CHALLENGES TO COLOMBIA'S NEW ADMINISTRATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001600010007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 29, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central
i;' f ids>/c
Secret
NI JIM 82-10008
29 July 1982
Copy 2 5 6
Challenges to C
New Administration
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CHALLENGES TO COLOMBIA'S
NEW ADMINISTRATION
Information available as of 29 July 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS ....................................................................................................
1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................
5
The Election of 1982-Its Meaning .....................................................................
5
Betancur-President-Elect .....................................................................................
6
Three Problem Areas for the Betancur Government ...........................................
6
The Economy ......................................................................................................
6
Criminality and Narcotics ..................................................................................
8
The Extreme Left and insurgency ....................................................................
10
The Betancur Government's Probable Policies ....................................................
12
Domestic Politics .................................................................................................
12
Economic Approaches ........................................................................................
13
Narcotics and Corruption ...................................................................................
13
Internal Security .................................................................................................
14
Foreign Policy and Implications for the United States ........................................
14
Social, Economic, and Political Trends .................................................................
A-1
Major Political Institutions and Groups ................................................................
A-2
The Army ................................................................................................................
A-3
Private Business .......................................................................................................
A-3
Labor .......................................................................................................................
A-4
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KEY JUDGMENTS
During the period of this Estimate (1982-86) Colombia will be
relatively stable. It will continue to cooperate with the United States in
most areas of common concern because of the effective control of the
government by the traditional moderate elite, opposition to Cuban and
to Nicaraguan ambitions, close ties between the US and Colombian
military establishments, and dependence on US markets and sources of
capital.
Newly elected President Belisario Betancur Cuartas, although a
Conservative, has an eclectic political philosophy combining Christian
Democratic and populist elements. From an impoverished background,
he sympathizes with Colombia's poor, something that will be reflected
in his economic and social programs. He strongly opposes Cuban/Soviet
expansionism in the Caribbean Basin, but his nationalism and Third
World tendencies will make him less openly supportive of US security
initiatives in the region than the current Colombian administration has
been. Respected for his integrity, Betancur is a pragmatist with a
reputation for administrative skills and a willingness to conciliate and
compromise to gain his ends.
President Betancur begins his term on a firm political base. The in-
ternal security situation has improved since last year. Unless the
insurgent groups unite or there is a significant increase in external
assistance to existing armed antigovernment groups in Colombia,
security forces will be able to contain insurgency at a low threat level,
although urban terrorism will continue to be a potential serious
problem.
Numerous problems will nonetheless face Betancur both domesti-
cally and in his relations with the United States:
? A sagging economy presents Betancur with his most difficult
challenge. Projected high fiscal and current account deficits will
threaten his ability to fulfill the ambitious targets of the National
Note: This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for
Latin America. It was coordinated at the working level with the Central Intelligence Agency; Defense
Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce; and
the intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
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Integration Plan (PIN), as well as his own campaign pledges on
housing and education. A prolonged period of low economic
growth, combined with high levels of unemployment, underem-
ployment, and inflation, is probable. Under these circumstances,
Betancur might experiment with economic innovations even at
the risk of political opposition from the right.
? Severe social problems and high levels of violence and crime,
exacerbated by the economic slowdown, will persist.
? Colombia will continue to be a principal producer of marijuana
and cocaine and an illegal processor and transshipper of synthetic
drugs such as quaalude. Betancur will be generally supportive of
US narcotics control objectives, but limited resources and the
pervasive nature of the problem will prevent the achievement of
decisive results.
? Heavy involvement of US firms in PIN projects may well
produce difficulties in US-Colombian relations, especially if slow
economic recovery results in problems of financing, disappoint-
ing profits, or even abandonment of some projects. Betancur will
support demands by Colombian firms for larger shares of
contracted work. US firms can expect complications in their
dealings with Colombian labor unions, a growing number of
which are Communist-controlled, and high rates of criminal
activity in regions where US firms will be operating pose
additional hazards.
? While his foreign policy will be generally compatible with that of
the United States, Betancur's tendency toward nonalignment and
his eclectic political philosophy will lead him on occasion to
demonstrate independence of Washington.
In sum, while there will be various stresses and some instability in
Colombia over the next few years, and some frictions with the United
States, Colombia's basic political domestic system and foreign orienta-
tion appear fairly secure and will undergo little substantial change. The
major institutions-private business, the military, the bureaucracy, the
Catholic Church, non-Communist labor unions, and the rising commer-
cial agricultural sector-all have important stakes in the existing system
and have expressed confidence in Betancur. The system of elite control
will almost certainly remain viable, and even though severe domestic
problems will persist there is no charismatic figure or organized
movement in sight showing promise of being able to give political form
to discontent or to rally the disaffected.
