PEACE AND CONFLICT IN SUDANIC AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110050-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: May 19, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Peace and Conflict in Sudanic Africa
C I A
DOCUMENT SERVICES JH Secret
19 May No. 1972
\ ~4
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
19 May 1972
SUBJECT: Peace and Conflict in Sudanic Africa*
This memorandum discusses the origins, current
status, and probable future course of three African
insurgencies. The battlegrounds -- in Chad, Ethiopia,
and Sudan -- are remote areas on the periphery of
virtually everything. At the moment fighting has
ceased in Sudan, the conflict in Chad is at a low ebb,
and the guerrilla war in the Ethiopian province of
Eritrea drags on. But the root causes of conflict --
the racial, cultural, and religious divergencies and
political aspirations for separation remain potent.
Hence, we are not sanguine about an early resolution
of any of them.
These conflicts, of themselves, are of marginal
importance to the rest of the world.. cut, for a variety
of reasons, the US, France, the USSR, and China- have
some interests at stake.
Arabs an s rae i s are
involved in a complicated fashion, and there is a danger
that the quarrels of Sudanic Africa may be caught up in,
or become a part of, any future major outbreak in the
Middle East.
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of National Estimates
and discussed with appropriate offices in CIA, which are in agree-
ment with its principal judgments.
GROUP 1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. THE SETTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Religion and Culture . . . . . . . . . 5
Political Separatism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ICI. THE FATE OF THE INSURGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . 11
Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Sudan. . . . . . 155
The Eritrean insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1f,'
IV. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
The Powers 20
Arabs and Israelis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
V. SOME UNCERTAINTIES 27
The Ethiopian Sn-ccession . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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Northern Africa and the Middle East
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I. THE SETTING
1. Across the wirc;est part of Africa from the Atlantic
Coast of Mauritania to the ,Ethiopian province of Eritrea on
the Red Sea is an ethnic frontier, the meeting ground of Arab
and Berber peoples of the North and black Africans of the
South.* Cutting through the same general area, and in places
coinciding with the ethnic border, is a line of cultural and
religious demarcation, setting apart an essentially Moslem area
from Christia-- or animist lands. National boundaries tend to
ig~',ore both these lines. Indeed, the separation of peoples
and cultures is nowhere neat or clear. Clusters of Arabs have
lived for centuries well south of the ethnic border, and Islamic
missionaries have proselytized millions of blacks in parts of
East and West Africa.
2. In Sudanic Africa religiously homogeneous areas are
gererzily reasonably peaceful, even if racially divided. This
app'ies to much of the western Sahara, where Islam prevails in
Sudanic Africa, as used in this paper, refers to the coun-
tries in this band -- Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan,
and Ethiopia.
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both black and Arab-Berber communities. The sparseness of
population probably contributes to the relative tranquflity,
as does the policy of delibErate neglect practiced by black
governments of Mali and Niger towards the white T''iareg nomads
who roam the desert, ignoring frontiers and administrators.
In Mauritania the white Maures (the Arab-Berber majority)
control national political life, but rely on the better educated
blacks to man the bureaucracy. The western Sahara is by no
means devoid of political tension, for there are fierce personal
and factional rivalries. The point is that racial, religious,
and cultural distinctions are not the highly charged issues
they are in the eastern half of Sudanic Africa.
3. This paper deals mainly with the three countries at the
eastern end of Sudanic Africa -- Chad, Sudan, and Ethiopia. There,
a mixture of separatist aspirations and cultural, religious, and
racial antagonisms have brought on prolonged and bitter guerrilla
wars. At the moment the conflict in Chad has subsided, and a truce
in Sudan has brought a halt to the fighting there, but suspicions
have not been allayed and tensions are still high. The primitive
folk in this remote part of the world have little concept of
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nationhood or any other modern institutions, and tend to identify
themselves -y race, creed, and cultural affiliation. Moreover, a
variety of outside influences -- Arab and Israeli as well as those
of the major powers -- makes the situation quite complex.
