WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

4 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
b November 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENT::
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review
completed
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
Impe SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EST, 5 November 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
COMMUNIST LEADERS GATHER FOR MOSCOW CELEBRATIONS 1
Consultations in Moscow this week end among leaders of
Sino-Soviet bloc parties, including Chou En-lai,
-probably will establish a framework within which Sino-
Soviet differences will be confined in the future.
SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS 4
The Pravda editorial for 1 November, a long policy
announcement, was intended to reassure the party and
the people that the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership will
not initiate new moves inimical to their interests.
BLOC ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR THE UAR 5
Credits extended this year will permit Cairo to move
ahead with development projects but will do little to
ease its current financial crisis and its shortages
of consumer goods.
NEW CABINET IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The new civilian government is composed primarily of
experienced technicians, but their ability to develop
strength and political support to concentrate on the
war effort remains in doubt.
SECRET
6 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
SECRET
ASIA-AFRICA (continued) wage
AREA NOTE
On Indonesia 7
AREA NOTES
On Saudi Arabia and on Congo 8
NEW REGIME IN SUDAN
Khartoum is quieter, but various factions in the new
civilian government are jockeying for position. The
Communists form the most solid bloc in the cabinet.
FRANCE TRYING TO DISENGAGE IN GABON
Paris appears to have decided to withdraw its support
from unpopular President Mba, but seems uncertain
what to do about any successor regime.
INTRIGUE CONTINUES IN TANGANYIKA AND ZANZIBAR
Radical elements on Zanzibar claim to have uncovered
a "counterrevolutionary plot." The authorities in
Tanganyika are supporting the buildup of Mozambique
nationalist guerrilla capabilities.
THE MLF AND THE ALLIANCE
The prospect that the multilateral nuclear force may
actually be formed has aroused strong French opposition
which could have some disruptive effects within the
alliance.
AREA NOTE 13
On Britain
ITALY'S NATIONAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
The 22-23 November elections will be widely viewed
as a plebiscite on the Moro government and,,if the
Socialists suffer greater than expected losses, the
party will have to reconsider its participation in
the government.
WEST GERMANY MOVES TO PLACATE ISRAEL
Bonn is pressing German aircraft firms to offer attrac-
tive jobs to missile scientists working for the UAR
and is also cooperating with Israel by assisting in
nuclear research and providing military aid.
AREA NOTE L5
On Nordic Foreign Ministers
SECRET
6 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY P,ige ii
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
TURMOIL IN BOLIVIA
The military leaders who overthre,u President Paz
Estenssoro have not yet formed a government, and the
delay is opening the way for extreme leftists and
Communists to exert their influence.
Pge
;6
FREI TAKES OFFICE IN CHILE
The new president is pledged to conduct a vigorous
program of economic and social reform, but he is
confronted with major national fiscal problems. His
success may hinge on his party's fate in the congression
al elections next March.
REPERCUSSIONS OF BRAZILIAN MILITARY INVESTIGATIONS
Military investigations which have turned up cases
of political corruption and subversion are causing
serious problems for President Branco and straining
the administration's relations with congress.
AREA NOTES
On Ecuador
UN MEMBERS TRYING TO RESOLVE ARTICLE 19 IMPASSE
There is increased activity from all sides to avert
a showdown as many nations intensify their efforts to
resolve the problem before the General Assembly con-
venes on 1 December.
SECRET
6 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
SECRET
Consultations in Moscow this
week end among leaders of Sino-
Soviet bloc parties probably
will establish the framework
within which the Sino-Soviet
conflict will be conducted in
the immediate future.
have previously taken a promi-
nent role in the polemic. Their
presence is probably intended
to lend authority to the group
by showing that the dominant
militant faction in the Chinese
party is represented.
Chou En-lai will head a
high-level Chinese Communist del-
egation. His presence will per-
mit the first face-to-face nego-
tiations between Chinese and So-
viet leaders since the Moscow
confrontation in July 1963. It
probably reflects a Chinese esti-
mate that recent developments
in the USSR can be exploited
to Peiping's immediate advantage.
The Chinese will almost
certainly seek to make the pro-
posed December preparatory meet-
ing of 26 Communist parties the
central issue in discussions.
They probably believe that con-
fusion in Moscow and strained
relations between the CPSU and
other Communist parties have
increased the pressure on the
Soviets at least to postpone
this meeting.
