WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006100010001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 13, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
52
State Dept. review completed 13 October 1967
No. 0311/67
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(Information as of noon EDT, 12 October 1967)
VIETNAM
As the relative lull in Communist military activity
in South Vietnam continues, Saigon's new Senate has
begun organizational sessions and preparations for
the lower house elections are under way.
MORE STRAINS ON CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA AND
BURMA
Despite the recent trend toward moderation in Com-
munist China's foreign policy, Peking's relations
with Djakarta and Rangoon are growing steadily worse.
DOWNTURN PERSISTS IN CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
Peking's emphasis on moderation continues unabated
and Red Guard activity has hit an unprecedented low.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 9
USSR'S GROUND TROOPS IMPROVE SAM DEFENSES
As part of a continuing program to improve the air
defense capabilities of their ground forces, the
Soviets are introducing the SA-4 Ganef, a new sur-
face-to-air missile system, and are extending their
deployment of an existing one, the SA-3 Goa.
RUMANIAN-SOVIET FRICTION OVER MOLDAVIA
The Bucharest regime's stress on nationalism to en-
hance its domestic popularity is apparently having
an effect in Soviet Moldavia, where ethnic Rumanians
make up 65 percent of the population.
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POLISH PLENUM STRESSES FARM PROBLEMS
The central committee meeting late last month ap-
proved several measures intended to make Poland
self-sufficient in food output.
COMMON MARKET PREPARES FOR DEBATE ON BRITISH ENTRY
The Council of the European Communities will meet
later this month to consider the Commission's report
on Britain's application for membership.
NIGERIAN ARMY CLOSES IN ON REBEL BIAFRA
The Nigerian Army has virtually completed its re-
capture of the Mid-West and is consolidating its
hold on Enugu, capital of the former Eastern Region.
The Biafran government, amid signs of growing tur-
moil and dissension, has withdrawn further inside
the Ibo heartland.
HUSAYN STRIVING TO IMPROVE JORDAN'S POSITION
The King's visit to Moscow last week probably was
intended primarily to assure continued support for
the Arab states against Israel, although tha USSR
allegedly offered to supply arms to Jordan. Back
home, Husayn reorganized his government and army,
apparently intending to assume closer personal
control.
TERRORISM INCREASES IN ISRAEL AND OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Terrorist incidents have increased considerably over
the past month in Israel and the Arab territories =_t
occupies. Continuation of this terrorism will almost
certainly lead the Israelis to consider soma kind of
direct reprisal against Syria, and possibly Jordan
as well.
EGYPTIAN WITHDRAWAL MAY LEAD TO FURTHER UNREST IN YEMEN 21
Egyptian troops have begun to depart from Yemen, but
Cairo has had trouble controlling Yemeni republicans
who feel that they have been "sold out."
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ALGERIAN REGIME FACES MOUNTING DISCONTENT
The Boumediene regime, muddling along in the wake of
its extreme stand in the Arab-Israeli crisis, is be-
set by feuding factions and mounting criticism, but
no effective challenge to its authority has yet ap-
peared.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 23
LATIN AMERICA TURNS TO EUROPE FOR ARMS
Major South American nations are turning increasingly
to Europe for modern military equipment not available
to them from US sources.
ANTI-AMERICANISM USED AS POLITICAL TOOL IN ECUADOR 25
President Arosemena appears to believe that Anti-
American actions--such as asking for the recall of
the US ambassador--will build his domestic political
following without affecting relations with the US.
URUGUAY INITIATES STRONG ACTION TO CONTROL LABOR 26
President Gestido has proclaimed a limited state of
siege to curtail strikes, but important members of
his government disagree with such forceful action
and have resigned.
DUVALIER DEALS WITH UNREST IN NORTHERN HAITI 27
The disorders of the past two weeks appear to have
been spontaneous and strict regime countermeasures
have forestalled further incidents.
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FAR EAST
Preparations for the installation of the new
South Vietnamese Government are moving ahead with-
out serious challenge from militant Buddhist and
student groups. Relations between Thieu and Ky
reportedly have improved, and their firm stand has
discouraged further protest demonstrations.
Military activity last week in South Vietnam
was limited to widely scattered clashes. Although
heavy shelling of the US Marine position at Con
Thien has not been resumed, North Vietnamese forces
are maintaining pressure in this section. Redeploy-
ments of North Vietnamese troops in the Demilitarized
Zone area may foreshadow intensified attacks along
a wider segment of the demarcation line, timed to
take advantage of the current monsoon season. Mean-
while, Communist activity in the Mekong Delta prov-
inces has increased and Communist forces still re-
tain the initiative in vast areas of the heavily
populated delta.
The trend toward moderation of the Cultural
Revolution in China continues, with major pronounce-
ments stressing the need to unite rival factions
in "revolutionary great alliances" as a means of
stimulating industrial and agricultural production.
Tensions between warring Red Guard factions remain
high, however, and united front groups formed in
response to these appeals will be nothing more
than a fragile facade. There is no evidence so
far of attempts by pro-Mao extremists to reverse
the trend toward unity and discipline over the
past month.
The success of the moderates in bringing
internal chaos under control has not been matched
by progress in liquidating the effects of Cultural
Revolution excesses abroad. China's relations
with Burma and Indonesia, for example, continue to
deteriorate. 25X1
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VIETNAM
Military activity in South
Vietnam this week was confined
to sporadic clashes with enemy
forces in widely scattered sec-
tions of the country. In the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) area,
meanwhile, the major realignment
of Communist forces that began
last week appears to be con-
tinuing. The major developments
thus far involve the withdrawal
of sizable enemy forces into
North Vietnam.