TI. THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT
Race
4. Fundamental to the conflicts in Chad and Sudan, and a
lesser ingredient in Eritrea, is the long-standing mutual dislike
of Arab northerners and black African southerners. This stems from
the master-slave relationships of earlier times. Until well into
the twentieth century, Arab slavers raided black communities in
southern Chad and southern Sudan. To a good many blacks as far
south as Ta.,kapia and Zaire, the word Arab is still synonomous with
slave tracer. In the past decade, interventions by North Africans
in black African affairs, e.g., Egyptian and Sudanese involvement
in the Congolese and Nigerian civil wars, Algerian hacking for
Cameroonian rebels, and Libyan support to Chadian insurgents, have
kept alive the old fears. Even Leopold Senghor, the urbane poet-
President of Senegal, in a speech in Morocco last fall discussed
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Arab-black relations in terms of the colonizers and the colonized.
Actual skin color makes little difference. For example, many
Sudanese who call themselves Arab are as black as the Bantus
and Nilotics of southern Sudan. Nonetheless, race is a sensi-
tive issue, since a good many Africans tend to see the Sudanic
African conflicts as clashes between racial groups.
Religion and Culture
5. Misunderstandings and discrimination in religious and
cultural matters are probably at least as important as racial
antagonisms in the origins of the Sudanic insurgencies. It is
rather difficult, however, to separate these factors from the
whole catalog of complaints lodged by the disaffected. For
example, did the southern Sudanese turn to violence primarily
because they hated the Arabs? Because government Islamization
policies threatened Christian and traditional forras of worship
and social organization? Or because they felt relegated to
second-class political status in a nation they had no part in
establishing? In the southern Sudan it was all of this.
6. Similarly in Chad, a mirror image of Sudan, Christian
and animist blacks lorded it over a politically impotent and
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educationally inferior Arab Moslem community. The Chadian
ruling elite engaged in no deliberate discrimination against Islam,
but tool: a rather cavalier attitude to Moslem sensitivities.
Enraged rebel leaders at an early stage in the revolt toyed with
the idea of declaring a Holy War, and appealing to the world commu-
n4ty of Moslems for assistance. In Chad as in Ulster, ancient
religious antagonisms are easy to arouse, and chance incidents often
appear to the participants as religious persecution.
7. Sectarian considerations had little to do with the origins
of the Eritrean insurgency, but have since assumed greater importance.
At the start of the revolt in the early 1960s, the Eritrean rebels
included both Christians and Moslems, reflecting the divided religious
affiliations of the province of Eritrea, and indeed in Ethiopia itself.
Over the years the rebel movement has taken on an almost exclusively
Moslem coloration, in part because recruiting efforts have been more
productive among Moslem youth than in the Christian community, in
part because the rulers of Eritrea are Amhara Christians, and also
because the exiled rebel leaders1iip found sanctuary in Damascus
Baghdad, and Tripoli, and absorbed a good deal of Moslem militancy
from their hosts.
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PoliticaZ Separatism
8. An additional ingredient in all of the Sudanic African
conflicts is the inclination of the dissaFfected to seek political
separation from the dominant group. In pre-colonial times the ethnic
groups lived apart from each other, traded occasionally, and expressed
their disagreements by frequent raids and assaults on the enemy".
The colonial powers put a stop to tribal and ethnic warfare, but this
kind of enforced pacification did little to instill unifying, national
sentiments. Indeed, it was hardly in the interest of the colonial
administrators to do so. With only limited military support, colonial
officials preserved the peace by keeping mutually antaganistic groups
apart from each other.
9. Independence changed all this. With the abrupt departure
of the British from Sudan and the more gradual French withdrawal from
Chad, colonial restraints were lifted. Inexperienced new governments,
formed from local political elites -- northern Moslems in Sudan,
southern Christians and animists in Chad -- were expected to share
,'olitical power in some fashion with more primitive fellow citizens,
who had either had scant contact with the dominant group or who
nursed old grievances against it.
