NEW EVIDENCE ON MILITARY DELIVERIES TO CAMBODIA: DECEMBER 1966 - APRIL 1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000200040001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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Cambodian Role in Supplying the
Vietnamese Communists
Sep 1970 IM 70-126, New Evidence On Military Deliveries to
Cambodia: December 1966-April 1969
Attachments: Carver to DCI memo, dated 5 Sep 70, re
Distribution of ER IM 70-126, September
1970, New Evidence on Military Deliveries
to Cambodia: December 1966-April 1969
(re timing of distribution)
Distribution List for IM 70-126
STAT 25 Feb 71
to DD/ER Blue Note re second ihstallationSTAT
of his Sihanoukville paper (attached)
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200040001-3
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
New Evidence On Military Deliveries
To Cambodia: December 1966 - April 1969
ER TM 70-126
September 1970
r L
Copy No.
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200040001-3
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
EXCLUDED kZOM AUTOMATIC
Itt)WthU*ADIH6 AND
Ulu;(; f,M1 5':IFSCATION
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 Approved For
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1970
New Evidence On Military Deliveries
To Cambodia: December 1966 - April 1969
Introduction
For gome time the community has been carrying
on an all-out effort to obtain detailed documentary
intelligence on the Communists' logistic activities
carried out through Cambodia to support Viet Cong/
North Vietnamese Army operations in South Vietnam.
supplies detailed information on the historical
development of the enemy's logistical operations in
Cambodia.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with other concerned offices of
the Directorate of Intelligence, the Directorate
of Plans and the Director's Special Assistant for
Vietnamese Affairs.
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I 25X1
 Approved For Pelease 2A^" ^?^o~QTn~nnconnn~nn040001-3 25X1
'iW
The Agency has also undertaken a major analytic
effort, complementary to its collection effort, to
screen, collate, evaluate and analyze the material
already obtained and the additional material which
is being submitted on a continuing basis from the
field. Evidence now in hand and already studied in-
cludes a bill of lading covering a military shipment
to Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) on the
Chinese ship He Ping and eight transportation and
packing lists that,
represent deliveries on other Chinese ships.
Each transportation and packing list itemizes the
military supplies contained in the delivery. The
lists do not identify the ships, but each bears a
handwritten date that appears to be the date of
delivery.
This memorandum presents the findings of our
preliminary analysis of the new information now in
hand. As explained in detail below, the new evidence
processed to date indicates that Chinese Communist
deliveries to Cambodia of military supplies, food,
clothing, and medicine for VC/NVA forces totaled about
26,000 tons, of which about 22,000 tons were military
supplies, an amount far higher than previously esti-
mated. The documents now in hand indicate that these
deliveries were made between December 1966 and April
1969. Copies of these documents are being disseminated
separately.
Additional analysis of the impact of this new
information on estimates of the enemy's logistical
position in Cambodia and South Vietnam is continuing.
Subsequent memoranda and reports based on this re-
search will be issued as quickly as the wealth-of
new data can be validated, screened, and analyzed;
but in light of the volume of material involved,
this process will take an extended period of time.
In addition to the material already obtained, we have
recently gained access to a further set of sensitive
Cambodian records consisting of several thousand pages
of documents. These new data should shed light on at
least some presently unanswered questions, but readers
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of this memorandum are cautioned that the additional
material -- which we in Washington have not yet
seen -- may conflict in some important respects with
the data presented herein.
In the aggregate, we believe the documents to
which the CIA has now gained access constitute a
virtually complete set of the Cambodians' records
on the supplies and materials furnished the Commu-
nists with the cooperation of the Cambodian Govern-
ment.
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25X1
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Ship Arrivals
1. In ship arrivals as in other areas, our
new evidence answers some questions but raises others.
