COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY AND SECURITY APPARATUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030135-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 135
• Publication Date: September 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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i op Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
UAW corr
Return to
I H I',37. Hq,
Intelligence Memorandum
Communist Subversion In The South Vietnamese Army
And Security Apparatus
ARMY review completed. Release as
Top Secret
ER IM 70-134
September 1970
1
59
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Copy No.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1970
Communist Subversion In The South Vietnamese
Army And Security Apparatus
Introduction
A recent Intelligence Memorandum* discussed the
Viet Cong covert agencies heavily involved in
intelligence and subversion. The agencies included
the Military Proselyting Section, the Security
Section, the Military Intelligence Office, the
Propaganda and Training Section, the Political
Struggle Section, and the Civilian Proselyting
Section. This memorandum is a more detailed study
of the Military Proselyting Section's subversive
organization, including the history, role, functions,
and extent of its operations within the South
Vietnamese Army and security apparatus.
The principal sources used in this memorandum
were captured documents, POW and rallier reports,
Other sources included Communist propaganda materials,
Viet Cong Military Proselyting -- Doctrine and
Organization
1. Viet Cong doctrine calls for fighting the
war in South Vietnam on three mutually supporting
fronts: military, political, and military proselyt-
ing. Military proselyting aims at undermining the
morale and effectiveness of the South Vietnamese
armed forces and security apparatus by propaganda
and subversion.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated with the Office of Current Intel-
ligence, the Office of National Estimates, and the
Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.
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2. The Vietnamese Communists organized a mili-
tary proselyting effort against the Army of the
Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) shortly after the
Army's official creation in 1955. The effort
gradually expanded thereafter. It enjoyed its
greatest successes during the politically unsettled
period between the overthrow of the Diem govern-
ment in November 1963 and the arrival of US ground
forces in early 1965. By then, ARVN desertion rates
were alarmingly high, and there were growing numbers
of small-unit defections and uprisings. Viet Cong
documents aver that a large share of the credit for
these ARVN difficulties belonged to their proselyt-
ing efforts.
3. The arrival of US ground troops in large
numbers strengthened ARVN morale and thereby set
back the Viet Cong's military proselyting endeavor.
Furthermore, in order to counteract the US troop
buildup, the Communists transferred large numbers
of military proselyting cadres to the combat
forces. High-level Viet Cong captives have since
indicated that the military proselyting front was
relegated to third-rate status by mid-1965. Mili-
tary proselyting activity continued to be wide-
spread, however.
4. In late 1967 the Viet Cong mapped a large-
scale military proselyting campaign to accompany
the Tet offensive of 1968. A few small-unit re-
bellions occurred in the weeks following Tet, and
desertion rates for 1968 were high, but the results
failed to meet expectations. There were three
reasons for the failure: the Communists had too
few assets assigned to proselyting, large numbers
of these assets turned out to be less effective
than hoped for, and the average South Vietnamese
soldier was not convinced that the Communists would
eventually prevail.
Military Proselytirg -- Organization, Quantity,
and Quality of Agents
Organization
5. Hanoi oversees the military proselyting
effort in South Vietnam through the Enemy and Mili-
tary Proselyting Directorate of the Ministry of
Defense. The Directorate forms policy, runs schools,
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and sends cadres south to fill key posts. For the
southern half of South Vietnam, the Military
Prose-lyting Section of the Central Office of South
V etnam (CO7SVN) directly controls most military
proselyting activities. In the northern half of
the country, military proselyting is directly con-
trolled from Hanoi. The chain of command throughout
South Vietnam extends downward through the regions,
provinces, districts, villages, and occasionally
hamlets.
6. The proselyting effort employs both full-time
and part-time workers. The full-time bureaucracy --
which directs the effort -- operates from Viet Cong
territory, although many of its cadres operate in
territory controlled by the government of South
Vietnam (GVN) from time to time. The full-time
bureaucracy includes administrators, propagandists,
clerks, secretaries, prison guards (the proselytors
run the Viet Cong military prison system), and
agent handlers.
7. The part-timers do the grass-roots proselyt-
ing work in the villages, hamlets, and cities of
South Vietnam. They include couriers, agent spot-
ters, women who write letters or plead with ARVN
soldiers to desert, and persons who distribute
pamphlets or write slogans on walls. Countrywide,
they probably number in the many tens of thousands.
This estimate is suggested by a COSVN report of
Jul- 1969, which stated that VC Military Region VI
(with about 4% of the population of South Vietnam)
had 9,480 persons organized into military proselyt-
ing cells.
8. Captured documents indicate that most part-
timers operate in GVN territory. Those who do so
are called "legal" personnel, because they have the
legal documentation required by the South Vietnamese
government. Most "legals" are recruited locally,
although some are infiltrated from North Vietnam.
Captured documents offer numerous examples of the
widespread use of "legals." A district in VC Binh
Dinh Province, for example, reported in 1968 that
it had at least 375 military proselyting "legals"
in GVN territory; a district in VC Quang Da Province
(GVN Quang Nam) reported that during a six-month
period, it had "consolidated and organized 247
military proselyting cells of 742 men who operated
in legal status."
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 Number and Quality of Agents
9. The number of military proselyting agents
in the South Vietnamese armed forces and security
agencies in early 1969 is estimated at approximately
20,000, a number which must he viewed a a broad
order of magnitude.* These agents range from highly
trained and dedicated agents to unproductive fence-
sitters. In listing agents on their rosters, the
Viet Cong usually try to make quality distinctions.
