CYPRUS- -AN OLD PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: September 24, 1973
• Content Type: IR

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Secret
0
Intelligence Report
Cyprus--An Old Problem
Secret
73
11o. 1456/73
i4 September 1973
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
24 September 1973
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Cyprus-An Old Problem
Summary
The conflict between the Greek and Turkish bommunities on Cyprus
has had repercussions far beyond the island. Greece and Turkey have twice
threatened war to protect the interests of their communities on the island.
The US and UK have been caught up in the island's problems, the Soviets
have occasionally tried to take advantage of the situation, and a UN peace-
keeping force has been on the island for almost a decade, keeping the lid on
deep-seated intercommunal antagonism.
Cypriot intercommunal problems continue to elude a satisfactory solu-
tion. Animosity between the two communities is deeply rooted in the
island's history, and independence in 1960 did not help. Major hostilities
erupted in 1963 and again in 1967, and passions continue to smolder.
Though talks between the communities have helped to keel) the level of
violence down, they have made little progress toward basic solutions--despite
the addition of "advisers" from Greece and Turkey, as well as a UN observer.
The talks remain deadlocked; the Greek Cypriots will accept nothing less
than majority rule, and the Turkish Cypriots demand greater participation in
the administration of the island than their 20-percent minority would seem
to justify.
Total political supremacy on the island is a basic goal of President
Archbishop Makarios. A shrewd political maneuverer, his tactics have at
times created misunderstanding and mistrust in both communities. Makarios
clings to the conviction that he was hoodwinked into accepting the original
ternis for independence, which included a protective veto for the Turks; he is
dedicated to expanding the already dominant Greek Cypriot position on the
island.
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They ma), be
directed to 25X1
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Cyprus has been relatively quiet since 1968, but trouble has been
brewing since late last year. This time the threat lies within the Greek
Cypriot community. George Grivas, a leader of the fight for independence,
secretly returned to the island late in August 1971. The aging guerrilla leader
has always been a fierce champion of enosis-union of Cyprus with Greece-
and he is now a bitter foe of Makarios, who favors enosis in theory but not
in practice. Grivas has carried out a series of terrorist acts against the
Makarios government, and there is a danger that violence could eventually
spill over into the Turkish Cypriot community.
This working paper defines the major issues, identifies the principal
players, and provides some historical background of a complex problem that
promises to be with us for a long time.
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The Problem
Part of Cyprus' problems grew out of the London-Zurich Agreements,
which gave the island its independence from Britain in 1960. The agreements
sought to bring about cooperation between the two communities by limiting
the power of' the Greek majority and providing guarantees for the Turkish
minority, The agreements, not surprisingly, failed to overcome the hostility
and nlistruSt. By 1963 the machinery of government had ground to a halt,
largely because there was (and is) no sense of'Cypriot nationalism among the
islanders; cultural and ethnic chauvinism divides Greek Cypriots front Turk-
ish Cypriots, and their separate political administrations prevent the develop-
ment of any sense of n,tionhood,
The limited sovereignty granted to Cyprus by the London-Zurich ac-
cords also contributed to the intensification of communal disputes. Al-
though the agreement made Cyprus an independent nation, it gave the UK,
Greece, and Turkey-the "guarantor" powers-the right to intervene in
concert or unilaterally if any one of them believed the status quo on Cyprus
were being threatened. This provision virtually ensured outside interference
in Cypriot problems. The trouble became international when Greece and
Turkey became protective of their island communities, as they did twice in
the sixties.
The upheaval in 1967 exemplified flow a relatively minor incident in
Cyprus can spiral into an international problem. General Grivas, then com-
mander of the Cypriot National Guard, sent armed patrols into two Turkish
Cypriot villages from which the guard had withdrawn three months earlier.