For example, some of the dates on documents 25X1
oincide with, or are close
to, the dates when C 1nese ships previously considered
confirmed or probable arms carriers arrived at Kompong
Som, but other document dates are in apparent conflict
with shipping information derived from 25X1
The dates on six of the nine
shipping documents now in Washington coincide with or
are within four days of the arrival dates of previously
known or suspected Chinese arms carriers (see Table 1).*
The bills of lading for the He Ping, however, contain
a 27 January 1967 date, a month after this ship is
known to have arrived in Kompong Som. The date of
another document -- 23 August 1967 -- was four days
prior to the arrival of the Ji Ning, a probable Chinese
arms carrier. The date associated with another docu-
ment -- 28 March 1968 -- was ten days after the arrival
and two days after the departure of the confirmed arms
carrier Wu Xi.
2. No satisfactory explanation has been found for
these apparent discrepancies or incompatibilities in
dates. The bills of lading on the He Ping show that
it was loaded in Tsamkong, China, on 14 December 1966,
and the cargo represented by the bills of lading was
probably unloaded when the ship was in Kompong Som
during 23-28 December. In the case of both the He
Ping and the packing list dated 23 August 1967, the
dates- on the documents may represent something
other than the date of arrival of the ship or the
completion of unloading. The discrepancy of the
28 March 1968 document -- only two days -- is of less
moment but still puzzling.
Origin of the Cargoes
supplies for the VC/NVA forces were brought
in only on Chinese ships, the cargoes
came from both China and North Vietnam. Analysis
of the packing lists indicates that the bulk of the
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 Approved For
arms and ammunition are Chinese types. There are
also small numbers of Soviet rockets, and the iden-
tification numbers on some items in the 1969 shipments
appear to be North Vietnamese. A notation on a
packing list dated 25 August 1968 indicates that
some of the explosives were of Romanian manufac-
ture.
4. Except for the December 1966 voyage of the
He Ping, the new documentation sheds no light on
where the cargoes were loaded. The bills of lading
on the He Ping show that the cargo was loaded in
Tsamkong (Fort Bayard), which has been the tradi-
tional port of loading for Chinese arms deliveries.
Shipping intelligence indicates that the other
shipments implied by the newly acquired documents
were also loaded in south China, probably at Tsam-
kong. There is no evidence that any of the nine
ships stopped at Haiphong en route to Kompong Som.
It is, therefore, likely that any North Vietnamese
materiel had been shipped from Haiphong to the port
of loading in China.
Volume of Deliveries
5. The documents we have processed to date in-
dicate that the total tonnage of supplies for VC/NVA
forces which apparently entered Kompong Som on nine
Chinese Communist ships during the 29-month period
December 1966 to April 1969 was about 26,000 metric
tons. Military supplies comprised about 22,000 tons
of the cargo.* On the first four ships (December
1966 - August 1967) military supplies represented 98%
of the total tonnage carried. Non-military supplies
accounted for about one-fifth of the tonnage de-
livered thereafter. The total of 26,000 tons con-
sisted of the following major categories.**
an average of about 10%
of the ordnance delivered on these shipments was ear-
marked for the Cambodian military forces. It is
possible that more complete documentation may show
that the Cambodian cut was covered by separate packing
lists.
** A complete breakout by shipment is given in
Table 2.
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Tons
Military
21,748
Ordnance
21,033
Weapons
2 , 565
Ammunition
17,128
Other
1,340
Non-military
4,174
Food
2,166
Clothing
388
Medical
1,620
Total
25,922
00040001-3
Percent
84
81
10
66
5
16
8
2
6
6. The principal categories of weapons and
ammunition delivered to Kompong Som during the period
were as follows*:
Weapons Number of Units Metric Tons a/
Crew-served
16,078
733
Individual
221,836
1,512
Ammunition
i31,9 t4
Rounds
Crew-served
10,721,092
Small arms
173,253,630
Mines and hand
grenades
516,624
~-, s
Metric Tons a/
10,814
4017:'
1,0 b/
a. Including packaging. The tonnages do"ot include
related items such as spare parts, carrying cases,
and so forth.
b. Including 203 tons of unspecified mines and explo-
sives.