Trustworthy agents are listed as "Fifth Columnists";
those of less certain reliability are designated as
"Sympathizers." Captured rosters suggest that the
number of Fifth Columnists a:.J Sympathizers are
roughly equal. The Viet Cong rolls also note whether
agents are Party or Party Youth Group members. Per-
haps somewhat more than one-tenth of all military
proselyting agents were Party-affiliated in early
1969. These made up the hard core of the agent
network. The evidence on the numbers and types
of military proselyting agents is laid out in the
Appendix.
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10. Since mid-1969 the Viet Cong have greatly
stepped up their efforts to increase the overall
number of military proselyting agents. They are
also attempting to increase the proportion of Party-
affiliated agents.
Positions of Agents
11. A substantial proportion -- perhaps as many
as 10% -- of the military proselyting agents are
officers. A survey of captured VC documents in
June 1969 showed that of 400 Fifth Columnists and
Sympathizers mentioned in these documents,** about
30 (or 8%) were officers, holding ranks of aspirant
through captain.
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* The gross estimate of 20,000 refers to agents
run by the military proselyting organization and
does not include an estimated 10,000 additional
agents controlled by the VC security and military
and 1969.
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in addition, a substantial percentage of agents
are non-commissioned officers.
12. The document survey mentioned above re-
vealed that some VC agents held key posts. The
agents included eight signal personnel (five of
whom were non-commissioned officers), an officer
in a District Intelligence and Operations Coordinat-
ing Center, two civilians assigned to an intelligence
unit on an airbase, a Warrant Officer attached to
South Vietnamese Naval Headquarters, a chauffeur
for an ARVN major, a sergeant serving at the Da Lat
Military, Academy, two sergeants and a lieutenant in
an infantry training base, a platoon leader of a
GVN anti-guerrilla formation
the body guard of a district chief, two
soldiers of unidentified rank serving in the office
of the Chief of Ordnance of ARVN, and a National
Policeman -- a Party member since 1956 -- who had
been assigned to the President's Palace in Saigon.
14. The evidence also suggests some military
proselyting agents have attained field grade rank
in ARVN.
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15. The number and position of high-level mili-
tary proselyting assets continuing to function in
ARVN or the GVN security agencies is impossible to
determine. The arrest in early 1968 of some senior
military proselyting cadres undoubtedly damaged
their effort. There is no way to tell, however,
whether these cadres told all, or even knew all.
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Given the Viet Cong practice of compartmentalizing
agents, they probably were not in a position them-
selves to be aware of the full extent of the VC
effort. Documents
indicate that the COSVN Military Prose y xng
Secticn -- which customarily controls high-level
military proselyting agents -- continues to run
extensive operations in Saigon.
Viet Cong Approaches to GVN Military and Security
Personnel
16. The Viet Cong military proselytors recruit
agents from among the hundreds of thousands of
soldiers and security officials they approach each
year.* Some soldiers and officials are contacted
on a one-time basis; others are cultivated over
long periods of time.
17. The Viet Cong make recruitment attempts even
at the highest levels. A captured COSVN military
proselyting cadre revealed that General Duong Van
"Big" Minh has been the target of Viet Cong military
proselyting efforts "since at least the early 1960s."
Minh's brother, a North Vietnamese colonel who had
been sent south by Hanoi's Enemy and Military
Proselyting Directorate, was in contact with Minh
in 1964 while Minh was South Vietnam's chief of
state. The brother, whose family lived in Minh's
Saigon residence, tried on several occasions to
persuade Minh "to have the GVN enter into a coalition
with the Communists."
18. Viet Cong proselytors also have tried to
approach General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the South
Vietnamese Joint General Staff. The contact was
attempted in mid-April 1968 through his brother-
in-law, a North Vietnamese army major.
Other documented attempts at high-level contacts
have included the ARVN Chief of Ordnance in the
* The assertion concerning approaches, which is
based on extrapolations from large numbers of
captured documents, takes into account the proba-
bility that the Viet Cong statistics are heavily
padded.
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Saigon area, the Commanders of ARVN's First and
Second Divisions, and three successive commanding
generals of I Corps.
19. The middle and lower levels of ARVN's
officer corps are also targets. A captured docu-
ment from VC Ben Tre Province (GVN Kien Hoa) indi-
cated the proselytors were "making efforts" in 1966
to approach a colonel, a major, and four second
lieutenants and had "established secret liaison"
with a captain, a lieutenant, six second lieutenants,
and an aspirant. Viet Cong plans for military
proselyting in Binh Dinh in early 19G8 provided for
approaches to the Binh Dinh Province chief, and
the heads of Binh Dinh's districts. A COSVN report
stated that in
January 1970 a military proselyting unit in VC
Region II had approached 19 majors, 23 captains,
and 67 lieutenants.*
20. The Viet Cong direct most approaches at
the rank and file. A COSVN military proselyting
report, for example, asserted that 41,341 South
Vietnamese soldiers were approached in a single
area in the Delta in the first quarter of 1969. A
report from Hoai Nhon District i.n VC Binh Dinh
Province stated that "378 key (military proselyting)
cadres. . . penetrated enemy posts and bivouacina
sites to motivate enemy soldiers" in the month of
May 1969. A district in My Tho Province reported
it "proselyted" 1,260 GVN soldiers during a ten-
day period in March 1.969. A report dated December
1969 claimed that the proselytors in a district of
VC Ben Tre Province had approached 500 soldiers
belonging to the 10th ARVN Regiment and 650 "Regional
Force, Self-Defense Force, and pacification
personnel."*
21. Approaches are made both through the soldiers'
families and directly by Viet Cong cadres. Direct
approaches by VC cadres are made more often to ARVN
soldiers, who usually serve away from home, than to
* In looking at such reports, one must be aware
that they may include some padding.
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troops in the Regional and Popular Forces, who
normally operate in their own locale. Some
approaches are so low-key that contacted soldiers
are not always aware they have been approached.
