THE CARIBBEAN: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001700030007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 30, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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f* Director of ;Jecret
Central
Intelligence
The Caribbean:
Prospects for Stability
Secret
NI JIM 82-10015
30 November 1982
Copy 3 r 2
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NI IIM 82-10015
THE CARIBBEAN:
PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY
Information available as of 24 November 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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SCOPE NOTE
The United States has a significant interest in the Caribbean region
because of economic and strategic considerations. The stability of the
region is threatened by substantial economic pressures and by the
attempts of unfriendly foreign countries, particularly Cuba, to expand
their influence. An understanding of the forces that threaten Caribbean
stability is essential for the framing of a US Caribbean policy that would
best promote national objectives and the viability of the region. This re-
port analyzes these forces and their impact over the next three years.
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PREFACE
There are three broad geographical concepts of the Caribbean
region: the Commonwealth Caribbean, the Caribbean archipelago, and
the Caribbean Basin. The Commonwealth Caribbean refers to the
English-speaking countries and territories of the region, including the
mainland countries of Belize and Guyana. The archipelagic concept of
the Caribbean loosely includes (a) all the islands in the Caribbean Sea,
(b) the Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands in the Atlantic
Ocean, and (c) the mainland areas of Belize, Guyana, French Guiana,
and Suriname. In its broadest sense, the Caribbean Basin includes all
countries and territories of the Caribbean archipelago, plus all other
mainland countries adjacent to the Caribbean Sea, from Mexico
southward to Venezuela.' In this report the Caribbean is defined as the
countries of the Caribbean archipelago, excluding Cuba, Puerto Rico,
and the US Virgin Islands. As US dependencies, Puerto Rico and the US
Virgin Islands fall outside the scope of this report. Cuba is excluded, per
se, to permit a focus on the Cuban influence on stability in the
Caribbean, as opposed to prospects for stability within Cuba itself. The
Latin republics of Central America are omitted from the report because
the dimensions of potential instability in those countries are markedly
different from those of the Caribbean archipelago.
' These geographical concepts are themselves flexible. For example, Bermuda is occasionally erroneous-
ly identified as a Caribbean country, as is El Salvador.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ iii
PREFACE ................................................................................................................... v
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
I. THE REGION AT A GLANCE .................................................................. 5
The Caribbean From a Global Perspective ................................................ 5
Importance for the United States ................................................................ 5
II. ECONOMIC TRENDS AND PROBLEMS ............................................... 7
Broad Economic Characteristics .................................................................. 7
Basic Economic Problems ............................................................................ 9
Seeking Economic Solutions ......................................................................... 11
III. POLITICAL PRESSURES ........................................................................... 16
Political Overview ........................................................................................ 16
Labor ............................................................................................................. 16
Political Opposition ...................................................................................... 17
Regional Politics ............................................................................................ 19
Relations With the United States ................................................................. 20
IV. SOCIOCULTURAL FACTORS .................................................................. 21
V. DESTABILIZING FORCES ........................................................................ 25
VI. COPING WITH THREATS ........................................................................ 30
Security Forces .............................................................................................. 30
Regional Security Cooperation .................................................................... 31
VII. PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 31
Overview of Stability .................................................................................... 31
The Role of the CBI ..................................................................................... 32
Subversive Threats ........................................................................................ 33
ANNEX A: Caribbean Security Forces ..................................................................... A-1
ANNEX B: Internal Political Dynamics of Caribbean Countries ........................... B-1
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Caribbean region will remain potentially unstable during the
period of this estimate-with continuing demands on the United States
for greater economic support. Unless the pro-Castro forces strongly
expand their efforts, it is unlikely that the political complexion of the
region will change drastically in the next one to three years.
However, the situation in two countries is potentially dangerous to
US interests:
- Grenada-because the pro-Castro regime has received addition-
al Soviet and Cuban weapons and other assistance, and probably
will become more active in regional subversion.
- Suriname-because the military-dominated government has
received Cuban support, and may be moving into the Cuban
orbit.
The recent decline in economic performance in the area is likely to
be checked somewhat during the period of the estimate. Some improve-
ment is expected as a result of possible slight increases in primary
commodity export prices, a lower rate of increase in the price of oil than
has occurred in recent years, and modest economic recovery in the
industrial countries. However, the underlying economic problems will
not be alleviated because the region:
- Has limited natural resources.
- Is dependent on primary commodity exports whose prices
fluctuate on world markets.
- Is subject to natural disasters like hurricanes and earthquakes.
The pace of economic recovery in industrial countries will be a key
element in reversing the recent Caribbean economic decline. In the
meantime, available international economic assistance programs can
lessen the Caribbean's economic problems, but will not by themselves
create the conditions necessary for sustained economic growth.
Note: This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for
Latin America. It was drafted b Office of African and Latin American Analysis, Central
Intelligence Agency, and coordinated at the working level with the Central Intelligence Agency; the
Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Departments of State, Treasury, and
Commerce; and the intelligence organizations of the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.
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US influence in the Caribbean will be tested by the economic gains
achieved by Caribbean countries under the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI). Several Caribbean leaders, including Jamaican Prime Minister
Seaga, stand to suffer political setbacks if the CBI and other Western
economic aid programs fail to make a significant economic contribution
within the period covered by this estimate.
Sources of economic assistance for the Caribbean will continue to
include not only the United States, but the other industrial democracies
such as the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands (the former
colonial powers), and Canada. International financial/development
entities, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank (IBRD), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), are
expected to increase their financial support for the region.
Even though the area's potential instabilities will derive primarily
from economic weaknesses, there will be other significant destabilizing
forces at work:
- Social-political problems endemic to the area-including popu-
lation pressures, drug trafficking, ethnic-cultural frictions, and
labor disputes.
- Continued efforts by Communists and their allied elements to
exploit the area's problems while undercutting US influence.
Additional actions will probably be taken by (1) Cuba, which
will intensify its subversive efforts; (2) Grenada, which-as long
as its pro-Castro regime remains in power-will increasingly
become a partner with both Cuba and the USSR; (3) Libya,
which will continue to finance radical activity in the area, and
(4) the USSR, which has become more active in Grenada and
Suriname.
However, the Caribbean area has important strengths, and these
will continue to limit instability. Well-established democratic traditions
exist. Among most leadership groups and the general population there is
little attraction to Communism, the USSR, or Cuba. Though the United
States is criticized, the democratic model will continue to be favored.
The outlook for stability in specific cases will vary over the period
of this estimate:
- The most serious prospects are in Suriname where military
leaders are threatened by internal rivalries and by increasingly
strident challenges from labor and other democratic elements.
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- The smaller Eastern Caribbean States such as Dominica and St.
Christopher-Nevis are vulnerable to political disruption because
of their very small sizes, serious economic problems, and the
weak condition of their security forces.
- Dangers to stability of decreasing magnitude will exist in
Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, and Trinidad
and Tobago.
- Prospects for stability are best in Anguilla, the Bahamas,
Barbados, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the British
Virgin Islands and in the French Overseas Departments of
French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique.
Economic conditions in the Caribbean will continue to spur both
legal and illegal emigration to the United States.
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Figure 2
Political Status of Caribbean Countries
,,yy United States
Gulf
of
Mexico
r
North
Pacific
Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
> nta-anmo
Cayman Is. (U.S. Naval Base)
(U.K.)
Turks and Caicos
q Islands
(U.K.)
British Virgil Is.
_ _ (U.K. Anguilla (U.K.)
_P rto op ~Vrrgin Is.
v(U.S.) 'Antigua and Barbuda
St. Christopher-Nevi% ?
(U.K.) dwontserrat (U.K.)
Guadeloupe (Fr.)
Dominica%
Martinique%
(Fr.)
Netherlands
Aruba Antilles
(Neth.)
/ Curaccaao 8-i,.
St. Vincent and
the Grenadines4 Barbados
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Thehamas
Bermuda
(U.K.)
North
Atlantic
Ocean
United Kingdom crown colony
Autonomous part of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands
French Overseas Department
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DISCUSSION
The Caribbean From a Global Perspective
1. The Caribbean has the world's highest concentra-
tion of national governments relative to population or
land area, with 14 independent nations among the 24
countries and territories in the region. The total
population is a mere 18 million, about the same as
New York State. If the four mainland countries (Be-
lize, French Guiana, Guyana, and Suriname) are
excluded, the remaining 20 countries and territories
occupy a combined area of 111,000 square kilome-
ters-about the size of Tennessee.
2. By their increasing presence in Latin American
regional organizations like the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS), the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB), and the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Latin America (ECLA), Caribbean coun-
tries have acquired a growing potential for changing
the original Latin characteristic of these organizations
and for diluting the influence of the traditional mem-
bers. They recognize the geographical rationale for
linkages to Latin America, continue to maintain fairly
close relationships with their former European colo-
nizers, and are highly dependent on US trade and
investment. With this choice of at least three political
hats to wear in their external relations, Caribbean
countries are potentially among the most inconsistent
in their positions on specific issues of international
politics. Generally, they have pursued a policy of non-
alignment in their external relations, but they remain
pragmatic in these linkages and are interested in
broadening relations with countries outside the region.
3. Caribbean countries produce less than 0.2 per-
cent of the world's total output and account for only 3
percent of the total gross national product (GNP) of
Latin America. They are highly dependent on agricul-
tural exports to the United States and the European
Community (EC), but these exports are not crucial to
the total supply in the importing countries. Sugar
production, for example, is the largest source of
employment in the Caribbean and the region accounts
for 45 percent of EC sugar imports. The EC, however,
has a sugar surplus and imports Caribbean sugar under
the terms of preferential arrangements made with
former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean,
and the Pacific, including Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica,
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Caribbean ba-
nana exports also provide substantial domestic em-
ployment and account for 21 percent of EC banana
imports, but countries outside the Caribbean have
larger potential supplies and better quality fruit. The
Caribbean share in the world market for sugar and
bananas owes more to EC trade concessions than to
competitiveness.
Importance for the United States
4. Trade and Investment. The United States has
significant economic interests in the Caribbean. US net
private direct investment in the Caribbean was about
$5 billion in 1981, with most of it in the petroleum and
bauxite industries. (This total excludes a large negative
investment position in the Netherlands Antilles, large-
ly because of US assets held by Netherlands Antilles
financial corporations.) US exports to the region in
1981 totaled $4 billion-mainly food, consumer goods,
and capital equipment. Imports from the Caribbean
were $8 billion, 72 percent of which were oil imports.
The region supplies about 80 percent of US imports of
bauxite and alumina. The United States is the Carib-
bean's most important trading partner, taking about 60
percent of the exports and providing some 16 percent
of the imports in 1981.
5. Strategic Considerations. The Caribbean is ad-
jacent to the southern shores of the United States,
contains vital shipping lanes, and provides access to
the Panama Canal. Nearly one-half of US trade goes
through the Panama Canal and the Gulf of Mexico,
including two-thirds of US oil imports and one-half of
US imports of strategic minerals. Grenada, Cuba, and
Nicaragua form a triangle within which most sea lines
of communication in the Caribbean could be threat-
ened in case of general hostilities. In Grenada the
construction of a major airport, expansion of military
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facilities, and possible expansion of port facilities will
improve the Soviet/Cuban capability to project,their
influence in the region. Cuban use of the airport
already is being considered for supporting Havana's
activities in Africa.
Principal Shipping Routes in the Caribbean Basin
The numerous deep passages among the islands and
between the islands and the mainland in the Caribbean
Basin provide flexibility in the choice of shipping routes.
The selection of a particular passage is normally determined
by the type of vessel, its cargo, and destination.
The Mona Passage, preferred because of prevailing cur-
rents, delineation of traffic lanes, and the presence of shore
lights, is used by the majority of the larger vessels passing
through the Panama Canal or sailing from Venezuelan or
other ports in the Eastern Caribbean to the east coast of the
United States.
The Windward Passage, also heavily used for the same
destinations, is considered less safe for navigation-especial-
ly by larger vessels-because of strong currents and the
unreliability of Cuban navigation aids.
The Galleon Passage, which is wide and deep with no
restrictions, is the primary route used by fully loaded large
crude oil carriers from the Near East and West Africa
destined for Caribbean refineries or transshipment points.
