CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 19, 1957
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
CONFIDENTIAL
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 17
OCI NO. 6418/57
19 December 1957
NO1ANGE !N GLASS. 0
Q D~ *1E D
CLASS. G ANGER O: ?.
tuEXT REv N CITE:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
13//
State Department review completed
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
UUNHULIV I IML
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SITUATION IN INDONESIA
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The pace of Indonesia's
18-day anti-Dutch campaign has
slowed noticeably as practical-
ly all Dutch-owned interests
on Java are now in Indonesian
hands. The army and moderate
government elements appear to
be concerned over the continu-
ing drift toward economic and
political chaos, and to be
groping for ways to redress the
situation. Thus far, however,
no effective leadership, has-
emerged to coordinate 'these
groups and direct their activi-
ties. For instance, an army
order to end the seizures of
Dutch property has been ignored.
Labor unions have continued
their seizures--probably to
test the army--and have not been
punished as threatened.
Medan
B A Y
O F
B E N G A L
ANDAMAN IS. }
4 CE*A
SUMATRA r ~~ 1x1 cgES -
V - '! HALMAHERA
"SINGAPORE >Y N
Padav~ BORNEO
'
_
J JAVA
D'akarta~=
'
INDIAN OCEAN
19 DECEMBER 1957
24479
TU OR
CONFI IAL
MALAYA
I N D O IW,E` I A
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 4
The chief beneficiaries
to date are the Communists, who
exploited the anti-Dutch drive
and who are now busily entrench-
ing themselves in the seized
Dutch firms.. Labor "assistance
teams," dominated by representa-
tives of the Communist-dominated
SOBSI labor organization, are
playing a prominent role in the
management of the firms. The
Communists also hope to exploit
the mounting economic disloca-
tion, particularly the food
shortages.
instance of Communist-led dock
workers refusing to unload rice
and other staples from a ship
in Djakarta's harbor.
C H I N A? PHILIPPINES
E A
25X1
25X1
- -- Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT' INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
President Sukarno is to
depart for India early in Janu-
ary; Premier Nehru has stated
he will be welcome to stay as
long as he likes. Sukarno's
absence from Indonesia, whether
for medical or political reaT-
sonp, will provide the army and
moderate politicians with per-
haps their last opportunity to
establish an effective non-Com-
munist government in Djakarta.
Civil elements are also
continuing to maneuver for the
setting up of a new regime.
The Masjumi and National party
(PNI) are said to be cooperat-
ing toward this end, and a spe-
cial parliamentary committee
which has been working for the
restoration of the Sukarno-
Ratta partnership has been or-
dered to submit a report some-
time between 15 January and 31
March, a period which coincides
with Sukarno's absence. Hatta
has made it clear he will not
return to high public office
unless he is given commensurate
authority. The chief weakness
in these moves is the fact that
the military and the politicians
appear to be competing with
each other.
Meanwhile, the confusion
in Java appears to have stimu-
lated intensified rebel activi-
ty in South Celebes. Mili-
tary leaders in Central Sumatra
plan to observe the first anni-
versary of their declaration of
autonomy on 20 December.
ROLE OF SOVIET PARTY SECRETARIAT ENHANCED
The Soviet party central
committee plenum held on 16 and
17 December approved personnel
changes in the top echelons of
the party which will probably
have the effect of further
strengthening Khrushchev's posi-
tion of pre-eminence. Three
party presidium members were
added to the party secretariat
--the executive organ of the
party under First Secretary
Khrushchev. The officials in-
volved--Nuritdin Mukhitdinov
and Aleksey Kirichenko, hereto-
fore party bosses of Uzbekistan
and the Ukraine, respectively,
and Nikolay Ignatov, party
first secretary of the Gorkiy
Oblast--will presumably relin-
quish their provincial posts
for full-time work in Moscow.
Mukhitdinov wasnnalso promoted
from candidate to full member
of the presidium, apparently
in order to fill the vacancy
left by Zhukov's ouster in
October.
As a result of the plenum's
decision, 10 of the 15 full
members of the presidium now
are members of the secretariat,
which now may replace the pre-
sidium as the locus of politi-
cal power in the USSR. The ef-
fect of the addition of three
more presidium members to the
secretariat will be to break
down the distinction between
policy-making, formally a func-
tion of the presidium, and the
SECRET
PART I OF
IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 4
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
implementation function, which
resides in the secretariat.
Since the secretariat is under
the acknowledged command of its
first secretary, Khrushchev,
the principle of "collective
leadership" would appear to
have been further weakened.
In view of persistent hints
of stresses and strains within
the hierarchy, it is possible
that the changes reflect an un-
even compromise stemming from
pressure for a transfusion of
new blood into the secretariat
to block Khrushchev from achiev-
ing one-man control. If so,
the effort apparently failed
since at least two of the three
new secretaries, Kirichenko
and Mukhitdinov, are clearly
Khrushchev proteges. What seems
more likely is that Khrushchev
sold the move to the central
committee on the grounds that
day-to-day party control from
the center needed to be
strengthened, particularly as
a follow-up to the decision to
decentralize economic manage-
ment.
Whatever the background,
the net result would seem to
be that Khrushchev has profited.
A situation now might arise in
which the full members of the
presidium who are not in the
secretariat--Bulganin, Mikoyan,
Shvernik, Kozlov, and Voroshi-
lov--are gradually excluded
from participation in the mak-
ing of major policy. Khru-
shchev, for instance, might use
this tactic against Bulganin
and Voroshilov, who are said to
have wavered in their support
of him during the crisis in
June.
At the same time, the dif-
fusion of responsibility among
a greater number of secretaries
decreases the likelihood of
any one of them obtaining suf-
ficient power to become a seri-
ous rival to Khrushchev. Party
secretary and presidium member
Mikhail Suslov, for example,
may find his horizons more
limited as a result of the
change. Suslov, of all the So-
viet leaders, is most often
identified as a rival of Khru-
shchev. Recent reports from
the Eastern European satellites
and Yugoslavia have linked Sus-
lov with a militant and ortho-
dox wing of the party which al-
legedly has been maneuvering
to remove Khrushchev from his
pre-eminent position. The
chances that such a development
would materialize have probably
decreased considerably as a re-
sult of the plenum's actions.
In Syria, internal politi-
cal maneuvering continued this
week against the background of
growing hostility between out-
right pro-Soviet elements, in-
cluding local Communists, and
the radical nationalists, typi-
fied by the Baath party, which
favors close ties with Egypt be-
cause it sees in the Nasir re-
gime an object of emulation and
a protection against the further
extension of Soviet influence.
A campaign to diminish Communist
influence, and possibly to re-
move or clip the wings of Chief
of Staff Bizri, still seems some
time away, however. A more
SECRET
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 4
- Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET
serious collision between the
two factions may occur when De-
fense Minister Azm returns from
Moscow, where he is still ne-
gotiating more detailed agree-
ments to follow up the Syrian-
Soviet economic agreement.
An internal political con-
troversy arose in Egypt-last
week with an attemp~y" Nasir's
minister of education to re-
sign his post following a vote
by the National Assembly urging
the government to admit more
students to Egyptian universi-
ties, a move the minister has
stated is impossible. The is-
sue is insignificant in itself,
but the assembly's reaction in
ignoring government policy is
another demonstration of the
potential which the assembly
may develop for irritating the
regime and bringing hitherto
private disagreements into the
open.
Iraq's long-awaited cabi-
net cage occurred last week
when Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, who
favored a mild policy toward
Egypt and Syria, was replaced
by Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, a
relatively obscure figure who
has long been associated with
Iraq's "strong man," former
Prime Minister Nuri Said. The
change came as Nuri himself re-
turned from a trip to the West
where he urged the need for
further moves to settle the
Palestine problem--on Arab
terms. A similar theme was be-
hind the recent meeting in An-
kara of representatives of the
Moslem members of the Baghdad
pact.
To forestall any possible
success for such moves, the
Israeli government has for some
time been putting out feelers
toward some kind of association
with NATO. Israeli emissaries
have visited several Western
European capitals to talk about
this subject.
Possibly as one preliminary
step, Israeli Prime Minister
Ben-Gurion apparently has been
plugging the idea that Israel
should encourage the establish-
ment of closer relations with
West Germany. Last week, the
prime minister ran into heavy
opposition from left-wing ele-
ments in his coalition cabinet.
The opposition played on still
warm Jewish feeling against the
Germans, but behind its stand
also lies a continuing reluc-
tance on the part of Israel's
socialist intellectuals to as-
sociate the state with what
they think of as capitalist
militarism.
Many Zionists also fear
thata.full-blown policy of clos-
er association with the Western
alliance system would permanent-
ly block the possibliity that
the USSR might eventually per-
mit its substantial numbers of
Jews to emigrate. Ben-Gurion,
on the other hand, appears con-
vinced that Soviet hostility to-
ward Israel will not evaporate
in the foreseeable future and
that it behooves his government
now to gain as many and as close
security ties with the West as
it can. The temporary setback
Ben-Gurion suffered this week
will not make him deviate from
this objective, and he may take
the occasion to force his op-
onents from e cabinet.
SECRET
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Page 4 of 4
_- Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
CO1AZA AL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In follow-up moves to the
messages sent to major NATO pow-
ers and India just before the
NATO conference opened, Soviet
Premier Bulganin addressed ad-
ditional letters to the smaller
NATO states and all UN members
plus Switzerland. These letters
are a continuation of Moscow's
efforts to achieve a "world-wide
detente" and to promote opposi-
tion to American plans' for
strengthening NATO militarily.
The proposals made in the
letters to NATO countries are
reiterated in the letters to
UN members. UN recipients are
told that the present state of
tension in the world can be at-
tributed to aggressive plans of
NATO under American leadership.
The notes end with an appeal to
individual UN members to support
the Soviet proposals and coop-
erate to prevent war.
The notes dispatched to
the NATO governments'. outlined
the same general Soviet propos-
als for various declarations
and agreements to reduce inter-
national tension. Each note,
however, was tailored to achieve
the optimum impact on the re-
cipient and was particularly
designed t.o_stimulate opposition
to American -Mans for the es-
tablishment of atomic and mis-
sile bases in West European
countries.
Bulganin played on French
pride in attempting to arouse
suspicion of Anglo-American in-
tentions. at France's expense,
and suggested that France, at
the Paris conference, propose
measures leading to a detente.
Italy was encouraged to believe
that its "peaceable" Middle East
interests as a Mediterranean
power would be jeopardized by
the "aggressive" Eisenhower-
Macmillan policy.
The letters to smaller
NATO countries were designed
largely to foster and encourage
neutralist sentiment by dwelling
on the dangers of retaliation
in the event of war if American
atomic and missile bases were
permitted on their territories.
The danger in rearming West
Germany was a major theme; all
the letters to NATO states ex-
cept those to Italy and Turkey
warned of the dangers inherent
in permitting 'Vest Germany to
acquire or manufacture nuclear
weapons. Greece and Turkey
were told of American desires
to link NATO with SEATO and the
Baghdad pact and were warned
that such a development would
involve those countries in mili-
tary conflicts at great ?dis--
tances from their own boundaries.
