MEMO TO GENERAL COUNSEL FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001500050001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 30, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXKUTIVE S tT'I: ?IZIAT
R O E . TINE su p ,
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Tie Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
1552
30 March 1984
NOTE FOR: General Counsel
FROM: DCI
Attached was passed to me today by
Lloyd Cutler. Look it over to see to
iv" at e^tenf we can be helpful--probably
not much. He wants a lot of information
on Oman in 1977; all he wants are some
leads to find the right people.
William J. Casey
Ex ,sc u It 'IN"
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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
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yk. Case .
HO LT, RINEHART AND WINSTON
Reader's Digest Press
95
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During Ecevit's year and ten months in office, the terrorist
kill rate had more than quintupled (from less than one to over
five a day). A decent and civilized left-wing democrat, he had
started out in January 1978 believing that the right was at the
bottom of all the nation's troubles. He was a much-chastened
.man when he stepped down.
'There was no separating the Fascist right from the revolution-
ary Communist left in Turkey's spreading terror. Both were in it
up to their necks, with the same sinister intent, and had been
egging each other on for a good ten years. There wasn't much
doubt about who started it, either. The left did.
More precisely, the Russians did. For invaluable clues in
this case we are indebted to a defector from the KGB named
Viktor Sakharov, whose documented story is told in John Bar-
ron's KGB.7 A bright young man with five years of Arabic stud-.
ies, Sakharov was sent to Yemen in 1967 to be broken in. He
went on to Kuwait in 1968, as a full-fledged KGB agent. The
KGB rezident there, who specialized in Turkish affairs, spoke
no Arabic. Neither did the man from GRU, handling Russian
military intelligence. A translator from the KGB Center was
long overdue, causing a huge backlog in. communications. Sa-
kharov, asked to help out, had access to a fabulous store of
-information.
He was operating at the heart of the KGB's VIII Depart-
ment, embracing the Arab states, Afghanistan, Iran, Yugosla-
via, Albania, Greece, and Turkey. Agents' reports crossed his-
desk from all over the area. (They were actually written in
invisible. ink.) Accordingly, he was able to learn in detail about
three major Soviet. operations in his zone. They were:
1. to sabotage Saudi Arabia's oilfields and, if possible, dislodge
its pro-Western monarchy;
2. to build terrorist cells in the Arab oil sheikhdoms around
Kuwait and the Persian Gulf, notably Qatar, Bahrain, and
Oman, offering scholarships and guerrilla training in the So-
viet Union; and
3. to mount a "brutal campaign of urban terrorism, kidnapping.
and assassination against-Turkey:" 8--
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The going wasn't too easy in the sheikhdoms, whose rulers
were deeply suspicious and extremely well informed. Still,
eighty tribesmen did get off to. Moscow from Qatar alone while
Sakharov was around, to his knowledge. Oman's Dhofar tribes-,
men also began to shape up around then, for the ten-year siege
to come. (The special.camp reserved for them near Aden, in
South Yemen, was set up in 1968.) The earliest Palestinian
guerrillas got started then as well. But of the three major proj-
ects, Turkey's was the most advanced by far.
As NATO's farthest outpost in the Middle East, facing the
Russians across the Black Sea and guarding the Dardanelles,
Turkey was a very special Russian target. The Russians had
come close to neutralizing if not annexing it just after World
War 11. when they were stopped short by the Truman Doctrine.
They were in a better position to try again after 1960, when -
nearly half a century of rocklike Turkish stability came to an
d
en
.
Kemal Ataturk's extraordinary revolution had swept the
Turks from a closed and medieval Islamic society to 'a Euro-
peanized nation with parliamentary government by then. But
Ataturk, though still revered, was dead; his political legacy had
and a patriotic army took over briefly in 1960 to set things
straight. The army promised to restore civilian rule and, mirac-
ulously, kept its word. (Colonel Turkel, bent on tough military
rule even then, was sent off as ambassador to India to be kept
out of mischief.). Though the democratic order was restored,
however, the system was weakened at the core and never re-
covered its strength.
The convulsive change for the worse may be measured by
the fact that not a single Turkish life was lost when the army
took over in 1960. Indeed, the last straw for army leaders that
year had been the death of two students-two--in demonstra-
tions against a wildly corrupt and inefficient government. There
would be no further political bloodshed until 1969, by which
time the Russians had put in quite a lot of work.
Sakharov, who defected from his KGB post in Kuwait mid-
way through 1971, had ample evidence of Russian penetration
starting in the early sixties. It began when the KGB in Ankara
recruited a few promising young Turks for training in Russia.
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0
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Back home, the freshly groomed Turkish agents recruited more
.radicals into a nascent terrorist movement. These were shipped
secretly to Syria for guerrilla training. Ostensibly. they were
going into Palestinian camps there. Actually, the arrangements
were made for them by two KGB agents working out of the
Soviet embassy in Damascus: Vadim A. Shatrov and the usual
embassy "chauffeur" Nikolai Chernenkov.
From Syria. Turkey's terrorist cadets inevitably spilled over
into other Palestinian camps from Lebanon and Jordan to
South Yemen, to be taken in hand by George Habash and Wadi
Haddad. University students in Ankara and Istanbul "would
just disappear for three or four months and then just show up
again," as an Ankara professor told me. By 1970, a group had
already been caught in the act of mounting a terrorist hit, as
they returned from training by way of Diyarbakir in eastern
Turkey-on a straight line as the crow flies from Baghdad, Wadi
Haddad's headquarters in Iraq. Year after year after that, Turk-
ish graduates of Palestinian camps-Russian-supervised or the
Habash-Haddad Front's-would be picked up..as they made
their way back home: in batches of ten or twelve, by boat or
car, loaded down with Soviet-bloc weapons .9
Meanwhile, the KGB's Disinformation Department (De-
partment A of the First Chief Directorate) was setting the scene
for a high-priority campaign against the American-NATO pres-
ence in Turkey. Between 1966 and 1970, the Disinformation
Department carried off three spectacularly successful forgery
operations. One was a widely circulated book purportedly
written by a Turkish senator, -"proving"fan -American- plot to
undermine "progressive" Turkish ' politicians and strengthen
right-wingers. Another document "proved" American inter-
ference to beef up rightist forcer in the Turkish army. A third
"proved" an American conspiracy with the ruling right-wing
military junta in Greece to take over, the half-Turkish island of
Cyprus by military coup, annex it to Greece, and tack it on to
NATO. This last-was passed on to the Turkish Foreign Ministry
as urgent intelligence information-by Soviet Ambassador Vas-
ili Federovitch Grubyakov, a veteran KGB officer-with sensa-
tional results.
The combined effect'might haveledany red-blooded young
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Turk to vow that Turkey would be "the graveyard of American
imperialism," just as many a young Turk did. Few realize to
this day thavall there-"documents" were egregious fakes.10
The anti-American riots breaking out on Turkish campuses in
1968 looked natural enough. Who wasn't rioting against the
United States in 1968? The appearance of an inflammatory
Marxist student organization called Dev Genc in 1969 looked
natural too. Turkish students were bound to feel the pull of
revolution, in a society wrenched from its rural and traditional-
ist Islamic moorings; struggling to pull abreast of industrial
Europe; stricken with inflation, unemployment, corruption,
and wretched shantytown slums. Yet the leap in a single year-
from setting fire to the American ambassador's car on a campus
in 1968 to a ready-made; professional underground terrorist
apparatus by 1969-was a dead giveaway.
It wasn't long before Dev Genc showed unmistakable signs
of prefabrication in structure, strategy, methods, slogans, litany,
logistics. "A subtle change in the catchwords of students'. public.
statements, meetings, boycotts, was observed during the late -
'60s, particularly since 1968.... Instead of merely deploring.the_
situation in moderate terms, demands were voiced loudly and
insistently and sometimes expressed by violent deeds," noted a
widely respected scholar of Turkish affairs. Catchwords
changed no less while in foreign affairs "the emphasis shifted
from Cyprus to anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, neutral-
ism, foreign capital and the Vietnam War." 11
Dev Genc's classic two-tiered form alone became a text-
book model for the decade's urban guerrilla movements. (The
Organization in Italy, the Provisional IRA, and ETA-Militar all
followed suit a couple of years later.) An open political arm
handled revolutionary propaganda, demanding a Leninist re-
gime in place of parliamentary democracy.12 An underground
military arm got going right on schedule, with a "brutal cam-
paign of urban terrorism, kidnapping and assassination against
Turkey." 13
The campaign was not a response to Fascist provocation;
there was none to speak of in 1969. While Colonel Turke? did
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 THE
SECRET WORK
OF SOVIET
SECCRET AGENTS
JOHN BARRON
I
READER'S DIGEST PRESS
Distributed'by E. P. Dutton & Co., ;nc.
New York
1974
i ~' fi'rv+ NO
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 SECRETS FROM THE DESERT
The impact of the. KGB upon world affairs sometimes best can be seen
through the eyes of individuals who are drawn into the subterranean
world it inhabits. The experiences of one such man, Vladimir Nikolaevich
Sakharov, yield remarkable revelations about KGB . influence upon one
of the continuing crises of current history, the travail of the Middle East.
Both Sakharov himself and the fate that befell him are unusual. But
the life he led while perched amid privilege atop Soviet society and while
stationed in Soviet diplomatic posts abroad typifies important realities
that rarely can be glimpsed by anyone outside the KGB.
The story that follows is based primarily upon extensive interviews
with Sakharov. Throughout the interviews he spoke of his experiences
and emotions frankly, sometimes painfully so. There is, though, one phase
of his life that he has pledged to keep hidden. Otherwise the story is
told as he lived and felt it.
At twenty-two, Vladimir Nikolaev-ich Sakharov was a young man
everyone envied. He stood six feet three inches tall, weighed a muscular
235 pounds, had wavy chestnut hair, hazel eyes, a handsome face, and
a reputation for brilliance. His family was influential and by Soviet stan-
dards wealthy; his wife was graceful, blonde, and beautiful. Among his
closest friends were Igor Andropov, son of the KGB chairman; Mikhail
Tsvigun, son of a deputy KGB chairman; and Viktor Kudryavtsev, son
of Sergei Kudryavtsev, the old master of subversion
f~: .ice. ....... .
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WD KGB
.Sakharov had, distinguished himself during five years of Arabic
studies at the most prestigious school in the Soviet Union, the Institute
of International Relations. Awaiting him.was a diplomatic career that
promised perquisites, immunities, and material benefits usually reserved
for the elite of the New Class.?
In the spring of 1967, Sakharov said good-bye to his wife, who was
expecting their first child, and left Moscow for six months of field train-
ing in the Middle East, preparatory to his graduation. He volunteered
for duty as a probationary consular officer. in the strategic Red Sea port
of Hodeida in Yemen. When he arrived in April, the temperature was
128 degrees and the humidity 96 percent. In the next few days he
learned that neither ever fell much lower.
The body perspired continuously, a fresh shirt became soaked in
five minutes, and shoes, if worn regularly, soon disintegrated from mois-
ture. The Russian colony, consisting of about six hundred diplomats anc
KGB officers, construction personnel, and wives and children, lived is
dread of virulent native diseases for which their doctors had no cure.
Most feared was a strain of bacteria that produced feverish death by
consuming or, as Soviet doctors said, "burning up" the brain. The corpse:
of Russians it lulled were hurriedly carted into the desert, drenched with
gasoline, and cremated to prevent contamination. In the streets, the,
Russians winced at the sight of amputees who were victims of the ancient.
Yemeni practice of cutting off the hands of thieves. Suspected crimina
still were caged and pilloried in the marketplace, where, passersby cool:.
poke, stone, or spit upon them. The Yemeni openly relieved themselve
on the streets, using stones in lieu of toilet paper, and a latrine steno
permeated the air.
The dangers posed by volatile, unpredictable Yemeni tribesmen we.
real enough. But these were exaggerated in the minds of the Russians b-
rumors only partially founded on fact. According to the lore prevale`
-- in the Soviet colony, tribesmen without warning or cause had gutted tl
U.S. embassy in Taiz with bazooka fire and burned down the We-
German embassy, killing several people. According to another rum-
widely believed -in the Soviet colony, desert marauders had bebeade
two KGB officers the previous year, mistaking, them for Americans Io.
near the A.den border.**
? "Me New Class is the term first applied by Yugoslav political philosopher M ic--
Djilas to the small minority that rules and administers a communist nation. The rum
New Class created by the communists after the Revolution consists mainly of
oligarchy, political bureaucrats, and Party workers. Djifas notes that because
minority controls the disposition and use of national resources, by.the Roman defsnit
of property it owns the state.
