
the first two weeks of this
year--a sharp increase over the
1,700-man weekly average for
1967. The number of attacks
in the first weeks is already
higher than any monthly total
in nearly two years, with nine
battalion-size Communist as-
saults having occurred so far.
Some of the heaviest fight-
ing occurred in Quang Tri Prov-
ince last weekend when a US Ma-
rine convoy was ambushed while
traveling along Route 9. Ameri-
can ca:~ualtiPS totaled 89 in the
Early in the week, main
force subordinates of the Commu-
nist B-3 Front in the highlands
of II Corps staged two ambushes
against US supply convoys. In
addition, both B-3 Front elements
and local force Viet Cong units
launched numerous small-scale
attacks.
In South Vietnam's III
Corps, there appears to be a dis-
tinct chronological pattern in
the enemy's current winter-spring
campaign. The major attacks--
against Loc Ninh, Bu Dop, and
fire-support base Burt--have oc-
curred at approximately one-
month intervals. If this pat-
tern continues, coordinated at-
tacks--spearheaded by elements
of the Viet Cong 5th, 9th, or
North Vietnamese 7th divisions--
could occur before the Tet holi-
day that begins in late January.
Hanoi Maintains
Political Initiative
The North Vietnamese seem
determined to keep their "will
talk" statement in the news and
to maintain the impression that
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they have taken a significant
initiative in trying to bring
about negotiations with the US.
On ]_6 January, Mai Van Bo, the
DRV representative in Paris and
and one of Hanoi's most aut:hori-
t.ative spokesmen, attempted to
heighten world in.ter~e~st in the
statement by commenting on the
timing of talks a.s well as their
pos:aible substance. He said
negotiations could start "after
a suitable time" and. indicated
than both the level of talks
and the agenda were negotiable.
Although Hanoi officials have
takE:n this line in private con-
versations in the past, this is
the first time they have dis-
cus;;ed it in public. Bo's phrase-
ology, however, still. carefully
preserves considerable flexibility
for Hanoi in deciding on the
actual timing and. substance of
any contacts.
Political Problems
In Saigon "^
On 15 January th.e govern-
ment: succeeded in wiring together
a temporary settlement of the
five-day-old electrical worJcers'
stri.ice, but not before its -tac-
tic:~ had sparked widespread re-
sentment from labor a.nd criti-
cism from informed Vietnamese.
The government at first resisted
the demands of the workers, ar-
rested some of their leaders,
and applied pressure for a re-
turr.~ to work . Walkouts by sym?-
,pathetic workers in other fie:Lds,
:however, raisF~d the threat of
an extensive economic paralysis
in Saigon and elsewhere, forcing
the government= to accede at lE=_ast
:partially to demands for a pay
.increase. Al:L workers returnf~d
to their jobs on 17 January.
The six arresi:ed leaders have
since been re.:Leased, but there
is some possil:~ility that at
.Least one wil_L still have to
face trial by a military court.
Although the settlement will
-probably damp down labor agita-
tion temporara.ly, the govern-
ment's inept ~~iandling of the
dispute impaired popular con-
fidence in thc~ regime. Some ele-
ments of organized labor may
now become moz-e willing to make
common cause with Buddhists,
;students, and other disaffected
~~roups in pre:asing grievances
,against the government.
Meanwhile, criticism of t;he
~lovernment's do-nothing attitude
toward the country's critical
problems has continued . So far ,
]zowever, President Thieu appears
Part of Thieu's difficulties
spring from hi.s continuing poor
srelations with Vice President
]~y, but he is also clearly
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unwilling to tangle with entrenched
military circles unless or un-
til he feels strong enough to
outmaneuver potential enemies.
For his part, Ky continues to
disparage Thieu and to predict
that the government will have
to turn increasingly to himself
for direction.
In an effort to strengthen
his image and to dispel a grow-
ing uneasiness in Saigon that
his government may be pressured
into an unfavorable compromise
with the Communists, President
Thieu delivered a hard-hitting
speech on 15 January reiterating
his previous insistence that Sai-
gon be a primary party in any
negotiations with Hanoi. He also
rejected any coalition with the
National Liberation Front. Argu-
ing forcefully that South Vietnam
was a victim of North Vietnamese
aggression, he declared that if
Hanoi continued to reject reason-
able proposals for a settlement
of the war, military pressure
should be increased.