The note to Canada suggested
that, as one of the major pro-
ducers of missiles materials,
Canada could play an important
role in-'-the settlement of the
atomic problem.
Communist propaganda ex-
ploitation of the letters has
been extensive, primarily fol-
lowing the lines set by the
letters themselves. Texts or
summaries of all the notes have
been broadcast, accompanied by
commentaries to the individual
countries largely conforming
to the slant used in the formal
note.
Considerable comment has
been devoted to refuting West-
ern statements that the messages
were intended to influence the
NATO conference. At the same
time, however, Soviet propa-
gandists 'contend that the
COAL
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
- Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
notes have had a definite ef-
fect on NATO.
Soviet domestic propaganda
stressed the "decline" in Ameri-
can prestige in light of Soviet
"scientific and technological
advances" and predicted that
the Paris meeting would accom-
plish little.
The recurrent theme of So-
viet propaganda as the Paris
conference concluded its ses-
sions was the "growing desire"
among NATO countries to hold a
serious discussion of Bulganin's
proposals. Particularly empha-
sized was the speech of Norwe-
gian Premier Gerhardsen reject-
ing missiles bases and the
stockpiling of'nuclear weapons.
Soviet commentators cited West-
ern news reports as evidence
that a ground swell of "back-
stage" support, including that
of West German Chancellor Ade-
nauer, was developing for Ger-
hardsen's position.
Public pressure in the NATO
countries is claimed to have been
the cause for a change in the
original plans for the meeting.
The chief objective of the United
States was said to have been to
induce its NATO partners to ac-
cept the American plan for de-
ployment of missile bases and
for a demonstration of unity of
views. Because of the "popular"
disapproval in Western Europe,
Moscow asserted, Washington's
plan for a "parade of Atlantic
solidarity" did not come off.
According to Moscow, the
United States obtained an agree-
ment in principle for deploy-
ment of IRBM missiles in West-
ern Europe only in return for
a "solemn pledge" to renew nego-
tiations with the USSR to end
the cold war and solve the dis-
armament problem. A Soviet com-
mentary labeled this agreement
a hypocritical attempt to recon-
cile irreconcilables--"the poli-
cy of strength with the idea of
negotiation."
The transformation of four
Soviet defense production minis-
tries into committees on 14 De-
cember has carried the general
reorganization of Soviet indus-
try further along lines initial-
ly proposed by Khrushchev, while
still assuring uninterrupted de-
velopment.of new military items.
Khrushchev's original plans
for the abolition of industrial
ministries did not exclude the
defense production ministries,
but, at the time of the estab-
lishment of the new regional
economic system last May, he
called for retention of the de-
fense-oriented-ministries. How-
ever, provision was made for at
least some plants of these minis-
tries to be transferred to op-
erational control of the coun-
cils of national economy (sov-
narkhozy), and apparently this
was done.
Since May, Malenkov, Molo-
tov, Kaganovich, and Zhukov,
who might have opposed the abo-
lition of defense production
ministries, have been removed
from high office.
Also the industrial econo-
my has come through the first
SECRET'
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 19
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
? SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 December 1957
six months under the new system
satisfactorily, according to
Soviet claims, Perhaps for
these and other reasons, the
time was deemed ripe for a fur-
ther step in the reorganization.
Reported recent conflicts
between the defense production
ministries and the sovnarkhozy
may have influenced the timing
of the present action. The
manager of the Gorkiy automobile
plant, one of the most important
industrial plants in the coun-
try, reportedly stated early
this winter that much strife of
this nature existed.
By creating defense tech-
nology committees, the USSR has
retained a team in Moscow which
would presumably maintain cen-
tral control and coordination--
particularly in developmental
work. Such a team could, for
example, coordinate development
of complex weapons systems,
which would be an impossible
task for the sovnarkhozy.
Planning the production of
such systems and their necessary
components and facilities will
also undoubtedly be carried out
at high governmental levels.
Heading the team in the Presid-
ium of the Council of Ministers
is Dmitry Ustinov, former head
of the Ministry of Defense In-
dustry and now deputy premier.
His former deputy and now chair-
man of the Defense Technology
Committee, Aleksandr Domrachev,
is relatively unknown, but may
have been working on important
missile projects. Valery Kal-
mykoy, chairman of the Radio-
REORGANIZATION 'Wo
SE PRO\
SKI
DECEMBER 1"7 ~~~``V
USSR DEPUTY PREMIER
(with responsibility for
Defense Production Activities)
MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Minister -
1st Dep. Min. Aleksandr Donrachev
MINISTRY OF
AVIATION INDUSTRY
Minister I
MINISTRY OF
RADIOTECHNICAL INDUSTRY
Minister VA1ftT7 xel v -
MINISTRY OF
SHIPBUILDING
Minister Andrei Redkin
Dep. Min. Boris Butoma
STATE COMMITTEE FOR
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY
STATE COMMITTEE FOR
AVIATION TECHNOLOGY
STATE COMMITTEE FOR
RADIO ELECTRONICS
STATE COMMITTEE FOR
SHIPBUILDING
er, central committee,
SECRET
electronics Committee,
has earlier been
identified as chief
expediter for the
Moscow missile defense
rings system.
The head of the
Aviation Technology
Committee, Pyotr
Dementyev, has been
associated with the
Ministry of the Avia-
tion Industry since
Stalin's death, and
most recently served
as minister. The
Shipbuilding Committee
is headed by a former
deputy minister of
the abolished Ministry
of Shipbuilding, Boris
Butoma, who for the
past 20 years has been
engaged in shipbuild-
ing. The former min
ister, Andrei Redkin,
has not been noted in
a new position.
While research
activities and design
Page 3 of 19
- Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
bureaus will presum-
ably be subordinated
to the newcommittees,
the production plants,
or at least the large
majority of them,
will now apparently
be under the juris-
diction of the sov-
narkhozy as other
industrial plants
are.
The only remain-
ing industrial minis-
tries are Medium Ma-
chine Building (atom-
ic energy), Electric
Power, Chemicals,
and Transport Con-
struction. The first
mentioned is retained
for its national stra-
tegic importance,
while the last men-
tioned serves the
USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
14 DECEMBER 1957
PREMIER
BULGANIN
DEPUTY PREMIERS
KOSYGIN
Light and Food Industry
ItUZMIN
Planning
MIKOYAN
General Matters and Trade
USTINOV
Defense Production Activities
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
PRESIDIUM
(Top-level responsibility for administrative
direction of Soviet Government. Specific
responsibilities listed are based on available
evidence but are not necessarily exclusive.)
MINISTERS OF ALL-UNION MINISTRIES (7)
MINISTERS OF UNION-REPUBLICAN MINISTRIES (12)
MINISTERS WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (8)
( Top Officials of Gosplan )
CHAIRMEN OF STATE COMMITTEES AND COMMISSIONS (11)
(Includes Deputy Premier Kuzmin, Chairman of State Planning Committee)
CHAIRMAN OF BOARD OF STATE BANK
HEAD OF CENTRAL STATISTICAL ADMINISTRATION
Rote: The premiers of Soviet republics are ex-officio members
of the USSR Council of Ministers.
Ministry of Transportation,?not
considered an industrial minis-
try. The Electric Power Min-
istry has apparently been re-
tained because of its nature,
pared by ORR
The Afro-Asian Solidarity
Conference, sponsored by the
Communist-front Asian Solidar-
ity Committee and backed by
Egyptian President Nasir and
his government, will open in
Cairo on 26 December. It is
emerging as a major propaganda
attempt to,move the "spirit of
Bandung" into a nongovernmental
context, where it--can be freely
used to further nationalist and
Communist objectives.
The conference will air a
whole series of anti-Western is-
sues affecting Asia and Africa
under an agenda item called
serving all branches of the
economy. Reasons for retaining
the Chemical Ministry are un-
known. (pre- 25X1
"Resistance to Imperialism and
Support for Rights of Peoples
to Independence and Sovereignty."
Indonesia's committee has stated
it will raise the West Irian
issue, while the Japanese dele-
gation is slated to attack con-
tinued nuclear testing and the
American occupation of Okinawa.
"The War in Algeria" is already
a separate agenda item.
Egyptian support of the
conference was apparently in-
tended to further Egypt's grow-
ing propaganda effort through-
out Africa as well as boost
Nasir's prestige as a champion
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 4 of 19
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 December 1957
of the principles of Bandung
charges of
Communist domination over the
meeting have somewhat lessened
Nasir's enthusiasm for the proj-
ect,, although there has been
no noticeable letup in Egyptian
organizational activities.
Between 300 and 400 dele-
gates from more than 40 coun-
tries and territories are ex-
pected by the sponsors, who
have taken full advantage of
the nongovernmental nature of
the meeting to secure the broad-
est possible representation of
colonies and nationalist. oppo-
sition groups.
The committee has approved
attendance from Oman, Senegal,
Somalia, and Eritrea and has
accepted Jordanian refugees and
Cameroonian "Freedom Fighters."
The Sino-Soviet bloc in-
terest in the conference will
probably be to register its
own concurrence of interest
with issues such as anticolo-
nialism, and to encourage a.
trend anti-Western attacks.
The Chinese will play the
major role in advancing Sino-
Soviet bloc interests. Pei
ping's delegation will be led
by Kuo Mo-jo, the Chinese Com-
munist specialist in Afro-Asian
issues and the regime's chief
spokesman on cultural and scien-
tific matters. The USSR ap-
parently is primarily interest-
ed in consolidating its identity
as an Asian state. Pravda's
discussion of the conference on
1 December included a rarely
made assertion that the USSR is
"equally a European and an
Asian state."
African and Asian govern-
ments have for the most part
recognized the Communist in-
fluence in the conference but
in general have not made stren-
uous efforts to inhibit attend-
ance by any individual nationals
in a "private" capacity. Con-
siderable local dispute has
been generated over selection
of delegations. The conference
itself has not been subjected
to much direct public attack,
probably because of the powerful
popular appeal to African-Asian
sentiment of "solidarity," and
"Bandung," and the desire not
to be left out of any meeting
concerning itself with regional
problems.
The conference may also
inspire the formation of new
Afro-Asian front organizations.
Both Japan and Egypt have in-
dicated their intention of pro-
posing an Afro-Asian Economic
Conference for 1958. A new at-
tempt to organize Afro-Asian
Trade Unions might also be made.
The Moroccan attacks on
Spain's West African possessions
present the Franco regime with
the choice of pursuing military
operations the Spanish economy
can ill afford or losing Spanish
territory and prestige. Spain's
actions probably will be af-
fected by French prospects in
Algeria.