? ? Yemen moved its capital from Taiz to Sanaa after. the 1962 revolution. Howe'
many nations retained embassy buildings in Taiz because of a lack of facilities
Sanaa. The Russians and Chinese additionally opened consulates in Hodeida. ( ;
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SECRETS FROM THE DESERT
The Russians assigned to Hodeida huddled together in a cramped
compound of apartments that lacked air conditioning and provided one
kitchen for each two families. A wall separated the compound from the
grounds of the Chinese consulate. Frequently, in the dead of night,
Chinese mounted the wall and banged tin pans, blew bugles, and
shouted curses at. the Russians. Sometimes they augmented the racket
by circling the compound in cars, chanting imprecations through portable
loudspeakers. Awakened by the din, Russian babies cried, distraught
mothers complained., and husbands cursed helplessly. Soviet policy pro-
hibited any response. -
Although the Russians had bought control of Yemeni President Ab-
dullah al Sallal, he was afraid to consort with them openly in the capital.
So the KGB acquired a house in Hodeida for secret meetings, and Soviet
-----A bassador Mirzo Rakhmatovich-Rakhmatov periodically drove across
the desert from Taiz to rendezvous with the President there. Arriving
early one morning in late April, -the ambassador stopped by the consulate
and asked for Sakharov, whose uncle was one of his oldest friends. He
announced without explanation that the regular consul in charge at
Hodeida, Ivan Skarbovenko, would not return from the vacation he had
just begun in Moscow.
"Young man, I congratulate you. You are now the acting consul,"
Rakhmatov said grandly, offering a hearty handshake. "Skarbovenko,
assured me you were quite capable of carrying on in his absence, and
knowing your uncle, I have confidence you can do the job until a perma-
nent replacement comes." Sakharov was too astounded to ask for a denni-
tion of his new duties, and the ambassador hurried off without offering
him any guidance.
The consulate had no telephones at the time, so the Russians often
eommunicated through hand-delivered notes. The morning after the am-
bassador's visit, Sakharov received a scribbled message saying, "Come
see me, please." It was from Vladimir.Ivchenkov, the KGB Resident who
posed as chief engineer of the State Committee for Economic Relations.
Ivchenko, a wiry blond in his late thirties, was a keen and aggressive
professional charged with nervous energy. Consecrated to his clandestine
calling, he had amassed an encyclopedic knowledge of Arab culture, and
he approached all problems clinically. He did not indulge in contemp-
tuous diatribes agairst the Arabs, but would often tell Soviet newcomers:
"The Egyptians need a hundred years to master our ways, the Yemeni
three hundred." Yet he was not expressing personal disdain, merely his
dispassionate judgment.
40,000) which provided a springboard for subversion along the Red Sea coast and
against nearby cil sheikdoms.
The \Vest Lerman embassy was burned in September 1984 and the American
embassy building ransacked in May 1967, but no fatalities occurred during either
attack. Whether --vo KGB officers actually were beheaded is not known.
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Inviting Sakharov to make himself comfortable in an office cooled
by a Westinghouse window air conditioner, Ivchenkov remarked, "I sup-
pose you know who I really am." Sakharov nodded.
"Well, let me be frank and straightforward," said Ivehenkov, lighting
another of the British cigarettes he chain-smoked. "It is of course expected
that you work for me. Your. youth and background can make you quite
useful, and your Arabic is admirable. However, our first duty, yours and
mine, is too look after our own people. I want a report about everybody
who comes to you. I want to know who's seeing Arabs, who's speculating
in currency, who's sleeping with whom, who's dissatisfied-everything
that's going on. You understand?"
'Perfectly," answered Sakharov.
Pouring himself a heavy slug of King George IV Scotch, Ivchenkov
asked, "Want some?" It was not yet 9 A.M., and Sakharov politely de-
clined. "If you are to deal with Arabs, you must learn to control and
exploit alcohol," Ivchenkov continued. It turns them into absolute
putty--"
"We are taught that their religion forbids it," replied Sakharov.
"Just so," said Ivchenkov. "They covet the forbidden, and they can
not handle it." Fidgeting and pacing the office, he began to lecture.
"Seat the Arab at a table lined with bottles. Give him soda and nuts,
while you drink whisky and comment about how relaxing it is. After a
while, suggest that occasions of state take precedence over social custom,
so it is permissible for him to take whisky. Once the Arab starts, he can-
not stop. When he's drunk enough, he'll agree to anything, sign anything.
"Sheienkov ? won a commendation here. It was actually for stupe-
fying the Foreign Minister and photographing everything in his bref-
case. .
While Ivchenkov retained the ultimate, hidden power over all Rus-
sians in Hodeida, Sak.harov, as acting consul, became the man to whom
they came for help in their personal lives, quarrels, and other troubles.
Bored and crammed together in the tiny,-torrid apartments, wives argued
and even engaged in hair-pulling battles over use of the kitchen or bath
or over even pettier issues. Ethnic rivalries led to brawls among construc-
tion workers recruited from different Soviet republics. Summoned one
night to stop a fight between an Armenian and a Kazakh, Sakharov
found one had a broken arm and the other a broken leg.
No one could have assuaged all the human vexations with which
he had to contend. But he tried, with patience, wit, and sympathy. Be-
fore long, Volodiya, as admirers called him, came to be known in the
colony as a fair and compassionate arbiter, a "good. guy" too young to
be encrusted with bureaucratic cynicism.
? Ivchenkov referred to Aleksandr Ivanovich Shelenkov. Stationed in Tai., Yemen,
until 1966, Shelenkov in 1971 turned up as the KGB Resident in Amman, Jordan.
 All the while, of course, Sakharov privately reported to Ivchenkov,
who entrusted him, with more substantive assignments-the identification
of Yemeni sympathetic to the Chinese, the spotting-of potential KGB
recruits among Egyptian forces stationed in Yemen, and the noting of
likely Arabs who could help penetrate into the oil-storage areas of
Aden. The two conferred almost daily and, because they liked each
other, often stayed up late into the night drinking together.
After the Arab-Israeli war in June, the Chinese intensified their prop-
aganda, accusing the Russians in leaflets and over loudspeakers of having
caused the Arab defeat Sakharov was so occupied in KGB efforts to
counter the Chinese campaign that he fell further and further behind in
his administrative duties. The morning of July 10 he worked at the con-
sulate alone, hoping to reduce a pile of paperwork. About 10 A.M. he
heard an ominous- babble-in-the- street -and- from -a-window saw the ap-
proaching vanguard of a Chinese-incited mob. Had he fled, Sakharov
probably could have escaped. Instead, he chose to protect the consulate
by bolting the doors, locking the windows, and turning on all the lights
to create an impression that others were present. By the time he finished,
the building was surrounded by some 1,500 frenzied Yemeni shouting
Chinese charges of Soviet perfidy. Stones pounded the building, and as
splinters of glass from smashed windows showered down around him,
Sakharov climbed to the roof. There he looked down on the shrieking
crowd armed with their long, curved knives and old British Enfield
rifles. Recalling the attacks on the American and German offices, he con-
cluded that eventually somebody in the mob would think of setting the
consulate afire.
Sakharov had accepted the fact that he might have to die unnatu-
rally, perhaps even in disgrace. Though he feared such a possibility, he
was prepared for it, provided that his death could have a meaning and
serve a cause. But to die now, having accomplished nothing, burned up
or dismembered by crazed men in a forsaken, miserable Arab town,
would be meaningless and terrible. Beating his fist'against the palm of
his hand, he cursed himself for not having run away. At that moment
he heard the sound of rifles being fired into the air and the rumble of
trucks bringing Egyptian troops to rout the mob.
By the next day, Sakharov was a hero. His honest attempts to ex-
plain that he had done little were interpreted as the modesty becoming
to authentic bravery. To everyone in the compound he was the valiant
Russian who singlehandedly stood up for his country against the loath-
some "yellows" and "subhuman"-and triumphed: The ambassador sent
proud congratulations. Ivchenkov embraced and kissed him. The construe
tion workers cheered him, and the children shouted "Volodiyal Volodiyal
Volodiya!"
Through the summer, Sakharov yearned more and more to go home
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"Ivchenkov did that!" Sakharov exclaimed.
"Ivchenkov did it," Skarbovenko said, shaking his head. "I thought he
His wife long had dreamed of a sea voyage, so he arranged passage
on a ship sailing from Alexandria to Odessa. Never had his wife been
happier. She anticipated each hour of the voyage and also planned to
pick up enough fine Egyptian cotton to sew dresses for a lifetime. Intent
upon realizing her every expectation, she bought dollars in Yemen for
,use in.Egypt and aboard ship. She knew all Russians were forbidden too
deal in foreign currency. Yet because so many of them flouted the regula..
'tions, she made little effort to conceal her purchase. Ivchenkov found
out about it and inexplicably decided to report her to the Center. When
Skarbovenko reached Moscow, he was summoned to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, demoted, and barred from going abroad again.
his techniques on Sakharov, and the pair nearly drowned grappling in,
the hot sea. Suffused with the spirit of laughing, intoxicated camaraderie,.
Sakharov thought no one could have a finer friend.
Back in Moscow, after he recovered from a round of welcoming
parties, Sakharov called upon Skarbovenko, the consul who strangely
had not come back to Hodeida. His appearance shocked Sakharov, for
he seemed to have aged a decade in a few months. Bitterly, Skarbovenko
told what had happened.
"Well, I think you deserve it," said Ivchenkov. "In any case, it won't
do you any harm in Moscow. Now let's celebrate."
By 4 A.M. both were quite drunk, and Ivchenkov announced they
must refresh themselves with a swim in the Red Sea so they could drink
more. Staggering to..rard the beach, he boasted of a newly acquired
mastery of karate. British intelligence symbolized his professional ideal,.
and he had,persuaded himself that all MI-6 officers were karate experts.
He had recently ordered a karate book to make himself the equal of his
cunning. British adversaries. Once in the water, he tried to demonstrate
and,see''leis baby daughter, Yekaterina, who had been born in_May. The
evening before his return to Moscow in September to conclude his studies
at the Institute of International Relations, Ivchenkov gave a farewell
-
dinner. As the other Russians started to leave, he insisted that Sakharov
remain. "I want you to read something," said the Resident.. It was the
fitness report he had written assessing Sakharov's work in Yemen. Every-
thing stated was factual, or almost so, but was so cleverly worded that
the report as a whole exaggerated the magnitude of Sakharov's achieve-
ments. Anyone reading the evaluation would have concluded that Sa-
kharov was an exceptionally gifted young man with all the native talents
of a great intelligence officer. "Can you think of anything we should
-
add?" asked Ivchenkov.
"It is far too good as it is," replied Sakharov.
 SECRETS FROM THE DESERT 35
was my best friend. Remember, I told you last year that if you needed
help, you could trust Ivchenkov."
"I can't believe it," Sakharov said.
"You'd better believe it," replied Skarbovenko. "It is too late for me,
but for you there is still time. You must learn to guard yourself against
the Cheldsts. They have the highest positions, but they are the lowest
form of our society. They spend all their lives betraying people, selling
people. They sell us in the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]; they sell
Party members, they even sell each other. Then the sons-of-bitches de-
fect to the Americans and sell the whole Soviet people.
"The Chekists eventually will call you; they will try to make you
one of them. Heed me, Volodiya. Have nothing to do with them!"
But Sakharov, for secret reasons of his own, already had determined
- --- that if the Chekists did call, he would answer as- they wished. Far from L .._
d
' b
dissuading .him, the story of Skarbovenko only fortified his resolve toe-
come an officer of the KGB.
The call came in November. The personnel director of the Institute,
himself a KGB officer, handed Sakharov a slip of paper and told him to
telephone the number written on it. He did so, and received instructions
to come at ten the next morning to an office on Neglinnaya Street, half
a block from Dzerzhinsky Square, and to ask for "Vasili Ivanovich."
A sentry ushered Sakharov into a reception room furnished only with
a wooden table and two chairs. Vasili Ivanovich, a plump, middle-aged
officer with white hair and a paternal manner, greeted him politely. "You
understand, of course, that I represent the most respected organization
in the Soviet Union-the Committee of State Security of the Council of
Ministers of the U.S.S.R.," he began.
"My purpose in talking to you is to explain some of the work of
our organization and to invite you to become a member. We have ob-
served you during the last year of your study. We know of your command
of Arabic and English. You have been given the highest recommendation
by the Institute, and your work in Yemen was outstanding. In fact, I
myself congratulate you. In these times we need gifted, educated young
men to contribute to the success of our state in the international field."
The officer specified numerous benefits the KCB would provide, in-
cluding immediate and permanent possession of a good apartment in
Moscow and a new suit and a new pair of shoes each year. Without dis-
paraging the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he stressed that KGB officers
abroad have much more influence, opportunity, and money than ordinary
Soviet diplomats. "At the same time, you will have all the prestige and
privileges of a diplomat, which is what everyone will think you are. And
for a young man our work is far more interesting and challenging. I will
not tell you that it is completely without hazards. But I can assure
01
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?
you that always the full might of the Soviet Union stands behind you."
The interview, which was realty a briefing, continued about two
hours. Sakharov understood that after specialized KGB training lasting
.a year or two, he probably would be assigned. to the American Depart-
ment of the First Chief Directorate and posted to Washington or New
York. But he gathered that from time to time he might also make use of
his training as an Arabist by working against the United States. in Arab
lands.
"You may discuss our conversation with your father, if you desire,"
said the officer. "However, you are to mention it to no one else, not even
your wife or mother. You can take a couple of days to think it over, but
I would be happier if I could have your decision now."
