FULL TEXT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000100700003-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 11, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/05121 :CIA-RDP88-010708000100700003-5
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM Firing Line
DATE May 11 , 1983 1 :00 P.M.
STATION WETA-TV
PBS Network
Washington, D.C.
WILLIAM BUCKLEY: The debate rages on the matter of
Central America, with special reference to development in
Nicaragua and El Salvador. At one extreme, the President's
recent speech is being held as a reinvitation to a new Vietnam.
At the other end, perhaps not correctly designed as an extreme,
it is held that the President desires more than actually he is
willing to endorse -- namely, the substantial evacuation from
this hemisphere of satellite states that are military arms of the
Soviet Union.
We have with us two guests. Congressman Stephen Solarz,
familiar to this audience, is a member of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, and returned recently from a trip to Central
America with very emphatic views about what we should do in the
area, rivaled only by his emphatic views of what we should not do
in the area. Mr. Solarz is a graduate of Brandeis University,
with a master's degree in public law taken from Columbia. He has
served in the New York State Legislature and was elected to
Congress in 1974, and threatens to live happily there ever after.
Before returning to public service, he did a stint of journalism
and of teaching.
Adolfo Calero was born in Managua, Nicaragua. He was
graduated from the University of Notre Dame, and went then to the
University of Syracuse, where he received a degree in law. He
returned then to Nicaragua, where he went into business. He was
active in the Conservative Party, opposed consistently the
dictatorship of Somoza, and was jailed by Somoza in 1978. In
January of this year, abandoning any residual hope for libertar-
ian or social reform at the hands of the Sandinistas, he left
Nicaragua, and serves as one of the directors of the FDN,
[Spanish expression]. He is accepted as one of the leaders of
Material supplied by Radio N Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
the opposition to the Sandinista government.
We must understand that the word oppostion, where
dictatorships are concerned, tends to define military or parami-
litary opposition, since in such countries there is no way to
settle political differences by democratic means.
I should like to begin by asking Mr. Solarz, did
Congressman Christopher Dodd, speaking the other night in
rebuttal of President Reagan, exactly reflect your own views?
REP. STEPHEN SOLARZ: I think to a very large extent,
Bill, Senator Dodd reflected my views about the situation in
Central America.
REP. SOLARZ: In Central America. Although had I been
given the opportunity to respond to the President on national
television, I might perhaps have put it a little bit differently.
BUCKLEY: What would you have put differently?
REP. SOLARZ: I think that I would have tried, perhaps,
REP. SOLARZ: Well, I think Senator Dodd made a very
eloquent speech and described very effectively an alternative
perspective on the conflict in El Salvador, which it was very
useful to put before the country.
I would perhaps have tried to draw a greater distinction
between the President's policy in El Salvador, as it exists
today, and what the concrete alternatives are before us in terms
of how we ought to be proceeding in that part of the world.
BUCKLEY: And that concrete alternative, you think that
he did not sufficiently elaborate, or that you would have
elaborated it at the expense of something else that he said?
REP. SOLARZ: I think he was given ten minutes of time
on television, so I don't think it would have been possible to
have fundamentally expanded what he had to say.
I wouldn't want to create the impression that I find
myself in fundamental disagreement with his approach. I think it
did reflect the views of a substantial majority of Democrats in
the Congress; obviously not all, but most. And in that sense, I
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
think it was a fair statement of an alternative perspective on
the situation in El Salvador.
BUCKLEY: Well, let me ask you, then, this. When you
made the statement that you believe in unconditional dialogue
between Salvador and the rebels, what did you mean by uncondi-
tional dialogue?
REP. SOLARZ: I mean, in effect, a negotiation in which
both sides come to the negotiating table without preconditions.
A dialogue in which both sides are free to put any proposals on
the table, but both sides are equally free to reject any pro-
posals that they believe are not in their interest to accept.
BUCKLEY: Well, what if they don't agree?
REP. SOLARZ: Well, if they don't agree, then you don't
have an agreement. But my quarrel with the policy of the
Administration is that while the President says he does favor a
political resolution of the conflict and does favor negotiations
between the government and the opposition, he has consistently
opposed an unconditional dialogue between the government and the
opposition, which is in fact the only way to get negotiations
going, and therefore, hopefully, to achieve a negotiated resolu-
tion of the war.
BUCKLEY: Would you be in favor of an unconditional
dialogue between Israel and the PLO?
REP. SOLARZ: No, I wouldn't.
BUCKLEY: Why?
REP. SOLARZ: I'll tell you why, and I think it's a very
good question. For a number of reasons. First of all, the PLO,
according to its charter and covenant, is clearly and unequivo-
cally committed to the elimination of Israel as a Zionist state
in the Middle East. Whereas in El Salvador, whatever one may
think of the opposition -- and I want to make it very clear taht
I have no brief for the FMLNA. I think it would be most unfor-
tunate, not only for the people of El Salvador, but for the
United States, if they came to power -- it's quite clear that
they are not calling for the elimination of El Salvador as a
separate state. They're not calling...
BUCKLEY: They're calling for the elimination of
Salvadoran democracy.
REP. SOLARZ: What they are calling for, as I understand
it, is a political settlement in which free elections would be a
part of the settlement.
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
BUCKLEY: That's a joke, isn't it?
REP. SOLARZ: Not necessarily.
BUCKLEY: Well, why is it a joke that the PLO doesn't
want that? They will tell you they want to come to terms with
Israel, under certain circumstances. Well, you know, the PLO has
come a ways from the days when it said that Israel should be
eliminated. I happen not to trust the PLO. But I don't trust
the guerrillas in Salvador. But I wonder why you mistrust -- why
you trust the guerrillas but you mistrust the PLO.
REP. SOLARZ: I don't trust either of them. In the case
of the PLO, it remains very clear that their ultimate objective
is not a settlement with Israel in which they can have a Pales-
tinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, living side-by-side in
peace with Israel; their ultimate objective, as they have made
clear over and over again, is the elimination of Israel as a
Zionist state and the establishment of a Palestinian state, not
just on the West Bank and Gaza, but including what is now Israel.