On 9 December, Spain be-
gan a withdrawal to five coast-
al perimeters, abandoning the
hinterland of all its West
African possessions. Spanish
forces are superior in numbers
and equipment to the attacking
irregulars of the Moroccan Army
of Liberation and, barring in-
tervention by the Royal Moroccan
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 19
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SPRY
Army, should be able to hold
these perimeters.
Spain is willing to relin-
quish its protectorate over
Southern Morocco, but it wants
Rabat to forego further terri-
torial claims. King Mohamed V,
however, is not likely to per-
petuate Spain's rights to the
north coast enclaves of Ceuta
and Melilla or to Ifni, Saguia
El Hamra, and Rio de Oro on the
west coast, where Spain hopes
to exploit possible oil and
mineral resources. Neither
Spain nor Morocco wants open
hostilities, but the success of
the Moroccan irregulars in forc-
ing the Spanish withdrawal will
probably encourage the King to
hold to demands unacceptable
to Franco.
Spain will probably rely
heavily on French backing in
West Africa. A meeting of the
French and Spanish foreign min-
isters at San Sebas-
tian in August seems
to have laid the base
for closer coopera-
tion; the French seem
concerned with shor-
ing up Spanish power
in the area. If
French aid is insuf-
ficient, however, or
if France's position
in North Africa con-
tinues to weaken, the
Spanish position in
West Africa would be-
come untenable.
Even with as-
sistance from France,
the Spanish economy
can ill afford mili-
tary operations in
West Africa. Spain
has been hit by seri-
ous inflation, and
living costs have
risen about 25 per-
cent 'in, the past
year. Labor is dis-
satisfied and busi-
* Spanish Defense perimeters
established at these points
CANARY ISLANDS
ness objects to price controls
and to import restrictions
aimed at alleviating the seri-
ous balance-of-payments deficit.
Expanded military expenditures
would be a severe blow to the
1958 budget, which already con-
tains a sizable deficit.
Although a serious econom-
ic crisis would threaten the
stability of the regime, the
political consequences of an
abandonment of Spanish West Af-
rica would probably be greater
and more immediate. Many army
officers were discontented
over Spain's withdrawal from
the Northern Moroccan Protecto-
rate in April 1956, and the
psychological effect of aban-
doning Spain's remaining Afri-
can holdings might cause .im-
portant army elements to shift
their support from the Franco
regime to a military junta or
to those favoring restoration
of the monarchy.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET- -
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 December 1957
HAMMARSKJOLD'S
TACTICS ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES
Syria, Jordan, and Israel rein-
forced his earlier belief that
an improvement in relations be-
tween Egypt and the West would
have a reassuring effect on the
Middle East. In addition to
discussing implementation of
the 3-percent surcharge on Suez
Canal shipping, Hammarskjold
will probably touch on other
problems such as the Palestine
refugees.
To aid these endeavors,
Hammarskhold was eager to keep
controversy over Middle East-
ern issues to a minimum at the
recent session of the General
Assembly. Initially his ef-
forts were seriously threatened
by discussion of Syria's com-
plaint of Turkish aggressive
intentions. Shelving of this
issue avoided a serious show-
down both within the Arab-Asian
bloc and the assembly itself.
Three other troublesome Middle
Eastern issues were disposed of
by this assembly with relative-
ly little rancor. On 22 Novem-
ber it decided that UNEF ex-
penses should be borne by all
members under the regular scale
of assessments; on 12 December
it called on all members to in-
crease aid to the Palestine
refugees; and on 14 December it
authorized the 3-percent sur-
charge on Suez Canal shipping
to defray the costs of the canal
clearance.
Following his successful
mission to Jordan concerning
Israel's Mt. Scopus convoys,
Hammarskjold visited Syria in
order "to tie their hands vis-
a-vis other Arabs." Israel, he
believes, realizes that it is
much more secure than it has
ever been, except for the threat
of Soviet intervention in the
area. The secretary general
was pleased over the amount of
pro-UN public sentiment in the
area. Much of this he attrib-
utes to the excellent job done
by the UN Emergency Force.
Hammarskjold will probably
continue to attempt to put out
brush fires and keep the situa-
tion as conducive as possible
for negotiations toward some
type of settlement. He be-
lieves there is much less risk
of an outbreak in the area now
than there has been for a long
time, but that the "patient is
still very, very weak:'
NEW GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN
Pakistan's third govern-
ment in three months, which took
office on 16 December under Re-
publican leader Firoz Khan Noon,
offers little prospect for capa-
ble leadership or for long ten-
ure. The new government, re-
placing the one led by I. I.
Chundrigar, may merely pave the
way for a return to power of
former Prime Minister Suhrawardy,
on whose support Noon's coali-
tion is dependent.
President Mirza called on
Noon, 64-year-old foreign min-
ister in the outgoing Republican-
Moslem League government, after
Chundrigar failed on 13 Decem-
ber to form another cabinet. A
new six-party coalition formed
to support Noon is united only
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 7 of 19
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 December 1957
by common opposition to Chun-
drigar's policy of separate
electorates for Moslem and mi-
nority communities. It has
adopted a platform calling for
elections no later than Novem-
ber 1958 under the noncommunal
voting system now in effect.
fected by the change in govern-
ment. Its support of the Bagh-
dad pact and SEATO will be
strongly maintained by Noon,
who has served as foreign min-
ister in the last two cabinets.
Suhrawardy, ousted as prime
minister in October, is likely
to play a key role in fu-
ture developments. While pro-
viding the essential backing
for Noon's government in the
National Assembly, he has re-
fused to allow his Awami League
colleagues to join the cabi-
net. Suhrawardy apparently
agreed to stand aside as po-
tential leader of the new
government in order to expedite
the defeat of the Moslem
League. He probably intends,
however, to exploit his con-
trolling position to promote
his own return to power
relieved of any responsibility
for the present government's
shortcomings.
Noon is not likely to pro-
vide effective leadership. De-
spite his wide experience, he
is not considered a capable
leader nor does he wield much
political influence. He was
able to form a cabinet only
after considerable difficulty,
and then only by including a
disproportionate number of Re-
publicans from the last cabinet.
There are no effective repre-
sentatives of East Pakistan in
the new cabinet.
Pakistan's pro-Western
orientation should not be af -
The appointment of Noon
to head a coalition opposing
the separate electorate policy
constitutes a significant re-
treat by President Mirza. Mirza
had strongly backed Chundrigar's
attempt to form another govern-
ment, and its failure left Mirza
with the alternatives of sanc-
tioning a government led by the
Republicans, who had repudiated
his leadership, or of resorting
to authoritarian rule. The de-
cline in his prestige and polit-
ical capability will make the 25X1
latter course of action increas-
ingly difficult.
Marshal Sarit and the rul-
ing Thai military group should
be convinced by the results of
the 15 December parliamentary
elections that continuation of
Thailand's pro-Western foreign
policy poses no threat to their
political interests. Leftist
candidates, who had campaigned
on an anti-SEATO, neutralist
platform, fared very badly, and
may wind up with even less seats
than the 22 they held in the na-
tional assembly which was dis-
solved shortly after the 16 Sep-
tember army coup d'etat.
The lack of voter appeal
of the leftists' neutralist
platform was especially apparent
in the Bangkok,~;a6tropolitan
area, where the -_,,strougly
SECRET'
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 8 of 19
r' Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BISY
19 December 1957
pro-Western Democratic party
swept 11 out of 12 seats, de-
spite the strong support given
leftist candidates by Bangkok's
predominately leftist press.
Aside from the poor show-
ing of the leftists, the most
significant aspect of the elec-
tion results was the large
number of independents who were
winners. With returns for 143
out of 160 contested seats re-
ported, independents won 55,
compared to 40 for the Sarit-
sponsored Unionists, 36 for the
Democrats, 6 for the leftist
Economists, and 6 for minor
parties, mostly leftist-orient-
ed. Of the victorious inde-
pendents, 37 were former mem-
bers of the now moribund Seri
Manangkhasila party (SMP), the
government party during Marshal
Phibun's regime.
Sarit and his military
group are undoubtedly satisfied
with the election results. They
have already announced forma-
tion of a new government party
composed of the 123 appointed
members of the assembly, the
Unionists, and former SMP mem-
bers who were elected as inde-
pendents.
The Laotian government has
installed its own governor in
Sam Neua Province, formerly
held by the Pathet Lao, and
Pathet battalions are arriving
at assembly points for demo-
bilization or integration into
the national army. These troops
are surrendering only antiquated
arms, presumably having shipped
all modern arms to North Viet-
nam or stored them in clandes-
tine depots.
Although Democratic party
leader Khuang Aphaiwong would
have added luster to the new
government, his inflexible at-
titude toward corruption prob-
ably could have made his pres-
ence in the government embar-
rassing to the military. It is
thus probable that by mutual
agreement Khuang and his party
will function ostensibly as an
opposition party.
The new legislature will
meet on 26 December, and a new
government is expected to be
formed shortly thereafter. The
chief difficulty facing Sarit
in forming a new government will
be that of finding a prime min-
ister who is reputable, well-
known abroad, and acceptable to
the military. If he fails to
induce outgoing Provisional
Prime Minister Pote to stay on,
Sarit may turn to Defense Min-
ister General Thanom or even
take over the position himself.
He would probably prefer to re-
main in his capacity as armed
forces commander, however.
Western observers have been
impressed by the discipline and
alertness of the Pathet troops
and officials. The British am-
bassador to Laos believes the
dispersal of such determined
activists throughout Laos con-
stitutes a grave danger to the
regime. The population in the
province had been organized
along Communist lines, but it
is difficult to assess their
fundamental attitude toward the
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 19
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Pathets. According to several
reports, many people appeared
favorably disposed toward the
government delegation and com-
plained of spending at least
one or two weeks each month do-
ing forced labor for the Pathet
regime.
It is widely agreed that
economic conditions in the
province are dismal, with few
consumer goods in the shops and
rumors of a rice crop failure
and possible famine. A severe
food shortage would offer the
government an opportunity to
demonstrate its concern for the
welfare of the population but
would also probably be a se-
vere test of its limited capa-
bilities.
The Pathet Lao political
party, the Neo Lao Hak Zat, has
opened its headquarters in
Vientiane and reportedly has
formed an alliance with the
left-wing National Union party,
both parties agreeing to nom-
inate joint candidates in all
provinces for the supplementary
elections scheduled for 4 May
1958. National Union leader
Bong Souvannavong reportedly is
predicting that the alliance
will win 15 of the 20 contested
seats and will then demand four
cabinet portfolios. Both parties
have received a boost as a re-
sult of the government's 29 No-
vember order releasing all polit-
ical prisoners held as Pathet
Lao collaborators.
Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma and other conservative
leaders of the leading Nation-
alist and Independent parties
recognize the critical impor-
tance of holding pro-Communist
electoral gains to a minimum
and are therefore planning some
form of campaign cooperation.
Souvanna, however, is pressing
for a merger of the two parties
and possibly the small Democratic
party into a single conservative
bloc that would remain united
after the campaign had concluded.