* Because the documents do not provide a detailed
breakdown by type for approximately 22 tons of weapons
and 983 tons of ammunition which arrived in the Decem-
ber 1966 He Ping shipment they could not be included
in this tabulation.
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25X1
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F777 I
Weapons and Ammunition Deliveries
7. A total of about 238,000 weapons were
identified in the deliveries. Individual weapons
constituted 93% of the total number of weapons
and represented 67% of the weight of all weapons.
New-family weapons -- the AK 47, RPD, and SKS --
represented about 83% of the total small arms
deliveries.
8. Weapons so far identified in
Kompong Som are shown below:
shipments to
Individual Weapons
Units
Metric Tons a/
7.62-mm pistol, Type 54
30,911
42
7.62-mm submachinegun,
Type 56
115,000
955
7.62-mm
semiautomatic
rifle,
Type 56
64,000
347
7.62-mm
light machinegun,
Type 53
125
5
7.62-mm submachinegun,
Type 54
2,500
16
7.62-mm AK submachinegun
100
1
7.62-mm submachinegun,
Type 56 (56-1)
3,000
21
7.62-mm machinegun,
Type 56
5,700
120
Individual rifles
500
5
Total
221,836
1,512
Crew-served Weapons
Units
Metric Tons a~
7.62-mm heavy machinegun,
Type 57
1,450
165
12.7-mm AA machinegun,
Type 54
600
106
40-mm rocket launcher,
Type 56
9,000
53
60-mm mortar
1,800
77
82-mm mortar
1,250
158
120-mm mortar
120
55
75-mm recoilless rifle
390
78
57-mm recoilless rifle
250
18
a. Including packaging. The terminology and weights
used in this tabulation are those given in the docu-
mentary materials.
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Crew-served Weapons Units Metric Tons a/
(Continued)
107-mm rocket launcher b/ 28 10
RPG launcher 1,190 13
Total 16,078 733
a. Including packaging.
b. The apparent anomaly of such a small number of
107-mm rocket launchers when compared with the large
number of 107-mm rockets is undergoing further inves-
tigation.
9. Individual ammunition rounds in the deliveries
total 173 million and crew-served ammunition totaled
11 million rounds, a ratio of 16:1. The total weight
of small arms ammunition shipments was approximately
4,017 tons, compared to crew-served deliveries of
about 10,814 tons. The major categories of small
arms and crew-served ammunition are shown below:
Individual Rounds
Units
Metric Tons a/
7.62-mm Type 56 incendi-
ary cartridges
7,001,280
141
7.62-mm pistol, Type 51
9,205,560
113
7.62-mm rifle, Type 56
39,144,600
920
7.62-mm machinegun,
Type 56
83,362,320
1,714
7.62-mm steel core,
Type 53
22,450,060
649
7.9-mm cartridge, rifle
4,000,000
129
7.62-mm tracer, Type 56
7,744,300
156
7.62-mm tracer, Type 53
199,760
6
CKC launcher antitank
rounds
24,800
35
CKC rifle grenades
70,950
79
Type AT/K44 AT grenade
20,000
30
Antitank grenades for
rifles
30,000
45
173, 253, 630
4,017
a. Including packaging. The terminology and
weights used in this tabulation are those given in
the documentary materials.
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Crew-served Rounds Units Metric Tons
RPG 7 ammunition 79,946 374
40-mm rocket 397,010 1,256
107-mm rocket 15,000 379
60-mm mortar 365,152 844
82-mm mortar b/ 639,246 3,191
12.7-mm, Type 54 8,120,500 1,337
85-mm 10,000 221
120-mm mortar 53,000 1,219
57-mm recoilless 60,000 240
75-mm recoilless 90,000 1,446
Rockets (not further
identified) 15,006 71
12.7-mm, Type 54 AA
machinegun 400,010 66
12.7-mm, Type 54 AA
machinegun tracer 100,130 17
14.5-mm 340,092 83
37-mm 36,000 70
a. Including packaging.
b. Including some 81-mm.