The Yucatan Channel and the Straits of Florida afford
passage for ships sailing to and from US and Mexican ports
on the Gulf of Mexico and by traffic between ports on the
east coast of the United States and Central America.
Other important but less frequently used passages include:
the Guadeloupe Passage, used for shipments between Eu-
rope and the Caribbean, and for oil transshipment and
offshore floating storage; the Martinique Passage, also used
for oil transshipment and offshore floating storage; the St.
Lucia Channel, for traffic between the Cape of Good Hope
and the Gulf of Mexico; and the Anegada Passage, for
shipment of cargo between Trinidad and the northeast coast
of the United States.
7. Political Factors. Political and economic stabil-
ity in the Caribbean is important to the long-term
security of the United States. Pressures caused by
deteriorating economic conditions in the region could
provide the basis for an upsurge in leftist activity,
undercut US political influence, economic ties, the
security of US private investment, and access to
important Caribbean strategic raw materials. With
some 20 parliamentary democracies in the Caribbean,
political stability in the region would demonstrate an
endorsement of the democratic principles of which the
United States is the principal showcase. Economic
stability in the Caribbean, to the extent that it is
promoted by market-oriented economic systems based
on domestic and foreign private enterprise, would be
an additional endorsement of US ideals as opposed to
Communist-inspired alternatives. In addition, regional
political stability and economic development are criti-
cal to US efforts to control its narcotics traffic and to
limit illegal immigration.
8. The United States also has a de facto political
presence in the Caribbean through its relationship
with Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. Although
the political attitudes of the independent Caribbean
governments are generally pro-United States, US in-
fluence is subject to challenge from several quarters:
- The threat of increasing Cuban political, mili-
tary, and economic influence remains.
- The Caribbean falls within the scope of Soviet
efforts to strengthen leftist and anti-US currents
in Latin American politics.
- As financially hard-pressed nations, Caribbean
countries are vulnerable to the blandishments of
radical Arab governments and groups, such as
Libya, in exchange for political support.
9. The economic woes of the Caribbean countries
are, to a great extent, attributable to the economic
characteristics that they share. Their typically small
sizes often create problems for their economic viabili-
ty. Caribbean economies are based largely on agricul-
ture, yet, on many islands, patterns of land tenure and
the mountainous topography serve to restrict the more
economical large-scale operations. They are essentially
monocultures, with agricultural production concen-
trated in sugar and bananas. Apart from Guyana,
Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and possibly
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Figure 4
Caribbean Countries: Destination of Sugar Exports, 1980
United States
European Community
Other
Barbados
121,695 mt
Guyana
263,412 mt
St. Kitts
33,009 mt
588040 11-82
Belize, they lack abundant natural resources. Produc-
tivity is low because of a surplus of labor in the
agricultural sector and a deficiency of capital in most
forms of economic activity. Domestic resources are
generally insufficient to provide the necessary infra-
structure for promoting economic progress. The region
is prone to devastating hurricanes for four months of
the year and to periodic ravages from earthquakes
and, in a few countries, volcanos.
Belize
103,149 mt
Dominican Republic
792,734 mt
Suriname
903 mt
Trinidad and Tobago
64,175 mt
10. Despite the economic liabilities shared by Ca-
ribbean countries, a broad range of economic perform-
ance and potential exists within the group. At the
lower end of the performance scale, Haiti remains the
poorest country in the Western Hemisphere with a
1981 per capita income of $370. In the English-
speaking countries in the Leeward and Windward
Islands, Dominica with
the lowest per capita income in the Eastern Caribbe-
an, $420; St. Vincent is only slightly better off.
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11. The Bahamas is among the more successful
countries with the highest per capita income in the
region ($7,200 in 1981) and an economy based on
tourism and offshore banking. Because of oil, Trinidad
and Tobago has international reserves of $3 billion-
75 percent of the region's total. Barbados, although
currently hurting from the global recession, has the
third highest per capita income, largely due to effec-
tive government and gains in tourism and light
manufactures.
12. The French Overseas Departments of Guade-
loupe, Martinique, and French Guiana are among the
front rank of Caribbean countries in terms of econom-
ic performance. In Martinique and Guadeloupe the
infrastructure is fairly well developed. Wage levels
and social services are comparable with those of
metropolitan France because of French Government
policy and large injections of economic assistance from
the metropole help to bolster the economies. The
Netherlands Antilles also is relatively prosperous, due
to Dutch generosity, petroleum refining, and a vibrant
tourist industry.
Basic Economic Problems
13. Caribbean governments are all confronted with
rapid population growth (eased only by migration), a
rising proportion of young people in the population,
chronic unemployment that is typically 25 percent of
the labor force, inadequate infrastructures, particular-
ly for transportation and power supply, and a hemor-
rhage of professional and managerial talent-seeking
better conditions abroad. Unfavorable external trade
relations also have contributed to the internal econom-
ic problems of the Caribbean countries as a group.
They are buffeted by high prices for imported oil and
manufactured goods that help to fuel domestic infla-
tion and by fluctuating world market prices for their
exported commodities. Chronic balance-of-payments
deficits are the rule, even when commodity prices
move in their favor. As a result, foreign capital inflows
are vital for keeping the Caribbean economies afloat.
As Caribbean countries try to promote their economic
development they are caught in a web of budgetary
deficits and rising external debt.
growth of 2 percent in 1981 was largely attributable to
massive injections of foreign aid. The direct foreign
investment inflows that the Jamaican authorities ex-
pect to spur economic recovery have not yet been
forthcoming, despite hundreds of projects on the
drawing boards. Sagging world demand for aluminum
has led to drastic cuts in bauxite and alumina produc-
tion-Jamaica's largest foreign exchange earner. Agri-
cultural production continues to falter. The country
has been unable to fill its guaranteed United Kingdom
banana import quota. The manufacturing sector is still
plagued with a shortage of imported raw materials
because of foreign exchange pressures. Chronic elec-
tric power failures due to rundown equipment have so
disrupted manufacturing, tourism, and the economy
in general that a US-owned power barge has been
temporarily brought in from Guam to support the
local power grid. Unemployment remains high, at over
25 percent of the labor force.'
15. The Dominican Republic's economy is caught
in a pincer of falling sugar export prices and volume-
due to a glut on world markets and the projected
impact of US import quota reductions-and high
prices for imported oil. Sugar export prices are pres-
ently 60 percent lower than in 1980. The market for
ferronickel, the second largest export, also is weak.
Unemployment is running at over 25 percent of the
labor force. The longer term outlook for Dominican
sugar is not good as corn sweeteners continue to make
inroads in the US market to which the Dominican
Republic is the chief exporter.
16. Trinidad and Tobago, with an economy domi-
nated by petroleum, has been experiencing declining
petroleum sector production since 1978, because of
natural depletion, technical difficulties, and govern-
ment conservation policies. Largely as a result, real
economic growth fell to 1 percent in 1981 compared to
an average 4 percent in 1977-80. Agricultural produc-
tion declined for five consecutive years through 1981
and the Trinidadian economy is saddled with a de-
crepit infrastructure (particularly in telecommunica-
tions and electricity services), a relatively high infla-
tion rate of 12 percent (despite price controls and
government subsidies), and escalating labor costs as
labor unions try to maintain real wage levels.
14. Jamaica is having a difficult time reversing
almost a decade of economic decline. Economic
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Unemployment Rates for Caribbean Countries
Bermuda
(U.K.)
Andros
Island
The$ahamas
North
Pacific
Ocean
0 200
Kilometers
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Jamaica
(U.K);
Puerto Rico e Anguilla (U.K.)
Virgin is.J
`tu si (U.S.) Antigua and Barbuda
(U.K.) St. Christoher-Nevis' .Montserrat (U.K.)
''Guadeloupe (Fr.)
Dominica
Martinique
(Fr.
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and
Netherlands the Grenadines Barbados
Aruba Antilles
Cur aire Grenada
acao ~(Kon
Trinidad
and
Tobago
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fIorth
At;antiC
Ocean
Turks and Caicos
Islands
(U.K.)
Less than 15 percent
15 to 25 percent
More than 25 percent
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17. Guyana's economic situation is perilous because
of weak exports and government policies aimed at
suppressing the private sector-inefficient state-run
enterprises account for 80 percent of economic activi-
ty. Principal exports (sugar and bauxite) have been
hard hit by declining world markets, and rice produc-
tion is down. There is a shortage of food, spare parts,
and other essential items. The economy is on the verge
of bankruptcy with international reserves of $6 million
equal to less than one week's imports.
18. In the Eastern Caribbean, Barbados remains
heavily dependent on tourism and sugar and the
expanding light industry sector is not yet robust
enough to cushion a simultaneous decline in these two
economic mainstays. Dominica's ramshackle infra-
structure, ravaged by hurricanes in 1979 and 1980,
remains a serious impediment to new foreign invest-
ment and the marketing of agricultural products. St.
Vincent has one of the more fragile economies in the
region based on agricultural exports, principally ba-
nanas, that are under a standing threat from hurri-
canes and volcanic activity.
19. Elsewhere, Haiti is undergoing persistent eco-
nomic deterioration exacerbated since 1980 by a
plunge in coffee production and prices, unfavorable
weather conditions, and some loss of private-sector
confidence in the government's economic manage-
ment. The economy of Suriname has been stagnant
since 1979, with declining demand in the bauxite
sector and general economic uncertainty among for-
eign investors following the 1980 military takeover.
Seeking Economic Solutions
20. Broad Economic Policies. Caribbean govern-
ments have adopted similar broad policies toward
solving their economic problems. Nearly all of them
need to adopt economic stabilization measures to
reduce their current account deficits. Some have IMF
agreements on stabilization, but performance has been
uneven.
21. Most Caribbean countries frame their economic
development plans in terms of revitalizing and diversi-
fying agricultural production, expanding light manu-
facturing for export, and promoting tourism. The
adverse impact of recession in industrial nations on
economic conditions in Caribbean countries has
prompted many governments to attempt a more effi-
cient approach to economic management. The level of
commitment to change varies because of the possible
political repercussions of curbed government spend-
ing. There has been no shift away from government
social programs, despite financial constraints. Substan-
tial public-sector wage increases have been granted
and appear to have been aimed at tempering unrest as
well as correcting past deficiencies. In Barbados, cen-
tral government current expenditures rose 31 percent
in 1981, largely because of higher welfare payments
and an increased government payroll. Wage increases
significantly contributed to deteriorated public fi-
nances in St. Christopher-Nevis (St. Kitts) and St.
Lucia. Montserrat, on the other hand, so improved its
public finances through good revenue performances
and prudent expenditures that it decided to discontin-
ue the grant-aided status formerly accorded it by the
United Kingdom.
22. Foreign Investment. The receptiveness of Car-
ibbean governments to foreign investment is warming,
prodded by economic necessity. They have been
vociferous proponents of the New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIEO) that advocates massive transfers
of resources from industrial to Third World countries.
Because these transfers have not been forthcoming,
most Caribbean leaders now recognize that self-deter-
mination by Caribbean countries has little substance as
long as the region remains a collection of mendicant
nations. Also, direct investment inflows usefully sup-
plement the grants and concessional loans that Carib-
bean countries have long relied on to finance their
balance-of-payments deficits and promote economic
growth. These grants and concessional loans have
become less freely available because of slow economic
growth and official budgetary restraint in countries of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD).
23. The general Caribbean economic environment
is one of state capitalism and centralized government,
with private-sector activity required to be compatible
with national objectives. This policy of state capitalism
is implemented even in those countries that promote
private enterprise. For example, Jamaica owns sub-
stantial interests in the bauxite industry, provides
telecommunication, railroad, and electricity services,
and is involved in several other ventures, including the
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sugar industry and the national airline. The Bahamas
owns a large share of the local hotel business and the
government of Trinidad and Tobago has full or part
ownership of over 50 domestic companies.
24. The emphasis on new investment differs among
the various Caribbean countries. In the larger econo-
mies, Jamaica is pushing for greater private-sector
investment and foreign participation in production,
while retaining government control of key economic
sectors. The Dominican Republic is preoccupied with
curbing inflation and government spending, but is
depending on agricultural development as the key to
prosperity over the longer term. Trinidad and Tobago
is placing a high priority on the development of
energy-based export industries that include the manu-
facture of steel, urea, fertilizer, and methanol. Over
the longer term, the government is also considering
aluminum smelting and liquid natural gas production.
