FOREIGN EQUIPMENT FOR NORTH KOREA'S SIX-YEAR PLAN (1971-76)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700050027-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: March 1, 1973
• Content Type: IM

 Approved For Release 2006/04/ ~" V#8 iR0pIlyGlq 2Y iv // Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Foreign Equipment for North Korea's Six-Year Plan (1971-76)
CIA
DOCd1VENT SERVICES BRANCH
FILE COPY
DO NOT DESTROY
Secret
ER IM 73-30
March 1973
Copy No.
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 Approved For Release 2006/04/1 % `:Kl+;'1' 5TOO875RO01700050027-6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
FOREIGN EQUIPMENT FOR NORTH KOREA'S
SIX-YEAR PLAN (1971-76)
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. North Korea's success at acquiring foreign plant equipment during
1971-72 enhances considerably the prospects for meeting the industrial goals
of the Six-Year Plan (1971-76). The USSR has agreed to supply 28 whole
plants, the Chinese have extended economic aid undoubtedly including some
capital goods, the East Europeans have agreed to supply a few plants, and
West European and Japanese firms have contracted to furnish 20 plants
worth at least US $180 million. These commitments have already resulted
in a rise in North Korea's imports of machinery and equipment to about
$250 million in 1972, compared witk $160 million in 1970 and only
$40 million in 1967. Most of the plant purchases have been made on credit,
and this is reflected in the cumulative trade deficit of about $475 million
in 1971-72.
2. The machinery and plant equipment being imported are going
into the industrial fields emphasized in the Six-Year Plan. Since 1970 these
imports have included Soviet equipment for plants in the electric power,
petroleum, metallurgical, and machine building industries; West German
equipment for electric power and metallurgical plants; and Japanese
equipment for light industries, notably textiles. This new industrial capacity
is expected to reduce dependence on imports and improve export
cupabilities.
3. The availability of credits has been the prime factor in
P'yongyang's ability to acquire capital goods from abroad. Compared with
the last plan, North Korea has been highly successful in securing Communist
Note: Questions and comments are welcomed. They may be directed to
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and Western credits for these major industrial additions. Soviet and Chinese
aid agreements are designed to finance the bulk of the foreign-supplied
portion of North Korea's industrial development program. Moreover, about
$150 million of the more than $180 million in whole plants already
contracted for from non-Communist countries are to be financed by West
European credits. Some additional purchases of Western plant technology
probably will be made during the remainder of the plan, judging from
continuing negotiations and the likely availability of suitable financing,
including perhaps even Japanese Export-Import Bank credits. Debt
repayment should not become a problem until the late 1970s, and even
then the market for North Korea's semi-manufactured mining products
should be sufficiently strong to permit debt servicing deliveries to the USSR
and China and to earn the requi ed foreign exchange to meet payments
to the non-Communist world.
4. As the Six-Year Plan began, North Korea entered a dialogue with
South Korea aimed at lessening hostilities and discussing possible
reunification. The success of this economic plan is particularly important
to President Kim II-sung to show the South Koreans and the world the
growth that is possible under North Korea's economic system. North Korea,
like China, provides few specific data with which to judge economic
developments within the country. However, just as with China, useful
insights can be derived from a careful gathering and analyzing of the
information on the foreign trade of major trading partners with North
Korea. Over the years, this foreign trade information - together with the
fragmentary information on the domestic economy - has revealed that
North Korea's success at industrialization has fluctuated with its success
at acquiring foreign industrial equipment and technology. This memorandum
provides a brief sketch of such developments under the extended Seven-Year
Plan (1961-70), highlights the significance of recent imports of machinery
and equipment, discusses the financing of these imports, and comments
on the outlook for continued success in acquiring capital goods from abroad
in the next few years. The Appendix provides a general discussion of recent
trade patterns and a set of basic foreign trade tables.
5. During the reconstruction period following the Korean War, North
Korea imported a variety of industrial plants under economic aid agreements
with its Communist allies. As a result, produccion of most industrial
commodities had by 1960 regained the peak levels attained under the
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Japanese in 1944. During 1961-66, however, North Korea's vacillating
position in the Sino-Soviet dispute alienated both the USSR and China.
