INDONESIA'S ROLE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160074-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: October 2, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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9Ic,es
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Indonesia's Role in Regional Affairs
Secresx
2 October 1973
No. 2450/73
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2 October 1973
Indonesia's Role in Regional Affairs
Summary
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Sukarno's Indonesia caused turmoil and
instability in Southeast Asia; in the 1970s Suharto's Indonesia fosters regional
cooperation and stability. Indonesian leaders past and present have always believed
that Jakarta should have a major role in regional affairs, but they have disagreed
about the manner in which this destiny should be realized. Sukarno couched his
leadership drive in revolutionary rhetoric and believed Indonesia should dominate its
neighbors; Suharto talks of pragmatic solutions to the problems of the region and
sees Jakarta as the first among equals.
Suharto's concept of Indonesia's regional role is generally shared within his
government, but his advisers differ among themselves as to how to achieve it. The
largely civilian Foreign Office is intellectually committed to the credo of nonalign-
ment, but the army officers who staff the security and defense apparatus believe
Jakarta's role is to encourage strong anti-Communist regionalism. They are highly
suspicious of the diplomats' desire to improve relations with Communist nations.
Jakarta's regional policy has some serious shortcomings. Indonesia may prove
unable to sustain sufficient economic development and political consensus at home
to underwrite an ambitious regional role. The developing interests of other states-
botb in the region and outside-may work to frustrate Indonesian programs. More-
over, Jakarta's blueprint may well prove inapplicable to the problems which South-
east Asia will face in the 1970s.
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. The directed to
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A Destiny for Leadership
Although still preoccupied with overcoming Indonesia's history of
economic and political instability, Jakarta's leaders are also driven by a
desire to see the country take its "rightful" place among Southeast Asian
nations. They are convinced that Indonesia's geopolitical importance, its
social and political "maturity" as a nation, and the prominence of its
statesmen in Third World forums entitle Jakarta to a larger say in regional
affairs.
Indonesian leaders, both civilian and military, believe strongly in their
own version of geopolitics. Jakarta takes great pride in comparative statis-
tics-the world's largest archipelago, one of the most densely populated land
areas of the world, the fifth largest population in the world, and the most
populous Muslim state. They argue that Indonesia's vast mineral wealth,
large p,,pt'?ation, and location on strategic international sea-lanes provide the
essential ingredients for regional prominence. From colonial times, world
geographers have extolled Indonesia's great natural wealth, so it is not
surprising that this has become a source of pride and perhaps inflated
self-importance to Jakarta. Indonesians recognize that their wealth makes
them an object for exploitation by others, but they are confident of their
own astuteness and believe they can parlay their resources into important
diplomatic advantage. Indonesian leaders have not fully thought out what
kind of leverage can be obtained or how it should be used. But they reason,
for example, that Japanese dependence on Indonesian oil could be used to
get Tokyo to support Jakarta's ideas about regional affairs in organizations
such as ECAFE.
Jakarta's leaders believe Indonesia's positron on the sea-lanes connect.
ing the Pacific and Indian oceans gives them leverage vis-a-vis the maritime
powers. These sea-lanes are Japan's petroleum lifeline to the Middle East and
are ess: ntial to the great naval powers for quick passage to the Indian Ocean
from the Pacific.
In Indonesian eyes, success in building a nation is as important as
natural heritage. "National resilience" is the Indonesians' term for the
political and social development of the past quarter-century. This concept is
grounded in a national mythology based on Indonesia's revolution against
the Dutch in 1945. From the time of Sukarno, Indonesia's fight for inde-
pendence and its revolutionary accomplishments have been used as a ration-
ale for its claim to leadership in the Third World. Indonesian leaders past and
present are often disdainful of nations they believe untcmpcred by revolu-
tionary experience. From their point of view. Malaysia, Singapore, and the
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Philippines were handed independence on a silver platter and have yet to cut
the apron strings binding them to their former colonial rulers. Thailand,
although never a colony, is condemned as too ready to accommodate the
US. Although out of sympathy with Hanoi's Communist policies, Indo-
nesians see North Vietnam as the only Southeast Asian nation that measures
up to their standards of "revolutionary maturity."
