THE KURDISH WAR--ROUND FOUR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004800110003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 23, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

tise 2006/11/13: CIA-FDPi''9-0O927A$8061100O3-7 23 April 1.65:
OCT, No, 9.86/65B
Copy NT.
Cis
a
L l E
THE KURDISH- WAR-RQIUN -FOUR
CEN SAL.. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
,
O F f` [ 4F C U R R E N T I N T E L L I G E N C E
. SECRET
G~ UPI Ekcludo-Y Pt im auto'mat
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
 Approved For Rele 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000110003-7
SECRET
23 April 1965
The military campaign recently launched by
the Iraqi Army against the Iraqi Kurds marks
Baghdad's fourth attempt to resolve its problems
in northern Iraq by force since former premier
Qasim first stumbled into war in Kurdistan in
1961. In the initial phase of this year's round
of fighting, the army appears intent merely on
pushing the rebels out of the relatively exposed
positions they occupied in the Kurdistan border
lowlands during the 14-month cease-fire that just
ended. In time, however, this campaign promises
to be as long, bloody, and costly--but probably as
indecisive--as that conducted by the Baathist re-
gime in 1963. Both sides again face considerable
difficulties. The army is still untrained to cope
with the guerrilla tactics of the rebels, and
morale is low. The Kurds are somewhat more divided
than they were in 1963, and their morale also may
suffer as the war continues without results. The
present campaign seems likely to underline the es-
sential situation that has prevailed in Kurdistan
for the past four years--stalemate.
The 1963 Campaign and the Truce
The 1963 campaign directed
by the Baathist government was
far more ruthless and determined
than the two drives conducted
by the Qasim regime. Although
the army managed to push deep
into Kurdish-held territory,
the Baathist regime was unable
to defeat the rebels decisively
before it fell in November 1963.
The new military government with-
drew some of the forces engaged
against the Kurds for security
duty in the Baghdad area. The
fighting dragged on in desultory
fashion until a cease-fire was
arranged with rebel leader Mulla
Mustafa Barzani in February 1964.
The cease-fire had advan-
tages for both sides. The new
government needed a period of
relative quiet in which to con-
solidate its hold on power,
while the Kurds, at war almost
continually for nearly two and
a half years, needed a breath-
ing spell. This was especially
true of the tribal forces that
had borne the brunt of the fight-
ing on the Kurdish side. The
members of the urban-based
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP),
the political arm of the Kurd-
ish separatist movement, were
far less anxious to conclude
a cease-fire, which in any case
was little more than an armed
truce.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
 J"k Oft
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
LEB
BEIRUT,
Area inhabited by
Kurds
4 A N
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
 Approved For Rel a 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A0O4 00110003-7
SECRET
The cease-fire ushered in
a period of relative calm in
Kurdistan--by far the longest
since the fighting had first
begun--but it did not bring a
solution to the problem of Kurd-
ish disaffection. The more ex-
treme Kurdish separatist demands
envisioned the establishment of
a virtually independent state
having only the most tenuous ties
with the central government in
Baghdad. The shaky, ethnocentric
Arab nationalist regime in Bagh-
dad, or indeed any government
likely to come to power, could
not contemplate such a situation.
On the contrary, it soon made
clear that the Kurds could not
expect official recognition of
their ethnic and cultural sep-
arateness.
It soon became apparent
that the Kurds and the govern-
ment had conflicting ideas of
what the cease-fire itself ac-
tually meant.
In announcing the cease-fire
agreement, the government issued
a nine-point program in which it
stated that it acknowledged "the
national rights of our Kurdish
brothers within the framework
of the Iraqi state," and that
it would release all Kurdish
prisoners, return local admin-
istration to the north, rein-
state dismissed Kurdish offi-
cials and employees, and begin
reconstruction in Kurdistan.
The government then publicly
claimed that there was no longer
a Kurdish problem and that there
was nothing to discuss with the
rebels, even though the latter
still remained under arms in
the north.
The Kurds, for their part,
claimed that the government
proclamation should be consid-
ered merely as the starting
point for negotiations designed
to settle the Kurdish problem.
They were soon complaining that
the government program itself
was being implemented very slowly
or not at all.
