WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005400030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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"Copy 'No. ' 5 2
E '' A 1*I Y
1 1TRAL, INTELLUG
CA`T`C1 11~I`E-LI1`~CE
State Dept. review
completed
ARMY review(s)
completed.
{adiru~;and d~1ssurre?n
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 11 August 1966)
Far East
Page
VIETNAM
Scattered contacts with Communist forces occurred this
week as allied sweep operations continued to keep the en-
emy on the defensive. Hanoi's propaganda stressed its
determination to press on with the war. The Saigon
government intensified publicity on the coming elections,
for which all potential candidates have now been
screened. The Buddhist Institute's leadership has
apparently decided to continue a militant line.
Thailand hopes to convene an Asian peace conference if
a majority replies favorably to its appeal to 16
nations for a negotiated settlement.
INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA MOVE TO END CONFRONTATION 5
Now that the new Indonesian cabinet has been installed,
the Suharto government has moved rapidly to make its
peace with Malaysia. The Malaysian Government,
although somewhat wary of Indonesia's ultimate in-
tentions, has seized this opportunity to end the three-
year confrontation.
Europe
NEGOTIATIONS ON OUTER SPACE AGREEMENT ADJOURN
The UN subcommittee working on a treaty governing space
activities had adjourned until September. Considerable
progress toward an agreed draft has already been made
and there is a chance remaining problems will be re-
solved.
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13RISK POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN FRANCE
Recent polls have indicated that President De Gaulle
and his party are more than holding their own against
divided opposition from the center and the left. The
rise in popularity may precipitate national parliamentary
elections this fall.
GROWING THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL FREE TRADE
Few developed countries other than the US have shown
any willingness to resist the growing campaign of the
less-developed countries for preferential treatment
in the markets of the richer, more advanced countries.
Middle East - Africa
NIGERIANS SEEK NEW BASIS FOR CONTINUING UNION 10
Pressure for an early breakup of Nigeria along tribal
lines lessened this week. Discussions are under way
as a first step toward working out a new basis for
continued regional association.
MUTINY CONTINUES IN CONGO (KINSHASA) 12
Katangan troops are still in control of most of
Kisangani, and other Katangans in northeastern Congo
are slowly moving toward the city.
SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION FORESEEN IN MALI 13
Economic delegations from both the USSR and Compunist
China are scheduled to discuss aid programs in Bamako
this month.
EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA TO DISCUSS YEMEN
Kuwaiti mediation has brought agreement for new talks,
but prospects for a settlement remain dim.
IRAQ GETS NEW GOVERNMENT
The appointment of moderately pro-Nasir Naji Talib as
prime minister may not end plotting by Iraqi Nasirists,
but Talib's military background may encourage army
loyalty to the regime in case of trouble.
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LITTLE SUMMIT MEETING TO BE HELD IN COLOMBIA
The presidents of Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela, as
well as representatives from Ecuador and Peru, are
meeting to discuss continental cooperation in prepa-
ration for the proposed conference of all OAS chiefs
of state.
LATIN AMERICANS SEEK ARMS FROM EUROPE
A number of Latin American nations, interested in
modern military hardware that the US is reluctant
to provide, have recently been offered advantageous
terms by European suppliers.
CUBAN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISTS
Fidel Castro's 26 July speech resurrected an old
problem that has periodically marred his relations
with the Moscow-oriented Communist parties of Latin
America--the question of peaceful or violent revolution.
REFORM PLANS ANNOUNCED BY ARGENTINE PRESIDENT
President Ongania has outlined further plans of his
government to institute reforms aimed at solving some
of the basic political and economic problems that have
plagued Argentina for many years.
URUGUAYAN PRESIDENT THREATENS TO RESIGN
National Council President Heber's short-lived resig-
nation threat was ostensibly intended to force support
for bipartisan constitutional reform, but his grand-
stand play has split his party and may doom early reform.
UNDERCURRENTS OF DISCONTENT IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
President Balaguer, moving to counter undercurrents of
discontent that have developed during his six weeks in
office, does not seem to face any serious challenge and
remains on top of the situation.
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Far East
VIETNAM
Scattered contacts with Com-
munist forces have occurred during
the past week as allied sweep op-
erations continue to keep the en-
emy on the defensive.
In the central highlands, Op-
eration PAUL REVERE II reported
several heavy engagements with
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Army units. Since this border-
surveillance ground sweep began on
31 July, 375 Communists have been
killed as compared with friendly
casualties of 65 killed and 214
wounded.
Sporadic fighting between US
Marines and elements of the 324B
Division has been reported in
northernmost Quang Tri Province
as Operation PRAIRIE continues its
search of the area. Cumulative
casualties for this operation which
began on'3 August include five
Americans killed and 26 wounded,
with a total of 67 Communists
killed.
In the coastal flatlands of
Quang Tin Province, US Marines
participating in Operation COLORADO
were in heavy contact with an es-
timated two-battalion enemy force
on 10 and 11 August. Initial cas-
ualty reports indicate 31 Americans
have been killed and 154 wounded.
A total of 142 Viet Cong have been
killed.