The revolution has special significance for the present Indonesian mili-
tary government because the army considers itself the lineal descendant of
the guerrilla units that defeated the Dutch. While civilian leaders such as
Sukarno were languishing in jail or isolated in Dutch-controlled urban areas,
army leaders like Suharto were in the provinces living with the people and
rallying them against the colonial forces. Army intellectuals argue, therefore,
that Indonesia's current leaders are united with their people in a manner
unknown to the governing elite in other Southeast Asian countries. The
military strategists in Jakarta note with pride that the army successfully
thwarted the 1965 Communist coup attempt and destroyed the Communist
party apparatus. They contrast this achievement with the inability of Ja-
karta's neighbors to solve their own Communist insurgency problems.
In many respects, the view of the world held in Jakarta today differs
little from that of the Sukarno era. Most of the present leaders were at or
near the center of power during Sukarno's rule, and they share many of his
basic foreign policy assumptions. The civilians were and are committed to
Sukarno's concepts of nonalignment, although they disapproved of his
flamboyant and often economically disastrous methods as well as his .latter.
day love affair with Peking. The military men remember with nostalgia the
days when Jakarta made world headlines, but they disliked Sukarno's efforts
to dimi.~isli the army's political power in favor of the Communists. They are
paranoid about renewed Communist activity in Indonesia-not from ideo-
logical commitment but because the 1965 plotters had targeted the army
leadership for elimination.
In international forums, Jakarta's present rulers still trade on Sukarno',
past prominence in Third World affairs. Jakarta i~ not above reminding
Malaysia and the others that they are latei..cmer- ;.,, the nonaligned club, that
they are at times dangerously naive, and that they ought to defer to
Indonesian counsel. Suharto and his advisers, however, have been careful to
avoid Sukarno's expansionist and revolutionary rhetoric. Sukarno's ideas
about Jakarta's mission to lead all Malay peoples from Malagasy to Manila as
part of a "greater Indonesia" never gained much acceptance in Indonesian
circles beyond the palace elite. Sukarno's adventurist foreign policy gave
Indonesia a bad reputation in regional capitals, and the rew leadership wants
to avoid reawakening old memories.
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Jakarta's View of Regional Affairs
"National resilience" is at best a vague concept even for many Indo-
nesians. This does not deter Indonesia's leaders from using the concept as a
philosophical base for their view of what regional Southeast Asian policies
should be. In a rather amorphous manner, they talk of the need to create
"regional resilience." Few government leaders, however, have articulated
Indonesia's specific regional aspirations in a coherent or organized manner.
Although there is little precise doctrine, the government supports a wide
variety of "think tanks" composed of otherwise underemployed acade-
micians who are contributing to a theoretical framework by voluminous
studies about regional resilience, great power containment, and Communist
subversion. When all is said and done, most government leaders would
probably subscribe to the following general views:
1. US withdrawal front Asia would lead to unchecked Chinese and
Soviet diplomatic competition in Southeast Asia and allow a resurgent
Japan to gain in peacetime the economic hegemon;' it could not realize
in war.
According to Indonesian planners, Southeast Asia's relatively weak states
can best meet this challenge by closing ranks and developing regional resilience.
In particular, Indonesia's leaders argue that Southeast Asian governments must
carefully control great-power access to the area's natural resources and popula-
tions. This principle lay behind last year's joint announcement by Indonesia and
Malaysia that both countries henceforth consider the Malacca Strait inside their
territorial waters, despite centuries of unquestioned international use. As public
justification, Jakarta cited the problem of oil spills that might occur from
unregulated use of the Strait by supertankers. Privately, Indonesia's leaders
acknowledge concern about heading off military competition for the Strait by
the navies of the US and the USSR and, eventually, China. Although recognizing
that Indonesia is in no position militarily to prevent outsiders from using the
Strait, Jakarta believes an all-out confrontation would be unlikely.