The Chinese delegation ap-
parently was carefully chosen
to convey the impression that
Peiping is ready for serious
negotiations. Chou is the Chi-
nese leader presumably most ac-
ceptable to the Soviets and only
two of the men accompanying him
Since Khrushchev's downfall,
Moscow and Peiping have appar-
ently been cautiously awaiting
moves which would reveal each
other's intentions and possibly
end the truce in polemics. Al-
though the new Soviet leaders
quickly reaffirmed most of the
positions long attacked by Pei-
ping, they have sought to create
the impression of a. desire to
ease the tone of the conflict.
The Chinese, for their part,
welcomed Khrushchev's removal,
addressed a congratulatory mes-
sage to the new leaders, and in-
dicated they were adopting a
posture of "watchful waiting."
They also served notice, however,
that they would not compromise
on "principles" by reprinting
statements of pro-Peiping for-
eign Communists underlining ob-
stacles to a rapprochement created
by Moscow's adherence to previous
positions.
The lull in polemics since
Khrushchev's removal and the
recent exchange of courteous
messages suggests that both Mos-
cow and Peiping intend to pre-
serve maximum room to maneuver.
SECRET
Page 1
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
SECRET
In the talks the USSF will
probably try to avoid a fcrmal
split with China in accorcance
with the general desire it the
Communist world. The Soviets
will probably represent these
talks as an opportunity for Pei-
ping to reconsider its opposi-
tion to a new conference and
the preparatory meeting. The
Russians undoubtedly will again
disavow any intention to "excom-
municate" the Chinese or to es-
tablish a new centralized Com-
munist organization. The Pravda,
editorial called for restoi ion
of unity on the platform of the
Moscow pronouncements of 1957
and 1960 and on the basis of
"complete equality and voluntary
cooperation."
Possibly in response to
information that Chou En -lai
would attend Moscow's 7 Novem-
ber anniversary celebrations,
the Soviets have now drawn the
lines clearly on two major posi-
tions most sharply attacked by
Peiping over the past year--the
Partial nuclear test ban treaty
and the proposal for a prepara-
tory meeting for a new interna-
tional Communist conference.
Moscow broke the post-Khrushchev
silence on the test ban with a
Pravda editorial on 1 November
hailing the treaty as a proof
of the "positive results,"
achieved by Soviet foreign pol-
icy. The next day a, communique
on Soviet talks with an Austrian
Communist delegation stressed
the need to proceed with the
preparatory meeting.
The Soviets also sharpened
political battle lines by pub-
licly inviting the Yugoslavs to
attend the Moscow ceremonies
and by ignoring the Albanians.
It seems likely that Chou's
most immediate objective is to
get the meeting postponed. The
Chinese probably calculate that
postponement would be viewed by
SECRET
6 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 2
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
`fry I%d
SECRET
other Communists as a victory
for Peiping and would handicap
Moscow's efforts to maintain
its leadership of the bloc.
Chou will probably press for
renewal of bilateral talks with
the Soviets offering this as a.
way out of the impasse which
existed before Khrushchev's re-
moval. Such a move would prob-
ably be well received by the
European Communist parties and
would be aimed at confronting
the Soviets with a choice be-
tween appearing to rebuff an
ostensibly conciliatory offer
or postponing the preparatory
meeting.
The Eastern European dele-
gations will be primarily inter-
ested in impressing upon the
new Soviet leadership that any
future tactics employed in the
Sino-Soviet dispute can not be
SECRET
6 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
at their expense. The determi-
nation of the Eastern European
leaders to look to their national
interests is reflected in the
decision by Czechoslovak party
leader Novotny and Rumanian
party leader Gheorghiu-Dej not
to join their counterparts from
Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria,
and Hungary at the meeting.
This is strikingly true in
Novotny's case. He has had a
long record of obediently re-
sponding to Moscow's beck and
call. Gheorghiu-Dej is contin-
uing his long-standing policy
to attend meetings of bloc lead-
ers. Despite the unusual impor-
tance of this meeting for the
future of the Communist movement,
he probably reasons that his in-
dependent posture and maneuver-
ability in bloc affairs is best
preserved by not personally as-
sociating himself with collec-
tive bloc decisions.
Page
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
SECRET
The Pravda editorial for
1 November, a Tong policy pro-
nouncement by the new leader-
ship, was essentially an exten-
sion and elaboration of the first
such statement which appeared
in Pravda on 17 October.