MACV has increased its esti-
mate of the strength of the 324B
Division from 5,000 to 9,410. This
change and others announced by
MACV raise the number of confirmed
North Vietnamese troops in South
Vietnam to 44,900, about three
quarters of whom have arrived this
year.
MACV is continuing to inter-
rogate a Viet Cong soldier who de-
fected on 2 August in II Corps. He
seems to be, as he claims, a lieu-
tenant colonel on the staff of a
Viet Cong division east of Saigon.
If so, he is the highest ranking
VC to have come over so far.
There have been frequent ru-
mors that other high-level Viet
Cong want to defect, but few have
done so. Most VC military defec-
tors are still newly conscripted
privates, usually from guerrilla
or militia units. As yet, no Main
Force or Local Force unit, even as
large as a squad, has defected en
masse. The few guerrilla units to
have rallied have done so, almost
without exception, as a result of
heavy military pressure.
Hanoi Determined to Continue War
North Vietnamese press commen-
tary this week featured articles and
speeches by prominent military
spokesmen expressing a determination
to continue the war. The content
and timing, following the public
reappearance of some politburo mem-
bers after a two-month absence,
strongly suggest a high-level review
of military prospects that reaffirmed
Hanoi's intent to fight a protracted
war. Several earlier articles, no-
tably one by Nguyen Chi Thanh,
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Aug 66
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OPERATION
COLORADO
OPERATION
PAUL REVERE II
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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suggested that this decision was
reached after extensive debate.
All of the latest commentaries
optimistically assessed the Viet
Cong's military accomplishments
during the last so-called "dry sea-
son" (November 1965 to April 1966).
Moreover, they argued that Communist
forces in the South in the past few
months have met the challenge of the
massive introduction of US troops.
Although admitting that the US
buildup has necessitated a review
of accepted theoretical as well as
tactical principles, these spokes-
men gave the impression of being
satisfied with VC performance. The
articles claimed that the Viet Cong
have not only protected their own
Main Force units from US spoiling
operations, but that throughout the
country they can still penetrate
and harass strategic American
strongholds such as Da Nang as well
as interdict all major land communi-
cations routes. The articles at-
tempted to create the impression
that despite the American buildup,
the VC have held their own without
any significant loss of territory
or people; and are ready for the
next round.
Election Developments
The Saigon government has in-
tensified its campaign to publicize
the 11 September elections for a na-
tional constitutional assembly.
Presumably to dispel skepticism con-
cerning the elections, Premier Ky
and his ministers tried to impress
provincial functionaries during a
recent seminar in Saigon with the
necessity of maintaining a fair and
free atmosphere.
The screening process for po-
tential candidates has been com-
pleted and the final list will be
posted on 12 August for the 108
seats, excluding the nine montag-
nard candidates who will be elected
in accordance with tribal custom.
The final pre-election process
will begin on 26 August, when a
two-week campaign period starts.
Buddhist Developments
Recent communiques and letters
from the Buddhist Institute indicate
that the leadership crisis has been
at least temporarily resolved. The
current line, presented by acting
chairman Thich Thien Hoa, tends to
reflect the stand of the militants
in calling for a boycott of elec-
tions organized by the Ky govern-
ment. There is no indication, how-
ever, that the Buddhist clerical
hierarchy plans to take to the
streets again. The Buddhists are
also calling for the release of fol-
lowers detained for supporting the
recent "struggle" movement.
Tri Quang was allowed to meet
this week with Buddhist Institute
council members, apparently to dis-
cuss his accepting an invitation
from some Japanese Buddhists to
visit Japan. Tri Quang seems dis-
posed to go and the government has
privately registered no objections.
Government Activities
Government leaders, taking ad-
vantage of the relative political
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Aug 66
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calm, are visiting Africa, Europe,
and the Far East. Premier Ky began
a four-day good-will trip to the
Philippines on 10 August, and Deputy
Premier Co is visiting several Euro-
pean and African capitals.
Thai Peace Initiative
Malaysia and the Philippines
joined Thailand on 8 August in a
note to 16 Asian countries urging
them to issue an appeal for a nego-
tiated settlement of the Vietnam
war. Earlier, Thai Foreign Minister
Thanat had called publicly for an
Asian-sponsored conference on Viet-
nam. Thanat told the US ambassador
in Bangkok that he realized the Com-
munists would probably not accept
his peace conference proposal, but
that if a majority of replies to his
16-nation note were favorable, Thai-
land would try at least to convene
a conference of non-Communist Asian
states that could provide a forum
for a general airing of views on
how the war can be ended.
Thanat indicated that the 8 Au-
gust note would be useful in "forc-
ing" Asian countries to take a
clearer stand on the war, and would
help refute allegations that the US
presence in South Vietnam is univers-
ally unpopular in Asia. Peking and
Hanoi have already denounced Thanat's
proposal. The Japanese, whose atti-
tude would be important, seem favor-
ably disposed to such a meeting.
