FOREIGN AID'S PURPOSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940017-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: March 28, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP88BOO443RO01103940017-9
Foreign Aid's Purpose.)
By Lee H. Hamilton
WASHINGTON - A major diffi-
culty with our foreign assistance pro-
gram is that It has largely become a
mechanism for helping two countries,'
Egypt and Israel.
With President Reagan's request
.for another sizeable increase - $700
million in military assistance for
Egypt and Israel - total aid for them
would rise to $4.8 billion in fiscal 1983
- $2.3 billion for Egypt and $2.5 billion
for Israel, the equivalent of more than
$45 for each Egyptian and $630 for
every Israeli. If the budget is ap-
proved, Egypt and Israel will corner
some 75 percent of our foreign mili-
tary sales program worldwide and
some 60 percent of the economic sup.
port program. Egypt will also con-
tinue to get more than 25 percent of
the food aid.
A staggering $25 billion in military,
economic, and food aid will have been
provided to Egypt and Israel from fis-
cal years 1978 through 1983. This sum.-
is nearly one-third of our worldwide
total for that period. A comparison
with the budget for Southeast Asia
during the Vietnam War is revealing:
From 1968 to 1973, Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia chewed up $17 billion in for-
eign aid - well over one-third of the
total.
That Egypt and Israel have staked.
out huge portions of the United States'
foreign aid budget is neither an argu.
ment against the aid nor the impor-
tance that we assign to their well-
being. There are persuasive reasons
for very high levels of military and
economic 'assistance to both coun-
tries, but the imbalance that such
amounts creates carries clear conse-
quences for the United States' na.
tional interests.
First, our commitments to eco-
nomic development in poor cotmtries
and to alleviation of suffering around.,
the world are called into question.
Given those rationales for foreign aid,
as stated by every post-World War II
administration, we must be uneasy
with a budget that tilts so strongly to- .;
ward two countries, however worthy,
and shows a corresponding neglect of
all others. A serious gap exists be-
tween our growing political and eco-
nomic interests in the developing
world and the low priority given the
developing world in our foreign aid
budget. The United States already is
slipping badly as a donor of economic
aid. Today, the United States ranks
15th among developed countries.
Second, serious problems arise in
our relations with other countries. The
poor nations know our attitude toward
developmental assistance; they also
know that Egypt and Israel receive
more economic aid than do all of them
combined. The imbalance breeds
envy and suspicion. Notwithstanding
our claims to the contrary, many
countries believe that we can control
those who receive so much of our aid.
Other states, including North Atlantic
Treaty Organization allies, find it'
hard to believe that they, as old
friends, receive so much less than.
Egypt, a new friend. The high levels of
assistance to Egypt and Israel are
used as leverage by Spain, Greece,
and Turkey when we negotiate mili-
tary base agreements. There is also
the danger that other countries exag-
gerate their security concerns be-'
cause they see the United States plac-
ing such a high priority on aid to two
countries that have been at war and
that maintain a military footing.
Third, there are risks for Egypt and
Israel. They expect ' enormous
amounts of American aid. Each cites'
additional aid to the other as a reason
for an increase in its own aid. Because
both are so dependent on our assist-
ance, their economies are distorted,
their debts burgeon, and their need for
more aid grows - if only to service
their debts. This is not healthy for
Egypt and Israel, nor is it in their
long-term national interests. If the
peace process eventually extends to
other countries, they too will demand
of us a large "peace dividend.".
Fourth, because of this concentra-:
tion of assistance, we have not begun to i
address adequately the world's social
and economic problems. Security and
stability in most countries depend as
much on solutions to such problems as
on military aid. If we cannot afford to
fight hunger, poverty, pollution, over-
population, disease, and illiteracy in
the poor countries, we may soon face
grave threats to security and stability
caused, in part, by our neglect.
Congress has recognized the dilem-
ma. In the 1970's, it directed that for- -
eign aid clearly support programs to
assist the poorest of the poor in solving
social problems and stimulating self-
sustaining economic growth. Budget-
ary constraints -the most notable are,
the costly Egyptian and Israeli pro-
grams and the strong emphasis on
military aid - have combined to dam-
age that mandate.
A review of our foreign aid programs
is warranted. Without turning our back
on Egypt and Israel, we need to rethink
the purposes of foreign aid, what it can :
and must achieve, and whether the
present distribution of aid is the best
we can do.
Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana Democrat, s
is choirrnan of the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee's Subcommittee on ' I
Europe and the Middle East.
Approved For Release 2007/11/13: CIA-RDP88BOO443RO01103940017-9