He may be motivated, in part, by
a desire to consolidate his
ascendency within the National-
ist party over his long-time
rival, Interior Minister Katay,
by forming a bloc from which
the latter's supporters might
be excluded.
SOVIET WRITER DUDINTSEV ADMITS "ERRORS"
Vladimir Dudintsev, author
of the controversial Soviet
novel "Not By Bread Alone," at
a recent meeting of the Moscow
Writers' Union admitted the
correctness and Justice of
criticism of his book by the
Soviet Writers' Union and prom-
ised to write a new work about
the Soviet intelligentsia which
will portray "positive heroes."
Although Dudintsev has been
under heavy attack as a "re-
visionist" for almost a year,
he had until now refused to
accept publicly official criti-
cism of his novel. That he
has done so will probably be
interpreted in the Soviet Union
as a triumph for Khrushchev's
policy of "comradely persuasion."
"Not By Bread Alone,"
serialized in the literary
monthly Novy Mir last autumn,
was at first praised but was
later officially criticized
for spotlighting "negative"
aspects of Soviet society when
it became evident it had be-
come a rallying point for
"dissident" Soviet intellec-
tuals and students as well as
a source for foreign criticism
of the Soviet regime.
At a meeting in March
of the Moscow Writers' Union,
SECRET
Page 10 of 19
- Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY .SUMMARY
19 December 1957
Dudintsev vigorously defended
his novel against .charges :t.hat
it distorted Soviet life. How-
ever, two months later he wrote
in a preface to the English
edition that he was "horror-
stricken",at the interpretation
of his book by unfriendly West-
ern critics, who paid attention
only to the negative aspects of
a novel which he intended chief-
ly for "internal consumption."
Khrushchev apparently made
a special effort to bring Du-
dintsev into line. In his
speeches on literature and art
published on 26 August, Khru-
shchev predicted that Dudintsev,
"with the assistance of the
party," would be convinced of
his errors and return to party-
inspired creative activity. An
interviewer quoted Khrushchev
as saying on 14 November that
he expected to see Dudintsev
personally soon.
The newspaper Evening
Moscow recently disclosed, in
Fie same article which reported
Dudintsev's admission of "er-
rors," that a collection of his
earlier short stories is being
prepared for publication in
book form. This probably is
both a reward to Dudintsev for
his "reasonableness" and an at-
tempt to "prove" to Soviet and
foreign readers that the regime
does not black-list.wr.iters who
have repented their mistakes.
Control of all publishing
facilities and of the Soviet
Writers' Union--which manages
pension and loan funds as well
as housing, medical, and vaca-
tion facilities for writers--
gives the regime a considerable
advantage in dealing with a
recalcitrant writer such as
Dudintsev. A more subtle but
effective control measure is
the professional isolation of
the intellectual who deviates
from the party line. The col-
leagues of an artist or writer
officially accused as a "devi-
ator" are expected to avoid as-
sociating with him and to add
their voices to the regime's
criticism of him.
When the de-Stalinization
campaign resulted in an unan-
ticipated degree of criticism
of the Soviet system during
1956, Khrushchev countered with
a policy of "comradely persua-
sion" designed to restore the
proper perspective to erring
artists and intellectuals. The
bolder "dissident" writers re-
acted with a "conspiracy of
silence," refusing either to
defend their positions or to
produce new works. However,
during the past few months
several leaders of the "con-
spiracy" have recanted and
promised to produce literature
"for the people."
The success of this policy
has probably convinced Khru-
shchev that Stalinist terror
will not be necessary in the
near future. It seems only a
matter of time before the few
writers still remaining silent
will admit their "errors."
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 11 of 19
- Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 December 1957
NEW LAW MAKES ESCAPE FROM EAST GERMANY A CRIME
The passage of legisla-
tion on 12 December making
flight, or aiding and abetting
flight, from East Germany a
criminal act is a logical step
for the regime in implementing
its tougher domestic policy
including norm increases, wage
cuts, and greater pressures
for stepped-up collectiviza-
tion and socialization. The
law is intended primarily to
curb the serious loss of man-
power and to reduce the trans-
fer of the new East German
currency to the West. The
East German Communists, rely-
ing on the presence of 350,000
Soviet troops, seem willing to
risk possible popular protests
against the harsher policies.
Despite tighter controls
on the Berlin sector borders
since the 13 October currency
pressures on the churches in
East Germany are partly respon-
sible for the abnormal in-
crease. In the main, however,
the stepped-up rate of flight
reflects the widespread fear
of harsher domestic policies
and tighter border controls
which will make future flight
more difficult and far riskier.
The new law is so general
as to be subject to various
interpretations. Its full ef-
fect, therefore, cannot be de-
termined until steps are taken
to enforce it. In addition to
having as its aim the curbing
of the refugee flow, the law
was obviously intended to cur-
tail contacts between East and
West Germans and, through
tighter passport control pro-
visions, insulate the East
German people from the atmos-
phere of political
and economic freedom
and the high standard
of living prevailing
in West Germany.
REFUGEES ARRIVIN IN WEST BERLIN
conversion, the flow of refugees
to West Berlin has increased--
3,475 in the first week of De-
cember, more than double the
number for the corresponding
week in 1956--although the
number usually drops at this
time of year. West Berlin
officials believe the growing
For several
months the regime has
been preparing to im-
pose tighter controls
on movement, and may
have deferred intro-
duction of stricter
measures pending
creation of a "legal"
basis for punishment
of offenders. The
regime's drive for
greater production
at lower cost is al-
most certain to increase worker
discontent, resulting in pos-
sible work stoppages and dem-
onstrations. increased sec-
tor and border controls, to-
gether with show trials of
persons apprehended in flight,
may discourage many potential
escapees.
(Concurred in by ORR)
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 12 of 19
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU1URY
HUNGARY STEPS UP REPRESSIVE?MEASURES AGAINST INTELLIGENTSIA
The Kadar regime in Hunga-
ry--possibly under strong pres-
sure from local Stalinists--
may be abandoning its truce
with Hungarian writers and re-
turning to a "hard" repressive
policy against the intelligent-
sia.
During September it ap-
peared that Kadar might have
reached some understanding with
certain Hungarian writers who
were becoming increasingly des-
titute as a result of their
continued refusal to write.
Some writers announced limited
cooperation with a new periodi-
cal, although they made clear
that they would not write on
controversial subjects. In re-
turn, the regime appears to
have meted out comparatively
moderate sentences to writers
implicated in the national up-
rising and to have tolerated
circulation of Western literary
works.
In November a number of
prominent cultural figures were
arrested and, on 13 December,
Kadar, referring to them, de-
clared, "Those who launched an
attack on the people must be
punished, and if the attack was
very ugly, then they must be
punished very severely."
Kadar's policies had been
arousing serious concern in the
powerful Stalinist wing of the
Hungarian party, which is in-
tensifying its demands for a
return to full-scale party con-
trol of literature. In his
first article in the official
party newspaper since March,
central committee member Jozsef
Revai, long-time ideological
czar under Rakosi, on 7 Novem-
ber sharply criticized the re-
gime's policy of permitting
writers to treat "popular" sub-
jects and demanded unrelenting
application of "socialist real-
ism" of the Khrushchev stamp.
In a second article on 24 Novem-
ber, Revai bitterly attacked
the "popular" writers. Revai
is reportedly on good terms
with Soviet presidium member
Suslov, and his reappearance
in print may reflect guidance
from Moscow.
Echoing Revai's "hard-line"
demands, Minister of State
Gyorgy Marosan on 6 December
demanded that writers "step up
to face the people and admit
that they made mistakes and
committed crimes." He further
declared that "a writer or poet
who is silent now is alien to
the people."
The Chinese Communists are
also being invoked as an author-
ity to justify harsh procedures
against intellectuals. The Pei-
ping correspondent of a Hun-
garian literary weekly on 29
November reiterated Mao's in-
terpretation of the "hundred
flowers" doctrine to cover
"weeds"--"if it turns out that
the flowers are weeds, we will
root them out.... The same
method should be used in Hun-
gary."
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 13 of 19
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
--SECRET- _
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PEIPING DEMANDS TIGHTER TRADE UNION DISCIPLINE
Speeches and resolutions
at the eighth congress of the
All-China Federation of Trade
Unions (ACFTU), which ended on
12 December, reflect Chinese
Communist concern over any un-
rest which might develop as a
result of renewed austerity for
urban workers. The emphasis
on the role of trade unions as
a "school for Communism" and
warnings against paying too
much attention to questions of
welfare and union-management
conflict reveal the regime's
determination to tighten up
labor discipline and to ensure
party control over workers.
This is the first ACFTU
congress since 1953, and the
regime treated it as an event
of great importance. Five of
the six members of the standing
committee of the party politburo
--including Mao Tse-tung and
Liu Shao-chi, the two leading
figures in the regime--turned
out for the opening meeting.
More than a thousand delegates
attended, representing 16,300,000
trade union members from 23
industrial unions.
Speakers hailed the 63-
percent increase in union mem-
bership during the past four
years and proclaimed ambitious
future goals. Liu Shao-chi,
Vice Premier Li Fu-chun, and
ACFTU Chairman Lai Jo-yu called
for increased efforts in pro-
duction so that Communist China
can surpass British industrial
output in 15 years.
A principal amendment to
the ACFTU constitution made
during the congress formally
established a "workers' con-
gress" organization. Lai Jo-yu
noted that formation of these
groups had been discussed at
the eighth congress of the
Chinese Communist party in
1956--at a time when the 'Yugo-
slavs were stressing their
workers' councils as a dis-
tinctive contribution to Com-
munist practice. Moscow has
indicated its disapproval of
Belgrade's concept, however,
and the Chinese Communist
workers' congresses, approved
by the party central committee
last September,have only a sur-
face resemblance to the Yugo-
slav organizations.
A workers' congress, Lai
said, is entitled to hear work
reports, to inspect production
and welfare expenditures, and
to "make all kinds of sugges-
tions"--so long as these do
not contradict directives from
higher authority or "infringe
on the rights of management."
This is in contrast with the
Yugoslav councils, which play
an actual role in factory man-
agement.
The new organizations will
be little more than an addi-
tional instrument to help the
unions act as a "link between
the party and the masses." Liu
Shao-chi underlined the impor-
tance of worker indoctrination,
declaring that all new workers
must undergo "ideological trans-
formation" to offset "bourgeois"
ideology seeping into the ranks
of the workers through "non-
proletarian elements."
Statements by Lai Jo-yu
and other spokesmen indicate
that the regime plans to im-
pose harsher austerity on the
workers, until now a favored
group, in order to bring their
living standards into line with
those of the peasants. Lai
stated that increases in wages
and welfare benefits should be
"somewhat smaller" than in-
creases in production, and de-
clared that the regime had
promoted some workers too fast,
set the rates too high for
certain jobs,a.nd made the terms
of welfare benefits too liberal.