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10. The post independence histories of Chad and Sudan are
characterized by total misunderstandings between the major ethnic-
cultural groups. In Sudan the northern rulers conceived of national
unity in terms of an Islamic state, closely linked to the Arab
world. As they saw it, southerners who did not share this view should
be pushed to adopt the customs and outlook of the North. Hence,
Sudanese domestic policies came to include an agressive Islamization
program, the substitution of Arabic for English in schools, the
expulsion of foreign missionaries, and an abrasive military rule
of the laggard southern regions.
11. Southern Sudanese resistance began with a mutiny of
southern army units on the eve of independence. The mutineers
fled to the bush and formed roving bands which became the core
of the developing insurgency. Atrocities committed by both sides
in the South in 1962-1963 hardened attitudes and ruined the efforts
of moderates to find a comproni2. The insurgency movement burgeoned
under the name Auya-nya (poisonous insect) and several competing
southern provisional governments sprouted up as expressions of the
separatist aspira-,ions of the major black tribes. For a decade, until
early 1972, ro" thern troops held key towns and lines of communication
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in the South, made occasional forays, and suffered from Anya-nya
raids. More than a million refugees, perhaps a quarter^ of the
population of the South, fled to the jungles and swamps or to
neighboring lands.
12. When independence came to Chad in 1960, the Moslem
half of the population took little note of the event and played only
a minor role in the organization of the new government. Trouble
set in fairly early when the regime assigned non-Moslem blacks
to collect taxes from the Arab Moslems, who had been left alone
by the French. The Moslem revolt, which began as a minor incident
in 1965, gathered momentum, drawing upon the heritage of ethnic
and cultural animosity and the blunders and impositions of the
government. The insurgency never developed much cohesion. Lacking
firm leadership, bands of ragged, poorly armed nomads and farmers
fought in isolated engagements against units of the Chadian, and
later also the French,army. The goals of the insurgents were as
vague as everything else in this struggle. They mainly wanted to
be left alone, and, therefore, sought some sort of autonomy.
13. Developments in Eritrea in the past 6ucade differ markedly
from those in Chad and Sudan. The Eritrean claim to a separate status
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from Ethiopia stems from its peculiar heritage. There is no
.:cllective memory of past greatness or of lost freedoms. Rather
Eritrean history consists of prolonged obscurity, followed by
subservience 'Co a series of foreign rulers: Turks, Egyptians,
Italians, British, and now Amharas from central Ethiopia. The
colonial experience, particularly the Italian interlude, provided
Eritreans with a greater exposure to the modern world and its ways
than others in Ethiopia had. It is mainly this self-perception of
separateness rather than racial or religious differences which gives
substance to Eritrean aspirations for autonomy or independence.
14. Eritrean dissidence originated as a reaction against the
incorporation of their homeland into the Ethiopian Empire in 1962.*
The movement began with a handful of :ixiles, and has retained an
elitist character. Over the years it has attracted intellectuals
and students, particularly the unemployed or underemployed, but made
little impact on the general populace. Discontent with Amhara domina-
tion is widespread, but so is apathy. The nationalist slogans of the
rebels do not strike responsive chords. The guerrillas probably number
Eritrea was dealt to Ethiopia by the UN in 1952. It had a semi-
autonomous, federated status until absorbed into Ethiopia by
Imperial decree in 1962.
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fewer than 2,500, but they are well armed and trained, and are
adept at fending off or eluding a much larger Ethiopian field
force.
III. THE FATE OF THE INSURGENCIES
15. Biafra and Katanga are conspicuous reminders that
separatist causes have not fared well in independent Africa.
There is nothing inevitable about this, but the obstacles to
success, of even a well-organized secessionist movement are
formidable. An African government, however inept, commands a
treasury and an armed force and can bestow jobs and favors. It
also claims legitimacy, i.e., recognition by other African govern-
ments. Biafra, for all its advantages in leadership, organization,
and skills, gained official recognition from only a few African
stater, and this had something to do with its failure. It is
because all African states are heterogeneous collections of peoples
within illogical boundaries, that the principle of inviolability of
territorial unity of each state is almost universally accepted. Most
African governments fear that secession is contagious, and believe they
are all susceptible.