The editorial reassured
the party and the people that
the new team would work for the
improvement of socialist democ-
racy and legality and the eradi-
cation of violations of law and
order. It stressed that col-
lective leadership now will be
strictly observed.
The editorial also gave
the impression that, in compari-
son with Khrushchev, the new
leaders will bring to their prob-
lems a more solid and business-
like approach. Boasting and
idle talk were again castigated,
-as was any "vulgarizing depre-
ciation" of ideological work.
There were no references
to reallocation of resources
among the military, heavy in-
dustry, and the consumer. How-
ever, the grandiose--and in
large part unrealistic--long-
range goals approved at the 22nd
party congress were.repeated.
According to official doctrine,
achievement of these targets by
1980 will bring the USSR to the
stage of Communism.
Pravda reiterated several
themes put forward by Khrushchev
during the past two years. It
stressed that labor productivity
should be improved by greater
use of modern technology and in-
creased efficiency rather than
by following the traditional
course of simply adding to exist-
ing capital assets. Investment
should be concentrated on proj-
ects which would show a quick
return and maximum results for
minimal expense. Wasteful pro-
ductive processes and low-quality
output were again severely crit-
icized.
Attacking "subjectivism
in planning," the editorial
argued that it is necessary to
"learn to make the right use
of economic levers and methods
in economy, cost accounting,
prices, credit and profits."
This may be another indication
of continuing support for the
economic liberalism concepts as-
sociated with Liberman.
The role of incentives
was recognized clearly in the
call for drastic improvement
in the quality of industrial
output, including consumer
goods and housing. The strong-
est thing Pravda could say for
agriculture was that "certain
successes" have been achieved.
Khrushchev's penchant for
issuing sweeping decrees and
his. incessant revamping of the
party and governmental adminis-
trative networks were roundly
scored. The idea that "com-
plex economic problems can be
solved .by mere injunction, that
it is only necessary to re-ar-
ganize administrative machinery
...or split a trust in two...
is thoroughly wrong:"
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 4
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
'%No SECRET `"'
The Communist Wind
BLOC ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR THE UAR
The USSR and Eastern Euro-
pean Communist countries are
winding up negotiations on sup-
port for the UAR's economic de-
velopment program. A Soviet
credit of $280 million extended
last May to finance projects
under the UAR's second Five-
Year Plan (1965-1970) has been
followed by new credits from
Rumania and East Germany for
over $50 million. Current ne-
gotiations with Poland may re-
sult in additional economic
credits. Total bloc economic
assistance since 1955 now
amounts to almost $1.1 billion.
Contracts implementing the
Soviet credit were concluded in
September. Soviet assistance
will continue to be concentrated
in Egypt's metallurgical, petro-
leum, and electric power indus-
tries. Over half the new credit
is to be used for two projects
--expansion of iron and steel
facilities at Helwan and con-
struction of a second lubricat-
ing oil plant at Suez. Other
projects include construction
of a heavy machinery plant, a
machine-tool factory, and a
thermal power station, and es-
tablishment of 20 new technical
training centers.
Rumania, extending its
first credit to Egypt, agreed to
help build two cement plants and
a soda products plant and to
provide equipment and installa-
tions to extract and concentrate
phosphates. According to the
Egyptian deputy premier for in-
dustry and mining, Rumanian aid
for these projects will total
$18 million. Additional credits
may be forthcoming, however, as
the Rumanian ambassador to the
UAR indicated last August that
his country would extend $70 mil-
lion in economic credits. The
new $35-million East German
credit is to be used to construct
textile factories, cement p,.ants,
and metallurgical and electrical
installations as well as to as-
sist the mining industry.
Czechoslovakia, although
extending no new economic credits
to Egypt, has agreed to partici-
pate in a number of new indus-
trial projects utilizing funds
still available from a Czech
credit of $57 million extended
in 1962. Previously, only $10
million of that credit had been
designated for specific use.
The new bloc aid will per-
mit Cairo to move ahead with
economic development projects,
but it does little to ease
Egypt's current financial crisis
and its shorts es of consumer
goods.
SECRET
6 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
%00 *400,
SECRET
The new civilian government
headed by former Saigon Mayor
Tran Van Huong is composed pri-
marily of experienced tech-
nicians. Its ability to develop
the necessary strength and po-
litical support to concentrate
on the war effort, however, re-
main in doubt.