Soviet Protest
The USSR has protested that
strafing by US aircraft damaged the
Soviet merchant ship Medyn in Hai-
phong harbor on 2 August. The pro-
test note was carefully worded and
did not suggest that the ship was
deliberately attacked or that Mos- 25X1
cow would change its present policy
of Limiting Soviet risks in Vietnam.
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INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA MOVE TO END CONFRONTATION
Now that the new Indonesian
cabinet has been installed, the
Suharto government has moved
rapidly to make its peace with
Malaysia. The Malaysian Govern-
ment, although somewhat wary of
Indonesia's ultimate intentions,
has seized this opportunity to
end the three-year confrontation.
The Malaysian deputy prime
minister signed in Djakarta on
11 August the "Bangkok agreement,"
which had been concluded in late
May and provides for the ending
of hostilities "forthwith." The
two countries presumably also
signed, as scheduled and at In-
donesia's insistence, secret let-
ters which modify the Bangkok
agreement by specifying that Indo-
nesian de jure recognition of Ma-
laysia will be delayed until the
peoples of Malaysia's Borneo
territories of Sabah and Sarawak
have been canvassed on the ques-
tion of remaining in the federa-
tion. Malaysia has refused In-
donesia's request that the Bang-
kok agreement itself be kept se-
cret.
Meanwhile, Indonesia shows
no indication of abandoning the
subversive efforts that presum-
ably are intended ultimately to
separate Sabah and Sarawak from
Malaysia. The initial purpose
of these efforts apparently is
to influence the outcome of the
canvass, which the Malaysian
Government assumes will be held
in conjunction with regular elec-
tions in the two territories,
probably some time next year.
The latest military incident
occurred ten miles inside Sara-
wak on 3 August when a party of
at least 12 uniformed Indonesian
"volunteers" fired on a Malaysian
patrol and severely wounded one
man.
Meanwhile, Indonesia and
Singapore are continuing discus-
sions on the resumption of trade
and consular relations. Singa-
pore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
has publicly reiterated that
Singapore-Indonesian agreement
must await the normalization of
Malaysian-Indonesian relations,
and is keeping the Malaysian Gov- 25X1
ernment informed of the progress
of the talks with Indonesia.
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Europe
NEGOTIATIONS ON OUTER SPACE AGREEMENT ADJOURN
The legal subcommittee of
the UN's Committee on the Peace-
fu=l Uses of Outer Space has ad-
journed further consideration of
an agreement governing activities
in space until the General Assem-
bly reconvenes in September. Con-
siderable progress has been made
toward an agreed draft, and de-
spite Soviet-US differences over
certain provisions, there is still
a chance that these difficulties
will be resolved this fall.
A major point of contention
has been the US proposal that
stations, satellites, and vehicles
in outer space be open at all
times to representatives of other
states. The Soviets have balked
at this, presumably because of
the underlying principle of in-
spection. Moscow also wants re-
porting on space activities to
be strictly voluntary, has opposed
channeling such reports through
the UN, and insisted that coun-
tries granting tracking-station
sites to one country be required
to grant them to others.
The US Embassy in Moscow
thinks that despite the Soviet
stand on these issues, the Rus-
sians want to conclude a space
treaty at an early date. Given
the high costs of space programs
and the continuing squeeze within
the Soviet economy, Soviet lead-
ers probably do not want an arms
race in space, and would welcome
limitations on possible US mili-
tary activities there.
Why Moscow has decided to
postpone an agreement at this
time is therefore unclear. It
is doubtful that Soviet-Chinese
relations have been a major factor
especially since Moscow has em-
phasized its view-that the nego-
tiations are "international"
rather than bilateral US-Soviet
talks. It may be, however, that
the Soviets have been reluctant
to move forward because of the
complexity of the Vietnam situa-
tion.
Moscow may also still be
hoping to pick up support on as
many outstanding points as pos-
sible. At the final meeting of
the subcommittee last week,
though, only Hungary and Bulgaria
fully endorsed the Soviet reserva-
tions now blocking the treaty,
and the Soviet proposal on track-
ing stations is almost certainly
unacceptable to most prospective
signatories.
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BRISK POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN FRANCE
President de Gaulle's party,
the Union for the New Republic,
is more than holding its own
against opposition from the cen-
ter and left. Current polls in-
dicate that the Gaullist Union
leads the field in national ap-
peal and that De Gaulle's per-
tonal popularity rose sharply
last month, probably as a re-
sult of his trip to Moscow. In
view of this favorable public
response, the party will prob-
ably increase pressure to hold
t_he national parliamentary elec-
Lions this fall rather than wait
until March 1967, the latest
elections can be held constitu-
tionally.
The Gaullists continue to
profit from the divisions within
the opposition, which is split
into three major groupings--
Vrancois Mitterrand's Federation
of the Democratic and Socialist
1,eft, Jean Lecanuet's Democratic
Center, and the French Com-
munist Party. While Mitterrand's
Federation has made considerable
progress in organizing itself
as a serious political entity,
its great unresolved problem is
its relation with the Communists.
Thus far, Mitterrand has refused
to commit himself to any formal
arrangement with them and has
kept the door open for a pos-
sible electoral alliance with
the Democratic Center. However,
a recent poll suggesting the
electorate would favor a Federa-
tion-Communist majority in the
legislature over a Federation-
Center alliance may encourage
Mitterrand to seek some--probably
relatively flexible--understand-
ing with the Communists.