"I am greatly honored by this opportunity to serve the Soviet peo-
ple," Sakharov responded. "I accept your invitation and pledge that I
will always strive to be worthy of it_"
It was as simple as that The KGB, through its staff officers and in-
formants at the Institute, surely observed Sakharov. But there was no
searching investigation of his background, no examination of his ideals
and motivation, no attempt to divine what he really thought. The reason
for this lapse was that the KGB considered Sakharov's family credentials
overwhelming. His father was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs courier, a
job far more important and prestigious in the Soviet Union than in the
West. For twenty years he had efficiently ferried Soviet secrets around
the globe, all the while performing myriad useful services for the KGB..
As a consequence, he had influential KGB friends in Moscow and numer-
ous foreign capitals. Moreover, Sakharov's uncle was deputy director
of the Ministry' of Foreign Affairs archives department; his grandfather
was an honored Red Army colonel assigned to the Central Committee.,
His mother-in-law was a. Kremlin psychiatrist, trusted to treat Party lead-
ers; her father commanded a concentration camp for political prisoners,
another position of prestige in the Soviet Union. The KGB also knew that
'Sakharov's closest friends were the sons of its highest-ranking ofcers-
Everything about him was ideal-his breeding, background, academic
record, and performance in the field. Indeed, he represented the quintes-
sence of the New Class.
From his earliest childhood, Sakharov's family imbued him with the
values and aims of that class-the acquisition and preservation of special
privilege, material possessions, and social status. The family carefully
supervised his choice of playmates to ensure that he associated with no
one beneath him. Children of Party officials, KGB officers, and senior
bureaucrats were acceptable; those of doctors, engineers, and workers
were not As a small boy, when meeting possible new playmates, Sa-
kharov's first question invariably was, -Who is your father?" His family
shamelessly indulged him with 'foreign products, the ultimate status
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 SECRETS FROM THE DESERT 37
symbol. His father, with a diplomatic passport and. highly placed friends,
had constant access to dollars and Western goods. The dollars he- sold
in Moscow yielded a fortune in rubles, while those he kept bought West-
ern merchandise cheaply at the special restricted stores that accept only
hard currency. Sakharov learned at an early age that foreign goods
bought favors. Once he accompanied his father to a KGB laboratory
hidden in an old house on Sadovoy Koltso to have an IBM. tape recorder
repaired. His father rewarded the KGB technicians with Parker pens and
Ronson cigarette lighters.
Virtually everything in the commodious Sakharov apartment near
the American. embassy came from abroad. Most of the furniture was
Scandinavian; the refrigerator Finnish, the vacuum cleaner a Hoover,
-the-stereo- a--Philips;-the television from RCA, the short-wave radio a
Grundig, the shower head from Sears, Roebuck. The first coffee Sakharov
ever tasted was Nescafe; his first cigarette was a Winston and his first
whisky White Horse. His best suit came from Brooks Brothers and his
favorite tweed jacket from the English Shop in Copenhagen. He boasted
a collection of -nearly five hundred American records, the most prized
being those of Stan Kenton, Glenn Miller, Cannonball Adderley, Frank
Sinatra, Dave Brubeck, and Peggy Lee.
Along with such luxuries, Sakharov s father brought wondrous tales
of the West, especially of Washington, which he loved. "There is where
I would like to live out my life," he told his son. "It is my city-quiet,
beautiful, friendly. The people live in their own cottages. If they want
to go somewhere, they just get in their car and go." Returning from a
trip to Washington in 1960, he remarked: "America is the happiest coun-
try in the world. It is written on the faces of the people. Whatever you
may hear, I have seen it for myself."
While secretly admiring the United States, Sakharov's father bore
no deep grievances against the Soviet system under which he prospered.
However, because Sakharov's mother herself traveled frequently during
the prolonged absences of his father, he lived much of the year with his
grandparents, and they, in different ways, were virulently anti-Soviet.
_ Turkish ancestry endowed his grandmother with a dark, gypsylike
beauty and a defiant, indomitable spirit that made her loathe everything
Soviet. "Shit!" she habitually exclaimed upon reading Pravda. "Everything
the Soviet press prints is shit. Tonight we will get the truth from the
BBC." Sakharov often fell asleep listening to the BBC or the Voice of
America on an American-made radio with unjammed frequencies.
Sakharov's grandfather was a model officer whose military record
and political. reliability had brought him through purges and earned him
stair position with the Central Committee. A. an idealistic young com- -
munist he had fought with the special Cheka troops. during the Revolu-
tion and afterward helped destroy unsubdued anticommunists as well as
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 marauding criminal bands plaguing the countryside. He received two
decorations for his valor during the 1941 Battle of Moscow. However,
the 1936-33 purges in which most of his army friends perished and the
subsequent official confirmation of the mass murders under Stalin.left
him with nothing but scorn for the cause to which he had given much
of his life.. Beyond his own comfortable survival, he now cared only
about the future of his grandson:
On Sakharov's twelfth birthday, his grandfather took him for a walk
in the park and spoke to him earnestly, summarizing the philosophy under
which Sakharov was to grow up. "Our society is controlled by a small
group of men," the old man said. "You can achieve a worthwhile life
only by becoming a member of that group. It is not enough to be on
the perimeter; you must gain the inner circle, and that is not easy. But
it can be done with hard work and study. If you will work and study,
I will give you anything, buy you anything you want.
"As you make your way upward, you will see with young eyes cruel-
ties and injustices. You cannot change them, and it is futile to" worry
about what you cannot change. Once you are secure with money and
position, you will learn to close your eyes and live your own life."
The family concluded that the surest route to the inner circle lay
through the Institute of International Relations, whose students were
graduated into careers affording status and the opportunity to work
abroad, and hence to make money. The Institute was almost exclusively
the preserve of the New Class. Even so, there were about fifteen appli-
cants with the right family credentials for each of the six hundred annual
openings, and the competition for entry was fierce. Sakharov's family thus
devoted his adolescence to preparations that would-give him advantages
in the competition.
He swam, boxed, wrestled, played tennis, and won third place in
the Moscow rowing championships, because athletic accomplishments
were a plus. He took private German and_ piano lessons, because knowl-
edge of a foreign language and music would further set him apart from
other youths. After Khrushchev decreed that university applicants who.-
had worked at a job would receive preference over those who had not,
Sakharov's uncle arranged a "job" at a high-school physics laboratory.
administered by a friend. He was paid during the next two years for
ostensibly working from 8 A.M. t:, 5 P.-m. while attending _bight school.
Actually, he showed up only in the morning to do his homework and left
in the early afternoon to work at sports The Institute required that every
applicant present a written endorsement from Komsomol, the youth
branch of the Party. The more glowing the recommendation, the better
an applicant's chances. Sakharov looked upon Komsomol as a plebeian
absurdity, and though he paid dues to retain paper membership, he did
not deign to attend meetings. But his father telephoned a friend who had
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 hf.J f.JI VVCU rui r. ICQJC .UU1/UO/ IL) . LI/-\-RU OO~VV?+?+JRVV IJVVVJVVV I-.7 ,s~, ~. '?1'~. y~.,~ h" r
fl
--~a.~ni~..v~:;neLiF~liafi.'G`a.'~?ti~]i~i'~attx.,.
a friend who was Komsomol chairman of. the Moscow.. District. There
was some discussion of a portable RCA television. The testimonial the
Komsomol chairman rsupplied as a result portrayed Sakharov as a veri-.
table latter-day Lenin, the ideal communist youth.
Sakharov took his five entrance examinations in June 1962. The first
consisted of writing a political essay, which, was graded subjectively. It
served to eliminate all female applicants except the daughters of the
highest Party officials. If the girls thus excluded were attractive, they
wound. up at the MFA school for typists and stenographers; if talented,
they were sent to the Institute of Eastern Languages. Another exam con-
sisted of a standard set of questions about geography, accompanied by
queries arbitrarily chosen for each applicant. By putting hard questions
to some and easy ones to others, the faculty weeded out applicants with
insufficient family influence. Out of -a- possible twenty-five points, Sa-
kharov scored twenty-four on his examinations, and his family celebrated
an entire weekend.
By virtue. of admission to the.Institute, students entered an exalted
caste, recognized by one and all as the-source of future oligarchs. Adults
deferred to them, youths from other schools envied them, and girls looked
upon marriage to one of them as a ticket to security, affluence, and the
good life. Among themselves, the students maintained a highly refined
system of snobbery. The lowest stratum was made. up of those relatively
few youths of humble origins accepted by the Institute for show, or
because they worked for the KGB. Without family influence and forced
to exist on monthly stipends of about forty rubles (roughly the amount
Sakharov spent each month on -taxis to and from school), they willingly
acted as informants in return for KGB patronage. The status of other
students was largely determined by their fathers' station in the oligarchy.
If a father suffered a career reversal, the son suffered socially. Dmitri
Tarabrin was perhaps the most brilliant and popular of the young men
at the Institute until his father was suddenly ousted from the American
Department of the KGB. As knowledge of this disgrace spread among
the students, Dmitri stopped receiving invitations to their private parties.
His ostracism was complete after about a year, when he appeared in
Russian clothes rather than the American ones he had worn previously.
Igor Andropov, whose father soon was to become KGB chairman, was
in a class all his own. He alone could skip school as he pleased. After a
prolonged vacation in Hungary left him unprepared for his annual exams,
professors obligingly visited him at his apartment to administer special
tests in private.
Except for the courses explicitly devoted to political indoctrination,
the curriculum at the. Institute was generally free of propaganda. The in-
struction, particularly in languages, area studies, and military intelligence,
was outstanding. In an atmosphere of semimilitary discipline, subtly en-
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- caber Alles." Many diners joined in this insult to the Russians by ris:
forced by KGB officers on the faculty, and the knowledge that the
informants were everywhere, students applied themselves during the dw
Outside of school, though, a majority, including those in Sakharo?
clique,.Iived a life bordering on the dissolute, and a goodly number dra:
as much as a bottle of vodka every evening. Weekends were given ov
to alcoholic and sexual orgies at apartments of students whose pare:
happened to be away. Igor Andropov hosted such an. affair in the sprz
of 1964, at which Sakharov wound up sleeping with a girl in. the bed
the.man who now heads the KGB.
Conditioned from boyhood to be conscious of class and to sht
social inferiors, Sakharov had no friends outside. the Institute except
some intimates of the family. He shopped in special stores, closed to t.
common citizenry; vacationed at state spas off limits to the public, din at restaurants only foreigners and the oligarchy could afford. He ev:
took taxis to school rather than the subway to avoid the stigma of m
gling with the herd. Not until 1964, when he was nineteen, did he ev
have any real. associations with ordinary people.
That spring he vacationed in Estonia, using money his grandfath
had given him as a reward for high grades at the Institute. Although E
Russians occupied the little Baltic nation in 1940 as part of a deal W
Hitler, the Estonians have stubbornly striven to perpetuate their langua
and culture. Sakharov found it delightful. However, he was constaw.
aware of a sullen hostility which the Estonians communicated in eve
manner they safely could. Twice after requesting street directions,
was deliberately steered far from where he asked to go. In shops, cle.
ignored him as long as another customer was present. One evening it
Tallinn hotel lobby, be met Aeroflot crew members who invited him
come along for a birthday celebration at a restaurant that had a ja
band. When the party was recognized as Russian, the band abrup-
stopped in the midst of a jazz tune and started playing "Dautsch.e
and singing the old German anthem
Once Sakharov saw a man buying a fishing rod in a store.
decided to purchase one.
"These are only for display, not for sale," said the clerk, a thin lit
man of about sixty.
"But I just saw you sell one," Sakharov persisted.
"For display only," repeated the unyielding Estonian.
"Look, what have you got against me?" exclaimed Sakharov in e t
peration. "What do you want?"
We want you to go away and leave us alone," replied the cle
Sakharov's next experience among ordinary people occurred in S-.
tember-of 1965. During a morning class at the Institute a Party secret.
announced: "All students will devote six weeks to. assisting our agri:
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 SECRETS FROM THE DESERT 41
tural workers. We leave tomorrow to demonstrate our solidarity with our
comrades at the kolkhoz. Be here with appropriate clothing by 0700
hours.'
Though Sakharov and his friends had never seen a collective farm,
they had read numerous official stories depicting the collectives as scenes
of pastoral happiness born of wholesome toil. Bouncing in a bus along
a rutty road toward the kolkhoz, some hundred miles north of Moscow,
they looked forward to a diverting lark in the country. But their first
twenty-four hours at the collective left them incredulous and mortified.
The inhabitants lived in clusters of one- and. two-room log huts.
spaced along an arc through the potato fields. The huts had dirt floors
and no plumbing or electricity. What little heat there was in any of them
came from small wood-burning stoves. The kolkhoz contained one ram-
shackle store to sell bread,. vodka, canned -goods; and sundries, but its-
shelves were mostly empty. Years before, Moscow planners had allotted
the store a piano-and two motorcycles. They still were there, unsold and.
encrusted with the dried spittle of contemptuous people who could
neither afford nor use them. The students' first three meals consisted
solely of milk and potatoes. As it turned out, milk and potatoes were all
they ate for the next six weeks except on the four days when bread was
available.