The Kurdish demands to the
new government differed little
from those that the rebels had
been putting forward regularly
since 1962. These demands in-
cluded allocation of a percen-
tage of the government's oil
revenues to the Kurds, since
most of Iraq's proven oil re-
serves are located in Kurdistan;
appointment of Kurdish adminis-
trators in all parts of Kurdi-
stan; specific recognition of
Kurdish rights in the new con-
stitution; dissolution of the
government-supported Kurdish
mercenaries still stationed in
the north; withdrawal of regu-
lar army units from Kurdistan;
resettlement of Kurds in lands
around the cities of Kirkuk and
Mosul from which they had been
removed by the I3aathist regime;
the retention of an armed Kurd-
ish force under the command of
Mulla Mustafa Barzani; and in-
struction in the Kurdish lan-
guage in the schools. These
demands, if accepted in full,
would have amounted to the vir-
tual creation of a Kurdish state
within a state.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004800110003-7
 Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
SECRET
Baghdad's Reaction
Baghdad did not seriously
consider the demands, and con-
tinued to insist that the Kurds
must be treated exactly like
other citizens of Iraq. Although
the two sides soon began sporadic
talks, these were in fact less
real negotiations than periodic
restatements of the position of
each side. Nonetheless, such
talks continued at intervals un-
til the end of March.
During this period, the gov-
ernment did release a consider-
able number of Kurdish prisoners,
but little construction work was
undertaken in Kurdistan, few
Kurdish administrators were re-
turned to their posts, and army
forces remained in the north
although in somewhat reduced num-
bers. Civil administrators were
introduced into areas accessible
to government control, but in
other areas of Kurdistan, Mulla
Mustafa Barzani maintained ef-
fective civil as well as mili-
tary control. Indeed, a working
agreement was reached between
the government and Barzani in
which the Kurdish leader was in
effect recognized as de facto
viceroy for the government in
much of Kurdistan. Barzani prob-
ably received government funds
for awhile in return for keeping
peace in areas out of effective
government control. This ar-
rangement prevented the usual
outbreak of fighting between the
army and the Kurds in the spring
of 1964.
Kurdish Factional Fighting
Such a tacit modus vivendi,
however, was clearly abhorred
by the more militant leaders
of the KDP, who hoped to
achieve complete Kurdish in-
dependence by further fighting.
They also could point out that
the government was not fulfill-
ing even Its minimal commit-
ments under the cease-fire
agreement and that the whole
question of the future of Kur-
distan remained in suspense.
Pressure by these lead-
ers to resume the war led to
increasing friction with Bar-
zani, culminating in April
1964 in an unsuccessful at-
tempt to oust him from the
leadership of the KDP. Bar-
zani reasserted his authority,
and his tribal forces engaged
in a series of armed clashes
with the followers of the mili-
tant KDP leaders, Jalal Tala-
bani and Ibrahim Ahmad, the
then secretary general of the
party. An attempted reconcili-
ation failed, and in July Bar-
zani had the militants ex-
-aelled from the KDP. His
forces then drove the armed
followers of Talabani and Ah-
mad across the Iranian border,
where they were briefly in-
terned and partially disarmed
by the Iranian authorities.
Barzani's Political Moves
Although it proved easy
enough to dispose of the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
 Approved For Rel a 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO 0110003-7
SECRET
dissident Kurdish militants in a
military sense, Barzani is aware
of the political threat they
can still pose for him. In
place of Ahmad and Ta.la.bani and
their associates, he has in-
stalled a new central committee
of the KDP composed of his own
trusted followers. In October,
he further reasserted his con-
trol by formalizing a "Kurdish
Revolutionary Command" com-
posed of himself and 11 of his
lieutenants, including several
tribal leaders as well as KDP
members. This organ is to oper-
ate, together with a 43-man
"Leadership Council," as the ex-
ecutive and legislative bodies
in Kurdistan pending the winning
of Kurdish national rights.
The Revolutionary Command
immediately promulgated a "con-
stitution" and issued various
laws and regulations governing
the judiciary, administration,
and tax structure of the "lib-
erated areas of Kurdistan."
The Kurds also appointed judges
and civilian administrators
throughout Iraqi Kurdistan--
even in areas under nominal gov-
ernment control--who by early
1965 constituted the only effec-
tive administration in the
north. These moves fell some-
what short of the unilateral
establishment of an independent
government, or, in practice,
even of full autonomous admin-
istration, but they effectively
undercut the appeal of the mili-
tant faction of the KDP by dem-
onstrating that Barzani had not
lost sight of the ultimate
Kurdish nationalist objectives.
Barzani reinforced this impres-
sion by sending Baghdad a stream
of Kurdish complaints and de-
mands.
In pursuing a. policy of
limited detente, of continuing
sporadic negotiations, and of
uttering periodic threats to
renew the fighting without
actually doing so, Barzani
throughout 1964 appeared to be
taking into account the general
weakness of the Baghdad regime.
He evidently thought the regime
might fall before a crisis was
again reached in relations be-
tween the two sides. In deal-
ing with the present military
government, he has been faced
with a narrowly Arab national-
ist regime which has proved it-
self virtually unable to recog-
nize any legitimacy in the
Kurdish desire for at least cul-
tural and administrative auton-
omy.. He probably has calculated
that a successor government
might be easier to deal with.
