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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003800060001-6
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• Original Classification: S
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. _ `7
OCI NO. 0440/62
26 October 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
State Dept. review completed 25X1
USAF review(s) completed.
GROUP I
Excluded from au-lomalic
downgrading rind
declassification
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 October 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 ]PDT 25 Oct)
THE CUBAN CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Soviet leaders, faced with the dangerous consequences
of a major miscalculation of US intentions, have taken a
variety of measures to minimize the danger to the USSR's
prestige and interests and to deter direct US military inter-
vention in Cuba. Moscow's cautious reaction to President
Kennedy's 22 October address on Cuba was contrived to avoid
commitments to specific Soviet countermeasures without giving
an appearance of acquiescing to the measures announced by
the President. Khrushchev's present intention, as reflected
in the diversion of Soviet ships away from the US quarantine
zone and in his call for a summit meeting, apparently is to
avoid incidents which might make the crisis more difficult to
control and to rely primarily on political pressures to fore-
stall further US actions in Cuba. There are no indications
that the USSR is planning retaliatory action in other areas,
such as Berlin or Southeast Asia.
SINO-INDIAN BORDER FIGHTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Chinese Communist military action against India appears
aimed at clearing away Indian outposts in areas at both ends
of the frontier, improving Peiping's bargaining position
by seizing new territory, and teaching New Delhi a lesson in
border warfare. New Delhi has rejected Peiping's Moscow-
supported proposals for negotiations
THE YEMENI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Crown Prince Faysal, who returned
home is wee to assume leadership of the Saudi Government,
has become a particular target of Cairo's propaganda attacks.
Inside Yemen, there continues to be friction between Prime
Minister Sallal and Cairo's hand-picked man, Deputy Prime
Minister Baydani.
DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Souvanna this week went to Hanoi to urge complete with-
drawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos. Souvanna's
apparent determination to chart an independent course has
drawn strong criticism from the Pathet Lao.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 October 19612
CONGO DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
No further progress has been made on the UN reconcilia-
tion plan. Although Adoula has repudiated the cease-fire
and financial agreements, at the same time he is demanding
that Tshombd comply rigidly with the plan in its entirety.
Tshombd now says that any attempt by Acloula to renegotiate
the cease-fire agreement will. delay a settlement for a
long time. UN Under Secretary Bunche arrived in Leopold-
ville on 22 October, presumably to try to break the impasse
NORTHERN RHODESIAN ELECTIONS FAVOR AFRICAN NATIONALISTS Page 11
Elections in Northern Rhodesia on 30 October are ex-
pected to give African nationalists a decisive role in
the legislature for the first time. Africans opposed to
the present structure of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland will thus be in a strong position in both Nyasa-
land and Northern Rhodesia. Pressure then will mount to
revise the federal constitution in the direction of a much
looser union, especially between the two northern territories
and white-dominated Southern Rhodesia.
PROSPECTS FOR THE REFERENDUM IN FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
e u an cris s wi inc i.ne many vo ers o c ng o a
strong leader. In any case the opposition political parties
are concentrating on the National Assembly elections in
SPECIAL ARTICLE
SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY FACTIONALTSM . . . . . . . . . . . , Page 1
The overthrow of civilian government in South Korea
last year by a military clique has made army factionalism
a major factor in political affairs. Two principal groups--
subdivided into numerous factions-,-are maneuvering for in-
fluence, and a third group is beginning to emerge. The
maneuvering is likely to increase in intensity during the
transition to the civilian regime promised for mid-1963.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
THE CUBAN CRISIS
The Soviet leaders, faced
with the dangerous consequences
of a major miscalculation of US
intentions regarding strategic
missiles in Cuba, have taken a
variety of measures to minimize
the damage to the USSR's pres-
tige and interests and to deter
direct US military intervention
in Cuba. Moscow's cautious
reaction to President Kennedy's
22 October speech was contrived
to avoid commitments to specific
countermeasures without giving
an appearance of acquiescing to
the measures announced by the
President. Khrushchev's pres-
ent intention, as reflected
in the diversion of Soviet ships
away from the US quarantine zone
and in his call for a summit
meeting, apparently is to avoid
incidents which might make the
crisis more difficult to control
and to rely primarily on polit-
ical pressures to forestall
further US actions in Cuba.
There are no indications that
the USSR is planning retaliatory
actions in other areas, such as
Berlin or Southeast Asia.
Moscow's initial reaction
to President Kennedy's speech
was intended to underscore the
USSR's military preparedness
to meet any eventualities. The
commander in chief of the War-
saw Pact forces, Marshal Grechko
ordered pact representatives in
Moscow to increase the military
readiness of member nations.