The pattern of the redeploy-
ments suggests that a new phase
of enemy activity may soon begin
with intensified attacks along
a more widespread section of the
DMZ, including strategic allied
positions in western Quang Tri
Province. Such activity could
be timed to take advantage of
the current monsoon season when
US tactical air and logistical
support will be most limited.
of Saigon has intensified in re-
cent weeks. This increase in
activity has included numerous
attacks on lightly defended gov-
ernment outposts and remote Rev-
olutionary Development teams which
have provided the Communists with
needed weapons and equipment.
In addition to such attacks,
enemy forces have concentrated on
interdicting major lines of com-
munication in the area--especially
strategic Route 4 which links the
agricultural delta provinces with
the markets in Saigon. Route 4
has recently been severed in 22
places and the resulting traffic
delays have caused another rise
in Saigon's food prices. In spite
of a good showing by South Viet-
namese units in some areas of the
delta, the enemy still retains
the initiative throughout vast
sections.
In central South Vietnam,
enemy forces continue their ef-
forts to evade US and allied
search-and-destroy operations.
American operations just to the
north of Saigon, however, have
resulted in the heaviest enemy
losses in this area in several
months.
Enemy military activity in
the Mekong Delta provinces south
Political Developments in
South Vietnam
Saigon's new 60-member
Senate opened on 11 October. Un-
til President Thieu is installed
and the lower house is elected
on 22 October, the Senate will be
occupied with the development
of internal rules and organiza-
tion. One 'fey job to be filled
is that of Senate president,
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who will probably deal directly
with the prime minister and other
important members of the execu-
tive branch. The leading con-
tender for this post is a popu-
lar retired general, Tran Van
Don, whose Senate slate was a
runaway winner in the recent
election. General Thieu, how-
ever, reportedly favors Tran
Van Lam, an experienced Saigon
politician.
over 1,200 candidates are
in the running for the 137 seats
in the lower house. Although na-?
tional issues will probably figure
in the campaign to some extent,
voting will be on a provincial
rather than a national basis.
The election is therefore likely
to be influenced more by local
factors than was the recent Senate
contest.
One development that should
help smooth the way for the in-
stallation of the new govern-
ment has been the decision by
militant Buddhist. leader Tri
Quang to end his protest vigil
outside government headquarters
in Saigon. He probably believes
that he has gained some ground
by his protest. The charter re-
cently granted the moderate wing
of the Buddhist church has been
temporarily suspended by them at
the government's behest in order
to create a favorable atmosphere
for conciliatory moves within
the Buddhist factions.
Tri Quang subsequently told
the press, however, that his strug-
gle to force the government to
revoke the charter is not over,
even though he appears to realize
that his actions have failed so
far to generate the mass support
needed to carry on a vigorous
public opposition.
Construction in Nor-:h Vietnam
Photography of northeast
North Vietnam near the Chinese
border shows that Hanoi has been
developing extensive military
and logistic facilities in the
area. A large group of instal-
lations is concentrated along
the Hanoi - Ping-hsi.ang rail line,
with a particularly large number
evident around the border town of
Dong Dang. ~'hese include some ten
storage sites and other facili-
ties for communications, vehicle
repair, truck parking and pe-
troleum as well as military en-
campments. There is also an
unidentified, and as yet incomplete,
complex about. four miles north-
west of Dong Dang that could be
a major military headquarters.
Many of these facilities
are probably connected with the
maintenance of supply lines from
China. The sites were probably
placed near the border in the
expectation that this location
would afford safe haven from US
bombing strikes.
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Photography also indicates
that construction has almost
been completed on a new road that
will facilitate movement between
the Haiphong area and Ning-ming
in south China. The new route
has been created by improving
existing roads north of Haiphong
and by new construction in China
near the border. There is cur-
rently only a gap of some three
miles at the border separating
the Chinese and DRV sections of
the road.
Doumer Bridge Repaired
Additional evidence of
Hanoi's concern with keeping open
supply lines from China can be
seen in the speed with which the
mile-long Doumer Bridge, which
was damaged in mid-August, has
been repaired. An eyewitness
reports that the bridge was
opened to two-way motor traffic
on 1 October and that the rail
portion of the bridge was in
service two days later. Photog-
raphy ndicates 25X1
that the repaired rail-line sup-
ports may not be as strong as
the original trusswork, but prob-
ably are adequate to carry at
least light loads at reduced
speeds.
Hanoi Secures New Aid
Agreements
Hanoi rounded out its cur-
rent series of aid agreements
by signing pacts this week with
Hungary, East Germany, and Czech-
oslovakia. The new accords,
which call for the supply of
a variety of military and non-
military goods to North Vietnam,
represent only a small portion
of Hanoi's over-all aid require-
ments. Nevertheless, they help
project an image of Communist
solidarit in backing the Viet-
namese.
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MORE STRAINS ON CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA AND 13URMA
Peking's relations with Dja-
karta and Rangoon are growing
steadily worse. Political fall-
out from the Cultural Revolution
during the past six months has
poisoned the diplomatic atmosphere
to such an extent that Indonesia
is close to a de facto break in
relations and the substantial Chi-
nese presence in Burma is threat-
ened.
In a note of 9 October, Indo-
nesia rejected Peking's protest
over the sacking of the Chinese
Embassy in Djakarta on 1 October
and refused Peking's request to
send an airplane to evacuate per-
sonnel injured during the inci-
dent. Djakarta insisted that if
a plane were sent, the entire
Chinese Embassy staff would have
to leave and the remaining four
Indonesian diplomats in Peking
allowed safe exit.
nor Peking appears willing to take
the initiative in a formal break.