Meanwhile, the government
appears to have scored a victory
in the National Assembly, with
the election on 17 January of
Nguyen Ba Luong as the chairman
of the Lower House. Luong's
election appears to represent
the first successful cooperative
effort by that body's progov-
ernment Democratic Bloc, of which
he is the nominal head, and the
predominantly Catholic Independ-
ence Bloc.
CAMBODIA'S SIHANOUK CLAIMS VICTORY IN TALKS G~JITH US
Cambodian Chief of State
Sihanouk was clearly pleased with
the cordial atmosphere and the
outcome of last week's discus-
sions with Ambassador Bowles.
His public statements por-
traying the talks as an impor-
tant victory for Cambodia are
designed to support his boasts
that his diplomatic skills would
keep the war from spreading to
Cambodia and are therefore in
part designed for his domestic
audience. Sihanouk apparently
also believes, however, that
the talks not only served their
primary purpose of forestalling
any immediate move across the
Cambodian border by allied
forces, but also provided some
important political advantages
for Phnom Penh.
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Sihanouk moved with alacrity,
for example, in claiming pub-
licly that the US had renounced
the x?ight of "hot pursuit" in
the talks. He then quickly con-
demned Washington's effort to
set t:he record straight as double-
deali.ng. Sihanouk also attempted
to e~:ploit statements in the
joint: communique that the US had
no "i.ntention to violate Cam-
bodi~in territory" and will do
"everything possible" to avoid
"act:s of aggression" if the US
taker action against Communist
troops in Cambodia.. Therefore,
without specifically disavowing
them,, he has now l.arge~ly blunted
the ~_mpact of his earlier public
statements that Cambodia would
not oppose US mili.taY~y activi-
ties in certain "i.sol.ated" bor-
der ment: has enabled
Cuba to moderni~:e and expand its
military i.nventc>ries as well as
to replace: worn out and destroyed
materiel. It has riot, however,
provided Cuba with an offensive
capability.
`"wo Soviet freighters, the
Kh:Lmik_ Zelinski-i anc~ the Fred-
er_Lck Zhil.io K Liri, which re-
ce~itly arrived ~_n Cuba, appear
to be carrying military cargoes.
These would be t:he first in 1966
and would bring to 30 the number
of military deli.ver.i~es since
September 1966.
This equipment is being de-
livered under an arms agreement.
probably concluded in the spring
of 1966 that apparently covered.
anticipated Cuban armed forces
needs into 'the late 19 60 s .
Just be=_fore t:he Cuban mis-
sile crisis of October, 1962,
massive shipments of Soviet mili-
tary equipment--some 250,000
tons aboard 125 sY:.ips--arrived
in Cuba. These deliveries .in-
cluded the bomber aircraft and
offensive m:issile~. that were re-
moved when Soviet forces with-
drew. They also included large
stocks of spare parts, mainte-
nance equipment, ar..d ammunition
that were used to meet Cuban
needs up to late 1.966. From
January 196:3 throt;.gh mid-Septem-
ber 1966 small amounts of addi-
tional military equipment were
delivered.
Since the departure of their
military forces from Cuba in 1963,
the Soviets have maintained an
estimated 2,000 military advisers,
technicians, and n.aintenance er-
sonnel in Cuba.
FIAVANA CULTUF;AL CONGRESS CLOSES
`]'he Cuban host.s~ stage-man-
aged last week'~? Cultural Con-
grE~ss in Havana wit.Yi the smooth-
ness of a well-t.oole:d publicity
machine. The "i.ntel.lectuals, "
who gathered from around the
world, were entertained in the
best Cuban tradition and prob-
ably left tYie island with new
admiration i:or the achievemc=_nts
of the Cuban revolution.
S}+,~: ~~~1~
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As expected, the delegates
adopted all Cuban-sponsored reso-
lutions. Some disagreement was
voiced :by less militant delegates
on the applicability of "armed
struggle" to the liberation of
artistic and creative work in
the underdeveloped world. The
Cuban line prevailed, however,
and "an armed revolutionary proc-
ess which meets the exploiter's
violence with the revolutionary
action of the exploited'? was en-
dorsed as the only method to
achieve true "national libera-
tion."
Ernesto "Che" Guevara was
cited as the personification of
revolutionary leadership in the
nonliberated nations." Intel-
lectuals were asked to turn down
invitat:ions and scholarships of-
fered by "imperialist agencies."
Scientists were requested to ab-
stain from participation in re-
search