Defense Minister Malinovsky re-
ported to the Soviet Government
on measures to raise the "battle
readiness" of Soviet armed
forces. Two days later, Mali-
novsky repeated earlier Soviet
claims of a "mighty and in-
vulnerable" global rocket and
of the capability to destroy
enemy rockets in flight. Mos-
cow also announced that all
military leaves had been can-
celed and that release from
active duty for members of the
strategic rocket forces, anti-
aircraft defense forces, and
the submarine fleet had been
postponed until further notice.
The Soviet Government state-
ment of 23 October, warning that
the US is "recklessly playing
with fire," was aimed primarily
at gaining time and placing
the US on the defensive while
Moscow attempts to generate
growing pressures on the US
which, the Soviets hope, will
deter further US military action
and oblige the US to ease the
quarantine on shipping. The
statement carefully refrained
from. specifying the USSR's
reaction to the quarantine and
to possible US military action
to remove the strategic missiles
in Cuba. It evaded the central
issue of the missiles and re-
affirmed the claim in Moscow's
statements in September that
the military equipment being
sent to Cuba is "designed ex-
clusively for defensive pur-
poses." It sought to play
down the USSR's role in the
crisis by portraying the con-
flict as one between Cuba and
the US.
Moscow's statement replied
only indirectly to President
Kennedy's warning of US nuclear
retaliation against the USSR
if any nuclear missiles should
be launched from Cuba against
any nation in the Western
Hemisphere. It stated that So-
viet nuclear weapons will never
be used for aggressive purposes
but added a vague and ambiguous
warning that the "Soviet Union
will strike a very powerful re-
taliatory blow" if the "ag-
gressors touch off a war."
Although the statement
denounced the US quarantine
and denied Washington's right
to halt and inspect foreign
vessels on the open seas, it
avoided any hints of Soviet
reaction beyond stating that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the USSR "resolutely rejects
such claims." The statement
also implied that the USSR will
seek to circumvent the US de-
mand for the prompt dismantling
and withdrawal of all offensive
weapons by contending that all
military equipment in Cuba is
defensive and owned by Cuba.
Moscow termed the US demand as
one which "naturally no state
which values its independence
can meet."
Although the Soviet state-
ment did not unequivocally deny
President Kennedy's statement
about the presence of strategic
missiles in Cuba, Soviet spokes-
men and propaganda have attempted
to cast doubt on the authenticity
of US information. The state-
ment dealt only indirectly with
this question by noting that the
US accuses Cuba of "allegedly
creating a threat to US security"
and termed this allegation
"hypocrisy." Soviet UN delegate
Zorin, however, charged that US
"fabrications" were designed to
persuade the UN Security Council
to "approve retroactively" US
aggressive acts against Cuba.
He claimed that the US had failed
to present proof of its charges.
Moscow radio on 24 October as-
serted that the US Defense
Department had produced "some
kind of faked photographs taken
from spy planes" to justify its
"aggressive acts." It said the
"big lie" spread by Washington
is aimed at justifying "far-
reaching aggressive actions."
The Soviet ambassador to Mexico
publicly denied that there is
an "arsenal of Soviet aims" in
Cuba, and a Soviet diplomat in
Britain said Soviet weapons
supplied to Cuba are not equipped
with nuclear warheads.
The Soviet statem"nt of 23
October again sought to justify
Moscow's military presence in
Cuba by pointing to the deploy-
ment of US forces and armaments
throughout the world and to US
rejection of Soviet proposals
for withdrawal of all foreign
forces from alien territories.
Khrushchev's call for a
""meeting at the highest level"
Uggests that the Soviet leaders
believe that time will work to
their advantage and provide grow-
ing opportunities to press the
US to agree to enter negotiations
with Cuba and the USSR and pos-
sibly to suspend implementation
of the quarantine and other
measures. In his reply to a mes-
sage from Bertrand Russell, Khru-
shchev sought to contrast Soviet
and 113 positions by pledging
that the USSR will do everything
in its power to avert war. He
said Moscow will avoid "reckless
decisions" and will not allow
itself to be "provoked" by US
actions. He also tried to en-
hancEe the urgency of a summit
meeting by warning that if the
US carries out its announced
"program of pirate action," the
USSR would have no alternative
but to "make use of the means
of defense against the aggressor."
He added that US "aggression"
against Cuba would render a sum-
mit meeting "impossible and use-
less."
The Soviet leaders are
seeking to convey an impression
of composure and discipline in
dealing with the Cuban crisis.
Khrushchev and other top Soviet
leaders went backstage to greet
an American opera singer after
a performance on 24 October. The
performances of other US cultural
groups in the USSR received an
unusually cordial reception on
23 October. The demonstrations
in front of the US Embassy in
Moscow on 24 October were per-
functory by comparison with other
demonstrations.
