WEEKLY SUMMARY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00927A006100070001-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
38
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 13, 2006
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 24, 1967
Content Type:
SUMMARY
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
52
State Dept. review completed 24 November 1967
No. 0317/67
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(Information as of noon EST, 22 November 1967)
VIETNAM
The third week of fighting in the area surrounding
the US strongpoint at Dak To resulted in a large
number of friendly casualties as Communist main
force units renewed their vigorous efforts to pin
down American troops in southwestern Kontum Prov-
ince.
CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS MARKING TIME
The political situation appeared to remain on dead
center last week, with little sign of movement
either toward increased efforts to repair ravages
caused by the Cultural Revolution or toward gear-
ing up "revolutionary" activity again.
THAILAND SEEKS TO CONTROL CHINESE IRREGULARS
The Thai Government has become increasingly embar-
rassed over the presence of Chinese Nationalist
forces in northern Thailand and hopes to curb their
activities.
PRESIDENT'S PARTY GAINS IN PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS
The Nacionalista Party of President Marcos has won
sweeping victories in the recent off-year elections
which should strengthen Marcos' prospects for re-
election in 1969.
Europe
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SECRE 1'
DEVALUATION MAY FAIL TO SOLVE BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC WOES
Prime Minister Wilson's government will be able to
ride out the immediate storm over sterling's de-
valuation, but the longer term prospects are less
promising.
z{UNGARY LOOKS TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE
The Kadar regime is getting out of step with its
allies, Poland and East Germany in particular, in
seeking to expand its relations with Western Europe.
CRISIS OVER CYPRUS
Although Cyprus itself was generally quiet, the
danger of a violent confrontation between Greece
and Turkey remained serious. As of mid-week, how-
ever, both countries were apparently still willing
to give diplomatic efforts a chance.
ARAB-ISRAELI TENSION INCREASES
In response to continued terrorism, Israel's poli-
cies are reflecting a new, harder line toward Jordan
and the West Bank.
ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP DISPUTE CONTINUES
Boumediene's attempt to reorganize the cabinet has
provoked adament opposition from Chief of Staff
Z'Biri, but the former guerrilla leader appears un-
willing to set off an actual revolt.
NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR PLODS ALONG
Federal military commanders are moving slowly and
carefully in the face of stubborn resistance by the
secessionist Biafrans.
STABILITY TENUOUS IN FORMER FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA 23
The recent airlift of French combat troops to the
Central African Republic highlights the concern
of both the local governments and France over the
stability of the four successor countries to the
old French colonial federation.
'
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Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 Nov 67
Middle East ---Africa
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COMMUNIST CHINA RENEWS EFFORTS IN AFRICA
Peking is moving ahead again in various African
countries with foreign policy programs that had
largely been held in abeyance by the disruptive
pressures of the Cultural Revolution.
Western Hemisphere
GUERRILLA DEFEAT GAINS RESPITE FOR BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT
The Bolivian Government's success against the guer-
rillas--which culminated in the death of Che Guevara
and most of his followers--has temporarily strength-
ened the Barrientos regime at the expense of the
opposition parties.
PERU'S BELAUNDE TRIES TO WIN WIDER SUPPORT
President Belaunde has named a new prime minister
in a belated effort to win support from the opposi-
tion-controlled Congress and the business community
for his administration's proposals to cope with the
current economic problems.
CHILEAN ELECTIONEERING STIRS POLITICAL SCENE
The senatorial by-election on 17 December probably
will be used by all political parties as a testing
ground for the 1969 congressional and 1970 presi-
dential elections.
RIGHT-WING PARTY GAINS STRENGTH IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
A growing movement favoring the return of exiled
General Wessin y Wessin and unfounded allegations
that US support is shifting from Balaguer to Wessin
have created an uneasy political situation.
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FAR EAST
The Communist campaign in the Dak To area of
South Vietnam's central highlands, now in its third
week, has developed into the most intensive and
prolonged fighting since the Ia Drang Valley battle
two years ago. This major operation and extensive
Communist military preparations throughout the
central highlands appear intended to demonstrate the
Communists' determination and capacity to outlast
the allied forces and to inflict heavy casualties
on them.
The National Liberation Front stole the march
on Saigon by announcing 72-hour truces during the
Christmas and New Year holidays and a seven-day
lull during the lunar new year in late January.
In Saigon, President Thieu and National Assem-
bly leaders are still preoccupied with organizing
the new government. The continuing problems caused
by tensions between Thieu and Vice President Ky
were reflected in Prime Minister Loc's private
complaint about the confusion created by conflict-
ing directives issued by the two leaders.
The week brought no significant signs of a
break in the apparent standoff between militant
Maoists
and moderate fo
rces in Peking. The pr
es-
ence of
many provincial
military leaders in Pe
king
in the
past month sugge
sts that high-level con
fer-
ences h
ave been taking
place, but the conflict
ing
lines i
n Peking's propa
ganda would seem to ind
icate
that ma
jor issues remai
n unresolved. At least
some of
the violence th
at continues to spread
in
China p
robably has been
encouraged by militant
Mao-
ists in
an attempt to i
nfluence the political
bal-
ance within the top leadership.
Recent elections in the Philippines recorded
sweeping victories for President Marcos' Nacional-
ista Party. Although the President's prospects for
re-election in 1969 have been strengthened, it
remains to be seen whether he will be able to trans-
late the election gains into greater party disci-
pline and progress on economic reforms long re-
sisted by the Senate. 25X1
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VIETNAM
The third week of fighting I Elements of the NVA 24th
strongpoint at Dak To resulted
in a large number of friendly
casualties as Communist main force
units renewed their vigorous ef-
forts to pin down American troops
in southwestern Kontum Province.
Heavy fighting developed
when US patrols encountered ele-
ments of several North Vietnam-
ese Army (NVA) regiments--the
32nd, 66th, and 174th--in the
hills southwest of Dak To. The
current Communist tactics have
been to engage American units
and then withdraw to well-pre-
pared defensive positions in
favorable terrain where they can
concentrate maximum firepower.