And if, in fact, the opposition in El Salvador was
calling for the total elimination of the Salvadorian state, I
would certainly understand the refusal on the part of the
Salvadorian government not to enter into discussions with them.
But let me make one other point.
BUCKLEY: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Wait a minute.
First of all, I want to ask Mr. Calero something.
Mr. Calero, is there a parallel there between the
behavior of the rebels in El Salvador and the behavior of the
Sandinistas? Did the Sandinistas say when they were struggling
for power that they would not, having achieved power, grant
freedom to dissenting minorities?
ADOLFO CALERO: Well, could I first comment on the PLO
tie-up with the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, because they are there in
Nicaragua. They're flying airplanes and they've trained the
Nicaraguan Sandinistas for years. And then the Nicaraguan
Sandinistas have helped and have aided the Salvadorian communist
guerrilla. So there's a definite tie-up between the Salvadorian
guerrilla, the Nicaraguan government, Sandinista government, and
the PLO.
Now, furthermore, Nicaragua, when Israel, in a defensive
action, entered Lebanon, the Nicaraguan government, which had not
formal relations whatsoever with Israel, in order to provoke a
scandal, in order to attack Israel, they came and broke relations
with Israel, something which didn't exist. And then Israel
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100700003-5
answered back, saying, "Well, we've had no relations."
But Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan government, the Salvado-
rian guerrilla, the PLO, and Libya have a definite tie-up. And
they are Israel's enemy, the Americans', the United States'
enemy, and enemy of Nicaraguans who want democracy.
BUCKLEY: Well, I think that's true, and I'm glad you
made that particular point about the involvement with the PLO.
But here's the question I'm asking. I happen to know Mr. Solarz
moderately well, and I really honestly think that he's in favor
of freedom, though not an awful lot of freedom is generated by
his policies. And I'm asking you this: Is it or is it not true
that when the Sandinistas were fighting to overthrow Somoza, they
said that they were fighting for a democratic Nicaragua? Is it
or is that not true?
CALERO: Well, the Sandinistas, when they were fighting
against Somoza, to begin with, counted with the support of a wide
spectrum of the Nicaraguan people. We were all fooled, however.
Because once they took power, they denied every reason for which
the Nicaraguan war against Somoza was fought. They have fooled
the Nicaraguans. They have fooled the Organization of American
States. They made commitments before the Organization of
American States for democracy, pluralism, for everything that
Western democracy stands for. And they have violated, one by
one, every one of those commitments. They haven't fulfilled
them, and they have no intention, apparently, of doing.
BUCKLEY: In what sense is there to be a distinction
drawn between the Sandinistas fighting for control of Nicaragua
and the guerrillas fighting for control of El Salvador?
CALERO: Well, both the Sandinistas -- when they fought
for control of Nicaragua, they definitely were fighting for
Soviet expansionism. It's been demonstrated. It's been shown.
It's clear to the eyes of everyone. And the Salvadorians are
exactly doing the same thing. They are trying to create in El
Salvador another Soviet satellite.
BUCKLEY: Why can't he see that?
REP. SOLARZ: Let me try my hand at that, Bill, because
I think you do have a somewhat different situation.
We failed, unfortunately, in our efforts to promote a
negotiated settlement of the conflict in Nicaragua. And when the
Sandinistas came to power in that country, they came to power
after Somoza fled, after the National Guard collapsed. And to
the extent that power does come out of the barrel of a gun, as
Mao once told us, they were clearly in a commanding position,
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-01070R000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
once the revolution triumphed, to do what they pleased.
And I fully agree that the Sandinistas have betrayed the
Democratic promise of the revolution. I think that's a great
tragedy.
The potential difference in El Salvador is that we may
be in a position to achieve a negotiated settlement of the
conflict with the Salvadorian armed forces still more or less
intact, thereby providing a meaningful counterweight to the
political forces represented by the opposition.
I have no doubt, by the way, that if the government of
El Salvador collapsed and the guerrillas came to power militari-
ly, you would have in El Salvador precisely the same kind of
government you now have in Nicaragua. And I think that's
something which we ought to try to prevent. But I think we have
a much better chance of preventing it in the context of seeking a
negotiated resolution of the conflict while there is more or less
a balance of forces in that country, than continuing the policies
of the present Administration, which in my view are more likely
to produce the very result they're designed to avoid.
BUCKLEY: Well, Mr. Solarz, the only balance of forces
there exists in El Salvador is a balance that is effected by what
I call the skyjacker's leverage. One man in a 747 with 500 other
people can effect a balance of forces. In fact, he can prevail
if he is willing to throw a hand grenade out in the center of the
plane.
Now, there is no such balance of forces if those
elections meant anything at all. They were very widely observed.
They were certified by even the United Nations observers as
having been democratic. And it showed an absolute, total
opposition to the rebels.
Now, what they are simply insisting is, "We don't abide
by democracy. We're going to use guns. We're going to blow up
bridges and blow up hospitals. And we're going to to that until
the opposition is worn down."
REP. SOLARZ: I would put it a little bit differently,
Bill. I think that what the turnout in the Salvadorian elections
demonstrated more than anything else was the overwhelming desire
on the part of the Salvadorian people for peace and an end to the
conflict. They have suffered enormously, as you know, in the
last four years. Over 40,000 noncombatant Salvadorians have been
killed. Most of them, by the way, by the security forces rather
than by the guerrillas.
But I think that the government of El Salvador and our
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
own government took what was fundamentally an utterly unrealistic
position. What they, in effect, said was, when the elections
were being held last year, was that the guerrillas should lay
down their arms and come into the electoral process. And all I
can say is that however desirable that would have been, it was
utterly unrealistic to expect the guerrillas to lay down their
arms in order to run in an election supervised by security forces
that have been responsible in the last few years for the murder
of literally 40,000 of their own people through gangland-style
death squads that execute people in the middle of the night.