The Commun:L$ t Party continues
to call for a "confrontation"
with the Federation in which a
common program and electoral tac-
tics can be devised to unite the
whole left. If Mitterrand holds
firm, however, the Communists
probably will moderate their de-
mands rather than isolate the
party entirely from the non-Com-
munist opposition.
The Democratic Center, with
a considerably narrower politi-
cal base than the Federation,
has nevertheless; managed to put
down roots in most of France.
In competing forlthe middle
ground in the po,L:Ltical spectrum,
however, it faceg severe compe-
tition from the Federation on
the left and from the Gaullists
--especially the Independent
Republicans--on the right. It
nonetheless could play a pivotal
role in the Natipnal Assembly
if the Gaullists' failed to win
a majority.
At this po:Lpt, the Gaullists
appear to have a:good chance of
retaining their bold on parlia-
ment regardless Of when elections
are held. Moreover, they appear
to be seeking to!:end their ex-
clusive reliance'; on De Gaulle.
According to a recent poll, most
voters would reapt more favor-
ably to a candidate supporting
the institutions'::..of the Fifth
Republic than to:one whose sole
merit is his support for De
Gaulle.
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GROWING THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL FREE TRADE
At the meeting in Geneva
last week of the UN Conference
on Trade and Development's
(UNCTAD) group on preferences,
few countries other than the US
showed any willingness to resist
the growing campaign of the less-
developed countries for preferen-
tial treatment. At stake is the
principle of multilateral, non-
discriminatory trade that the US
has supported for many years.
Differing attitudes on the merits
of particular plans leave room
for further maneuvering before
the expected showdown at next
year's second general UNCTAD
meeting, but considerable acri-
mony may develop in the meantime.
Thus far the differences
among the developed countries--
largely between those opposing
any preferences, those favoring
preferences on a global scale,
and those favoring selective pref
erences for certain countries or
products--have been tempered by
the "technical" and noncommittal
nature of the discussions, which
have.also been going on within
the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development. Re-
cent changes in France's position
may be intended, however, to
force the developed countries,
particularly the US, to agree on
a single preference policy. Hav-
ing abandoned its previous sup-
port for selective trade prefer-
ences, Paris is now attempting to
line up Common Market support
for a system whereby individual
developed countries would offer
all less-developed ones duty-
free quotas on their exports of
manufactured and semimanufac-
tured goods.
There is some doubt that the
Common Market could in fact af-
foru the burdens of such a pol-
icy if the US and other major
developed countries did not
also participate. Most of the
less developed would clearly
favor a joint offer`of prefer-
ences for a maximum number of
their products. Nevertheless,
some are apparently intrigued
by the prospect of some progress
before all the developed can
agree on one set of basic rules.
In any case, officials of
the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) are worried
that a proliferation of pref-
erential proposals could blight
the hope of continuing the gen-
eral movement toward global
free trade after the present
Kennedy Round negotiations--
under GATT auspices--have ended.
The less developed argue that a
lowering of tariffs on a most-
favored-nation basis, as the
Kennedy Round envisions, is in-
sufficient, and might place
their "infant" industries in an
even worse position with respect
to more advanced competitors.
Although the principal developed
countries at Geneva have made
clear that willingness to dis-
cuss preferences does not commit
them to any particular plan or
even to preferences in principle,
the hopes of the less developed
have undoubtedly been whetted
merely b the rolon ed consid-
eration.
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Middle East - Africa
NIGERIANS SEEK NEW BASIS FOR CONTINUING UNION
Pressure for an early breakup
of Nigeria along tribal lines
lessened this week as new Supreme
Commander Gowon met with regional
representatives in a first step
toward working out a new basis
for continued association. Some
form of loose federation with a
high degree of regional autonomy
appears likely to emerge from
the discussions. There are in-
dications, however, that Gowon
NIGERIA
Former regional boundaries
demarcate groups of provinces.
is not in full control of hard-
core northern army elements, who
can be expected to resist any
decisions or orders not to their
liking.
Although eastern military
governor Ojukwu has still not
formally acknowledged Gowon as
deposed General Xronsi's succes-
sor, he joined the other regions
in sending representatives to the
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Lagos talks. Recent remarks by
Ojukwu indicate that he has
pulled back somewhat from his
earlier insistence that partition
is the only solution for Nigeria.
Current attitudes of important
Ibo citizens, especially former
eastern premier Okpara, are not
yet known, however. Okpara, who
had been detained by Ironsi, has
just been released from prison
along with most other confined
politicians and may attract more
popular support than Ojukwu.
There is reportedly some
sentiment among the northern
emirs and chiefs for the separa-
tion of the East from the rest
of the country. However, the
designation of Sir Kashim Ibrahim,
a former civilian governor of
the North, as one of the top rep-
resentatives to the interregional
talks may indicate that moderates
who wish to preserve the country's
basic unity have prevailed. In
any event, the prospect of an
early secessionist move by the
North seems to have diminished.