Gromyko made a demonstrative
stop in East Berlin on his trip
back to Moscow from New York.
His public remarks there on 24
October, however, contained no
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
hint of Soviet retaliatory
action against the Western
position in Berlin. He re-
stated the Soviet position
that an agreement with the
West is possible but only on
the condition that Western
"occupation troops" are with-
drawn and East German sovereignty
is respected. He avoided any
mention of a deadline but
declared that the West should
realize that the East German
There are nine Soviet of-
fensive missile sites in Cuba.
Five sites--all for 1,100-mile
medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs)--appear to be fully
operational. One additional
MRBM site is expected to be-
come fully operational on 28
October. One 2,200-mile inter-
mediate-range ballistic missile
(IRBM) site may become operational
by I December, the other two
by 15 December.
SAGUA CA GRANDE
MRPM COMPLEX
frontiers are "firmly and
reliably secured." Soviet
propaganda continued to play
down the possibility of a "new
Berlin crisis" in the near
future and professed to see a
"more realistic approach" to
the German problem at the UN
General Assembly.
It now is apparent that
the deployment to Cuba of So-
viet offensive missiles and
associated construction equip-
ment and prefabricated materials
began last spring. Necessary
surveying, road construction,
and initial building con-
struction were mostly concen-
trated in August, September,
and October.
Four MRBM sites are grouped
in the San Cristobal area of
western Cuba, and two are near
Sagua la Grande. Each has or
will have four launchers with
at :least two missiles for each
launcher.
Two fixed sites for IRBM
missiles are in the Guanajay
area near Havana. One IRBM
site is near Remedios, and there
probably is a second, companion
site there. Each of the IRBM
sites has four launch pads.
There is no positive evi-
dence that nuclear warheads for
these missiles are present in
Cuba. However, certain buildings
under construction at the sites
appear to be for storage of
nuclear weapons.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
?Effective air defense perimeter
(estimated radius: 20-25 nautical miles)
The 24 Soviet surface-to-
air (SAM) sites in Cuba now are
in operational status and give
air defense cover to most of
Cuba.
Other Weapons
In addition to the Ml'WM and
IRBM deployment and'the SAM de-
fensive system, there are three
known short-range cruise-missile
sites in Cuba and 12 short-range
missile-equipped KOMAR motor
torpedo boats.
Aircraft counts at the
various fields show a total
of 22 IL-28 (Beagle) medium
jet bombers at San Julian in
extreme western Cuba. None
have been observed else-
where.
Jet fighters are concen-
trated in areas near surface-to
-surface missile installations.
All. 39 known MIG-21s (Fishbeds)
are at Santa Clara airfield in
central Cuba, about midway be-
? Confirmed surface-to-air missile (SAM) site
X Possible SAM site, exact location unknown
Support facility for processing equipment
Airfield with MIG aircraft
MISSILE ACTIVITY IN CUBA, OCTOBER 1962
tween the Sagua Grande MRBM site
and the IR'.3-M site near Guanajay.
As many as 26 MIG-15s
(Fagots) and 9 MIG-19s (Farmers)
recently have been located at
the Cuban Air Force Headquarters
base at San Antonio de los Banos,
south of Havana and near both
the IRBM installation at Guana-
jay and the MRBM sites at San
Cristobal.
Thirteen IL-14 (Crate) trans-
port aircraft have been noted at
nearby P1.aya Baracoa. Two other
unidentified transports are
located here also, and there is
one apiece atSan Antonio de los
Banos and. at Camaguey. As many
as.40 helicopters have been re-
ported at Playa Baracoa air-
field, Cuba's major heliport.
Cuban Reaction to President's
Speech
Cuba's reaction to the US
moves of 22 October has been-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
cautious. The high level of mili-
tary alert continues, but Castro's
public response to the crisis has
been relatively restrained. His
speech on 23 October--unusual in
that it was not the occasion for
a mass public demonstration--was
comparatively mild, full of stereo-
typed references to "the inevitable
triumph' of the Cuban revolution
over "Yankee imperialism." The
speech explicitly rejected any in-
spection of Cuban territory by
foreign nationals. The subdued
tone of the Castro speech and the
lack of significant comment by
other Cuban leaders since may be
a result of close consultation
with Soviet authorities.
Non-Cuban press represent-
atives in Cuba report the city to
be calm and relatively normal,
with none of the confusion and
disorganization that accompanied
the mobilization prior to the in-
vasion of 1961.