Neither Jamaica nor Trinidad has produced compre-
hensive programs on agricultural development, despite
serious deficiencies in that sector of production.
25. In the Eastern Caribbean the foreign invest-
ment focus is on small-scale, export-oriented manufac-
tures that would absorb surplus labor and ease the
shortage of foreign exchange. St. Kitts is developing a
lively light industry, including electronics assembly
and clothing manufacture. In the Windward Islands,
St. Lucia's expanding manufactures now include fur-
niture and processed foods. St. Vincent is increasing
the number of small export-oriented manufacturing
plants. Little is happening in Dominica, despite much
talk and planning. On the mainland, Belize is recep-
tive to foreign private development of mineral
resources.
26. Job Creation. In their efforts to promote eco-
nomic development Caribbean governments operate
under institutional handicaps, in addition to natural
ones. They suffer from a shortage of managerial and
technical personnel and from cumbersome public
administration. In the English-speaking countries edu-
cational systems are out of tune with the vocational
requirements of economic expansion in agriculture,
industry, and tourism. Secondary school enrollment
rates are much higher than they were in 1960, but the
percentage enrollment in vocational training remains
low. For example, it is 4 percent in Jamaica and 9
percent in Trinidad. (In South Korea and Taiwan,
where rapid economic development has taken place,
the vocational enrollment ratio is 16 to 18 percent.)
The result is large numbers of newly minted Caribbe-
an secondary school graduates with aspirations to
white-collar jobs that are not available or with skills
that are not highly marketable.
27. Caribbean governments have belatedly recog-
nized the problem of inadequate job training and are
taking steps to correct it. In a new emphasis on
technical and vocational education, Barbados-re-
garded as a regional leader in economic planning-
opened a $10 million complex in May 1982 capable of
training 3,000 students annually. Applications for ad-
mission have exceeded 4,000. In Jamaica, the Seaga
government has launched a Human Employment and
Resource Training Program (H.E.A.R.T.) to improve
the marketable skills of job seekers.
28. Dependence on Foreign Resources. The
combined balance-of-payments deficit of the Caribbe-
an region has taken an alarming turn in recent years
with prolonged recession in industrial countries and a
weakening in commodity export prices and tourism
receipts. Excluding the French Overseas Departments
and some minor territories, the current account deficit
climbed progressively from $192 million in 1977 to an
estimated $1.3 billion in 1981. Most of this deteriora-
tion was accounted for by the Dominican Republic
and Jamaica. As the Caribbean countries increased
their borrowing to help finance the worsening current
account positions, their total medium- and long-term
external debt soared from $3 billion to $5 billion over
the same period. We expect the current account
deficit to rise to $1.5 billion this year, before falling
back to $1.3 billion in 1983.
29. Caribbean countries have continued to rely
heavily on external financing to keep their economies
afloat. The net inflow of direct investment, loans, and
official grants has been averaging a little over $1.6
billion annually since 1977 (excluding the three
French Overseas Departments in the region). These
inflows, however, have been falling relative to external
financing requirements. Between 1977 and 1981 these
external financing requirements, measured by the sum
of current account deficits and official external debt
amortization payments, soared from $392 million to
$1.8 billion. For 1982 net inflows are projected at
slightly over $1.5 billion compared wih financing
requirements of $2.0 billion.
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Table I
External Debt of Caribbean Countries
Total
2,829
3,
351
3,698
4,410
5,115
Antigua and Barbuda
21
31
33
42
58
Bahamas
109
97
lot
102
162
Guyana
398
428
468
519
635
Haiti
129
172
208
249
320
Jamaica
945
1
,056
1,143
1,299
1,430
Montserrat
I
I
1
1
2
Netherlands Antilles
246
252
269
303
330
St. Lucia
8
11
14
15
18
St. Christopher-Nevis
5
5
7
9
11
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
4
4
6
11
12 b
Suriname
10
31
29
28
26
a Official and officially guaranteed debt. Data rounded.
b Estimated.
Figure 6
Caribbean Region: Current Account Balances
a Goods, services, and private transfers. Excludes Anguilla, British Virgin
Islands, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, and the French
Overseas Departments of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique.
b Estimated.
c Projected.
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Table 2
Net Resource Flows and Official Development
Assistance to the Caribbean Region a
Total
All sources
1,505.8
1,686.9
1,841.0
2,765.0
2,589.3
2,423.2
ODA
634.7
787.2
801.5
982.6
1,146.1
1,449.5
Anguilla
All sources
1.7
1.1
1.1
2.3
2.3
2.3
ODA
1.7
1.1
1.1
2.3
2.3
2.3
Antigua and Barbuda
All sources
2.6
3.4
5.5
5.6
3.3
6.5
ODA
2.1
3.1
5.4
3.6
3.3
5.6
Bahamas
All sources
261.5
558.3
153.6
617.4
748.0
62.6
ODA
0.7
0.6
0.6
1.3
1.4
2.1
Barbados
All sources
-11.3
27.6
11.0
14.9
45.7
19.1
ODA
5.4
7.6
5.8
11.3
11.1
13.9
Belize
All sources
13.9
11.2
9.1
18.1
19.7
17.9
ODA
8.7
11.6
9.6
18.2
20.7
14.7
Cayman Islands
All sources
28.6
14.2
146.7
152.9
350.1
279.2
ODA
1.6
2.1
1.5
3.2
0.7
1.5
Dominica
All sources
8.0
4.6
5.0
6.5
8.8
17.4
ODA
7.9
4.3
5.0
7.1
9.1
17.7
Dominican Republic
All sources
53.3
48.4
80.2
35.2
128.0
155.7
ODA
30.7
33.0
33.6
49.9
77.7
125.0
French Guiana
All sources
53.8
68.3
88.6
86.5
92.3
111.7
ODA
45.4
63.5
85.3
78.9
92.5
111.7
Grenada
All sources
2.7
2.7
3.3
2.7
2.9
3.7
ODA
2.8
2.7
3.3
2.6
2.9
3.2
Guadeloupe
All sources
180.6
200.0
201.8
238.3
290.6
170.8
ODA
150.3
166.5
158.2
191.7
232.6
88.9
Guyana
All sources
37.2
61.7
19.7
52.0
42.4
48.6
ODA
10.2
17.0
11.9
28.4
34.8
43.1
Haiti
All sources
56.5
70.1
88.0
94.5
128.7
120.7
ODA
59.3
71.8
87.6
92.8
92.6
105.2
Jamaica
All sources
93.8
-12.1
67.0
116.4
90.4
216.4
ODA
25.1
26.2
33.3
122.1
97.5
126.0
Martinique
All sources
200.6
227.6
238.8
287.4
334.6
738.6
ODA
164.7
194.6
202.1
235.4
296.1
568.8
Montserrat
All sources
4.5
3.4
3.2
1.4
1.4
3.9
ODA
4.5
3.4
3.2
1.4
1.4
3.7
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Table 2 (cont.)
Net Resource Flows and Official Development
Assistance to the Caribbean Region
Netherlands Antilles
All sources
421.3
274.7
605.0 851
.2
110.7
204.8
ODA
33.3
49.3
41.6 48
.0
56.9
96.6
St. Christopher-Nevis
All sources
1.6
2.6
2.3 2
.2
1.8
6.2
ODA
1.6
2.6
2.1 2
.1
1.8
6.2
St. Lucia
All sources
10.5
7.8
6.8 3
.8
2.2
9.7
ODA
8.9
7.2
4.4 3
.7
2.2
8.6
St. Vincent
All sources
6.1
4.4
4.0 4
.6
5.7
10.7
ODA
6.0
4.0
4.4 4
.5
5.7
9.7
Suriname
All sources
56.8
104.9
106.5 66
.8
94.6
80.1
ODA
52.8
103.8
90.2 65
.6
94.6
82.2
Trinidad and Tobago
All sources
16.1
-4.0
-11.3 104
.8
74.2
67.8
ODA
5.4
4.8
5.7 4
.5
4.1
4.7
Turks and Caicos Islands
All sources
1.7
2.6
2.3 1
.6
1.6
1.8
ODA
3.2
3.8
3.5 2
.8
2.3
3.4
British Virgin Islands
All sources
3.7
3.4
2.8 -2
.1
9.3
67.0
ODA
2.4
2.6
2.1 1
.2
1.8
4.7
30. Bilateral economic assistance to Caribbean
countries has been the major source of their external
financing in the past. For example, it provided 31
percent of net resource inflows to the region in 1980,
exclusive of the French Overseas Departments. Mainly
because of budgetary restraint in OECD countries, this
percentage contribution has shown little change since
1977, despite sharply increased external financing
requirements. In these circumstances, Caribbean
countries will have to rely more on alternate financing
sources such as direct investment and multilateral
financial institutions until their current account posi-
tions improve substantially.
31. Direct investment, mainly from the United
States, has proved to be an important source of
external financing in the past, fluctuating between 20
to 30 percent of total financial inflows in recent years,
according to World Bank estimates. However, the bulk
of the investment inflows in recent years has been
channeled to only a few countries (mainly the Baha-
mas and Trinidad and Tobago) and principally for
petroleum-processing facilities. The poor outlook for
the petroleum and bauxite industries, combined with
more aggressive Caribbean programs for attracting
foreign investment and incentives under US proposals
for the Caribbean Basin Initiative, are likely to alter
this pattern of investment flows over the period of this
estimate.
32. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has
been assuming a major role in providing balance-of-
payments support to Caribbean countries in the face
of their widening current account deficits. Between
1977 and September 1982 the gross drawings of these
countries from the IMF were $930 million. Jamaica
received $600 million of this amount, while $290
million went to support the Dominican Republic,
Guyana, and Haiti.
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33. The role of multilateral economic development
institutions in Caribbean external financing is expand-
ing but has not yet assumed major proportions. For
example, 1981 loan approvals for Caribbean countries
by the Caribbean Development Bank were $48 mil-
lion. The Inter-American Development Bank ap-
proved $206 million. World Bank loan approvals for
the region during its 1981-82 fiscal year totaled $192
million.
Political Overview
34. Caribbean countries are almost all practicing
democracies. Adult suffrage is the rule and the human
rights record has, on the whole, been a good one.
Elections are freely held and there is no regional
propensity toward political violence. A small number
of countries depart somewhat from these norms. In
Grenada, Prime Minister Bishop has ruled without a
parliament since seizing power in 1979, and no elec-
tions are in sight. Suriname is in the grip of a left-
leaning nonconstitutional junta, dominated by military
strongman Desire Bouterse, which ousted the elected
government in February 1980-less than five years
after the country gained independence from the Neth-
erlands. Guyana's elections in 1980 were blatantly
fraudulent and press freedom is greatly restricted
Maurice Bishop
Prime Minister, Grenada
under President Forbes Burnham. Despite some liber-
alization in recent years, Haiti remains a dictatorship
under the autocratic rule of President-for-Life Jean-
Claude Duvalier.
35. Caribbean governments, for the most part, are
subject to considerable political pressure from labor
unions. In the English-speaking Caribbean, the for-
tunes of major political parties are closely linked to the
support received from the labor movement. In Jamai-
ca, the People's National Party and the Jamaica Labor
Party have had close links to particular workers'
organizations for decades. The Antigua Labor Party
and the St. Vincent Labor Party have similar affili-
ations. The dependence of some Caribbean govern-
ments on support from their labor union power base
restricts their ability to implement policies perceived
by labor unions as hostile to their interests. Wage
demands have been behind most serious disputes as
workers' incomes fail to keep pace with escalating
consumer prices. In the Caribbean, the government is
often the largest single employer and can ill afford to
resist wage increases, if political peace is to be
maintained.
36. Caribbean governments have been vulnerable
to actual or threatened large-scale strikes by workers.