This confirms that one of
the primary goals of the Com-
munist forces in the current
winter-spring campaign is to pin
down and destroy major allied
units in the central highlands.
The heavy jungle canopy, the lack
of landing zones for helicopters,
and the steepness of the moun-
tains make American troop move-
ment and supply efforts in this
area the most difficult yet faced
in South Vietnam. The Communists'
apparent intention to wage a long
campaign is reflected in the dis-
covery of many enemy caches of
ammunition, the presence of an
extensive series of bunkers and
other well-constructed defensive
positions, and the presence of
as many as 8,000 enemy troops in
the area.
Regiment have now spread the battle
area north and east of Dak To,
while other enemy units are ap-
parently expanding their efforts 25X1
to engage and tie down friendly
forces as far south as central
Darlac Province.
ex-
tensive preparations are presently
under way by the North Vietnamese
.units throughout the central high-
lands in an effort to extend allied
forces on a wider front. All of
the Communist forces are under
the control of the B-3 Front,
the over-all command authority in
the western highlands.
As the campaign progresses,
an increase can be expected in
attacks on US Special Forces camps
and other remote outposts, in
ambushes staged against allied
supply convoys along strategic
Routes 14 and 19, as well as in
mortar and rocket attacks on vital
allied installations in Pleiku
and Darlac provinces.
Activity in the Laos Panhandle
Reports from the Laos pan-
handle indicate that Hanoi has re-
sumed large supply shipments to
South Vietnam followinc7 the end
of the rainy season. Through the
first 18 days of November, at
least 195 trucks were observed
moving south on Route 23 just south
of the Mu Gia Pass. On Route
912, the second road from North
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Vietnam into Laos, over 300
trucks were spotted by aerial
observers in late October. It
is also clear from photography
that heavy stockpiling has been
going on in the Mu Gia Pass area
since at least September in an-
ticipation of dry weather.
Politics in South Vietnam
President Thieu has re-
portedly begun organizing his
personal office staff. The key
position in the office of the
presidency will be that of secre-
tary general, and it appears that
Nguyen Van Huong, a close adviser
and the manager of Thieu's presi-
dential campaign, is slated for
the post. Thieu's present mili-?
tary and administrative staff will
be retained, but apparently will.
come under Huonq's supervision.
Several specialized advisory coun-
cils will also be attached to the
President's office.
The two houses of the Na-
tional Assembly continue to move
ahead with their internal. organiza
tion. In the upper house, work
is proceeding slowly on internal
rules. Members have voted, how-
ever, to allow formation of blocs
with a minimum membership of 15,
as opposed to the original pro-
posals that would have allowed
the formation of only two blocs
in the 60-man body. In the lower
house, validation of the member-
ship is almost completed and dis-
cussion of internal rules may
soon begin. The lower house has
devoted considerable discussion
to the plight of 17 students who
were drafted for demonstrating
against the election, and has
agreed to create a ten-man com-
mittee to discuss the matter fur-
ther with the government. The
principal officers of this com-
mittee are outspoken opponents of
the government, who may hope to
embarrass it over an issue in-
herited from the previous military
regime.
On 18 November, the Commu-
nists ordered their military
forces to observe a cessation of
all military attacks for 72 hours
during both the Christmas and New
Year holidays and a seven-day lull
during the lunar new year (Tet).
This action steals the march on
President Thieu's informal proposal
of a few weeks ago for 24-hour
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cease-fire periods at Christ-
mas and New Year, and only 48
hours for Tet. The Viet Cong an-
nouncement also makes the Christ-
mas and New Year cease-fire periods
24 hours longer than the corre-
sponding periods they called for
last year.
Hanoi's Air Defenses
North Vietnamese air defense
units were unusually successful
in downing 18 US aircraft in in-
tensive operations in the Hanoi/
Haiphong area between 16 and 20
November. The effectiveness of
the Communist defense appears to
have been the result of a more
vigorous application of established
tactics rather than of any new
weapons or procedures.
An exceptionally high level
of surface-to-air missile and anti-
aircraft artillery (AAA) fire was
reported. Although many of the
missiles were fired at random, they
nonetheless accounted for ten of
the US losses while the usually
more effective AAA downed only
two planes.
Hanoi's MIG force, estimated
to consist of only about eight air-
craft still operating from bases
in North Vietnam, shot down four
US planes during this period. Un-
known causes claimed two addi-
tional aircraft.
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SL CRE1.
CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS MAR
The political situation ap-
peared to remain on dead center
last week, with little sign of
movement either toward increased
efforts to repair ravages caused
by the Cultural Revolution or to-
ward gearing up "revolutionary"
activity again.
Regime propaganda continued
to feature "moderate" themes
such as the importance of educa-
tion and the need to make use of
the experience of "old cadres,"
but these themes were played
in a lower key than similar pro-
nouncements made in September and
October. Moreover, they are cur-
rently linked to such "revolu-
tionary" Maoist concepts as the
overriding necessity to maintain
close contacts with the "masses"--
normally a euphemism for the Red
Guards. The tone of this low-
keyed propaganda suggests that a
stand-off between proponents of
pragmatism and of all-out revolu-
tionary fervor now exists in Pe-
king.
Current and future policies
have probably been the subject
of acrimonious discussion in Pe-
king for most of the past month.
I I not only all im-
portant leaders at the center but
many of the leading military
ING TIME
figures from the provinces were
present in the capital to mark
the anniversary of the Russian
Revolution. Nearly all of these
leaders showed up for a rally of
army "activists" on 14 November.
High-level conferences involv-
ing the military almost cer-
tainly took place in the inter-
vening week, and the cautious
tone of current propaganda sug-
gests that controversy continues
in meetings that may still be
under way.