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16. Though the odds are against their success, separatist
movements in Africa are nonetheless generally hard to put down.
This is particularly true in Sudanic Africa, where the distances
between the capital and areas cf dissidence are so vast, the
logistics and morale problems of maintaining government troops
in the field so great, and the expenses of counterinsurgency so
crippling. In Sudanic Africa all of the fighting has taken place
on the home ground of the insurgents. In these circumstances,
guerrilla forces need not be very competent or cell organized to
keep the conflict alive. Indeed, the most impressive facet of these
lackluster wars is their duration; 17 years in the Sudan, around 9
years in Eritrea, and some 7 years in Chad.
17. By every other criterion, these have been dismal, inept
performances by all participants. There has been a good deal of
,tilling and destruction, generally in a purposeless way. It is
difficult to gauge success or failure of campaigns, because an
air of confusion has pervaded since the beginning. On the in-
surgent side the lines of command are vague, leaders are often
more involved in factional disputes with rivals than in combat-
ing the enemy, and the bands of guerrillas are normally out of
contact or communication with their fellows.
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Chad
18. The insurgency in Chad is now in a most uncertain status.
A year ago it appeared to be withering away. French troops brought
in from the metropole and from Djibouti in 1968 had served as cadres
in the Chadian Army, and as special units. After they had chased
down and defeated the major guerrilla bands, President Tombalbaye
offered an amnesty and decreed a series of reforms which belatedly
gave the Moslems a greater chance to participate in national life.
New administrative arrangements afforded greater local autonomy, the
central government incorporated some of the previously jailed Moslem
elite, and plans were drawn up for development in the Moslem lands.
19. The Chadian spring of 1971 was followed by a brief summer
and an early frost. Tombalbaye was disturbed and frustrated by
evidence of arms shipments from Libya to remnants of the rebels.
He therefore used a minor incident of pamphleteering in the Chadian
capital in August to break relations with Libya. In response the
Libyans stepped up aid to the insurgents and recognized them as the
true Chadian Government. By early 1972 there were signs of growing
strength in the ranks of the Moslem rebels in northern and eastern
Chad and a worried French general arranged to bring in a company of
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reinforcements from France. Inflammatory broadcasts from Tripoli
helped revive the spirit of Moslem resistance. Amidst these ominous
developments, the Sudanese Government began to cooperate with Chad
to cut off the Libyan arms flow, and French diplomatic pressures on
Chad and Libya brought about a kind of detente. Governmental rela-
tions were restored and the Libyans ceased overt support to the rebels.
20. At the moment Tombalbaye is in power, which is the way
the French wail;. it. Pompidou on a state visit to Chad a few months
ago assured the local government of French intentions to furnish
military and economic aid for some time to come. French policy in
Africa has hardly changed since de Gaulle arranged independence for
his African clients a dozen years ago. Commercial, cultural, mili-
tary, and governmental groups in France are still effective in pre-
serving French hegemony over the former colonies.
21. There are limits, though, to French involvement. Pompidou
is highly sensitive to charges occasionally made in the French National
Assembly and in the leftist press that Chad is a kind of Vietnam, in
which France is trying to impose by force a political solution which
many Chadians don't care for. So far only a few dozen French lives
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have been lost, but this is a very touchy issue. Pompidou is
committed to the principle of disengagement and is gradually re-
ducing the French military presence. If fighting were to resume
on a large scale which led to many French casualties, he would
probably reconsider the French neo-colonial military role. He
would not, for example, send French draftees to Chad. Without
a strong French military and technical presence in Chad, it would
be very difficult for the regime now in power to preserve national
unity.