Physically fit young men raised on the kolkhoz escaped by enlisting
in the army, and the more attractive girls escaped through marriage.
The older or crippled men who remained monopolized jobs involving
farm machinery. No matter how idle they might be, . because of over-
staffing and broken-down machinery, they ccucocted excuses for not
going into the fields. Younger women chained to the farm by their plain-
ness fought viciously for jobs in the crude kolkhoz dairy. So the tilling
of the fields-the digging of potatoes-was left mostly to old women and
children, who labored from 8 A.M to 6 P.m. six days a week.
For the adults, the kolkhoz was a world without hope; nothing re-
lieved their days save the oblivion of alcohol. A river offered the only
means of bathing, and its waters were so frigid from autumn through
spring that baths were rarities. Deprived of facilities or incentive to
maintain their appearance, stripped of individual dignity. and self-respect,
everyone spoke to each other with a venom and vileness of language
that shocked Sakharov. They spoke even more hatefully to the students,
whose status and prospects symbolized everything they would never at-
tain.
Sakharov felt the most compassion, for a woman who, with her
daughter, was forced out of her hut to make room for himself and ten
of his classmates. She had a dumpy, worn body with straight, stringy
hair and a forlorn, creased face marked by dark moles. Each morning
and evening she was required to come and cook potatoes for the stu-
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42, KGB
dents who had displaced her. Shamed by his contribution to her evic-
tion -and additional ,servitude,. Sakharov tried to make friends with her,
but his efforts were unavailing until he thought of giving her a bottle
of vodka. For the first time, he saw her smile, -and on subsequent evenings
she sometimes stayed awhile to talk with him.
She long d to own a cow. Its milk, which she would sell or consume,
would give her a tiny measure of liberty. Its mere possession would make
her superior to her neighbors. The state formerly permitted each family
on the kolkhoz to keep one cow and cultivate a small private plot.
Khrushchev abolished this policy on the theory that people would be
more productive if not distracted by private enterprises. However, many
of the cows that were confiscated by the state perished because the
kolkhoz was ;not. supplied with added fodder. Moreover, because the peo-
ple worked no harder in the fields, the quantity of food grown declined.
Now the state once more allowed the private plots and cows. But the
woman had no money to buy a new cow or seed.
Sakharov bad brought some of his belongings to the kolkhoz in a blue
KLM flight bag given to him by his father. Just before the students re-
turned to Moscow in October, he handed the bag to the woman, saying,
"I want you to have this as a present." She unzipped the bag to find it
contained bottles of vodka and nearly a hundred rubles, all the cash
Sakharov had with him. "For a cow," he said. Tears flowed down the
woman's wrinkled face.
Heretofore, Sakharov s experiences had denied him any sense of
identity with the Soviet people-or any concern for them. The influences
of family, class, - and schooling all taught him that the purpose of life
was the pursuit -of his own interests. But riding back to Moscow, thinking
of the kclkhoz and Estonia; he began to wonder if perhaps there might
not -be another purpose.
That fall, at a weekend party, Sakharov spotted- an eighteen-year-old
girl with golden silken hair, green eyes, beautifully, formed features, and
an exquisitely contoured body that made men stare. Having plied her
escort into alcoholic collapse, he gallantly offered to take her home in a
taxi- Instead, he took her to his grandparents' apartment for the night.
The alluring girl, Natalia Palladina, was as brilliant as she was
beautiful. Because of sheer native intelligence, she quickly and easily
mastered whatever she undertook to learn, whether ballet or cooking,
foreign languages or esoteric art, social graces or Marxist theory. But
Natalia was an even more spoiled child of the New Class than Sakharov.
Her 'psychiatrist mother was determined that she should be a future
queen of the Soviet Union. She molded her daughter from infancy on-
ward to fulfill the ordained role. The rigorously controlled upbringing
endowed Natalia with sophistication and regal manners that enabled her
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to captivate adults. Yet beneath the beguiling veneer, her mother's am-
bitions and values made her selfish, willful, and materialistic.
Upon meeting Natalia, Sakharov's family was ecstatic. Nothing was
more important to them than his choice of a wife: Since his early adoles-
cence, they had tacitly encouraged him to bring girls home for the night,
discouraging him only from forming emotional attachments. Not only
did they want to inspect each girl; they wanted his normal drives grati-
fied, so that sexual impulse would not influence his marriage. Natalia
personified their ideal. In her they saw every qualification his career re-
quired. "This is the girl for youl" raved his father, who immediately set
out to promote a marriage, showering Natalia with presents from New
York, among them a fur jacket from Saks. Natalia's mother, equally en-
thralled with Sakharov and his career prospects, became just as ardent a
proponent of marriage.
Physical attraction was the strongest bond Sakharov and Natalia
shared. Under the influence of it and parental pressures, they married in
November 1965. But their differences in personality, temperament, and
outlook soon caused sharp conflict. Sated by the materialism of his up-
bringing, affected by his experiences in Estonia and on the collective
farm, Sakharov no longer looked upon luxury, privilege, and status as
ends unto themselves. In quest of other goals, he read underground
literature and came to regard Solzhenitsyn as a sublime example of
courage and Russian patriotism. He had not completely shed the biases
and class snobbery taught to him since childhood. Yet he had developed
a tolerance and compassion toward others that made him interested in
matters beyond his own self-interest. Natalia wholeheartedly embraced
the New Class materialism and aspirations he now rejected. She looked
upon Solzhenitsyn as a fool for not bending his talents to service of the
state and reaping rewards in return. And she treated the slightest frus-
tration of her whims as cause for indignation or an outright tantrum.
They argued frequently and tempestuously. Sometimes after arguments,
days passed without their speaking to each other. Had it not been for the
birth of Yekaterina and awareness that divorce would. preclude them
from achieving their common goal of going overseas, they certainly
would have separated. ;
As soon as Sakharov announced his readiness in November 1968 to
join the KGB, Vasili Ivanovich consummated the recruitment by requir-
ing him to sign the standard KGB secrecy oath. It did not occur to Sa-
kharov that he first should consult his family. He assumed they would
be proud. Though never discussing details, hi.s._father_always , left the
impression that he served the KGB as. much .as the Ministry. of Foreign
Affairs. Once be boasted: if I wanted, I could come home tomorrow in
the uniform of a KGB colonel." Yet when Sakharov confided that he was
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joining the KGB, his father, for the first time in his life, shouted at hiai
in rage.
"My son will not be a Chekist!" he yelled; "Neverl" With, unprece-
dented vehemence, he named friends fired from the KGB after the
death of Stalin, after the discovery in 1962 that Colonel Oleg Penkovsky
was a spy, and as a consequence of some unexplained convulsion in the
mid-1960s. "One man makes a mistake, and ten innocent men are fired to
,
he continued. "They discover one American or British spy, and a hun-
dred are fired. And when the KGB fires you, your life is at an end. You
can do nothing. No one will touch you!
"If you slip in the MFA, you can catch yourself. You are not ruined.
There are other places to go. And the MFA does not take away your
soul."
Overwhelmed, Vladimir asked in bewilderment: "Isn't it true that
you yourself have worked for the KGB? Aren't many of your friends
in the KGB?"
"I live as I must. You must live as you can," his father quickly
answered. "There are good men in the KGB, and I have friends. That
I do not deny, but we will not always be here to protect you.
"Now hear my warning. I cannot stop you. But if you join the KGB,
I disown you. I will never help you again. You will get nothing from
me, ever."
"Father, it is impossible," said Sakharov. "I have signed the papers.
Tomorrow I start the physical examinations. What can I. do?"
"Do nothing. Just don't go near them again," his father ordered.
"I will arrange everything."
At the Institute the next afternoon, the Personnel Department sent a
note commanding Vladimir to telephone the KGB number he first called.
He ignored it, and the messages that followed. On the third day, the
:KGB stopped calling. Seemingly, his father's influence had prevailed.
Earning twenty-three of a maximum twenty-five points on his -.final
examinations, Sakharov was graduated from the Institute in January 1968
and assigned as an.assistant attache to the Soviet consulate in Alexandria.
After weeks of briefings at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he, Natalia,
and Yekaterina departed from Odessa in May by ship. Awaiting them
at the pier in Alexandria was a Russian of about forty, with dark hair, a
pleasant round face, and a paunch spilling over his belt. "I am Viktor
Sbirunov, vice consul," he introduced himself. "I have a nice apartment
for you right across the hall from mine. Come on, my wife has supper.'
As they drank and talked, Sakharov perceived.that Sbirunov knew
virtually everything about him-his family's connections, his accomplish-
ments at the Institute, his service in Yemen, even his aborted recruitment
by the KGB. Obviously Sbirunov was the -KGB Resident, a fact he pri-
vately acknowledged later in the evening.
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 SECRETS FROK THE DESERT 45
Sbirunov was a tough, aggressive, effective officer, a genuine Chekist
who already had attained in life more than he expected. His career
started as a militia invesigator in the Caucasus. He later worked his way
into the KGB. by acting as a local informant and by :sheer tenacity ulti-
mately gained a transfer to Moscow. He then took night courses at the
university and, in the expansion of KGB foreign operations during the
early 1960s, was shifted to the First Chief Directorate. His language was
obscene, his jokes vulgar, his table manners messy. "I fought my way up
from the village into the KGB and made myself what I am today," he
liked to boast .
A small incident that evening demonstrated to Sakharov that Sbiru-
nov was a true Chekist Three Russian women, one crying and hysterical,
came to the apartment as they finished supper. From what Sakharov
overheard of their conversation in the hall, he gathered that the crying
woman had just been the victim of an attempted rape. Nov she vaguely
sought some sort of redress, or at least consolation, from a Soviet official.
"You fool! What do you expect- me- to- do?" Sbirunov snapped. "The
Arabs are subhuman and act like animals. You are supposed to be civi-
lized' and have sense enough to know that. I have told you not to go to
the marketplace at night. You are to blame, not the animal. Stop bawling
and go home. If you make more trouble, I will send you back [to the
Soviet Union]."
Returning to the table, Sbirunov ' shook his head. "The Egyptians
are Arabs, and the Arabs are all just like niggers," ? he declared. "Sub- ?
human, all of them. I tell you, though, sometimes I don't know who are
worse, the subhumans or our stupid women." Natalia smiled as ii she
had just beard something very chic.
After the wives had retired to another room, Sbirunov referred to
Sakharov's dealings with the KGB in Moscow. "You tried to run away
from us," he said laughing. "No one gets away from us. You see, we have
you now." Sakharov laughed also. He realized that to avoid the bother
of contesting his father, the KGB had let him go in Moscow, fully in-
tending to recover him in Egypt. Sbirunov didn't even ask him if he
wanted to work for the KGB. From that evening on, Sbirunov and other.
KGB officers simply told him what to-do and treated him as one of theirs.
Natalia and Sakharov were instantly popular in the Soviet colony.
The Russians liked to show off such a strikingly handsome couple in
diplomatic society, representing them as typical young Soviet emissaries.
Attired in clothes Sakharov's father had bought for her on Fifth Avenue,
Natalia was one of the more elegant women in Alexandria. She taught
herself English, learned to prepare exotic Middle Eastern dishes, and
? The word Sbirunov actually used was the plural of "chesno:hopy," the term by
which Russians popularly refer to black people of all nationalities. Literally trans-
lated, it means "black ass."
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charmed those Russians and foreigners who could help her husband.
Though their private relations remained empty and often antagonistic,
in every other way Natalia was precisely the asset Sakharov's family had
sought for him. Sakharov, however, needed no help. The eagerness and
ease with which he accomplished assignments, menial or complex, led
the KGB to congratulate itself on its own perspicacity in co-opting him.
Everyone considered him an inordinately gifted. young man who realized
that he still had much to learn and who was determined to learn so that
he could better serve his country. His thoughtful questions impressed his
superiors, and his habit of returning to the consulate to work alone two
or three nights. a week further testified to his devotion.
These were important and dramatic, times to be with the KGB in
the Middle East, where the Soviet Union had mounted its greatest sub
versive operation of the decade. Whereas the Czars yearned for warm-
water ports on the Mediterranean, Soviet leaders coveted control of
Middle East petroleum, which comprises about 60 percent of the earth's
reserves. Already, Western Europe and Japan depend almost entirely
upon the Middle East. for the oil that fuels their economies. According
to some projections, unless American domestic resources are better ex-
ploited, by 1990 the United States will have to buy fully half of its
petroleum from the Middle East. Thus, Soviet strategists accurately
equated the power to control or interrupt the flow of oil from the Middle
East with the power to blackmail the West and Japan.
By the summer of 1868, the Soviet Union had progressed far toward.
converting Egypt into its principal base of subversion against the Arab
world. In return for some $2.5 billion worth of arms and aid, President.