22. However, large numbers of soldiers are
contacted openly by mail. A district in Binh Dinh
Province reported that it had sent 722 letters to
South Vietnamese military personnel in one month
during the spring of 1969. There were 101 replies
reported.
Viet Cong Military Proselyting -- Functions
23. The tasks of Fifth Columnists and Sympathizers
include formenting unit revolts, aiding Viet Cong
attacks, performing acts of sabotage and assassina-
tion, stealing munitions, promoting desertions and
defections, recruiting new agents, and setting up
accommodations whereby local GVN units refrain from
actively participating in the war.
The Viet Cong sources, primarily captured documents,
tend to embellish successes and often need to be
taken with a grain of salt.
Uprisings
24. The military proselytors' most ambitious
goal is to spark revolts in GVN units. Such revolts,
sometimes translated as "struggles" or "uprisings,"
have ranged from unit-wide defiance of orders to
small units turning on their fellows.
25. High-level Viet Cong documents claim these
"uprisings" occur fairly frequently. A report from
the COSVN Military Proselyting Section alleged there
were 284 such uprisings in the first six months of
1969. The report cited several instances in which
GVN units "refused to participate in sweep opera-
tions or act as reinforcements." Cases were also
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cited in which the soldiers beat up or killed their
officers, and an incident in which "thousands of
soldiers" in a training school "opposed carrying
out military exercises." Whether all these inci-
dents did indeed occur is impossible to check,
because of the tendency on the part of the South
Vietnamese to hush them up. Furthermore, there is
undoubtedly a tendency on the part of VC report
writers to call a relatively minor incident. an
"uprising."
26. The most spectacular example of an inside
rebellion which the GVN tried to conceal occurred
north of Saigon in March 1966 when a group of ARVN
soldiers made off with half a dozen tanks. The
dissident soldiers shot up their ARVN compound and
then headed for Viet Cong territory.*
27. Several recent instances of rebellion have
turned up in captured documents
Aiding Attacking Forces
28. A captured COSVN Military Proselyting re-
port claimed that there were 151 instances of mili-
tary proselyting agents aiding Viet Cong military
attacks in the first half of 1969. The document
claimed the "destruction" of a number of posts,
warehouses, and vehicles, and the "disintegration"
Viet Cong had overrun five Popular
Force outposts in the Delta with the help of
inside penetrations.
* AZZied air strikes were caZZed in, and all but
one of the tanks were destroyed. The Viet Cong
used the surviving tank as a training aid.
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29. Captured documents have noted other examples
of assistance to attacking VC forces by military
proselyting agents. One described a "brilliant"
attack on a Revolutionary Development team in Kien
iioa Province in the fall of 1967. The attack had
been planned by a Viet Cong military proselyting
agent. who had joined the team after his graduation
from a three-month course at the Revolutionary
Development training center at Vung Tau.
An ARVN officer in charge of a platoon of 105-mm
howitzers in GVN Vinh Binh Province secured the
small arms of his soldiers and then permitted the
Viet Cong to enter his compound. The Communists
killed most of the platoon and used the howitzers
to fire at the province capital.
Sabotage
30. Military proselyting agents also try to
perpetrate acts of sabotage. For example, a captured
document descr"bing the activities of a military
proselyting section in Da Nang's Second Precinct
stated it had performed 34 acts of sabotage between
23 August 1968 and 22 March 1969. The report alleged
the destruction of a gasoline depot, a tank, a truck,
four jeeps, a helicopter, a reconnaissance aircraft,
two howitzers, and a machinegun. Other sabotage
includes the destruction of records, the misrouting
of orders, and general administrative foot-dragging.
Assassination
31. Military Proselyting agents use assassina-
tion to cause terror and disruption; however, it is
believed that proselytors are responsible or only
a small fraction of all assassinations of military
personnel. A captured document of March 1967 stated
that a Fifth Columnist serving as the head of the
security element of a GVN district seat in Chau Doc
Province killed the District Chief and managed to
lay blame on the chief's deputy, who was subsequently
arrested. In another case, three enlisted men be-
longing to the ARVN Seventh Division in the Delta
killed their commanding officer, shot "several other
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personnel," and then defected with their weapons to
the Viet Cong in early 1968.
Intelligence
32. The primary intelligence aim of Military
Proselyting agents is to gather data of use to agent
recruiters. Such data include biographic details
on individuals, information-on troop morale, and
intelligence concerning exploitable differences
between GVN individuals. The evidence indicates that
the gathering of intelligence by the proselytors,
although secondary function, is their most success-
ful effort. The pervasiveness of their agents en-
ables the VC propaganda machine to target specific
individuals and groups and gives the Communists
extensive insights into all manner of GVN activity,
both military and political.
SAY.
33. A review of captured documents, POW reports,
Although a few reports mention moderately sizable
thefts, most thievery by the proselytors is small
scale, made more for psychological effect than to
add to Viet Cong stocks. The military proselyting
apparatus is only one minor source of leakage from
GVN stores.
instances of military proselyting agents supplying
the Viet Cong with stolen munitions or equipment.
turned up more than a hundred
Promoting Desertion and Defection
34. The Viet Cong attempt to promote desertion
by propaganda and agitation. The Fifth Columnists
try to capitalize on complaints of low pay, poor
living conditions, excessive discipline, short
vacations, and transfers away from close relations.
The proselytors' agitation is laced with traditional
themes of Viet Cong propaganda -- principally anti-
Americanism and allegations that the South Vietnamese
are US puppets. Viet Cong Fifth Columnists are
particularly active each year during Tet, when the
inclination to go home is strong among all Vietnamese.
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35. Although the Fifth Columnists try to
promote desertion in all types of units, their
highest priority target appears to be recruit
depots. Captured documents and POW reports indicate
that several such depots are heavily penetrated.