The resulting drop in assistance was a major factor in the stretching out
of the Seven-Year Plan (1961-67) by three years to 1970.
6. Late in 1966, P'yongyang renewed its efforts to expand imports
of machinery and plant equipment to improve industrial performance. Soviet
project assistance was restored after the Soviet-North Korean
rapproachment. A cumulative trade deficit of more than $200 million during
1968-70 reflected the rapid rise in imports of Soviet machinery and
equipment in these years. North Korea also began negotiations with firms
in Western Europe and Japan for machinery and equipment, including whole
plants. While P'yongyang had to wait until the Six-Year Plan period to
achieve success in purchasing whole plants from the West, it did make
substantial purchases of machine tools and other categories of machinery
from Western Europe and Japan during 1968-70. The renewed wave of
Soviet project assistance together with the Western machinery enabled North
Korea to fulfill major industrial goals of the Seven-Year Plan in 1970.
Capital Imports and the Six-Year Plan
7. An average annual growth rate of 14% in gross industrial
production is planned for the Six-Year Plan, an increase greater than the
12.8% reportedly achieved during the extended Seven-Year Plan but about
the same as claimed for the period 1967-70. Among the ambitious goals
are the substantial expansion of capacity in electric power, metallurgy,
machine building, and textiles. P'yongyang is also planning to add new
industrial sectors, notably petroleum refining and petrochemical production.
Given domestic limitations in machine building, imported machinery and
equipment are expected to provide a substantial portion of the industrial
capacity to achieve the 1976 production targets.
8. The success that North Korea has had in expanding total imports
of machinery and equipment in recent years is shown in the following
tabulation:
1967
40
1968
94
1969
160
1970
160
1971
185
1972
250a
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T
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As noted earlier, the jump in these imports in 1968-70 was a major force
in the step-up in industrialization in the latter years of the previous
long-term plan. The further rise in 1971-72 suggests a significant boost
toward the goals of the new plan. Likewise, the types of machinery and
equipment being imported reflect the industrial sectors that are emphasized
in the plan* (see Figure 1).
9. The largest category
of machinery and equipment
imports was power -generating
equipment. The economic plan
calls for 2,200 megawatts in
additional generating capacity
by 1976. About three-fourths
of the equipment to reach this
goal has been coming from the
USSR, which promised to ex-
pand one of North Korea's
thermal powerplants, to con-
struct two others
West Germany supplied equip-
men t for a hydroelectric
powerplant. By importing and
constructing these powerplants
early in the plan, P'yongyang
hopes to prevent power short-
ages that would inhibit indus-
trial production.
Figure 1
North :(ores: Distribution of imports
of Soviet and Non-Communist
Machinery and Equipment
1970-71
Total: US $269 Million*
Transport
Equipment Light Industrial
Metallurgical
EJ Non-Electric Equipment
'Excluding Imports from China and Eastern Europe.
10. As with power-generating equipment, metallurgical equipment
imported for the plan thus far has come primarily from the USSR and
probably included equipment for two steel rolling mills, for expansion of
crude steel production, and for North Korea's first aluminum plant. North
Korea also imported steel rolling equipment from West Germany.
* Imports from t e U SR constitute the lion's share of imported industrial equipment and, together
with supplies from non-Communist countries, accounted for roughly 80% of the estimated total
imports of machinery and equipment in 1970-71. Technically, machinery and equipment imports
in 1970 occurred during the extended Seven-Year Plan. However, because of the timelag in installing
and operating the equipment, their effect on industrial growth is more relevant to the Six-Year
Plan.
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Metallurgical equipment will add capacity to produce 2 million metric tons
of additional rolled steel and at least 1 million tons of crude steel. Imported
mining machinery will be used to develop two new iron ore deposits. North
Korea hopes not only to produce enough ferrous metals to supply its own
needs, but also to increase exports of semifinished steel products as well
as zinc, lead, and other nonferrous metals.