In the West, Chief Awolowo, the
top leader of the important Yoruba
tribe, has come out strongly in
favor of a federated, unified
Nigeria.
Gowon's announced intention
to return the country quickly to
civilian rule probably represents
both his own inclination and a
realization that there are few
senior army officers left who are
capable of administering the
i0w
country. He has, however, con-
tinued the ban on political par-
ties and has told the politicians
to avoid making controversial
statements. Basing his program
on the immediate repeal of Ironsi's
May decree creating a unitary
state, Gowon has already convened
an advisory committee, composed
of civilian nominees of the re-
gional military governors, to pre-
pare the way for a constitutional
review assembly. Meanwhile, ci-
vilians are to be added to the
executive council of the Ironsi
regime.
The badly shattered army
continues to pose major problems.
Some of the northern troops, dis-
regarding Gowon's orders, are ap-
parently still searching out Ibo
military personnel. Ojukwu, who
is clearly concerned about the
predominance of northerners in
the army battalion based at Enugu,
the eastern regional capital,
has demanded "neutralization" of
the army by the return of each
tribal component to its home re-
gion. Northern Hausa officers
also favor such a reorganization,
although aware that it would
create serious troop shortages
in certain areas. The 18,000-
man police force, whose person-
nel are largely recruited from
the areas in which they serve,
is the principal means of main-
taining law and order. 25X1
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MUTINY CONTINUES I N CONGO' (KINSHASA) .
The Mobutu government has
made no real progress in its
efforts to end the mutiny of
Katangan troops in Kisangani
(Stanleyville). The city is
quiet, but the Katangans remain
in undisputed control of most of
it. They give every indication
of confidence in the strength
of their position, and the gov-
ernment seems unlikely to re-
gain their allegiance without
substantial concessions. Pre-
mier Mulamba, who is now in Kin-
shasa after spending two weeks
in Kisangani negotiating with
the mutineers, apparently plans
L.o return for further talks at
the end of this week.
Another Katangan unit,
which left its posts in the far
northeastern Congo two weeks
ago, is continuing its slow
progress toward Kisangani and
may now be at Buta. There is
little prospect that the govern-
ment forces in the path of this
unit will be able to stop it.
It has already caused consider-
able disruption in the region
it has passed through. Reports
are beginning to come in of re-
newed. rebel activity in the
areas left ungarrisoned by the
departure of the Katangans or
by the disappearance of govern-
ment troops.
Relations between Belgium
and the Congo, on the other
hand, have recently improved
somewhat, and there is some pros-
pect that a dialogue between the
two can be started., Mutual sus-
picions are so deep,' however,
that deterioration could easily
begin again.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC' OF THE CONGO
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPULIC
1 r)UATEUR
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12 AUGUST 196L
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SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION FORESEEN IN MALI
An intensification of Sino-
Soviet competition in Mali may be
shaping up. An economic delega-
tion from the USSR arrived in
Bamako on 9 August and one from
Communist China is scheduled to
arrive later this month to dis-
cuss aid programs.
Recent deliveries of Soviet mili-
tary equipment ordered under an
October 1965 arms agreement have
included T-34 tanks, armored per-
sonnel carriers, arms and ammuni-
tion, and MIG jet aircraft. Some
surface-to-air missiles may also
have been included in the agreement.
After the slow progress of
the past several years, Moscow
now appears to be preparing to
revive its economic aid program--
apparently in an attempt to coun-
ter Chinese efforts there. Mos-
cow has sent its delegation to
look into proposed aid projects--
the construction of a meat canning
plant, a tannery, and a railroad
linking Bamako with Kankan in
Guinea--to utilize outstanding
Soviet credits of about $25 mil-
lion.
The groundwork for increased
Soviet economic participation was
laid during President Mobido
Keita's visit to the USSR last
October when preliminary discus-
sions were held on possible Soviet
projects and tentative agreements
reached. At that time Moscow also
took steps to alleviate some of
Mali's financial burdens by agree-
ing to consolidate the Malian
debt, postpone debt repayment un-
til 1970, and cancel all unpaid
interest.
Moscow has also increased its
activity in the military field.
Communist China, which has
suffered a number of setbacks in
Africa during the past year, has
continued to use economic aid of-
fers to strengthen its influence
in Bamako. In June, during Jus-
tice Minister Madeira Keita's
visit, Peking responded to Mali's
request for hard-currency'assist-
ance with a $3-million cash loan
--bringing the total of such aid
now extended to some $11 to $17
million, roughly one third of Pe-
king's cash credits extended to
all African countries.
Any additional Chi-
nese aid projects probably will
involve new credits, since most
of the $38 million already ex-
tended has been obligated for
specific use and over two thirds
has been drawn down.