The growing estrangement be-
tween China and Burma has been
furthered by Rangoon's request on
6 October that Peking withdraw
the approximately 450 Chinese aid
experts and technicians in Burma
by the end of the month. The
Burmese action was precipitated
by a Chinese note of 4 October
which threatened to terminate the
aid projects unless Rangoon acted
to halt anti-C:ninese activity and
to punish those responsible for
the attack on the Chinese Embassy
in Rangoon last summer. Although
China's anti-Burmese propaganda
campaign has subsided since last
summer, the Chinese note made it
clear that Peking is not presently
interested in improving its se-
verely strained relations with Ne
Win.
In line with its recent trend
Loward moderation in foreign af-
fairs, Peking avoided retaliatory
action against the Indonesian Em-
bassy in Peking and has limited
its reaction to a routine diplo-
matic protest. The Indonesian
Government, for its part, appar-
ently hopes that a "suspension"
of diplomatic relations with Pe-
,king will satisfy anti-Chinese
military and student elements.
For the moment, neither Djakarta
China's foreign aid program
in. Burma, provided under a $84-
million credit extended in January
1.961, has been a source of fric-
tion between the two governments
ever since Chinese technicians be-
gan promoting the Cultural Revo-
lution among Overseas Chinese and
Burmese worker:;. Following the
widespread ant:!-Chinese activity
in Burma in late June, actual work
on Chinese aid pro ' ect.s has been
in abeyance.
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DOWNTURN PERSISTS IN CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
Peking's emphasis on modera-
tion and the restoration of order
continued unabated last week.
The central authorities appear
to be pursuing the new policies,
introduced in early September,
with considerable determination.
As a result, Red Guard activity
has fallen to its lowest level
since the introduction of these
groups as the "shock troops of
the Cultural Revolution" in Au-
gust 1966.
In addition to the "business
as usual" propaganda themes that
stress the importance of indus-
trial production and the gather-
ing of the harvest, the regime
is emphasizing the paramount im-
portance of establishing unity
among rival Red Guard groups.
Peking has had considerable
success in achieving at least
superficial unity among various
Red Guard factions throughout the
country. Press reports state that
"revolutionary great alliances"
are being formed in many parts
of China.
Deep-seated tensions between
militant leftist and more con-
servative, locally oriented Red
Guard groups still exist, how-
ever.
Students, who have provided
the backbone for the Red Guard
movement, are slated to return to
school this month. The regime,
however, had set a number of
earlier deadlines for a return
to the classroom that went largely
unheeded. While Peking's deter-
mination to enforce its will on
recalcitrant youngsters seems
stronger at present than at any
time in the recent past, report-
ing is still too scanty to de-
termine if most students have
left the streets and returned to
school.
There has been a paucity of
hard information from the mainland
in the past week--an additional
sign that the Cultural Revolution
is in low gear. Wall posters were
taken down in Peking for National
Day and no new ones have been
posted since. The disappearance
of the posters--a key device for
political agitation--provides a
further indication of the Peking
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leadership's current determination
to restrict Red Guard activity.
Since the National Day cele-
brations, regime spokesmen and
major propaganda organs have been
stressing the theme that the Cul-
tural Revolution has already
achieved many of its objectives.
A recent editorial of the theo-
retical journal, Red Flag, repeats,
this line, emphasizing t_ie im-
portance of ideological purity
in what appears to be a return
to the attempt in early 1966 to
portray the Cultural Revolution
as a long-term effort.
This line provides Peking
with a rationale for quietly clos-
ing out at least the violent
phase of the Cultural. Revolution.
Most leading :'_eftists, associated
with the extremist policies that
characterized the movement at
its height st__ll remain active
and in positions of importance,
however. It is unlikely that
they are willing to accept a per-
manent end to the Cultural Revo-
lution, and they will probably
work to secure a reversal of the
moderate policies being pushed 25X1
by the more pragmatic forces now
in ascendancy in Peking. 1 -1
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Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Oct 67
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EUROPE
At a meeting of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow,
the Russians announced--in part for the effect abroad--
a 15-percent increase in their defense budget. Expen-
ditures for defense are not likely to rise by that
amount; some of the increase probably reflects ac-
counting changes that shift defense expenditures from
other budget categories. The total Soviet budget
for 1968 will be 12 percent larger than this year's.
The Supreme Soviet also took up a new bill on
universal military service that will probably shorten
the period of active duty for military conscripts
but would not necessarily reduce the size of the
armed forces.
Britain's Labor Party conference ended in some-
thing of a triumph for Prime Minister Wilson. On the
important resolutions, he got the conferees approval
and his position as party leader went unchallenged.
In France, a leftist-sponsored censure motion
on De Gaulle's economic and social policy was de-
feated by a wide margin, giving the government some
breathing space. Farmers and workers continue their
antigovernment demonstrations, however, and Premier
Pompidou will be ressed to find solutions to
their problems. hard 25X1
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Soviet Sam Systems
for
Ground Forces
SA-3
SA-4
The SA-3 Goa is effective against The SA-4 Ganef has good mobility.
aircraft flying at altitudes between The Ganef missile has an effective range
50,000 and about 1,000 feet. Its range of about 27 miles and can probably hit
is about 12 miles. aircraft flying as high as 65,000 feet.
SA-2
The SA-2 Guideline system can down aircraft flying as high as 90,000 feet.
Depending on the variant of the system, the SA-2 has a maximum range of from
17 to 27 miles, and a minimum effective altitude of from 3,000 to about 1,500 feet.
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USSR'S GROUND TROOPS IMPROVE SAM DEFENSES
As part of a continuing pro-
gram to improve the air defense
capabilities of their ground
forces, the Soviets are introduc-
ing a new surface-to-air missile
(SAM) system, the SA-4 Ganef, and
are extending the deployment of
an existing one, the SA-3 Goa.