Jakarta's greatest concern regarding the big powers, however, is ovar the
effect on local Overseas Chinese of the expected growth of Chinese influence in
Southeast Asia. Indonesian leaders fear that other Southeast Asian governments
will reach bilateral agreements with Peking that could adversely affect regional
security. Jaka;t,a wants assurance that local activities by Chinese diplomats will
be so circumscribed that Peking cannot use Overseas Chinese as a fifth column.
Perhaps more than any other state in the region, Indonesia.-particularly its
military lead
r
h
d
e
s-
as a
eep seated paranoia about Chinese designs on the area.
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Jakarta's fears about Soviet activities stem from a belief that Moscow
will try under the guise of economic and technical aid to create spheres of
influence. Indonesian leaders have been particularly concerned about Malay-
sian interest in Soviet economic and technical assistance, and they per-
sistently cite Jakarta's own unsatisfactory experience with expensive and
ill-conceived Soviet projects. Although they acknowledge the need for out-
side assistance to underdeveloped countries, Indonesia's leaders actively
discourage massive aid projects that require large numbers of foreign person-
nel, warning that this opens the way to subversion and possible dependency.
Jakarta fears that Southeast Asia is in danger of becoming an economic
colony of Japan. This fear makes Indonesians especially keen on working out
favorable trade arrangements between the region and the European
Communities. Indonesians also resent what they believe is Tokyo's unwilling-
ness to aid local development projects that do not directly benefit Japanese
commercial interests. In Jakarta's view, Southeast Asian states must be mere
hardnosed in their business dealings with Japan and must require Tokyo to
participate on their terms in modernizing the indigenous economics.
2. Neutralization based on great-power guarantees is not a viable
method for insulating Southeast A sia from great-power competition.
Indonesians see the idea of a "neutral" Southeast Asia guaranteed by
the great powers as premature and regard the Malaysian proposal to this
effect as naive. Indonesian military men argue that neutralization-in what-
ever form-will not be possible until regional states are internally secure and
externally united against outside interference. Jakarta argues that local states
also need time to reconcile differences such as the Philippine-Malaysian
dispute over Sabah in order to eliminate the temptation of big powers to
"divide and rule." Until such time as the region is "resilient" (among other
things strong and united), Jakarta advocates continuation of US bases and
mutual defense pacts-such as the Five Power Defense Arrangement-to
counter the consequences of increased Sino-Soviet competition. The Indo-
nesians believe that realization of de jure neutralization is not possible until
the area is strong enough to assure de facto neutralization; when that point is
reached, a formal declaration is no longer necessary.
3. A strong regional association is the best means for protecting South-
east Asian interests, and that Indonesia must he in a position to exercise
considerable influence in any such grouping.
Indonesia sees the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-a
grouping of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia
founded in i 967 as an economic and social organization-as the main
instrument for promoting regional resilience and Jakarta's regional policies.
At the most recent ministerial meeting, ASEAN agreed to establish a perma-
nent secretariat, and Jakarta immediately suggested Indonesia as the future
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site. Jakarta, of course, is eager to have such a permanent ASEAN apparatus
located in Indonesia as a symbol of Indonesian importance and influence in
regional affairs. Thus far, no decision has been reached.
With active encouragement from Jakarta, ASEAN is gradually evolving
as a forum for discussion of regional political and diplomatic affairs. Recent
meetings have devoted a great deal of discussion to the problem of recogni-
tion of China, and concern expressed within ASEAN circles has helped slow
the pace of Kuala Lumpur's accommodation with Peking.
Indonesia is currently advocating expansion of ASEAN membership to
include Burma and the four Indochina states. Burma, although initially
indifferent, is beginning to show interest, but the Indochinese states have
more immediate problems and are deferring action. An expanded ASEAN
appeals more to Jakarta's civilian leaders, however, than to its military men.
The civilians argue that if North Vietnam can be persuaded to join ASEAN,
it will corme to identify its national interests with those of other Southeast
Asian states and thus will be less swayed by the desires of Peking or Moscow.
Although men like Foreign Minister Malik recognize the difficulty of secur-
ing North Vietnamese acceptance, they believe the idea worth keeping alive.