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Although many of the Commu-
nist undertakings are of ques-
tionable feasibility or value,
they are projects particularly
desired by Bamako. The Malians
presumably are especially pleased
over the Chinese provision of
hard currency. Nevertheless,
Mali over the past year has
greatly moderated its propaganda
support of Communist causes and
has noticeably drawn back from
its blatantly pro-Chinese posi-
tion of late 1964. In addition
to trying to maintain a neutral
stance between the USSR and Com-
munist China, Mali appears deter-
mined not to jeopardize its
changes of getting aid from
other sources, such as France,
the EMC, and the US. 25X1
EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA TO DISCUSS YEMEN
Egypt and Saudi Arabia have
again agreed to new talks on
Yemen, but disagreement on de-
tails continues to endanger a
settlement.
It is nearly a year since
Nasir and Faysal signed the
Jidda Agreement, laying down the
terms for a cease-fire in Yemen,
the cessation of military aid
to both sides, and the establish-
ment by the Yemeni people of an
independent government. Only a
tentative cease-fire has been
achieved so far. Patient media-
tion efforts by Kuwait have now
persuaded the two countries to
meet in Kuwait on 15 August to
discuss terms patched together
from Egyptian and Saudi views.
The main stumbling blocks
have been the ratio of repre-
sentation in the proposed in-
terim Yemeni government and the
relationship between the time of
Egyptian troop withdrawal and
the outlawing of the Yemeni
royal family. Both sides appear
ready to accept the Kuwaiti com-
promise that the ratio in the
new government be set at three-
fifths republican and two-fifths
royalist.
Kuwait also recommends that
Egyptian troops be withdrawn
within six months, with the new
government then deciding upon
the banning of any "undesirables,"
namely, the Yemen royal family.
Egypt maintains that six months
is too short a time. Saudi
Arabia insists that all Egyptian
troops should be out before the
royal family is Outlawed, since
the Saudis fear that the ban
will leave the royalists without
leadership. These views seem
irreconcilable at this stage,
and the prospects for an early
compromise appear dim 25X1
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I RAQ GETS NEW GOVERNMENT
President Arif's replace-
ment of prime minister Bazzaz with
the moderately pro-Nasir Naji
Talib may not avert a new power
bid by Iraqi Nasirists with Egyp-
tian support. Talib's military
background, however, may encourage
army loyalty to the regime in the
event of trouble.
Arif's dismissal of Bazzaz
may have been sparked by a dis-
covery that pro-Nasirist ele-
ments were preparing to move.
The three-day delay in an-
nouncing the new cabinet suggests
Talib experienced considerable
trouble. His original goal was
reportedly a "coalition of all
elements," but apparently most
refused to participate. As
finally formed, the cabinet has
primarily colorless individuals
with little previous experience.
It includes a few "tame" Kurds,
but they lack significant sup-
port and may fail to convince
Iraq's Kurdish insurgents of
the government's good faith.
Some of the new ministers have
served in previous Baath Party
governments--and therefore may
not be altogether trusted by
,the Nasirists--but no actual
Baathists agreed to participate.
Talib and several of the
new ministers are retired mili-
tary men, and Arif presumably
hopes this will ensure army sup-
port. Bazzaz, the country's
first civilian prime minister
since 1958, was distrusted by
the military, particularly those
who felt that he had "sold out"
to the Kurds. A loyal army
could almost certainly deal
with a coup attempt, even one
with Egyptian backing.
Arif's haste to disassociate
himself from Bazzaz is indi-
cated by the recent barrage of
criticism in the Baghdad press
against Bazzaz' policies. Since
the key charge seems to be that
Bazzaz was an agent of imperial-
ist interests, a cooling of re-
lations with neighboring Iran
and Turkey is probably in the
offing.
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Western Hemisphere
LITTLE SUMMIT MEETING TO BE HELD IN COLOMBIA
The presidents of Chile,
Colombia, and Venezuela are to
meet in Bogota from 14 to 18 Au-
gust to discuss continental co-
operation in preparation for a
proposed conference of all OAS
chiefs of state. Representatives
of the presidents of Ecuador and
Peru, who are unable to leave
their countries at this time,
will also attend. The gathering
was suggested by Colombia's new
,president, Carlos Lleras Restrepo,
during a preinaugural tour of
several Latin American countries.
The meeting will apparently
focus on economic matters. Presi-
dent Eduardo Frei of Chile has
long been an advocate of closer
international economic coopera-
tion, and it appears that the
meeting will attempt to develop
common ideas about the position
of Latin American countries in
their relationships with indus-
trialized nations. Improvement
of existing mechanisms such as
the Latin American Free Trade
Area will also probably be dis-
cussed. Although the question
of arms limitation had figured
prominently in the communiques
issued during Lleras' trip, this
topic apparently will not come
under consideration.
The meeting of this group
of "reformist" presidents has led
to some uneasiness on the part of
other Latin American countries
that the formation of a bloc of
West Coast couxit:ries might also
be envisaged, but spokesmen of
of the presidents scheduled to
meet in Bogota. have been quick
to issue denials, of this. Further
speculation that, the presidents
might attempt to create a Latin
American bloc in opposition to
the US has also brought forth de-
nials by both Lleras and Frei.
These responses, probably reflect
sentiment prevailing among Latin
Americans in general. In late
July, for example, the Brazilian
Foreign Ministry, reacting both
to discussions of the Bogota meet-
ing and to Chilean press articles
on the possible emergence of a
Brazil-Argentine "axis" in the
wake of the Argentine coup, is-
sued a statement opposing the
establishment of regional blocs
within the OAS.