Violence and attendant dis-
ruptions continue to increase
throughout China. Although the
number and seriousness of these
dislocations still remains well
below that of last summer,
trouble seems to be spreading
fairly rapidly.
In east China, clashes ap-
pear on the upswing in Fukien,
Chekiang, Hunan, and Kiangsu
provinces. In Canton, tensions
among rival Red Guard groups
continue to cause disturbances
despite a strong military pres-
ence attempting to maintain or-
der during the Canton Trade Fair.
At least part of these troubles
can probably be attributed to
covert encouragement b Maoist
militants in Peking.
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THAILAND SEEKS TO CONTROL CHINESE IRREGULARS
The Thai Government has be-
come increasingly embarrassed
over the presence of Chinese Na-
tionalist forces in northern Thai-
land and hopes to curb their ac-
tivities.
Bangkok underlined its concern
last month by ordering the Chinese
to leave the country within four
months. The leaders of two of
the three major Chinese National-
ist groups in Thailand reportedly
agreed to the deadline.
5 0
MILES
The irregulars--now number-
ing upwards of 1,800--have been
operating in the Burma-Thai-Lao
border area since 1949, ostensibly
to conduct intelligence and low-
level military operations against
China. The Taiwan government at
one time was deeply involved in
these activities, but in recent
years has provided only limited
logistical support. Most of the
irregulars' time has been spent
running opium and maintaining a
secure base of operations. The
Thais have consistently closed
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their eyes to the Chinese use of
remote mountainous areas in north-
ern Thailand for training and
supply activities, primarily be-
cause a major Thai military effort
would be necessary to force the
Chinese out.
The events leading to the
recent ouster order from Bangkok
began last August when a large
Chinese group withdrew into Thai-
land after a battle with local
tribal groups and a Lao Army unit
in neighboring Laos. The Thais
subsequently moved a regimental
combat team up to the border to
block the entry of a second Chi-
nese group, which reportedly in-
tended to cross the border from
Burma. Bangkok regarded the
crossing of the frontier last Au-
gust as particularly blatant.
Moreover, there may be re-
percussions affecting Thailand's
relations with Burma. A large
number of Burmese recruits ac-
companied the Chinese force and
this may have added to Bangkok's
conviction it was necessary to
make at least a token effort to
effect a withdrawal of the Chi-
nese.
The Thais, however, are
anxious to avoid a showdown over
the issue. Inasmuch as the Chi-
nese irregulars will probably
make a gesture toward acceding
to the Thai demands, it is likely
that Bangkok will quietly return
to its previous policy of acqui- 25X1
escing in a discreet Chinese
Nationalist presence.
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PRESIDENT'S PARTY GAINS IN PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS
The Nacionalista Party of
President Marcos has won sweeping
victories in the recent off-year
elections, an unexpected achieve-
ment that should strengthen Mar-
cos' prospects for re-election
in 1969.
Nacionalista candidates have
captured six of the eight Senate
seats being contested, as well
as over two thirds of the na-
tion's governorships, mayoral-
ties, and other local offices.
A pro-administration independent
and a Liberal took the remaining
two Senate seats.
Liberal Benigno Aquino's
outstanding showing was a major
setback for the administration.
Aquino, a former governor, is a
vigorous opponent of Marcos and
is now regarded as future presi-
dential material. His victory
is being challenged in the Su-
preme Court on technical grounds.
Marcos also failed to block the
re-election of the incumbent
Liberal mayor of Manila, Antonio
Villegas, whose political stock
in trade has been baiting the US.
His opponent had been personally
chosen and vigorously supported
by the President.
Marcos will now have nominal
control of the Senate, but the
progress of his economic programs
will depend in part on his abil-
ity to enforce party discipline.
Philippine politicians frequently
cross party lines for personal
advancement, and a defection of
several Nacionalistas last Janu-
ary threw control of the Senate
to the Liberals. It also re-
mains to be seen whether Marcos
will have any greater success in
overcoming the Senate's long-
standing opposition to economic
reforms.
The Nacionalistas' impres-
sive gains in the provinces may
well prove more significant than
the senatorial victories. Marcos'
increased local control will
give him greater leverage in im-
plementing development projects
and in mustering support for the
1969 presidential elections.
Marcos spent far more effort
campaigning for provincial can-
didates than for the Senate hope-
fuls, who are elected at large.
Election day was generally
peaceful after the widespread
violence of the campaigns. The
Election Commission, however,
has come under severe criticism
for inefficient voter registra-
tion. Possibly ten percent of
the electorate was disenfran-
chised in the general confusion
of drawing up new voter lists.
F_ I
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EUROPE
Public confidence in Prime Minister Wilson's
government declined further with the decision to
devalue sterling. All wings of the Labor Party
rallied round, however, and there was no immediate
danger that the government would fall. The outlook
for the longer term is cloudy.
The consequences of sterling's devaluation in-
evitably became involved in discussions among the
Six on Britain's bid for membership in the European
Communities. Early in the week, France turned down
a proposal by the other members to invite Britain
to participate in Community consideration of the
impact of devaluation. Further word on the subject
may be forthcoming when President De Gaulle holds
his press conference on 27 November.
On the draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty
(NPT), meanwhile, the Community is increasingly
preoccupied with eventual negotiations with the IAEA
to find a mutually acceptable solution for applying
safeguards. The Germans, in particular, seem more
concerned than ever lest the NPT foreclose the
maintenance of EURATOM's own safeguard system. In
addition, several countries are now raising the
question of whether a failure to reach an agreement
between EURATOM and the IAEA would oblige the US,
as a signatory of the NPT, to suspend the delivery
of nuclear materials on which the Community depends.
There is more evidence that Yugoslav-Rumanian
relations are recovering from the estrangement of
last summer caused by Belgrade's cooperation with
Moscow in support of the Arabs. Yugoslav Premier
Spiljak visited Bucharest last week and Serbian
party secretary Doronjski had been there earlier.