The cabinet was announced
on 4 November, four days after
Huong was approved as premier
by the High National Council.
Huong, who has outlined a pro-
gram including political and
economic freedoms within limits
of wartime discipline, serves
as his own defense minister.
Nguyen Luu Vien, retaining the
Interior Ministry, also acts as
first deputy premier. US-trained
economist Nguyen Xuan Oanh is
second deputy. The cabinet mem-
bers are predominantly from the
southern part of the country.
The new leadership is
probably acceptable to General
Khanh, who has been formally
designated to remain armed
forces commander. Khanh and
other senior officers show
little enthusiasm for the gov-
ernment, however. Their sup-
port may become even more
halfhearted should the now
government prove unwieldy or
be slow in producing results.
There are also indications
that Buddhist leaders, particu-
larly the more radic
Quang
have reservat
al Tr..
*nnG ahnnt
,
the new government.
25X1
25X1
The week's military ac-
tivities were highlighted by
an enemy mortar attack on
Bien Hoa Air Base on 1 No-
vember. Five US B-57 bombers
were destroyed and 13 B-57s
were damaged in addition to
11 other aircraft. The Viet
Cong's success in mounting
this "high-impact" operation
may encourage the Communists
into further ventures of this
kind.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
SECRET
Indonesia: President
Sukarno was due to return to
Indonesia this week from his
most recent global tour. His
seven-week trip included a three-
day visit in Moscow in late Sep-
tember and a briefer stop in
Shanghai on 4-5 November.
Acting president Subandrio,
concurrently first deputy prime
minister and minister of foreign
affairs, was asked, during a
recent speech to police officers,
how the revolution would be con-
tinued if Sukarno were no longer
able to lead. According to the
Indonesian press, Subandrio re-
plied that the revolution would
go on by making the entire pub-
lic "progressive" and not
through a clash of forces or by
"playing at a coup d'etat."
During Sukarno's absence,
a polemic developed between Com-
munist and non-Communist elements
in Indonesia over a series of
issues. The debate, waged chiefly
through press articles, w;ls ex-
pressed in strong terms and for
a few days was unrestricted.
Either at Sukarno's orders or
with the prospect of Sukarno's
return in view, acting president
Subandrio on 29 October sressed
to non-Communist leaders the
need for unity and for tho ces-
sation of argument, and the
tone of the debate has softened
considerably. Adam Malik_ the
minister of trade who has chal-
lenged the Communists repeatedly
during recent months and who was
a leading figure in the debate,
was summoned to Tokyo on 19
October by Sukarno
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
SUDAN
SANKURII iBVl I NDI)
BUJUMBURA
MFLELE t~~I
Rebellion , aFr, Su
xiiAS i
KWANGC3 J Xabonga~'
Z
SOUTH
.4T/l\ A N G 0 L A
OCEAN
4 NOVEMBER 1964
Frol,incin7 boundaries h.- beerz 'rsterpolotr d jrom -Img I
46222 majrs and intelligeii eports. and arc nv1 d . ' t,7 ?
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
International boundary
Province boundary
Q Naticnal capital
* Province capital
Approximate area of
uprising
c
BRAZZAVILLE
AKE
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
- SECRET .woe
Saudi Arabia: King Saud
was deposed on November in
favor of Crown Prince Faysal
by the united vote of the cabi-
net, religious leaders, the
royal family, and a consulta-
tive council of distinguished
persons. The armed forces and
the national guard appeared to
play a passive role, and the
change is receiving general sup-
port from the populace.
Congo: The rebel military
posit on appears to be crumbling
rapidly in the face of continu-
ing government advances. Gov-
ernment troops in the northwest
have cleared the rebels from the
Bumba and Boende areas and are
heading toward Ikela, 190 miles
west of Stanleyville. Other
government forces have freed
Sankuru Province of organized
King Faysal has not yet
appointed a new prime minister.
He may continue to exercise that
office himself with his brother
and deputy premier, Prince
Khalid, carrying the burden of
routine work. Ultimately, Fay-
sal is expected to design
Khalid as heir annarent.
rebel units. In the southeast-
ern Congo, Belgian Colonel Van
Der Walle's "Fifth Brigade"--
composed of a 120-man mercenary
force, Congo Army elements,and
a Belgian logistics team--began
its drive north from Kongolo to
Kindu on 1 November. The govern-
ment military position in the
east, in the Uvira-Bukavu-Goma
area, has also improved.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 8
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
SECRET
NEW REGIME IN SUDAN
The situation in Khartoum
is quieter, but the stability
of the newly formed civilian
government is uncertain. Some
shuffling of cabinet posts is
already taking place.