The military, however, favor a non-Communist ASEAN with a well-
developed security and intelligence orientation designed to minimize Chinese
influence in Southeast Asia. They believe the civilians are naive if they think
they cari create an independent regional bloc that would include Communist
states yet be sufficiently united to counter what the military consider to be
China's designs on the area.
In addition to boosting ASEAN, Jakarta is strengthening its bilateral
relations with individual ASEAN states.
Jakarta has also invited ASEAN states to send military officers to attend
the Indonesian War College to learn about national and regional resilience.
One important test of Jakarta's bid for a leadership among ASEAN
states is its effort to mediate the Philippine-Malaysian dispute over Sabah.
Prior to Match 1973 the dispute had received low-key attention in ASEAN
councils, but at that time President Marcos threatened to reopen his diplo-
matic and propaganda offensive against Kuala Lumpur. The action aroused
concern in Jakarta about ASEAN unity-a concern heightened by the central
position of ASEAN in Jakarta's foreign policy planning. A meeting of the
principals organized by Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik was incon-
clusi,ic; Malik apparently was unable to dispel Manila's doubts about Ja-
karta's impartiality. A peaceful solution negotiated by Jakarta would add
substantially to its image as a regional leader but apparently this is not in the
cards in the near future.
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4. Jakarta must develop its military capability as the "linchpin" of
regional security and must promote the defense capacity of its neigh-
bors.
Indonesian military planners believe regional resilience requires more
than undertaking mutual consultations or presenting a united front to the
great powers. They believe that local Communist insurgencies and internal
subversion will continue and that Jakarta must be able to assist its neighbors
jr combating such problems.
In concrete terms, Jakarta wants to develop a small mobile strike force
that has the transport and logistics capability to serve outside Indonesia. For
example, such a self-contained unit could be sent to assist Malaysia if
another round of serious communal rioting occurred or if Communist
insurgents launched an offensive that was beyond Kuala Lumpur's capacity
to contain. Indonesia's top military men believe Jakarta's Western friends
can be persuaded to help create such a regional strike force because all have
an important stake in a stable Southeast Asia. Indonesian leaders interpret
the Nixon Doctrine as supporting their regional defense aspirations; more-
over, they believe that Australia and New Zealand will also assist them
because the archipelago is the first line of defense for Australasia.
Military men believe they have gained valuable experience in regional.
security problems through participation in the International Commission fo'.
Control and Supervision (ICCS) in Vietnam. Although many Indonesia.
Army generals initially believed they could work through the ICCS to bolster
South Vietnam's non-Communist government, they now admit they can
have little direct impact on the situation there. Nevertheless, they insist,
Indonesia has learned more about dealing with Communist officials and their
political tactics. Jakarta's eagerness to have Malaysia replace Canada on the
ICCS stemmed in part from the belief that Kuala Lumpur's "naive" leader-
ship would benefit from a similar exposure to the "realities of Communism."
Indonesia believes its Vietnam experience increases its stature as a regional
military and security consultant.
Indonesia also has a security treaty with Malaysia. This treaty, signed in
1972, is limited to border security, but Indonesian generals clearly see
Malaysia as an outer defense perimeter. If Kuala Lumpur faced an external
attack or if Indonesia believed Communic* insurgents or internal disorder
threatened the Malaysian Government's control, Jakarta would seriously
consider sending troops, whether or not Malaysia formally requested them.
Jakarta has no security treaty with Singapore, but Indonesia would not stand
by and allow what it believed to be a hostile regime take over there. The
Philippines, despite geographic proximity, apparently does not play a signifi-
cant part in Indonesian defense planning, probably because Jakarta believes
the US will protect Manila.
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Indonesia has already taken some steps toward promoting its leadership
in regional security. It has offered to train troops from other Southeast
Asian states in paramilitary tactics and has provided paratroop training for
some Malaysian Army units. ASEAN states have been invited to send officers
to the Indonesian war college, and some have already accepted. Indonesian-
Malaysian joint operations along the Sarawak border have helped contain the
Communist insurgency in East Malaysia, but Jakarta believes Kuala Lumpur
should follow its advice and eliminate those local Chinese communities
which are potential support for dissidents. To improve its own military
expertise and raise its stature among other Asian states, Jakarta has arranged
for joint training exercises with the Australians. Indonesia would like to
increase the variety of training it can offer to neighboring states and also to
upgrade the level of joint operations, but it lacks the necessary equipment,
particularly naval vessels and aircraft.