Makarios probably did not favor this move, and Grivas was motivated in part
by a need to do something about his Sagging reputation. Fighting continued
for several days, and the Turks threatened to invade the island. Only an
agreement by Athens, after US mediation, to withdraw Grivas and its illegal
troops from the island ended the confrontation. Troops front both Greece
and Turkey were introduced into Cyprus prior to the 1967 clash in numbers
beyond the terms of' the London-Zurich agreements. After the 1967 clash
most of' these illegal troops were removed. The mainland contingents on
Cyprus are generally now kept within the treaty limits: 950 for Greece and
650 for Turkey. Greece and Turkey seem more reluctant to intervene
militarily today because of the international disapprobation provoked by the
1967 episode. Bo6'. communities are still armed camps, however, and weap-
ons are easily smuggled onto the island. A single spark, perhaps struck by the
enosists, could lead at any time to renewed violence, which would again
tempt mainland guarantors to intervene.
The main division on the island is between Greek and Turkish Cypriots,
but there are also serious divisions within the two communities themselves.
The continued jockeying of these forces creates instability within each
community and minimizes the possibilities for compromise.
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The Divided Majority
Archbishop Makarios would reject any arrangement that detracted from
the concept of a unitary state run by the Greek Cypriots, He regrets signing
the London-Zurich Agreements because they granted a separate status to the
Turkish Cypriots, His desire to achieve a unitary state in Cyprus is evident in
the intercommunal talks, where he has been willing to cooperate on minor
issues, but not on the concept of' majority rule. The Archbishop also wants
Cyprus to be a totally independent state, free from outside interference.
Although he is a devoted believer in Hellenism-the cultural identity of
Greeks-he opposes enosis in the belief' that political union between Cyprus
and Greece would greatly diminish his power. His public position is, "enosis
is fine, but not now.
Other Greek Cyi; its do not share Makarios' views on enosis. Some
want it now; others would accept temporary independence with union to
come later. Makarios plays these factions against each other with notable
success, but occasionally radical elements within the Greek Cypriot com-
munity push the enosis issue.
The most persistent of these is George Grivas, whose terrorist campaign
against the British was a significant factor in London's decision to give up its
former colony. Grivas believes Makarios sold out the island's interests by
signing the London-Zurich Agreement, and he has never given up his self-
appointed mission to make Cyprus a province of Greece. In his latest effort,
Grivas pulled together about 500 men who were willing to fight openly for
enosis. Grivas and the Archbishop have been waging an increasingly hazard-
ous battle for the support of'the community since 1972, when Grivas turned
his guerrillas loose in a terrorist campaign to discredit Makarios. The increase
in violence in their dispute is a reminder that civil war could again visit the
island.
As the months of 1973 wore on Grivas' forces were demoralizing the
police and embarrassing the government with well-coordinated raids and
bombings of police stations and other public buildings. Makarios countered
by purging the police of many Grivas adherents and by crcatina a tactical
reserve unit. This police unit, composed of' 500 trusted officers and men,
arrested many of Grivas' supporters and confiscated large amounts of arms.
Grivas struck back by kidnaping Makarios' minister of justice and continuing
the bombings.
Makarios would like to be rid of the General, but is constrained by
certain factors. Grivas is a hero of the struggle for independence, and to
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arrest him would risk alienating the enosists among the Greek Cypriots.
Moreover, Makarios must be concerned over Athens' reaction. As a result,
the Archbishop has been limiting his actions to rounding up Grivasites and to
denigrating his group a, "bandits."
Grivas is an avid anti-Communist and has vowed to destroy the party oil
Cyprus. The Communist Party supports Makarios and his drive for an
independent Cyprus. Another leftist faction, led by Vassos Lyssarides, who
is close to Makarios, is determined to block Grivas by any means. It has
about the same strength as the Grivas force. Up to now, Makarios has held
Lyssarides back and prevented a blood bath involving these two radical
extremes within the Greek Cypriot community. Should the Grivas forces
make any really determined and forceful push to fulfill the general's lifelong
goal of enosis, there is a good possibility that Makarios would allow Lys-
sarides to use all his resources against Grivas.