11. The need to develop the iron and steel industry is apparent from
North Korea's recent purchases of special-quality steel products. North
Korea's production of steel does not include many of the alloy steels
important to the growth of the economy, especially the machine building
industry. In the past, requirements for special steels were supplied by the
USSR. In 1972, however, North Korea signed a five-year contract to
purchase additional alloy steel products from Japan. Purchases rose from
less than $1 million in 1971 to about $9 million in 1972.
12. Petroleum refining is North Korea's newest industrial venture. The
cost of the Soviet equipment and technical assistance for the Sungri
Chemical Plant, based on US equipment costs of similar capacity, is
estimated at $40 million. The plant is scheduled to process eventually
2 million tons of imported crude oil into various products, including
aviation fuels and lubricants. According to Soviet press announcements, the
refinery was scheduled for trial production in 1972, using Soviet crude oil.
However, the usual announcement of completion has not been made,
suggesting a possible delay. (Figure 2 shows the crude oil refining portion
Figure 2. North Korea's first oil refinery, the Sungri Chemical Plant at Unggi, is being
constructed with Soviet economic assistance.
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of the plant in the final stages of construction.) The refinery will supply
raw materials for a $52 million petrochemical complex, recently purchased
from a consortium of Western firms. North Korea plans to begin
construction of the complex some time in 1973. Since North Korea has
been importing sizable quantities of petroleum and petrochemical products,
considerable foreign exchange should be saved when these plants are
operating.
13. Imports of industrial equipment for the textile industry are
already affecting the economy favorably. These purchases include two plants
from Japan (a 100,000-spindle textile mill and a $7 million knitting mill)
and individual pieces of machinery for installation in textile plants, imported
from Japan and Western Europe.
14. North Korea also imported a wide variety of other non-electric
machinery, electrical equipment, and transportation equipment. The general
description of the machinery, however, precludes any meaningful
identification by industrial destination. Nonetheless, the unspecified items
in the statistics are important. These items come almost entirely from Soviet
trade data and could contain equipment for any number of plants Moscow
promised to P'yongyang in 1970, including machine building plants to
produce machine tools, batteries, micrometers, bearings, and railroad cars.
Financi;ag the 1971-72 Trade Deficit
15. During 1971-72, North Korea incurred a cumulative trade deficit
of about $475 million, due in large part to deliveries of machinery and
equipment. Some $400 million of this deficit was with the USSR and is
believed to have been financed by credits arranged under the aid agreement
signed in 1970. Smaller deficits with East Germany and China also were
probably financed by credits. On the other hand, a $40 million hard
currency trade deficit, primarily with Japan, was settled by gold sales
amounting to about $20 million during 1971-72, some medium-term credits
from West European banks, and possibly some drawing down of hard
currency holdings.
Prospects Through 1976
16. The prospects of North Korea's Six-Year Plan have been
strengthened by the recent imports of foreign machinery and equipment.
Nevertheless, North Korea will have to continue importing large quantities
of equipment if the industrial goals of the plan are to be met. This depends
on North Korea's ability to maintain economic aid especially from the
USSR. If North Korea's neutral policy in the Sino-Soviet dispute persists,
economic support from its Communist trading partners will likely continue.
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No information is available on the total value of Soviet or Chinese
commitments to North Korea's development program. However, Soviet aid,
which includes a commitment to supply 28 plants, is expected to continue
at least through 1975 - the final year of the current trade and aid
agreement. The Chinese aid agreement of August 1971 will remain in force
until 1976.
17. P'yongyang has good potential for further expanding imports of
machinery and equipment from the non-Communist world. In the past,
North Korea's trade with Japan and Western Europe had been hampered
by Western credit restrictions and the absence of trade missions in various
Western capitals. During this plan, however, almost all West European
countries either have issued or are willing to issue credit guarantees for
export of machinery and equipment to North Korea? and Pyongyang has
put forth considerable effort to enhance trade ties with the West. Japan
is the only one of North Korea's developed trading partners that has not
extended credit guarantees to North Korea. Japanese officials have only
stated that applications for Export-Import Bank credits will be studied on
a case-by-case basis, which suggests that these credits will become available
in the next few years. Tokyo appears to be awaiting satisfactory progress
in the North-South talks before risking the antagonism of its important
trading partner - South Korea.