Official and unofficial ex-
pressions of support, sympathy,
or understanding for the US
position on Cuba-- either overtly
or privately expressed by govern-
ment leaders--have reached an
impressive volume from all parts
of the world. Nations from which
such expressions have recetitly
been received are Italy, Portugal,
Luxembourg, Belgium, Switzerland,
Iran, India, Thailand, Congo
(Brazzaville), Sudan, Jamaica,
and Panama. Among the very few
nations or groups expressing open
opposition to the US stand was
the Algerian National Liberation
Front, which terms the quarantine
of Cuba an intolerable.inter-
ference in the internal affairs
of that country." An official
Iraqi statement also says the US
quarantine is a "flagrant vio-
lation of the principle of freedom
of the international seas" and
a "regression for the organiza-
tion of international society."'
An Air Cubana plane com-
ing from Prague made a technical
stop at Goose Bay, Labrador, on
23 October and was searched by
Canadian authorities before being
allowed to continue to Havana.
Two East German missile technicians
and five Czech technicians were
on board.
In Latin America, military
support for the quarantine action
has been offered by Argentina,
Guatemala, Peru, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, and
Honduras. Enthusiastic backing
for the US position is reported
arnnong the Chilean armed forces,
particularly on the part of air
force officers. The Argentine
Government has offered two
destroyers on three days'.notice,
with a submarine, a marine bat-
taalion with transport, and other
units if required later. The
Argentine Air Force commander
has sent messages to General
LeMay and other hemisphere air
force commanders pledging read-
iness to participate in any
joint measures required by the
Cuban crisis.
The Peruvian offer is
qualified by a requirement of
unanimous approval of the GAS
resolution. The Uruguayan Gov-
ernment, according to press re-
ports, has now decided to sup-
port the OAS resolution, but
with certain reservations on
the use of armed force.
President Duvalier of Haiti
and President Rivera of El
Salvador have announced support
for the quarantine policy. Presi-
dent Goulart of Brazil, however,
apparently seeks a mediatory role.
Demonstrations of opposition
in Latin America remain scattered
and ineffective. The Communists
appear reluctant to commit them-
selves to a major effort in the
face of widespread official and
public acceptance of the US
position.
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SINO-INDIAN BORDER FIGHTING
After a week of heavy fight-
ing at at least seven points
along the Indo-Tibetan frontier,
Chinese military action against
India appears to be taking on
some of the characteristics of
a large-scale "punitive expedi-
tion."
In addition to clearing
away Indian outposts in areas
at both ends of the border where
the Indians have been particu-
CHEN LIAI Y
Boundary shown on most US and Western maps
-..- Demarcated
x - Delimited only
Indefinite
Boundary shown on, recent Chinese and Indian maps
(where differing from US and Western maps)
Chinese
Indian
Arrows indicate Chinese advances
--I-- Railroad Airfield
Road Pass
- - - Major caravan route :5645 Spot height
f itnatl \
SECRET
angi Dawan
. 61ao
cAH14%i1R~
y (5tatu cf u e
larly active during the past four
months, the Chinese have moved
well beyond their previous ad-
vance positions. The key local
headquarters town of Towang in
the northeast fell on 24 October
and the Chinese have surrounded
the :Indian strongpoint and re-
supply base of Chushul in Ladakh.
The Chinese offensive seems
designed to discourage New Delhi's
hopes and weaken its capabilities
21571 7#pUOt 1 N , .
hankot
2g5Uo
Jullundur _ Mandl
PAN
Rudog
or trail (in feet)
STATUTE MILES 150
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to make any gains along the
border by force and to bring the
Indians to the negotiating table
on Chinese terms.
The Chinese have been suc-
cessful on all military fronts,
largely by employing numerically
superior forces, better supplied
and more heavily armed than their
Indian adversaries. Casualties
on both sides have been heavy,
running to more than 2,000 on the
Indian side in the first four
days of fighting.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In an effort to consolidate
its gains and emphasize its
"reasonableness" Peiping on 23
October called for an end to
the border warfare and for both
sides to draw back 12 miles
from the positions as of that
date along the whole border.
The Chinese also proposed a
further Chinese pull-back in
the northeast and a renewal of
negotiations between Nehru and
Chou En-lai in either New Delhi
or Peiping.
On 25 October, a Pravda
editorial called for a nego-
tiated settlement of the border
dispute on the basis of the
Chinese proposals.
This editorial is the first
Soviet statement on the border
issue since the recent outbreak
of fighting. It indicates some
shift from the careful neutral-
ity which Moscow has heretofore
maintained in dealing with the
issue. The editorial, adverting
to the "notorious" McMahon Line,
indirectly characterizes the
Indian position as chauvinistic.
The Chinese proposals, on the
other hand, are regarded as
"constructive," taking "due
account" of the interests of
both parties.
On 20 October the Soviet
ambassador delivered a letter
from Khrushchev to Nehru urging
a peaceful settlement of the
dispute.