The Sudanese Communist
Party won a major victory dur-
ing last week's negotiations,
despite its numerical weakness.
Lack of real leadership and
fragmentation among the non-Com-
munist groups apparently enabled
the Communists to get three and
possibly four ministerial posts.
Although their portfolios are
for the most part minor ones,
the Communists are the only co-
hesive bloc in the cabinet. Some
members of the civilian National
Front which organized the new
government, and which includes
representatives from political
parties and professional groups,
reportedly opposed early Commu-
nist efforts to dominate the
front.
President Ibrahim Abboud,
who led the former military
junta, has been retained as
nominal head of state and chief
of military affairs. The de-
fense portfolio, however, is
held by the new prime minister,
Sir Khatim al-Khalifa. Abboud
has been given limited legisla-
tive veto powers, presumably to
minimize the chance of factional
deadlocks within the cabinet.
The National Front appar-
ently is now intended to func-
tion as a political party, and
front leaders presumably hcpe
to control the elections that
have been scheduled to take
place next March. In the past,
however, the traditional politi-
cal parties have consistently
failed to form any cohesive al-
liance, and their divisions in-
crease the possibility tha', the
Communists will dominate front
activities.
The future role of th- arm
is still unclear.
Southern spokesmen also
seem dissatisfied with their
limited role in the new govern-
ment. They had hopes that. at
least three portfolios would be
assigned to southerners, and
have already refused to accept
one of the two southern candi-
dates finally named.
SECRET
6 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
BRAZZAVILLE
-' SLEOPOLDVILLE
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
SECRET
FRANCE TRYING TO DISENGAGE IN GABON
France's apparent decision
to withdraw its support from
unpopular President Leon Mba has
plunged Gabon into a new polit-
ical crisis. The President
left Gabon for Paris on 25
afte~ng informed
that
French troops guarding him
would be withdrawn on 1 Novem-
ber. Mba's unwanted presence
in France where he had hoped
to plead his case before
De Gualle
has further
complicated an already delicate
problem.
Since last February, when
the French reinstated Mba after
he had been ousted by a mili-
tary coup, anti-Mba and anti-
French sentiment has grown as
Mba has shown his vindictive-
ness. The immediate cause of
Paris' decision to withdraw
its support was probably the
stepped-up campaign of terror
waged by Mba's goon squad over
the past six weeks. Even some
local Europeans have been
victimized during this period.
Gabonese officialdom is
attempting to maintain an air
of normalcy despite the fact
that the French withdrew their
guard unit from the presiden-
tial palace on 1 November.
Official announcement of Mba's
departure was not made until
31 October when the government
bulletin explained that the
purpose of the trip was to
consult with Paris on aid mat-
ters. Mba's cronies are calling
for still more repressive meas-
ures against opposition elements
who have evidently not yet at-
tempted to exploit the situation.
Local French diplomats have
continued to emphasize Mba's
pro-Western position in foreign
policy. They are probably trying
to justify past French support
of him, and may also be uncer-
tain over Paris' final decision.
The most widely popular suc-
cessor at this point would prob-
ably be the imprisoned Jean
Aubame, Mba's principal political
opponent, who headed the sh?.3rt-
lived provisional government last
February. Jean Marc Ekoh, who
was a member of the provisional
government but who is at liberty,
also appears to have considerable
support. Both men are high?_y
competent politicians of the
older generation, and have been
generally pro-West and part:.cu-
larly favorable to the US. They
have become strongly anti-French,
however, as a result of Paris'
support of Mba.
Paris has now apparently
become uncertain as to how to
proceed. To protect their own
interests, the French are prob-
ably maneuvering to confine Mba.'s
leading opponents, especially
Auba.me and Ekoh, to a subordinate
role in any successor regime, if
not to exclude them altogether.
Paris is particularly interested
in protecting access to Gabon's
considerable mineral resources,
which include the most concen-
trated high-quality uranium 1e-
posits in the Western world.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page l0
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
v S"o
SECRET
INTRIGUE CONTINUES IN TANGANYIKA AND ZANZIBAR
Tanganyika and Zanzibar--
newly renamed the United Republic
of Tanzania--continue to be the
scene of considerable political
intrigue, part of it directed
against neighboring Mozambique.