These systems are intended
to augment the SA-2, whose mo-
bility is limited and whose per-
formance against tactical air-
craft has been unsatisfactory.
Of the more than 3,850 SA-2s
fired in North Vietnam prior to
mid-October, only 83 have downed
aircraft.
The SA-4 is now being used
in large-scale army maneuvers,
according to Soviet press reports.
This mobile system is the first
Soviet SAM designed specifically
for the air defense of troops in
the field. In this role, it
probably will replace the SA-2,
which-.-with its cumbersome train
of fuel trucks, radar support
vans, cranes, and transporters--
is unable to keep up with fast-
moving ground force units and
creates logistics problems when
it becomes separated from support
areas.
The SA-4 missile is ram-jet
powered, allowing it to use eas-
ily transportable, low-grade fuel.
The missiles are dual mounted on
a tracked vehicle that serves as
both transporter and launcher.
The radars, communications gear,
and support equipment required
for the system undoubtedly are
vehicle mounted, also.
Soviet forces in East Ger-
many are constructing four-posi-
tion launch sites for the SA-3
Goa. The eight sites discovered
so far all appear to be defending
Soviet airfields. The SA-3 is
designed to shoot down low-flying
aircraft. About 100 sites were
built in the USSR before deploy-
ment there virtually halted in
1964.
The new SA-3 deployment sup- 25X1
plements the SA-2s already posi-
Eastern Europe is a logi-
cal location for SA-3 sites be-
cause in the event of war the
threat of low-altitude attacks
by allied fighter-bomber aircraft
will be substantially greater
there.
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YUGOSLAVIA
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RUMANIAN-SOVIET FRICTION OVER MOLDAVIA
Moscow continues to be sensi-
tive to Rumania's irredentist
claim to the former Rumanian prov-
ince of Bessarabia--now part of
the Moldavian SSR--because of the
possible disruptive effects of the
claim on the local population.
Premier Kosygin recently made
a special trip to Kishinev, capi-
tal of the Moldavian Republic,
ostensibly to award the city the
Order of Lenin. In his speech
there on 30 September, however,
Kosygin presented a vigorous and
lengthy defense of the Soviet
Union's annexation of Bessarabia,
stressing the great improvement
in the life of the Moldavians as
a result of this union. He made
it clear that any change in the
Moldavian Republic's present
status is out of the question.
His remarks cannot help but ag-
gravate relations between Moscow
and Rumania.
Ethnic Rumanians make up 65
percent of Soviet Moldavia's popu-
lation and they probably listen
with interest to nationalistic
broadcasts from Rumania's powerful
radio and television stations
at Suceava, Iasi, and Galati.
Whether or not this spillover of
broadcasts has been intentional,
it seems to have contributed to
restiveness in the area, as indi-
cated by several Radio Moscow
broadcasts in Rumanian since last
June.
The recent exchange of visits
by leaders of the USSR and Hungary
with the Rumanians, as well as
the unusual swing through Transyl-
vania late last month by Rumanian
party chief Ceausescu and his
guest, Bulgarian party boss Zhiv-
kov, are probably associated with
the current revival of Rumania's
traditional problems with Russia
over Moldavia and with Hungary
over Transylvania.
The strong nationalism Bu-
charest has espoused since the
first of the year probably has
generated considerable appeal
among ethnic Rumanians in Soviet
Moldavia. Since embarking on its
nationalistic course in the early
1960s, the regime has stressed
various aspects of Rumanian na-
tionalism. The development of
an enhanced national consciousness
has been an important element of
the Rumanian party's domestic
policy.
In view of the Rumanian re-
gime's determination to use na-
tionalism to enhance its popu-
larity, emphasis on Rumania's
historical national identity prob-
ably will be intensified as the
Rumanian party prepares for a na-
tional party conference on 6 De-
cember. One effect will be to
keep alive this irritant in re-
lations between Bucharest and
Moscow.
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POLISH PLENUM STRESSES FARM PROBLEMS
A Polish party central com-
mittee plenum held at the end of
September dealt solely with agri-
culture. The reciime is trying
to make agricultural output keep
pace with Poland's rapidly grow-
ing population.
The Polish leaders cited
favorable developments in recent
years, but admitted that farmers
were not efficiently using avail-
able seed, fertilizer, and ma-
chinery. They deplored the high
level of foreign currency expend-
itures for grain imports--$125
million this year. The plenum
decided that the immediate task
is to increase grain, fodder,
and cattle production by concen-
trating the state's efforts in
regions where production has
lagged.
The plenum also unveiled a
major new land consolidation
procrram intended to reverse the
trend toward increasing fragmen-
tation and poor use of peasant
holdings. Elderly farmers will-
ing to sell at least 12 acres of
land to the state would receive
lifetime pensions, and would re-
tain their dwellings and 2.5 acres
for life. Another program would
step up reclamation of marginal
land owned by state farms.
Speakers at the plenum indi-
cated, however, that the proposals
do not signa:_ a charge in Poland's
agricultural policy, under which
;B5 percent of arable land is pri-
vately owned. The proposals are,
in fact, intended to permit the
absorption of small holdings by
larger private farmers in cases
where a state take-over would not
be feasible.
Agricultural experts will
be used more extensively for ad-
vising farmers. Proposals were
made to improve administrative
control of all agricultural spe-
cialists, to increase their au-
thority, and to raise their pay.
The plenum also decided to
intensify ex:_sting programs.