Nasser had mortgaged both the policies and economy of his country to
the Russians: Soviet officers gave orders to the Egyptian military. Soviet
engineers supervised Egyptian'workers in the construction of bases from
which Arabs subsequently were barred. An extraordinary delegation from
the Central Committee itself, along with some fifty KGB and GRU
officers, stood watch in Cairo to ensure that Egyptian actions reflected
Soviet interests. Among themselves, the Russians, only partially in jest,
referred to Egypt as the 'Soviet Egyptian Republic."
Nevertheless, Soviet dominance of Egypt was neither absolute nor
completely secure. Certainly the Russians could not consider Egypt an
integral part of their empire as they do East Germany, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, and Hungary. In each of these Eastern European satellites, the
Soviet Union has installed an indigenous New Class largely unsupported
by the people. Because their rule rests solely upon Soviet power, these
regimes must remain servile to Moscow. Nasser, however, commanded
the allegiance of the Egyptian populace and thus retained at least an op-
lion of, independent action. The Russians also worried about a quiescent
minority of Western-oriented Egyptians who opposed subserviency to
 .,~? AnnrrnicrJ ~nr Rclc~ec')f1f17/f1S2/1R ? (`lA_Rf)DPPPfflAA' Pf r)lrr) V1FfVV11_Q
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~~'S -,.afi:'+t~. _ _r -i._ ..~'.,.~,~..~?`si .'uz'~. s.r_.~,?.r~.z, ~ ^.a. x... __ ._..? ?a - .... _ ... .... .:_.. - ... -
the Soviet Union. They also realized that an accommodation between the
Arabs and Israel would'diminish Egyptian need, for Soviet arms and thus
endanger their hold on Nasser.
Therefore, the KGB endeavored to build a hidden foundation for
an enduring Soviet dominance. It recruited agents in the Egyptian mili-
tary, the security services, the press, the universities, the governing Arab
Socialist Union Party, and even among Nasser's personal advisers. Shortly
before Sakharov arrived, it also started to penetrate those groups sym
pathetic to the West. The Russians relied on all of these agents to re-
inforce covertly their influence over the existing Egyptian regime. And
they counted on them to form the nucleus of an Egyptian New Class
wholly beholden to the Soviet Union.
Sakharov in executing KGB asignments, reading secret dispatches,
translating intelligence reports from Arabic, and listening to KGB shop
talk, was able to watch the Soviet strategy unfolding. Sbirunov in-
structed him to cultivate selected Egyptians the KGB considered vulner-
able to subversive overtures. One was Abdel Madsoud Fabmi Hasan,
the young chief of an intelligence unit assigned to protect and watch
foreign consulates in Alexandria. "It is normal for you as a new officer to
introduce yourself and state our desire for good relations," Sbirunov told
Sakharov. "Hasan is a little man now. But never forget that little men
sometimes grow into big men."
Taking along a bottle of whisky, Sakharov visited Hasan and sub-
sequently invited him to dinners and then to a diplomatic reception, where
he presented Sbirunov. Periodically Sakharov called on the Egyptian
with gifts, usually caviar or whisky, which he sometimes explained away
as part of an "overshipment" mistakenly sent to the consulate. After
about three months, Sbirunov ordered him to stop seeing Hasan.
"He may be offended,- said Sakharov. "1Ve have become rather good
friends.'
"He understands," Sbirunov replied.
Sakharov never saw the Egyptian again. But later he translated re-
ports about Egyptian intelligence operations and foreigners in Alexandria
that Hasan regularly provided Sbirunov.
The Egyptian responsible for counterintelligence on Russians in the
Alexandria area was Major Abdel Hadi el-Sayed. As part of a plan to
suborn him, the KGB arranged a scholarship for his brother to study. in
the Soviet Union. Sakharov met the brother before his departure for the
Agricultural Institute in Tbilisi and, using this tenuous social link, intro-
duced himself to the major. Thereafter, he followed the usual pattern of
. development-until Sbirunov interceded to take charge. of el-Sayed.
Sbirunov also encouraged Sakharov to strike up acquaintances with
government officials and businessmen on his own. Local communists were
the only Egyptians with whom contact was prohibited. Sakharov pitied
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_ -.._:. _~, az? - ~;-=sue:
these idealistic Marxists. They had been persecuted for years, first under
King Farouk, then under Nasser, who, as -a sop to the anticommunist
elements among his people, periodically made a great show of jailing
them. Now the Russians scorned them as foolish, troublemaking "amateur
Marxists" or agents of the Chinese. "The trash of society," Sbirunov
called them. The communist editor Mohammad Koreitim offered. to de-
vote an issue of his magazine to commemoration of Lenin's birth, asking
only that the Russians promise to buy five hundred copies. The Russians
turned him down, and after he kept pleading, evicted him from the con-
sulate. Faithful to the cause, Koreitim published the commemorative
edition anyway from his own sparse resources. Sbirunov merely laughed
when Egyptian journalists subsequently accused Koreitim of taking a
Soviet bribe.
Although Sakharov never revealed his KGB affiliation to anyone in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he assumed that his nominal boss, Con-
sul General Oleg Shumilov, had been briefed about it. However, in June
Shumilov asked him to his office and shut the door. "A very serious
matter has arisen," he announced gravely. "I am informed that two nights
ago you went to a nightclub with an Egyptian. Our rules are clear, and
you violated them by failing to report this contact. What is your expla-
nation?"
"Lam seeing the Arab at Sbirunov's orders," Sakharov answered.
"Who do you think you are working for?" Shumilov exploded. "The
KGB or the MFA?"
"I am working for the Soviet Union," replied Sakharov.
Shumilov misconstrued this as a calculated impertinence, and his
face reddened. "Young man; I don't care who you are or who your father
is!" he shouted. "The Ministry sent you here to work for me. If you do
anything else without consulting me first, I will ask the ambassador to
send you home."
Shumilov offered him an awkward apology. "Neither one of us can con-
tiol the circumstances," Sakharov said respectfully. "I still want to do my
duty for the MFA. Ask anything of me. I will help in every way I can."
The incident left Sakharov with a kind of immunity and liberty
rarely enjoyed by Russians abroad. Under the aegis of the KGB, he could
circulate freely among foreigners, and Shumilov no-longer dared inquire
about his associations or whereabouts. Because he performed some con-
sular duties, the KGB did not demand as full an accounting of his time
and contacts as it did from its own staff officers or from regular diplo-
mats. Thus, no one questioned him when he took long afternoon drives
across the desert-where neither Russians nor Egyptians could follow
him without being detected. If questioned, he was prepared to explain
that because of his evening work he seldom could spend time with his
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 daught, Yekaterina, whom he was merely treating to a swim in the sea.
On one occasion while they were frolicking together in a gentle
surf, an immense man, weighing at least 320 pounds, wallowed toward
them like a fat walrus. He had a long black beard, coal-black hair and
eyes, and an intelligent, raffish face. Delighted to encounter fellow Rus-
sians, he introduced himself in a booming bass voice as Anatoli Kaz-
noyetsky, Archbishop of the Russian Orthodox Church for all Africa. The
bishop, without doubt, was the most colorful KGB agent in the Middle
Last
He anti his tall, graceful wife soon became the Sakharovs' favorite
friends in. Alexandria. Kaznovetsky was interested in everything. Skilled
in mechanics and addicted to gadgetry, he repaired his own car, distilled
his own. liqueurs, and built his own spearfishing gear. He listened to
Bach and Beethoven by the hour and sometimes drank two bottles of
vodka at a single sitting with no visible effects except a florid face. He
was perfectly capable of administering religious sacraments one hour
and writing reports for the KGB the next. Beyond their common relation-
ship with KGB. Sakharov and Kaznovetsky shared many obliquely ex-
pressed perceptions of Soviet reality.
The bishop's principal KGB mission was to persuade clergymen of
other faiths to adopt and propound the Soviet view on international
issues such as Vietnam, the world peace movement, and the Arab-Israeli
con.Qlet. At the same time, he assisted in recruiting religious agents, par-,
titularly among the Copts, the Christian minority. His clerical position
also permitted him to reconnoiter African regions and social circles to
whichI official Soviet representatives were not easily admitted. At the
Alexandria consulate, Kaznovetsky dealt exclusively with Sbirunov, de-
livering written reports and receiving instructions every week. He also
traveled to Cairo about once a month to confer with the KGB Resident
tliere,IPavl Nedosekin, a ruthless wartime terrorist feared by everybody,
including Sakharov. Accompanying the bishop to Cairo on business of
his own, Sakharov saw him emerge from the guarded Room No. 6,
1 4here the embassy disbursed funds for clandestine operations.
In time. Sakharov felt,secure enough with the bishop to request a
secret! favor in behalf of himself and Natalia. "Do you think," he asked,
"that JYekaterina could be baptized? I mean, without anyone knowing,"
With a fatherly embrace, Kaznovetsky answered, "Of course, my
soon, of course."
Sakharov kept hidden in the bottom of his cufflink box a small
oiden cross given to him by his grandmother at the time of his own
laaptism. Taking it along, he searched Alexandria hoping to find a match-
ing one for Yekaterina. The night of the baptism, the bishop arranged
his living room to resemble, as nearly as possible, a sanctuary, even
sett:rg up an altar. He appeared in the magnificent vestments of the
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Russian Church, adorned with a. miter and carrying a crosier. The solemn
setting and the organ chorales from the bishops stereo made Sakharov
feel as if he were in church. After the baptismal ceremony, Kaznovetsky's
wife, in the old Russian fashion, served a grand festive supper in cele-
bration.
Saying good-night, the bishop whispered, "Do not worry, Volodiya,
no one will know." Both recognized that the KGB would consider the
baptism a mark against Sakharov. The interest in religion that it signified
might be dismissed as a harmless aberration or youthful whimsy, but the
record of the baptism would be permanent, and, should circumstances
ever arouse official. suspicions about Sakharov, it would weigh against
him.
Yekaterina fell. asleep after. the dinner, clutching a little cross in her
hand. She was a beautiful, angelic child with her mother's golden hair.
After settling her in her crib, Sakharov and Natalia spontaneously em-
braced and went to bed together for the first time in months.
Half a year or so later, the bishop approached Sakharov with a per-
sonal problem. The foreign car he owned in Moscow had long been
inoperable because it required replacement parts unobtainable in the
Soviet Union. The bishop had managed to buy all the needed parts plus
some spares in Egypt, but, as their importation was strictly illegal, he
bad no means of transporting them to Moscow. He wondered if Sakharov
might, with the aid of his diplomatic passport, take them along on his
next home leave. Aware of the dangers of smuggling contraband, Sa-
kharov hesitated. "Of course,' said the bishop, "I do not wish to involve
you in trouble. It merely occurred to me that a clever young man such
as yourself might know a way." Then he added, By the way, how is your
beautiful little Yekaterina? Every time I think of her, -I feel comforted
that she enjoys the blessing of our Lord."
It was sheer blackmail. Despite Natalia's fears, Sakharov shipped the
crate along with their luggage when they left for a Moscow vacation in
August 1969. As it happened, the customs inspector looked.at his diplo-
matic passport and waved. them on without examining their belongings.
While in Egypt, Sakharov journeyed to Cairo two or three times a
month to discharge tasks for Sbirunov or attend to consular business.
After stopping at the embassy, he customarily stayed overnight with
friends. He talked most often with KGB officers Gennadi Yenikeev and
Valentin PoIyakov; MFA Referentura Chief Ivan Ignatchenko; and an
accomplished Soviet Arabist, Sergei Arakelyan, whom Nasser idolized
and employed as his personal interpreter. During these visits Sakharov
learned much about what really was happening behind all the public
bombast and posturing typical of Middle Eastern affairs. His friends con-
fided that Soviet pilots, flying MIGs with Egyptian markings, were
dying in aerial combat. Once while he was in Cairo, the bodies of two
 Russian pilots shot down by Israeli Phantom jets were brought in from
the desert, and he saw their wives weeping on the caskets. Arakelyan
also told him of secret trips Nasser made to 'Moscow and of his con-
versations at the Kremlin.
He learned the most, however, from Sbirunov, his KGB boss, neigh
bor, and drinking companion in Alexandria. Although generally discreet,
the Resident at times did succumb to an impulse to impress people with
his secret knowledge. Drinking Scotch with him late on a spring evening
in 1969, Sakharov expressed surprise that the KGB had not detected
Israeli preparations for the lightning attack in June 1967.
"Everyone knew Israel was prepared for war," Sbirunov said. "But
the main task of any Soviet representative is to ascertain the exact date
of war and just what the enemy plans are."
"Well, in- Yemen we wondered why this was not done," Sakharov
rema
"Oh, no!" Sbirunov interjected.."There was information, exact in-
form, ation. We learned the exact date of the attack and the hour of the
attack. That was sent to the Center. We were astonished they did not
tell the Arabs. Maybe they did not believe it or doubted the source.
Maybe it was just a routine fault at the Center, or maybe it was planned.
I don't know."