Desire Bouterse
Army Commander, Suriname
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In Dominica, a two-week general strike that shut down
the economy in 1979 forced former Prime Minister
Patrick John to agree to large wage increases that the
economy could ill afford. The dispute precipitated
John's resignation. John's successor, Oliver Seraphine,
quickly reversed his repudiation of the wage increases
under threat of another strike by the powerful Civil
Service Association. In the Dominican Republic, a
violent two-day taxi drivers' strike in August 1979
protesting the third gasoline price increase that year
caused former President Antonio Guzman to offer
gasoline price subsidies (terminated in late 1980) to
taxicab operators. Newly elected St. Lucia Prime
Minister John Compton's efforts to promote economic
recovery and a stable industrial climate are being
stymied by trade union calls for an indefinite shelving
of Compton's proposal for a ceiling on wage increases.
Political Opposition
37. Nongoverning political parties and groups have
ample opportunity to capitalize on economic condi-
tions in the Caribbean by blaming incumbent govern-
ments or by promising better economic alternatives.
The leverage of nongoverning political parties is stron-
gest in the small English-speaking Caribbean islands,
where struggles between political factions in national
legislatures of less than 20 members can cause parlia-
mentary majorities to vanish overnight.
38. In Antigua, pro-West Prime Minister Vere
Bird's Antigua Labor Party (ALP) is weakened by
internal factions, on the one hand, and given a lease on
life by political infighting in the opposition Progressive
Labor Movement (PLM), on the other. The ALP and
PLM factions could probably regroup as new coali-
tions, but waiting in the wings as a potential spoiler
is leftist Tim Hector, who leads a minuscule third
party, the Antigua-Caribbean Liberation Movement
(ACLM). Hector's ACLM is active in spreading propa-
ganda, publishes a widely read newspaper, and is
organizing among local youth and women.
39. In St. Lucia, Prime Minister John Compton's
principal opposition are the radicals, George Odlum,
head of the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), and Peter
Josie, leader of the St. Lucia Labor Party (SLP).
Despite Libyan funding, Odlum and Josie sustained
crushing defeats in the May 1982 general elections,
emerging with only three of the 17 seats in St. Lucia's
House of Assembly, compared to Compton's 14. Od-
lum and Josie, however, have a following among St.
Lucia's urban unemployed youth, have ties to Cuba as
well as to Grenada's leftist regime, and maintain their
demonstrated capability for organizing violent protest.
The failure of the Compton administration to show
positive economic results may provide Odlum and
Josie with a new opportunity for disruption.
40. In Dominica, massive economic problems have
put Prime Minister Eugenia Charles and her Domini-
ca Freedom Party (DFP) in a delicate position.
Charles's opponents have little chance of replacing her
through the parliamentary process in the next three to
five years. Plots to overthrow her government were
thwarted twice in 1981. The Dominican opposition
includes the Dominica Labor Party (DOMLAB), head-
ed by former Prime Minister Patrick John, recently
acquitted of treason after a failed coup attempt. The
United Dominica Labor Party (UDLP), with two of 21
seats in parliament, is led by the Douglas brothers, the
power-hungry Michael and the Marxist Roosevelt. The
Dominican Liberation Movement Alliance (DLMA)
headed by William Riviere, not represented in parlia-
ment and without a formal membership,
will seek to
exploit any failure of the Charles regime to achieve
economic gains.
41. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, there is little open-
ly disruptive activity by nongoverning political groups.
In Jamaica, the People's National Party (PNP) is still
working on its new political strategy after its massive
defeat by the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) in the
October 1980 general election. The PNP's left wing,
including Marxist D. K. Duncan, could try to discredit
the Seaga government by exploiting labor disputes. At
present, industrial strife in Jamaica involves the JLP-
affiliated Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU),
the PNP-affiliated National Workers Union (NWU),
and the smaller trade unions. Trevor Munroe's 3,000-
member Communist Workers Party of Jamaica con-
tinues to build a base in the labor movement. Munroe
is regarded as the doyen of Caribbean radicals and his
group is believed to have been behind several armed
bank robberies in Kingston, possibly to fund his party.
He does not have sufficient extremists under his
control to conduct sustained organized violence against
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Figure 7
A Gallery of Caribbean Radicals
Juan Bosch
Leader, Dominican
Liberation Party,
Dominican Republic
Roosevelt Douglas
Member, United Dominica
Labor Party, Dominica
D. K. Duncan
Member, People's National
Party, Jamaica
Tim Hector
Leader, Antigua Caribbean
Liberation Movement,
Antigua
Trevor Munroe
Leader, Worker's Party of
Jamaica, Jamaica
Cheddi Jagan
Leader, People's Progressive
Party, Guyana
Peter Josie
Leader, St. Lucia Labor
Party, St. Lucia
George Odium William Riviere
Leader, Progressive Labor Leader, Dominica Liberation
Party, St. Lucia Movement Alliance,
Dominica
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the government, nor is he held likely to employ these
tactics in the medium term.
42. Suriname's military authority outlawed the tra-
ditional opposition parties shortly after the February
1980 coup. Since then, opposition sentiment favoring a
return to constitutional government has been ex-
pressed primarily through organized labor with occa-
sional support from the private media and business-
men's and lawyers' organizations. The leadership of
Suriname's largest labor federation, the Moederbond,
has been highly critical of the Bouterse regime, and
rallied enough union and public support to challenge
the regime with a general strike in late October 1982.
43. The numerous small leftist parties in the Do-
minican Republic currently are attempting to form a
united front while targeting President Jorge Blanco's
austerity measures for criticism. Some of the more
radical groups reportedly have plans to destabilize the
government through terrorist acts. In Haiti, there is no
organized internal opposition to the Duvalier regime.
There is little effective dissent by Guyana's main
opposition party, Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive
Party (PPP), which has been effectively defanged by
President Burnham. All mainstream political parties in
Trinidad and Tobago are pro-West and basically
supportive of the democratic process.
Salvador Jorge Blanco
President, Dominican Republic
Regional Politics
44. Political cohesion among Caribbean countries is
far from being realized. Cultural and economic fac-
tors, as well as a perceived conflict between national
interests and regional sovereignty, present formidable
obstacles. Cultural and linguistic considerations pre-
vent any realistic regional political cohesion between
Haiti and the Dominican Republic, on the one hand,
and the English-speaking Caribbean, on the other. The
political status of Guadeloupe, French Guiana, and
Martinique as departments of France and that of the
Netherlands Antilles as an autonomous part of the
Netherlands restrict these countries from forging for-
mal political links with the rest of the Caribbean.
45. Despite cultural similarities, political cohesion
within the English-speaking Caribbean is adversely
affected by economic disparities and by nationalist
impulses that impede supra nationalist efforts toward a
grand federation. The poorer and more- advanced
countries distrust each other's motives for seeking
greater political unity. The short-lived 1958-62 West
Indies Federation collapsed after Jamaica's withdraw-
al on a rising tide of Jamaican nationalism. The less
developed Eastern Caribbean countries (Antigua,
Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts, St. Lucia,
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) plus Belize
currently perceive the interests of the more developed
Caribbean countries (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and
Trinidad and Tobago) as not coincident with their
own. From this ideological position the Organization
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) emerged in 1981
to promote economic cooperation and a harmonization
of foreign policy among the seven less developed
island countries. These countries have made up the
Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) since
1968.
46. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) ap-
pears to be the most likely vehicle for improving
political cohesion among Caribbean states. CARICOM
was launched in 1973 to promote economic integration
among the English-speaking Caribbean countries. All
these countries except the Bahamas, the Cayman
Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the British
Virgin Islands are members. Current economic condi-
tions have led CARICOM members to impose trade
restrictions on each other and substantial gains in
regional political cohesiveness are unlikely until the 25X1
economic situation improves. In addition, historic
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Table 3
Caribbean Countries: Membership in Regional
Multilateral Organizations
Montserrat x X
Netherlands Antilles
a Caribbean Community.
b Caribbean Development Bank.
c Eastern Caribbean Common Market.
d Economic Commission for Latin America.
Inter-American Development Bank.
rivalries between the larger countries such as Jamaica
and Trinidad and Tobago will continue to be an
obstacle. Signs of an increasing political role for CARl-
COM, however, are appearing. CARICOM's potential
for political cohesion lies in the preamble of the
CARICOM treaty that aims at a common foreign
policy and the promotion of noneconomic cooperation,
and in the periodic meetings of CARICOM heads of
governments. The CARICOM heads of governments
meeting in November 1982 succeeded in reaching an
agreement on the importance of maintaining the
integrity of national boundaries-a matter of concern
Organization of American States.
s Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
h Associate member.
Associate member through membership in West Indies
Associated States.
to Belize and Guyana, which have territorial disputes
with Guatemala and Venezuela-and in affirming the
principle of human rights in the region-an indirect
censure of Grenada and Guyana.
Relations With the United States
47. Caribbean governments recognize the impor-
tance attached by the United States to maintaining its
influence in the region. Their perceptions of US action
toward maintaining that influence differ. The govern-
ments of the Dominican Republic and Haiti grudging-
ly accept the US economic and political influence,
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despite a past record of direct US intervention in their
affairs. Their anti-Communist positions and their
strong economic dependence on the United States are
the overriding factors. On the other hand, the govern-
ments of Grenada, Suriname, and Guyana see the
United States as a threat to any Caribbean country
that adopts a socialist model of economic and political
self-determination. More generally, Caribbean govern-
ments find it difficult to reconcile to the satisfaction of
their supporters their economic dependence on the
United States with the nationalism they preach. Most
Caribbean political leaders thus feel the need to
maintain an ambivalent position regarding the US
presence in the Caribbean. Under these circumstances
no long-term commitments to the United States are
assured.
48. As repeatedly stated by their leaders, the gov-
ernments of the English-speaking Caribbean countries
wish to broaden their external relationships without
undue outside influence and to promote cohesion
among themselves. They see no inconsistency in re-
ceiving US economic assistance without acknowledge-
ment of a political quid pro quo. In pursuing these
objectives, Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Toba-
go supported the lifting of OAS sanctions against Cuba
in the early 1970s when the United States opposed the
move. Similarly, although they are not in sympathy
with the Bishop regime, most English-speaking Carib-
bean governments opposed US efforts to exclude
Grenada from the provisions of the US Caribbean
Basin Initiative.
IV. SOCIOCULTURAL FACTORS
49. Caribbean countries share a common legacy of
colonialism founded on black slavery, indentured la-
bor, and a white power elite, but they differ culturally
and linguistically based on their British, French, Span-
ish, and Dutch colonial heritages. Such cultural and
linguistic fragmentation inhibits the adoption of a
regional approach to vital matters like national securi-
ty, economic development, and international relations
and renders individual countries more vulnerable to
destabilizing forces than they would be under more
cohesive regional integration.
50. Vestiges of colonialism also curtail social harmo-
ny in many Caribbean countries. Class distinctions and
class antagonisms remain. Upward social mobility,
although possible, remains difficult. For Caribbean
people still savoring their recently received freedom
from colonialism, the realization that society is not
changing as fast as they would wish could lead to
growing pressures for social change.
51. Religion. An estimated 70 percent of the Ca-
ribbean population are regular church-goers, and reli-
gion generally has been a stabilizing influence in the
region. As a colonial legacy, Catholicism and Protes-
tantism are the dominant religions, but with a funda-
mentalist bent that regards Communism as ungodly.
Some social researchers claim that religion in the
Caribbean provides a release from trying economic
circumstances and, to this extent, it probably has had a
dampening effect on political protest. Rastafarianism
does not impact significantly on the region as a
cultural-sociological phenomenon, although individual
groups have been linked to violence in Dominica and
Trinidad and Tobago.
52. Urbanization. Population shifts to urban cen-
ters present a serious problem for Caribbean govern-
ments in larger countries like the Dominican Republic,
Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.
The problem is less severe in the small island territo-
ries, where most of the population is within two hours'
travel time of urban centers and can perform urban
jobs or search for urban employment while remaining
in rural areas. It is difficult to separate the contribu-
tion of urbanization to adverse Caribbean social condi-
tions from other factors such as income disparities,
weak government finances, and government misman-
agement. Urbanization, with the accompanying pro-
liferation of slums in Georgetown, Guyana, and
Kingston, Jamaica, has contributed to high urban
unemployment and crime rates and to a general
deterioration of public services as the demand for
these services exceeds the government's ability to
supply them. More importantly, from the viewpoint of
stability, the Jamaican experience shows that a large
body of urban unemployed constitutes a ready source
of manpower that can be hired for organized violence
for political ends.