Spiljak met with Rumanian Premier Maurer and party
chief Ceausescu in what was described as a "warm 25X1
and comradely atmosphere." The two regimes prob-
ably wanted to coordinate their views on a world
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DEVALUATION MAY FAIL TO SOLVE BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC WOES
Prime Minister Wilson's gov-
ernment will be able to ride out
the immediate political storm but
it has suffered a serious loss of
confidence from the decision to
devalue the pound and increase
restrictions on the UK economy.
The instinct to rally 'round
in time of trouble and in the face
of partisan attack by the opposi-
tion has served to keep the large
Labor majority in Parliament in
line, as has the unpalatable al-
ternative of a general election
in which many Laborites would
lose their seats. New elections
are not required before 1971.
The longer term outlook may
be different. Party unity is
fragile, and many Laborites are
bitter about the new deflationary
measures--with their prospects for
further unemployment and further
deprivations for most Britons--
that accompanied devaluation. If
the economic picture is not con-
siderably brighter next spring,
the government may face a serious
revolt within the party.
The government's public image
has suffered in recent months be-
cause of nagging economic problems
and a series of political set-
backs and blunders. The confes-
sion that the past three years of
economic sacrifice have been in
vain and that even greater sacri-
fices lie ahead was the crowning
blow. Even if the new policy in
time produces a substantial im-
provement in Britain's economic
condition, the leadership may not
be able to restore public confi-
dence in its ability to govern
effectively.
On the positive side, the
government's action will probably
accomplish the immediate economic
objective of ending pressure on
sterling and cause a reflow of
funds into the UK. The decision
by all major countries to hold
the present value of their cur-
rencies will eliminate most of
the speculation about a further
devaluation in the near future.
The rise in the UK bank rate to
eight percent should attract sub-
stantial amounts of short-term
capital to London.
The prospects are less prom-
ising, however, that the new
measures will accomplish the
changes necessary to effect a
lasting surplus in the balance
of payments. The devaluation,
by making British goods cheaper
in foreign markets, should be a
considerable aid to British ex-
ports, but the program of domestic
restrictions may be insufficient
to prevent the gains of devalua-
tion from being eaten up by in-
flationary wage and price in-
creases.
To restrain rises in wages
and prices, the government will
rely on the type of voluntary
cooperation it has gotten during
its deflationary program of the
past 16 months. The public's
shattered confidence in the gov-
ernment, however, could lead to
a breakdown in this cooperation.
The leaders of Britain's two
largest trade unions have already
said they will press for some
major wage increases.
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HUNGARY LOOKS TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE
Hungary is renewing its search
for ways to expand relations with
Western Europe--and West Germany
in particular--perhaps even at
the expense of its ties to Poland
and East Germany.
To this end, the Kadar re-
gime apparently had decided to
explore the possibilities for
movement toward Western Europe in-
herent in the so-far amorphous
Communist proposals for new Euro-
pean collective security arrange-
ments. Not surprisingly, in view
of the regime's dependence on
good relations with the USSR,
Hungarian leaders first cautiously
unveiled their ideas in Moscow.
Speaking on 4 November at
the 50th anniversary celebrations,
Hungarian party boss Kadar empha-
sized that it was a state's pre-
rogative to work out a foreign
policy consonant with its national
interests as a preliminary to
coordination of policy among the
world's Communist parties.
when he stopped short of endors-
ing the permanent division of
Germany. Moreover,he flatly con-
tradicted Gomulka and other East-
ern European leaders who have as-
serted that a West German renun-
ciation of the use of force as an
instrument of policy would be
valueless. Fock called instead
for acceptance without conditions
of such small steps toward solu-
tion of complex European security
problems.
Publication of Fock's arti-
cle in Pravda does not necessar-
ily imply Soviet endorsement.
The absence, however, of specific
adverse Soviet pressure--such as
apparently was applied on Hungary
last spring immediately after
Rumania established diplomatic
relations with the Federal Repub-
lic--will encourage the Hungarian
leadership to continue to explore
its new path toward a reconcili-
ation with Western Europe.
Kadar was probably clearing
the way for an article by Hungar-
ian Premier Fock, which was pub-
lished in Pravda on 16 November.
Fock's thesis that "the German
question is the main question of
European security," was by itself
unexceptionable and was couched
in standard anti - West German
propaganda terms. Fock also
stayed in step with other East
Europeans when he expressed sup-
port for the "invaluable existence"
of East Germany.
He parted company with at
least Poland's Gomulka, however,
Fock's article drew an imme-
diate reaction from the East Ger-
mans who, along with the Poles,
probably believe that their long-
term security interests are
threatened. On 16 November, the
day the article was published,
East German Foreign Minister
Winzer said that an East-West
German agreement is an "indispen-
sable precondition" for any ef-
fective renunciation-of-force
arrangements. On the next day,
Winzer flew to Moscow, possibly
to review the East German and
Hungarian positions with the So- 25X1
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Troubles in the area reached a critical stage
this week with the confrontation between Greece
and Turkey over Cyprus and serious incidents along
the cease-fire line between Israel and Jordan.
Diplomatic efforts were continuing to avert
armed conflict over Cyprus as of noon on 22 Novem-
ber, but both Greek and Turkish armed forces re-
mained in a high state of readiness.
The recent clashes between Israeli and Jorda-
nian forces will make it more difficult for Jordan
to prevent terrorists from infiltrating Israel and
the West Bank. Increased terrorism will almost
certainly bring new Israeli retaliation.
The body politic of India broke out this
week in a rash of state political crises. The
most serious was in populous West Bengal, where
the radical-left Communists, who were the most
powerful force in a coalition government that
was dismissed by the governor, are bent on vio-
lent protest. On the other side of the country,
the non-Congress governments of neighboring Pun-
jab and Haryana states also folded, and mid-term
elections may eventually be necessary.