Just as, by the way, it would have been equally unrealistic for
the guerrillas to say to the government that the security forces
should lay down their arms and run in an election supervised by
the guerrillas.
I happen to believe that an electoral process does
provide, hopefully, the best way of bringing the conflict in El
Salvador to an end. But to the extent that it can provide a
basis for ending the war, it can only be on the basis of elec-
tions in which both sides can have some real confidence that the
security of the candidates will be protected and the results of
the election will be respected.
BUCKLEY: But my point is that nobody who is not a far-
gone romantic can entertain any such confidence. What grounds
would a Salvadoran have for believing that his right to worship,
that his right to express his points of view, his right of
freedom of the press would be protected by people who unabashedly
identify themselves, as Mr. Calero says, with the Sandinistas,
whose whole purpose, really, is to show that they are not
interested in these bourgeois distractions?
REP. SOLARZ: Well, if in fact they were the ones who
were running the election, I think that that kind of lack of
confidence would be amply justified. But presumably they
wouldn't be the ones supervising the elections.
My sense is that if you can get an agreement between the
government and the opposition to end the war based on some kind
of electoral process in which all forces and factions can
participate, it would presumably be based on an election in which
some sort of mutually acceptable regional force came into the
country, as in Zimbabwe, to supervise the electoral process. And
to the extent that it is widely believed in Washington and in San
Salvador itself that in the context of such elections the
guerrillas would not be able to win a majority of the vote, then
I think we have every reason to seek an electoral process in
which the opposition is willing to participate, because out of
such a process we could hopefully not only achieve an end to the
fighting, but a new government in El Salvador in which the
prospects for political pluralism and genuine freedom were
enhanced.
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
BUCKLEY: What do you think the alternative, Mr. Calero,
is to a pursuit along those lines?
CALERO: Well, I certainly wouldn't trust any commitment
made from the guerrillas in El Salvador, because I know them,
through the Sandinistas, I know what they are after. They're
after power. I know what they pursue. And they simply do not
believe in elections. Where they get their instructions from,
Cuba and the Soviet Union, they don't have elections. Power is
never given to the opposition.
The Sandinistas have repeatedly stated that there will
be no option for us, the opposition, to reach power. We can go
to elections, like in Eastern Germany, but we will not have the
option to govern. I mean that's the way the communists are.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, Bill, if I could interject a thought
here. If a dialogue could be established between the government
and the opposition in El Salvador and if the government offered
to hold elections on a basis in which all forces could have a
legitimate sense of security, where it was clear not only to the
Salvadorian people but to the rest of the world that a genuinely
free and fair election was in the offing, and the opposition
rejected such an election, then I think it would significantly
strengthen the capacity of the government in El Salvador to
appeal for regional and international support, not to mention the
support of our own people; and would certain strengthen the base
of domestic support for the President's policy in our own
country.
BUCKLEY: If you were the Napoleon running this show and
REP. SOLARZ: I thought you were the Napoleon running
this show.
BUCKLEY: Well, I'll tell you what I'd do. But if you
were the Napoleon running the show down there and this were
offerd to you, would you not, on behalf of the guerrillas, say,
"Of course. I'll be glad to engage in such an exercise,"
intending, therefore, merely to take an opportunity to advertise
your synthetic social programs, to fool 15 percent more American
congressmen than are already fooled; and then, when the results
came in, you would charge all kinds of threats and you would say,
"Well, there was intimidation there, and we're going back to the
war for the virtue of social"? That's what...
REP. SOLARZ: Well, I'm not, of course, Napoleon. Nor
do I have any desire to be Napoleon. But if I were in that
position, I can tell you, Bill, that I would not come to the
conclusion you came to. Because if in fact a political agreement
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
can be reached between the government and the opposition in which
both sides go into an election under some form of regional
supervision, and it should turn out that the opposition is
soundly defeated in the election, which is a...
BUCKLEY: They were a year and a half ago.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, they didn't run in the election, so
one can say that they were defeated.
BUCKLEY: Well, they boycotted it. They boycotted it.
But there was an absolute majority of voters who voted for the
other side. So even if all of them had voted on the other side,
there would have been a majority.
REP. SOLARZ: But my point here is that if in fact you
have elections under some kind of regional supervision and it
turns out the opposition is soundly defeated, and then they went
back to a form of guerrilla warfare, it would deprive them of
virtually all of their internal and external legitimacy.
REP. SOLARZ: Oh, I think it clearly would. And I think
it would break the back of the insurgency and put the government
in a much better position over the long run to prevail.
But let me ask you a question, if I might.
BUCKLEY: Well, Mr. Calero has something.
CALERO: I wanted to make a comment. It seems that
people don't learn from recent experiences. In Nicaragua, when
the moderate opposition, in private enterprise, the church, had
Somoza against the wall, and there had been some uprisings, also,
in the country, then there was a mediation, led and inspired by
the United States. And between this [unintelligible] which
grouped all the democratic forces and the government of Somoza.
And you know who boycotted that? The Sandinistas. They were
opposed to any -- to the reaching of an agreement. They were
opposed to getting Somoza out because they wanted to overthrow
Somoza. And they boycotted that. They boycotted every effort.
And I participated in that. I know. And because they didn't
want to have Somoza out, they didn't want a coup d'etat in
Nicaragua taht would get Somoza out, because they wanted Somoza
there in order to be able to keep on fighting him, as they did,
to overthrow him, and to keep power to themselves.
The communists don't share power. I mean that's common
knowledge. Any neophyte will know that.
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
REP. SOLARZ: It seems to me that we have everything to
gain and very little to lose through an effort to bring this war
to an end through a negotiated settlement. The way things are
going now in El Salvador, Bill, if the war continues much longer
-- and there's no imminent prospect for a military victory by
either side -- the eventual winners may end up envying the
losers. So far, over 40,000 Salvadorians have lost their lives.
That's the equivalent, in American terms,...
BUCKLEY: You may say it one more time. You've said it
twice. A limit of three.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, that's a lot of people, and it's
something I think we ought to be concerned about. In American
terms, that's the equivalent of over two million Americans.