For example, a defector report in the fall of 1969
described in detail a large and efficient underground
railroad for deserters from a recruit depot in the
Delta. The railroad had apparently been in operation
for several years.
36. It is impossible to relate GVN desertion
statistics to Viet Cong blandishments. The dif-
ficulty in doing so lies in determining what makes
a man desert. The Viet Cong, naturally, tend to
give their proselytors considerable credit for in-
ducing desertions. A report of the COSVN Military
Proselyting Section claimed that "32,534 puppet
soldiers" deserted "due to. . .military proselyting
activities" in the first half of 1969. This is
about half the 60,851 military deserters carried
37. Most deserters do not defect to the Viet
Cong. There are several examples, however, indi-
cating that this has occurred, particularly when
the enemy has done well. An exhaustive review
of captured documents failed to yield the extent of
this phenomenon.
Recruiting
38. The Viet Cong have long stressed that "Fifth
ocument indicated that another fifth Columnist, a
Second Lieutenant serving as the deputy chief of
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the psychological warfare section of a GVN Marine
battalion, recruited three other Marines in his
unit.
Accommodation
39. One of the Fifth Column's most pernicious
activities is holping to set up local agreements
whereby South Vietnamese military units refrain
from actively participating in the war. These
understandings sometimes delineate territory, some-
times restrict certain types of action, and oc-
casionally call for advance warning of military
activity. it should be noted that military
proselytors are only one of several Viet Cong
groups engaged in this effort.
40. A Viet Cong document about South Vietnamese
military positions in III Corps described a variety
of accommodations. The Viet Cong permitted one
Regional Force garrison to leave its post "only
on the condition they didn't carry any weapons."
Fearing the prohibition would be noticed by higher
Allied authority, the Communists amended the agree-
ment to allow the soldiers to carry and shoot
their weapons, "but only in a direction prescribed
by us." Another unit which gave the Viet Cong a
"fairly large" quantity of ammunition "stayed in
its post. . and obeyed the stipulated conditions."
When the unit was replaced, it "passed down to the
new commander all the conditions [the Viet Cong; had
dictated. . . ." A third unit, belonging to the
Popular Forces, allowed Viet Cong actors to "perform
plays to motivate the workers" in the textile plant
the unit was guarding.
41. Recently, the Viet Cong have attempted to
set up accommodations based on the possibility of
a scaledown in fighting. A letter captured on 30
September 1969 addressed to an ARVN "commanding
officer" in a district in the Delta noted the Paris
negotiations and problems pertaining co "the [US] troop
withdrawal." The letter proposed that the officer
refrain from sending his troops on patrol, from
drafting youths, from organizing agent networks,
and from requesting artillery or air support at
night and recommended that he allow the local in-
habitants (presumably including VC agents) freedom
of movement. The letter, which suggested that he
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carry out his official tasks in a pro forma way,
promised not to attack the officer's unit "in return
for the above provisions."
42. Although documentary evidence on the problem
of accommodation is fragmentary and often dated,
there are indications that strongly suggest it is
still widespread. Many US advisers who have served
in the field have commented on the existence of
tacit accommodation in their areas. One stated:
"We know it's going on, but what can we do about it?
No one admits these accommodations, and they are
almost impossible to prove. But when the guerrillas
keep by-passing this or that hamlet, you have a
right to be suspicious."
43. It is important to note that accommodations
almost invariably favor the Viet Cong. As a rule,
the Communists have taken the initiative in making
the agreements. Furthermore, their higher echelons
almost always know of and approve the arrangements.
On the South Vietnamese side, accomniociations are
made, just as invariably, without the approval of
higher echelons.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Viet Cong and South
Vietnamese
Problems of the Viet Cong
44. The Viet Cong proselytors are not without
their problems, some of which have increased sig-
nificantly in recent years. The GVN military is
larger, the Viet Cong population base is smaller,
and the GVN security apparatus somewhat more ef-
fective than earlier.
45. In the last five years, the size of the
South Vietnamese Armed Forces (including ARVN,
and Regional and Popular Forces) doubled, from some
500,000 men in January 1965 to about one million
now. Furthermore, after Tet 1968 the GVN began
to develop the People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF).
The GVN Ministry of Interior claimed that the combat
elements of the PSDF had more than 1.2 million
members in May 1970, most of whom have been trained,
and about 350,000 of whom are armed.
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46. The growth of the military proselytors' area
of responsibility has taxed the organization by
vastly increasing the load on its already over-
burdened case officers. This problem has been ex-
acerbated by the loss through attrition of ex-
perienced agent handlers.
47. The Communists have employed two techniques
to deal with the problem. First, they are trans-
fering cadres to the military proselyting organiza-
tion from other bureaucracies, particularly the
army and their guerrilla units. Second, they are
using increasing numbers of northerners in their
proselyting efforts, even in GVN territory. The
second technique is not always satisfactory, be-
cause northerners are less effective as proselytors
in South Vietnam than southerners. They are easy
to spot and often distrusted.
48. The GVN security apparatus has become more
effective since mid-1968, with the countrywide
implementation of the Allied Phoenix program against
the VC structure. At the same time, South Vietnamese
counterintelligence organs, notably the MSS but also
the National Police, have improved.
49. Captured enemy documents show VC concern
over the increasing effectiveness of the GVN
security apparatus and the Phoenix program in some
areas. Viet Cong security service reports, for
example, have dwelt on Communist "shortcomings" and
on the danger of operating in some places, par-
ticularly Saigon. Prisoner interrogations confirm
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tary proselyting officials in the Delta recently
had complained about the "inimical situation" in
some areas there.