Recent Soviet moves indicate
that the delicate balance Moscow
has sought to maintain in rela-
tions with both parties has been
disturbed by the Cuban situation,
which has made bloc solidarity
paramount for the USSR, as well
as by the latest fighting on
the border.
The Indians, who have cul-
tivated Moscow's "neutrality"
on the border question, have
termed Peiping's repetition at
this time of its mutual with-
drawal proposal "hypocrisy."
India has also rejected media-
tion offers by the UAR and
Liberia.
According to Foreign Secre-
tary Desai, Indian policy at
the present time will be to hold
on, to make the Chinese pay
dearly for every advance until
winter hampers operations, and
then to prepare for fighting
in the spring. The Indians are
probably counting also on the
fact that as the Chinese pene-
trate deeper into the northern
area, poor communications and
rough -terrain will impair Chi-
nese logistics as they have
Indian., New Delhi may hope that
reinforced Indian troops, being
pushed closer to their own
sources of supply, will be able
to stop the Chinese even before
winter.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The forces of the Yemeni
revolutionary government remain
in control of the greater part
of the country. Additional ar-
rivals have brought the total
strength of Egyptian ground
forces--largely "blitz" troops
and paratroops--to an estimated
2,500-3,000 men.
Nasir apparently hopes that
he can take advantage of the mo-
mentum generated by the Yemeni
revolution to undermine the
Saudi monarchy. Cairo's "Voice
of the Arabs" broadcasts, as
well as its clandestine radio
output, are sharply attacking
Crown Prince Faysal, who re-
turned home this week to assume
leadership of the Saudi Govern-
ment. The Egyptian radio has
urged the Saudi Army to rise
against Faysal and has called.
him "a treacherous fox," "an
agent of the foreigners," and.
a man "as evil as Saud."
especially between Prime Minister
Sallal and Cairo's hand-picked
man, Deputy Prime Minister
Baydani. In a conversation
with the US chargd on 19 October,
Sallal said that the US should
not believe statements made by
certain ministers, particularly
Baydani, which might give the
impression of UAR domination
over Yemen. Yemeni policy will
be made, he claimed, by "Yemenis
who stayed home and created the
revolution, not by returning
exiles."'
It seems clear, despite
mutual distrust between him
and the UAR Government, that
Sal:Lal is likely to remain re-
sponsive to Cairo's wishes as
long as he needs Egyptian mili-
tary assistance to protect the
revolution and as long as large
numbers of Egyptian troops re-
main in the Yemen. If and when
the Egyptians pull out, there
will probably be an extensive 25X1
shake-Up of the Yemeni Government.
In Yemen itself, there con-
tinues to be friction among top-
level revolutionary leaders, and
Premier Souvanna Phouma
has returned to Vientiane after
a trip to Hanoi to urge the
complete withdrawal from Laos
of North Vietnamese military
elements.
kok to confer with Marshal Sarit,
his dealings with the rightist-con-
Souvanna's apparent deter-
mination to chart an independent
course has drawn strong criti-
cism from left-wing elements in
Laos. His recent trip to Bang-
trolled National Assembly, and
his efforts to remove the North
Vietnamese military presence
from Laos have combined to al-
ienate the Pathet Lao at least
temporarily.
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CONGO DEVELOPMENTS
No progress has been made
on the UN reconciliation plan
for the Congo since Adoula
repudiated the cease-fire and
financial agreements on 17
October, despite his expression
of full support for the UN plan
and the statement in his com-
muniqu6 with Under Secretary
McGhee that the "bridges are
not cut." He has ordered a
halt to any reactivation of
joint commission talks in
Elisabethville pending talks
with UN Under Secretary Bunche,
who arrived in Leopoldville on
22 October.
Adoula told Ambassador
Gullion that his action did
not mean a rupture of the
talks, but rather a suspension.
The tone of his 18 October press
conference, however, indicates
that Adoula's position has
considerably stiffened. Stress-
ing the 27-month delay in at-
taining a Katanga settlement,
Adoula said again that the UN
plan could not be negotiated,
that it constituted a whole
which must be accepted or re-
jected by Tshombe, and that he
would not enter into any talks
with Tshomb6.
Tshomb6 has reacted slowly,
but on 22 October he informed
UN officials in Elisabethville
that any attempt by Adoula to
renegotiate the cease-fire
signed on 16 October would
raise new problems and result
in long delay. The Katangan
leader has not yet commented
on the UN-drafted constitution.
Two railroad cars con-
taining 70 tons of copper
crossed the reopened Lubilash
bridge on 17 October, but
Union Miniere officials say
that no other shipments are
planned. The route remains
open
UN air reconnaissance
supports previous reports
that Tshomb6 has added Vampire
jets to his air force. One
such aircraft was sighted at
Kolwezi airport, and there
may be a total of four. Re-
ports on the fighting between
Katangan and Congolese forces
which occurred in northern
Katanga just prior to the
cease-fire indicated that the
Katangans were using their re-
cently acquired Harvard piston
trainers to strafe and possibly
bomb Congolese positions.