(Concurred in 25X1
by ORR)
SECRET
Page 14 of 19
- Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER FACES DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES
Renewed factionalism in
Japan's ruling Liberal-Democrat-
ic party will probably be in-
tensified at the regular session
of the Diet beginning on 20 De-
cember and is expected to be
the major consideration in Prime
Minister Kishi's timing of the
general elections. Party dis-
cord could threaten the stabil-
ity of Kishi's government,
strengthen the Socialist opposi-
tion, and delay passage of any
legislation, including the budg-
et for the fiscal year beginning
1 April 1958.
Former Prime Minister
Shigeru Yoshida and other con-
servative party leaders who
resent continued exclusion from
key positions are threatening
to form a third party and topple
the government. Their opposi-
tion has centered on Kishi's
retention in the cabinet of
Economic Planning Board Minister
Ichiro Kono, who they believe
is too ambitious in expanding
his power. The Yoshida group
may attempt to gain popular sup-
port by claiming an ability to
obtain greater concessions from
the United States than can the
Kishi government.
The Yoshida and Kono groups
are irreconcilable and both are
confident of winning Kishi's
approval in the showdown they
are demanding. Kono believes
his support of Kishi's rise to
power, which initially was op-
posed by the Yoshida forces,
gives him a strong advantage.
He believes also that he holds
the balance of power in the
present cabinet and that he
would probably be able to force
the government's resignation if
the prime minister should show
any lack of support for him.
Yoshida, who has been de-
manding elections in January
or February 1958 before Kono
increases his power further,
told Ambassador MacArthur that
a long discussion with Kishi
on 10 December had convinced
him that elections would not be
held before April. He said
Kishi must ease Kono out,
but recognized that this would
be difficult and would take
time.
Kishi has said only that
elections will not be held be-
fore the Diet approves the
1958 budget, and apparently
has not decided definitely on
when the elections will be held.
In any event, elections must be
held by February 1959.
Continued open factional-
ism in Japan's conservative
ranks would favor the trend to-
ward the left and neutralism
that has been evident in Japan
over the past several years.
It is possible that a successor
to Kishi, particularly if he is
Kono, not only might loosen ties
with the United States but might
seek closer relations with the
Communist bloc, especially Com-
munist China. Such a policy
would have the support of many
conservatives as well as that
of the Socialists.
Ambassador MacArthur re-
gards the forthcoming elections
as equal in importance to the
recent German elections and be-
lieves the outcome will have
an important influence on the
American position in Japan and
on Japan's role in Asia.
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 15 of 19
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC INTERFERENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA
Unsettled political condi-
tions in several countries of
the Caribbean area have opened
the way for renewed plotting by
Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo
of the Dominican Republic, who
has frequently manifested a de-
sire to establish personal he-
gemony over the area. His major
effort now is being directed
against Guatemala, where he is
intriguing to install a right-
ist regime friendly to his dic-
tatorship.
Dominican subversion in
Guatemala, reported as early as
May 1957, increased considerably
following the assassination of
President Carlos Castillo Armas
in July. Trujillo attempted,
through support of extreme
rightist elements, to influence
the outcome of the 20 October
presidential election. Confu-
sion arising from mob action
fomented by the defeated right-
ist candidate, Miguel Ydigoras
Fuentes, the subsequent annul-
lingct the election, and the
rise of the leftist Revolution-
ary party inspired even greater
Dominican efforts. The Do=
minicans apparently resorted
to at least one murder--
a method they are widely
accused Of using--in an
attempt to achieve their ends
in Guatemala.
Guatemalan press stories
of Dominican activities, includ-
ing an unsubstantiated allega-
tion that Trujillo was involved
in Castillo's assassination,
coincided with a lurid Dominican
radio propagandai campaign
against Guatemala and almost
resulted in the severing of
Guatemalan-Dominican relations.
Trujillo continues to support
Ydigoras Fuentes financially,
adding to the already serious
SECRET
division among anti-
Communist political
parties.
In Honduras,
Dominican interference
is directed against
President-elect Ramon
Villeda Morales, whose
stand against dictator-
ships and friendship
with Costa. Rican
President Jose Figueres
are anathema to Tru-
jillo. Dominican-
Honduran relations
were disrupted early
last May following
Honduran allegations
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 16 of 19
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 5RY
19 December 1957
that Trujillo was supplying arms
to Nicaragua in the then explo-
sive Honduran-Nicaraguan border
dispute.
With respect to Colombia,
the arrival of ousted Colombian
dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla
in the Dominican Republic late
in August was accompanied by in-
dications that Trujillo was sup-
porting Rojas' plan to reinstate
his authoritarian regime. Rojas'
second visit in December pro-
voked similar rumors, but evi-
dence of Dominican conniving
was much less tangible.
The recent exchange of hon-
onary decorations between Tru-
jillo and Haitian army chief
Kebreau indicates Dominican in-
terest in the growth of strong
military control over Haiti's
newly inaugurated government.
Although previous rumors that
Trujillo might offer economic
aid to Haiti as a means of ex-
erting political influence were
never substantiated, the Tru-
jillo-Kebreau rapprochement
leaves open such a possibility.
Governor Foot's imaginative
gestures of good will have been
favorably received both in Athens
and in Cyprus. When he returns
to London, probably in January,
the British cabinet may adopt
his expected recoa e. dat ?ns for
rapidly advancing Cypriot self-
government.
The governor's surprise
visit on 11 December to the
strongly nationalist mayor of
Nicosia and his stroll down the
streets of Nicosia following
serious rioting--the first time
a governor has done so for years
--indicate his willingness to
break with precedent and drar-
atime his aim of ending what
he terms "the present drs dful
mess." At least for the pres-
ent, most Greek Cypriots, in-
cluding the leaders of EOKA,
appear willing to grant the
governor the few weeks' grace
he has requested to conduct his
appraisal. For his part, the
governor has said he would mini-
mize the use of security forces
during provocative incidents.
Foot's planned solution is
evidently a considerable depar-
ture from present British policy,
but he professes confidence that
he can sell it both to the
Cypriots and to the Colonial
Office. Although Foot refuses
to divulge any details yet, his
plan is likely to include the
uncondition :1 return of Makarios
and the drafting of a new con-
stitution in which Makarios and
other Cypriots would participate.
Otherwise, Foot may suggest
that Britain proceed immediately
to grant wide powers of self-
government unilaterally and call
for elections to implement them.
He will probably also recommend
some positive statement promis-
ing self-determination after a
specified period. In his last
post, Jamaica, Foot was noted
for promoting timely concessions
in order to forestall more ex-
tensive demands.
Pressure from both the
Labor party and the press to do
something about Cyprus is likely
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 17 of 19
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
to make the cabinet receptive to
Foot's ideas. Anxious not to
prejudice the possible imple-
mentation of his proposals,
British officials will await
Foot's suggestions before taking
any further action. The govern-
ment.apparently places consider-
able reliance on his judgment
as an experienced and liberal
colonial administrator.
Adoption of his recommenda-
tions might require abandonment
of Britain's long-standing aim
of negotiating for agreement
on the island's status with
Greece and Turkey.
Turkey would probably op-
pose strongly such a change in
British policy. Ankara continues
to insist that any scheme of
self-government is a step toward
enosis--union of Cyprus with
Greece. The Turks insist that
partition is the only solution
to the Cyprus problem and are
following a policy of "watchful
waiting" pending a declaration
of intention by Governor Foot.
The wave of strikes recent-
ly instigated in Ceylon by unions
affiliated with the Trotskyite
Nava Lanka Sama Samaja party ap-
pears to have quieted down, but
it has left confusion in its
wake. The government, which
temporarily settled most strikes
by granting interim wage raises,
now faces the problem of find-
ing funds with which to pay its
workers, while private industry
anticipates a series of demands
from workers comparable to those
recently made on the government.
The major strikes of mu-
nicipal, port, transportation,
communications, and other labor
organizations which paralyzed
Colombo from 20 November were
for the most part settled by
6 December. However, Colombo
port was still in a chaotic
condition a week after the
settlement, with labor continu-
ing an unofficial slowdown,
warehouses bulging, the harbor
congested, and ships bypassing
or leaving the port without
loading. Tea and rubber sales
were suspended and some small
plantations were in financial
difficulties.
Prime Minister Bandaranaike,
who expressed sympathy for the
workers and granted pay in-
creases to most striking unions,
will now have to find over $10,-
000,000 with which to make the
promised payments. At the mo-
ment, there is no clear indica-
tion of how this will be done.
If Bandaranaike temporizes, he
may find himself faced with an-
other series of strikes more
difficult to end.
A one-day strike on 9 De-
cember of 375,000 non-Communist
tea estate workers of the Ceylon
Workers' Congress demonstrated
the power of this organization
and emphasized that workers
employed by private industry
will have to be appeased if
government unions are given ex-
tensive wage raises. Tea, rub-
ber, and coconut estate workers
in interior Ceylon far outnum-
ber the working population of
Colombo and would present a
serious problem both to private
employers and to the government
if they should strike for an ex-
tended period. Ceylon's economy
is heavily dependent on the
smooth operation of these plan-
tations.
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 18 of 19
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
One of the main features
evident in the recent strikes
is the growing strength of N.
M. Perera, leader of the Trot-
skyite Nava Lanka Sama Samaja
party, who controls most of the
striking unions in Colombo.
His rival, Philip Gunawardena,
Ceylon's food and agriculture
minister, used to have consider-
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
able labor support but now ap-
pears to have very little.
Should Perera and S. K. Thon-
daman, who controls the estate
workers of the Ceylon Workers'
Congress, at any time place
pressure on the government si-
multaneously, Bandaranaike
would, be in a difficult posi-
tion.
Page 19 of -19
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
(JUNFIULN I IAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 December 1957
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE WEST GERMAN NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM
West Germany's recently an-
nounced atomic energy program
provides for the building over
the next five years of nuclear
power stations with a combined
initial capacity of 500 mega-
watts at an estimated cost of
at least $200,000,000. Several
research reactors are already
under construction. The nu-
clear build-up will serve basic
research as well as provide the
beginning of a power and pro-
pulsion program and could be
adapted for military research
purposes.
Atomic affairs Minister
Siegfried Balke has indicated
that the projected power re-
actors will be supplied by
firms from various countries,
including Britain, the United
States, and Germany itself.
the Federal Republic cannot
stand aside while other coun-
tries plan the exploitation of
nuclear energy. Other German
officials also feel that Ger-
many must lead the way in scien-
tific and engineering develop-
ment. Balke has pointed to the
importance of nuclear energy in
view of the enormously increas-
ing demands of German industry
on other sources of energy.
He recently wrote that "the
time is not far off when the
Federal Republic will be able
to bridge a gap in the energy
field only by providing nuclear
sources of energy." Undoubt-
edly, the Federal Republic will
eventually want to undertake
the production of nuclear weap-
ons.