22. The civil war in Sudan was much more extensive in terms
of people involved, ferocity of fighting, and intractability than
the other Sudanic conflicts. For about the last 10 years the war
has been a stalemate. From time to time successive regimes in
Khartoum have made gestures toward er& ng the conflict but each
time mutual distrust prevailed.
23. President Numayri, unlike his predecessors, has actually
managed to bring the fighting to a halt. Aided by Emperor Haile
Selassie, and benefiting from the strength he gained from vigorously
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squashing a leftist coup attempt, Numayri persuaded Anya-nya leaders
to meet with Sudanese officials in Addis Ababa in late 1971. The
southerners arrived in a suspicious and cautious mood, but were
gradually convinced of northern sincerity. The agreements signed at
Addis in March of this year provide for considerable southern aut'Jnoiny
within a national political framework. Some 6,000 of the Anya-nya
guerrillas are to join with an equal number of northerners to form a
southern contingent of the Sudanese Army. Other arrangements are
left to Numayri and joint commissioners.
24. If goodwill can be sustained and the instrumentalities
of reunification carried through promptly, there is a fair chance
that peace can be preserved. President Numayri and others are
stumping the hinterland to drum up support for reconciliation. The
Sudanese cabinet, which includes some southerners, and the ruling
party, which is generally responsive to the President, are for it.
Also, the Ethiopian and Ugandan governments, which
supported the Anya-nya for years, are publicly endorsing the accords.
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25. But reconciliation is still in a very delicate stage,
and could be wrecked quite easily. A good deal depends on how
long Numayri can hold power. Sudanese politics are normally
turbulent, and previous Presidents who appeared to be firmly in
control were overturned suddenly. There is no assurance that
Numayri's policies would prevail after his departure, for there
is a considerable reservoir of anti-southern sentiment in the
North, particularly in the Army and among pro-Egyptian factions.
These groups, and the Presidents of Libya and Egypt, had hoped
that Sudan would join the Confederation of Arab Republics (CAR),
and seek closer relations with members of the Arab League. The
reconciliation scheme now fairly well rules out such developments.
Nervous southerners would not stand for membership in the CAR.
The price of internal peace in the Sudan, then, is some degree of
estrangement from the Arab World.
26. Doming ahead are massive problems of resettling a million
or more southerners, now abroad or in the bush far from their old
villages. Before the South can begin to participate in national life,
it will require help in devising political forms and economic infrastruc-
ture. The meager resources of the Khartoum government are grossly
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inadequate, but foreign humanitarian agencies will probably
provide considerable help.
27. Most important now, and in the long run, is the atti-
tude of the Sudanese. This is the big opportunity, which may not
present itself again. There is widespread relief in the South that
the shooting has stopped. But it is too early to judge whether or
not there is enough momentum to carry through a real reconciliation.
It is clear from the reluctance of refugees to return that there is
very little mutual trust or confidence. At best it will be an uneasy
truce endangered by efforts of recalcitrants to stir up trouble. Re-
version to civil war seems less likely than a long confused period of
attempts by two very diverse cultural groups to find agreement.
The Eritrean Insurgency
28. In the aftermath of the Addis peace co;iference, a
number of Ethiopians are wondering why their own guerrilla war
in Eritrea cannot be resolved by negotiations. It cannot because
Haile Selassie has no intention of bargaining with those he considers
bandits; because he still hopes to crush the rebels militarily; and
because the Eritrean rebels in contrast to the Anya-nya do not
represent a disaffected population.
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29. Clearly, Haile Selassie sees the Eritrean Liberation
Front (ELF) problem as a manageable one, to be tackled with
counterinsurgency in the field and diplomacy in Arab and Commu-
nist capitals. The Ethiopian Army's Second Division and the
Israeli-trained emergency police have been moderately successful
in combat, and diplomatic appeals to China, Sudan, Saudi Arabia,
and the two 1'emens probably have had some effect in cutting down
the arms and training available to ELF units. The insurgency
goes on, much as before, with cyclical bursts of activity, followed
by months of dormancy. So long as the Sudanese Government forbids
ELF transit and safehaven, the rebels are inconvenienced, though
not critically hampered. In short, Ethiopian counter efforts have
not had a major effect in curbing the ELF.