53. The growing proportion of young people in the
Caribbean presents a long-term challenge to the exist-
ing political systems, which have not been able to
provide substantial numbers of them with jobs. The
median age for the region is around 16, compared
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with 30 for the United States. Youth majorities do not
present a problem of political violence in most Carib-
bean countries since they are, for the most part,
unorganized. However, they constitute a potential pool
of growing support for alternate political systems
because of their disillusionment with the present
political order. Caribbean radicals realize this and are
assiduously cultivating the youth of Antigua, Domini-
ca, and other islands. In St. Lucia, the Progressive
Labor Party leader George Odlum has recognized the
political potential of youth support by enlisting a
motley array of young thugs, supposedly armed by
Cuba.
54. Social Conditions. Poor social conditions in
Caribbean countries are not expected, by themselves,
to threaten stability in the region. These conditions are
an established feature of Caribbean life and have not
been used to rationalize political takeovers in the past.
They would pose a significant threat only if they
worsen markedly because of a serious, protracted
economic decline.
55. In Caribbean family life, the negative social
impact of high illegitimacy birth rates and low mar-
riage rates is substantially offset by an extensive web
of kin groupings that provides a cushion for the
Caribbean family against social pressures and exces-
sive financial difficulty, especially among the masses.
In terms of literacy, life expectancy, and available
medical services, social conditions in the Caribbean
are generally more favorable than in most other Third
World countries where social unrest does not occur.
The relative poverty of Caribbean countries, their
proximity to the United States, and their exposure to
US media and consumption patterns serve more to
stimulate migration to the United States than to
foment unrest at home.
56. Although social conditions are by no means
good, most Caribbean governments have been making
steady progress in improving them. Living standards
continue to rise and substantial gains have been made
in education and housing. The general level of medical
services continues to improve, despite declines in
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago due to mismanage-
ment. Life expectancy in the English-speaking Carib-
bean of 68-71 years is among the highest in the Third
World.
57. Ethnic-Cultural Differences. Caribbean coun-
tries are multiracial in character and ethnic-cultural
differences are significant in only four countries in the
region. East Indians comprise the largest ethnic group
in Guyana (51 percent of the population), Suriname
(37 percent), and Trinidad and Tobago (43 percent)
and vie with the black population for political power,
with varying degrees of intensity. In Haiti, the mulatto
economic elite is outnumbered by blacks nine to one in
a country where governments have traditionally based
their support on one or the other group. Ethnic-
cultural differences are not likely to create serious
problems in any of the four countries over the period
of this estimate.
58. In Guyana, the black-dominated People's Na-
tional Congress (PNC) is firmly in political control.
While a few East Indians are in the government, most
of the East Indian community is affiliated with the
opposition and President Burnham's policies clearly
favor the Afro-Guyanese. In Suriname, the Creole-
dominated military leadership strives for the appear-
ance of ethnic neutrality. In Trinidad there are under-
lying tensions involving blacks and East Indians; but
no opportunist has sought directly to exploit racial
differences for political ends. Problems would arise in
Haiti only to the extent that the policies of President
Duvalier appear to favor the mulatto minority. Mind-
ful of the success his father and predecessor had in
building a power base on black support, Duvalier is
unlikely to exacerbate black/mulatto tensions.
59. Population Growth. Social pressures from pop-
ulation growth in the Caribbean would be considera-
bly greater without the relief provided by emigration.
The average rate of population increase, adjusted for
emigration, is under 2 percent. The natural rate of
population growth, however, is about 3 percent, well
above the Third World average. This natural increase
is taking place in a region which-apart from Belize,
French Guiana, Guyana, and Suriname-has limited
land space.
60. Most Caribbean countries have official and
private-sector programs for restraining natural popula-
tion increase. The evidence suggests that these pro-
grams ebb and flow with foreign curbs on Caribbean
emigration. For example, family planning programs
have existed in Jamaica since 1939, but were only
intensified after the 1962 United Kingdom Common-
wealth Immigration Act curtailed Caribbean emigra-
tion and before the 1965 US Immigration and Nation-
ality Act facilitated emigration from the independent
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countries in the region. The Jamaican results have
been mixed, but intensified population control pro-
grams launched in Barbados and Trinidad in the 1960s
after the UK curb are believed to be largely responsi-
ble for reduced rates of natural increase in those two
countries.
61. Emigration. Emigration has been a basic fea-
ture of Caribbean life for generations and has long
been accepted by Caribbean governments as a safety
valve for population and employment pressures. The
population movement is both intraregional and extra-
regional and is driven more by economic than political
considerations. Haitians make up 8 percent of the
population of French Guiana; immigrants-legal and
illegal-account for 20 percent of the Bahamas' popu-
lation; Guyanese flow to neighboring Suriname and
Haitians to the Dominican Republic; and the Nether-
lands Antilles and Trinidad and Tobago attract work-
ers from the English-speaking islands of the Leeward
and Windward group. The receiving countries in turn
send people to metropole countries and to mainland
countries in the Caribbean Basin, like Venezuela.
62. The net flow of legal and illegal emigrants out
of the Caribbean region currently is estimated at
170,000 to 200,000 a year. Until the early 1970s,
Caribbean countries generally were not seriously af-
fected by the loss of the surplus unskilled and semi-
skilled workers that accounted for most of the outward
movement. They probably benefited from emigrants'
remittances to support dependents left behind. Since
the mid-1970s the flow of emigrants has been supple-
mented by an exodus of already scarce professional
workers impelled by worsening economic conditions in
the region and by the leftward political drift in
countries like Grenada, Suriname, and Jamaica. The
changing composition of Caribbean out-migration has
led to a marked reduction in skills available to the
public and private sectors. Jamaica has lost some 40
percent of its professional workers since 1974; the
Netherlands now has more Surinamese doctors than
does Suriname; and a considerable number of the
25,000 Haitians in Canada's French-speaking Quebec
Province are professionals.
63. The impetus for emigration in the Caribbean is
expected to continue unabated, although opportunities
for resettlement in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Netherlands are likely to decline,
exacerbating unemployment in some countries. Emi-
grants who have established themselves in receiving
countries stimulate additional emigration by bringing
in dependents or by functioning as contacts for future
emigrants. Also, the economic disparity between Ca-
ribbean countries and metropole centers remains too
large to restrain outflows based on economic reasons.
This economic disparity even rationalizes emigration
that originated on-political grounds. Having adjusted
to life abroad and further improved their economic
status, the Jamaican professionals who left during the
Manley regime have not been returning in significant
numbers, despite the election of the more conservative
Seaga government two years ago.
V. DESTABILIZING FORCES
64. Cuba and, to a lesser degree, the Soviet Union
are the main sources of external destabilizing threats to
the Caribbean, but Libya and North Korea also play
secondary roles. The Soviet Union has diplomatic
relations with five Caribbean countries and Cuba has
diplomatic ties to seven. Libya has diplomatic relations
with Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trini-
dad and Tobago, and North Korea has relations with
Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, St. Vincent, and
Suriname.
65. Soviet Strategy and Tactics.2 The basic Soviet
strategy in the Caribbean is to present a low profile in
official relations with Caribbean governments while
providing financial and other support for Communist
and other radical groups. Moscow's aims are to dis-
credit US policy, undermine US influence, and pro-
mote radical change. It has adopted a cautious, gra-
dualistic approach in its relations with the region. The
Soviets suffered a setback with the 1980 defeat of the
Manley government in Jamaica, followed by the elec-
tion of moderate governments in Dominica (1980) and
St. Lucia (1982).
66. Moscow's institutional and economic ties with
the Caribbean remain at a fairly low level for the
region as a whole. There has, however, been a substan-
tial expansion in Soviet linkages to Grenada and, to a
lesser extent, to Suriname in recent months. The
Soviets recently established an embassy in Grenada
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Figure 9
Cuban and Soviet Diplomatic Presence in the Caribbean
North
Pacific
Ocean
A>
Turks and Caicos
Islands
(U.K.)
Dominic
Republic
Dominica
Martinique
(Fr.)
Pt. Lucia
St. Vincent andj
the Grenadinesa Barbados
lrenada
Trinidad
and
Tobago
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Bermuda
(U.K.)
North
Atlantic
Ocean
~ V 0
Th"hamaa
It -
Cuban Diplomatic Relations
with resident ambassador
without resident ambassador
Soviet Diplomatic Relations
with resident ambassador
without resident ambassador
British Virgin Is.
(U.K.);
P R' a '` Anguilla (U.K.)
a.
Virgin Is.,.
St. Christopher-Nevis o ntigua and Barbuda
(U.K.) 'Montserrat (U.K.)
Guadeloupe (Fr.)
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SECRET
67. Moscow has recently established an embassy in
Suriname. In financially pressed Guyana, Soviet insti-
tutional and economic ties have been constrained by
longstanding ideological support for the opposition
People's Progressive Party, headed by Cheddi Jagan.
More importantly, however, Moscow does not perceive
the Burnham government as reliable and consequently
is not willing to support it fully. Elsewhere in the
Caribbean, official contacts with Moscow are relative-
ly low keyed. Elected governments recognize that
close links with the Soviets would not receive popular
support.
68. Moscow's tactics in furthering its aims in the
Caribbean currently center on funding local Commu-
nist organizations and front groups and cultivating
pro-Soviet sentiments among academics, students, and
labor organizations. Moscow sees the local orthodox
Communist parties largely as instruments of Soviet
policy. Most are given an annual stipend and assistance
in formulating political strategy.
year to students from the Dominican Republic, Grena-
69. The Soviets offer hundreds of scholarships each
da, Guyana, and Jamaica hoping to improve Moscow's
image and to establish a local cadre for the Soviet
intelligence services. By the end of 1981, an estimated
855 Caribbean students were in the Soviet Union,
including 500 to 700 from the Dominican Republic.
70. Cuban Strategy and Tactics. Havana's objec-
tives in the Caribbean coincide with Moscow's, but the
Cubans are much more active and have far more
contacts with Caribbean governments than the Soviets.
Cuba's main objective is to promote revolutionary
change which it seeks to accomplish primarily by
penetrating democratic trade union movements and
by cultivating radical personalities and groups. Be-
cause Havana has limited access to the Caribbean
trade union rank and file, its attempted trade union
infiltration is directed at union leaders. Havana seeks
to woo the masses through friendship societies, cultural
groups, and student and women's organizations. Ha-
vana acts primarily on its own initiative, but it also
serves as a Soviet intermediary. It is well suited for the
role as a go-between, because Caribbean radicals, and
some Caribbean governments, identify more easily
with Cuba than with the Soviet Union for racial and
geographical reasons.
71. Cuba's official contacts with the government of
Grenada are substantial. In the Eastern Caribbean,
Cuba uses Grenada as an agent to spread propaganda
and to maintain contact with other radicals in the
region. Havana's close relationship with Grenada's
Maurice Bishop and other members of the People's
Revolutionary Government dates back to the mid-
1970s. The Cuban Ambassador to Grenada, Julian
Torres Rizo func-
tions as an influential adviser to Bishop on a wide
range of issues. Havana has provided the Bishop
government with at least $50 million in aid, principal-
ly Cuban labor and materiel for the construction of the
Point Salines International Airport, which will have a
3,200-meter runway capable of accommodating the
largest commercial jets and many of the large trans-
ports in the Soviet inventory. This airport could play
an important role in ferrying Cuban troops and mate-
riel to Africa. Cuba is heavily involved in the upgrad-
ing of Grenada's security forces, providing military
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traffic to continue virtually unabated. In the Turks
and Caicos Islands, Chief Minister Norman Saunders
owns the refueling facilities of the South Caicos air-
port, which has been publicly identified as an impor-
tant link in the marijuana traffic into the United
States.