The inception of a German
nuclear energy program has
caused intense competition--
as well as cooperation--among
firms of several nations anx-
ious to supply, reactors and
undertake construction. Various
projects are afoot. The Rhine-
Westphalian Electricity Works
(RWE). has plans for a nuclear
power reactor. Following can-
cellation of its contract with
a US-British group for con-
struction of a 15-megawatt boil-
ing water reactor, RWE has re-
quested new tenders for a 100-
megawatt power plant. A Calder
Hall type will probably be se-
lected if suitable guarantees
can be agreed on.
Different kinds will be used in
order to choose the most effec-
tive type for the future. The
combined capacity of the pro-
posed plants will be 500 mega-
watts, with the possibility for
an expansion to 1,500 megawatts.
Objectives
In a public statement on
7 November, Balke declared that
Brown-Boveri and Krupp seem
likely to build a power reactor
for the Duesseldorf city power
company. Three utility com-
panies in North Germany are
jointly planning an atomic pow-
er plant of 100 megawatts. For
other locations, Babcock and
Wilcox of Germany has offered
to build a 50-megawatt Calder
Hall -. type reactor, and' the
CONFIDE IAL
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
MODEL
OF THE
FRANKFURT
RESEARCH INSTALLATION
Frankfurt General Electric Com-
pany is interested in construct-
ing a power reactor of 100 mega-
watts capacity. These firms
will reportedly maintain con-
tact with each other and syn-
chronize their projects.
Because of the enormous
costs, German industry has
shown little interest in de-
veloping nuclear energy on its
own. Consequently, the federal
and state governments have been
investing in the projects along
with private citizens and
firms. This type of financing
was arranged for the Karlsruhe
research reactor, scheduled for
completion in 1959 under the
direction of Prof. Karl Wirtz.
The universities are the
center of operations for Ger-
many's top nuclear physicists,
among whom are Prof. Rudolf
Fleischmann of Erlangen and
Prof. Wolfgang Gentner of Frei-
burg. Several universities are
building research reactors, and
in the state of North Rhine -
Westphalia, Prof. Leo Brandt
1. Main institute building
2. Entrance
3. Work hall
4. Power plant
5. Building for the 1.5-megavolt
Cascade accelerator
6. Building for the 6-megavolt
Van de Graff accelerator
7. Reactor laboratory
8. Reactor building,
9. Control room and entrance
sluices
10. Radio-chemical laboratory
has organized an atomic research
center which, located probably
at Juelich, will be accessible
to three universities. One of
two research reactors there
will be used to develop fuel
elements for aircraft propulsion
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page :2 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
reactors. In Hamburg, negotia-
tions are under way to purchase
a prototype for a ship propul-
sion reactor.
Uranium and Legislation
West Germany has only a
meager supply of uranium at pres-
ent. The only actively mined
uranium deposit was closed in
November, but other areas, es-
pecially in the Palatinate, give
promise of future output.
Through its membership in
EURATOM, however, the Federal
Republic is assured of adequate
supplies of uranium and other
fissionable materials. In ad-
dition, it has concluded several
bilateral agreements to obtain
supplies for peaceful purposes.
It can obtain 2,500 kilograms
of contained U-235 from the
United States; nuclear fuels
from Britain; and 500 tons of
uranium over the next five years
from Canada.
At the current session of
the Bundestag, an effort will
be made to adopt the two atomic
energy laws which failed to pass
last summer when the government
refused to accept Social Demo-
cratic amendments prohibiting
the use of nuclear materials
for military purposes. One, an
amendment to the constitution,
gives the federal government
concurrent jurisdiction with the
states over atomic energy; the
other governs the utilization
of nuclear energy by regulating
the handling of fissionable ma-
terials, providing penalties for
misuse, guaranteeing fulfillment
of international obligations,
and providing licensing proce-
dures. By treaty, all special
fissionable materials produced
or imported will be the property
of EURATOM when the treaty be-
comes effective.
Military Applications
The Paris treaties of 1954
prohibit the Federal Republic
from manufacturing nuclear weap-
ons. The Bonn government's in-
terest in the general field of
nuclear weapons has been grow-
ing, however, and, in the spring
of 1957, provoked a reaction
from 18 leading German nuclear
scientists who said in the
"Goettingen Manifesto" that they
would have nothing to do with
the production of nuclear weap-
ons. Among the 18 were Nobel
prize winner Dr. Otto Hahn and
Dr. Werner Heisenberg, also a
Nobel prize winner and director
of the Max Planck Institute for
Physics, which is building a
research reactor. Minister
Balke is also among the oppo-
nents of military uses and
supported the 18 scientists.
Bonn may, however, at some time
ask for a repeal of the treaty
restrictions and, until then, is
free to carry on civilian nu-
clear activities.
The nuclear program out-
lined by Minister Balke can
serve a variety of purposes--
for pure research, provide the
beginning of a power and propul-
sion program, and could be
adapted for research for mili-
tary uses. The Germans are
very interested in obtaining
plutonium from their program.
In addition to use in weapons,
plutonium may also be used as
fuel in advanced types of power
reactors.
While the West German nu-
clear energy program is in the
early development stage and is
modest in size compared with the
programs of Britain and France,
Germany, through its membership
in EURATOM, may participate in
a much larger nuclear power pro-
gram that Balke has announced.
The release from present treaty
obligations and unrestricted ac-
cess to source materials will 25X1
permit Germany to develop a nu-
clear program at least comparable
to that in France.
(Concurred in by O
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 December 1957
FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
Many Frenchmen are begin-
ning to stress early reforms
of the French constitution and
electoral system as the only
alternative to dictatorship. A
special parliamentary committee
to draft revisions began delibera-
tions early in December, and Pre-
mier Gaillard has called for con-
sideration ofconstitutional re-
form.by3parliament immediately
after the Christmas recess. De-
spite growing recognition of
the need for reforms, differ-
ences in party objectives limit
the prospects for an early posi-
tive step.
The 1946 Constitution
The continuing drain of
the Algerian war on French re-
sources and renewed speculation
that a "strong man" may be the
only alternative have spurred the
drive for fundamental changes
in the present constitution.
Public approval of a change is
indicated in the results of a
recent press poll which showed
that nine out of ten Frenchmen
believe modification of the con-
stitution:could'.improve govern-
ment stability; four out of nine
are convinced that the 1946 con-
stitution is the chief cause of
chronic cabinet crises in Francea
Political leaders have contrib-
uted to the present mood by cit-
ing the inadequacies of the con-
stitution as an excuse for their
parties' behavior in repeatedly
overturning cabinets.
The French constitution of
1946 was endorsed by little more
than one third of the voters,
opposed by only slightly less,
and ignored by the rest. Con-
trived by the overwhelmingly
leftist postwar assembly, which
was determined to assure the
dominance of the legislature,
the constitution compromised or
complicated most legislative
processes and perpetuated the
ineffectiveness of the cabinet.
Every premier under the Fourth
Republic has paid lip service
to the need for constitutional
reform, but many either pri-
vately opposed it or were so
overwhelmed by day-to-day busi-
ness that their proposals soon
became dead letters. In any
event, the complexity of the
amending process--the last amend-
ment took four years--has mili-
tated against any fundamental
revision.
Status of Reform Proposals
Parliament in 1955 took
the first step required for
presently envisaged reforms by
specifying the articles in need
of amendment. Despite the in-
terest in action to complete
revision now, however, the
chances are against immediate
improvement. Wide divergences
of opinion on the shape reforms
should take have discouraged
any strong drive for a change.
Gaillard's plans call for
the special unofficial parlia-
mentary committee formed early
in December to prepare a draft
of recommended changes. The
committee represents only those
parties which make up his ma-
jority, excluding from prelimi-
nary stages the Communists and
Poujadists, who reject any idea
of strengthening a democratic
regime. Gaillard has threatened
to present his own reform bill,
embodying measures for reinforce-
ment of the executive power and
redefining France's relations
with the overseas holdings, if
the committee fails to arrive
at a decision.by 15 January.
His proposals to strengthen
the executive call for widening
the power of the president of
the republic to dissolve the as-
sembly under certain conditions,
modifying vote-of-confidence
procedures, and ending legisla-
tive initiation of expenditures.
The Parliamentary Situation
There is a parliamentary
majority in favor of steps to
SECRET
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
reduce government instability.
Nearly every political party has
at least one pet project, how-
ever, and no one of the numerous
reform proposals has majority
support. A group of deputies,
allegedly supported by most non-
extremist parties except the
Socialists, favors a proviso sim-
ilar to one in the West German
constitution, requiring the ap-
proval of a successor before a
government can be overthrown.
To counter negativism in
the assembly, the Socialists
propose that the assembly have
its own bills prepared before
it can reject government pro-
posals. The Socialists have
wanted to avoid appearing less
leftist than the Communists in
maintaining the supremacy of
the assembly as the repository
of political power, but an evo-
lution in Socialist thinking
may be under way as a result
of Guy Mollet's experience as
premier. Shortly after his
investiture in 1956, he called
on "the republican parties" to
strengthen the executive with-
out encroaching on parliament's
power.
Many conservatives agree
with former Premier Paul Rey-
naud's plan that reform must
begin at the beginning by sim-
plifying the method of amend-
ment. They would cut the re-
quirement for a two-thirds or
three-fifths majority on con-
stitutional legislation. Right-
ist emphasis on the right of
dissolution as the key to ade-
quate reform has been somewhat
reduced by Edgar Faure's unex-
pected use of the power in 1955.
The extremely fragmented assem-
bly which resulted failed to
show the gains expected by the
rightists.
Gaullist demands for a com-
plete overhaul of the constitu-
tion were intensified by the
recent crisis, which occasioned
an unusually strong flurry of
rumors about the general's re-
turn to power. The official
Poujadist position favors a
strong executive under General
de Gaulle. The general himself
is understood to favor putting
deputies "on paid vacation" un-
til'a new constitution is sub-
mitted to public referendum.
President Coty has stepped
out of his neutral role to call
for major constitutional reforms.
His concern over the frequency
of crises was dramatized by re-
ports that he was seriously con-
sidering summoning De Gaulle
for consultations and by his
reported threat to resign if
another crisis as grave as those
of 1957 occurred soon.
Electoral Reform
The frustration of demo-
cratic procedures by the con-
sistently negative votes of
200 Communist and Poujadist
deputies has also quickened in-
terest in electoral reform, but
profound disagreement among the
republican parties makes a reso-
lution unlikely soon. The sin-
gle-district system, which con-
servatives and Radicals favor,
is opposed by the Popular Re-
publicans, the Socialists, and
the Communists, who prefer the
existing system of modified
proportional representation.
The party-alliance subter-
fuge adopted in 1951 to reduce
Communist and Gaullist repre-
sentation in the assembly broke
down in the 1955-56 electoral
campaign. Some modification of
the electoral law is in pros-
pect, but Gaillard appears to
have discouraged any hope for
major changes by appointing a
Popular Republican to handle
the government's constitutional
and electoral reform policies.
There is little prospect of
early results from a reported
agreement last summer between
Mollet and a prominent Independ-
ent leader, Senator Duchet, to
work for a two-party system.