Planned investments in agricul-
ture in 1966-?70 are to be 66-
percent higher than in the pre-
vious five-year plat... Short-
term credits to farmers will also
be substantially increased. The
grain contract purchasing system,
under which the government guar-
antees to buy grain at stipulated
prices, is to be expanded. In
addition, each district is to
have its own program designed to
improve practices ir. which the
district has been weakest.
These measures may improve
agricultural production over the
long run, but they a.re unlikely
to enable Po'-and to achieve self-
sufficiency in grain by 1970.
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To do this, the government will
probably have to offer such ad-
ditional incentives as higher
contract prices and lower ferti-
lizer prices.
The plenum was the first
held since the Middle East crisis,
but it brought none of the politi-
ical shifts that reports suggested
might have been in the offing.
This tends to support recent in-
dications that party leader Go-
mulka has succeeded--at least
temporarily--in controlling the
controversy within the party over
his strong support for Moscow's
anti-Israeli stand.
COMMON MARKET PREPARES FOR DEBATE ON BRITISH ENTRY
The European Commission has
set the stage for a crucial de-
bate among the Six on enlarging
the European Communities with its
report on the question of the
membership requests of Britain,
Ireland, Norway, and Denmark.
The immediate issue is when to
open negotiations with the ap-
plicants, particularly Britain.
The Commission and the Five favor
early talks with the British, but
the French contend that negotia-
tions with London would now be
premature.
In its report, the Commission
concluded that enlargement "could
both reinforce the community and
provide it with an opportunity
for new progress on the condition
that the new members accept, as
they have declared they are will-
ing to do, the provisions of the
treaties as well as the decisions
which have been taken under them."
The political significance of the
report goes beyond the Commis-
sion's recommendation for widen-
ing the membership, however. The
report makes clear the Commission's
intention to use accession nego-
tiations to move further toward
economic union, to establish the
principles of a common policy on
technology, and even to move to-
ward a community monetary system.
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The Commission sees Britain's
difficulties not so much as ob-
stacles
to entry as problems af-
i:acting the whole community that
Will have to be worked out in
negotiations. The Commission's
:mphasis on the "preliminary"
nature of its report, moreover,
is intended to strengthen the
argument that only negotiations
among all the governments can
provide the necessary informa-
tion on which to base a final
decision. The thorough catalogue
of problems ?n the report is
directed in part against the
tench contention that extended
debate is still necessary within
the Council, which will discuss
the report at a meeting on 23-24
October.
French officials are al-
leging that the problems, which
they say they are pleased the
Commission's report raises, only
i=emonstrate that the UK is clearly
not yet: ready for membership.
13e Gaulle took this line with
t:he British ambassador in Paris
last wEeek, asking him whether
it would not be better to start
negotiations "at some time in
the future when the UK was
ready.
The Germans--who chair the
Council until the end of the
year--may be reluctant: to face
a. showdown with Paris, but they
and others of the Five may be
equally reluctant to leave un-
decided until the French take the
Council chairmanship in January
the issue of whether or not to
negotiate. The permanent rep-
resentatives o:f the Six in Brus-
sels will prepare the agenda for
the Council meeting in late Octo-
ber, presumably attempting to de-
fine the options available to
the ministers.
The official British posi-
tion is that London only wants to
negotiate with the six member
governments. Lord Chalfont has
stated, however:, that the Brit-
ish may be prepared a: a last
resort to settle for preliminary
negotiations with the Commission.
There is no indication that the
community is yet considering a
compromise solution of this kind.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Unsettled conditions persist in the Middle East.
Terrorism has increased markedly during the past
month in Israel and Israeli-occupied areas. Jordan
is making a major effort to stop the infiltration of
anti-Israeli saboteurs through its territory, but
Syria, Iraq, and refugees from Gaza continue to aid
the terrorists. The possibility of Israeli retalia-
tory raids on Syria, and perhaps on Jordan as well,
is growing.
Meanwhile, King Husayn has paid a visit to Mos-
cow, where he was offered Soviet support. In addition,
he has reorganized the Jordanian Government and Army,
giving himself a greater role in directing both.
Yemen was a scene of disorder as implementation
of the Khartoum agreement began. Riots forced the
Arab states delegation to depart without meeting Pres-
ident Sallal, but Egyptian troop withdrawal is going
on despite charges by Yemeni republicans that Egypt
has "sold them out." In Cairo, rumors are circulating
that Nasir may soon step out of the presidency.
Intense political maneuvering is the order of
the day in a number of countries. In Greece, the
junta is applying new pressures on the King and mak-
ing plans to add some civilians to the government,
probably as window-dressing. Afghanistan is seeking
a successor to Premier Maiwandwal, who resigned on
11 October because of ill health. In the Indian state
of West Bengal, the death agonies of the coalition gov-
ernment continue, with none of the groups seemingly
able to agree on a solution. Meanwhile, New Delhi
has reinforced military and police units in Calcutta
and its environs in anticipation of violence arising
from the political uncertainty.
In Africa, attention centers on Nigeria. Federal
forces are closing in on rebel Biafra, whose capital,
Enugu, has now fallen. Although the war could still
go on for some time, Biafran morale is sagging and
some elements may be willing to seek peace negotiations.
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NIGERIAN ARMY CLOSES IN ON REBEL F,IAFRA
The Nigerian Army has virtually
completed its recapture of the Mid-
West and is consolidating its hold
on Enugu, capital of the former
Pastern Region. The Biafran gov-
ernment has withdrawn further in-
side the Ibo heartland, amid signs
of growing turmoil and dissension.