Some 150 Zanzibaris--mostly
Arabs--were arrested last week
by a few radical members of the
Revolutionary Council on the
island. The action was prompted
by rumors of a "counterrevolu-
tionary plot" with "British
involvement." Vice President
Karume approved the arrests,
although the regular Tanzanian
police authorities were not
involved.
Over the past few weeks,
however, Karume has become gen-
erally somewhat more moderate
and has shown signs that he is
beginning to distrust many of
the radical elements around him.
He recently ordered the dissolu-
tion of the Revolutionary Trade
Union and Students Union, two
of the three Communist-front
organizations on which the power
of the Revolutionary Council
is based.
Soviet military aid has
arrived on the mainland
Asia-Arica
According to local rumor,
the Soviet arms are destined for
the Tanzania-based Mozambique
nationalists, but it is more
likely that they are for the
Tanzanian Army, possibly for a
planned fourth battalion. Gov-
ernment leaders have stressed
that they need such weapons to
defend their Mozambique border
in case the Portuguese retaliate
for Tanzania's sheltering the
nationalists.
One Tanzanian battalion is
training with Chinese small arms
delivered in early September,
while the two remaining have
British equipment.
Other arms, more clearly
intended for nationalist opera-
tions in Mozambique, have been
provided by Algeria, which has
been trainin nationalist guer-
rillas.
population.
A detachment of Zanzibar troops
with Soviet antiaircraft guns
was shipped to Mtwara last
month, but was returned because
it had engaged in a wave of
banditry against the TanL7anvikan
The Algerian ambas-
sa or o anzania had said
earlier that arms shipments
for the nationalists would be
arriving from Algeria by both
air and sea in the near future.
He also stated that the
Mtwara airfield on the Mozambique
border is being lengthened and
improved, presumably to facil-
itate anti-Portuguese activities.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page it
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
SECRET
The showdown on the multi-
lateral nuclear force (MLF) ap-
pears to be approaching. The
prospect that the force may
actually be formed has aroused
the French to active opposition,
although the US has agreed that
it is not feasible to have a
MLF charter by the year's end,
and that the new British Govern-
ment must have time to decide
about joining. A crisis within
the alliance becomes a, distinct
possibility during or even be-
fore the next NATO ministerial
meeting scheduled for mid-Decem-
ber.
Britain's new Labor govern-
ment earlier this month launched
an alternative proposal for com-
bining existing national nuclear
deterrent forces of NATO mem-
bers into a seaborne MLF. The
seaborne component would be
significantly smaller than the
25-ship, 200-missile force ad-
vanced by the US, however, and
all forces would be placed in
a new NATO nuclear commander
under SACEUR. The plan is de-
signed to preserve a. useful role
for Britain's existing V-bomber
force and Pershing land-based
missile battalions, its TSR-2
supersonic strike aircraft now
under development, and its pro-
grammed nuclear submarines to
be equipped with US-furnished
Polaris missiles. The Wilson
government hopes that the full
commitment of these forces to
NATO can be exchanged for a
SECRET
greater voice in the use of the
US' strategic nuclear deterrent
forces.
West Germany, which has
until now demonstrated a strong
interest in setting up a sea-
borne MLF by the end of the year,
has not yet reacted strongly
either to the UK plan or to the
prospective delay. German
spokesmen have indicated they
are willing to examine the Brit-
ish idea, although they are re-
portedly disturbed that the de-
sired timetable will not be kept.
Italy and the Netherlands have
advised the US they were not
prepared to make a decision to
join the MLF until early next
year. Both are probably relieved
that. London is taking a more
active role in discussing nu-
clear arrangements in the al-
liance.
In principle, the UK plan
would provide a place for De
Gaulle's force de frappe. The
French, however; have a.Twa.ys
passively opposed an MLF as in-
consistent with their concept
of European nuclear defense
strategy, which would invalve
a nuclear deterrent independent
of US control or participation.