With regard to Congo (Kinshasa), neither the
mercenaries nor the Katangans have yet been evacu-
ated from Rwanda despite the Organization for
African Unity's efforts. When the International
Red Cross pulled out of the operation to airlift
the Katangans to Zambia, the Congolese Government
produced plans to return them to safe haven in
the Congo; the Katangan reaction, however, is
still uncertain.
The Nigerian civil war plods along, as the
OAU consultative mission gathers in Lagos in an
effort to halt the hostilitie
s, E
25X1
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CRISIS OVER CYPRUS
Cyprus itself was generally
quiet as of noon on 22 November,
but the danger of a violent con-
frontation between Greece and
Turkey remained serious.
Tensions have mounted during
the past week, following the out-
break of fighting on 15 November
between the Greek Cypriot National
Guard and Turkish Cypriots in the
Ayios Theodoros - Kophinou area on
the island.
prepared to land troops on Cyprus
if the Greek Government does not
remove it: "illegal" forces from
the islanc.. Another of Ankara's
demands hz.s already been met--
the removz.1 of Greek General Grivas,
the commander of Cypriot armed
forces anc the individual largely
responsib:.e for the extent of the
15 November fighting. Although
Grivas probably will not return
to the is:.and, his absence has
not calmed the high state of
emotion and military preparedness
in Turkey.
Ankara, working through third
parties, has insisted that it is
Term!; for quieting the crisis,
which Ankara has apparently agreed
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to, go beyond the removal of
troops, although they do call
for evacuation of those in ex-
cess of the number allowed under
the London-Zurich agreements of
1959, which provided the basis
for Cypriot independence from
the British in 1960. The terms
would also include an enlarged
and improved mandate for the
UN peace force, the payment of
an indemnity for the Turkish
Cypriot losses in the fighting,
and security arrangements for the
Turkish Cypriot populace inde-
pendent of Greek Cypriot authority.
Ankara at the same time would be
called upon to reaffirm the in-
violability and integrity of the
Cyprus Republic.
Athens recognizes the serious-
ness of the situation, but is try-
ing to avoid reacting diplomati-
cally to the Turkish terms until
tensions have calmed. It has in-
sisted that a quieter atmosphere
was necessary before any thought
could be given to the question of
troop removal. Foreign Minister
Pipinelis said that a Turkish
ultimatum to remove Greek troops
could only end in disaster. Athens
has not yet answered the Turkish
note of 17 November, which it re-
gards as an unmenacing protest of
the Ayios Theodoros incident, only
hinting at the question of troop
removal.
There have been some additional
shooting and bombing incidents on
the island, but generally the situ-
ation there has been calm. Most of
the shootings have been initiated by
the Turkish Cypriots, probably in
the hope of gaining direct support
from Ankara, which reportedly recog-
nizes this danger of deliberate
provocation. Perhaps to bolster
the morale of its island brethren,
Ankara has continued to send fighter
and reconnaisance aircraft over
the island throughout the week.
As of mid-week, it appeared
that both sides were still willing
to give di-lomatic efforts a
chance. 25X1
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ARAB-ISRAELI TENSION INCREASES
Israeli policies toward Jor-
dan and the West Bank are reflect-
ing a new and harder line in re-
sponse to continued terrorism.
In an exchange on 20 November be-
tween Israeli and Jordanian
forces, Israeli shellfire hit an
Arab refugee camp and killed 14
Jordanians and wounded 28, mostly
refugees.
Jordanian Government to continue
its policy of attempting to pre-
vent Syria.i-supported terrorists
from crossing Jordan and enter-
ing the West Bank and Israel.
The Israelis have apparently
departed from their previous pol-
icy of escalating to heavier
weapons only after the other side
has done so. On 21 November, the
Israelis used planes against Jor-
danian positions for the first
time since the June war.
In early November, the Is-
raelis leveled a Jordanian town
on the West Bank which, prior to
the June war, had a population
of 1.0,000. The Israelis claimed
the town was destroyed because
it might provide a possible hid-
ing place for terrorists. The
Jordanians claim that the destruc-
tion of the town and other homes
and buildings in the southern
portion of the West Bank is unre-
lated to terrorism and is an ef-
fort by the Israelis to occupy
and exploit fertile lands. In
any case, the destruction of their
homes will discourage the refugees
from returning, even if the area
is eventually returned to Jorda-
nian control.
25X1
The Arab states have become
increasing_.y fearful of an Is-
raeli stril:e at Jordan and/or
Syria. Much of this Arab fear,
however, hies been generated by
Israeli. troop rotations. In-
creased terrorism in the absence
of any Jordanian effort to re-
strict the movement of infiltra-
tors across. its land, however,
would almoEt certainly result in
an Israeli retaliatory strike.
Although tt.ere is no indication
at this time that an Israeli ac-
tion is imminent, the Israelis
are capablE of mobilizing suffi-
cient forcES to mount a retalia- 25X1
tory strikE with little or no
warning.
This harder Israeli line may
have made it impossible for the
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ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP DISPUTE CONTINUES
The dispute between Revolu-
tionary Council President Bou-
mediene and council member and
chief of staff Colonel Tahar
Z'Biri probably will continue
unresolved for some time.
The dispute broke into the
open over a long-rumored cabinet
reorganization. Boumediene ap-
parently planned to eliminate
Z'Biri's mouthpiece, the left-
wing minister of labor, and the
minister of agriculture. In
turn, Z'Biri has demanded the
ouster of some of Boumediene's
henchmen and a meeting of the
whole Revolutionary Council, in
in which he stands a better
chance of mustering a majority
vote than does Boumediene. Al-
though Boumediene is prepared to
compromise, Z'Biri remains ada-
mant but apparently unwilling to
set off a revolt.
The quarrel is rooted in the
antipathy between the Algerian
guerrillas--Z'Biri is their
symbol--who fought the revolu-
tion within the country and those
in the military who--with Bou-
mediene--sat out the revolution
outside the country. After five-
and-a-half years of independence,
the former guerrillas have found
their power progressively reduced
in favor of the small, educated
elite around Boumediene.