79. Jamaica is the major source for marijuana of
Caribbean origin flowing into the United States and
provides an estimated 10 percent of all marijuana
consumed here. Jamaica is also a transshipment point
With the exception of Antigua, the Eastern
77. Libya has increasingly sougnt to ex en its
influence into the region. The Qadhafi government
has provided leftist Grenada with at least $10 million
to date. Some of these funds have been earmarked for
the Point Salines Airport project, but Libyan financing
has also facilitated the purchase of new buses and
three British-built patrol boats received by the Bishop
Caribbean radicals, Libya helped to fund the unsuc-
cessful campaigns of St. Lucia leftists George Odlum
and Peter Josie during that island's 1982 general
elections. Antiguan radical Tim Hector has also re-
ceived Libyan financial support.
78. Other Destabilizing Forces. In some Caribbe-
an countries, law and order is threatened by interna-
tional drug trafficking, with its attendant opportunities
for the bribery and corruption of government officials.
The Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands are
key transshipment and aircraft refueling points for the
illegal flow of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana to the
United States. In the Bahamas, the difficulty of con-
trolling the flow of drugs through a 700-island chain is
compounded by insufficient resources in manpower,
patrol boats, and aircraft
Caribbean islands are not international air junctions
and do not have to contend with a flow of drug
couriers. Marijuana production in the area is a small
but growing problem. Marijuana grown in Dominica,
for example, is mainly sold in nearby Guadeloupe,
where it presumably reaches the tourist trade.
80. The activities of exile groups bent on destabiliz-
ing Caribbean governments have not assumed signifi-
cant proportions. Most of these activities are directed
at the Duvalier regime in Haiti, and numerous Haitian
exile groups of leftist or rightist persuasion are located
in the United States, Canada, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Venezuela, and France. The lack of cohesiveness
among these groups makes them largely ineffective
and they have almost no constituency within Haiti.
There is no organized external opposition to the Bishop
regime in Grenada. Despite repeated threats by ousted
Prime Minister Sir Eric Gairy to regain power, he has
no following of his own. Guyanese and Surinamese
exile groups aimed at challenging the existing govern-
ment largely exist on paper only.
Security Forces
81. Caribbean countries vary widely in their ability
to contain domestic unrest and cope with external
threats. In the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and
Trinidad and Tobago, the security establishments are
fairly large and, by Caribbean standards, relatively
competent. With the exception of Barbados and Gre-
nada, the security forces in the English-speaking East-
ern Caribbean islands often are marginal establish-
ments with minimal apability.
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82. Caribbean security forces can reasonably cope
with isolated disturbances, but most would be hard
pressed to counter widespread internal violence. Bar-
bados excepted, the English-speaking Eastern Caribbe-
an islands are incapable of repelling armed invasions
of anything greater than company size and would
require outside help to deal with that contingency. In
March 1979, for example, Grenada was taken by some
50 men. Security force deficiencies are particularly
acute in Dominica, where the personnel are poorly
trained, equipped, and led and have been ineffective
in containing criminal and Rastafarian elements, let
alone organized violence or coups.
83. The involvement of Caribbean security forces
in politics varies within the region. Security forces in
Grenada and Guyana are highly politicized and ac-
tively support the incumbent governments. Haiti's
security forces serve primarily to maintain the Duva-
lier regime. In the Dominican Republic, the armed
forces have a reputation for interfering in the political
process to influence or reverse election outcomes,
although they did remain neutral in the general
elections last May. The Jamaican security forces were
subject to political pressures during the PNP adminis-
tration but now are politically neutral for the most
part. St. Lucia's police force is believed subject to
intimidation by the island's radical political groups,
such as that led by George Odium.
Regional Security Cooperation
84. In the Eastern Caribbean, political cooperation
is taking place in matters of security. Prime Minister
Tom Adams of Barbados is the prime mover in the
effort. In December 1979, Barbados sent members of
its defense force to St. Vincent to undertake constabu-
lary duties during an insurrection in the Grenadines, a
St. Vincent dependency. During the December 1981
attempted coup in Dominica, Barbados assisted the
Dominican government with arms and ammunition
and the Barbados Defense Force (BDF) was ordered to
prepare for intervention, if necessary. Before the May
1981 elections in St. Lucia, the BDF made contingen-
cy plans in case the internal situation on the island
deteriorated. In November 1982, Antigua, Barbados,
Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent agreed on a
regional security cooperation pact that opens the way
for Barbados to play a more active role in defending
the other islands.
J. M. G. "Tom" Adams
Prime Minister, Barbados
VII. PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE UNITED STATES
Overview of Stability
85. While most Caribbean countries are likely to
remain stable during the time covered by this assess-
ment, a few are in danger and many are faced with
potential instability for years to come. This will contin-
ue to pose a threat to US interests in the Caribbean
and for the security of a region that is of vital strategic
importance to the United States. The danger will
continue because of fragile economic, political, and
social structures that remain vulnerable to internal
pressures from radical groups and Cuban/Soviet/Lib-
yan subversion. In an environment where labor unions
wield substantial political influence, labor unrest will
continue to threaten economic stability.
86. The small English-speaking Eastern Caribbean
islands will remain especially susceptible to disruption.
Politically, their minuscule national legislatures, whose
members have a propensity for shifting their political
allegiances, will not improve the prospects for stable
national government. Economically, these countries,
for the most part, will remain nonviable. Their contin-
ued high dependence on external assistance will leave
them open to overtures from Cuba, Moscow, and
Libya.
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87. The trend toward fragmentation of small island
groupings with the advent of independence creates yet
another factor of instability. For example, separatist
pressures in St. Christopher-Nevis, Antigua and Barbu-
da, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Netherlands Antilles
remain potentially troublesome.
88. We do not believe that the pressures on Carib-
bean stability will generate widespread disruption in
the region. Periodic disturbances have tended to be
country specific and there is no shared philosophy of
revolutionary change that has any foothold in the
Caribbean as a whole.
90. The CBI program of one-way free trade and an
increased role for private-sector investment to pro-
mote economic progress provides genuine opportuni-
ties for export diversification and expansion by Carib-
bean countries but will benefit over the period of this
estimate mainly those Caribbean countries that can
best seize the opportunities within that time frame.
Most of the smaller Caribbean countries will have
difficulty doing so. They often lack the basic infra-
structure to support highly increased manufacturing
for export and would require substantial infusions of
capital into the public sector that would be hard to
obtain.
The Role of the CBI
89. US influence in the Caribbean over the next
three to five years will be tested by the success of the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The CBI has raised
expectations of a significant US commitment through-
out the region and many government leaders-espe-
cially Jamaican Prime Minister Seaga-have identi-
fied themselves closely with the initiative. The failure
of the CBI to meet these expectations and to produce
positive economic results would have both political
and economic repercussions. It would also provide
material for Soviet and Cuban propaganda; Cuba is
reportedly ready to use Grenada's economic program
as a showcase alternative to the CBI.
Edward M. Seaga
Prime Minister, Jamaica
91. In agricultural trade and production, Caribbean
economies are founded on sugar and bananas. Many of
them lack the political as well as economic flexibility
to switch to agricultural alternatives that may prove
more attractive to US investors. Difficulties of air
transportation are also a limiting factor. Production
shifts by Eastern Caribbean countries that would
enable them to penetrate the buoyant US market for
fresh flowers, for example, are hampered by inade-
quate transport facilities, despite natural advantages
and relative proximity to the United States. Colombia,
which is about as far from the United States but has
better air transport facilities, is a successful flower
exporter to the US market.
92. CBI proposals on incentives to US investors in
the Caribbean will serve to reassure those Caribbean
leaders who endorse an increased role for foreign
investment in their economic development plans, but
we see few dynamic properties in Caribbean countries
that are likely to generate substantial increases in
direct US investment inflows over the period of this
estimate. We do anticipate a shift in investment flows
to labor-intensive manufacture and away from the
extractive industries. Virtually all countries in the
region have had foreign investment incentive pro-
grams for many years, and to date, except for bauxite,
petroleum, and tourism in a few countries, the invest-
ment inflows have been relatively small and below
expectations.
93. Econometric analysis of data on US direct
investment in the Caribbean region from 1966 to 1980
indicates that the net US investment position has been
determined mainly by the current level of earnings on
US direct investment in the region and by the share in
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total exports of products, mainly bauxite and petro-
leum, that are of import interest to the United States.
The size of Caribbean markets for locally produced
output was not found to be a significant factor. If these
past trends continue, the absence of natural resources
that may be developed for the US market will con-
strain future US direct investment flows to most
Caribbean countries. The unimportance of domestic
market size in generating US investment inflows sug-
gests that foreign investment programs by Caribbean
governments that aim at production for domestic
markets are not likely to bear much fruit. For coun-
tries without natural resources, the ability to attract
new US investment will largely depend on efforts to
research the US market and to identify new export
products like handicrafts, furniture, and processed
fruit that are amenable to light manufacture and do
not have large capital requirements for individual
projects. Shifting perceptions of political risks could
alter the relative attractiveness of individual Caribbe-
an countries as sites for direct investment.
its intermediaries, Cuba and Grenada, in situations
where it would be less promising to act on its own.
95. Despite its 1980 setback in Jamaica, Cuba's
attempts to infiltrate and influence Caribbean coun-
tries are expected to intensify.
Subversive Threats
94. Moscow is expected to maintain its efforts to
reduce US influence in the Caribbean. The US posi-
tion in the region is complicated by the fact that most
Caribbean governments are unlikely to reverse their
foreign policy of nonalignment. They will continue to
seek good relations with the United States while
remaining open to other foreign links. In pursuing its
aims, Moscow has the advantage of being able to use
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ANNEX B
INTERNAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
Despite a move away from leftism in Caribbean
countries since 1980, the region retains a potential for
instability. The combination of ministates, regional
fragmentation, relative poverty, and unattainable po-
litical and economic aspirations is a volatile one. This
annex summarizes the political situation in individual
countries together with a medium-term political
assessment.
ANGUILLA
Government: British self-governing dependency; formerly
part of associated state of St. Christopher-
Nevis-Anguilla until a new constitution in
February 1976 provided separate ad-
ministration.
Government leader: Chief Minister Ronald Webster.
Elected legislature: Seven-member House of Assembly: Anguilla
People's Party (APP), Ronald Webster, 5;
Anguilla National Alliance (ANA), Emile
Gumbs, 2.
Last election: June 1981.
Political Situation: Anguilla became a dependency
of the United Kingdom in December 1980, formally
dissolving its relationship with the associated state of
St. Christopher-Nevis. Its constitution closely resem-
bles that of the British Virgin Islands and other British
dependent territories. Politics are lively and based on
personality, not ideology. Anguilla should be reason-
ably stable in the medium term, because it has been
less affected by the forces of change evident elsewhere
in the Caribbean.
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
Government: Independent state within the Common-
wealth as of 1 November 1981, recognizing
the British monarch as chief of state.
Government leader: Prime Minister Vere Bird, Sr.
Elected legislature: Seventeen-member House of Representa-
tives: Antigua Labor Party (ALP), Vere Bird,
13; Progressive Labor Movement (PLM),
Robert Hall, 3; Independent, 1.
Last election: April 1980.
Political Situation: The newly independent state of
Antigua and Barbuda remains firmly under the con-
trol of 73-year-old Vere Bird, Sr., who has long
dominated politics on the island. The government is
reasonably stable, although separatist sentiment on
Barbuda is fueled by charges of neglect by the central
government. Prime Minister Bird faces some factional-
ism within his own party, and a challenge from his son
Lester Bird-the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister-who is impatient to succeed his father.
Another ambitious son, Vere Jr., is Deputy Speaker of
the House of Representatives. The moderate opposi-
tion party is badly fragmented and virtually paralyzed
as a result of its inept performance in power during
1971-76. The demise of the party's newspaper in 1981
and a continuing leadership split has been successfully
exploited by the small leftist Antigua Caribbean Liber-
ation Movement (ACLM), led by Tim Hector, which is
seeking to fill the vacuum. Under Bird's rule, Antigua
seems certain to remain firmly on the side of the
United States and to maintain a private enterprise
philosophy in its efforts to develop a viable political
and economic system.
Government: Independent state within the Common-
wealth as of 10 July 1973, recognizing the
British monarch as chief of state.
Government leader: Prime Minister Lynden 0. Pindling.