18. The relaxation of credit restrictions in Western Europe has
resulted in contracts for equipment long under negotiation. Since 1970,
North Korea has contracted for 20 whole plants costing more than $180
million. Of this total, about $150 million will be financed by credits of
from five to eight years, guaranteed by the respective West European
governments. These plants include the $52 million petrochemical complex,
a $40 million paper complex from Finland, a $50 million ammonia-urea
plant from Austria, a tin-plating plant from Austria, and various other plants
for the chemical and metallurgical industries.
19. Besides these purchases, North Korea is seriously negotiating with
Japanese and West European firms for at least 15 more whole plants valued
at more than $200 million. Included among these plants are a motor vehicle
plant to produce trucks, petrochemical plants, and a television plant. Only
a few of the 15 plants could be purchased for completion by 1976; the
more expensive facilities, notably the truck plant, may require several more
ears of negotiation before any contract is signed.
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APPENDIX
NORTH KOREA'S FOREIGN TRADE IN 1971-72
Trade turnover jumped from $710 ,million in 1970 to $910 million
in 1971 and to about $1 billion in 1972 (see Figure 3). However, if
allowance is made for the effects of the 1971 currency revaluations on
the dollar estimates, North Korea's total trade in 1972 in real terms can
North Korea: Direction of Trade
Million US $
Imports
581
Other Communist
7_1 Eastern Europe
China
USSR
1972
Preliminary
be seen to have grown little, if any, above the 1971 level. In both 1971
and 1972, large trade deficits were registered with a cumulative total of
about $475 million for the two years. (For a detailed account of North
Korea's foreign trade, by country, see Table 1.)
The willingness of North Korea's Communist trading partners to extend
credits was the primary stimulus to the expansion of trade, permitting
imports to exceed exports by a wide margin. The USSR, North Korea's
most important trading partner, was the largest benefactor. Credit assistance
permitted the deficit in Soviet-North Korean trade to rise from about $95
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North Korea: Foreign Trade, by Country"
r'
Exports
_ _
Imports
1970
1971
1972b
1970
1971
1972b
Total
315
325
390
398
581
610
Communist
256
265
315
337
517
495
USSR
136
136
180
230
367
350
Chinac
50
65
75
50
70
85
Eastern Europe
51
39
40
43
60
50
Bulgaria
3
4
N.A.
3
4
N.A.
Czechoslovakia
11
12
N.A.
5
8
N.A.
East Germany
17
7
N.A.
15
34
N.A.
Hungary
4
3
N.A.
3
2
N.A.
Poland
10
7
N.A.
9
5
N.A.
Romania
6
6
N.A.
8
8
N.A.
Otherd
19
25
20
14
20
10
Non-Communist
59
60
75e
61
64
115e
East Asia
40
35
42
29
32
80
Of which:
Hong Kong
4
4
3
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Japan
33
28
36
25
31
78
Singapore
3
3
3
4
2
2
Western Europe
18
21
30
22
18
18
Of which:
Austria
Negl.
0
0
4
2
Negl.
Belgium-Luxembourg
2
2
3
Negl.
1
Negl.
France
1
4
9
5
8
11
Italy
Negl.
3
7
2
1
West Germany
11
8
8
9
4
4
Other
2
4
3
10
13
17
Of which:
Australia
0
0
0
6
Negl.
6
Canada
0
0
0
0
8
6
Egypt
I
I
N.A.
2
2
N.A.
India
0
3
N.A.
1
2
N.A.
a. The data in this table place North Korea's trade on an export f.o b. and import c.i.f. basis. Because
of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
b. Preliminary.
c. The estimates for China are roughhewn projections from data of earlier years; deliveries of
military hardware are not included.
d. Including Cuba, North Vietnam, Mongolia, and Yugoslavia.
e. The data for 1972 are cumulative monthly totals of the respective trading partners prorated on an
annual basis.
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million in 1970 to abo'+t $230 million in 1971. Fragmentary information
suggests that the deficit niay have fallen off to about $170 million in 1972.