It is doubtful that impor-
tant substantive results will
develop from the conference, and
the final communiques will prob-
ably be confined to generalized
expressions of support for demo-
cratic institutions and economic
cooperation. Nonetheless, if the
meeting goes as scheduled, it
should provide a' ,salutary oppor-
tunity for an exchange of ideas
by three of the hemisphere's more
progressive leaders.
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LATIN AMERICANS SEEK ARMS FROM EUROPE
Although most Latin American
countries obtain the bulk of
their military equipment and ci-
vilian and military aircraft from
the US, they occasionally turn to
suppliers outside the hemisphere,
especially when for one reason or
another the US is reluctant to
furnish desired terms. A number
of such deals are now pending,
and several countries seeking
European or Japanese equipment
recently have been offered advan-
tageous terms by suppliers trying
to achieve greater penetration
of what has been a traditional US
market.
In Argentina, the Ongania
regime has indicated it will look
elsewhere if the US continues the
suspension of military aid and
sales that followed the military
overthrow of President Illia.
The government is discussing a
$130-million package with the UK,
which would include frigates, sub-
marines, helicopters, and the in-
stallation of a steam catapult on
the Argentine carrier Independ-
encia. The Argentines have also
discussed the loan of the British
carrier Centaur while their own
is being refitted. Argentina's
favorable balance-of-payments po-
sition would facilitate purchases.
Brazil has been looking for
aircraft, both military and ci-
vilian. Varig Airlines is con-
sidering an offer of transport
aircraft from
Company, but a deal for Frenc
military jets, built under li-
cense in West Germany, has ap-
parently fallen through.
Venezuela has been negotiat-
ing since last year for the
purchase of F-86 Sabrejet
fighters from West Germany. The
Venezuelans have already acquired
14 British Canberra twin-jet
bombers and 20 French Allouette
helicopters. The army is study-
ing the purchase of French mech-
anized and armored equipment, and
the navy has offers of subma-
rine and destroyers from both
the UK and Japan.
Mexico is also considering
aircraft built under license in
West Germany--in this case, F-84
Thunderjets as well as F -86s,
both less obsolete than aircraft
in its present inventory. The
Dominican military, although
currently dependent on US as-
sistance, is considering the
purchase of French helicopters,
which they believe more flexible
than US types.
Thus far there has been no
significant reduction in the
percentage of supplies bought
from the US. The more advanced
Latin American nations, however,
have increasingly expressed
their desire for more modern
military hardware, and contin-
ued US reluctance to supply such
weapons could well lead to in-
creased sales by European and
Japanese suppliers.
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NE C'RJ 1.
CUBAN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISTS
Fidel Castro's 26 July speech
resurrected an old problem that
has periodically marred his rela-
tions with the Moscow-oriented
Communist parties of Latin America
--the question of peaceful or
violent revolution.
The tone of Castro's speech,
in which he scornfully chided
Latin American "pseudorevolu-
tionaries" who choose the path
of "electioneering" rather than
violence, is further evidence
that he has once again lost pa-
tience with the pro-Moscow parties.
Castro appears to have served
notice that he is no longer bound
by the accord, reached at the
Havana meeting of Latin American
Communist leaders in November
1964, whereby he grudgingly
agreed to fund only those extrem-
ist groups endorsed by the local
parties. Few of these parties
favor armed struggle as the best
means of bringing about revolu-
tion in their countries, and
recent years have seen a sharp
drop-off in actual Cuban assist-
ance.
Some Communist leaders, who
--unlike the Cubans--suffer the
consequences of governmental
retaliation against leftist
violence, are highly concerned
over Castro's renewal of the
debate. For example, Manuel Mora,
secretary general of the Costa
Rican Communist Party, has ac-
knowledged "serious differences"
between his party and the Castro
regime. He has complained of
pressure from Castro to initiate
guerrilla activity in Costa Rica
--a path Mora has consistently
refused to take, much to Castro's
disgust.
Castro gave Chilean President
Frei and his administration a
severe tongue-lashing and the
subsequent espousal of the speech
by Senator Allende of the Chilean
Socialist Party reportedly has
created a serious:political di-
lemma for the Chilean Communist
Party. The party would like to
maintain an outward appearance of
unity in leftist ranks but has
chosen the "via Pacifica"--the
peaceful way--as the proper road
to power while the Socialists have
adopted a more militant approach.
Luis Corvalan, Communist Party
secretary general, in responding
to a Chilean Government statement
provoked by Allende's espousal,
found it necessary to point out
that his party stands for mutual
"noninterference" among the
Latin American "progressive and
revolutionary forces." Orlando
Millas, a member of the party's
political committee, cut short
his trip to Cuba after Fidel's
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speech and returned to Chile to
make a full report to party
leaders.
REFORM PLANS ANNOUNCED BY ARGENTINE PRES I DENT
President Ongania has out-
lined further plans of his gov-
ernment to institute reforms
aimed at solving some of the
basic political and economic
problems that have plagued Ar-
gentina for many years.