Barzani probably believed that
even if a, regime of similar
outlook were to replace the
present one there was no guaran-
tee it would honor any signifi-
cant agreement he might reach
now and that therefore there
was no good reason to try very
hard to reach such an agreement.
The Egyptian Factor
An additional factor in
his calculations no doubt has
been the attitude of President
Nasir of Egypt, whose influence
on the regime in Baghdad has
from the beginning been espe-
cially strong. Nasir had
steadily advised restraint on
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004800110003-7
 ON Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-0FR%
0927AO04800110003-7
SECRET
those elements within the Iraqi
military government who wished
to resolve the impasse in Kur-
distan by force.
In the summer and autumn of
1964 when the Iraqi Government
appeared to be pressing Egypt
to enter into an immediate
formal, constitutional union
with Iraq, Nasir demurred. He
cited as one major reason the
continuing Kurdish problem, which
he insisted would have to be
solved peacefully before final
arrangements for union could be
worked out. Undoubtedly Nasir
thereby expected to impose a
long delay on the question of
union with Iraq because he re-
mains extremely reluctant to
assume responsibility for
Iraq's many social and politi-
cal problems.
Nasir's partisans within
the regime, who, with their
usual exclusively Arab orienta-
tion and outlook, might normally
be the group least willing to
reach an accommodation with the
Kurds, have in fact proved to
be the strongest advocates of
a negotiated settlement. The
various disputes over this is-
sue have been very largely a
reflection of personal and par-
tisan rivalries rather than of
conviction, but they nonetheless
served to postpone, until this
spring,any final decision about
renewing the use of force
against the Kurds.
The struggle between the
two major factions within the
regime--the pro-Egyptians and
those opposing early union with
Nasir--probably reached some
sort of climax in November 1964.
However, a government shake-up
at that time strengthened the
hand of the pro-Egyptian fac-
tion and the Kurdish question
was apparently shelved for
several months.
Renewed Hostilities Planned
Last February, however,
the army began a major transfer
of forces to the Kurdistan area,
and tension rose sharply in
the north. A propaganda war
started. The Kurds claimed
through their representatives
abroad that the government was
planning a war of genocide in
which poison gas was to be
used. The government admitted
for the first time since the
cease-fire had gone into effect
that all was not peaceful in
Kurdistan, and accused the reb-
els of being "imperialist
agents" with no popular sup-
port. An economic blockade
of Kurdistan was also imposed
by the Baghdad authorities.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
 Approved For ReWe 2006/11/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A000110003-7
SECRET
Hostilities apparently were
planned to resume in early April.
A delegation headed by Premier
Tahir Yahya went to Cairo on 2
April to ask for Egyptian sup-
port of the contemplated ac-
tion, and specifically for
authorization to use in the
campaign the 600-700 Egyptian
combat troops stationed in Iraq.
This authorization was denied.
Those elements of the
Iraqi regime favoring the use
of force against the Kurds prob-
ably also expect that the Iraqis'
visit to Cairo just before hos-
tilities began will make both
the Kurds and the Arabs believe
that Nasir has tacitly endorsed
the government's actions.
The New Campaign
In this initial phase, the
new campaign is probably rela-
tively popular among most Iraqi
Arabs, who, like their govern-
i,nent, find it virtually impossible
to consider seriously even the
]`Curds' most modest demands for
cultural or political autonomy.
The large Shia Arab religious
2ommunity, however, also has seri-
ous grievances against the present
regime, which is dominated by
Sunni Arabs. A possible antire-
gime Kurdish-Shia alliance is
rumored, but is unlikely. The
Shias have traditionally harbored
anti-Kurdish sentiment and their
community is largely unorganized
politically. Nonetheless, the
Shia factor is important in the
army, since the majority of the
enlisted ranks are Shia. Their
morale is not high, and Kurdish
ambushes and hit-and-run tactics
are not likely to improve it.
The army has committed some
45,000 men--three full divisions
and elements of a fourth, in-
cluding armor and artillery units
-?-to the new campaign. This force
should have little trouble pushing
the Kurds back from their forward
positions, but as in previous cam-
paigns, it will have increasing
trouble as it moves into the moun-
tain fastnesses that constitute
the heart of Kurdistan.. As before,
Kurdish mercenaries recruited from
the tribes traditionally opposed
to the Barzani tribe will bear the
brunt of the fighting in the moun-
tains.
SECRI_1,P T
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
 Auk, Oak I
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
SECRET
Kurdish strength is hard
to estimate. Mulla Mustafa
Barzani probably has a hard core
of 5,000 tribal fighters under
his command. He could perhaps
call on an additional 30,000
men, including armed townsmen
of the KDP. He would be hard
put, however, to arm adequately
a force of this size.