Makarios always has blamed Athens for part of his problems. He
believes-with some reason-that the Greeks want to weaken his control of
Cyprus and that this was why they allowed the exiled Grivas to return to the
island. Inasmuch as Athens cannot openly oust the Archbishop, supporting
Grivas has been the logical decision.
Makarios also blames Athens for the attempt by the Cypriot bishops to
defrock him in the midst of Grivas' terror campaign. Grivas openly sup-
ported the action of the rebel bishops, but it was they-rather than the
Archbishop-who were subsequently defrocked.
The Greek Government had avoided publicly coming between the two
rivals, but by late summer newly designated President Papaclopoulos clearly
and openly castigated Grivas. Papadopoulos urged that an end to his terrorist
campaign would be the highest service the general could render to Cyprus
and the "national center," meaning Greece. Papadopoulos may have feared
that the intracommunal struggle was risking more direct Greek involvement
at a time when he had his hands full giving his own administration-the
"Hellenic Republic"-a changed look. British and Canadian demarches also
had urged Athens to curb the general's activities.
. Whatever Papadopoulos' motives, Grivas responded by branding the
Greek leader's intervention a betrayal of the cause of Hellenism. A verbal
battle continues on the island, but violence has tailed off' and Makarios
appeared to be winning the latest round. Whether the general is ready to give
up the battle, however, is still questionable.
The Turkish Cypriots see all this instability within the Greek Cypriot
community as a threat to their own security, fearing that the fighting could
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spill over into their enclaves and lead to another intercommunal clash. Troop
maneuvers and alerts within the Turkish enclaves are held to prepare for this
eventuality. The Turkish representative to the intercommunal talks cites the
recurrent violence to justify demands for greater autonomy.
The Turkish Cypriot position has become more inflexible since Febru-
ary 1973, when Rauf Denktash took office as the Turkish Cypriot vice
president of the island. Denktash has little of the dynamism of Makarios, but
he is a strong leader, has the support of the Turkish community, and has
done a good job at the intercommunal talks. He favors direct intervention by
Turkey to force compromises from the Greek side.
Some of Denktash's goals have created tensions between the Turkish
Cypriots and Ankara. The relationship between the Turkish military on the
island and the Turkish Cypriot administration has always been touchy.
Denktash insists that the vice president must have autonomous control of
both the military and political affairs of the Turkish community. His
position challenges not only Makarios' authority as president, but also
Ankara's insistence that its commander of the Turkish mainland force on
Cyprus control military matters within the Turkish community and review
political decisions. Strains between Ankara and Denktash surfaced recently
when Turkish troops on the island went on maneuvers in direct violation of
an agreement between the two communities not to hold exercises or parades
that might increase intercommunal tensions.
These differences are likely to continue. The Greek side might cite the
Turkish maneuver as an example of overly aggressive Turkish behavior, but
the Turks would justify their position by pointing to the instability on the
Greek Cypriot side. This sort of argumentation serves only to continue the
polarization of the communities.
A dozen or more nations have an active interest in the Cyprus question.
Aside from simple bilatera! interests, many countries believe that the balance
of power in the Mediterranean could be upset if Cyprus were to slip over the
edge.
Greece and Turkey
Greece and Turkey have had an uphill struggle since 1968 to prevent
tensions on the island from harming their bilateral relations. Greek President
Papadopoulos has made it clear that Greek-Turkish hostilities over the island
would not serve Greek interests. To prevent any misunderstanding over
Cyprus, there is now a "hotline" between Athens and Ankara and foreign
ministers of the two countries meet periodically. Efforts are being made to
separate problems Greece has with its Turkish minority and Turkey with its
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Greeks from the Cypriot communal problem. Both nations have urged their
respective communities on the island to resolve their differences and return
to some degree of harmony,
Despite these efforts, another Greek-Turkish confrontation is always
possible. For Turkey, the fact that more than 100,000 Turkish Cypriots live
under the Greek Cypriots is an emotional issue that cannot be easily
dismissed. Turkish military leaders add fuel to the issue by contending that
Cyprus in unfriendly hands would be a threat to Turkey's security. They
maintain a force in southern Turkey to remind Greece and the Greek
Cypriots that they are ever ready to defend the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey
trains and arms the 10,000-nian defense forces of the Turkish Cypriots and
provides Turkish officers to command them. Without Turkey's moral, mili-
tary, and increasing monetary support-now about $30 million a year-the
Turkish Cypriots would probably be forced to knuckle under to the Greek
majority or to leave the island.