5. Indonesia should use its leadership in ASEAN and its membership in
world bodies to help influence international issues that have implica-
tions for Southeast Asia.
The Suharto government displays the same sense of mission in the
international arena that it does in its regional diplomacy. The leaders realize,
however, that Sukarno's style left an image of irresponsibility, and they are
working hard to portray Indonesia as a stabilizing influence in Third World
circles.
Indonesia took great pride in the election of Foreign Minister Adam
Malik as UN General Assembly president in 1971 --only five years after
Jakarta rejoined the world body. The recent selection of an Indonesian
career diplomat as secretary general of the Economies Ccmmis3ion for Asia
and the Far East (ECAFE) is seen as another opportunity to expand
Indonesia's influence. Jakarta hopes to change what it believes is a bias in
ECAFE decisions that favors the opinions of developed nations.
The Constraints of Reality
A variety of economic and political constraints over time will work to
limit Indonesia's ability to influence regional policies. It is quite possible,
first of all, that Jakarta will be embarrassed, and its ambitions rendered
hollow, by a failure at home to sustain the kind of economic development
and political cohesion that would put leverage and credibility behind its
regional proposals.
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The Suharto government inherited serious economic and social prob-
lems from Sukarno, and many have not been solved. The broad political
consensus that united the anti-Sukarnoists in 1966-67 has eroded somewhat
as various elements, both military and civilian, have discovered that the new
regime is actually constraining their interests. As yet there is no sign of
serious splits, but the initial enthusiE sm has evaporated. The mandate con-
ferred by the 1971 elections on Suharto to move ahead with his domestic
policies is more image than reality-the campaign was organized to obscure
issues, political opposition was kept at token level; and election ground rules
were slanted in the government's favor. Opposition political elements have
subsequently been isolated from decision-making and left to vent their
frustrations through disorganized attempts to discredit the regime.
As long as the ruling military elite remains united about goals and
policies, they can probably afford to ignore the critics. There are growing
signs, however, that the army is becoming divided about the proper uses of
its power-even as its organizational structure is becoming more unified and
centralized. Suharto's ability to formulate policy-both foreign and domes-
tic-is perforce constricted by the need to balance off competing factions
within the army and between the army and civilians. Suharto's own position
as President is secure, since he is the only person acceptable to all power
groups. He in turn tries to neutralize these groups by complicated checks and
balances and by reliance on a small circle of persona;iy loyal palace assist-
ants. Suharto's style of government, which requires a consensus among the
ruling group before action is taken, frequently gives individuals and small
factions undue influence. In the Indonesian milieu, public dissension among
ruling groups is viewed as an important indicator that the leader is in danger
of losing his mandate to rule. As a result, Suharto clearly prefers to defer
decisions rather than risk a divisive discussion.
It is as yet far from clear whether the loss of political dynamism will
seriously undercut Indonesian economic development. If it does, it will take
the edge off Indonesia's regional pretensions and perhaps even divert much
of the regime's attention from regional concerns. Any serious challenge to
the Suharto government would probably be precipitated by economic policy
shortcomings-inability to modernize the economy, to contain corruption to
acceptable limits, or to improve the bureaucracy's performance.
Massive foreign investment has been confined largely to extractive
industries located in scattered enclaves cut off from local society. As a result,
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although this sector has been greatly modernized, the indigenous, largely
agricultural economy has progressed very little. The extractive industries
produce great quantities of foreign exchange but much of these earnings are
already mortgaged to pay the debts of the Sukarno era. Large personal
profits go into the pockets of the generals who act as benefactors for local
Chinese and Western businessmen. Some observers have reported recently
that the gap between rich and poor, between Jakarta and the provinces, is as
bad as-and possibly even worse than-in the Sukarno years.