Sakharov, of course, was intrigued by this assertion that the KGB
acquired and yet withheld momentous intelligence that might have,
spared the Arabs their military debacle. Less than a week later he was
even more intrigued by a revelation Sbirunov casually made at a routine
consulate staff meeting. Present were Consul General Shumilov; Sbirunov
and Sakharov, representing the KGB; the GRU Resident; and the Central
Committee representative. Sakharov asked whether the increasing influ-
ence in the Egyptian government of a comparatively moderate editor,
Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, might augur difficulties, for the Soviet
Union.
"No, not so long as Sharaf stays where he is," answered Sbirunov.
"I never heard of him," said Shumilov.
"Sami Sharaf in reality is the foremost figure in the government. He
is the intelligence adviser to the President, the man Nasser listens to
most," declared Sbirunov. "From our standpoint, he is the most positive
force in Egypt. He is the one we rely on."
Sbirunov spoke truthfully but not wisely. Sharaf was far too impor-
tant to be exposed to those who had no real need to know about him.
In fact, at the time, Sami Sharaf was one of the most important KCB
agents in the world. He represented a case of a "little man" who grew.
into a "big man"; a vindication of the KGB practice of recruiting myriad
agents in the hope that a few will succeed years hence, a classic illustra-
tion of how a single agent of influence can alter history.
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. Sharaf, barely five feet six inches tall, with his stooped, round
shoulders, bulging stomach, bald head, dark, moony eyes, and 'droop'ing
mustache, looked like a sad pear. His appearance belied his quick mind,
natural talent for intrigue, tough, ambitious- personality uninhibited by
scruples, and seemingly inexhaustible capacity for work. Aside from
treason, he had no personal vices. The chief indulgence he granted him-
self was an occasional evening at the movies with his wife. .
KGB cultivation of Sharaf began in 1955, when he visited Moscow
with one of the first Egyptian military missions seeking Soviet aid.
Shortly thereafter the procommunist All Sabry, who then headed the
Egyptian cabinet, appointed Sharaf his assistant. Whether he did so at
Soviet prodding is unknown. Sharaf soon reorganized Sabry's office, in -
the process gathering more power into his own hands and gaining direct
access to Nasser. He returned to Moscow in 1957 with another Egyptian
delegation, and again the KGB assiduously courted him. Sharaf visited
New York in -3958 and. twice met secretly with Vladimir Suslev, a KGB
officer posing as a counselor with the Soviet delegation to the U.N.
Even some former KGB officers knowledgeable about the Sharaf
case are not sure precisely when he became a. controlled agent. Evidence
suggests that the year was 1958. For subsequent to 1958 Sharaf was not
mentioned by his true name either at the Center in Moscow or in en-
ciphered KGB dispatches. Instead, the KGB referred to him by the type
of code name reserved for controlled agents. His was Asad,-the Arabic
word meaning "lion."
Under the misleading title of Director of the President's Office of
Information, Sharaf emerged in 1959 as de facto chief of Egyptian intelli-
gence--the principal intelligence adviser to Nasser. He disassociated
himself from Sabry and adopted the pose, carefully formulated by the
KGB, of a fervent Arab nationalist. He argued that Egypt's- overriding
domestic goal should be realization of a'''social democracy, along with a
dominant foreign policy. objective of Arab unity leading to Israel's dis-
memberment. In every way possible, he impressed upon Nasser the view
that because of domestic political considerations, the United States would
ultimately support Israel. Therefore, Egypt would play' East against
West and extract all it could from. the Russians without compromising its
sovereignty.
With or without Nasser's knowledge, Sharaf consummated a secret
deal providing for joint Egyptian-KGB operations and Soviet training
of Egyptian intelligence officers. The arrangement _ permitted the. Rus-
sians to further penetrate the Egyptian government through the officers
they indoctrinated. It. also provided Sharaf with a pretext to meet openly
with his KGB case officer in Cairo, Vadim Kirpichenko.
By the early 1960s, Sharaf approved all foreign assignments of
Egyptian personnel, supervised security investigations of government-
-.~=~riia~-
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employees, and personally directed foreign intelligence operations of par-
ticular. interest to Nasser. For this purpose he organized within the intel-
ligence service a special network of officers reporting directly to him.
More significantly, he determined which reports reached Nasser, as well
as the, content of his daily briefings. Thus, through Sharaf, the KGB con-
trolled the intelligence that the Egyptian President relied on most to
form his judgments and national policy.
Still another dimension. of the elaborate web the KGB spun around
the Egyptians has been revealed by Ladislav Bittman,.former deputy
director of the disinformation and action department of Czechoslovak in-
telligence. Bittman, who fled to; the United States in 1968, disclosed that
during the 1960s the Czechs dangled their own agents before Egyptian
intelligence officers in Western Europe. As soon as the Egyptians recruited
some of these Czech spies, the; disinformation department supplied them
with;a stream of false but persuasive reports alleging French, British, and
American perfidy against Egypt. To the Egyptians this fake intelligence
was 'all the more convincing because it presumably resulted from their
own' enterprise. And Sharaf was able to cite it as documentation. in sup-
port'of the anti-Western arguments he urged upon Nasser.
:Sharaf continually sought ways to erode Egyptian ties with the West.
With KGB guidance, he planned the November 1964 mob demonstration
that culminated in the burning of the United States Information Service
library in Cairo.
As Nasser s most intimate confidant, Sharaf by 1967 attained power
in Egypt second only to that of the President himself. It was Sharaf who
relived presidential ordeis to Egyptian cabinet ministers, becoming in
-effect their superior. But his greatest influence upon Egyptian affairs
derived from his success in masking his true allegiance. Nasser realized
that the Russian advice was self-serving and might not coincide with
Egypt's interests. He also recognized that many of his associates, notably
Vice President Ali Sabry, Interior Minister Sharawi Gomaa, and War
Minister Mohammed Fawzi, were Soviet allies. But he had no reason to
question his trusted and loyal intelligence chief, who, guided by the
KGB, steadfastly maintained the posture of a patriot concerned only with
what was best for Egypt.'Sharaf, in fact, was the one man upon whom
Nasser felt he could rely for objective counsel. And during the critical
spring of 1967, when Nasser was making the decisions that would lead
to war or peace, Sharaf presented him the picture of the world the
KGB wanted him to see.
Like Consul General Shumilov, Sakharov had not heard of Sharaf
until Sbirunov incautiously, praised hi-n. But the. casual- remarks of the
Resident conveyed to him extraordinary meaning. And during the next
year, the one subject about which he most tried to learn was Sarni Sharaf.
In May 1970, Soviet Ambassador Sergei Vinogradov called Sakharov
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54 KGB
to Cairo.. After flattering him with comments about his performance in
Alexandria, he announced that "the neighbors"-an MFA term for the
KGB-had requested that Sakharov be assigned to Cairo. If Sakharov
agreed to the transfer, the ambassador could guarantee him an excellent
apartment and a promotion. Sakharov accepted with alacrity. Cairo ranked
as a major center of KGB operations, and he particularly wanted to be
stationed there. Unfortunately, his plans were to be thwarted.
Three or four days later, Sakharov's mother telephoned him from
Moscow. "Have you heard about your new assignment?" she asked.
"Yes," he replied. "I saw the ambassador last week."
"Oh, it's not the one you think," his mother said proudly. "You are
going to the golden land. Your father has arranged it."
Sakharov muttered some words of thanks, disguising his disgust. In
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the "golden Iand" meant Kuwait, the oil-
rich Arabian emirate on the Persian Gulf. Years before, through some
bureaucratic miscalculation, the Soviet government had authorized per-
sonnel stationed in Kuwait an unduly high cost-of-living allowance. With
this extra money, Soviet personnel in Kuwait could buy duty-free Western
products that commanded huge sums in Moscow and thereby accumulate
a small fortune. Sakharov long since had ceased caring about money,
but he did care about what he could learn in Cairo. Once more, though,
his family had interceded to control and change his life. There was nothing
to do but go to Kuwait.
The third day after he landed there, Sakharov unexpectedly met.
Stanislav Yeliseev, a young Soviet diplomat and friend of his student
days. Over dinner, Sakharov deliberately mentioned that the KGB had
advance intelligence on the surprise Israeli attack in 1967, knowing
Yeliseev had been working in the Middle East section of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Moscow at the time of the Arab-Israeli war. "Yes,
that is true," Yeliseev said. "Later it became known in the MFA that
we were informed in advance but did not tell the Egyptians. The big
question was, Why?" That was all Yeliseev could offer. Though Sakharov
tried, he never learned anything more about the fascinating possibility
that the KGB may have furthered the Arab defeat.
Yeliseev was far mor' talkative about the miserable morale of the
Soviet colony in Kuwait. As Sakharov soon saw for himself, it was in. a
state of sullen, mutinous disarray created by the newly arrived ambas-
sador, Nikolai Kuzmich Tupitsyn.
A mean, foolish, and autocratic functionary, Tupitsyn had received
the ambassadorship in reward for years of slavish service as a Party secre-
tary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was an aging, tyrannical bu-
reaucrat who enjoyed flaunting authority. So he banned the sale of
duty-free liquor, prohibited recreational use of the embassy motor launch,
and forbade the traditional. farewell parties. He himself drank steadily
'~uw : as .r to v ~.+ r. m,, ,mss, .rte
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 Approved For Release 2007/08/16 CIA RDP88B00443R001500050001-9
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from mid-morning on, and often commandeered the launch for fishing.
From Moscow, Tupitsyn imported four lackeys to develop his own in-
formant network within the colony. Among them was his secretary and
mistress; Rita Smolicheva, a redheaded shrew.
Normally, a KGB Resident would have warned the Center about
such an ambassador. Yet the Resident in Kuwait, Lieutenant Colonel
Vladislav Sergeevich Lobanov, wearily had retreated into himself after
twenty-five years of subversion and espionage. He still did his job but
without the old Chekist impulses.
Unless an offender was Jewish or obviously incorrigible. Lobanov
no longer filed the derogatory reports that led. to recall. "You know our
system," he told a young GRU officer arrested for drunkenness. "If some-
one who doesn't like you found out about this, he could ruin you. Now,
let's forget about it and not let it happen again: Once he remarked to
Sakharov: "It is no wonder our young people are turning to religion.
What. else can we give. them besides alcohol?" Sakharov felt that if
Lobanov had been a younger man, he would have been a likely candidate
for defection to the British or Americans, whom he admired. As it was,
the Resident wanted merely to complete his tour without incident and
retire- to his dacha with his books, folk music, and garden. He was pa-
tronizing toward Tupitsyn, content to watch in amusement as the ambas-
sador clumsily tried to enforce the security procedures that were the
proper province of the KGB. If security collapsed, as it soon did, Lobanov
could rationalize that the ambassador was to blame, as he largely was.
Conditions in Kuwait were radically different from those Sakharov
knew in Egypt, where the Russians could do as they pleased. The Kuwaiti
security service was vigilant, efficient, and devoid of any illusions about
the Russians. Moreover, the Kuwaitis realized that so long as the Soviet
Union wished to maintain diplomatic relations with them, they could
maintain as tough a policy as they wanted toward KGB personnel. They
rigidly restricted the number of Russians allowed in the country. While
Sakharov was there, the whole colony seldom totaled more than thirty,
including women and children. To Tupitsyn's blustering demands that
the quota be increased, the Kuwaiti replied that there were quite enough
Russians there already, perhaps even too many. In Western countries,
KGB officers have swung at photographers, assaulted citizens, and staged
kidnappings, yet remained physically untouched by local police. But a
Kuwaiti policeman, after being slugged by a drunken GRU officer,
knocked down the Russian, picked him up, and beat him. The police kept
the Russian in jail for three days, then ordered the embassy to come and
get him.
In this dismal working climate, Sakharov expected to see or learn
little. But on Monday of his second week in Kuwait, Lobanov gave him
an assignment for which he could not reasonably have hoped.. specialist
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in operations against Turkey, Lobanov knew no Arabic. Neither did the
GRU. Resident, Valentin Yakovlevich Zimin, who barely spoke English.
A translator promised by the Center was long overdue, and a growing
backlog of reports remained untranslated. Because of the KGB endorse-
ments from Egypt that preceded his arrival, the Resident felt he could
trust Sakharov to process them. To do so, though, Sakharov'would require
some preliminary briefings.
The agents' reports, the files and messages to and from the Center
to which Sakharov now obtained access, were revealing. Sakharov learned
much more as he was taken into the confidence of both the KGB and
GRU Residents. In time, he was able to identify numerous agents, recog-
nize embryonic penetrations, and discern the general. outline of four ?
major Soviet operations.
One was aimed at sabotaging the oilfields and eventually subverting
the government of Saudi Arabia. The KGB there had established and
was attempting to sustain a terrorist guerrilla organization calling itself
the Front of Liberation of Saudi Arabia. Sakharov translated several
reports from KGB agents planted among the terrorists, written in invisible
ink and mailed to drops in Kuwait. Each contained some complaint about
the extreme difficulty of operating against the government, and one
bemoaned the quick execution of terrorists who were -captured.