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Problems of the South Vietnamese Government
50. Many of the GVN's current difficulties with
military proselyting stem from the government's late
start in recognizing the nature and extent of the
threat. Before Tet 1968, the governrrent lacked a
comprehensive program to counter subversion in its
armed forces. At Tet, however, the proselyting
threat came to be recognized because of the fortuitous
capture of a number of COSVN-level military ros l t-
ing cadres. 25X1
52. Despite GVN efforts, Communist agents appear
to be able to infiltrate the South Vietnamese gov-
ernment and armed forces with relative ease. They
can do so by acquiring legal papers and then join-
ing the -South Vietnamese armed forces by either
enlisting or permitting themselves to be drafted.
Legal papers can be readily procured by bribery,*
* A military proselyting network subordinate to
COSVN estimated it would spend 247,000 piasters to
"buy" ID cards in Hau Nghia Province in March
and April 1970.
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by theft, or by applying to local GVN authorities
through regular channels. Another common method
of picking up legal papers is by false defection
through the Chieu Hoi program. Agents using this
method find it particularly easy to infiltrate the
South Vietnamese armed forces, since, in December
1969, President Thieu ordered the drafting of all
physically qualified "ex-Viet Cong" not actually
in prison.
53. In addition to acquiring legal papers, the
Viet Cong can also provide their cadres with forged
identification which can be used to gain entry
into, or exit from, the South Vietnamese armed
forces. During a nine-month period in 1967, accord-
ing to a captured document, a single VC forging cell
distributed 145 false ID cards, 55 Deferment Certifi-
cates, 40 sets of discharge papers from an ARVN
Airborne Battalion, 50 Pacification Cadre's mission
orders, and a host of lesser documents. At the
same time, the cell obtained from higher Viet Cong
authorities 200 civilian ID card blanks, 50 blank
identification cards for National Policemen, and
two seals of Saigon's Seventh Police Precinct. Al-
though the Viet Cong have found it difficult to
falsify certain types of newly issued documents,
it is clear that they still have a significant forg-
ing capability at district level and above.
54. The laxity of the South Vietnamese ID card
system abets Viet Cong attempts to obtain or forge
legal documentation. The rigid procedures that
supposedly govern the reporting of lost ID cards
are seldom followed. Official statistics show that
1.7 million cards of a new type were issued between
October 1968 and April 1969. Of the thousands of
the new cards that were stolen or destroyed during
the period, only 13 were reported lost. The in-
effectiveness of the ID system is illustrated by
an Allied report of October 1969 which indicated
that in the previous 12 months only "35 known or
suspected Viet Cong" had been detected as a result
of the new cards.
55. South Vietnamese attempts to combat military
proselyting are further hampered by the VC pene-
tration of the GVN security and counterintelligence
apparatus. These penetrations hamper the roundup
of military proselyting agents by providing them
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with tipoffs of impending security actions, by
misdirecting GVN investigations, by falsifying or
destroying records, and by performing other acts
of administrative sabotage.
56. Information concerning the penetration of
South Vietnamese security organizations is con-
siderable. It indicates that besides the Military
Proselyting Section, two additional major VC
organizations -- the Security Section, and the
Military intelligence apparatus -- handle pene-
trations within GVN security agencies. Such
penetrations have included the ex-deputy head of
the counterintelligence branch of the MSS, two
ARVN majors who had served with the Police Special
Branch, the chief medical officer of the National
Police, and large numbers of low-level military
and civilian policemen. The most numerous and
best-placed of these agents are run by the Security
Section. No important Security Section penetration
has yet been reported caught.
57. Still another factor limiting GVN long-term
successes against the military proselyting network
is the GVN's continuing inability to retain Viet
Cong prisoners. The magnitude of the problem is
illustrated by an experiment carried out by the
Phoenix program in October 1968. Phoenix personnel
drew up a list of 125 Viet Cong who were reported
to have come into Allied hands, by capture or
defection, in August and September. Phoenix
officials could find none of them. The problem
continues. A report by MACV in August 1969 stated
that from "75%-90% of all (Viet Cong infrastructure
personnel) captured were released within six months
to one year of arrest." Captured Viet Cong reports
indicate that many cadres who return from GVN
prisons are given a short period of indoctrination
by the VC and then are sent back into the GVN
organization as agents.*
A Some, of course, are shot if they are suspected
of having become double agents.
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58. Although the MSS and other GVN security
agencies have improved in the last year or so, they
still leave a great deal to be desired. A MACV
study of March 1969 on the GVN counterintelligence
and security services outlined a number of MSS
inadequacies. The study indicated the MSS was then
overextended, undermanned, and without a clear chain
of command. Only a fraction of the 2,816 persons
in the MSS was assigned to seeking out Communist
military proselyting penetrations. The rest were
assigned to ferreting out corruption, to routine
police work, and to apprehending the thc-isands of
Viet Cong agents run by Communist security and
military intelligence services. Finally, the MACV
study observed that "the effectiveness of the MSS
counterintelligence operations is contingent on the
prevailing [GVN internal] political atmosphere. Politi-
cal matters receive priority attention."
59. The continued willingness of most GVN
soldiers and civilian functionaries to tolerate Viet
Cong agents in their midst is perhaps the big
gest
problem the GVN faces in its war against pros
elyt-
ing.
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number ot approaches o one kind or another made
by the VC to soldiers probably reaches into the
hundreds of thousands annually.
As noted earlier, the
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62. The GVN's problems with the Communists'
military proselyting effort may be expected to
worsen, at least in terms of gross numbers of persons
proselyted in one manner or another. The ARVN draft
is taking in more and more inductees of doubtful
loyalty, and expanding control over the rural popula-
tion is bringing hundreds of thousands of people into
contact with the armed and security forces who have
lived for many years in a Viet Cong-dominated society.