Economic imbalances will worsen if Suharto is forced to acquiesce in
the desires of some important military men for increased expenditures to
modernize the armed forces. Nevertheless, Suharto can probably weather
economic difficulties as long as the ruling elite remains united behind him.
The only case where he could not would be a massive rice shortage. The
harvest this year was poor, but the government should be able to cope with
the situation by timely imports and by judicious appeals for belt-tightening.
Suharto's domestic shortcomings are not serious enough to threaten his
regime, but they may limit his freedom to develop and implement new
foreign policy lines. Moreover, the prognosis for the economy in the next
few years suggests that Indonesia will be hard pressed to present its own
experience as a model for the other nations in the region.
Reactions From other Southeast Asian States
Jakarta may well have trouble selling its ideas about the future config-
uration of Southeast Asia to other regional states and to outside powers.
Indonesia's ASEAN colleagues do not necessarily accept all of Jakarta's ideas
about how to solve regional problems or even agree with Jakarta's assessment
about what the problems are. In particular, Southeast Asian leaders differ
about the nature and extent of the Chinese "threat." Most agree that the
area 5h~iuld develop an independent voice outside the competing great power
blocs, 'c' it they seem confused by Indonesia's concepts of regional and
national resilience. They see Indonesia's revolutionary experience as a unique
case which has little relation to their own problems. Moreover, respite
Suharto's careful planning, there are lingering suspicions that Jakarta's re-
gional model may in fact be a design for Indonesian hegemony.
To some degree, Jakarta's present ability to leas and influence regional
cou;icils results from the failure of other states to develop specific positions
on a variety of regional issues. These states have not begun to attach as much
importance to regional action as Jakarta does; they still see their foreign
affairs primarily in bilateral terms. Because Jakarta's leaders think more
about regional affairs than do most of their neighbors, they exude a self-
confidence and purposefulness that often have carried the day in regional
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councils, The same opportunities that make it necessary and possible for
regional groupings like ASEAN to show increased vitality-the end of the
war in Indochina, the gradual withdrawal of the US military presence, and
the Sino-US rapprochement-will also stimulate other countries, particularly
Thailand, to pay closer attention to regional affairs and to voice their views
more vigorously.
Among the ASEAN states, Malaysia alone will probably continue to
support most of Indonesia's regional positions, but Kuala Lumpur occasion-
ally chafes at what it sees as Jakarta's patronizing attitude. Malaysian leaders
are also uncomfortable with the blatent anti-Communist bias of Suharto's
military advisers.
Singapore's leaders often belittle Jakarta's pretentions to regional lead-
ership, partly because of an ethnic Chinese bias against non-Chinese and
partly because of a negative assessment of Jakarta's potential for following
through on the regional development it propos^s. Despite their own ambi-
tions, Singapore's leaders apparently realize that a Chinese city-state has
little chance to lead an overwhelmingly nor-Chinese regional association. But
Singapore will want at least an equal voice tor itself and will work behind the
scenes to prevent any state from dominating ASEAN.
The Philippines are probably the least committed of the ASEAN
members to the concept of a regional approach to important foreign policy
issues. In addition to the presence of US bases on its soil, Manila is
economically and culturally tied to the US; Philippine foreign policy is still
formulated largely in terms of the Manila-Washington relationship. Manila's
activities within ASEAN have thus far been designed largely to enhance
national, or presidential, prestige.
Thailand is an alternate claimant for regional leadership. It is already
the headquarters for existing regional organizations such as SEATO and
ECAFE, and it is a large, stable state with significant economic resources.
Although closely tied to the US, Bangkok is showing signs of a more
independent foreign policy. Thai leaders also are beginning to take ASEAN
more seriously and to assume a more active role in it. Thai leaders share
many of the same ideas on regional affairs as Jakarta, but they are quite
willing to voice differences they might have with Indonesia.
On the other hand, the Australian Government under Prime Minister
Whitlam believes a strong Canberra-Jakarta axis is the key to regional
stability and development. Despite basic ideological differences with Indo-
nesia's military leaders, Whitlam has promised continued military and eco-
nomic assistance to help Jakarta achieve its goal. Although pleased with
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Canberra's behind-the-scenes support, Jakarta is not enthusiastic about Whit-
lam's ideas for a large Asian association that would also include Australia,
China, and Japan, believing it would only complicate life for the Southeast
Asian states.
