NORTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004300050003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 27, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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27 December 1963
OCI No. 0312/63B
Copy No. 70
SPECIAL REPORT
NORTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
25(1
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Since 1954, when the Geneva accords were signed
and French influence disappeared, North Vietnam has
built up the most formidable military force in South-
east Asia. This establishment, primarily a ground
army with no tactical air and little naval capabil-
ity, does not yet compare favorably with modern West-
ern armies. However, drawing on the experience of
the war in Indochina, it has developed a highly
specialized capability to support and maintain in-
surgency operations in adjacent countries. In Laos,
North Vietnamese combat forces entered the conflict
at a critical moment in early 1961 and saved the day
for the pro-Communist Pathet Lao. In South Vietnam,
the Viet Cong organization has received direction,
inspiration, and material aid from North Vietnam.
The Army
North Vietnam emerged in
1954 from the eight-year Indo-
chinese war with an experienced
cadre skilled in subversion, in-
filtration, and guerrilla war-
fare. Using this as his base,
General Vo Nguyen Giap, the
commander at Dien Bien Phu and
now minister of defense, launched
an ambitious program to develop
underlying the whole, a heavy
stress on political indoctrina-
tion of the troops. Despite
many frustrations and setbacks,
some caused by the need to use
the army in agricultural and
economic tasks, the goals he
set forth have largely been
met.
The overwhelming strength
of the People's Army of Vietnam
a modern conventional
army.
Giap's program
had several important
provisions: standard-
ization and moderni-
zation of equipment,
organization, train-
ing, and discipline;
establishment of com-
pulsory military
service including a
reserve force; devel-
opment of technical
services; introduc-
tion of training for
modern warfare; and,
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(PAVN) lies in the
ground force troops.
These number 225,000
men, while the air
force and navy have
only 2,500 to 5,000
men each. The main
ground force elements
are 11 infantry divi-
sions/brigades, 1
artillery division,
and 10 independent
infantry regiments,
backed up by artillery,
antiaircraft artillery,
and engineer and other
service and support
units.
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North Vietnam is divided
into five military regions
which primarily fulfill combat
support and administrative func-
tions comparable to the various
army areas of the United States.
Most of the forces are concen-
trated in the Hanoi-Haiphong
area of the Tonkin Delta, al-
though there are sizable troop
dispositions in each military
region.
The strength of the army
lies principally in its highly
trained, competent, and intensely
loyal officer corps combined
with a disciplined, tightly con-
trolled organization. In addi-
25X1
GEN PARTY DEL
L FOR THE ARMY
MINISTRY OF
NAT DEF
CMDR IN CHIEF
OF THE ARMY
I
POLITICAL
DIRECTORATE
tion, individual North Vietnamese
infantry soldiers are highly
adaptable and inured to hardship.
Many have had or are receiving
combat experience in Hanoi-in-
spired insurgent movements in
Laos and South Vietnam.
Participation in these "lo-
cal" wars also gives the army
command staffs in Hanoi valuable
experience in planning, direct-
ing, and supporting insurgent
activities and actual combat sit-
uations. This training has ap-
parently added to the traditional
strengths of the North Vietnamese
Army: its proclivity for uncon-
ventional tactics, its high degree
ORGANIZATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE HIGH COMMAND
CADRE
DIRECTORATE
GENERAL
STAFF
(FORMERLY
REAR SERVICES
DIRECTORATE)
AIR STUDIES I { COASTAL DEF
BUREAU I BUREAU
SECURITY DEFENSE MILITARY
COMMAND COMMAND REGIONS
(MILITIA FORCES) (REGULAR FORCES)
SECRET
NATIONAL DEF
COUNCIL
TRAINING LOGISTICS
1 DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE
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of mobility, detailed planning
and study of objectives, and
its prowess in political and
psychological warfare.
SELECTED NORTH VIETNAMESE GROUND FORCES EQUIPMENT
7,62-mm. pistol
7.62-mm, carbine (SKS)
USSR (Chinese copy)
USSR (Chinese copy)
USSR (Chinese copy)
USSR (Chinese copy)
USSR (Chinese copy)
USSR (Chinese copy)
Equipment and Logistics
Mortars
82-mm . '
1.20-mm
Rockets and Recoilless Weapons
2.56- and 3,5-inch rocker bound
57-mm. recoilless rifle
75-mm. recoilless rifle
'90-mm. rocket launcher Mae 51
Pt-76 tank, amphibious
r BTR 41arrioredpersonnel carrier
Assortedhalf Tracks and light scout tors
T `34 tpn)Cs (reportedly)
?SU-76 assault guns
tar Transport
Truck GAZ-51, 4x2
Truck GAZ-63, 4x4
Truck GAZ-678, 4x4
T`rvck ZIS-(5l,
truck GAZ 69
;Signat Equipment
7Q Handi-talkie
7.1;8 Walkie-talkie
)02E ,
IW3
China
USSR (Chinese copy)
USSR (Chinese copy)
US
US (Chinese copy)
US (Chinese copy)
China
USSR (The North
USSR Vietnamese
USSR Army has an
USSR estimated
The army has always been,
and remains, completely con-
trolled by the party and sub-
servient to its political de-
cisions. A major reorganiza-
tion in 1960-1961 was based
on the political decision to
intervene in Laos and South
Vietnam and this decision re-
mains a major influencing fac-
tor underlying the present or-
ganization of the PAVN. The re-
organization was an attempt to
prepare the armed forces for
prolonged guerrilla warfare
while at the same time present-
ing a credible conventional
threat to Southeast Asia and
maintaining the internal secu-
rity of the homeland.