Ongania revealed in a 4
August press conference that
his regime will eventually per-
mit the formation of new polit-
ical parties to replace the
ones abolished after the coup,
but it seems clear that this
will be permitted only after
other reforms are completed.
The government will promulgate
a law guaranteeing freedom of
the press, association, and pe-
tition, and will also publish
a new labor code. Details of
these plans are still lacking,
however, and it appears that
the regime is in no hurry to
relinquish any of the powers it
took after the June coup.
Ongania also gave some in-
dications of his government's
economic plans, which include
both a short-range, "transi-
tional" program and long-range
goals. He hopes to eliminate
the budget deficit by cutting
government investment and public
works projects and by transfer-
ring many state-owned enterprises
to the private sector of the
economy. Ongania indicated that
the government will make an ef-
fort to attract both domestic
and foreign capital, and to in-
crease revenues by streamlining
tax-collection methods. The
regime's long-range goals in-
clude a new social security sys-
tem and ending the inflationary
spiral.
The Ongania government had
stated similar aims in more gen-
eral terms in the past, and the
press has begun to criticize
the government for its slowness
in beginning the promised re-
forms, hinting that perhaps the
ministers are still groping for
solutions. Ongania's address,
however, points to several meas-
ures the government plans to
implement and it is now becom-
ing evident that, while moving
slowly, the regime does have
definite goals and is beginning
to formulate the policies through
which it hopes to achieve them.
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URUGUAYAN PRESIDENT THREATENS TO RESIGN
National Council of Govern-
merit President Alberto Heber re-
signed "provisionally" on 3 Au-
gust, claiming that obstacles
placed in his path kept him from
governing effectively; but in a
6 August speech he said he would
resume his duties immediately.
Much of the speech was devoted
to his frustrated efforts to con-
trol inflation and his inability
to fulfill a pledge to enforce
necessary stabilization programs.
Heber also pointed to con-
flict over the removal of con-
troversial General Liber Seregni
--a member of the opposition Colo-
rado Party--from command of an
important military region near
Montevideo as typical of the
pettiness and ineffectiveness of
the present government system.
Confidants say that opposition
to the transfer by council mem-
bers from his own governing Blanco
Party was the final straw that
caused the walkout.
The Uruguayan council form
of government encourages pro-
longed discussion and discourages
decision-making. It has been
basically unable to cope with
persistent economic deterioration,
soaring living costs, and labor
agitation, much of it Communist
Page 20
inspired. There is considerable
popular support for reform of this
unwieldy system, but many politi-
cians who see change as a threat
oppose this either overtly or
from behind the scenes.
Although Heber avoided naming
such politicians and alluded only
indirectly to factionalism within
his own party, his grandstand play
was ostensibly intended to force
recalcitrant Blancos to support
a bipartisan constitutional reform
plan, the only approach likely to
attract the required majority
vote. His maneuver has caused a
split in both major Blanco fac-
tions, however, and increased
chances for antireform elements to
stall the proposal in congress
beyond the 27 August deadline for
its inscription on next Novem-
ber's ballot. The only clear
gainers to date apparently are
the Colorados, who are gleefully
pointing out obvious Blanco fac-
tionalism, and the Communists,
who hope to prevent any change in
the ineffective government that
has created conditions ideal
for the expansion of Communist
activity.
Heber's demagogic actions,
his apparent determination to
enforce his will, and the pro-
posed military changes will do
little to allay the fears of
those who suspect him of laying
the groundwork for an unconsti-
tutional change of government.
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UNDERCURRENTS OF DISCONTENT IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
President Joaquin Balaguer,
moving to counter undercurrents
of discontent that have developed
during his six weeks in office,
does not seem to face any serious
challenge and remains on top of
the situation.
Many Balaguer partisans have
complained about the paucity of
jobs made available to them, but
the President responded that his
"government of national unity"
cannot capriciously discharge
government employees who are not
members of his own Reformist
Party. This disappointment over
patronage may ease once the gov-
ernment's emergency investment
program gets under way, but so
far the program is stalled by a
lack of direction and by diffi-
culties in drawing up specific
projects.
On 1 August, Balaguer re-
placed National Police chief Mo-
rillo, at least partially to meet
complaints by conservative ele-
ments in his party of an alleged
"leftward drift" by the regime.
The new chief is believed compe-
tent and personally loyal to Bala-
guer, but may not display Moril-
lo's concern for badly needed po-
lice reforms.
Page 21
Opposition leader Juan
Bosch has criticized the over-
bearing tactics of Balaguer's
supporters who want fast congres-
sional approval of the adminis-
tration's sugar reforms. Per-
haps partly out of frustration
with his party's ineffectiveness,
Bosch is now considering a
month's trip in Europe.
Bosch's party may press the
President for military reforms
in the wake of the arbitrary ar-
rest of several party officials
on 6 August by air force offi-
cers. Although they were
quickly released unharmed, Bala-
guer may attempt to head off
charges of political suppres-
sion by disciplining the offi-
cers involved. However, such ac-
tion would add to military dis-
content.
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