Similarly, most mainland Greeks still have strong emotional ties to the
substantial number of Greeks outside Greece. Greece's influence over the
Greek Cypriots has diminished in recent years, partly because almost 8,000
Greek troops were withdrawn in 1968, and rartly because Athens has been
trying to improve relations with Turkey. Another factor that has reduced the
role of Greece in Cypnis is the enmity between Makarios and junta leader
Papadopoulos. The Greek President apparently regards Makarios as the main
obstacle to peace on the island and improved relations with Turkey. Ma-
karios worries about Greek-Turkish rapprochement on the Cyprus problem
that might lead the two nations to collaborate to oust him.
NATO wants to preserve a strong southeastern flank against the grow-
ing Soviet presence in the eastern Mediterranean. NATO's strength in the
area depends largely on the US Sixth Fleet and the military support of
Greece and Turkey. Another Greek-Turkish confrontation over Cyprus could
seriously impair that effectiveness. NATO members are also concerned that a
weak government in either country might use the Cyprus issue to divert
attention from problems at home and cause another confrontation, with all
the headaches that would entail.
The United Kingdom
Britain's interest in Cyprus focuses chiefly on two military bases lo-
cated on the island. The UK obtained sovereignty over these bases in the
London-Zurich Agreements as a way to maintain a foothold in the Mediter-
ranean. President Makarios does not press the issue, but he would like to
have them returned eventually to Greek Cypriot control, despite the modest
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size of the bases and the helpful contributions they have made to the
Cypriot economy. London can visualize that once a permanent solution to
the intercommunal problem is found, Makarios will attempt to abrogate the
agreements that granted the UK these bases.
Even so, the British would like to see community problems on Cyprus
resolved, if' only to get out from under their share of the cost of supporting
the UN peace-keeping force. London urges both Athens and Nicosia to put
an end to the violence inside the Greek Cypriot community. The British are
genuinely fearful that the fighting between Greek Cypriot factions will
produce a reaction in the Turkish Cypriot enclaves and cause an inter-
communal clash.
The US shares the same basic concerns as the UK and other NATO
allies regarding Cyprus, The US has made two unsuccessful attempts since
the London-Zurich Agreements to mediate a settlement to the inter-
communal dispute. In a major initiative in 1964, Dean Acheson proposed
partitioning the island along ethnic lines, but this would have meant shifting
population and Makarios turned down the proposal. A stern warning from
President Johnson to Ankara in 1964 may have cooled the Turkish fervor for
an invasion of Cyprus, but it also weakened US relations with the Turks. As
as a result of Cyrus Vance's hectic mission of November 1967, Athens,
under Ankara's pressure, recalled Grivas and most of the "illegal" Greek and
Turkish troops were withdrawn. US political and financial support of the UN
has helped preserve a peace-keeping force on Cyprus, but diplomatic pressure
by the US and others has, through constant use, lost much of its effective-
ness.