The real answer to the problem will continue to be
troop morale rather than a large-scale counterintel-
ligence effort against the proselytors. There is
no effective way to prevent most types of approaches
from being made, and the only good defense is to
convince the individual soldier that if he becomes
a proselyted agent he is betting on a losing horse.
Military Proselyting -- Policy and Plans
63. Since early 1969, Hanoi has scaled down
military activity in South Vietnam, and given in-
creased emphasis to the political side of the war.
The policy change has been reflected by three major
developments: a shift from large Main Force opera-
tions to small-unit warfare; a transfer of experienced
cadres from the military to political and subversive
tasks; and large numbers of cadres going underground,
usually into GVN territory, which has been rapidly
expanding.
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64. Hanoi's decision to change their mode of
warfare became evident on the battlefield after
the Viet Cong winter offensive in early 1969. Since
then, the enemy military activity has largely, con-
sisted of skirmishes, stand-off artillery bombard-
ments, sapper raids, and acts of terrorism and
sabotage. Parallel with the decline in large-unit
warfare has been a decrease in the rate of infiltra-
tion of troops from the North. The Communist Army
has adapted to the new mode of warfare: several
large units have split up into smaller formations,
and the Communist sapper (or special action) organi-
zation has been strengthened. A COSVN Directive
(CT 7) of early 1970 indicated that the purpose
of much current Communist military activity is to
support the Political Struggle and Military Proselyt-
ing operations -- that is, the use of military ac-
tivity as a credible threat to support propaganda
themes.
65. The transfer of cadres from military to
political and subversive endeavors began in earnest
about the middle of 1969, apparently in response to
a key COSVN Directive (CTNT 88) of early May. The
transfer involved physically moving cadres from the
army to political agencies and a shift of responsi-
bilities within the army itself. The new policy
represents a reversal of earlier policies in ex-
istence since the middle of 1965, when political
cadres had been sent to combat posts in the Com-
munist Army.
66. The COSVN Directive (CTNT 88) also called
for sending large numbers of cadres into GVN-con-
trolled territory. Substantial evidence indicates
that a large-scale "legalization" of cadres has
been going on since the middle of 1969 -- perhaps
longer in some areas. The reassigned cadres in-
clude Security Police, Military Intelligence agents,
political agitators, and teachers, as well as Mili-
tary Proselyting agents.
67. Communist plans for giving increased emphasis
to military proselyting were integral to the low
profile strategy adopted in early 1969. The plans
were disseminated by a series of COSVN directives
which have fallen into Allied hands since then.
The basic directive (CTNT 105) was released in
June 1969 and quoted in COSVN Resolution Nine of
July. It launched what the enemy called an
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"Accelerated Military Proselyting Campaign." COSVN
Directives of October 1969 (CTNT 124) and of Janu-
ary 1970 (CT 1) amplified and modified the basic
plan. Several other COSVN decrees -- for example,
a frequently cited Directive of November 1969
(CTNT 136) -- have prominently mentioned proselyting.
Together, the documents suggest that the military
proselyting front has regained the stature it had
prior to US intervention.
68. The documents cited above, although far from
clear in detail, have laid out in general both
short-term and long-term goals for the new military
proselyting program. Resolution Nine, for example,
suggests the short-term goal was to "contribute to
the disruption of the Vietnamization scheme of the
United States. " A later Top Secret directive made
it clear that the most intensive short-term proselyt-
ing efforts were to be aimed at areas "where US troops
have withdrawn." Directive CTNT 105 indicated that
the military proselytors in these areas would employ
standard "tactical" proselyting techniques, such as
fomenting unit rebellions and coordinating proselyt -
ing actions with outside military attackers.
69. The long-term goal for military proselyting
was also consonant with the overall Communist
strategy. It was to prepare for a large-scale sub-
versive struggle within the South Vietnamese govern-
ment and armed forces. The preparations chiefly con-
sisted of building a strategic reserve of subversive
assets.
70. How the Viet Cong intend to use the strategic
reserve of military proselyting subversives has
apparently been left open. The Communists seem to
view the reserve as a weapon which can be employed
in a number of contingencies. The contingencies
could include a ceasefire, a coalition, a major
political upheaval in the GVN such as a coup, or
the fall of US troop strengths to levels the Viet
Cong believe they can handle. When the contest
occurs, Resolution Nine foresees a "close coordi-
nation. . .between political struggles and troop
proselyting activity to support the people's up-
rising. . ." An MSS study of 1969, based on enemy
documents of "high validity," went further. It
stated that the enemy's military proselyting ap-
paratus would play the principal role in the political
struggle after the fighting dies down.
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71. Several sources suggest the Viet Cong set a
goal of having something in the order of 50,000
strategic and tactical military proselyting agents
in the South Vietnamese military and government
security structure by the end of 1969.* The magni-
tude of the goal appears to be confirmed by a report
from the Delta which stated the Viet Cong there
hoped to have placed "the equivalent of one division"
of agents in the GVN army in each of the Delta's
two regions by the end of September 1969. Neither
the overall goal nor the target in the Delta seems
realistic, particularly in light of recent trends
in the war.
72. The evidence confirms that the Communists
have been making intensive efforts since mid-1969
to place additional agents. Some have been recruited
in-place; others have been infiltrated from the Viet
Cong structure. While the evidence is too fragmentary
to estimate the number of agents placed, the docu-
ments suggest that the overall size of the network
has increased somewhat, primarily because of the many
agents infiltrated from the outside. The most common
source of agents is the guerrillas, whose overt
activities have become more and more circumscribed
by increasing GVN security in rural areas.