Most of the 1971 rise in trade was due to Soviet military deliveries,
estimated at about $135 million. In 1972, military imports probably
declined to the neighborhood of $50 million. The decline in military
shipments was partly counterbalanced by a rise in machinery and equipment
deliveries, while exports to the USSR rose sharply.
Similarly, in 1970 and again in 1971, China extended to North Korea
economic aid that probably included a commitment to supply whole plants
on credit. There is little information on the trade between China and North
Korea. However, it is believed that this trade has been rising in the past
few years and that imports have grown somewhat faster than exports. Trade
with most East European countries, on the other hand, remained relatively
balanced during the past several years. Trade with East Germany is the
only exception where possible credits to North Korea permitted both the
1971 increase in trade and the deficit with Eastern Europe. In 1972, East
European trade with P'yontyang probably fell off slightly.
Trade with the?non-Communist world is also playing an important role
in North Korea's new development plan. Since 1970, North Korea has been
negotiating with firms in Japan and Western Europe for whole industrial
facilities. These negotiations began to bear fruit in 1972. Imports from
non-Communist countries, based on partial year statistics of the major
trading partners, rose to their highest level in 1972 and resulted in a $40
million trade deficit. Trade with Japan accounted for most of the increase
in imports and thus for most of the deficit. In order to finance this
imbalance, North Korea sold $12 million in gold to France in 1972,
following sales of $9.1 million in 1971, and probably received some credits
from Western Europe.
The commodity composition of North Korea's trade depicts the
economic significance of foreign trade to the economy. North Korea earns
foreign exchange primarily by exporting heavy industrial products such as
pig iron, steel, tiagnesite, zinc, lead, and cement as well as some agricultural
products such as rice, fish, apples, and tobacco. In turn, North Korea
purchases a wide variety of goods necessary for the maintenance and growth
of the economy. Grain imports usually fluctuate with North Korea's
domestic harvests, whereas imports of petroleum products, chemicals, and
manufactured goods have risen in line with domestic requirements. Of all
North Korea's imports, however, machinery and equipment are the most
? significant items. These imports increased from $160 million ?.. 11970 to
$185 million in 1971 and may have reached $250 million in 1972. (For
a detailed account of North Korea's commodity trade, see Tables 2 and 3.)
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North Korea: Commodity Composition of Foreign Trade
25X1 I
Million US $
Imports
Exports
1969
IP70
1971
1969
1970 1971
total
398
398
581
279
315 325
Food and tobacco
42
56
50
40
39 36
Crude materials and
edible oils
23
25
22
28
34 34
Petroleum products
and fuels
57
59
75
4
5 7
Chemicals
22
22
28
17
13 12
Manufactured goods
44
41
46
162
194 201
Machinery and equipment
160
160
185
16
22 23
Unidentified
50
35
175
14
8 12
North Korea also receives significant amounts of military goods from
the USSR and China. Order-of-battle estimates suggest deliveries of Soviet
military hardware of more than $120 million in 1971. Soviet export data
suggest that military shipments may have been $125 million to $150 million
in 1971.F- I
t has been
a the residual category of unidentified commodities in the
Soviet trade statistics contains Soviet military shipments to other countries
on credit or current account. In 1971 this category of unidentified
commodities rose to $164 million from only $24 million in 1970. Deliveries
as grants are not included in the Soviet trade data.
The Soviet-supplied equipment included SAM battalions and associated
equipment, SU-7 Fitter aircraft, ground force weapons and materials, and
considerable amounts of electronic equipment. In addition to Soviet
deliveries, China has supplied military hardware, possibly as a grant,
including MIG aircraft, tanks, artillery, naval craft, and spare parts. Poland
supplied AN-2s, which will probably be used by th' military.
There are some indications that imports of military hardware declined
in 1972. Soviet trade data for that year are not yet available and
order-of-battle estimates require a timelag of from eight to 12 months.