The USSR
The Soviets have drawn the most benefits from the festering Cyprus
issue. They like Makarios' efforts to preserve Cyprus' independence and to
stimulate antipathy between the Greek and Turkish mainlanders. The Soviets
want to keep the island from becoming a NATO base and thus weaken
NATO's southeastern flank-goals which are served by either continuing
friction or independence. The Soviet position is aided by a strong, well-
organized Communist Party that encourages good relations between the
USSR and the island. Although the Russians them,ulves have sent no arms to
Makarios since an agreement in 1964, they have not prevented other Com-
munist nations, particularly the Czechs, from delivering arms. A shipment of
Czech arms contributed greatly to the 1967 outburst, and a shipment last
year helped produce current uncertainties. Moscow is careful to ensure that
the Cyprus issue does not disturb its relations with Greece or Turkey, but
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applauds Makarios for the discomfort he causes NATO, The Soviets have
consistently supported Makarios at the UN, but ';.lave refused to contribute
to the maintenance of the UN force on Cyprus.
The principal peace-keeping, peace-making task has fallen to the UN. A
peace. keel) iug force, now composed of 3,000 troops and police from Austra-
lia. Austria. Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the UK, has been on
the island since 1964. Because of its small size, the force has been unable to
prevent outbreaks of violence on the island like that u f 1967, but has
successfully mediated a number of minor intercommunal squabbles. I ro n i-
cally,bccauseofthesesuccesses, as well as financial reasons, the contingent has
been cut back over the years, despite the constant underlying threat of
violence. Financial backers of the UN force would like to reduce the
numbers even further. Suggestions about changes in the force always raise
questions about whether it is really needed. Its mandate is renewed every six
months: the next review will be in December.
While others are using diplomatic persuasion to influence Cyprus'
future, the islanders themselves have been discussing ways to resolve their
problems. Since 1968, reuresentatives from both communities have been
talking intermittently on constitutional issues. The representatives hove
made no progress on major issues, but the talks do provide a channel of
formal communication; indeed, they may offer the only hope for settlement
of' the basic issues.
In 1971. arguments over the degree of autonomy to be granted to the
Turkish Cypriots led to a breakdown in the talks for several months: it took
strenuous pressure from the UN Secretary General to get them started again.
Local autonomy was discussed again last fall, and another deadlock set in. A
UN observer and constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey are pressing
hard for compromise on this issue. The UN observer has had some success in
inducing the two sides to discuss issues previously considered not negotiable.
Still, in the fall of 1973 settlement of these issues seemed remote.
The turmoil in the Greek community now diverts the attention of the
participants and helps them to put off the painful compromises required.
The Turkish Cypriots continue to prepare for new violence. Ankara provides
Turkish Cypriot forces with new weapons; considerable quantities of' arms
have been smuggled in over the years, most often by ship. A few Turkish
Cypriots would welcome new intercommunal violence; they believe that
disruption on the island and a subsequent military action from the mainland
are the only way to attain the rightful status for their community.
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Thus, in the short term, political conditions will not change very much
from their present deplorable state. Makarios is extremely popular and is not
likely to relax his hold. He has demonstrated a capacity to outwit and
outmaneuver his opponents. Grivas and other Greek Cypriot opponents will
continue to work against him and at times will use violence to press their
case. The Turkish Cypriots will insist upon full recognition of their rights.
Greece and Turkey will find their dealings with the island more a liability
than an asset, and neither will wish to project itself more actively into the
Cypriot maelstrom. The international community, wishing above all to
prevent a major power showdown in the eastern Mediterranean, will seek to
maintain the status quo. Cyprus, in short, will not change much, and this
means that a violent eruption is possible at any time.
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Chronology and Armed Forces Breakdown
Armed Forces on Cyprus
Greek (mainland) legal contingents
950
Turkish (mainland) legal contingents
650
Turkish Army (mainland) illegal
150-300
Turkish Cypriot regulars
4,000
Turkish Cypriot reserve
6,000
Cypriot (Greek) National Guard
8,600
Greek (mainland) officers in National Guard
Makarios' special contingent
The Tactical Reserve Unit (TRU)
Grivas' guerrillas (estimated)
500
Lyssarides' guerrillas (estimated)
150-300
UN Forces (Australia, Austria, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and U.K.)