10, 721, 092 10,814
Organization
10. Recent reporting and newly acquired evidence
also provides detailed information on the organiza-
tion of the Cambodian support operation. Earlier
reporting had provided a picture of the general
framework of the Cambodian/Communist logistical ap-
paratus in Cambodia but had given little hint of
the extent of Cambodian involvement and the relative,
sophistication of the operation. The new reporting,
for example, describes the existence of Cambodian
Provincial Committees which facilitated the flow
from Cambodian depots to Communist border caches; it
also notes the detailed accounting procedures used to
verify deliveries to the Communists.
also implicated as involved in this traffic a
number of high Cambodian officials whose detailed in-
volvement was hitherto unknown or unproved.
11. Still, some details concerning the traffic
remain unclear. A full analysis of the arms traffic
requires more information on the timing, quantities,
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 and final border destinations of deliveries from
Cambodian depots to VC/NVA forces. Preliminary
field summaries indicate that at least some of
these needed details are contained in additional
documents now being dispatched to Washington.
12. In addition to the recently received data
on military shipments into Kompong Som, new informa-
tion also has become available
on enemy su 1 movements south out o Laos
odia.
13. I Iordnance was moved
west on Route 110 in southern Laos to Koh Russey
and then south by boat on the Tonle Kong to Stung
Treng, where it was loaded onto trucks and delivered
to Communist forces deployed along the Cambodian
border opposite II and III Corps. The ordnance
reportedly consisted of 107-mm and 122-mm rockets no launchers were included.
107s and 122s came into Stung Treng from Laos
once a year in 1966, 1967, and 1968, and estimated
that the shipments totaled between 1,000 and 1,200
tons. In comparison, the shipments to Kompong Som
included a total of about 450 tons of large rockets,
of which about 380 tons were 107-mm rockets.
Additional data on overland movements of Communist
supplies through Cambodia from southern Laos may be
contained in the material now en route to Washington.
This aspect of the Communists' supply operation will
be reviewed in greater detail after all the evidence
has been examined.
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200040001-3
Secret
Secret
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 Approved For Releasg8@;7i9/06 : CIA-RDP78T
b2095R000200040001-3 25X1
5 September 1970
SUBJECT: Distribution of ER IM 70-126, September 1970, New
Evidence on Military Deliveries to Cambodia:
December' 1966 - April`1969
1. We are all aware of the problems and ramifications of this
memorandum which bear on decisions regarding the manner and timing
of its distribution. One other relevant consideration is the fact that
this memorandum is, in effect, a revision or "memo to holders" of
ER IM 69- 177, December 1969, Chinese and Soviet Military Deliverie:.
to Cambodia. Hence, recipients of the December memo should get
the new memo as well. (As a practical matter, they will get the new
one anyway, even if we restrict the latter's circulation to a handful
of senior officers. Hence, from the standpoint of political cosmetics,
it would be better for such distribution to come directly from the Agency.)
Given the above, we recommend the following scenario.
2. Top Level Distribution.
a".' Kissinger. You should personally hand Kissinger
his copy on Tuesday, 8 September. Because you will
be there, the buckslip can be short.
b' Rogers/Alexis Johnson/Cline. For several reasons,
Cline should give Rogers and Alexis Johnson their copies.
This can be achieved by sending Cline three copies with
a note from you requesting him to deliver one of them to
the Secretary and one to Alexis Johnson.
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cl Laird. I can hand deliver Laird's copy at my
session already scheduled for 1100 Tuesday, 8 September.
Same buckslip text as Kissinger's, for similar reasons.
e: Moorer should receive a personal copy transmitted
on Tuesday, 8 September, by a personal note from you.