Enugu is reported to be prac-
tically deserted except for federal
troops, who are continuing to clear
out small pockets of resistance,
mostly on the outer edges of the
city. In the Mid-West, federal
troops captured the important Ibo-
inhabited town of Asaba on the Niger
River cn 6 October, reportedly at
the cost of heavy casualties. Ad-
vance elements from this federal
force may now be in Onitsha, a
.Large Ibo city on the eastern side
of the Niger. The 4,600-foot Asaba-
Onitsha, bridge, completed in 1965 at
a cost of over $16 million, may have
been damaged near the Biafran end.
The federal government appears
to be readying a major amphibious
operation aimed at either Port Har-
eminent Ibo leader, such as Nige-
rian ex-President Azikiwe, to be-
come governor and thus perhaps
avoid having to occupy Iboland with
federal troops.
Federal leader Gowon has al-
ready carved up the former Eastern
Region into three states, promising
the minority tribes a greater
measure of self-rule once federal
control is re-established. The Ibos
would have t1.eir own state within
the federal Structure and, Gowon
hopes, would eventually be reinte-
grated into Nigerian life on an
equal basis with all the other
tribes. His most pressing prob-
lem, however, is to prevent a
further massacre of Ibos by his
predominantly northern troops,
whose basic discipline remains
questionable.
There are indications that
some Ibos are beginning to think
:Ln terms of negotiations to end
the war. Ojt,kwu, however, has
relocated hie government, prob-
ably at Aba.
Po s
2,000 troops, as well as substantial
quantities of supplies, have been
shipped out of Lagos to a staging
point in the Mid-West in the past
week. The federals' first objec-
t=ive, however, would probably be to
eliminate the Biafran-held positions
in the vicinity of Bonny.
Lagos is now beginning to think
in terms of how to govern the rebel-
lious Ibos. The federal government
probably hopes it can persuade some
Ojukwu is nevertheless
facing increasing turmoil within
[3iafra. Accounts of treachery
and anarchy are widely circulating
in many of the larger towns
and
cities. There also appears
to
be considerable mistrust and
even
open fighting among re
gular
army
units, police:, and mil
itia.
Late last week, the On
itsha
city
council reportedly sou
ght to
make peace with the fe
deral
troop
commander at A
saba.
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SOUTHERN NIGERIA
Porto
Novo
Map
l
e
ape
T,enin 1~.~.
Warri
F incados 12~
ERN
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Okene
Auchi
ERN a
"Yenagol
t Harc
-?- State boundary
Former Region boundary (*Capital)
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HUSAYN STRIVING TO IMPROVE JORDAN'
King Husayn's visit to the
Soviet Union last week probably
was intended primarily to assure
continued Soviet support for the
Arab States and to coordinate
attempts to achieve Israeli with-
drawal from the occupied terri-
tories.
Although the Jordanian press
hailed the King's trip as usher-
ing in a new era of Soviet-Jorda-
nian friendship, it also stated
that Husayn's overture to the
Soviets was not a departure from
Jordan's pro-West policy, but
an expression of its desire to
seek a "better balance" in future
relations with the big powers.
The Jordanian press also quoted
unnamed Russian sources to the
effect that the USSR was willing
to supply arms to Jordan without
conditions.
The formation on 7 October
of a new Jordanian cabinet under
Bahjat Talhuni represents a
further effort by King Husayn
to overhaul the internal admin-
istration of the country and as-
POSITION
sume closer personal control.
Talhuni, who has been prime min-
ister twice previously, is not
'Likely to exercise forceful lead-
ership on his own. The 18-man
cabinet contains only four new
members in addition to Talhuni
and, as is the custom, is equally
dh.vided between East and West
Bank residents.
King Husayn will also assume
more direct personal :supervision
of the armed forces, and has ap-
pa:gently abolished the top army
commands. The former commander
in chief of the Jordan Arab Army,
Habis Majali, has been elevated
to the relatively unimportant:
position of minister pf defense,
former 25X6
deputy commander in c:zief, Sharif
Nasir, the King's uncle, will
now act only as the King's mili-
tary aide. These moves, as well
as the retirement of Eour senior
military officers who held key
commands on the West :3ank during
the June war, are pro::ably in-
tended to bolster sagg~in morale
among junior officers.
TERRORISM INCREASES IN ISRAEL AND OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Terrorist incidents have in-
creased considerably over the
past month in Israel and the Arab
territories it occupies,espe-
cially the West Bank. Continua-
tion of this terrorism will al-
most certainly lead the Israelis
to consider scme kind of direct
reprisal against Syria, and pos-
sibly Jordan as well.
The Israelis have charged
that the Syrians are training
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and arming infiltrators and sab-
oteurs, and Tel Aviv has pub-
licly warned that Israel may
have to strike "at the centers
of terrorism." An Israeli Army
spokesman has stated that 160
saboteurs associated with the
Fatah organization--the Pales-
tinian group most active in ter-
rorist operations--were captured
in the last week in September
alone.
Jordan is making a major
effort to prevent saboteurs from
EGYPTIAN WITHDRAWAL MAY LEAD TO FURTHER UNREST IN YEMEN
Egyptian troops have begun
to depart from Yemen, but Cairo
has had trouble controlling
Yemeni republicans who feel
that they have been "sold out."
Cairo has had little suc-
cess in placating the major Yem-
eni republican groups. From the
very beginning, these groups have
been hostile to the Khartoum
agreement, which called for Egyp-?
tian evacuation and formed a
tripartite committee to work out
details of a settlement.
Although President Sallal
was finally induced to invite
representatives of the committee--
headed by Sudanese Prime Minis-
SECRET
crossing Jordanian territory and
according to authorities in Am-
man, has arrested over 200 ter-
rorists since the June war. The
presence in East Jordan of some
200,000 Palestinian refugees from
the West Bank and Gaza precludes
the complete interdiction of
the movement of terrorists.
ter Mahjub--to Sana, their ar-
rival on 3 October sparked vio-
lent riots resulting in five
killed and some 25 wounded. The
committee departed hastily with-
out seeing Sallal.