3,000
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United Kingdom assumes administration of Cyprus
from Ottoman Empire.
1914 United Kingdom annexes Cyprus.
19'5 Cyprus becomes a British Crown Colony.
1931 Greek Cypriots riot for enosis (union with Greece).
1955-59 "Emergency period" of terrorism aimed at
achieving enosis.
1959 February London-Zurich Agreements pave way for Cyprus'
independence.
December ArchbishopMakarios III wins presidential election.
1960 July Elections to House of Representatives.
August Cyprus becomes independent on 16 August.
Communal Chamber elections are held.
1964 March
August
1965 July
Makarios proposes 13 constitutional amendments
designed to increase the efficiency of the govern-
r iznt at the expense of Turkish Cypriot power.
Communal fighting breaks out.
U.N. Security Council resolution authorizes peace-
keeping Corce and U.N. mediator.
Turkey conducts air strikes against Greek Cypriot
forces.
Greek members of House of Representatives de-
prive Turks of voting privileges conferred by Con-
stitution.
United Nations successfully negotiates cease-fire
after outbreak of fighting in Famagusta.
U.N. General Assembly calls for respect for "the
sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial
integrity" of Cyprus.
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1966 June
November
1967 November
1968 February
1969 August
September
1970 March
July
September
Bombings result in blockades of Turkish quarter of
Nicosia.
Mal;:ario imports Czechoslovak arms for Cyprus
polir:e force.
Turkey mobilizes and threatens military interven-
tion in Cyprus following Greek and Greek Cypriot
National Guard attack on Turkish Cypriot villages;
U.S. mediation, coupled with U.N. Secretary Gen-
eral's appeal, halts immediate threat of war.
Makario.-; is reelected President.
Makarios announces "normalization" measures de-
signed to give freedom of movement and trade
throughout the island to the Turkish Cypriots.
Intercommunal talks begin.
President Makarios publicly expresses "little op-
timism" regarding the outcome of the intercom-
munal talks.
President Makarios and Vice President Kucuk meet
for talks, the first such meeting since intercom-
munal split in 1964.
Attempt is made on Makarios' life when assailants
fire on his helicopter.
Parliamentary elections are held in both Greek and
Turkish communities. Clerides is reelected Presi-
dent of the House of Representatives.
General Grivas charges Makarios with "never favor-
ing enosis," claiming that he was pushed into
making public statements of support by "genuine
Greeks."
October Makarios claims union of Cyprus with Greece is no
longer feasible.
1971 April General Grivas calls for a change of government in
Cyprus to achieve enosis.
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September Grivas, former leader of the Greek Cypriot under-
October
1972 February
March
June
ground organization EOKA, returns clandestinely
to Cyprus.
Greek and Turkish representatives meet in New
York in attempt to instill new life in intercom-
nuulal talks on Cyprus; they seek the assistance of
the U.N. Secretary General.
Greece demands that Makarios reshuffle his cabinet
to eliminate "leftists" and surrender to the U.N.
peacekeeping force the Czechoslovak arms de-
livered clandestinely in January.
The Holy Synod of the Cypriot Orthodox Church
calls on Makarios to resign.
Makarios reshuffles cabinet but rejects synod pro-
posal that lie resign.
Formal expanded intercommunal talks open, on 8
June, in the presence of U.N. Secretary General
Waldllcinl.
July First working session of expanded talks on inter-
conlnlunal problem begins on 4 July among rep-
resentatives from both Cypriot communities,
Greece, Turkey, and a special representative of the
U.N. Secretary General.
1973 February Makarios is pronounced President for another terns
when no other candidate appears.
Rauf Denktash takes over as Vice President when
the last candidate withdraws from the race.
February- Grivas' struggle for enosis heats up with bombings
August and other violence sponsored by rival Greek
Cypript factions.
Intercommunal talks still snagged on sticky issue of
autonomy for Turkish Cypriots.
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