30. The ELF leadership, most of which lives in exile in Arab
capitals, still has access to funds, facilities, arms, and training.
At the moment it is badly factionalized into two or three main groups,
which are dominated by strong-willed, feud-prone personalities.
Attempts to bring the rival groups together have failed, and the
splits have grown to the point that factions of ELF have begun
battling each other in the mountains of Eritrea.
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31. Imperial Armed Forces are probably sufficiently large
and competent to wipe out the insurgency if they were Si c.directed.
This would require the concentration of armed force now deployed
elsewhere in Ethiopia, and a better command structure. To Haile
Selassie the risks of this, in terms of a potential challenge by
the military to his own position, are greater than the prospective
achievements. If the Emperor chose to grant some greater autonomy
to Eritrea and provide more development assistance, the ELF would
be greatly undercut and weakened. But in practical terms, the Addis
Government would not want to seem to be rewarding dissidence, or to
favor a non-Amharic proviirce. Hence the counterinsurgency will
probably drag on for years, until the ELF either withers away (which
it shows no sign of) or makes a concerted move against Imperial
authority at some moment of internal crisis in Ethiopia.
IV. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
The Powers
32. The governments of Sudanic Africa and the leaders of the
dissident movements are highly sensitive to pressures and influences
from the outside world. All of the great powers and some of the
lesser ones are at least marginally involved in the troubles of Sudanic
Africa. The
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military aid to Ethiopia are important considerations in the course
of events there. China recently establishes' diplomatic relations
with Ethiopia and is negotiating some rather large economic aid pro-
jects with Ethiopia and Sudan. The USSR, once the main arms supplier
to Sudan, is trying to regain some lost influence there and compete
with China and the US for influence in Addis Ababa. The French are
heavily involved in the affairs of all countries from Chad westward to
the Atlantic and in the East they govern the Territory of the Afars
and Issas. This small colony includes Djibouti, the t.rminus of
Ethiopia's rail link to the sea.
33. At the moment all of the outside powers are acting in a
very cautious fashion. The truce in Sudan and the restoration of
relations between Chad and Libya have te.:-r(,rarily lowered tensions
in the area. So far as one an tell, none of the external powers
is engaged in rekindling the conflicts. From the US point of view,
the government in Sudan ,end the policies it espouses are as good as
can be expected; the insurgency in Eritrea, though worrisome, has not
affected US personnel or property; and the Ethiopian Government is
still a friend of the US.
34. As for the Communist powers, the Chinese are trying to
ingratiate themselves with the legitimate governments in Sudan and
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Ethiopia, and are not now sponsoring any dissident factions. In
the past Peking had provided training and arms to the ELF. They
are advertising themselves as fellow sufferers in the oppressed
underdeveloped world, without great power pretensions. So long
as their economic aid is useful to the Africans, and they keep
out of mischief, the Chinese are likely to build influence in
these countries, at the expense of the USSR, and perhaps also
of the US.
35. The Soviets are still recovering from the bruises of
last summer when P'umayri crushed the coup attempt of the Sudanese
Communist Party, executed a number of party leaders, and hinted
that the Soviets bore some responsibility for the revolt. Relations
between Moscow and Khartoum are still cool, and, barring another
leftist coup, it will be a long time before Russians are trusted
in Sudan.