However, Minister of Finance Kim Kyong-yon, in his budget report to the
Supreme People's Assembly, stated that planned defense spending in 1972
would decline to 17% of total expenditures from the actual share of 31%
in 1971. While these data may reflect some statistical manipulation, a
cutback in the defense budget probably occurred.
12
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North Korea: Commodity Composition of Trade
with the USSR and Non-Communist Countriesa
USSR
Non-
Communist
USSR
Non-
Communist
Total imports
230.0'
61.4
366.8
633
Foodstuff r and tobacco
Of which:
22.7
8.4
15.1
8.4
Wheat and wheat flour
19.1
5.1
11.8
7.1
Refined sugar
3.4
0
1.3
0
CYude materials and edible oils
Of which:
14.2
&2
11.3
5.7
Cotton
9.4
2.3
9.3
2.0
Vegetable oils
2.7
0.2
1.6
Negl.
Rubber
0
3.9
0
1.8
Petroleum products and fuels
44.6
0.9
40.2
1.0
Petroleum products
30.8
0.9
26.0
1.0
Coke
3.3
0
5.!
0
Coal (bituminous)
10.4
0
9.1
0
Chemicals
Of which:
6.9
4.6
7.4
6.8
Fertilizers
0
0.7
0.7
0
Organic
2.4
0.5
2.1
0.1
Medicines and pharmaceuticals
0.8
0.8
0.9
0.5
Manufactured goods
Of which:
17.4
9.9
17.5
10.1
Rubber tires
4.3
0.1
4.2
0.2
Textiles and synthetic fibers
1.1
4.1
1.2
3.6
Ferroalloys
3.1
0
2.3
0.2
Iron and steel products
2.8
0.4
3.1
0.8
Aluminum
1.1
0.1
0.6
Negi.
Timber products
1.1
1.8
1.9
0.1
Machinery and equipment
100.0
27.8
111.5
29.9
Non-electric
73.7
18.3
87.4
20.5
Electric
6.8
8.2
6.5
8.3
Transportation equipment
3.5
0.:;
3.1
0.7
Unspecified machinery
16.1
0.6
14.6
0.4
Unidentified
24.2
1.8
163.8
1.6
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North Korea: Commodity Composition of Trade
with the USSR and Non-Communist Countries"
(Continued)
Million US $
1970
1971
US.7R
Non-
Communist
USSR
Non-
Communist
Total exports
135.9
59.2
135.8
60
4
Foodstuffs and toba
Of which:
cco 24.6
4.7
23.5
.
5.1
Fish
0
2.9
0
2
8
Rice
12.5
Negl.
14
7
.
0
Corn
0
1.3
.
0
0
7
Apples
5.3
0
3.3
.
0
Tobacco
4.1
0.2
1.3
0
Crude materials and
Of which:
edible oils 4.3
24.8
3.6
23.1
Silk
0
3.4
0
7
3
Iron ore
0
5.6
0
.
4
8
Other minerals a
nd ores 4.3
6.8
3.6
.
6.3
Petroleum products
and fuels 0
1.3
0
1
2
Coal
0
1.3
0
.
1
2
Chemicals
Of which:
2.3
0.3
2.0
.
0.4
Calcium carbide
1.4
0.2
0.3
Negl
Manufactured goods
Of which:
92.0
26.9
93.2
.
29.6
Pig iron
4.9
4.2
5.1
2
5
Rolled steel prod
ucts 37.2
3.7
33.1
.
2
3
Zinc
4.4
4.6
3.8
.
13
0
Lead
2.2
6.8
1.0
.
4
6
Other nonferrous
metals 0.3
7.0
0.1
.
4.8
Magnesite powder
11.8
0
21.1
0
Cement
6.7
Negl.
5.2
0.1
Other constructio
n materials 1.7
Negl.
0.4
0
Clothing
'
16.7
0.1
18.3
Negl
Ma.
,Pnery and equipm
ent &2
0.2
5.4
.
0
3
Unidentified
4.6
0.8
81
.
0.8
Gold selesb
0
10.5
0
9.1
A. Bccau Be of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
b. Exported but excluded from the totab.
Approved For Release 2001BEQ, $M-RDP85T00875RO01700050027-6