In Brussels, Adoula's
recent moves have produced a
highly adverse reaction. For-
eign Minister Spaak's chances
of obtaining domestic support
for economic pressiirPG on
Tshomb6 have been further re-
duced. Spaak has indicated, more-
over, that any Belgian decision
to increase economic assistance
to Leopoldville would have to
await a more constructive atti-
tude on Adoula's part.
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NORTHERN RHODESIAN ELECTIONS FAVOR AFRICAN NATIONALISTS
Elections in Northern Rho-
desia on 30 October are ex-
pected to give African national-
ists a decisive role in the pro-
tectorate's legislature for the
first time. Kenneth Kaunda's
United National Independence
Party (UNIP), the principal
African party, will hold prob-
ably the largest single bloc
of seats and possibly an absolute
majority.
The new legislature has 45
seats. Fifteen members will be
chosen by an "upper voters'
roll," which is predominantly
European but also contains a
significant number of Africans.
Another fifteen will be elected
by a largely African "lower
roll." One member will be chosen
by the protectorate's Asians and
mulattoes. Fourteen so-called
"national members" will be
chosen under a complicated pro-
cedure designed to ensure the
election of moderates.
UNIP has been waging a
vigorous campaign. Since the
only other African party is
discredited and demoralized,
Kaunda and his followers hope
to take all but one or two of
the "lower roll" seats. They
also hope that their efforts
to present their party as
moderate and responsible will
lead to the election of UNIP
Africans or UNIP-sympathizing
whites in some "upper roll" and
many "national" seats. The
only other large bloc is likely
to be Sir Roy Welensky's United
Federal Party, which expects
to take most of the upper roll
seats.
Kaunda, like Nyasaland's
Hastings Banda, has been cam-
paigning for the breakup of the
present Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, which joins
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland
to the white-dominated colony
of Southern Rhodesia. Banda's
party is already the predominant
one in Nyasaland. With Africans
in a strong position in both
northern territories, drastic
revision to loosen the federation's
structure, especially these
territories' ties with southern
Rhodesia, may get under way as
early as mid-1963. There-
after, African pressure for
early independence for Northern
Rhodesia will probably increase
rapidly.
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De Gaulle has threatened
to resign if he does not get a
solid majority in the 28 Oc-
tober referendum on his pro-
posal to have the next presi-
dent of France elected. by pop-
ular vote. The Cuban crisis
will incline many voters to
cling to a strong leader, but
will not deter the opposition
political parties in their at-
tempt. to win control of the
National Assembly in the late
November elections.
The five parties responsi-
ble for the downfall of the
Pompidou government have urged
defeat of De Gaulle's proposal,
and the French press is almost
unanimously opposed. Other
than the National Assembly,
opposition has also been ex-
pressed by the Senate, the
Council of State, the Constitu-
tional Council, and the Law
Faculty of the University of
Paris.
It is generally recognized
that De Gaulle has the easier
proposition to defend when he
argues that all French voters
should have a direct voice in
electing a president. The nice-
ties of the argument about the
relative advantages of one con-
stitutional article over another
are too abstract for the average
voter, who is inured to charges
that De Gaulle is violating the
constitution. The more sophis-
ticated remember that some of
De Gaulle's severest critics
today were not overly con-
scientious themselves about
the constitutional limitations
under the Fourth Republic when
they seized opposition news-
papers or ordered the Suez
attack.
In his public statements
De Gaulle has avoided any dis-
tinction between majorities of
eligible and actual voters
A cabi-
net 'Minister told the American
Embassy that support in the
range of 48 to 52 percent of
the eligible voters would be sat-
isfactory. A public opinion poll
of early October favored De
Gaulle.
A high abstention rate in
the referendum would probably
work to De Gaulle's disadvan-
tage. The vehemence of
his opponents' attacks may make
many voters hesitate to approve
the proposal, but rather than
vote against De Gaulle they
will tend to abstain. This
tendency may be countered, how-
ever, by concern over the possi-
bil-1ty of a leaderless France
in the midst of an international
crisis over Cuba and Berlin.
Despite their public con-
centration on the referendum,
the party machines are really
preoccupied with the elections
of 1.8 and 25 November. Maurice-
Ren& Simmonet, secretary general
of the Popular Republican Movement
(MRP), told an American Embassy
official tnat, while the idea
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of unified opposition with a
single anti-Gaullist campaign
is appealing to political
theorists, it is not practical
because the four non-Communist
opposition parties have dif-
ferent electorates. With few
exceptions, each party will run
its own candidates on the first
round. In the runoff however,
only the strongest Socialist,
Radical, Popular Republican or
Independent candidate will con-
tinue. Simmonet admitted that
national headquarters had little
means of enforcing this policy
on the local federations, but
he expects it to be followed
in most constituencies.