Crisis of Empire
The Algerian war has
brought into :sharp ' focus
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 5 of 14
__ Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 December 1957
France's need for a decisive
government and a redefinition
of its "union" with its depend-
ent areas. Some of the fore-
most advocates of constitutional
reform part company over the
future of Algeria. The Social
Republicans, who want a strong
executive, are also adamantly
opposed to relinquishing sover-
eignty over Algeria. One of
the chief arguments cited by
opponents of the basic statute
recently adopted for Algeria
was that it opened the gates to
dissolution of the French Un-
ion, and this position will be
even more pronounced when the
Council of the Republic debates
the statute.
Nevertheless, the original
concept of a centralized French
Union has already been over-
taken by events, and the idea
of some form of "federal union"
between France, Algeria, and
other French-controlled areas
preoccupies all political ele-
ments from the Socialists to
De Gaulle. One prominent poli-
tician has pointed out that if
the cumbersome provisions for
amending the constitution had
been followed to the letter,
French Black Africa. might al-
ready be in revolt. The admin-
istrative reforms railroaded
through the assembly last year
as "basic statutes" are suffi-
ciently flexible to permit the
complete political evolution
of France's possessions south
of the Sahara. They may yet
serve as a model for an under-
standing with the ethnic Alge-
rians.
The "rectification" cam-
paign in the Chinese Communist
party--which is entering its
final stage--has thus far re-
sulted in the reassignment of
perhaps half a million low-
level party officials to menial
jobs and, apparently in the
downgrading of a few of the par-
ty's leaders. The campaign is
expected to entail the expul-
sion of thousands of party mem-
bers, and may culminate in the
arrest and punishment of two
or three members of the party
central committee.
First Warnings
A cleansing of the party
was foreshadowed at the eighth
national congress in September
1956, when both Mao Tse-tung
and Liu Shao-chi, number-two
man in the Peiping regime,
called for strengthening of or-
ganizational work and "educa-
tion" in the Communist ranks.
In his report to the congress,
Party Secretary General Teng
Hsiao-ping noted that the party
had grown eightfold since 1945,
and that more than half its mem-
bers had joined after "libera-
tion" in 1949. Teng declared
that some party members, new to
power, had become arrogant and
independent--the error of "sub-
jectivism." Unfamilar admin'
istrative responsibilities had
made others prone to "bureaucrat-
ism" and "sectarianism"--the
latter a tendency toward unneces-
sarily authoritarian methods.
Efforts at party reform be-
gan soon after the close of the
congress and gained new force
in early 1957, probably as a
result of further reflection by
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A001500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Communist leaders on the dis-
orders in Poland and the Hun-
garian rebellion. In February,
Mao dwelt at length on the sub-
ject of "contradictions" between
the people and their leaders in
a "secret" speech to the Supreme
State Council.
In March, party propaganda
chief Lu Ting-i stated that a
party "rectification" campaign,
patterned on the 1942-44 Cheng
Feng movement--a contraction of
the Chinese phrase "cheng tun
tso feng' meaning to correct
the style or spirit of work--
would begin "soon." This was
followed by a spate of edito-
rials and official statements
on the question of solving con-
tradictions through rectifica-
tion, climaxed by a central com-
mittee directive on 27 April
formally launching a new cam-
paign.
The movement was slow in
getting off the ground. "Bloom-
ing and contending"--the tech-
nique of large group discussions
and criticism prescribed as the
main tool for rectification--
was carried on in a "perfunc-
tory" manner. The rank and file
responded without enthusiasm to
a party directive issued in May
calling on cadres to get close
to the "masses" by performing
manual labor.
Peiping made a new call
for "criticism" in May and re-
newed requests that nonparty
people help in correcting Com-
munist errors. The result was
an outburst of criticism late
in the spring attacking Commu-
nism itself--both the party's
monopoly of power and its basic
program. The attack seemed to
take the regime by surprise,
particularly when some members
of the party became involved.
Intensification of Campaign
Peiping reacted by speedily
redefining the limits of "criti-
cism" in terms that left no
doubt that "liberalization" was
finished, and by launching a
massive counterattack against
"rightists" inside And outside
the party. These measures
brought expression of dissident
opinion to an abrupt halt, and
Peiping took a second look at
the whole question of "recti-
fication." The result was a
decision to broaden the Cheng
Feng into a nationwide campaign,
including non-Communists, and
to adopt a tougher line on the
question of party purity.
Teng Hsiao-ping formalized
the shift in September in a long
report before an enlarged plenum
of the central committee. He
spoke of the "extreme necessity
of conducting a large-scale
Cheng Feng movement within the
fundamental column" of the Com-
munist party. While asserting
that the party was basically
healthy, Teng declared that par-
ty members were committing dan-
gerous errors. Some Communists,
he said, had been infected with
"bourgeois individualism" and a
few were "degenerate and cor-
rupt." Liu Shao-chi, Teng's
boss in party matters, took a
similar line in a major policy
speech delivered on 6 November,
,in which he pointed to revision-
ism as the "main danger" at
present.
Both Liu and Teng were care-
ful to stress that mass debate--
a technique closely linked to
Mao himself--would be the chief
method used in restoring the
party to full health. Their
statements make it clear, how-
ever, that the the old formula
of "blooming and contending" had
acquired a new interpretation.
Teng compared public discussion
during the rectification cam-
paign to a purifying "fire."
Liu used the same imagery, as-
serting that "the flames of
full and frank criticism will
not only burn out the enemy, but
our own shortcomings and mistakes
as well." Cadres who are loyal
to the "socialist cause," Liu
added, need not fear "being
licked by the fire."
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 December 1957
"Rectification" at the lower
levels has been markedly accel-
erated since Teng's report to
the central committee. The Com-
munist press has boasted of the
number of "opinions" brought out
in mass debate, although the re-
gime has complained that cadres
are still afraid to encourage
"basic" criticism. Officials
now are said to be responding
with enthusiasm to the program
for manual labor and making
progress in "improving their re-
lations" ^vith the workers. A re-
cent Peiping broadcast asserted
that "many of the cadres who
used to cover their noses with
handkerchiefs when they came
across a dunghill now scramble to
-carry baskets loaded with dung."
Peiping announced in early
December that more than 810,000
party and government cadres had
been relieved of their posts
and sent to "production" jobs
on farms or in factories, and
promised that the number still
to be transferred would "far
exceed" this figure. Fragmen-
tary information indicates that
about half those demoted in this
fashion have been party members.
The campaign appears to be
picking up speed in the middle
reaches of party membership--
the 300,000 cadres who hold
posts higher than country com-
mittee members and whose achieve-
ments Teng Hsiao-ping has called
of "decisive significance" to
the work of the party.
On 5 December, Peiping re-
vealed that Wang Han,a vice min-
ister of supervision, an alter-
nate member of the party con-
trol commission,. and a party mem-
ber for 25 years, is under at-
tack for casting aspersions on
Mao and opposing Communism.
People's Daily reported on 12
December th-a-F-four senior offi-
cials of the Supreme People's
Court, of whom three are party
members, have been denounced
for opposing party leadership
in legal matters.
None of the top party lead-
ers--that is, members of the cen-
tral committee--has yet been ac-
cused under the "rectification"
campaign. However, at least
three seem to have been demoted
this year, and one of them may
have been dropped from the com-
mittee. In April, Tseng Shan,
a deputy director of the govern-
ment's important Fifth Staff
Office--coordinating work in
finance, currency, and trade--
was apparently relieved of that
post, and has been out of the
news ever since.
In June, Chen Man-yuan,
party first secretary in Kwangsi
Province, was removed from his
post for failure to distribute
food properly, and may have lost
his central committee post as
well. In August, Chen Yu, min-
ister of coal industry, whose
ministry had been under fire for
insufficient production, was
named to a largely ceremonial
position as governor of Kwang-
tung Province.
Scope of the Purge
The purge of the party--
that is, the expulsion of thou-
sands of its members, and the
arrest of many of them--is not
expected to claim as many casu-
alties as the "reorganization"
of 1951-54. Teng Hsiao-ping,
who will apparently preside
over the final phase of the
purge, has himself acknowledged
the importance of avoiding de-
structive terror in the party
ranks. The operation appears
to resemble painstaking and no
doubt painful dentistry--the
removal of decayed matter to
save a tooth--rather than a
dramatic extraction. Whereas
the 1951-1954 campaign resulted
in the expulsion or forced res-
ignation from the party of
about 10 percent of its members,
no more than 5 percent are ex-
pected to be dropped in the
present campaign.
The largest category of
purgees will probably be those
branded as "rightists"--a catch
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 8UAMARY
19 December 1957
all charge covering all forms
of revision of Marxist dogma in
the direction of Western-style
liberalism. Most of those in
this category will probably be
intellectuals. Teng Hsiao-ping
last September observed that the
party has absorbed "too many
young intellectuals," and said
that of the 1,880,000 party mem-
bers with intellectual back-
grounds, the great majority had
not been "steeled in production"
or put to the test of serious
class struggle. Other party
members will be attacked and
punished on general charges of
sloth and incompetence in carry-
ing out party policies, for
specific failures, or for per-
sonal shortcomings--corruption,
abuse of authority, and the like.
Two specific issues have
been indicated by top party
spokesmen as possible grounds
for charges which may be made
against more highly placed mem-
bers of the hierarchy. The
first, put forward by Liu Shao-
chi, concerns the attitude of
party members toward rapid
socialization. Liu noted in No-
vember that "vague doubts and
rejection" of this policy by
"some people" hinder the advance
of the Communist cause.
The second issue, indicated
by Teng Hsiao-ping in his Sep-
tember report to the central
committee, is the formation of
cliques and factions having
personal loyalty toward a. spe-
cific individual. The Chinese
Communists have been keenly
alive to this problem since
1954. In his report, Teng de-
clared that to have a "flush
hand" of cadres--a term previ-
ously used with reference to
"kingdoms" within the party--
was unwholesome at the country
level, "not to mention this
situation on any other level
higher than the county.."
Purge of Top Leaders
Some high-level Chinese
Communist party leaders, in
addition to the three previously
noted, are expected to be casu-
alties of the "rectification"
campaign. Most of them will
probably be demoted to less
responsible posts--like the
majority of lower-level members
caught in the campaign--with-
out losing their membership on
the central committee, but a
few will probably be dropped.
Peiping may even choose
to climax the campaign with the
expulsion and arrest of two or
three party leaders, just as
the party "reorganization" of
1951-1954 concluded spectacular-
ly with the discovery of the
"antiparty. conspiracy" of
politburo member Kao Kang--an
alleged suicide--and party or-
ganization director Jao Shu-
shih--reportedly still in jail.