The KGB also had begun to build cells of terrorists in the oil sheik-
doms south of Kuwait, along the Persian Gulf. Here again it sought to
wrest control of another source of Middle East oil vital to Western Eu-
rope and Japan. To attract future terrorists, the KGB held out to youths
of these sheikdoms the lure of scholarships in the Soviet Union, where the
most apt could be observed, recruited, and trained. Sakharov noted that
eighty young men from the sheikdom of Qatar alone had already been
ferried clandestinely to Russia through Cairo.
A third operation, consisting of a brutal campaign of urban terrorism,
kidnapping, and assassination directed against Turkey, was much more
advanced and successful. It began in the early .1960s with a few agents
recruited by KGB officers working out of the Soviet embassy in Ankara
and trained in the Soviet Union. Back in Turkey, this cadre inducted
more radicals into the terrorist movement, some of whom were slipped
into adjoining Syria for training in camps supervised by the Russians. The
consequent violence, which produced martial law, curfews, and other
social dislocations, starkly exemplifies how the KGB has perfected the
techniques of convulsing a society at little cost or risk to the Soviet Union.
Finally, the KGB and CRU were joined in an extremely sensitive
effort to penetrate, dominate, and exploit the Palestinian guerrillas.. The..
Soviet purpose was to neutralize Chinese influence among the Palestinians
and, ultimately, to harness the guerrillas as a force against those Arab
leaders trying to stay independent of a Russian hegemony over the Middle
is
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East. To avoid antagonizing the many Arab rulers who already felt men-
aced by the mercurial,- unpredictable Palestinians, the Russians denied
them official recognition. When the Palestinian chieftain Yasir Arafat
visited Moscow,in 1970, for example, he was received by the Soviet Afro-
Asian Solidarity' Committee-a KGB front-rather than by any representa-
tives of the Soviet government.
However, in the summer of 1970, the KGB began smuggling arms
to the Palestinian Liberation Army through Egypt.? The GRU dispatched
thirty Palestinians to the Soviet Union to convert them into controlled
agents while training them in guerrilla warfare. It also developed an
influential agent in Colonel Sha'ir, a Syrian Palestinian in the Liberation
Army.
Sakharov discovered no evidence of Soviet complicity in the hijack-
ing and destruction of commercial airplanes that the Palestinians under-
took shortly after they were assured secret. Russian support. But the
Russians were alarmed by the possibility that their clandestine relations
might be exposed and cause them to be blamed for the more reckless ter-
rorism. The Central Committee on May 10, 1971, issued an urgent top-
secret order forbidding all Soviet embassies from any further dealings
with the Palestnians. Contacts thereafter were made by KGB and GRU
ofncers in the veld and by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.
Though none of these major operations originated from Kuwait, the
KGB and CRU, Residencies there assisted in'all of them. An annual quota
system required both Lobanov and Zimin to recruit at least three Pales-
tinians for indoctrination in the Soviet Union and subsequent infiltration
into the guerrilla movement. In addition, the KGB in Kuwait sought to
manipulate segments of the Palestinian Liberation Organization through
one of its principal agents, Dr. Ahmad Khatib, a wealthy businessman
driven by pathological hatred of the Kuwaiti royal family. Through in-
fluence Khatib exerted on Palestinians around Foreign Minister Sheik
Jaber el-Ahmad, the KGB in 1970 promoted the Kuwaiti decision to
suspend subsidies to independent Jordan. The information Sakharov ob-
tained, of course, was often fragmentary. Lobanov confided, for example,
that he was involved in the Turkish operation, without letting Sakharov
know just how. But Sakharov did glean names of Armenian, Ceylonese,
Indian, and British residents of Kuwait used by the KGB in the operations
against the sheikdoms and Saudi Arabia.
In the same way he had succeeded with Sbirunov in -Alexandria,
Sakharov earned the confidence of Lobanov through his display of ef-
? The New York' Times of September 18, 1972, quoted unnamed Palestine guerrilla
sources as "stating that the Soviet Union had begun to supply arms.directly to the
Al Fatah organization. The report came thirteen days after the Black September
terrorist group, an element of Al Fatah, murdered eleven members of the Israeli
Olympic delegation at Munich.
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ficiency, enthusiasm, and diligence. And as in Egypt, he established a
routine that allowed him time alone on deserted beaches and at the office.
He ordinarily awakened about 6 A Nr., fixed a breakfast of Nescafe and
cornflakes, then drove to the beach, ostensibly for a swim. At 2, P.%f.,
when the official tropical workday ended, he returned to his apartment,
some eight miles from the embassy, ate lunch, and took a nap. After play-
ing with Yekaterina, he often went back to the embassy around seven
and worked alone until ten or eleven o'clock.
Like Referentura personnel the world over, the guards were not
allowed off the grounds without an escort, and Sakharov volunteered to
be their escort. He took their wives shopping, brought them snacks at
night, and became their friend. Sakharov cultivated their friendship in
hope that, in some future emergency or other special circumstances, he
might prevail.upon them to bend the rules and let him into the Referen-.
tuna alone for a few minutes.
The morning of May 22,1971, Sakharov called upon Lobanov, intend-
ing to suggest that he was now prepared to become a staff officer of-the
KGB. His words and actions had been planned precisely. He had been
overseas three years. Soon he would be recalled for a tour of at least two
years at the Ministry, where his access to information might be relatively
limited. He now needed to join the KGB officially and permanently, no
matter what his father thought. But he did not want to take the initiative,
to be a supplicant. He calculated that if Lobanov informed the Center
that he was receptive, the assignment would come to him.
But before Sakharov could even bid him good morning, Lobanov
asked, "Have you heard the news-from Cairo?"
`No, I have been swimming," replied Sakharov.
"They have wiped us out!" exclaimed Lobanov. "Sadat arrested all
our people-Sabry, Gomaa, Fawzi-everybodyl"
_ Was there a man named Sharaf? " asked Sakharov.
"The intelligence chief? Yes, him too," responded Lobanov.
President Anwar Sadat had not "wiped out" all KGB agents in the
Egyptian government. But he had crushed an imminent coup and created
absolute pandemonium*at the Kremlin..
In another Middle East miscalculation, the Russians had totally mis-
judged Sadat. When he succeeded Nasser in September 1970, they looked
upon him as a colorless mediocrity, an inoffensive bureaucrat who, after
a decent interval, could be displaced by their own men. However, he
soon demonstrated both a shrewd competence and an alarming inclination
to govern Egypt in terms of its own interests rather than those of the
Soviet Union. Though Sadat was neither pro-Western nor anti-Soviet, he
was sufficiently independent that. by. the spring of 1971, the Russians
concluded they should dispose of him.
A ranking Egyptian delegation departed from Moscow on April 15
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after observing the 24th Party Congress. One member, Sami Sharaf,
stayed behind, it was announced, for a "medical checkup.' Actually, Sharaf
remained to consult with the KGB about a coup-a coup by which the
Soviet Union intended to install its own New Class of Egyptian rulers and
transform the country openly into a "Soviet Egyptian Republic." Some-
how, Sadat learned of the plot and crushed it, arresting Sharaf and
ninety other conspirators.
In the Kremlin the arrests raised a specter of disaster. The whole
Soviet position in the Middle East, as well as its multibillion-dollar invest-
ment, now seemed jeopardized. Fearing mob assault on their embassy in
Cairo, the Russians hurriedly erected a wall around it and stationed
soldiers with machine guns on the roof. Soviet President Nikolai V.
Podgorny, who had worked well with the Egyptians before, flew to
Cairo to assess and try to repair the damage. Through a combination of
threats and promises, he extracted from Sadat a treaty pledging continued
Egyptian cooperation.? The treaty notwithstanding, the Egyptians sen-
tenced Sharaf to death for treason, though Sadat commuted the sentence
Because Lobanov was so preoccupied with the Egyptian situation
that May morning, Sakbarov decided to await a more propitious time to
broach the subject of joining the KGB. But the KGB Resident left on
vacation in early June before Sakharov found occasion to speak to him.
Each day, driving to and from the embassy, Sakharov rounded a
certain traffic circle and scrutinized a Volkswagen sedan that often parked
there. Sometimes books, toys, and other items were visible in the rear
window of the can The afternoon of ;uly 10, 1971, Sakharov as usual
slowed to inspect the Volkswagen. In the rear window he saw something
that made his hands tremble and his heart pound-a bouquet of flowers.
It was an emergency signal from the American Central Intelligence
Agency. Vladimir Nikolaevich Sakharov was a CIA agent and had long
been one. Now, by placing the flowers in the car, the CIA was telling
him that he was in danger and must flee. .
To Sakharov, espionage represented the only effective, practical
form of rebellion. It caused him neither feelings of guilt nor disloyalty.
For like others of his generation and class, he never had acquired a sense
of personal identity with the Soviet Union, or an allegiance to it. He
thought of the Soviet Union simply as the place where by reason of birth
the calculated, pitiless pursuit of his own self-interest was- to occur.
Both in orgies with his New Class peers and in the despair of the
collective farm, Sakharov experienced a degradation that ultimately
caused him to reject the values he had been taught to prize. His rejection
? In an effort to liberate the arrested Soviet agents and sympathizers, Podgomy told
Fresident Sadat, "Everyone in the Soviet Union greatly admires All Sabry."
Sadat replied: "All Egyptians greatly admire Nikita Khrushchev."
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of these New Class values turned to hatred of the system that spawned
them. But he knew that to strike at the prevailing order successfully, he
would have to strike at it secretly. Thus, even while a student, Sakharov
resolved to seek, inside and outside the Soviet Union, an opportunity to
establish relations with a Western intelligence service.
When he approached the Americans, Sakharov stated that he wanted
neither payment nor asylum. He asked only opportunity to help subvert
the system by undermining the KGB. For that opportunity he daily risked
his life but gave it a sustaining purpose.
The second time he met the Americans, they began drilling him in
emergency escape procedures. He could hear the words of the American
officer: "If it happens, stay calm; above all else, stay calm. Right up to
the moment you meet us, there can be no deviation from your normal
behavior. Remember, if it happens, they may already be watching you."
As Sakharov's circumstances changed,. the CIA changed the escape plan.
The one now in effect required him to meet the Americans at a desig-
nated site at 11:20 P.M. Sakharnov looked at his Seiko watch, a present
from his father on his twelfth birthday. It was 2:11 P.M.
Sakharov feared not only the imminent danger but the unknown
future. He had vowed to himself and to the Americans that he would
live the rest of his life in the KGB, secretly resisting. He had no idea of
the kind of life he would begin at 11:20 P.M, assuming he survived until
then. He only knew that the end of his marriage would be merciful for
both Natalia and him. But then there was Yekaterina.
His efforts at lunch and a nap were in vain. About 4 P.m. he took a
called to Yekaterina. They drove aimlessly until. sundown, when he
stopped by the sea. He watched her, beautiful and laughing, run up and
down the beach, shrieking whenever a small wave washed over her feet.
Suddenly she ran straight to him and jumped into his arms. "Papa, why
are you crying?" she asked.
"I am not crying, ICatushka," he said. "I just have sand in my eyes."-.
Sakharov wanted to be kind to Natalia, to communicate to her in
some way that he respected her. For all the hell of their marriage, she
was still an intelligent woman with whom he bad shared parenthood and
six years of his life. He decided that he could be kindest by leaving her
with no remnants of affection for him, by making her believe that his
disappearance was a blessing. So, after they put Yekaterina to bed, he
provoked an argument. All their grievances against each other poured out
in vindictive words until she screamed, "Get out! Get out!" He kissed his
sleeping daughter and drove off to the embassy, where the guard let him
in as usual.
There, Sakharov removed documents from his safe, then went to the
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 SECRETS FROM THE DESERT 61
Referentura. on _the_ second floor. "Vasili, something urgent has come
up," he told the guard. "Could you let me in for a few minutes?"
"Why not, Volodiyai" answered the guard.
At 11:05 P.m. Sakharov said good-night to the guard and walked
away toward. the desert,, leaving the keys in his car. The only personal
belongings he carried with him were an- automatic pistol and his baptismal
cross. About.noon the next day, Russians began grimly patrolling the
airport and highway border crossings out of Kuwait. By then, Sakharov
was thousands of miles away.
The story of Sakharov is unavoidably incomplete because he has
refused to disclose when, where, or how he became an agent of the CIA
or to reveal precisely what he did in its behalf. The CIA similarly has
declined to answer questions about the relationship.
One of the more intriguing unanswered questions is why the CIA
chose to withdraw an agent of such value and potential. Apparently it
believed he was in danger. But why? Sakharov fled Kuwait shortly after
the Egyptian government arrested Sharaf and ninety other Soviet sym-
pathizers. Although he obviously could not have caused the arrests, may-
be there was some relation between them and his flight; maybe not.
However, Sakharov by the intelligence he provided doubtless did
damage Soviet Middle Eastern strategy, and therein lies the significance
of his story. Soviet policies based heavily upon clandestine action are in
effect hostage to the conspirators assigned to execute them. At times'
they can be ruined by the lone individual who elects to betray them.
And during the past two decades, disgusted. KGB defectors repeatedly
have undermined Soviet policies by exposing their clandestine founda-
tions.