They probably see nothing new
in the UK plan. It has probably
increased French anxiety that
any MLF will foreclose possi-
bilities of a Gaullist-style
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
Party Leader
Deputy Leader; Treasury; and
coordinator of domestic affairs
Chairman of the Planning
Committee; Economic Affairs
Home Office
Education and Science
Social Services and Wales
Agriculture
Labor
Technology
Steel
Housing
Transportation
Foreign Affairs
Commonwealth Affairs
Defense
Foreign Trade
Health
Scotland
Pensions
Power
Aviation
Public Building and Works
Land and Natural Resources
Post Office
Law
Colonies
Overseas Development
OTHER PARTY LEADERS
Chairman of the Party
Vice Chairman of the Party
General coordinator,
party strategy & tactics
Chief Whip, House of Commons
Deputy Whip, Commons
Party Leader, House of Lords
Deputy leader, House of Lords
Sir Alexander Douglas-Home
Reginald Maudling
Edward Heath
Sir Edward Boyle
Quintin Hogg
Sir Keith Joseph
Christopher Soames
Joseph Godber
Ernest Marples
lain Macleod
John Boyd-Carpenter
Enoch Powell
R.A. Butler
Duncan Sandys
Peter Thorneycroft
Edward du Cann
Richard Wood
Michael Noble
Mrs. M. H. Thatcher
Mr. J.W.W. Peyton
Angus Maude
J.E. Ramsden
F. Corfield
Miss M. Pike
Sir John Hobson; Sir Peter Rawlinson
Julian Amery
Robert Carr
Lord Blakenham
Michael Fraser
Selwyn Lloyd
Martin Redmayne
William Whitelaw
Lord Carrington
Lord Dilhorne
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
SECRET
European confederation, and make
a. common Franco-German defense
policy impossible.
In a 29 October talk with
US officials in Pa.ris,a senior
French Foreign Ministry official's
personal view was that if the
Britain: Conservative
leader -D_o_u_gTa.s-Home has given
the key posts in his "shadow
cabinet" to Maudling and Heath,
but without favoring either as
heir apparent for the leader-
ship.
The US Embassy in London
believes Douglas-Home probably
has not yet made up his mind
who should be his successor.
Major responsibility under him
is split between the two front
runners--Maudling for party
operations, Heath for policy
planning. This should give
both.men ample opportunity to
prove themselves in opposition.
Other potential leadership
contenders who have been given
posts in which they might dis-
play their talents include lain
Macleod, who will lead the party's
opposition to any government
attempt to renationalize the
steel industry. Ma.cleod's
ability as one of the party's
sharpest debaters apparently
offset the resentment caused by
his refusal to serve under Doug-
las-Home while the party was in
office.
US continues to press for MLF
De Gaulle, who now more than
ever regards the proposal, as a
"smoking bomb" in his hand, will
take some counteraction having
serious disruptive effe
within the alliance.
Enoch Powell, the other
rebel against Douglas-Home's
leadership, also has been taken
back into the fold as spokesman
on transportation. His brief
includes trucking, another area
which Labor has promised to na-
tionalize.
R.A. Butler no longer is
discussed as a candidate for
the leadership. There has been
some speculation that Butler
remains as foreign affairs spokes-
man only because he declined
to be "kicked upstairs" to the
House of Lords.
Most Conservatives feel
the party needs a new leader
before the next elections,
which might come within eight-
een months. Douglas-Home's
assignment of younger "modern-
izers" to important posts prob-
ably is a. first step in the se-
lection and develo ment of a
successor.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WE]!CLY SUMMARY
Page 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
SECRET
ITALY'S NATIONAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
The 22-23 November nation-
wide municipal elections will
be widely viewed as a plebiscite
on the center-left government's
performance to date.
The Socialists (PSI) are
expected to be the only major
party to register heavy losses.
The major difficulty for the
PSI is that the two successive
Moro governments in which they
have participated failed to make
any significant progress on the
coalition's reform program.
Although the government has
gained some credit for its suc-
cess in arresting the increase
in inflation, this seems unlikely
to prevent PSI losses since the
party's working-class following
fears that the stabilization
program will cause increased
unemployment.
In recent weeks, the PI
has drawn some comfort from the
prospect of exploiting the re-
percussions of Khrushchev's
ouster in the Italian Communist
Party (PCI). It is doubtful,
however, that this issue witl
adversely affect the PCI, which
is expected to re ister ele=:-
toral sins.