In Sana, resentment over
Egyptian policy seems to be grow-
ing. According to press reports,
representatives of Yemeni youth
and tribes both passed resolu-
tions on 10 October supporting
the republic and rejecting the
Khartoum agreement.
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ALGERIAN REGIME FACES MOUNTING DISCONTENT
The Boumediene regime in Al-
geria is beset by feuding fac-
tions and has lost all momentum
in its efforts to resolve its in-
ternal difficulties. The regime
is the target of mounting crit-
icism as it muddles along in the
wake of its extreme stand on the
Arab-Israeli war, but no effec-
tive challenge to its authority
has yet appeared.
Speculation is rife through-
out Algeria that changes are im-
minent within the government.
Much of the conjecture arises
from the constant and bitter feud-
ng among various ministers, which
has nearly paralyzed the govern-
ment's decision-making processes.
Another factor is the antagonism
between the military clique sur-
rounding Boumediene and the so-
called "wilayists"--those Alge-
rians who carried on the revolu-
tion against France from inside
the country. Moreover, there are
frictions within the National
liberation Front, Algeria's only
political party, as well as be-
tween the party and the bureau-
cracy., A great deal of the in-
fighting devolves from disagree-
ments over the direction Algeria
should take and frustrations over
the regime's failure to achieve
appreciable progress toward solv-
ing hard-core economic problems.
Algeria's economy has gone
steadily downhill ever since
Boumediene assumed power in June
1965; the cost of living has
risen noticeably in the past few
months. Although wages remain
steady, unemployment--more than
half the labor force in 1965--
has gotten worse. Furthermore,
the regime ante.gonized the busi-
ness sector by exploiting the
Middle East war to increase and
collect taxes, particularly
those on business.
Another cause for dissatis-
faction is the belief that the
government, in whipping up popu-
lar feeling during the Middle
East war, followed a dishonest
course that could only have ended
in the isolation in which Algeria
now finds itself with respect to
both Arab and African politics.
Moreover, in breaking with the
US, nationaliz:_ng US businesses,
and remaining aloof from Western
Europe, the government: is be-
lieved to have cut off' important
potential sources of economic
assistance.
Despite the pervasive dis-
content, Boumediene's opponents
do not seem ab:Le to collaborate
in. a move to unseat him. The
base of his power is the army,
and the key commands apparently
are still loyaL. The National
Liberation Front is weak, unable
to attract the elite, and con-
stantly engaged in internal
bickering. Critics within the
administration seem unable so
far to conclude a political alli-
ance with any faction within the
army. Opposition elements ex-
cluded from the regime, as well
as the anti-Boumediene organiza-
tions based in Europe, still lack
popular su port within the coun-
try.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The highlight of the week in Latin America was
the report from the Bolivian Army that counterin-
surgent troops had killed Che Guevara. This could
be a crippling blow to the morale of Cuban-inspired
insurgents throughout Latin America, who recently
have been on the defensive almost everywhere. It
seems unlikely, however, that Fidel Castro will de-
sist from fomenting revolution in other countries be-
cause of the loss of his most romantic agent.
Several nations are in the midst of programs for
modernizing their armed forces, and editorial writers
in a number of countries see in Peru's purchase of
French supersonic fighters the first step in a new
and expensive arms race. Brazil, for instance, seems
determined to follow Peru's example, although Bra-
zilian leaders have indicated they prefer US equip-
ment if they can get it.
Argentina is also in the market
for modern
arms,
but at present is more interested
in
tanks than
in
aircraft. El Salvador has agreed
to
delay its
search
for expensive armaments, but has
by
no means abandoned
the project. Similar aspirations
of
other countries,
although receiving less publicity, probably will be
whetted by recent events.
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LATIN AMERICA TURNS TO EUROPE FOR ARMS
Major South American na-
tions are turning increasingly
to Europe for modern military
equipment not available to them
from US sources.
After much haggling and
hesitation, Peru has finally
concluded a deal with France
to purchase 12 Mirage-5 super-
sonic fighter aircraft at a cost
of more than $27 million, in-
cluding spares and training.
President Belaunde of Peru had
tried to stave off military pres-
sure but finally was forced to
jive in despite the effect this
might have on US economic aid.
Peru's acquisition of super-
sonic aircraft--the first in
Latin America outside Cuba--will
undoubtedly spur its neighbors
to consider similar moderniza-
Lion of their own outmoded air
forces.
Brazil is also negotiating
with the French to buy Mirages
in the event it cannot obtain
!US-built F-5 supersonic fighters.
3raz.il, like Peru, would prob-
ably prefer the US aircraft. The
Costa e Silva government, however,,
Eeelss that it can no longer put
off modernization of the air
Eorce, which is still flying jets
built before the Korean War. To
sweeten the deal the French have
offered to construct a factory
.in Brazil to build jet trainers
and small transport aircraft.
The idea of manuafacturi.ng
their own equipment in domestic
factories also appeaLs to the
Argentines, who are shopping for
new tanks for the army. The Ar-
gentines have asked several com-
panies to submit bids for supply-
ing modern tanks, and the French
may have the lead here with their
A.MX-30. The Jngania regime has
specified that the tanks are to
be assembled in Argentina, con-
templating the possibility that
Argentina would be able to manu-
facture such equipment in the
future.
Both Brazil and Argentina
would like to take a similar ap-
proach in upgrading -:heir navies.
Brazil plans to build destroyer
escorts in its own shipyards us-
ing a US prototype. The Argen-
tines plan to buy a British frig-
ate to serve as the prototype for
additional do:nestica:Lly built
combat craft.