Five hundred thousand Salvadorians are now refugees. In
American terms, that's the equivalent of over 20 million.
BUCKLEY: We lost the equivalent, in modern terms, of 60
in the Civil War. So I know what it is, historically, to die in
civil wars.s
REP. SOLARZ: And in economic terms, the gross national
product in El Salvador has declined by over 25 percent in real
terms in the last two years.
BUCKLEY: Thanks to the rebels, yeah, largely.
REP. SOLARZ: So, what is the answer to this problem and
this dilemma?
BUCKLEY: It's not an easy answer. But I'll tell you
exactly the way we're headed right now. We're headed towards the
defeat of the democratically-elected, however imperfectly
libertarian-oriented, force because of the attitude of the United
States of America. Because they look at us and they say, "Well,
these are the people who did it in Vietnam. These are the people
who have done it for everybody except Israel," the sole example
of people that we are, apparently, steadfast friends of, "and
they're going to do it to us."
REP. SOLARZ: Let me suggest...
BUCKLEY: And for Christopher Dodd to get up there and
say, "They're all sending their money to Miami," so would
Christopher Dodd send his money to Miami if he thought that day
after tomorrow the Nazis were going to take over, or the commun-
ists take over.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, let me suggest an alternative
perspective to you. Because it seems to me that the policy we're
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
now following is almost certain to eventually produce precisely
the result it's designed to avoid, which is to say...
BUCKLEY: Thanks to you people.
REP. SOLARZ: ...a military victory by the guerrillas.
BUCKLEY: Thanks to you people.
REP. SOLARZ: No, and I'll tell you why. I'll tell you
why. Because in the last two years we have provided the govern-
ment of El Salvador close to a quarter of a billion dollars in
military assistance. And from a purely military point of view,
they're in worse shape today than they were then.
I would suggest that we could double, triple, or even
quadruple the amount of military assistance we provide to the
security forces in El Salvador, and it would make relatively
little difference in terms of the eventual outcome. So far,
we've given the Salvadorians far more military aid than the
opposition has received from its outside sources of assistance.
BUCKLEY: How do you know?
REP. SOLARZ: I know on the basis of reports from the
intelligence agencies of our own government, which have made it
clear that while it is true -- and I fully accept this and
acknowledge it, and condemn it, by the way -- that the FMLNA, the
guerrilla group in El Salvador, is receiving aid from Nicaragua,
from Cuba, from Libya, from Vietnam, and from other communist
countries. Yet the total amount of aid they've received is
substantially less than the total amount of aid we've given the
government of El Salvador.
The problem, from the military point of view, with the
government of El Salvador has much more to do with ineffective
leadership and inadequate motivation than it does with any
shortage of arms or ammunition.
BUCKLEY: Well, that may be. That may be. The fact of
the matter is that to the extent that the rebels have fewer arms
that they'd like to have is because we're keeping them from
getting them, not because they aren't there. The Soviet Union is
giving 20 times more military assistance to Cuba, to Cuba, than
the United States is giving to all of Latin America. Now, that
just gives you some sense of the scale in which we are playing
around there, like ballet dancers, in a very serious war that the
other side is winning.
CALERO: I think we are never going to convince Con-
gressman Solarz or our position. And I would suggest, if you
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
don't mind, that we go a little bit into Nicaragua.
BUCKLEY: Of course.
CALERO: And into Mr. Dodd's speech, since he said that
he was backing -- he was in agreement with most of what he said.
I would like to comment that, to begin with, Senator
Dodd said that he was dead sure that at the foot of every
revolution was hunger and poverty. Well, we know that in Uruguay
was a model welfare state, way back before the United States ever
thought of welfare. And the communists, through the Tupamaros,
the terrorist Tupamaros, also helped by the PLO and by all the
terrorists in the world, turned back that government from being a
welfare to being a military government now. And what the
communists wanted there was power. They didn't want welfare.
They didn't want the people to live in a high standard of living,
because they already had it.
Now, in the case of Nicaragua, all the slogans of the
revolution, mind you, did not mention one word about hunger or
poverty. They said, "Liberty or death. Free country or death.
Nicaragua will again be a republic." I mean those were the
slogans.
And then, people who live in affluency, like they do
here in the United States, think that because we don't eat New
York steak cuts every day, I mean that we are -- you know, that
we are in misery. And we are not. I mean I prefer to go to a
lonely beach in Nicaragua than to go to Coney Island. I mean
that's the way...
REP. SOLARZ: Coney Island is in my district.
[Laughter and confusion of voices]
REP. SOLARZ: Brighton Beach. You might like that.
CALERO: Let me finish. Let me finish, please.
Political underdevelopment is at the root of the
problems we had in Central America, the problems we've had in
Latin America. It's not necessarily, as I have demonstrated,
poverty and hunger. Also, the desire or the wish or the will of
Soviet expansionism, which will topple any government that will
allow itself, or that the United States will permit itself to
topple.
And I want to ask you a couple of questions. Mr. Dodd
said that he would oppose -- and you, of course -- the establish-
ment of Marxism in Central America. And since 1979,
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
Nicaragua fell, Grenada, and lately Surinam, and Salvador -- I
mean nothing much is being done, or not enough effort is being
done to keep Salvador from going communist.
Another thing he said, that he would not accept the
creation of Soviet bases. I bet you this very minute the Soviets
are building bases in Nicaragua. This very minute they are doing
it.
And something else he said was that he would not
tolerate the placing of missiles. And, I mean, the Nicaraguan
defense minister has stated that he has the right to place Soviet
missiles in Nicaragua.
I mean to sum this up, how will -- how do you suggest,
Congressman Solarz, that you will stop Soviet expansionism in
Central America, in view of what is already happening there?
BUCKLEY: In answer to your question, Nicaragua's regime
has built 36 new military bases and garrisons. The previous
regime had 13. Nicaraguan pilots and mechanics are being trained
in Bulgaria. The regime has received, so far, 50 Soviet tanks,
1000 East German trucks, 100 antiaircraft guns, Soviet 153
millimeter howitzers with a range of 17 miles. Cuban has four to
five thousand civilian advisers in Nicaragua, plus 2000 military
and security advisers.
