ALGERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000200035-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: August 28, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENT11AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
28 August 1963
=rr- MEMORANDUM NO. 62-63 (Internal ONE Working Paper
CIA Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: Algeris
A war-weary Algeria has made progress in restoring a semb:;,ance
of order to the chaos resulting from the revolution, but a great
many problems remain. The country will remain heavily dependent
on outside aid for a long time to come. Ben Belle has largely
eliminated his political rivals and is entrenching himself in
power, aided by his personal popularity, by a widespread desire for
order and by support of key elements of the military. He is pushing
through a consti+.ution and will, in all probability, be President
of Algeria by the c.nd of September. We do not think he is likely
to be severely challenged for control of the country in the near
future.
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1. Few newly independent countries have begun their existence
with the handicaps which faced Algeria in tbc. summer of 1962. Fight
years of civil war had killed many tens of.t:iousands, caused moss
dislocations of population, and. disrupted both rural and urban
economics. The exodus departure of 90 percent of the Europnnns
furthered mass unemployment and left administrative chaos in the
cities. There was more than a little likelihood that competition
for power among Algerian leaders -rould result in renewed fighting.
In the past year, however, the Algerians have o'complished a great
deal. Law and order has been generally established; the rudiments
of an administrative system are beginning to fill the gaps left
by the departing French; there has been progress in Algerianizing
the formerly European-owned and oriented economy; political
disputation has remained within tolerable limits. In sum Algeria
looks a great deal better today than most observers could have
imagined last summer.
2. Although these accomplishments have checked a deterioration,
the Algerians have a long uphill road ahead of them. The country
is plagued with massive unemployment. The government is critically
short of revenue and will have to resort to stringent austerity
measures to avoid budget deficits of a magnitude which would
spark inflation. TrainedL manpcv.-er for all sorts of activity --
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industrial, commercial, agricultural, and administrative --
is in w!)efully short supply. P rther, a fair proportion of those
who have acme competence in these fields are suspect because
they acquired the competence by staying wi-~h the French rather
than Joining the rebell:'on. Algeria is heavily dependent on
outside aid, principally from France in the form of money grants
and, despite a good harvest this year, from the US in the form of
food. Den Eella and his cohorts, and indeed the greater part of
the political spectrum, appear to recognize the vital role of
foreign aid in av-tding financial chaos and widespread sta-!^ration.
3. Algeria today can perhaps be characterized as a country
which clearly sees its goals ??- peace, progress, an independent
life -- but has no clear idea of how to go about getting there.
The people, exhausted by the rigors of the rebellion, are willing,
indeed looking for guidance but so for this has come only in
generalities Algerian leaders have be':i educated in a school
of clandestine activity, revolt and uerrorism, a school not
ideally ruited to t.ne demands of statehood. Hence lines of
authority are confused and often contradictory. Many specific
problems, e.g. tax collection, local administration, are far
from adequate solution. Nationalized properties have been turned
over to workers committees which often have little notion of how
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to run them In ahrrt, there is a partly dug foundation hole
frcan which the structure of a viable Algerian Arab otate will
come day rise, but no one has much idea of what it will look
like or where the construction materials will come from.
4. The principal architect of the stata is Primn Minister %. mad
Ben Bella. Ben Bella himself rather typifies the "modern" Algerian.
Ec in of rural origin, and feels atrot.jy that land re-distribution
leading to a 'i otter life for the pea Santry is an imm.diate need.
He is, however, an astute politician
who sees himself an the person test capable of leading his country
forward. His tent is to govern on authoritarian, state socialist,
and generally neutralist lines.
'~. With Ben Bella at the bead of the government, the
political situation nas been marked by a trend toward centralized,
one-man direction. The various and disparate elements which
joined in the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) to fight for
independence strove to achieve a dominant position in the new govern-
went. Ben Bella has played his cards skillfully, however, to
eliminate or neutralize most of his potential political rivals.
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Seve-;ai things have helped him to entrench himself in power.