In all three countries, the
military soug.at to acquire US
arms before turning to Europe.
Now that the switch has been made,
other Latin nations will probably
be less reluctant than formerly
to take advantage of the increased
capability and willingness of Eu-
ropean factories to supply their
needs.
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ANTI-AMERICANISM USED AS POLITICAL TOOL IN ECUADOR
The increasingly anti-Ameri--
can attitude assumed by Ecuador's
interim President Otto Arosemena
appears to be a matter of domestic
politics rather than an attempt
to disrupt relations with the US.
Even after asking for the
recall of Ambassador Coerr on
the grounds of alleged undiploma-
tic remarks, Arosemena reiterated
his desire to "increase the
cordial relations" existing be-
tween the two nations. He has
obviously concluded, however,
that attacking US policies is
the best and fastest way to build
a political following in Ecuador.
This belief was probably
fostered by the favorable Ecua-
dorean reaction to the position
he took at the hemispheric sum-
mit conference last spring in
Punta del Este. At that time,
Arosemena lashed out at US trade
and aid policies and declined
to sign the Declaration of Presi-
dents at the close of the con-
ference. A critical attitude
toward US trade and lending pol-
icies has since become a basic
part of Ecuadorean policy.
In the past two weeks,
Arosemena's criticisms, partic-
ularly of the Alliance for Prog-
ress, have become more severe.
When negotiations for a $30-mil-
lion loan from private European
sources aroused opposition from
some of the nation's leading
economists, Arosemena attempted
to justify the loan by disparaging
the international lending system.
He charged that the "Alliance for
Progress is a frustrated hope,"
and specifically attacked the
requirements for "purchasing raw
materials at high prices from the
US and employing North American
technicians at exorbitant prices."
Arosemena's reaction to the
speech in which Ambassador Coerr
answered these charges is only
another manifestation of the
policy of attacking the US for
political gain. Although he in-
dicated that he has no serious
intention of jeopardizing rela-
tions with the US, he hopes to
profit politically by standing
up to the US and once again demon-
onstrating his ability to "safe-
guard the honor of the republic."
The extent of the public's re-
sponse to this latest gambit may
be the determining factor in
whether Arosemena decides to re-
sign the office of interim pres-
ident--which he has held since
November 196E--to run for a full
term in the presidential elec-
tions scheduled for June 1968.
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URUGUAY INITIATES STRONG ACTION TO CONTROL LAEOR
The Gestido government is
taking unusually forceful action
to control Communist-inspired
labor agitation in Uruguay. A
limited state of siege was de-
cla.red on 9 October, all strike
propaganda has been barred, and
a large number of union agitators
have been arrested. Despite these
measures, the Communist-backed
24-hour general strike was held
as scheduled on 11 October and
met. with some success.
The government's actions
follow a long series of economi-
cally crippling strikes, work
stoppages, and demonstrations.
The immediate provocation was
the! refusal of private bank workers
to process checks issued by the
Bank of the Republic (BOR). They
described their actions as a dem-
onstration of support for the BOR
workers' grievances against the
bank, but President Gestido called
it economic sabotage rather than
legitimate trade union activity
and. used it as the basis for pro-
Gestidc has accepted the
earlier resignations, and influ-
ential members of his government
believe that the way may have
been cleare& for a new and more
effective pr,licy. Unless the
government adopts economic meas-
ures to deal with the basic
causes of labor unrest, the Com-
munist agitators will have suf-
fered only a temporary setback.
To charge economic policy,
however, or even to continue with
the present hard line on labor,
Gestido must broaden his legisla-
tive support. His faction of the
Colorado Party does not command a
majority, ard he is engaged in a
bitter quarrel with the leader of
the most powerful faction, Jorge
Batlle. Unless Gestido is will-
ing to make the concessions neces-
claiming a state of siege. Four sary to end the quarrel, he may
cabinet ministers and a key member be forced tc form. a national unity
of the government's economic team government ty filling some of the
immediately resigned in protest. vacant posts with members of the
opposition Elanco Party.
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DUVALIER DEALS WITH UNREST IN NORTHERN HAITI
President Duvalier has taken
action to deal with scattered
antiregime disturbances in Haiti's
traditionally restive Northern
Department.
One of Duvalier's henchmen
from the dread TonTon Macoute has
been sent to the area to "restore.
Duvalierist order," a curfew and
strict security measures have
been imposed, and the President
has issued orders that all dissi-
dents will be shot. No further
incidents have occurred since
these measures were put into ef-
fect.
dence, whether or not it poses
a real threat to his regime. He
has been particularly sensitive
to troubles in the north. Fol-
lowing minor unrest in that area
last May, he sent the same Ton-
Ton Macoute official to conduct
a purge of the local government.
His concern this time is ap-
parent in his dismissal of the
head of the rubber-stamp Supreme
Court, a Northerner. There are
also rumors that Northern offi-
cers of Duvalier's security forces
have been sent to Cap Haitien in
order to get them out of Port au
Prince.
The disorders, apparently
sparked by poor living conditions,
appear to have been spontaneous
and lacking in leadership. There
is no indication of Communist in-
volvement.
Duvalier, however, tends to
overreact to any sign of dissi-
In addition, the government
has closed the US Binational Cen-
ter in Cap Haitien and has asked
that the USIS representative
there be recalled to Port au
Prince, apparently because of
suspected involvement in the dis-
orders. This move may presage a
deterioration in Haitian-US re-
lations.
SECRET
Approved Fpra@@le_ a 2( /g6 g& # P79-00p77p6~0/0010001-5
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Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100010001-5
 ACCre For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100010001-5
Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100010001-5