Elected legislature: Forty-three-member House of Assembly:
Progressive Liberal Party (PLP), Lynden
Pindling, 32; Free National Movement
(FNM), Kendal Issacs, 11.
Last election: June 1982.
Political Situation: Bahamian Prime Minister Pin-
dling's Progressive Liberal Party was returned to
power for its fourth five-year term in June 1982
following an acrimonious campaign by opponents who
charged it with corruption and ineffectiveness. The
entrenched ruling party, while winning 32 out of 43
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seats, presumably was shaken by the unprecedented
hostility it encountered during the election and the
closeness of many local races. Although not threatened
over the short run, the government will be under
pressure to tackle increasing economic and social
problems. The opposition Free National Movement is
no match for Pindling's well-organized and well-
funded party, but it has begun to make inroads among
the disillusioned middle class.
Government: Independent state within the Common-
wealth as of 20 November 1966, recognizing
the British monarch as chief of state.
Government leader: Prime Minister J. M. G. "Tom" Adams.
Elected legislature: Twenty-seven-member House of Assembly:
Barbados Labor Party (BLP), Tom Adams,
17; Democratic Labor Party (DLP), Errol
Barrow, 10.
Last election: June 1981.
Political Situation: Barbados is one of the most
prosperous and stable islands in the Eastern Caribbe-
an. It has a strong two-party system with a long
tradition of democratic practice. The reelection of
Adams' party in June 1981 demonstrated the populari-
ty of his middle-of-the-road policies, although his
earlier margin over the opposition was narrowed.
Leftist parties on the island are small and ineffective,
but they are active in proselytizing unemployed youth.
Barbados is expected to remain stable in the medium
term.
Government: Independent state within the Common-
wealth as of 21 September 1981, recognizing
the British monarch as chief of state.
Goverment leader: Prime Minister George Price.
Elected legislature: Eighteen-member House of Representatives:
People's United Party (PUP), George Price,
13 seats; United Democratic Party (UDP),
Theodore Aranda, 5 seats.
Last election: November 1979.
Political Situation: After leading Belize to inde-
pendence last September, Prime Minister Price retains
firm control of the majority PUP Party and of the
country. The violence of 1981, touched off by the
opposition UDP's hostility toward independence and a
tentative agreement with Guatemala concerning the
boundary dispute, has subsided. Price, acting in his
additional roles of Finance Minister and Foreign
Affairs Minister, has concentrated his efforts since
independence on expanding Belizean relations with
other nations and international organizations. He has
also been forced to deal with Belize's faltering econo-
my, which grew by only 1 percent last year. Growing
factionalism within the PUP has required Price's
mediation on several occasions. A split within the PUP
would provide an opening for the more conservative,
probusiness UDP, which won 47 percent of the popu-
lar vote in the 1979 national election. Opposition to
Price's policies over the next two years will center on
declining economic conditions and on any proposed
agreement with Guatemala that the opposition feels
compromises Belizean sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS
Government: British crown colony (with limited local au-
tonomy).
Government leader: Chief Minister Lavitty Stoutt (British Gover-
nor David Robert Barwick).
Elected legislature: Nine-member Legislative Council: Virgin Is-
lands Party (VIP), Lavitty Stoutt, 7; United
Party (UP), Conrad Madero, 2.
Last election: November 1979.
Political Situation: These islands remain firmly
linked to the British and, because of their small
population and resource base, are not expected to press
for full independence in the near future. The islands
have a degree of internal self-government under a
British governor who is responsible for defense, inter-
nal security, and external affairs as well as the civil
service and judicial system. The government of Chief
Minister Stoutt has been strongly pro-US. Both major
parties are moderate, and radical movements have not
yet gained a foothold.
CAYMAN ISLANDS
Government: British crown colony (with limited local au-
tonomy).
Government leader: Governor G. P. Lloyd; Chief Secretary, Den-
nis Foster; Assembly Leader, Jim Bodden.
Elected legislature: Twelve-member Legislative Assembly: The
governor chairs a four-member Executive
Council chosen by and from the Legislative
Assembly. There are no political parties, and
the two political groupings are based on
personality rather than ideology.
Last election: November 1980.
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Political Situation: The Cayman political situation
remains stable with no change expected in the coun-
try's status as a colony of the United Kingdom.
Elections for the 12 Legislative Assembly seats do not
have to be called until 1984, and there is no general
sentiment for independence. The role of the Cayman
Islands as a tax haven and banking center, along with
its almost full employment, is expected to reinforce its
prospects for economic and political stability.
Government: Independent state within the Common-
wealth as of 3 November 1978, recognizing
the British monarch as chief of state.
Government leader: Prime Minister Mary Eugenia Charles.
Elected legislature: Thirty-member House of Assembly with 21
elected members and 9 elected or appointed
senators: Dominica Freedom Party (DFP),
Eugenia Charles, 17; United Dominica La-
bor Party (UDLP), Michael Douglas, 2; Inde-
pendents, 2.
Last election: July 1980.
Political Situation: Dominica is one of the poorest
islands in the Caribbean and potentially one of the
least stable. Elected by a landslide in July 1980, the
capable and energetic Eugenia Charles faces many
problems: an economy devastated by hurricanes, gov-
ernment mismanagement, recurrent coup plotting,
criminal activity by Rastafarian cultists, and disaffec-
tion by political malcontents and former members of
the disbanded defense force. The release of former
Prime Minister Patrick John, who was implicated in an
abortive coup, has added to security concerns. Charles
has actively sought assistance from many economic aid
donors and is striving hard to put her fiscal house in
order. Although Charles's popularity remains high,
unscrupulous opponents can be expected to keep up
the pressure to undermine her programs and to gain
support from the large pool of unemployed youths on
the island. The radical Dominican Liberation Move-
ment Alliance (DLMA), headed by William Riviere, is
small in numbers but active in cultivating ties with
Grenada, Libya, and Cuba. Because of threats to the
government, Charles has asked for and received help
from the United Kingdom, Jamaica, France, and
Barbados in improving the capabilities of the security
force.
Government: Constitutional democracy.
Government leader: President Salvador Jorge Blanco.
Elected legislature: Twenty-seven-member Chamber of Depu-
ties and 91-member Senate, both under Do-
minican Revolutionary Party (PRD) control.
Last election: May 1982.
Political Situation: The Dominican Republic is
entering a new phase of its 20-year journey from
dictatorship to functioning democracy. With the elec-
tion in May 1982 of Salvador Jorge Blanco, a soft-
spoken Senator from the center-left Dominican Revo-
lutionary Party, the Dominican people rejected the
old-style caudillo politics long exemplified by former
Presidents Joaquin Balaguer and Juan Bosch. President
Guzman, who committed suicide in early July, presid-
ed over a transitional period in Dominican political
development. The Dominican Republic is in poor
economic shape. Jorge Blanco will have virtually no
grace period in which to tackle the problems that have
their root cause in world energy price hikes, hurricane
damage, and declining commodity prices. Unemploy-
ment-at a level of over 25 percent-especially will
furnish an immediate and emotional issue for his
political opponents on both the left and right. So far,
however, he has managed to maintain popular support
for his assistance program.
Government: Overseas Department of France.
Government leader: Prefect Maxime Gonzalvo (appointed by the
French Government); General Council Presi-
dent Emmanuel Belloney (popular election).
Last election: French general election, May 1981; Cantonal
elections, March 1982.
Political Situation: The political climate in French
Guiana has been relatively calm in recent years. The
nascent anticolonial movement (Moguyde) became
inactive after the French Government began a crack-
down in the summer of 1980. Cantonal elections this
year, however, were marred by demonstrations and
some violence. The General Council that eventually
emerged is evenly divided between socialists and
conservatives. The Mitterrand government recently
announced its intention to replace the current electoral
structure in the overseas departments-the General
and Regional Councils-with a single assembly elected
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by proportional representation some time in 1983. The
proposed single assembly and voting procedures will
afford the left better representation than at present.
The new system represents a threat to departmental-
ists, who favor remaining an integral part of the
Republic, and promises to enliven local politics over
the next year.
Government: Independent state within the Common-
wealth as of 7 February 1974, recognizing
the British monarch as chief of state.
Government leader: Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.
Elected legislature: None.
Last election: December 1976.
Political Situation: Since Bishop's New Jewel
Movement seized power from the corrupt Gairy dicta-
torship in March 1979-the first such illegal takeover
in the English-speaking Caribbean-he has moved
deliberately to implant a Cuban-style revolutionary
Marxist state. Bishop rules by decree, without a consti-
tution, and has spoken only in vague generalities about
creating mass organizations that would constitute a
"people's democracy." The security forces have the
island under firm political control. Bishop could very
well be ousted by a shift of factions within his own
government, however, but his removal would not alter
the government's Communist bent.
Government: Overseas Department of France.
Government leader: Prefect Guy Maillard; General Council Pres-
ident Lucette Michaux-Chevry.
Last election: French general election, May 1981; Cantonal
(General Council) elections, March 1982.
Political Situation: Despite one of the highest
standards of living in the Caribbean, the French
Department of Guadeloupe has experienced some
political turbulence in the last few years. A spate of
bombings attributable to local proindependence
groups rocked the island in 1980 and early 1981. The
terrorist incidents, however, subsided over the past
year. In the recent Cantonal elections, the leftist
parties made a significant showing, outpolling the
right to win 10 out of 18 contested seats in the General
Council. The conservatives-represented by the Gaull-
ist Rally for the Republic-still retain control of the
Council, but are plagued by internal splits on almost
all issues except their stand against independence.
Although the Socialist Party outpolled the Communist
Party, the latter remains the best organized and most
ideologically homogeneous party in Guadeloupe. The
March 1982 elections suggest that the left will do
particularly well in next year's election for a single
ruling council. The left has significant strength in the
more densely populated urban centers and should
profit from the vote based on proportional representa-
tion. Moreover, the burgeoning youth majority, facing
an unemployment level of over 20 percent, will be
increasingly lured by the left's call for independence
and an end to Antillean domination by a minority of
white French "colonists."
Government: Republic with Executive President.
Government leader: Executive President Linden Forbes Burn-
ham.
Elected legislature: Fifty-three-member National Assembly:
People's National Congress, Forbes Burn-
ham, 41; People's Progressive Party, Cheddi
Jagan, 10; United Force, Fielden Singh, 2.
Last election: December 1980.
Political Situation: Prime Minister for many years,
Forbes Burnham had himself elected to the newly
established position of Executive President in Decem-
ber 1980 in a blatantly fraudulent election. Burnham's
corrupt and brutal regime, whose endurance is based
as much on the tolerance of the Guyanese as on
Burnham's own skills, faces increasing danger. Despite
Guyana's wealth of mineral, timber, land, and water
resources, its economy is in precipitous decline. Al-
though Burnham appears to be securely entrenched at
present, the tide could turn swiftly. As the economy
deteriorates, outbreaks of violence will probably in-
crease and could conceivably develop into general
disorder reminiscent of the race riots of the early
1960s.-Also menacing Guyana is Venezuela's claim to
over five-eighths of the national territory. For the
moment, Burnham is playing the dispute as an exter-
nal threat and attempting to draw Guyanese concerns
away from the economic situation.
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Government: Dictatorship under President-for-Life.
Government leader: President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier.
Elected legislature: Fifty-eight-member Legislative Chamber/
National Assembly: Pro-Duvalierist, 57, In-
dependent (Alexandre Lerouge), 1.
Last election: February 1979. (Legislature turns all powers
over to the President every year.)
Political Situation: After 25 years in power, the
Duvalier regime shows no sign of disappearing from
the Haitian scene over the medium term. Jean-Claude
Duvalier, now in his 11th year as President-for-Life,
has demonstrated little of his father's penchant for
violence and has made tentative efforts to improve the
quality of life in Haiti. The regime, however, still
utilizes control of the security forces, favoritism, and
corruption as the basic mechanisms of political surviv-
al. Although many Haitian businessmen are disgrun-
tled with Duvalier's mismanagement of the economy,
they have virtually no power base from which to
challenge him. Duvalier appears to be firmly in
control of the security forces, as ill prepared as they
are. He also benefits from the passive support of the
masses, who are too preoccupied with their own
survival to play a role in national politics.