Hand delivery is not necessary and would be too much of
a good thing.
e~. Bennett should be hand delivered his copy -- with
an accompaning note from you -- by either R.J. Smith or
John Bross accompanied by Paul Walsh, who can defuse
his irritation and answer any immediate questions.
Bennett should be getting his copy at about the time
Kissinger and Laird are getting theirs. We want all
three to hear about this memo first from us, not from
each other (in any permutation).
$/. Gayler. Since the other USIB principals are
getting personal copies, Gayler should get one too. This
can be done on 8 September via a short buckslip (Kissinger/
Laird text will suffice).
J. Admiral Anderson. The fact that you are having
lunch with Anderson on 8 September is fortuitous. He can
simply be handed a copy informally at lunch and told that
we will be happy to brief him and/or the PFIAB in further
detail if he so desires. No note required.
a. I can send copies to the following, timed to go out
Tuesday afternoon:
2. William Sullivan, with info copies to the
other members of the NSC Vietnam Committee.
3. Assistant Secretary of Defense/SA Gardiner
Tucker, with whom we have dealt on the logistics
data collection problems.
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4. Wayne Smith (Larry Lynn's successor).
b. John Bross, for form and politics sake, should
send a courtesy copy to Froehlke. On Tuesday afternoon.
c. R.J. Smith should send personal copies on Tuesday
afternoon to the following:
1. General Chapman
2. General '~'-~-- _ wn
3. Admiral Harlfinger
4. General Triantafellu
5. General McChristian
4. Working Level Distribution.
The working level distribution of the December memorandum is
as follows:
State 5
DIA 14
Air Force 16
Army 13
NSA 7
Navy 1
NSC 1
NIC 1
We should make similar distribution of the new memo via normal channels
on Wednesday morning, 9 September.
five copies
to be personally delivered to COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. In making the
deliveries, emphasis should be laid on the preliminary nature of the
document and its sensitivity,
therein.
- 3 -
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 Approved For Release 21231O O : CIA-RDP78T020O
At my request, OER and FE/Reports are translating the field
documents into a dissemination package which can be distributed
Thursday morning, 10 September.
Geo ge A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
~cc: General Cushman
Mr. Karamessines
Mr. R. J. Smith
Mr. Bross
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Distribution of Intelligence Memorandum Entitled "New Evidence on
Military Deliveries to Cambodia: December 1966 - April 1969"
ER IM 70-126 September 1970 SECRET
Copy No. 1 - Dr. Kissinger (Delivered by DCI)
2 - Secretary Rogers
3 - Secretary Laird
4 - Deputy Secretary Packard
5 - Admiral Thomas H. Moorer (Chairman, JCS)
*6 - Lt. General Donald V. Bennett (Director, DIA)
7 - Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
8 - Ray S. Cline (State)
9 - Admiral Anderson (PFIAB)
10, 11, 12 & 13 - DDI
14 - John Bross for Mr. Froehlke,
15 - Vice Admiral Noel Gayler (Director, NSA)
16 - Marshall Green
17 - William H. Sullivan
18 - Gardiner L. Tucker
19 - John Holdridge
20 - James Engle
21 - Roger Kirk
22 - Brig. General F. E. Karhohs
23 - Brig. General Foster Lee Smith
24 - Robert Nooter
25 - Dr. K. Wayne Smith (National Security Staff)
27 - A
28 - DD/OER
29 SAVA
30 Ch/D/l
31 Adm. liarlfinger
32 -- Gen.Chapman
33 Gen. Stewart
34 - Gen. McChristian
35 - Gen. Triantafellu
41(3 --Z/7
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/OER
has just given me the second
installment of his Sihanoukville paper. I haven't
had time to go over his first chapters but I
thought that in the meantime I would get you a
set of everything I had. There is still more
to come that is supposedly in the typewriter.
25 Feb 71
(DATE)
FORM NO. REPLACES, FORM 10.101
I AUG 54 lol WHICH MAY BE USED.
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