Barzani's hard-core force,
however, is well supplied with
weapons, including bazookas and
other relatively modern infan-
try weapons. Much of this ma-
teriel has been purchased by
the Kurds in Europe. Some am-
munition and small arms are
obtained by raids on Iraqi mili-
tary installations. Rebel mo-
rale is relatively high, but a
degree of war-weariness was
evident at the time of the Feb-
ruary 1964 cease-fire, and such
a feeling could again develop
if the rebellion drags on.
Barzani has also achieved
a relatively high degree of co-
hesion among the Iraqi Kurdish
tribes especially since the fall
of the Qasim regime in early
1963. Unlike previous Kurdish
uprisings, which were largely
local, the present rebellion
encompasses virtually all of
Iraqi Kurdistan. Most Kurds,
and certainly all of the tribal
fighters who have borne the
brunt of the conflict, allow
Barzani to speak for them and
generally follow his lead in
negotiation with the Baghdad
authorities.
All the Iraqi Kurdish
tribes, however, are not in-
volved in the rebellion. A
small number have remained neu-
tral and the traditional ene-
mies of the Barzani--the Zibari,
Harki, Baradost, and Surchi
tribes--continue in large
measure to oppose the rebels.
The dissident radical faction
of the KDP still remains un-
reconciled with Barzani,
largely as the result of per-
sonal antipathy between Mulla
Mustafa and Ibrahim Ahmad. In
addition, there have been ru-
mors that certain tribal leaders,
especially in the extreme north
of Kurdistan, are not as anxious
as before to engage in a new
round of fighting. Barzani
apparently had to engage in a
fence-mending expedition among
these tribes when the transfer
of government forces to the
north in February and March
indicated that a new outbreak
of hostilities was likely.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
 Approved For Reese 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A800110003-7
SECRET
These differences among
the rebels may have been in part
responsible for the relatively
conciliatory negotiating posi-
tion the Kurds presented to the
government last winter. This
new, "minimum" set of demands
significantly modified the rebel
position on administrative au-
tonomy. The Kurds announced
that they were willing to give
up earlier demands for full self-
government, for a Kurdish parlia-
ment, and for amalgamation of
the Kurdish provinces into a
single unit, as well as for a
proportional share of the govern-
ment's oil income. Barzani prob-
ably calculated that even these
modified demands would prove
unacceptable to the government--
as indeed they were--and that
his relatively moderate position
would put the onus for renewal
of the fighting on the Baghdad
regime. The government, for
its part, has carefully refrained
from announcing that its troops
have gone into action in the
north, doubtlessly calculating
that if the Kurds are the first
to announce that fighting has
been resumed the rebels would
appear to be the aggressors.
In this new round of fight-
ing the Kurds can expect to re-
ceive a limited amount of covert
aid from the Iranian Government
--as they have in varying de-
grees since 1962. Indeed, the
Shah has for some time been en-
couraging Barzani to resume
hostilities whatever the at-
titude of the Baghdad authori-
ties might be. He continues
to be anxious about the extent
of Nasirist influence in the
Iraqi Government and feels that
the present regime has in ef-
fect brought Nasir to his west-
ern border. He believes that
continued fighting in Iraqi
Kurdistan will fully occupy the
attention of the authorities
in Baghdad, lessen their capa-
bilities for causing him trouble
among the Arab population of
southwestern Iran, and perhaps
in time result in the overthrow
of the Iraqi regime itself.
In the spring and summer
of 1964, the Shah encouraged and
worked closely with the dissi-
dent KDP elements led by Jalal
Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad,
since this group was intent on
renewing the war against the
Baghdad authorities at any
cost. It has become apparent
that this faction has no mili-
tary potential in Iraqi Kur-
distan, however, and the Shah
has once more shifted his at-
tention to Mulla Mustafa
Barzani. It is likely that
SECRI'ET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
 Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
SECRET
he will continue to support
Barzani's forces as long as
Mulla Mustafa can command their
loyalty, and as long as they
continue to form the backbone
of Kurdish resistance.
As Iraqi preparations for
the conflict progressed Baghdad's
relations with the Soviet Union,
which had grown steadily warmer
during the summer of 1964, have
again begun to deteriorate.
The USSR continues to offer prop-
aganda support for Kurdish au-
tonomy within the Iraqi state--
as it has done since the fight-
ing first commenced in 1961--
but this support has been strictly
limited to propaganda. Neither
the Soviet Union nor the Euro-
pean satellites have supplied
arms or other material aid to
the rebels, and there is no in-
dication that this position is
likely to change. Indeed, the
USSR is continuing to supply
the Baghdad government with
arms and equipment which can be
used in the fighting in the
north. Arms shipments to the
anti-Communist Baathist govern-
ment were halted briefly at the
height of the 1963 offensive
against the rebels, but it is
unlikely that this experience
will be repeated. The present
regime has been careful not to
exacerbate its relations with
the Soviet Union.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7
 Approved For Ruse 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000110003-7
SE CRE T
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110003-7