Z'Biri's present support in-
cludes not only the former guer-
rillas within the army and the
National Liberation Front (FLN),
but also a heterogeneous coali-
tion of other malcontents:
labor leaders, leftists and Com-
munists, and some strong mili-
tary elements. More socialisti-
cally oriented, they seek a
greater role for organized labor
in government. They accuse Bou-
mediene of having scuttled self-
management in industry and of
letting it die out in agricul-
ture. They also disagree with
the regime's policy of allocat-
ing oil and gas revenues to in-
dustry rather than agriculture.
On the other hand, Bou-
mediene and his close advisers--
Foreign Minister Bouteflika, In-
terior Minister Medeghri, Fi-
nance Minister Kaid, and FLN
chief Belkacem--are faced with
overwhelming economic problems
and generally place pragmatism
first and ideology second. They
have come to rely more and more
on technicians as they strive
to put Algeria on its feet.
Another irritant is that Bou-
mediene holds Z'Biri responsible
for having miscalculated Egyp-
tian and Syrian capabilities
last June, which led to Algeria's
die-hard policy toward Israel,
and its resulting embarrassing
diplomatic isolation.
Z'Biri--if he did decide
on open revolt--probably could
count on some support from re-
gional military commanders in
eastern Algeria. Boumediene's
position is basically stronger,
however, bolstered by gendarmerie,
police, an efficient intelligence
network, and long experience in
overcoming challenges to his au-
thority. Among the military, Bou-
mediene enjoys considerable pres-
tige, but not overwhelming loyalty,
modernization. 125X1
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NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR PLODS ALONG
Federal military commanders
are moving slowly and carefully in
the face of stubborn resistance by
the secessionist Biafrans. Al-
though hurting, the rebels are dog-
gedly sticking to their fight for
independence.
Several recent Biafran attempts
to regain their capital, Enugu,
failed, but until the Enugu area is
secured, federal forces probably
will not try to thrust deeper into
densely populated Ibo tribal lands.
A federal column from the north is
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nearing the Enugu-Abaliki road at
Nkalagu to relieve Biafran pressure,
which so far has denied federal
use of the En.ugu airfield.
Federal forces on other fronts
have also found the going slow.
One group, previously thwarted in
its attempt to cross the Niger
River to Onitsha, has received nu-
merous reinforcements of men and ar-
tillery in preparation for another
try. In the southeastern area,
federal troops have moved north of
Calabar toward a crossing point on
the Cross River, but Biafran units
apparently still are blocking the
main road north to Cameroon and
Ikom, where federal troops have had
skirmishes with Biafrans recently.
Ojukwu's regime shows no sign
of giving up the fight. Recent
speeches by Ojukwu and other top
leaders exhort the Ibos to greater
efforts and reiterate Biafran terms
for peace negotiations--full sover-
eignty for the former Eastern Re-
gion.
Federal forces, in addition to
a steady stream of small arms and
ammunition from a number of sources,
have received three MO-VI - class
Soviet patrol boats, a part of
last summer's deal with the USSR.
STABILITY TENUOUS IN FORMER FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA
The recent airlift of a com- Erratic President Bokassa of
pany of French combat troops to the CAR is presently in one of his
Bangui--capital of the Central Af- periodic nervous moods, and the air-
rican Republic (CAR) and geographic lift to Bangui on 10 November was
center of former French Equatorial in direct response to his request
Africa--highlights the concern of for French troops earlier this
both the local governments and France fall. What prompted the request
over the stability of the four suc- is not altogether clear, although
cessor countries to the old colonial rumors of impending antigovernment
federation. activity have been heard in Bangui.
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Bokassa has been increasingly criti-
cal of Finance Minister Banza, the
only person capable of ousting
him.
At present, uneasiness is
more prevalent in Gabon, where
there are signs of renewed worry
over the problem of succession to
ailing President Mba, who has been
in a Paris clinic for over a year.
Youthful Vice President Bongo,
groomed to succeed to the presi-
dency, has failed thus far to
achieve the status and degree of
acceptance of Mba. The French are
anxious to preserve their dominant
influence in Gabon, their primary
source of uranium ore, but appar-
ently hope to avoid a repetition of
their direct intervention in 1964
that squelched an anti-Mba coup
deemed inimical to French interests.
In Chad, the two-year-old Mus-
lim rebellion continues in the coun-
try's eastern provinces, and Presi-
dent Tombalbaye seems increasingly
depressed over his inability to
solve the nation's pressing eco-
nomic problems.
Events in Congo (Brazzaville) 25X1
continue to be shrouded in ob-
scurity and extremist rhetoric,
but the deployment of French com-
bat troops to Bangui could have a
sobering effect on the freewheel-
ing radical elements that oppose
President Massamba-Debat. Mas-
samba appears to be responsible
for whatever moderation persists
in Brazzaville, and he seems to
have become increasingly accept-
able to the French.
France maintains defense agree-
ments with all four countries and
has maintenance-of-order accords
with Gabon, Chad, and Congo, un-
der which French troops may be
called in to quell internal dis-
orders. The airlift to Bangui
is a relatively low-cost preven-
tive measure that gives reassur-
ance to the governments of the 25X1
area and food for thou ht to o-
tential coup makers.
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COMMUNIST CHINA RENEWS EFFORTS IN AFRICA
With the easing of the disrup-
tive pressures of the Cultural
Revolution on Chinese foreign af-
fairs, Peking is turning its at-
tention to policy programs, largely
held in abeyance for many months,
affecting various African coun-
tries. Red Guard "supervision"
of foreign policy matters began
to wane in late August, and since
that time the Chinese have stepped
up exchanges of delegations and
have offered increased economic
and military assistance to several
African states.