36. Soviet relations with Addis Ababa are clouded by their
arms assistance to Somalia, the traditional foe of Ethiopia. The
continuing supply of military goods and training to the Somali Army
is upsetting to Haile Selassie, but he values his non-aligned status
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and hopes to stimulate a little competition among the US, China,
and the USSR for economic aid to his backward country. The
Russians are not yet particularly forthcoming, though they are
worried about the new large Chinese official presence
D
37. In general the USSR is not particularly happy about the
eastern Sudanic governments and would welcome a change in any of
the capitals. But they have very limited assets in terms of organized
local sympathizers, and perhaps at this time they lack the inceitive
to take on the risks of encouraging political change. In a broader
sense, the USSR is expanding its interests and activities in the
Indian Ocean area, including the Red Sea. If new political turmoil
arose in Ethiopia or Sudan, or if the insurgencies flared up, the
result,,ng tensions could bring the Soviets more directly onto the
scene. If the Soviets were to take a more assertive posture, the
conflict of interests between the USSR avid the US in this area would
become much more obvious,and touchy situations could arise.
38. On another level of involvement, the Israelis and the Arabs
have been participating more directly in the Sudanic conflicts. For
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years Israel has cultivated relations among black African states,
offering economic aid programs and military advice and assistance
in return for diplomatic support in the UN and elsewhere. In
Chad, where the French presence predominates In the modern sector,
a handful of inconspicuous Israeli technicians have carried out a
variety of minor economic aid projects. The truce in Sudan and the
decisions of Ethiopia and Uganda not to permit arms traffic to
southern Sudan has brought to an end the substantial Israeli mili-
tary support of the Anva-nya.
39. In Ethiopia the Israelis have made themselves useful,
perhaps indispensable, in the training of the main counterinsurgency
force, the emergency police. Israelis are also training units of the
Ethiopian Army, and providing a variety of technical assistance in
non-military matters. To the Israelis Ethiopia is their only friend
in the Red Sea area, and, therefore, worth cultivating. Common concerns
about Communist-radical Arab cooperation in the Red Sea area have brought
the two countries together, and an imaginative propaganda and cultural
effort, built around the Solomon-Queen of Sheba tradition, which means
a lot to Coptic Christians in Ethiopia, has helped to solidify relations.
40. All this has not passed unnoticed in the Arab world. As
Israeli support of Ethiopia has burgeoned in the past few years, the
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ELF has latched onto Arab backers in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and
elsewhere, playing in shrill tones the theme of an imperialist-
feudalist-Zionist ccispiracy to keep Eritreans in thralldom.
The ELF, even in its current faction-ridden state, is provided
access to radio propaganda in Damascus, Baghdad, and Tripoli,
trains recruits in Fatah camps and officers in Iraqi military
schools, and runs arms across the Red Sea from the Yemens. Libya
and other Arab states furnish more funds than the ELF can effectively
use. The ELF, perhaps out of gratitude to its hosts, has chosen'to
identify itself increasingly as an Arab-Moslem movement, a facet of
the larger Arab-Israeli struggle.
41. Until quite recently the Arab states of North Africa,
Eritrean issue in the UN or the Organization of African Unity
(OAU). This measure of discretion stemmed from respect for Haile
Selassie and from the OAU ban on support to secessionist movements.
Times have changed, however, and the Libyan Government of Colonel
Qadhafi intends to bring up the Eritrean dispute at international
gatherings this year. Qadhafi, with a fat wallet, is busily out to
eliminate Israeli influence in black Africa. A number of poverty-
stricken black rulers have found it profitable to visit Libya and
had refrained from raising the
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denounce Israel in ritualistic joint communiques. General Amin,
President of Uganda, and once an ardent supporter of the Anya-nya
is the latest to appreciate the value of Libyan friendship.
Israeli military advisors who were training the Ugandan Army and
Air Forcel
(were ousted along with civilian
technicians, consultants, and businessmen. Egyptians and Libyans
are beginning to appear in Uganda in greater numbers.