Great-power interests are probably incompatible with many of Jakarta's
ambitions, despite the fact that most world leaders give lip service to the
concept of independent regional groupings. The maritime powers-regardless
of ideology-strongly oppose Jakarta's plan for regional control of the
Malacca Strait. China will be on guard against any possibility that ASEAN
will develop into an anti-Peking association. The Soviet Union, though less
implicated than China in the 1965 coup, has not yet succeeded in establish-
ing a good working relationship with the Suharto regime. Moscow would
doubtless applaud the growth of an anti-Chinese bloc in Southeast Asia, but
not if it adversely affected Moscow's own bilateral interests in the area.
Jakarta's model of regional resilience is unrealistically ambitious. Indo-
nesia has only a limited ability to assist its neighbors in combating insur-
gency or achieving political stability and economic growth. Jakarta's ideas
about the need for "oneness" between the army and the people are based on
the relative homogeneity of Indonesian society and are irrelevant to the
problems of insurgency in Malaysia, Burma, and the southern Philippines,
where the dissidents are ethnically and culturally distinct from the ruling
elite. The chronic turmoil of Philippine political life is another potential
threat to Jakarta's model for regional stability; yet Indonesia has no way of
changing it. In any event, the ideal is probably unattainable-even in Indo-
nesia, where it exists largely in the classrooms of the military academics.
Indonesia's diplomatic ambitions have been an important catalyst in
helping to create a sense of regional identity and in causing Southeast Asian
states to take a broader view on solutions to many of their problems. But
praise from news media and foreign diplomats about the Suharto regime's
"remarkable recovery from the chaos of Sukarno" and Jakarta's "new,
responsible international leadership" have given Indonesian leaders an unreal
conception of their ability to organize and influence Southeast Asian affairs.
In a scaled-down version, Jakarta's concept of an independent self-reliant
bloc of Southeast Asian states could contribute greatly to future stability in
the area and reduce the temptations for great-power interference.
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ASEAN got off to it slow start' in I9(i7, but it has gradually assumed it
larger r,,)lc in the foreign policy planning of the member suites. Regionalism
itself has become more importanI, as local leaders come to view their
problcmc in the context of Southeast Asia rather that in he vaguer context
of former colonial or Third World countries. ASEAN has begun establishing
a permanent apparatus to devil with the common interests, such as promo-
tion of tourism. The number of formal ASEAN meetings has Increased, and
the various leaders often meet informally while attending other forums such
as the United Nations. ASEAN also provides it point for contacts with
outside powers and with other regional groups like the European Conunu-
nities. All of,' these developments make the association all important "re for
stability and unity in a region which has badly needed it sense of continuity
and identity of interests. While ASEAN will probably never develop into a
well-integrated or cohesive unit speaking with one voice and exerting system.
atic pressure on specific issues, it can still fill an important role in articu-
lating shared local interests vis-a-vis outs.de power groups. ASEAN countries
have many economic problems in common, and there is potential for greater
cooperation among them in such areas as improved technology and collective
marketing. In the longer run, ASEAN's most valuable function will probably
be its contribution to the growing sense of regional idr.ntity and self-
conf!Jcncc among Southeast Asian states.
Within the context of what ASEAN ca i do, Indonesia unquestionably
can play an important part. The Suharto regime is respected by other
ASEAN members, although they resent Jakarta's sometimes overweening
pressure. Indonesia has already demonstrated that it is in a good position to
help mediate conflicts among member states, and its priority interest in
regional stability is an encouraging sign for the future of regional affairs. In
more concrete tcri.)s, Jakarta does hav. cxpcrienwe in particular fields-such
as guerrilla warfare and c'omestic intelligence -that would be helpful to other
states in the area
It f, unlikely that any one member will come to dominate ASEAN or
successfully mold it to its own national interests. If the history of padt
meetings Is any guide, leadership will vary depending on the ic.~uc--. file
personalities present and the degree of national interest involvcd.
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