The greatest potential
Chinese commitment has been
made to Tanzania and Zambia for
assistance in constructing the
Tan-Zam railroad. In an agree-
ment signed in Peking on 5 Sep-
tember, the Chinese undertook
to assist the project, esti-
mated by Western sources to
cost about $400 million and to
require from four to eight
years to build. Although all
parties have given heavy prop-
aganda coverage to the agree-
ment, the Chinese probably
have retained the option of
reconsidering their participa-
tion following initial surveys.
Peking's relations with
Mali, which contains the larg-
est Chinese aid mission in Af-
rica, have improved apprecia-
bly.
the Chinese are 25X1
increasing their economic aid ef-
forts in Mali. Following a Sino-
Malian aid agreement in August,
a new group of 87 Chinese tech-
nicians arrived in Mali to join
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the estimated 1,300 Chinese aid
technicians already in the country.
The Chinese also reportedly
promised substantial financial aid
to the Congo (Brazzaville) when
Prime Minister Noumazalay visited
Peking in early October. A Chi-
nese mission is expected to arrive
in Brazzaville in the near future
to examine possible new projects.
Since 1964, Peking has extended
about $25 million in credits to
the Congo and currently has ap-
proximately 300 aid personnel there.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Labor problems are plaguing several Latin Amer-
ican countries, in some cases more for political than
for economic reasons.
In Chile, the unions dominated by Communists
and Socialists scheduled a general strike on 23 No-
vember to protest the government's wage readjustment
policies. Brazil faces a similar situation. Illegal
strikes, although usually of little individual sig-
nificance, are becoming more numerous. More often
than in the past, they are directed against govern-
ment wage laws rather than against economic inequi-
ties. In Ecuador, where political motives are mixed
with legitimate labor grievances, the Arosemena ad-
ministration has recently taken a firmer stand against
Communist-led strikes.
Economic motivation is clearer in Guatemala,
where railroad employees who have not been paid re-
cently are threatening the US owners and staff with
physical violence. The labor picture in Peru is
quiet at present, but the expiration of many con-
tracts in December could lead to union demands for
wage increases to compensate for recent price in-
creases.
In Uruguay, labor unions are dominated by Com-
munists, but the leaders have difficulty organizing
a strike on purely political issues. Agitation on
economic issues is usually successful, and most
workers, squeezed between rising prices and stable
salaries, probably will respond to any strike call.
In the diplomatic sphere, maneuvering on the
part of several candidates for the post of secre-
tary general of the OAS prevented any from getting
the necessary two-thirds vote on the first two bal-
lots--the Panamanian and Venezuelan candidates get-
ting the largest vote each time. A simple majority
will elect a candidate now, with the next ballot
coming on 27 November. Brazilian and Argentine
diplomats at home and at the UN were very active
in attempting to get a resolution on the Middle
East before the Security Council.
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GUERRILLA DEFEAT GAINS RESPITE FOR BO_IVIAN PRESIDENT
The Bolivian Government's
success against the guerrillas-
which culminated in the death
of Che Guevara and most of his
followers--has temporarily
strengthened the Barrientos re-
gime at the expense of the op-
position parties.
Since the outbreak of hos-
tilities in early March, the dis-
parate and often antagonistic op-
position groups had been united
in their attack on the govern-
ment's handling of the guerrilla
threat, in the belief that the
insurgency would lead to a loss
of presidential prestige. The
government's success now has
thrown the opposition off bal-
ance and has exposed again dif-
ferences within the Parties
over future policy.
The Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left (MNR), the party of
former president Paz, papered
over its internal differences
in early June, but now seems
once more divided. A number of
more militant leaders have writ-
ten an extremist document, "The
National Revolution Against the
North American Occupation,"
which more moderate elements
have denounced.
The Bolivian Socialist
Falange (F;3B) was already split
between militants and those who
favor cooperation with the armed
forces. I: now faces the pros-
pect of a :-evolt from the mid-
dle group, increasingly discon-
tented with the party's inabil-
ity to adolat a coherent line
leading toward eventual attain-
ment of power.
Although the government's
position his been temporarily
strengthened by these develop-
ments, the: ,e are signals of
danger ahead. The President
is more than ever beholden to
the armed :orces, not only be-
cause of their regained pres-
tige but a:.so because of the
government s loss of control
over some political forces.
Four of thc! seven, university
student federations have elected
Communist =.eaders during the
past four rionths, a record for
leftist hegemony in the trouble-
some education sector. Also,
the governrent's efforts last
year to enure the election of
a sympathetic leader in a major
labor confederation seem to
have been r.egated in recent
union elections.
As a.iesult, Barrientos may
have to yield to military pres-
sures in a number of important
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areas, perhaps even to the ex-
tent of allowing increased mil-
itary representation in the gov-
ernment. The military can be
expected to be less patient
than previously in handling a
sometimes truculent opposition,
whether in street demonstrations
or in Congress, and may even
press for the exercise of uncon-
stitutional powers.
An even greater danger, how-
ever, lies in the possibility
that the armed forces--enjoying
their first civilian popularity
in some time--may seek to con-
solidate their position by cater-
ing to the resurgent wave of na-
tionalism. This may pose serious
problems for the US, particularly
in relation to private and gov-
ernment investments in Bolivia.
PERU'S BELAUNDE TRIES TO WIN WIDER SUPPORT
President Belaunde has
named a new prime minister in a
belated effort to win support
from the opposition-controlled
Congress and the business com-
munity for his administration's
proposals to cope with the cur-
rent economic problems.
Dr. Raul Ferrero Rebagliat_L,
an expert on international and
constitutional law, succeeds to
the post held by Edgardo Seoane
since 7 September. Until his
appointment, Ferrero was a member
of the International Court of
Justice.
Although the appointment
has been greeted with mild ap-
proval by the Congress and the
business community, influential
leaders of the President's own
party have expressed disappoint-
ment at the choice. Former prime
minister Seoane, reportedly
quite bitter over Ferrero's
selection, returns to his pre-
vious position as secretary
general of the governing Popular
Action (AP) party.