42. Qadhafi, in his revolutionary fervor and militant rhetoric,
is a spiritual heir of the early Nasser. More than any other Arab
ruler, he feels an obligation to interve:;e in Sudanic Africa's endemic
conflicts. His record, at this early stage, is a mixed one. The
truce in southern Sudan has at least temporarily eliminated Israeli
influence there, but the Khartoum government is now in no position to
join with Libya in the Confederation of Arab Republics as Qadhafi
had hoped. His angry feud with Chad subsided a few weeks ago. Libyan
arms and training had helped to revive the Chadian Moslem insurgency,
but not enough to do in Tombalbaye's government. Qadhafi has now
dropped overt support of the rebels, and Tombalbaye has agreed to
a strong pro-Arab statement on the Middle East. Beyond that it is
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not clear what is agreed upon. Tombalbaye needs money badly, and
Qadhafi would welcome a break in Chadian-Israeli relations, and
expulsion of the few Israeli experts there. Even if Tombalbaye
were to make some further moves against Israel in expectation of
a Libyan payoff, mutual distrust will dominate Chadian-Libyan rela-
tions for a very long time. Indeed, it would be surprising if the
Libyans were to abandon entirely their aid to the Chadian rebels.
43. In the case of Ethiopia, Libyan money will not buy
Qadkifi anything worthwhile. The Ethiopian connection with
Israel is pretty solid, despite some occasional wrangling at
lower levels. Even if Qadhafi were to offer to withdraw support
for the ELF in return for a break in Addis Ababa-Tel Aviv diplomatic
relations, there is virtually no chance that the present Ethiopian
Government would consider it. Libyan assistance to the ELF, mainly
financial, is not likely to raise the capabilities of the insurgents
significantly.
V. SOME UNCERTAINTIES
44. All of the Sudanic African governments are fragile
creations, highly dependent upon single strong rulers. The re-
placement of Tombalbaye in Chad by a more radical, or even a
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pro-Communist chief of state would not be a matter of much concern
to the US.
On the other hand, the removal
of Numayri or of Haile Selassie could change the situation to one
less favorable to US interests. If Numayri were succeeded by a
figure more sympathetic to Moscow or Peking, or Cairo, it would
have an unsettling effect on the whole area. The hard-won Sudanese
unity would be very difficult to maintain; indeed, a new government
might deliberately .scrap the southern agreements. In addition, ca
leftist regime in Khartoum would be more likely to furnish aid to
the Eritrean guerrillas. The US has no formal diplomatic relations
with Sudan and few other interests there.
The Ethiopian Succession
45. Probably the major uncertainty hanging over this area is
the shape and character of post-Haile Selassie Ethiopia. The
Emperor is vigorous, but he is approaching 80. The Crown Prince,
the constitutionally designated successor, has no experience in
governing, and is not consulted in any way. At the Emperor's death,
the Crown Prince would almost certainly be accepted nomi,ially as the
new Emperor, but might face a turbulent situation very quickly. The
pent-up frustrations of the modernist elite, the personal ambitions
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of a score or so of generals and feudal nobles, and the latent
tribal discontents of the subject peoples of the Empire would
be manifested in some fashion. This could range from peaceful
delegations to the new Emperor to violent attempts to remove him
and change the form of government. Almost certainly, the Eritrean
guerrillas would consider the Emperor's death the long-awaited
moment for an all-out drive to gain control of their province.
Such a move would probably fail, unless the Imperial forces in
Eritrea fell into disarray, or were withdrawn to the capital to
serve some political purpose.
46. Even if the Imperial transition proves to be more orderly
than the above scenario suggests, there will be some anxious moments
and difficult decisions for US policy makers. In the changed situa-
tion US interests might be more difficult to determine. For years US
advisors have urged Imperial authorities to adopt more modern methods,
but if, in a new regime, an internal division were to arise between
modernists and traditionalists in Ethiopia, both factions would probably
expect s,,ipport from the US. If tribal or regional dissidence arose,
the US would be called on to provide more military aid to the central
government.
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47. At the death of the Emps.ror the question is likely to arise
of the degree of US interest in, and willingness to become involved
in, the affairs of Ethiopia.
IN addition
are general considerations of US friendly relations with Ethiopia,
and the costs of preserving these. Ethiopia, in and of itself, is
sometimes an embarrassment, but there are few others states in the
area willirq to associate themselves so forthrightly with the US.
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