Prri+F1bly most imx,ortant is the general war-wear,ne0 13 of the
po,;''elation; eight years of bloodshed is enough in most peoples'
mil',ido an-I there jus L :Lnn' G much interest in violently partisan
cyposition to a government which is at least stable and certainly
Ions repressive than the trench. Secondly, Ben Bella in
,)personally poptilar; he has the politician's appeal for the masses,
especially thoss~t in the countryside. -tirilly, he has the cooperation
of key elements of the army led by Colonel Houari Boumedienne.
6. Having achieved a dominant position, Ben Belle is now
engaged in an operation to push through a conct;.tuLion which will
give wide powers to a president. The regime intends to follow
up a nat.s onwide referendum on the constitution promptly with elections
which will almost certainly return Ben Bella to the office of
president. This process is planned for completion in mid-
September and we think it will go through pretty much on schedule.
Other political r],nents are being give=, no opportunity to present
their own ideas of what Algeria 'a future political system should
be. Li consequence, a number have quit the country or the
political arena, convinced that they cannot beat Ben Bella and
*? There is a possible parallel between the present Algerian
situation and the Spain of post civil war days, where
war-weariness of the people was a major factor in Franco's
a7bility to establish himself in power.
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unwilling to An him in a subordinate role. The latest, and
perhaps most notabl e, "def ector" is Ferha c nb''as, who has long
been devoted to n parliamentary form of uovernment. On present
form, Ahmae' Ben Bella will be President of Algeria by the end
of September.
7. In the next year or two, we expect there will be rumors
and ern hapLi some preparations for armed rebellion to Ben Bella'-3
regime on the part of disillusioned leaders. Belkacem Krim, the
Kabyle leader and one of the original group of nine men who began
the rebellion? has already approached Tunisia for arms and supplies
for such a purpose. Muhammad Khider, another of "the nine" is
rumored to have made similiar soundings in Morocco. We do not
rate very highly the chances of a successful armed rebellion,
chiefly because there does not seem to be much enthusiasm for
further struggle and bloodshed. Indeed, the only place from which
a significant challenge to Ben Bella might come is the army. This
could occur either if it rem,{ned under Colonel Boamedienne o,
if it split into factions. Boumedienne apparently would like
to apply socialist measures such as nationalization more quickly
and more widely than Ben Bella has done, but we do not think he
is so set on this course as to challenge Ben Bella. For one
thing he doesn't have the latter's popularity; for another a direct
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challenge would risk civil war which would be unpopular and which
he has no certainty of winning. There is came possibility that
the problems Ben Bella faces could mount up no as to cause a
virtual breakdown of authority. Such conditions could lead to
military internrention but, on balance, we believe this is unlikely
in the near future.
8. Algeria's relations with France are likely to be of
critical, if not vital, importance for some time to come. The
present arrangement is an eminently logical "marriage of con-
venience" whereby France contributes substantial sums (
since July 1962) for budgetary support and development in return
for use of the Sahara nuclear test sites and for the opportunity
of maintaining a sizeable measure of French cultural and commercial
interests in Algeria. Should the French testing program cause
a violent increase in pressure on Algeria, say became of a
belief that fsllout was contaminating West Africa. Ben Bella
might be forced to denounce he French connection, even at the
risk of losing French financial assistance. He would probably
turn at least initially to t: I-lest, chiefly the US, to take caer
most of this French role. However, the Bloc -- which has confined
its assistance in Algeria largely to technical aid and education
so far -- might seize the opportunity to play a larger role than
heretofore.
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9. Barring such a development, Algeria will continue to lool,
to the US for assistance in the form of food and some technical
advice or services and it probably will not be forthcoming with
expressions of gratitude for same. As long as Algeria's relations
with Tunisia and Morocco remain cool but correct, they are not
likely to cause problems for the US. However, as successful
revolutionaries, the Algerians have a compulsion to support
revolutions elsewhere, especially in Africa. This support may
from time to time bring Algeria into conflict with the US in the
UN, say, as the US strives for a moderate approach to problems
in the southern Africa scene. The Algerians clso see Cuba as
a revolutionary country struggling against big power domination
and this attitude will probably bring on some diplomatic clashes
with the US from time to time. The some is true in respect of the
conflict in Vietnam, where Algerian sympathy for Hanoi appears to
spring from an emotional feeling of solidarity with others who
have faced the tender mercies of the "pares" and the Foreign
Legion rather than from ideological considerations.
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