73. Captured documents concerning current plans
for in-place recruitment, although scattered and
relatively low-level, are fairly consistent. A
district-level document from the Delta of August
1969 called for the recruitment by each village
military proselyting section of two to three "ad-
ditional" Fifth Columnists and five additional
"secret agents," prPcumably Sympathizers. A
directive from a district in Phu Yen Province called
for the recruitment of an average of six new Fifth
Columnists for each of its 11 villages. if the
district-level directives cited above reflect a
countrywide recruitment policy, they suggest that
' The documents, picked up in several areas, call
for the creation of a subversive network compri.$ing
5% of the military and security apparatus, whose
combined strength exceeds a million.
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village recruiters are expected to come up with a
substantial portion of the agents needed to reach
the 50,000 goal.
74. The reports indicate that the Viet Cong use
of false defectors undoubtedly increased considerably
in 1969.
(captured docu-
ueIIUs,inuicataa single VC district in Binh Dinh
Province intended to send in from 100 to 300 false
ralliers late last year.* A rallier
stated that 27 Viet Cong
were being trained as false ralliers in one of the
provinces' eight districts late last August. A
cadre captured from VC Subregion 5 outside Saigon
stated that the Subregion echelon had earlier in the
year sent in 50 cadres to infiltrate the GVN struc-
false ralliers countrywide probably reached into the
several thousands in 1969 and comprised a large per-
centage of the defectors tallied in South Vietnamese
Chieu Hoi statistics.
75. The evidence also suggests that an unusually
high percentage of false ralliers were Party members.
A report from Phuoc Tuy Province, for example, in-
dicated that VC Region VII had ordered each province
and district to select as ralliers Party members with
"at least 5-10 years" experience. The district re-
port from Binh Dinh suggested that almost all the
"100-300" false ralliers were to be Party members.
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Other reports suggest that many, if not most, of
the false ral.l:Lers are being sent in to join the
South Vietnamese Army as military proselytinq agents.
76. Evidence concerning Viet Cong recruitment:
attempts is inconclusive. Recently captured docu-
ments suggest Viet Cong military proselyting recr!iit-
ers have done satisfactorily in several areas. A
document from VC My The Province, for example, indi-
cated the province !:ad recruited "over 400 Fifth
Columnists" between November. 1969 and March 1970.
District and village level reports from Quang Ngai,
Phu Yen, Binh Dinh, Binh Tuy, and Ben Tre claim
military proselytors there recruited unusually large
numbers of agents in late 1969 and early 1970. A
recent document from II Corps indicated that at
leas t one of the reasons for the proselytors ' re-
cruiting success was the influx into GVN ranks of
large numbers of new recruits, many of whom had
previously lived in Viet Cong areas. But reports of
success are by no moans universal. Military
proselytors in GVN Long An, for example, complained
in the fall of 1969 that they were finding it dif-
ficult even to maintain the agents they had.
77. High-level Communist documents are mixed
concerning the success of the military proselyting
recruitment effort in recent months. On the one hand,
a COSVN Military Proselyting report of January 1970,
(while admitting shortcomings in several areas)
stated that "subordinate military proselyting sections
(were making] progress in planting Fifth Columnists in
enemy ranks." Other recent high-level Communist
documents suggest that recruitment has lagged far behind
"requirements."
Summary and Conclusions
78. The Viet Cong state ti;cy are fighting the
war on three fronts: military, political, and
military proselyting. The military prosclyting
front, formally opened in 1956, aims at undermining
the morale and effectiveness of the South Vietnamese
armed forces and security agencies. We estimate that
by early 1969 the Communist military proselytors
had in the organizations perhaps 20,000 subversive
agents, a number which must be considered as a broad
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order of magnitude. Somewhat more than one-tenth
of the agents may have belonged to the Communist
Party or. Youth Group. These agents are the network's
hard core. Many others of the acgants are far less
motivated and effective. Recent documents indicate
that the Viet Cong have a goal -- probably un-
realistic -- of increasing the overall number of
military prorselyting agent, to 50,000.
79. In June 1969 the Viet Cong launched an
"Accelerated Military Pro,elyting Campaign." The
campaign was part- of a new Communist strategy,
formulated earlier in the year, designed to lower
the Communists' profile while they rode out US troop
withdrawals. The military proselyting campaign has
the short-term objective of disrupting the South
Vietnamese govornmen't: -- particularly in areas where
US troops have left ? ?- and the long-term goal of
building a reserve o!. subversive agents. The re-
serve could be used in a number of contingencies:
a ceasefire, a political upheaval such as a coup,
or an overall deterioration in the strength of the
South Vietnamese government.
80. The military proselytors are trying to ex-
pand their agent network by in-place recruitment
and by infiltrating agents into the GVN armed forces.
'Recent evidence concerning the effectiveness of
their recruitment efforts is inconclusive. However,
there are -numerous reports of infiltration attempts,
particui.arly by false defection through the Chieu
Hoi program. The number of false defectors in 1969
possibly reached into the several thousands.
81. Military proselyting agents have been be-
hind many of the South Vietnamese Army's past
failings. They have had a substantial but unquanti-
fiable effect on government desertion rates and
have been responsible for small unit uprisings and
for large numbers of assassinations and bombings,
sometimes in coordination with Communist military
attacks. One of their most pernicious activities
has been helping to set up accommodations whereby
South Vietnamese units refrain from vigorously
participating in the war.
82. The Viet Cong are not without their problems
in implementing their expanded military proselyting
program. The GVN security apparatus has become
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sc.mewhat more effective over the past several yearn.
Counterintelligence organs, particularly the National
Police, have improved. Captured enemy documents
show VC concern in some areas over the increasing
effectiveness of the GVN security apparatus.
83. However, the problems confronting the 11IRVN
Military Security Service (MSS) in its effort to
combat proselyting are large and fundamental. First,
Viet Cong agents can penetrate the G'/N without too
much difficulty. Second, the Communists almost
certainly have penetrations in both the police and
MSS themselves. Third, the GVN judicial system
frequently detains Viet Cong prisoners for only a
sLort period of time.