Seoane's control of the
party machinery and his command
of the loyalties of the majority
of local AP organizations will
give him leverage to oppose ad-
ministration programs that he
believes would compromise the
party's campaign promises of
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1963. Such opposition could
rapidly develop when the new
prime minister attempts to reach
an agreement with congressional
leaders on 1968 budget and tax
measures. Some party leaders,
in view of the anticipated op-
position, are already predict-
ing that the new cabinet will
not last long.
Belaunde faces some diffi-
cult weeks ahead. The Congress,
which will convene in special
session on 25 November, is ex-
pected to be even less willing
than in the past to allow new
taxes without an agreement by
the administration to make
sharp cuts in expenditures. The
cost of living continues to inch
upward, threatening another
round of strikes and wage demands
by workers in December, when many
wage contracts are up for renewal.
If bus fares go up, following
an expected rise in gasoline
prices, unrest will increase
even more.
SECRET
In a political maneuver to
stem the decline in his prestige,
Belaunde has moved against the
International Petroleum Company
(IPC). The government has an-
nounced it will take IPC--a sub-
sidiary of Standard Oil of New
Jersey--to court to collect ad-
ditional taxes owed by the com-
pany as well as all the company's
profits for the last 15 years.
IPC officials are gravely
concerned cver the effect of
this action on the company's
future operations. They have
indicated that they might shut
down the oil fields, which
produce nearly 80 percent of
Peru's petroleum needs, rather
than submit to unfair and
excessive taxation. Such
action could provoke a confron-
tation between the government
and the IPC which could dis-
courage future US investments
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CHILEAN ELECTIONEERING STIRS POLITICAL SCENE
A senatorial by-election
in Chile on 17 December prob-
ably will be used by all politi-
cal parties as a testing ground
for the 1969 congressional and
1970 presidential elections.
Although the seat in ques-
tion is in an agricultural dis-
trict where local problems are
the predominant interest, the
opposition will probably cam-
paign primarily on national is-
sues. If it wins, it can then
claim that by defeating the
candidate of President Frei's
Christian Democratic Party (PDC),
it has demonstrated Frei's loss
of popularity during his three
years in office.
The left-wing leadership
of the Radical Party (PR) will
be trying to prove that its pol-
icy of cooperation with the Com-
munists and Socialists is paying
important dividends. The PR
has nominated Alberto Blatra,
president of the Chilean-Soviet
Cultural Institute, and has ob-
tained formal support from the
Communist Party. The Socialists,
always less enthusiastic than
the Communists about cooperating
with the PR, have as yet made no
formal declaration of support.
They will not run their own
candidate, however, and certainly
will in no way hamper Baltra's
campaign.
. In an attempt to minimize
the national implications of
the election, the PDC has nomi-
nated one of the area's most
popular politicians, Jorge Lav-_
andero. Despite the PDC's de-
cision to run a local man rather
than a national figure, the gov-
ernment is certain to be watch
ing the results closely, and
members of the administration
probably will campaign for
Lavandero.
Two relatively small parties
are also contesting the election.
The conservative National Party
has not yet named its candidate,
and is running only to keep its
name before the voters. PADENA,
a small leftist party, has en-
tered the race, but its candi-
date may withdraw in favor of
Lavandero.
One of the most important
issues is certain to be the gov-
ernment's wage-price policy for
1968, although this program
will have less effect in an agri-
cultural area than in other
parts of the country. The pro-
gram, which calls for part of
the 1968 wage readjustment to
be paid in bonds of a govern-
ment fund, has sparked opposi-
tion from all political and eco-
nomic sectors. Lavandero's
close association with the Frei
administration may be a severe
handicap if he is forced to cam-
paign primarily on a platform
of support for the wage-price
policy.
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SEC:R ET
RIGHT-WING PARTY GAINS STRENGTH IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The growing strength of the
right-wing Democratic Quisqueyan
Party (PQD), which is promoting
exiled General Wessin y Wessin as
its 1970 presidential. candidate,
is creating an uneasy political
situation in the Dominican Repub-
lic. The PQD recently applied
for recognition as a political
party, a move that could pave the
way for Wessin's return from exile
in Miami, Florida.
President Balaguer had stated
last July that he would permit
Wessin to return if sufficient
popular support for such a move
developed, and he recently ac-
knowledged Wessin's eligibility
to participate in forthcoming
elections. He has made no move
to lift the ban on the general's
re-entry into the country, how-
ever. Balaquer reportedly be-
lieves that Wessin's return at
this time would create divisions
in the armed forces, on which his
government so heavily depends.
Wessin, who led the counter-
revolt against the rebel forces
that precipitated the civil war
of 1965, became a symbol for the
rightists and was "voluntarily"
retired and exiled to the US in
September 1965 by provisional
president Garcia Godov. It ap-
pears that he is fast becoming a
rallying point for disaffected
political z.nd business elements
who for a variety of reasons see
him as a potential instrument for
upsetting what they consider to
be an unsatisfactory status quo.
There is rE:ason to believe that
Wessin sti=.1 commands some loy-
alty in thE~ armed forces, partic-
ularly at _.ower levels, but the
number of r.is followers is be-
lieved to le small.
Unfour.ded rumors of a less-
than-posit.ve US attitude toward
Balaguer hz.ve added to the Wes-
sinista cor.troversy. Such alle-
gations have gained wide currency
among rumormongers and have led
to charges by otherwise, responsi-
ble elements that US support is
shifting tc Wessin.
There are indications that
Wessin and his supporters are
planning same major move on 1 De-
cember. St.ch an action, unless
authorized by the government,
could lead to a confrontation be-
tween the Ealaguer regime and
Wessin's fcllowers. So far, pro-
Wessin civilian and military ele-
ments are rot united. Neverthe-
less, the Potential clearly exists
for alliances that could pose
serious prcblems for the Balaguer
government.
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Secret
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