The Socialists are touchy
about the competition of the
small Unified Socialist Party,
which quickly rejected the
possibility of joining the So-
cialists in cooperating with the
rightist Independent Party. Its
campaign may weaken Socialist
candidates decisively in some
districts. Socialist Secretary
General Guy Mollet also fears
popular front tendencies may
develop because he is convinced
the Communists will assure the
election of some Socialist candi-
dates in the runoff round.
Simmonet admits that the
MRP will have a difficult time
in the elections if De Gaulle
campaigns actively for the
Union for the New Republic (UNR) 25X1
--the only party committed to
back him in the referendum and
electoral campaigns.
Cultural Affairs Minister ndr
Malraux, however, is organizing
an Association for the Fifth
Republic as a Gaullist electoral
machine to approve candidates
who agree to support De Gaulle.
This move would permit the
President to back individual
candidates without openly
committing him to a specific
party
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY FACTIONALISM
The military coup in South
Korea in May 1961 placed the
political future of the country
directly in the hands of its
armed forces. While officers
who led the coup denounced the
infighting and corruption of
the civilian politicians, they
have brought into the govern-
ment their own personal quar-
rels and long-standing factional
struggles. As the present re-
gime tries to find a solid
base on which to erect a new
civil government structure, the
attitudes and ambitions of a
variety of military groups
will play a prominent role.
Development of Military
Factionalism
Intense factional feeling
is characteristic of Koreans.
Ambitious men have relied
almost exclusively on creating
a group of personally loyal
henchmen rather than on at-
tracting support for a cause.
Fierce competition among domi-
nantpersonalities rather than
ideological division has been
the rule.
Before the 1961 coup,
factionalism in the military
related largely to purely
military affairs--such as
promotions, assignments, and.
control of the various services.
These matters were the concern
of competing groups of senior
generals, whose associations
were largely determined by
their regional origins and
the place and character of
their early military training
while Korea was under Japanese
rule.
With the coup, however,
a new group emerged--the "colo-
nels;" whose distinctive char-
acteristic is that their early
professional training consisted
of a very rapid course in South
Korea's own Officer Candidate
School. Since the coup, a
third major group has gradually
become apparent. This consists
of those officers, still junior
for the most part, who have re-
ceivedfull four-year professional
training at the South Korean
Military Academy.
Identification of any of-
ficer's factional attachment
is complicated by the fact
that some have ties with more
than one group. Moreover, a
number of senior generals have
joined with the "colonels" be-
cause the latter were the.driv-
ing force behind. the 1961 coup.
Conflicts between the
"colonels" and the senior gen-
erals have been the principal
cause of friction within the
government leadership. Assisted
by his reputation for personal
honesty,,junta leader General.
Pak Chong-hui has managed to keep
himself above the factional
struggles and has maintained
a balance among the factions.
Even he, however, may be unable
to keep the situation in check
during the coming months as
individuals and factions scram-
ble for political advantage in
the civilian government which
has been promised for mid-1963.
The Senior Generals
Among the senior generals,
probably the two strongest fac-
tions consist of officers who
have a common provincial origin
--eLther the Hamgyong or Pyongan
provinces of what is now North
Korea. The pre-eminence of men
from this area in the South
Korean Army after World War II
was due partly to a martial
tradition in these provinces
but mainly to the fact that many
came from careers in Japan's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Kwantung Army. Not only did
they find that opportunity for
advancement was limited in
North Korea, but many had been
strongly indoctrinated with
anti-Communism.
With the dissolution of
the Japanese armies and the
division of Korea, these offi-
cers found their way south and
entered the South Korean mil-
itary establishment. Having
no local or family ties in the
South, they formed tight fac-
tions on the basis of their
origin in order to protect and
advance their careers.
The Hamgyong faction is
led by retired General Chong
Il-kwon, the South Korean am-
bassador in Washington. Chong
served as army chief of staff
longer than any other officer
and is still influential in
the military. His influence
is not confined to senior of-
ficers, as his adherents hold
important positions throughout
the army and the bureaucracy.
Two Hamgyong generals, Lt. Gen.
Yi Chu-il, the vice chairman
of the ruling Supreme Council
for National Reconstruction,
and Marine Maj. Gen. Kim Tong-
ha lead opposition to the "colo-
nels" from within the junta.