What's Dodd doing about it?
REP. SOLARZ: Well, I think it's a very fair question.
And let me respond, Bill, first of all, by saying that I would
begin by responding to the communist threat in Central America by
working far more closely with our friends in the region, almost
all of whom favor negotiated resolutions of the conflicts in that
part of the world. I would support the initiatives being taken
by Mexico, Venezuela, Panama and Colombia, who have called for
dialogues both between and within the countries of the region.
BUCKLEY: You wanted to comment on that, Mr. Calero.
CALERO: Look, I went to Panama last week to find out
about what had happened in Contadora, and I was told -- I will
not mention the person, but at a very, very high level -- that
the Contadora meeting was boycotted, was torpedoed by the
Nicaraguan communist foreign minister, Mr. d'Escoto. He refused
to talk to the other Central American ministers. I mean all
d'Escoto wants to do is to talk to the United States. You know,
they want to have a dialogue with the United States. And then,
of course, they will reach no agreement. And then a bigger
scandal will be raised. You know, "These damn American imperi-
alism. Yankees, enemies of humanity," like the Sandinista
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
hymn reads.
CALERO: Well, Mexico. Mexico foreign policy, really,
is the opposite of what the United States does. I mean that
seems to be their guide, you know. And they were even flabber-
gasted. I heard that even the Mexicans.
Now, the Sandinistas, I'm sure, have lost support from
Venezuela. They are losing support from Colombia. These are
members of the Contadora group. And the Panamanians are not
happy at all, since they hosted this reunion and the Sandinistas
boycotted it. I mean this reunion in Panama of the Contadora
group, with the Central American foreign ministers participating,
was a failure because the Sandinistas -- which is equivalent of
saying the communists -- just boycotted them.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, I think that if our
foreign
policy
in Central America is going to succeed, Bill, that
we've
got to
work in concert with the countries of the region
rather
than in
opposition to them. And at a time...
BUCKLEY: It depends whether they're
on our
side.
Right?
REP. SOLARZ: And at a time when everyone from the Pope
throught the Mexicans, the Venezuelans, the Colombians, the
Panamanians, the Costa Ricans are all calling for a political
settlement of the conflicts in the region, it seems to me that we
ought to be lending our influence and our prestige to such...
BUCKLEY: Don't bring the Pope in. Don't bring the Pope
in. The Pope is bound by generic chains to say, "Under no
circumstances should disputes be fought out violently." So the
fact that he is making this -- that he says people should talk to
each other is not really one diplomatic chessmate for you.
REP. SOLARZ: Would you say the same thing about
Archbishop Rivera y Domas (?) in El Salvador, itself, who has
also called for a dialogue...
BUCKLEY: I would say that about almost man of the
cloth. It is extremely hard to expect a minister to say, "Go out
and kill as many of them as you possibly can. And then let's
hope that we get peace that way." But, unfortunately, there are
the martial arts, which are not the same as [unintelligible]. It
should, in a sense, ultimately be guided. But the prudential
judgment of how to achieve the best for the majority sometimes
calls for the use of the force of arms. And God knows [unintel-
ligible].
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
SOLARZ: The question which you addressed, I think,
Bill, which Mr. Calero addressed to me, was: What should we be
doing to prevent the spread of communism in Central America? And
I think that the answer, of course, depends on the country
involved.
In the case of El Salvador, one of the things I would do
is to say to the government there that if they want military
assistance from the United States, which clearly they do, that
they have got to bring to an end the killing of their own people
by their own security forces, by eliminating the so-called death
squads that are operating in that country.
BUCKLEY: ...angelism. I mean this has been doing on in
Latin America for 400 years before you were born. I think they
ought to do that too. But they're not necessarily going to do
that. Colombia, without any reference to the United States, lost
a million people in five years after the Second World War. It
had nothing to do with capitalism. That's just, unfortunately,
the way some people are who are not practiced in the political
stability Mr. Calero speaks of.
So, I don't think people should kill each other. But I
do think it has nothing whatever to do with whether or not
there's going to be progress or whether or not we have a vital
interest in preventing the satellization of Central America by
Russia.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, I would make two points here, Bill.
The first is that so long as the death squads remain in operation
in El Salvador, it will be objectively impossible for the
government there to win a military victory. Because for every
noncombatant killed by the security forces, they generate a dozen
sympathizers for the guerrillas.
And secondly, the success of Rios Montt in Guatemala,
who no sooner after coming to power managed to eliminate the
urban death squads in his country, even if he permitted the army
to continue running on the rampage in the countryside, demon-
strates that if there is a will and determination to end these
death squads, it can be done. And if he did it in Guatemala, why
can't it be done in El Salvador?
BUCKLEY: I'm saying it can be done and I'm saying it
should be done, and I'm saying its being done is not politically
decisive. There were death squads in Argentina, and the people
who countenanced them are still in power. And they were killing
other people who were busy killing them. So there's no parti-
cular moral winner in that death squad vendetta.
But I think you're quite right as regards the first two
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
points, but not necessarily right as regards the third.
CALERO: It was very interesting for Congressman Solarz
to mention the government of Guatemala, that he has suspended the
death squads, etcetera, you know. That means that Guatemala
--oh, my God -- in Guatemala things have improved. And yet
there's no aid to Guatemala. I mean Guatemala hasn't been given
anything to fight the communist guerrillas.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, I would, frankly, have to disagree
with you here, Mr. Calero. Because while it is true that the
situation in Guatemala improved in the cities after Rios Montt
came to power, it clearly got much worse in the countryside,
where the Guatemalan army went on the rampage and killed literal-
ly thousands and thousands of Indians living in the Kishe (?) and
Wawatanango (?).
CALERO: You mean just now? Just now?