North Vietnam has depended
almost entirely on Communist
China for heavier firepower,
better transportation and com-
munications facilities, and
standardized weapons and equip-
ment. Arms and equipment have
flowed almost continuously across
the border since 1949. Many
weapons now considered standard
in the North Vietnamese Army
are of Soviet origin, supplied,
however, by the Chinese. Other
items are of Chinese Communist
manufacture.
Recent evidence indicates
that this flow has provided
generally adequate stocks of
conventional equipment. Hanoi's
own arms and ammunition produc-
tion capability is limited, and
it produces only limited quanti-
ties of mortars, bazookas, gre-
nadesq mines, and small arms and
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ammunition. It does have a
capability for arms repair, how-
ever.
While the over-all program
for standardization of equipment
has been quite successful, weak
areas remain. The most notable
inadequacies are in heavy ord-
nance equipment such as artillery
and armor, and these will be the
weaknesses most difficult to
remedy. Lacking an industrial
base, Hanoi must continue to de-
pend on outside sources for
major items of equipment.
Backing up the People's
Army is a 500,000-man militia
or trained reserve. Only the
elements of the militia consid-
ered politically reliable are
armed. The balance of this
force is used for local security
missions or as informants. The
entire force, organized on a
provincial basis, undergoes two
weeks' training each year.
The militia is apparently
intended to be the hard core of
the trained reserves. It is
to be built up through a con-
scription program begun in ear-
nest in 1959 after several years
of experiments. Yearly call-up
varies according to national
and local needs. Men between
the ages of 18 and 25 are sub-
ject to two years' service in
the armed forces, while those
between 26 and 45 serve an un-
specified length of time in the
reserves. The recent increased
emphasis on this reserve force
reflects the regime's desire
to maintain a modern army.
Training
General Giap had early
realized that improved training
was essential in developing a
modern army. A complete mili-
tary school system was institu-
ted after 1957 and a separate
General Training Directorate
on a level with the General
Staff was established in 1958.
Although instruction in guer-
rilla warfare techniques--a
North Vietnamese speciality
since 1945--is not neglected,
conventional warfare training
is stressed. Emphasis is placed
on infiltration, camouflage,
marksmanship, and field fortifi-
cations.
This formal training is
supplemented by the combat train-
ing available in both Laos and
South Vietnam. It is probable
that Hanoi rotates as many per-
sonnel as is feasible into Laos
to take advantage of this
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experience. North Vietnam's
military school system, as well
as its training philosophy,
rests heavily on Chinese Commu-
nist foundations. The number
of Chinese advisers at Vietnam-
ese military schools is not
known, but the tightening re-
lationship between China and
North Vietnam makes it certain
that Chinese influence will re-
main high.
One of the early tasks of
the fledgling air staff was air-
field construction and improve-
ment. A large number of sites
had been inherited from the
French, but most of them were
overgrown or abandoned. Only
20 airfields with landing strips
longer than 2,000 feet were
serviceable and only five of
these are considered capable
of supporting even limited jet
aircraft operations.
Although North Vietnam
has no combat aircraft at the
moment, the foundations for the
creation of an air arm have
been laid. The 1954 Geneva
accords had specified "combat
aircraft, jet engines and jet
weapons" in the long list of
forbidden military equipment.
While Hanoi did not hesitate
to ignore the accords in build-
ing up its ground force, it
apparently felt that there was
not the same immediate need to
create an air force in blatant
contravention of the accords.
Future acquisition of an air
capability, however, has been
made easy by the foundation
established in adminstration,
logistics, transport, and air
defense.
The air command and admin-
istrative organ of the PAVN
started out as a small Air
Studies Bureau of the General
Staff. Its primary functions
were pilot training, air base
restoration and maintenance,
and long-term development
studies.
In the past few years, ex-
tensive improvements have been
made on at least 10, and perhaps
as many as 20, airfields. At
least three new airfields have
been built, including one--at
Phuc Yen, about 30 miles north-
west of Hanoi--with a concrete
runway over 8,500 feet long.