WEST GERMANY MOVES TO PLACATE ISRAEL
The West German Government
is attempting to deal with long-
standing Israeli complaints
about the employment of West Ger-
man missile scientists and tech-
nicians by the UAR. Bonn has
felt that a law barring such ac-
tivity would be unconstitutional,
but it is taking other steps to
satisfy Israel. Bonn has also
publicly revealed that it is co-
operating with Israel in the nu-
clear field and giving Israel
military aid.
A few of the estimated 75-
100 German missile men in Eg
ecentl left
SECRET
6 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
Now
SECRET
Bonn on 26 October confirmed
press accounts that "for years"
it has had a military assistance
agreement with Israel. Expanding
on the official admission, the
German press stated that West Ger-
many has supplied about $50 mil-
lion worth of military equipment,
trained Israeli military person-
nel, and helped establish Israeli
arms factories.
Bonn has revealed that it is
also cooperating with Israel in
the peaceful uses of atomic
energy. According to the West
The Nordic Foreign Ministers
meeting in Reykjavik on 27-28 Oc-
tober dealt primarily with UN
matters.
The ministers agreed that
the UN peacekeeping operations
in Cyprus would be necessary af-
ter the present 31 January dead-
line, and that the need for the
Nordic contingents there will
continue for several more months
at least. They also supported
enlarging the Security Council
and the Economic and Social Coun-
cil. Iceland will ratify this
measure next week; Norway, Den-
mark,and Sweden by the end of
the year, and Finland early in]965.
On the Article 19 question,
the ministers agreed unanimously
German Scientific Research Minis-
try, $1.6 million is being ex-
pended during 1963-64. Research
is being undertaken at the Weiz-
mann Institute in Israel, where
two top German nuclear physicists
are currently on "temporary duty."
In publicizing these activi-
ties, Bonn risks endangering its
relations with the Arab states.
For the sake of clearing the air
with Israel, however, it evi-
dently has decided to run this
risk. Bonn still appears far re-
moved from formal recognition of
the Israeli Government, a move
which could result in UAR
rec-
oenition of East Germanv_
on the legal validity of the
US position, but expressed the
hope that the time gained bS
the postponement of the Gen-
eral Assembly opening, which is
supported by the Nordic coun-
tries, will be used to find an
acceptable solution. The Swedes
and Norwegians were especially
insistent that this is basically
a political question, and that
the major powers are responsi-
ble for finding a solution. A
Finnish Foreign Ministry official
however, stated that the Danes
and Norwegians will almost cer-
tainly vote with the US in the
event of a confrontation.
SECRET
6 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 15
Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120001-0
 Approved For Release 2007/10/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600120001-0
I%W i ~4w' SECRET AI %
The military leaders who over-
threw President Paz Estenssoro on
4 November have not yet formed a
government although radiobroadcasts
continually refer to a military
junta. General Alfredo Ovando
Candia, the commander in chief of
the Bolivian armed forces, suppos-
edly heads the "junta." General
Hugo Suarez Guzman, the commanding
general of the army, has announced
that he will be a member of the
junta, but his status is unclear.
Vice President Barrientos, the
key figure in the ouster of Paz,
was scheduled to confer with Ovando
on 5 November regarding the form of
government to be established
The military revolt was trig-
gered by the mutiny of a portion of
the Ingavi Regiment, a security de-
tachment of the Army General Staff,
in La Paz on the morning of 3 Novem-
ber. Both Ovando and Suarez were
held briefly by the mutineers. It
is unclear whether Barrientos was
directly connected with the La Paz
uprising; he claims he had nothing
?Qi - Paz Estenssoro
Gen. Barrientos
to do with it. Nevertheless, he an-
nounced his support of the rebels.
Other military units, most opposi-
tion political parties, and the min-
ers joined the rebellion as the day
progressed. Paz resigned on 4 No-
vember when it became evident that
a civil war would ensue if he at-
tempted to remain in power. He left
for Lima, Peru.
The absence of any effective
government, with resultant v.olence
and chaos, provides an opporunity
for Communists and other extremist
elements to exert their influence
in the formation of a new government.
Extreme leftist Juan Lechin, ex - vice
president and head of the Na:ional
Leftist Revolutionary Party ;PRIN),
has already tried to force his par-
ticipation in the junta. He appears
to have failed, but his attitude can
be expected to influence those who
will organize an interim government.
Communist inroads can be controlled
only if the new government quickly
imposes strong military rule.
The nation's tin miners, who
are under Communist and extr