Several central committee
members have been out of the
news for an unusually long pe-
riod or have appeared in a
curious fashion. These in-
clude: a member of the party
secretariat; two deputy directors
of major party departments, the
organization, and the industrial
work departments; the directors
of two important government
staff offices coordinating the
work of various economic and
political ministries; the chair-
men of two important planning
commissions; a few directors of
major ministries; some secre-
taries of provincial party com-
mittees; and some military fig-
ures, in Peiping and in major
military headquarters elsewhere.
While most of these persons are
expected to appear sooner or
later in good health and stand-
ing, as has been the case in the
past, their party and govern-
ment posts are such that some
of them could plausibly be ac-
cused of the kind of errors that
"rectification" seeks to expose.
The only member of the
inner core of party leadership--
the six-man standing committee
of the politburo--whose status
is in doubt at this time is Chen
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUN My
19 December 1957
Yun, for some years the party's
fourth-ranking figure and its
leading economist. Chen has
seemed to be declining in im-
portance during 1957, and has
been out of the news since early
November, missing several oc-
casions he could have been ex-
pected to attend. Chen may be
COMMUNIST MILITARY POWER IN THE FAR EAST
The Communist armed forces
in the Far East, besides the
Soviet forces in the area, con-
stitute the three largest bod-
ies of troops in the Sino-So-
viet bloc: the armies of Com-
munist China, North Korea, and
North Vietnam. The Asian Com-
munist forces have all been
built up in recent years through
large amounts of .direct and in-
direct Soviet aid. Following
the recent talks between 12
top-ranking Chinese Communist
military officials and their
Soviet counterparts, the USSR
probably agreed to provide new
military aid to Peiping. So-
viet Defense Minister Malinov-
sky's statement that Moscow is
willing "to transmit our ex-
perience in the building up of
armed forces to our Chinese
friends" may also affect the
development of the other Asian
Communist armed forces.
Ground Forces
Total Communist ground
force strength in the Far East
is estimated at about 3,600,-
000, or about twice the strength
of the free world armies in the
area. These Communist armies
are making significant efforts
to improve their already superi-
or military capabilities.
SECRET
opposed to certain of the re-
gime's ambitious economic ven-
tures. While there seems al-
most no chance that he will be
purged or even formally de-
moted at this time, it is con-
ceivable that he is being slowly
squeezed out of th handful of
top policy--makers.
The USSR has built up a
445,000-man force in the Soviet
Far East despite the area's
lack of economic or military
self-sufficiency. Concentrated
in the Southern Maritime Dis-
trict and the Lake Baikal area,
they have the best of World
War II-type equipment, presumably
are being supplied with new
weapons and equipment, and are
believed to have a nuclear
capability.
Chinese Communist ground
forces, which total about 2,600,-
000, are deployed in strength
along the coastal areas, with
the greatest concentrations in
Northeast, North, and East China
opposite Taiwan. Chinese mili-
tary leaders have indicated
they favor reducing the size
of these forces while reinforc-
ing them through modernization
and re-equipment.
Peiping relies greatly on
Moscow for heavy and complex
equipment,
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 10 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 'WEEKLY SUMMARY
North Korea's army of about
338,OUT_froops, the third larg-
est in the Sino-Soviet bloc, has
improved significantly in com-
bat capability, largely as a
result of extensive Soviet aid.
Artillery firepower of the So-
viet-equipped North Korean army
is at least twice that of South
Korea's. Training continues to
improve and includes simulated
nuclear exerdises. A large-
scale corps-level maneuver was
held in December 1956, and
large-scale winter field exer-
cises may be a regular feature
of the annual training program.
USSR
(FAR EAST)
445,OOOQ
BURMA
62,200
LAOS
22,00,
U AN
_4 ,000
14,11
Chinese military:train-,
ing, 'regarded'-as-fair ;t9
good, 'emphasizes night Com-
bat-,' marksmanship,' and defensive
training in atomic warfare.
The most significant weak-
nesses of North Korea's armed
forces are heavy reliance on
the Soviet Union for virtually
all major equipment and an acute
manpower shortage which prevents
any substantial increase in
the number of troops. Although
North Korea continues to in-
crease its military capability
through improved training and
logistics, it will remain de-
pendent on supplemental Chinese
Communist manpower and Soviet
equipment.
Numerically inferior to
South Korea's army, North Ko-
rea's ground forces are sup-
plemented by five armies of
Chinese Communist troops num-
bering about 300,000. As many
as six additional Chinese Com-
munist armies could be deployed
to North Korea on short notice.
The army of North Viet-
nam, numbering about 300,000
including 35,000 regional troops,
is the weakest of the Asian Com-
munist forces. It is, however,
pursuing a fairly rapid program
of development. With the fourth
largest ground force in the
Sino-Soviet bloc, Hanoi recent-
ly began military conscription
on a trial basis in a manner
reminiscent of Communist China's
program in 1954.
The North Vietnamese army
has evolved rapidly from a guer-
rilla organization to a force of
one artillery-.apd 14 infantry
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 December 1957
divisions with various support
troops. Hampered.by a severe
shortage of modern equipment
and trained technicians and by
logistics problems, it is in-
creasing J.its ::capabilities
through considerable aid from
Communist China.
Despite its
weaknesses, the army
of North Vietnam is
capable of defeating
the combindd forces
of Laos, Cambodia,
and South Vietnam.
Air Forces
About one fifth
SOVIET
CHINESE
N. KOREAN
TOTAL
JET
PISTON
JET
PISTON
JET
PISTON
FIGHTERS
FIGHTERS
UGNT
UGNT
MEONIK
=._
R OUN(
ATTAC
sommS
BOMBERS
ROMREOS
iOMERS
1709
-
710
-
142
142
1670
105
450.
165
-
20
445
_J
1
-
_
75
30
-
-
3824
105
]
1235
195
142
162
along the East China coast in
the Canton-Shanghai-Tsingtao
areas. Over-half the force con-
sists of fighter aircraft, al-
most entirely jets. However,
the jet light bomber force--es-
timated at 350 aircraft--poses
COMMUNIST AIR POWER FAR EAST
of total Soviet air strength--
some 3,450 a rcraft representing
all major components of Soviet
military aviation--is based in
the Far East, concentrated large
ly in the Maritime territory,
the Lake Baikal region, Sakhalin
Island, and the lower Kurils.
Soviet offensive and de-
fensive capabilities have been
improved during the past year
by the introduction of BADGER
(TU-16)jet medium bombers and
BISON (MYA-4)jet heavy bombers.
New aircraft also have appeared
in fighter units.
There has been no firm
evidence of a deployment of
missiles to the Soviet Far East.
The Chinese Communist air
force has made remarkable strides
since the Nationalist withdrawal
and now ranks fourth, behind
Britain, in the world in terms
of aircraft in operational units.
Since June 1950, its air strength
has expanded from approximately
350 obsolete planes to some 2,-
500 modern aircraft. Developed
with Soviet material aid and
policy guidance, the air force
has attained ssi_gnifican:t mili-
tary stature in its own right
and has increased the Communist
air threat in the Far East.
Most Chinese air units are
concentrated in Manchuria and
a formidable offensive capabil-
ity, China's is the only non-
Soviet Communist air force with
a long-range bombing capability,
although at present this'is
limited by the possession of
only 20 piston medium bombers.
There have been numerous
reports indicating a :substan-
tial increase in the number of
FRESCO (MIG-17) fighters.
In the strategic Taiwan
Strait area, the Chinese Com-
munist air force has the capa-
bility, barring American inter-
vention, to establish and main-
tain air superiority. Although
possessing adequate aircraft
strength and air facilities for
offensive purposes, the Chi-
nese continue to maintain a de-
fensive posture in the area,
avoiding air operations which
could be interpreted as warlike.
There are no known air force
tactical units based on the
China coast directly opposite
Taiwan. In the event of hos-
tilities, however, the Chinese
could rapidly deploy fighters
and bombers to the area.
North Korea has succeeded
in building up--in violation of
the armistice agreements--a
modern jet-equipped air force
overwhelmingly superior to that
of South Korea. The North Ko-
rean air force consists 'of
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 12 of 14
__,_~_ Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 December 1957
three fighter divisions, one
ground-attack and one light
bomber division, and numerous
technical and support units.
It is equipped with an esti-
mated 590 aircraft, of which
over 400 are jet fighters.
Some of North Korea's jet fight-
ers are believed to be MIG-17's.
North Korea's bomber divi-
sion, estimated to have 75
BEAGLE (IL-28) jet and 30 BAT
(TU-2) piston light bombers,
has been based in Manchuria.
Gradual transfer of the entire
bomber force to North Korean
bases is expected.
Pyongyang has apparently
placed emphasis on increasing
its air defense capability, es-
pecially near the demilitarized
zone and along the east coast.
North Vietnam operates
a few g-ht aison and trans-
port aircraft but has no air
force.
The USSR has considerably
strengthened-its naval forces
in the Far East during recent
years by transferring warships
from the European USSR and by
building new vessels in the
Pacific area, primarily in
Komsomolsk.
The main naval forces op-
erate out of the major naval
bases at Vladivostok, Sovet-
skaya Gavan, and Petropavlovsk,
while the remaining units are
located in other ports in the
Soviet Far East. The princi-
pal operating areas of this
fleet are the Sea of Japan, and
more recently the Sea of Okhotsk.
. Long-range submarines of
postwar design now constitute
almost half of the USSR's Pacif-
ic submarine strength. A sub-
marine possibly equipped to
carry and launch guided mis-
siles was sighted in the Sea
of Japan in November 1956.
This sighting was made only a
few months after a similar one
in the Baltic.
Future Soviet naval expan-
sion in the Far East is expected
to feature submarines as the
principal naval weapon.
Communist China is making
rapid strides lin-b-ulrding up
its naval forces. It has the
most effective naval force of
any Far Eastern power except
the Soviet Union. While the
Chinese navy is at present prin-
cipally a coastal defense force,
its capabilities will show con-
tinued improvement as ship-
building programs progress. So-
viet Riga-class destroyer es-
corts have been under construc-
tion at Shanghai's Hutung ship-
yard. Possibly four of these
vessels have been launched.
Also under construction are
Kronstadt-class patrol craft
and motor torpedo boats.
CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVAL FORCES
Destroyer Types 7
Long-Range Submarines 7
Medium-Range Submarines 4
e Submarines 4
Short-Ran
g
Old Submarine (Short-Range) 1
Mine Sweepers(Fleet) 4
21
Submarine Chasers
19 DECEMBER 1957 71217
The greatest offensive
potential of the Chinese Com-
munist naval force is its short-
haul amphibious lift capability.
The North Korean navy,
which consists of a few patrol
craft, has little capability
beyond limited coastal patrol
and is not likely to be sub-
stantially improved in the fore-
seeable future.
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 13 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY
19 December 1957
North Vietnam has no navy,
but the Directorate of Coastal
Security maintains a small ma-
rine element equipped with 25
to 30 small patrol craft based
principally in the Haiphong
area. These vessels are employed
in coastal and inland waterway
patrol. This small force could
provide the nucleus for a small
naval force at some future time.
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 14 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500100001-5