Although this field is probably
intended to serve as an interna-
tional air terminal, it could
also handle modern high-perform-
ance combat aircraft.
The air arm derived a new
impetus from the Soviet airlift
into Laos which began in late
1960 and extended through October
6
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STATUTE MILES
27 DECEMBER 1963
34440
?Nghia Lo
?Dien Bien ~qu
LAOS
NORTH VIETNAM
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE
? Airfield * Air defense headquarters
12 IL-14 (Crate) twin engine transports
18 LI-2 (Cab) twin engine transports
8 AN-2 (Colt) single engine biplane-transports
15 YAK-18 (Max) single engine monoplane-trainers
10 ZLIN-226 single engine monoplane-trainers
4 MI-1 (Hound) helicopters
GULF
OF
TONKIN
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1962. Soviet aircraft staging
out of North Vietnamese fields
required sophisticated support
in order to get heavy payloads
off the ground. This support
was given, with Soviet and Chi-
nese help, in the form of strength-
ened runways, loading and unload-
ing facilities, POL and cargo
storage areas, and maintenance
facilities.
When the Soviets withdrew
from the Laos air supply opera-
tion, they left most of their
equipment behind. The transport
aircraft included in this equip-
ment more than doubled the PAVN
aircraft inventory.
Air Defense
North Vietnam's Air Defense
Command is directly under the
General Staff on the same level as
the air and naval entities. It
is divided into two elements--
air warning and antiaircraft artil-
lery.
Without tactical aircraft,
however, only a limited reaction
is possible. The only active
air defense capability is light
(37-mm.) and medium (85- and 88-
mm.) antiaircraft artillery.
The medium AAA is used to defend
urban centers, industrial com-
plexes, and airfields. Approx-
imately 40 medium AAA sites--
generally with eight guns each--
have been identified throughout
the country.
The expansion of the South
Vietnamese Air Force has contrib-
uted to North Vietnam's sensi-
tivity about its air defense
capability. Today North Vietnam
would be extremely vulnerable
to an air attack. As the early
warning air defense system grows
in sophistication and the airfield
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NORTH VIETNAM
NAVAL PORTS AND BASES
Major port or base
Other port or base
3 S-0.1 subchasers
12 P-4 motor torpedo boats
30 Swatow-class motor gunboats
4 P-6 motor gunboats
4 Minesweepers
37 Patrol craft
STATUTE MILES
27 DECEMBER 1963
34442
I \\ Hai-phdgg
,tinn,q tail
GULF
OF
TONKIN
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improvement program shows results,
Hanoi may attempt to acquire
fighter aircraft or surface-to-
air missiles. Until then, some
reliance, in the event of an
attack, might be put upon the
Chinese Communist fighter capa-
bility operating out of airfields
close to the North Vietnamese
border.
The Navy
The groundwork for North
Vietnam's navy was laid in 1955
with the establishment of the
General Directorate of Coastal
Defense. It is still primarily
a coastal defense force, with no
real .deepwater- capability. Its
principal equipment is 30 Chinese
Communist Swatow-class motor gun-
boats and 12 Soviet motor torpedo
boats. The navy guards against
smuggling and illegal entry or
exit, conducts some minelaying,
and participates in the transport
of small clandestine forces.
Naval forces have not fig-
ured very prominently in Hanoi-
supported guerrilla wars. The
navy does have a capability, how-
ever, to counter attempted land-
ings of small special-force teams
and it has been used to run guns
and supplies to the Viet Cong.
Although naval capabilities are
limited by the small number of
vessels and their modest seagoing
characteristics, minor offensive
action could be undertaken in the
form of surprise torpedo boat
attacks.
The navy will undoubtedly
remain a minor element in Hanoi's
military strength. It is com-
pletely dependent on the Commu-
nist bloc for all arms and equip-
ment. Local shipyards are not
This is one of the two Soviet "SOO. 1"
Class submarine chasers turned over to
North Vietnam in January 1961. The
"S S. O. 1 " is the I argest and most modern
class of ship in the North Vietnamese
Navy.
expected to produce anything
larger than district patrol
craft for the foreseeable future.
The size of Hanoi's ground
forces has been relatively static
for the past several years and
no large expansion is expected.
Further improvements in the army's
capability for unconventional war-
fare is doubtless in prospect.
The recent reorganization of
several divisions into a brigade
structure--a move which gives
the army greater flexibility
and mobility--perhaps points
the direction for future organi-
zation. Further improvements
in weapons, logistics, and facili-
ties can also be expected.
The largest growth will un-
doubtedly take place in the air
defense organization. Acquisi-
tion of fighter aircraft is
likely. In addition, if South
Vietnam's air capability con-
tinues to grow, Hanoi may make
serious attempts to acquire sur-
face-to-air missiles.
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