REP. SOLARZ: Over the course of the last year. I spoke
CALERO: Things have improved. I've been in Guatemala
many times and I've traveled -- I find now that people who would
not go to their farms before, because they were afraid of the
guerrillas, I mean are now going to their farms. And that the
farmers themselves have made what you call in the West, have made
posses in order to defend themselves against guerrilla attack.
You know, the paymaster of [unintelligible] goes on
Saturdays to pay -- used to go on Saturdays. Now they go Monday,
Wednesday, Thursday. You know, they change the days because you
have no security from the guerrillas.
REP. SOLARZ: Let me say to you, Mr. Calero, that what
you have in Guatemala today in the countryside is the peace of
the grave.
I think it's very interesting that when the Afghan
refugees come out of Afghanistan, we implicitly believe what they
tell us about the horrors perpetrated against their people by the
Soviet forces in their country.
BUCKLEY: Well, because it's plausible.
REP. SOLARZ: Yeah, because it is plausible. When the
Vietnamese flee from Vietnam, we accept what they have to tell...
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
REP. SOLARZ: ...us about the treatment which they
received from the communists in Hanoi. But there are today
30,000 Guatemalan refugees in Mexico who have, over the course of
the last year, fled from their country and from their homes and
villages, almost all of whom report massacres having been
committed by the armed forces of Guatemala.
CALERO: And these people that go over to Mexico train
in Mexico and come back as communist guerrillas to Guatemala.
REP. SOLARZ: I'm sorry to say that that is not quite
the case. I was in Mex...
BUCKLEY: I'm glad it's not the case.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, so am I, because I would not like to
see Mexico being used as a base of aggression against Guatemala.
CALERO: It is already being used. I mean the Guate-
malan guerrillas are training in Mexico, as well as -- you have
mentioned here, and I accept, the Nicaragua guerrillas were
trained in Salvador. And the Nicaraguan Sandinistas were trained
in Costa Rica. I mean that is logical. That happens whenever
there are borders. It's a good thing, though, that the guerril-
las -- I mean the communist guerrillas are in southern Mexico
now. I mean when they come up to northern Mexico, then it will
be a different story.
REP. SOLARZ: You can approve or disapprove of Rios
Montt. But certain facts are indisputable. Amnesty Interna-
tional, America's Watch, U.N. observers, and others, all of whom
have visited the refugee camps in southern Mexico, report that
there are literally thousands and thousands of Guatemalan Indians
there who have fled in the course of the last year, all of whom
have tales of terror and horror to tell about how army troops
came into their villages, shot up everything in sight, executed
whomever they could get their hands on, as a way of terrorizing
the indigenous population and drying up the sea, as it were, in
which the guerrillas...
CALERO: I brought Guatemala up because you cited
Guatemala as an example of what could happen in El Salvador if
the death squads were liquidated. So you were the one who said
that things had improved in Guatemala.
BUCKLEY: But he said they improved in the cities but
not the country. Right?
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
BUCKLEY: But I really don't know why we [unintelli-
gible]. Because, unhappily, if the job here today is going to be
able to describe inhuman activity in Latin America, it will be an
endless show. It is unfortunately a bloody land, as a result of
its failure to discover political civility, even as Spain was a
bloody land in this century. God knows, we have enough blood on
our own hands, though not on that scale recently.
We're talking about people like Christopher Dodd -- this
was brought up here by Mr. Calero -- saying, "Ah. It is indeed
against the interests of the United States to permit a Marxist-
Leninist force, military force, to embed itself in Central
America." Well, what is he proposing we do about Cuba? It would
be about as hard for us now to take Cuba as it was Okinawa.
Cuba's a formidable 800-mile-long aircraft carrier.
Now, what is Dodd -- what does he mean by all this empty
rhetoric about how he believes the United States ought to prevent
this kind of thing, when it has happened?
REP. SOLARZ: I think that Senator Dodd will have to
speak for himself. And I hope you'll invite him on one of your
programs so he can do so.
But my answer to that question would be that with
respect to Cuba, we ought to follow the advice of the commission
which is headed by Sol Linowitz, our former Ambassador to the
OAS, and previous President of Colombia, Mr. Paz, who...
REP. SOLARZ: Yeah, of Ecuador. Excuse me -- who,
together with many other distinguished leaders from the Americas,
have just suggested that a serious effort ought to be made to try
and resolve the differences between the United States and Cuba in
the context of a comprehensive dialogue in which, hopefully, we
could persuade them to refrain from providing military assistance
to revolutionary groups in the region.
BUCKLEY: I see them and up them one. Let's do that
between us and Moscow.
REP. SOLARZ: Fine. I'm delighted to know you favor
negotiations with the Soviet Union.
BUCKLEY: But you say unconditional. Unconditional
--the only circumstances under which I would deal with Moscow,
I'd say, "Look, old shoe. I'm going to hang on to my Constitu-
tion." But as I understand your use of unconditional is that you
don't set any limits on what you hang on to.
REP. SOLARZ: In this regard...
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
BUCKLEY: Israel wouldn't say, "I want to hang on to my
sovereignty."
REP. SOLARZ: On the contrary, Bill. On this question
of unconditional dialogue and negotiations, I take precisely the
same position taken by Prime Minister Begin, who said to King
Hussein of Jordan and to the elected leaders or self-appointed
leaders of every Arab state -- because there are no elected
leaders in the Arab World, unfortunately -- that he would be
willing to sit down at the peace table with them on an uncondi-
tional basis, in which they could put whatever demands they
wanted on the table and Israel could put whatever proposals it
wanted to on the table.
BUCKLEY: He didn't really mean unconditional. Either
we use language precisely or we don't. It's obviously condition-
al, because he's not going to give up the security of Israel.
REP. SOLARZ: I think if there's any world leader who
uses words very carefully, it's Menachem Begin.
[Confusion of voices]
BUCKLEY: Because if you say unconditional, meaning no
conditions, that presupposes that up for barter or discussion is
the sovereignty of Israel. Now, you and I both know that isn't
so.