A purge soon after the
military coup greatly reduced
the influence of the Pyongan
faction. Pyongan officers
nevertheless still hold impor-
tant economic and. government
positions, and the group could.
probably obtain the support of
their provincial compatriots,
now in South Korea, including
several thousand civilian refu-
gees.
A "Manchurian" faction,
consisting of officers who re-
ceived their education at the
Japanese military academies in
Manchuria, cuts across both the
provincial groups, being espe-
cially heavily represented in
the Hamgyong faction.
The Kwantung Army experi-
ence of these senior officers
has some ideological importance
beyond anti-Communism. An un-
usually intense distaste for
civilian politics and politicians
was typical of that army's out-
look. Moreover, the Kwantung
vision of economic growth under
"efficient" military auspices
may well have influenced Pak
Chong-huff's ideas on the infusion
by the military of a spirit of
dynamism into South Korea.
The senior officers group
now farthest in the background
seems nevertheless to have the
best; chance of making a come-
back under civilian rule. This
is the "Japan" group, consisting
of men of great prestige who
were educated at the imperial
military academies or the more
prestigious universities in
Japan. These officers are
mostly of South Korean origin
and are linked by educational
background and family ties to
some of the country's most
prominent civilian political
and financial figures.
Other lesser factions are
unlikely to regain prominence.
Members of the once important
"Chinese" faction, made up of
officers who began their careers
with the Chinese Nationalists,
are generally too old to be
active political leaders. One
of them, however, is retired
Lt. Gen. Yi Pom-sek, an early
lieutenant of former president
Rhee. His Racial Youth Corps
might possibly provide a base
for a political comeback.
During the past two years,
the senior generals' principal
opponents have come from the
so-called "eighth class"--field-
grade officers who were the real
moving spirits behind the 1961
coup. The group has been des-
ignated as the eighth class
to graduate from the Korean
Military Academy, but it actually
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
is a composite of short-term
OCS graduates.
It is led by security
chief Colonel Kim Chong-pil,
the second man in the ruling
junta and the chief lieutenant
of General Pak Chong-hui.
This eighth class has a
number of unique characteris-
tics. It was the first to be-
gin training after the founding
of the republic, and was the
first to begin train.ing under
native leadership. It was
exceptionally large, in part,
because of the need to replace
officers purged for Communism
in 1948. Between January and
May 1949 a total of 1,801 of-
ficers were graduated. Al-
though the bonds of loyalty are
strongest within the individual
sections, the heavy casualties
suffered by the class as a
whole during the Korean War
and the leadership of a few
exceptional officers gave it
a sense of cohesion.
After the war the eighth
class along with surviving
members of some other OCS groups
felt frustrated because they
had to serve in the middle
ranks under generals little
older than themselves. An at-
tempt was made in 1960 by
"colonels" from the eighth
and two earlier classes to
have the general-officer ranks
thinned out. Although this
effort was not immediately
successful, it served to focus
sentiment within the ranks of
the field-grade officers and
thereby strenghtened their
position.
Since then, however, mem-
bers of the eighth class have
gradually maneuvered members
of the earlier classes out of
position, so that the general
accrual of influence to the
"colonels" has more and more
been an accrual to the eighth
class. This maneuvering is
only one of the factors working
to divide the "colonels." There
continue to be rivalries within
the class itself. Eighth-class
members close to Kim Chong-pil,
for example, enjoy select posi-
tions in his security organiza-
tion, while other members of the
class are on active army duty
far removed from the prestige
and pleasures of Seoul. Eighth-
class members who serve on the
ruling Supreme Council for
National Reconstruction are
special objects of resentment.
Such schisms are likely to
become increasingly acute.
"Four-Year" Men
The break between these
field-grade officers and the
four-year Military Academy
graduates is far sharper than
that between the "colonels" and
the generals. Not only do the
four-year graduates--now mostly
company-grade officers--share
the common experience of an
extended period together in
one institution, but they have
established distinct traditions
of their own. Better trained
than the short-term graduates,
they regard themselves as an
elite corps and tend to look
down on all their predecessors
as corrupt and unprofessional.
The four-year graduates
have been strongly indoctrinated
against involvement of the mili-
tary in politics and presently
restrict themselves to their pro-
fessional duties. However, should
the ;present regime continue too
long in power and become corrupted,
the chances of a reaction from this
group would seem good.
Attitudes Toward US
Regardless of factional af-
filiations, the officer corps gen-
erally tends to identify the coun-
try's future with continued close
ties with the United States. The
"colonels," however, have had the
least exposure to American influence
and tend to be antagonistic toward
what they regard as intervention in
South Korea's internal affairs.
Thus as long as Kim Chong-pills
eighth class retains a pervasive in-
fluence in the government, US - 25X1
South Korean relations are likely to
be bumpy.
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