JAMAICA
Government: Independent state within the Common-
wealth as of 6 August 1962, recognizing the
British monarch as chief of state.
Government leader: Prime Minister Edward Seaga.
Elected legislature: Sixty-member House of Representatives: Ja-
maica Labor Party (JLP), Edward Seaga, 51;
People's National Party (PNP), Michael
Manley, 9.
Last election: October 1980.
Political Situation: Elected by an overwhelming
political mandate, the Seaga government has taken
some steps to correct serious structural weaknesses and
to restore the confidence needed to attract foreign
investment. Politically inspired terrorism has been
brought under control, although serious crime on the
island-particularly in Kingston-remains a problem.
The badly battered PNP of former Prime Minister
Michael Manley remains under his control. Manley
shows no signs of changing the party's orientation,
although he is aware of the need to alter the party's
image if he is to regain any measure of popular
support. The small but energetic Communist Worker's
Party of Jamaica, headed by Trevor Munroe, is con-
ducting a strong campaign to gain a foothold within
the island's powerful labor movement. Both Manley
and Munroe can be expected to make life difficult for
Seaga as the island's recovery moves more slowly than
expected. Besieged by power outages, water shortages,
labor disorders, and other troubles, Seaga will be
vulnerable to growing political attack by his oppo-
nents. Cuban-trained cadres still possess weapons, and
if Seaga begins to lose popular support they could
renew terrorism aimed at sabotaging his recovery
program.
MARTINIQUE
Government: Overseas Department of France.
Government leader: Prefect Jean Chevance; General Council
President Emile Maurice.
Last election: French general election, May 1981; Cantonal
(General Council) elections, March 1982.
Political Situation: Like Guadeloupe, Martinique
is represented in the metropole by three Deputies and
two Senators. With the election of a socialist govern-
ment in France, a significant program of governmen-
tal decentralization currently is being undertaken.
Decentralization already has brought some decrease in
the power of the prefect and should produce a
significant increase in the powers of locally elected
legislatures in the near term. Although the left made a
good showing in the March 1982 elections, the right
still maintains a significant majority in the General
Council of Martinique (24 seats to the left's 12). Unlike
their counterparts in Guadeloupe, the Communist
Party of Martinique has had less success in gaining
popular support, mainly because of the effective
campaigning of the island's non-Communist left. The
Socialists-represented primarily by the Martinique
Progressive Party-have their principal strength in the
capital city and in the person of longtime Deputy,
Mayor of Fort-de-France, and renowned poet, Aime
Cesaire. The political outlook is a stable one.
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Government: British crown colony (with limited local au-
tonomy).
Government leader: Chief Minister John Osbourne.
Elected legislature: Seven-member Legislative Council: People's
Liberation Movement (PLM), John Os-
bourne, 6; Progressive Democratic Party
(PDP), Austin Bramble, 1.
Last election: November 1978.
Political Situation: Under moderate and practical
leadership, Montserrat is one of the more stable terri-
tories in the Caribbean. The government is taking its
time on the subject of independence, and there are no
really divisive political issues. Recently, a left-leaning
People's Christian Alliance Party was formed by
George Irish, head of the Montserrat Allied Workers
Union; however, barring unforeseen circumstances,
the highly popular Osbourne should win the next
election, which is due to be held before March 1983.
The Montserratians are staunchly pro-US and anti-
Communist.
Government: Self-governing territory of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands.
Government leader: Minister-President Domenico Martina.
Elected legislature: Each island has its own local government
and political parties-there are no national
political parties. The June 1982 election pro-
duced the following lineup of seats in the 22-
member Legislative Council:
Curacao: Movement for a New Antilles (MAN), Do-
menico Martina, 6; Democratic Party (DP),
Aruba:
Bonaire:
3; National People's Party (NVP), 3.
People's Electoral Movement (MEP), G. F.
Croes, 5; Aruban Patriotic Party (PPA), 1;
Arubaanse Volks Parti, 2.
Democratic Party Bonaire (UPB), 1.
Windwards: Windward Islands Democratic Party
(DPWI), 1.
Last election: June 1982.
Political Situation: The Netherlands Antilles cur-
rently is a semi-self-governing territory within the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, but separatist demands
from Aruba have compelled the Dutch to discuss plans
for independence. Aruba, under its stubborn and
charismatic leader, Gilberto F. "Betico" Croes, is
determined to break away from Curacao. Croes is
demanding separate status pending restructuring of
the Netherlands Antilles and approval of unilateral
independence for Aruba. Among schemes under study
are commonwealth or associated states status. St. Eu-
statius, Saba, and St. Maarten prefer to remain under
the Dutch wing and do not wish to be linked with
Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao. While the Dutch are
attempting to keep the islands within some sort of
loose arrangement, the tendency toward fragmenta-
tion appears to be gathering strength.
Government: British associated state (with full internal
autonomy).
Government leader: Premier Kennedy Simmonds.
Elected legislature: Nine-member House of Assembly: St. Kitts
Labor Party (SKLP), Lee Moore, 4; People's
Action Movement (PAM), Kennedy
Simmonds, 3; Nevis Reformation Party
(NRP), Simeon Daniel, 2.
Last election: February 1980.
Political Situation: The government's decision to
table a proposal on independence is the islands' major
political issue. The government hopes to conclude
independence negotiations with the British by the end
of this year, but the timetable for achieving it is not
yet clear. St. Christopher-Nevis formally agreed in
December 1980 to relinquish its claim to Anguilla.
(Anguilla will revert to crown colony status upon St.
Christopher-Nevis's independence.) The Simmonds
government reportedly has included provisions for
increased Nevis representation in a postindependence
arrangement, clearly to counter Nevisian separatism,
which has shown increased signs of revival. The
independence issue is certain to remain a contentious
one. The opposition labor party claims that the PAM-
NRP coalition has no mandate to obtain it. Relations
between Simmonds and his Nevis coalition partners
may also be strained by the independence issue.
Government: Independent state within the Common-
wealth as of 1 March 1967, recognizing the
British monarch as chief of state.
Government leader: Prime Minister John Compton.
Elected legislature: Seventeen-member House of Assembly:
United Workers' Party (UWP), John Comp-
ton, 14; St. Lucia Labor Party (SLP), Peter
Josie, 2; Progressive Labor Party, (PLP),
George Odium, 1.
Last election: May 1982.
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Political Situation: A sweeping electoral victory for
John Compton's United Workers' Party in May 1982
dealt a crushing defeat to leftist leaders whose interne-
cine struggle for power had weakened the ruling St.
Lucia Labor Party. After three years of the feud, the
Labor Party had alienated most people on the island
who blame the infighting for the steady record of
economic deterioration. The decision of ambitious
former Deputy Prime Minister George Odium to bolt
the St. Lucia Labor Party in April 1981 and form his
own Progressive Labor Party left the government
under the shaky leadership of a political darkhorse,
Winston Cenac, whose weak government finally col-
lapsed in January 1982. An interim government head-
ed by Michael Pilgrim, an Odium protege, performed
a caretaker function until elections were held. Od-
ium's defeat and the defeat suffered by Peter Josie,
leftist former Foreign Minister, who was chosen to
head the rump faction of the Labor Party, gave
Compton's middle-of-the-road party a strong mandate
to find solutions to the economic malaise. Despite his
popular victory at the polls, Compton faces problems
similar to Seaga's in Jamaica. If radical leaders Odium
and Josie, who have ties to Grenada's Bishop as well as
the Libyans and Cubans, decide to bury their personal
rivalries, they might be able to forge a stronger
opposition to Compton. Both antagonists are attempt-
ing to build up a youth following from among the
large number of urban unemployed.
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
Government: Independent state within the Common-
wealth as of 27 October 1979, recognizing
the British monarch as chief of state.
Government leader: Prime Minister Milton Cato.
Elected legislature: Thirteen elected representatives in 19-mem-
ber House of Assembly: St. Vincent Labor
Party (SVLP), Milton Cato, 11; New Demo-
cratic Party (NDP), James Mitchell, 2.
Last election: December 1979.
Political Situation: Prime Minister Cato's govern-
ment (elected in 1979 for five years) seems to be stable
in the near term. The economy is showing signs of
recovery after severe blows from volcanic eruptions
and hurricanes; however, St. Vincent remains one of
the poorest countries in the Eastern Caribbean. A
rapidly growing population, high unemployment, and
inflation could lead to serious social discontent. The
radical leftist United People's Movement (UPM) made
a respectable showing in the 1979 election (14 percent)
and is undeniably attractive to the growing number of
unemployed youth. The antiestablishment religious
cult of Rastafarianism is growing fast. The small
country also faces a security threat in the strong
separatist movements in its dependency of the Grena-
dine Islands, which it shares with Grenada. So far,
Cato's government appears to be meeting its many
problems with a minimum of political strain. The
SVLP should remain in power for the foreseeable
future, since it is unlikely that the UPM will obtain a
majority, and the NDP is strictly a Grenadine party.
Government: Nonconstitutional civilian government ap-
pointed by military junta; rule by decree.
Government leader: President Lachmipersad Frederik Ramdat
Misier (ceremonial); Prime Minister Henri
Neiihorst; Army Commander Desire Bou-
terse (de facto ruler).
Last election: 1978.
Political Situation: Army Commander Desire Bou-
terse emerged as Suriname's strongman six months
after he and a group of fellow noncommissioned
officers toppled the constitutionally elected govern-
ment of Henck Arron in February 1980. Since then,
Bouterse has exerted effective control over the civilian
government and military establishment, although he
has little. popular support. The political situation is
likely to become highly unstable over the period of
this estimate as labor unions and other democratic
institutions in Suriname become increasingly assertive
in resisting the leftward drift of the government and
the presence of the military in it. Although Bouterse
and his Foreign Minister Harvey Naarendorp claim
that their foreign policy is nonaligned and nationalis-
tic, they are directing Suriname on a leftist and pro-
Cuban course. In order to entrench himself more
securely in power, Bouterse is looking to Cuba and
Grenada as models, and he is taking advice and some
limited military assistance from the Castro regime.
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Government: Parliamentary democracy.
Government leader: Prime Minister George Chambers.
Elected legislature: Thirty-six member House of Representa-
tives: People's National Movement (PNM),
George Chambers, 26; United Labor Front
(ULF), Basdeo Panday, 8; Democratic Action
Congress (DAC), A. N. R. Robinson, 2.
Last election: November 1981.
Political Situation: George Chambers, who was
appointed Prime Minister following the death in
March 1981 of longtime Trinidadian leader Dr. Eric
Williams, led the ruling People's National Movement
to a sweeping victory in elections held the following
November. The black-dominated party retained its
traditional 24 seats and picked up two more at the
expense of the opposition United Labor Front. This
reflected both the superior party machinery of the
PNM and the disunity of the largely East Indian
opposition groups. The winning campaign strategy
successfully discredited PNM maverick Karl Hudson-
Phillips and his Organization for National Reconstruc-
tion as a tool of business, linked to foreign interests.
The country has problems of inefficient government,
Tobago separatism, and racial dichotomy, but none of
them are expected to develop serious proportions in
the medium term.
Government: British crown colony.
Government leader: Chief Minister Norman Saunders.
Elected legislature: Progressive National Party, Norman Saunders,
8; People's Democratic Movement, Oswald
Skippings, 3.
Last election: November 1980.
Political Situation: Although plagued with instabil-
ity and disorder in the recent past, this island group
appears to have settled down under businessman
Norman Saunders. He has pushed back plans for
independence by eight to 10 years and is concentrat-
ing on economic development. One of the country's
biggest problems is the large-scale narcotics transship-
ment flow through the islands which has brought
money but, with it, corruption and organized crime
influence. Because the islands are too small and poor
to be an independent country, various plans have been
constructed to associate it with the Bahamas, Bermu-
da, or even Canada. None of the plans seems likely to
succeed. So far, Saunders enjoys a fair amount of
popular support, but this support could easily fade.
The country has experienced some political violence in
the past. Opposition leader Skippings appears to be
biding his time, waiting for Saunders to fail.
B-8
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/03: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 700030007-9
 Approved For Release 2008/04/03: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 700030007-9
Approved For Release 2008/04/03: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 700030007-9