REP. SOLARZ: No. What Prime Minister Begin is saying
is that he would like to go into negotiations in which any demand
or position can be put on the table. He's not obligated to
accept it. But he doesn't want to establish conditions as a
basis for beginning the negotiations, as a way of faciliating
dialogue with his Arab neighbors.
BUCKLEY: Well, okay. Well then, do -- then, if you
don't know it, I do. He's wasting his time. It's not going to
happen.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, unfortunately, I think you're right
and that it won't happen. And the reason it won't happen is that
35 years after the establishment of Israel, whose independence
anniversary we celebrated just a few days ago, there remain no
Arab leaders who are willing to come to the negotiating table and
negotiate a genuine peace with Israel. Anwar Sadat tried it, and
I think that was a great step forward, for which, unfortunately,
he made and had to pay the supreme sacrifice.
Now, the Lebanese leaders are negotiating with Israel
today, but clearly under duress.
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
I think it was a terrible tragedy that King Hussein
refused to come into the peace process.
BUCKLEY: I do too. But let's keep our attention
focused. I am simply saying that, in my opinion and in my
experience, talk about let's settle our differences amicably
belongs either in a pulpit or on the part of people who want not
to think. Because you can always leave a conference and say,
"We've decided to try to settle our differences by negotiation,"
and you've accomplished exactly nothing.
We know what are the conditions. The conditions are
that there shan't be a government in Salvador like Nicaragua's.
That's our conditions. That's all we want. And we are perfectly
willing to negotiate anything else.
REP. SOLARZ: I have a real sense of deja vu, Bill,
because I first made my appearance on your program many years ago
right.
BUCKLEY: And I was right. Whatever it was, I was
[Laughter]
REP. SOLARZ: On a discussion concerning what was then
called Rhodesia and which is now called Zimbabwe. And I think
there, too, you took the position that negotiations with the
Patriotic Front, which was the name of the opposition in that
country, would be fruitless and couldn't possibly succeed. And
yet the fact remains that the British were successful in bringing
about an end to the war in Rhodesia through a negotiated settle-
ment between the Patriotic Front and the government of Bishop
Muzorewa and Ian Smith, which led to free and fair elections and
an end to the conflict in that country which was literally
devastating that nation...
BUCKLEY: Nkomo wouldn't agree with that. And the
casualty figures for last month were higher than those of any
other month in the last ten years.
REP. SOLARZ: I think that some of the recent...
BUCKLEY: You should have used another example. What
happened the second time you were on?
REP. SOLARZ: The second time was on the same issue.
But finally, Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, and it's got its
independence. And we moved on to other matters.
But, look, I share your concern over some of the recent
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
developments that have taken place in Zimbabwe. But that doesn't
vitiate the force of the example and the lesson here, which was
that it is possible, even in the context of a civil war, to
achieve, under certain circumstances, a negotiated settlement.
Now, it may well be that in El Salvador, no matter how
hard we try, even if we can get negotiations going, that it won't
be possible to get both sides to agree. I acknowledge that
possibility. I'll go further. I'll say that there is a probabi-
lity that you won't be able to get a negotiated settlement. But
so long as there is a possibility, it seems to me that we have a
moral and political imperative to pursue it.
BUCKLEY: Not if you undermine, as you would by pressing
that particular line, the determination of the majority, who have
been validated by democratic experiences, as recently as a year
ago, to try to save their own country.
REP. SOLARZ: We would both agree, I assume, that in the
long run what we would like to see in El Salvador is the emer-
gence not only a peaceful El Salvador, but a genuinely plura-
listic and democratic El Salvador. And I would submit to you
that the prosepects...
BUCKLEY: Not too pluralistic. I don't want any
communists...
REP. SOLARZ: But an El Salvador in which people were
free to determine their own future, in which opposition...
BUCKLEY: Only their own future. Not other people's
REP. SOLARZ: Right. And which would be, presumably,
genuinely nonaligned; certainly, hopefully, sympathetic to the
United States, not a base for agression in the region.
I would submit, Bill, that we have a much better chance
of achieving that solution in the context of a negotiated
settlement than of a military victory for either side. And I'll
tell you why. Both the opposition and the government essentially
consist of coalitions in which there are genuine hardcore
communists among the guerrillas and genuine and dedicated
democrats among the opposition, as well.
BUCKLEY: Like Mr. Calero when he was against Somoza.
REP. SOLARZ: Precisely. And like Guillermo Ungo today,
who's the leader of the Democratic Revolutionary Front in El
Salvador, and Hector Dada and Reubin Zamora, and others. Just as
there are within the government of El Salvador both genuine
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
democrats, like the President, Mr. Magana; the Foreign Minister,
Chavez Mena; the previous President, Napoleon Duarte; but also
what can only be characterized as, in effect, dictatorial, if not
fascistic, elements within the security forces, who have no more
of a commitment to democracy than you and I have to Marxism-
Leninism.
And it seems to me that if the guerrillas win a military
victory, then the prospects for pluralism will be nonexistent,
because the democrats like Ungo and Zamora will be dismissed, as
Mr. Calero was in Nicaragua. Whereas if the government in El
Salvador wins a military victory, there's a very real possibility
that the dictatorial elements within the armed forces will seize
power and the Salvadorian democrats will be dismissed, as well.
BUCKLEY: Why? It didn't happen in the Philippines. It
didn't happen in Thailand. It didn't happen in Venezuela. It
didn't happen Bolivia. It didn't happen in Colombia. In Boliva
to a certain extent, because everything happens in Bolivia. But
Colombia is democratic now. So is Venezuela. We helped them.
It didn't happen in Greece. It was another 20 years before the
colonels came around.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, each country bears the burden of its
own history. And in a certain sense, each country is unique.
BUCKLEY: You see, you have a marvelous skill at
undermining what you've said by giving lofty generalities under
which it becomes sort of irrelevant.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, look at the history of El Salvador,
BUCKLEY: You start by making broad assertions. Then I
say, "Well, how does this fit this situation?" Then you
say,
"That really isn't covered by those broad assertions. I'll
give
you broader assertions."