84. The most basic problem facing the GVN
security apparatus, however, is the willingness of
most government soldiers and functionaries to
tolerate suspected Viet Cong agents in their midst.
Communist documents suggest approaches to GVN
soldiers and police by Viet Cong military proselyting
operatives total hundreds of thousands per year,
85. This study of Viet Cong military proselyting
leads to four major conclusions:
a. Most GVN soldiers do not feel
positive identification with the present
government in Saigon. Their tepid
allegiance, illustrated by their toler-
ance of Viet Cong agents, allows the
subversion network to exist.
b. The GVN security organization
has been inadequate in its efforts to
combat the military proselyting in
most areas, and there is little as-
surance that it will be able to prevent
the growth of this activity.
c. The military proselyting effort --
because it is clandestine and because it
largely takes place in "pacified" areas has received scant consideration in Allied
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prognoses of the war. Since military
proselyting (like other VC subversive
activities) is largely unmeasured --
many of the favorable trends portrayed
in Chieu Iloi and LIES statistics are
exaggerated.
d. The Viet Cong military proselyt-
ing network is unique in that the South
Vietnamese government has no equivalent
subversive apparatus in the Viet Cong
structure. The end result is the pitting
of the tightly controlled and relatively
secure Viet Cong structure against the
sprawling and heavily penetrated military
and security establishment of the South
Vietnamese government.
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Estimate of Military 11roselyt:ing Agents
on Viet cone Rolls: Earl 1969
The estimate of 20,000 military proselyting
agents on Viet Cong rolls as of early 1969 was
derived from extrapolations from records of a
limited number of areas and echelons. As pointed
out in the text of the memorandum, the estimate is
designed only to suggest a broad order of magnitude.
The two types of military proselyting agents are
"Fifth Columnists" and "Sympathizers."
Among the records used were translations and
excerpts taken from hundreds of pages of documents,
capturd in late November 1968, which covered a
number of districts and villages in VC Ben Tre
Province. The documents recorded the presence on
VC books of more than 500 Fifth Columnists and
Sympathizers in GVN ranks in that province alone.
Since the records were far from complete, the actual
number of agents in Ben Tre was probably much higher.
Detailed village records from one of the province's
nine districts, Mo Cay, suggests that eight of Mo
Cay's villages had more than 150 agents in 1967 --
that is, more than 18 per village. The rosters
did not indicate the number run by the district
echelon.
these documents were never exploited locally an
that there were no known arrests or investigations
of South Vietnamese military personnel as a result
of their capture. Therefore, most of these agents
were probably still at large in early 1969.
Tam Binh District in VC Vinh Long Province had
140 proselyting agents in GVN ranks in August 1969,
of these, 44 were run y the
district and 96 by the district's 11 subordinate
villages -- that is, almost nine per village. Also,
according to recent defectors, Vinh Loi City --
equivalent to a district in Viet Cong organization --
ran at least 30 to 40 military proselyting agents
early this year.
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The Military Proselyting Section of VC llai Lang
District in Quang Tri Province ran some 35 agents
at the end of 1968, according to an analysis of a
captured document. The document omitted discus-
sion of village-run agents, almost certainly more
numerous than those handled by the district.* A
scattering of village reports from other areas
suggest that it is common for villages to run at
least half a dozen agents. Many villages run more
than six.**
The evidence cited above concerning agent numbers
is relatively straight forward. Indirect evidence
from elsewhere suggests the numbers listed are not
unique.
For example, a captured report from Binh Dinh
Province indicated that the military proselytors
recruited at least 51 Fifth Columnists and 40
Sympathizers in the first quarter of 1969. Another
captured document, from Phu Yen Province, indicated
the proselytors there recruited 354 military proselyt-
ing agents in a seven-month period between November
1968 and May 1969. In both cases, the newly re-
cruited agents joined those already on the rolls.
Records of Subregion II outside Saigon suggested the
subregion echelon ran at least 31 agents -- man
well-placed -- as of 30 May 1968.
including nine "GVN service personnel and four My Tho
rose y i.ng cell in My Tho City recruited 13 agents,
* Hai Lang is one of three districts belonging to
actor -
ing to statistics published at the end of May 1968, "
there were 382 agents "within the Front. "
the statistics "cannot be depended
* Viet Cong maps divide South Vietnam into seven
regions, 32 provinces, five subregions roughly equiva-
lent to provinces, 250 districts, and some 2,500
viZZages.
on for accuracy.
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A three-woman Military
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policemen" prior to its loader's arrest in April 1969.
A recent COSVN document indicated :here wore still
several hundred military proselyting cadres operat-
ing in My Tho's vicinity three months later.
There are also areas in which information on
numbers of agents is scattered and fragmentary, but
where other evidence suggests they abound. For
example, military proselyting reports from VC Quang
Nam and Quang Ngai -- provinces of relatively heavy
Communist influence -- suggest the Fifth Columns
there are large and active. Similarly, documents
suggest that, as recently as a year ago, some areas
just beyond the suburbs of Saigon were infested with
agents.*
Furthermore, there are some areas in Vietnam for
which evidence concerning Fifth Columnists, either
direct or indirect, is almost non-existent. These
tend to be regions where US presence has been small
and where the GVN has run the show. Incident rates
and activity patterns suggest that Viet Cong in-
fluence is strong in many such areas -- for example,
large tracts of Delta. A high incident rate is
probably a good indicator of the existence of Fifth
Columnists.
.4 Because of the intense pacification ca-paign
thereabouts, many of these may have been arrested
or may have become inactive. Evidence suggests that
military proselyting within the city itself is limited.
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