Yet despite the reverses and risks incurred, Soviet leaders from Lenin
onward have evinced no inclination to diminish their reliance upon clan-
destine actions. One reason they have not may be found in their phi-
losophy. Former U.S. Ambassador George F. Kennan writes of earlier
Soviet leaders: "These, it must be remembered, were all men who had
renounced, as a matter of ideological conviction, the view that there were.
any absolute standards of personal morality to which one owed obedience.
Usefulness to the cause of social transformation, as defined by themselves,
was the supreme determinant of right and wrong in all human conduct,
including their own. With relation to people outside the Party itself, this
was indeed the only criterion. Here, dishonesty, trickery, persecution,
murder, torture were all in order, if considered to be useful and impor-
tant at the moment, to the cause." Such men naturally considered it better
to steal. than to buy from another country; better to seek control of a man
than to seek his cooperation; better to compromise an ambassador than
to compromise with his government.
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Perhaps it"would. be unfair to. impute this exact sam& mental set to
the contemporary Soviet leadership. Nevertheless, the present leaders
remain steeped in clandestine ways and addicted to dependency upon the
KGB. And as the ensuing chapter demonstrates, the dynamics of Soviet
society are such that it will not. beeasy for them or future Soviet leaders
to free themselves of this dependency, whatever they might themselves
desire.
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S
422 - KG3
Background of Sharaf: The details of Sharaf's background and activities
emanate from various foreign security services as well as from Sakharov.
The presence of an extraordinarily important KGB agent of influence in
the Egyptian government prior to 1971 has been further confirmed by.
another KGB defector.
Disinformation operations against Egypt: Interviews with Bittman.
Soviet personnel in Kuwait: Names of most of the Soviet nationals with whom
Sakharov dealt in Kuwait appear in the List of Diplomatic and Consular
Corps, April 1969, issued by the Kuwait Foreign Ministry; Prominent
Personalities in the USSR.
.Terrorism in Turkey: Interviews with Turkish embassy officials, Washington:
"The Trade in Troublemaking," Time, May 10, 1971.
Exploitation of Palestinian guerrillas: Soviet Analyst, June 20, 1972; "LU.R.S.S.
et Les Palestiniens," Les Informations Politiques et Sociales, Paris, Sep-
tember 23, 1972.
Trial of 91 Egyptians: New York Times, August 25, 1971.
Podgorny-Sadat agreement: Christian Science Monitor, August 25, 1971.
Sentencing of Sharaf: Christian Science Monitor, December 10, 1971.
Kerman quotation: Introduction by George Kennan to Power and the Soviet -
Elite by Boris I. Nicolaevsky, pp. xiv-xv.
CHAPTER III
Barghoorn case: Nosenko is the sole source of information concerning what
transpired within the KGB and Politburo before and after Barghoorn's
arrest. The account of the arrest and incarceration is based upon an inter-
view with Professor Barghoorn. President Kennedy's statements were pub-
lished by the New York Times, November 15, 1963, in a transcript of his
press conference. Other relevant published reports may be found in Barg-
boorn's "The Security Police"; New York Times, October 31, November
13, 16, 17, 20, 21, 1963; New York Herald Tribune, October 30, 31.
November 13, 15, 16, 1963.
--Establishment of Cheka;, Carr, Scott, Hingley, pp. 117-32.
.Dzerzhinsky quotation: Scott, p. 8.
Deaths inflicted by Cheka: Conquest, The Human Cost of Communism,
M SSIS, 1970, p. 11.
Lenin quotations: ". . . this is unheard of ..." Lenin, Works, V. 35, p. 275;
"narrow minded intelligentsia . . . sob and fuss," V. 28, pp. 331-43,
Pravda (Moscow), December 18, 1918, "merciless mass terror," V. 35,
pp. 287, 288.
Opposition to communists and revolt at Kronstadt: Scott, p. 14; Shub, p. 405.
Lenin quotations: "We have failed . . ." Conquest, p. 3; "resting directly on
force," Lenin, Works, V. 31, p. 326; letter to Kursky, V. 33, p. 321.
Conquest quotation: Conquest, p. 8.
Deaths inflicted under Stalin: ibid., p. 533.
s
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 Ececution of Beria cohorts:, interview with Deriabin..
.irrushchev as a Stalinist: Pistrak, pp. 123, 145-48, 165.
s_nrushchev speech: Speech of Nikita Khrushchev Before 'a Closed,Session of
the XCXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on
February 25, 1956, SSIS, 1957.
Wolfe quotation: Wolfe,. Khrushcheu and Stalin's Ghost, pp. 67-68.
Party announcement of June 30, 1956: Speech of Nikita Khrushchev .. .
SSIS, 1957, p. 21.
Pravda quotation: Cited by Wolfe, Khrushchev and StaIin's Ghost, p. 75.
Xhrushchev quotation regarding Chekists: ibid., p. 41.
Library of Congress study: Soviet Intelligence and Security Services, I964-
1970, A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications, with Some Addi-
tional Titles from Other Sources, R SSIS, 1972.
Pipes quotation: Pipes, p. 4.
CHRAPrER IV
T' -e chapter is based in the main upon heretofore confidential data provided
by Western security services and former KGB personnel. All but Nosenko,
Deriabin, and Sakharov have requested anonymity. Some published sources
can be cited to document portions of the chapter.
Andropov: References to Andropov's background derive from Prominent Per-
sonalities in the USSR; Valeurs Actuelles (Paris), April 26, 1967; New
York Times, Toronto Globe and Mail, May 20, 1967;. Sunday Star
(Washington, D.C.), May 21, 1967; Daily Telegraph (London). April
14,'1971. References to the Hungarian Revolution are based primarily
upon the United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Problem
of Hungary, New York, 1957, and Hungary's Fight for Freedom, a special
issue published by Life, 1956. The description of Andropov's apartment.
was supplied by Vladimir Nikolaevich Sakharov, who several times was a
guest of Andropov's son.
References to William Fisher: Los Angeles Times, August 22, 1972; New York
Times, August 27, 1972.
Scientific and Technical Directorate: Some data pertaining to Soviet scientific
and technological espionage are provided by Penkovsky, pp. 69, 77, 105,
339.
Sege report: Deakin and Storry, p. 230.
Stalin's disregard of intelligence: Rauch, p. 307; Conquest, pp. 484-89.
Ciphers, signals, and communications: New York Times, April 6, 1965; Wash-
ington Post, April 6, May 11, 1965; Toronto Globe and Mail, May 11,
1S65; Wise and Rose, p. 107. _
Persecution of Jews: Obserrer. . (London), December 12, 1971;. Washington
Post, August 12, September 26, 1972, April 20, 1973; Daily Telegraph
(London), August 14, 1972; Sunday Telegraph (London), May 21, 1972;
New York Times, April 28, 1972; Soviet Analyst, 'September 14, 1972.
i
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WASH I.NGTON - History will mark
the events in Iran, Afghanistan and
Nicaragua in 1979 as a turning point in
the invisible war between radical and
moderate forces for control of the oil
and destiny of the.Middle East and
control of Central America and Mexi-
co.
In the Middle East, the outcome of
the process now gaining momentum
might include the replacement of the
royal fa^ihes in the oil states of the
Arabian Peninsula by radical anti-
Western regimes. Among the effects of
such a change could be the use of Israel
and oil supplies as the fulcrum to divide
America. from Europe and Japan.
which dt end on that region for more
than 70 percent of their oil consump-
tion. White encouraging radical de.
stabilization in the Persian Gulf area,
the Soviet Union could use a d.plumacy
of conciliation with Europe and Japan
intended, to end any meaningful at-
liance with America.
The S a :dini.ta victory m Nicaragua
last July encouraged leftist terrurists'
assaults 4gatnst the Governments of El
Salvador and Guatemala; these con-
... .~ ,.Z rtrro ^.d .' ht ' u' . a rd
Soon. -Iliat in turn would open Mexico
to the politics of polarization through
leftist terror and to possible destabili-
zation by a coalition of reformist, r -di-
cal and Communist groups opposed to
the current regime. Mexico might then
become an Iran-next-door.
United States policy toward the Mid-
,.t..:._^. . al~~ ^ ale
cal war that is raging could be lust. In
Central Arnenca. this requires addi-
tional support'for peaceful reform and
immediate act ion against extremist
and Cuban-supported terrorism In the
Middle East, adequate Western mili-
tary power is necessary. However this
alone will not preserve our interests
against thret' converging radical forces.
Radicalism
Abroad
By Constantine C. Menges
First. Palestinian terrorists, includ-
ing the Palestine Liberation Organiza.
lion, believe that after the ruling elites
on the Arabian Peninsula are replaced
by radicals, the Palestinians will be
able to force the entire West to abandon
Israel Second. the radical Govern-
ments of Libya. Syria. Algeria. Iran
and, to some degree. Iraq, share this
view, but they would remain hostile to
the democracies even without the pre.
text of Israel because their leaders be-
lieve much of the Marxist mythology
about Western "evils." Third. the
Soviet Union and its client govern-
ments. among them Southern Yemen's.
aim io do anything possible. short of
risking major war, that will bring the
^!! ti...^r to their control.
Oman. The failure to meet the May 26
deadline for completing negotiations
for Palestinian autonomy could be the
r..,..~ ~
Last November, the attack on they
Great Mosque in Mecca was aimed at
overthrowing the monarchy in Saudi
Arabia. Kuwait, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi,
Qatar and the United Arab Emirate%
are even more vulnerable, since their
Palestinian and Shutt Moslem minori-
ties add up to about half the population
in each state. The practical approach to
destabilization in the small oil states"
might combine pressures and threats
from neighboring Iran or Iraq with in-
ternal upheavals encouraged by radi/
cats.
Simultaneously. Soviet proxies might
be active. After the summer Olympics
have ended. Cubans and East Germans
might help Communist Southern Yemen
or Libya make use of. the hundreds of
modern tanks, armored personnel car.
riers, mobile artillery andmobile air-
defense missiles already stockpiled in
those countries.
What should be done? Rather than
waiting passively for destabilization to
strike tine country after another, a
coalition of democracies and Islamic
nations must take the offensive against
radical and terrorist networks. Dec-
ades of repression of Islam inside the
Soviet Union. and the brutality in Af-
ghanistan, should he used to show Mos-
tem peoples the co-isequences of Soviet
dominance. There should b's a solution
providing for Palestinian autonomy
based on democratically. .chosen au- -
thonty and for the security of Israel.
This will be possible only if the radical
w. _s are contained.
It is an illusion to believe that any-
thing other than the disappearance of
Israel would satisfy any of the three
radical forces. The democracies must
use conserva,ion of energy, tee;urology
and unity to establish real economic
counterpressures to the Organization of -
Petroleum Exporting Countries. And Ii-
", ?': ;: _ t-_:,t tt,^. a concerted but pit-
n7... :tv2crate
governments of oil states or there will
be a complete cessation of economic
transactions with many of the demo-
cratic nations.
C..otunhnpC. Menf es, editor of "in-
ternnhnnal Strategic Issues." a news-
letter. is author of "Spain- The Strug-
gle for Demm-rucy Today ?"
N-N1. Cl11 ISo~ e- 431-- I
Approved For Release 2007/08/16: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500050001-9
 Approved For Release 2007/08/16: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500050001-9
THE. NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, D1 CEM11F.'R 12.1976. 13
atar, Site of Oil Ministers' Conference This Week; Bolsters Its Border Guard to Block Any Terrorists J
Ii011A, halerr, Der? 11-tills leuudelnl ~Indhadl? director Ut the Qatar radial
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a.. IIruiv Iue.usIIrrti'en art plat IIn's hi 1;Ilarlt l (IIr:1 nn'IIIninarv IIIl!eIl11V herein! Ilia- IllerI to meet In (l.illar. a bleak nrnmunlurv Acrnrdlnely mnturveI army uatrnls Al.1......t ..I... 1. is a ....rl...l',In he ,'urd, nu'd o.u.:rn
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Iiaoug a i leeung next week of life url'an 1111 Wednesday fur talks that are expectedI that jlitc Irum IAc Arabian Penmwla into hordefs its try, to thwart any mlih rnhnn., to uuauthunecd vmitnrs Starting Imllar?Tremor on Iranian Ira/}t Border
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1)e,ert puntli have been intensified. rlll prlcrs, the first in 15. months.. collared anti evll?sutelling fill that bungs Foreign, applicants for visas to Inter the windows of the Gulf llotet's t00-loot- s'.da was recorded today nrlu' the lb, l n. r
Bulletproof steel shuners have been put 1'Ine pore uu'rcasesare'nf ennrruuus the sllcikilum 32 hellion it year. Qatar have been screened more catetuilyl long main banquet hell, where the meet- between Iran and Iraq al>,mt .11U Iola
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hratelrr are hewnA careful/Y screened by tvnrld's uldusltial and develuping coun?' prndinR terrorism actigm have been made During the meeting, patrol halals. nfl the hanijurt room was shuttered and ports of u1lurks or dmml;e.
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Approved For Release 2007/08/16: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01500050001-9