REP. SOLARZ:
You
clearly agree with Hegel, who
once
said that if theory and
fact
disagree, so much the worse for
the
facts. And let me tell
you
about the facts in El Salvador.
BUCKLEY: Well, in certain situations. In certain
situations.
REP. SOLARZ: In El Salvador you've had 50 years of
military rule.
CALERO: I want to say a few words. You know, history
-- well, if you know about it, the Salvadorians were so deter-
mined to be democratic that in 1822, or so, they wanted to
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
become an American state. You know, they wanted to join the
Union of the United States.
BUCKLEY: I wish the hell they had.
CALERO: Things would be better.
You know, but what is really at the root or the base of
this problem is the fact that Central America, I'm sorry to say,
was discovered by Americans until just now, and they found that
there was someone else there already. I mean the communists.
And talking about El Salvador, I mean what can you
expect when the revolutionary movement in El Salvador is named
after Farimundo Marti, a renowned communist, who Sandino threw
out of his camp. So the Salvadorian guerrillas are being true,
they are being true to what they are. I mean they named their
guerrilla effort after a communist. Farimundo Marti is his name.
He was killed or something in 1930 -- in the 1930s. But they
have revived him because of what he represented, communism. And
I'm sure that's what they want.
And in El Salvador, I don't think these negotiations
that you are proposing -- I mean why don't they -- in Salvador
they had elections. Why don't the guerrillas -- I mean the ones
who are real active in the guerrillas, they don't have to go to
elections. Why didn't their supporters go? Because the guerril-
las in Salvador have no supporters. I mean the Salvadorian
guerrillas have dedicated themselves more to fight against power
stations, against buses. You know, they have burnt hundreds of
buses. They have shut down, dynamited hundreds of power sta-
tions, dynamited bridges. I mean they are destroying the
country. I mean they don't care. As long as they reach power,
they don't care if they destroy the country.
REP. SOLARZ: Mr. Calero, I have no brief whatsoever for
the guerrillas in El Salvador. I don't want to see them come to
power. But let me tell you this. When I was in El Salvador, as
recently as January, I found that some of the most important and
influential leaders of the Salvadorian government itself will
tell you privately that they recognize that the only way to bring
the war in that country to an end is through a dialogue with the
opposition. But they refrain from coming out publicly in favor
of such a dialogue because of the fear of the far right and their
allies within the military. And they believe that if the United
States changed its position, it would strengthen their hand
within Salvador itself.
I'll tell you something else. Take Roberto D'Aubuisson,
the leader of the Arena Party, the President of the Constituent
Assembly, the spokesman for the far right in El Salvador, the one
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
who is most vehemently opposing the notion of dialogue. This
very same Roberto D'Aubuisson, a few months ago, secretly went to
Panama, where he met with Anna Guadeloupe Martinez, one of the
leading guerrilla commandantes, precisely in order to explore the
possibilities of a negotiated settlement.
When I was in El Salvador, I met with the leaders of the
Arena Party and I asked them how they felt about dialogue. And
do you know what they said to me? They said to me, "We're
opposed to it because we're not in power. If we had won the
elections, we would be doing it ourselves."
So I think there's a tremendous amount of hypocrisy here
on the part of elements within the Salvadorian government.
It's all well and good for us to say that we don't think
a dialogue will work, that negotiations can't succeed. The fact
of the matter is that many influential Salvadorians see it as the
only way out of an increasingly hopeless situation, and believe
it should be given a chance.
BUCKLEY: Well, they would certainly see it as the only
way out if we're going to pull the rug out from under them.
Absolutely. They may as well give up tomorrow rather than
protract this struggle.. If we're going to start wheezing over
$110 million, then it seems to me that they'd better give up. It
just shows that the United States cannot be depended on, period,
end.
And then, where next do we look? Honduras? Guatemala?
Mexico? Somewhere along the line, when Christopher Dodd says
that Americans can't stand to permit the establishment of a
Marxist state, he's going to have to say what Marxist states we
won't permit. I see no program of his to do anything about Cuba
or about Nicaragua. And day after tomorrow, he will have
forgotten about Salvador.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, let me say that neither Chris Dodd
nor I are advocating a total termination of American military
assistance to E1 Salvador. What we've said...
CALERO: How about the Nicaraguan rebels?
REP. SOLARZ: I'll talk about Nicaragua in one second.
What we've said is that our military assistance to El
Salvador should be made conditional on a willingness on the part
of the Salvadorian government to enter into an unconditional
dialogue with the opposition and to bring to an end the death
squads being operated by their own security forces.
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5
Now, insofar as Nicaragua is concerned, all I can say
here, Mr. Calero, is when I met with Aden Pastora in San Jose,
Costa Rica a few months ago, he told me when I asked him what the
United States could do to advance the prospects for political
pluralism in Nicaragua, given the extent to which the Sandinistas
had cleary repudiated the democratic promises of the revolution,
he responded by saying that the single most meaningful thing the
United States could do would be to terminate its military
assistance to the FDN, or the so-called Contras, who are opera-
ting out of Honduras against Nicaragua.
BUCKLEY: Why?
[Confusion of voices]
CALERO: He's thinking differently now. His spokesman,
Mr. Ravelo (?), just said that they were friends of the FDN and
that they wanted to reach an agreement with the FDN. And so you
are some months behind, Mr. Solarz. And I'm talking right now at
this very minute. That's what has been said by Ravelo.
REP. SOLARZ: Well, my -- the answer to your question,
Bill, is that Pastora, who I think is a genuine democrat -- and I
hope you would accept that.
CALERO: Yes.
REP. SOLARZ: Who is...
CALERO: I accept it. Yes.
REP. SOLARZ: Who is genuinely and deeply opposed to
what the Sandinistas have done to his country, said that he
believed that American aid to the FDN enabled the Sandinistas to
legitimize their repression within Nicaragua by arguing that it
was necessary in order to prevent the ex-Somozasistas from coming
back to power.
BUCKLEY: Thank you, Congressman Solarz.
Thank you, Mr. Calero.
Approved For Release 2007/05/21: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000100700003-5