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Nevertheless, Colombia should be carefully monitored for signs of
political crisis. Twice in this century Colombia has experienced civil
wars that took hundreds of thousands of lives. In a region experiencing
severe economic stress and political pressures exacerbated by Cuban
and Soviet actions, Colombia, despite its current favorable outlook for
stability, cannot be considered safe from possible drastic and unfavor-
able change, toward either radicalization or a military coup. Possible
indicators of such change would include:
? Unification of the armed left.
? Growth of a liberation theology movement in the Colombian
Catholic Church.
? Communist control of the labor movement and the successful
conduct of large-scale strikes and work stoppages.
? Rise of political factionalism in the armed forces.
? An ideological split between the traditional parties and break-
down of interparty cooperation.
? Outbreaks of mass urban disturbances and the appearance of
demagogic leaders of the urban poor.
? Spread of vigilantism as a response to the deterioration of the
criminal justice system.
? Marked decrease in narcotics control efforts.
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DISCUSSION
The Election of 1982-Its Meaning
1. On 30 May 1982, Belisario Betancur Cuartas was
elected President of Colombia for a four-year term
beginning 7 August. In a three-candidate race, the 58-
year-old Conservative Party candidate won 47 percent
of the vote, a plurality of about 400,000 over the
Liberal Party's candidate, ex-President Alfonso Lopez
Michelsen. Liberal Party reformer Luis Carlos Galan
Sarmiento got almost 750,000 votes, about 12 percent
of the total, splitting the Liberals and ensuring Lopez's
defeat.
2. The election was significant on several counts.
Almost 7 million of about 12 million eligible voters
went to the polls, a 40-percent increase over the 1978
turnout and a reversal of a 12-year decline in partici-
pation that had led to concern about the legitimacy of
the traditional Colombian two-party system. The Con-
servatives' victory after two successive Liberal admin-
istrations ended fears that they were consigned to
permanent, minority opposition status. The Commu-
nist-backed Democratic Front received a crushing
setback, gaining only 1 percent of the vote, a convinc-
ing voter rejection of class-based electoral appeals. The
violent left was also discredited when the M-19 insur-
gent movement was unable to carry out its threats to
disrupt the elections. Galan's showing may foreshadow
a change in Colombian politics toward a greater
ideological distinction between the two major parties.
3. Moreover, Betancur's victory was national in
scope. His inroads into traditional Liberal bastions on
the north coast and in working-class urban districts
indicate that his administration will have support in all
regions and within all classes. Armed forces dislike of
Lopez was clear, and Betancur's election all but
eliminated the fears of a military coup in the near
term. During the March congressional elections the
Conservatives captured only a minority of seats in the
two-house national legislature, but some elements of
the divided Liberals are expected to support much of
the administration's legislation. This, plus the strong
presidential authority in the Colombian system, indi-
cates that the legislature is unlikely to cause Betancur
any substantial trouble.
4. The platforms of the candidates were too vague
to allow the election to be called a mandate for a
particular program. If anything, it was a rejection of
the party patronage and corruption Lopez was be-
lieved to represent. Both Betancur and Galan general-
ly enjoy reputations for integrity. Lopez was also seen
as so distrusted by key groups, particularly the Army,
that his election would have increased the possibility
of a coup or, at best, a series of destabilizing political
confrontations. Thus, the elections can be interpreted
as being essentially:
? An endorsement of the traditional political system.
? A call for elimination of political corruption.
? A rejection of class-based, leftist appeals.
? Expression of a desire for stability and rejection of
violence.
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Betancur-President-Elect
5. Belisario Betancur is one of 22 children of a poor
coalminer. He briefly studied for the priesthood as a
young man before going on to earn a law degree.
Joining the Conservative Party in 1947, he first be-
came known as a political journalist expounding the
views of the far right wing of the party. During the
1950s he founded his own newspaper, then became a
partner in the Tercer Mundo (Third World) Publishing
Company, becoming a wealthy man in the process. He
was elected to the Colombian Senate in 1958.
Betancur's main concerns are domestic socia is-
sues-housing, education, health-and the economy.
Uncharacteristically for a Colombian Conservative, he
maintains a strong identification with the working class
and is convinced of the need for social change to
improve the condition of Colombia's poor. In foreign
policy he has some Third World and nationalistic
tendencies. He will be inclined to demonstrate independ-
ence of US leadership. However, he is conscious of the
Cuban and Nicaraguan threats to Colombian internal
and territorial security and will be supportive of region-
al efforts to stop the expansion of Marxism-Leninism.
Three Problem Areas for the
Betancur Government
The Economy
8. While Betancur begins his term under favorable
political and security conditions, he faces the most
difficult economic situation Colombia has experienced
in 20 years. Businessmen and government planners
alike have had to revise their projections in the face of
the persistent recession. The World Bank, for example,
had predicted a 1981 recovery to a growth rate of 4.5
percent, instead of the 2.5 percent actually achieved.
The current Turbay administration, fearing inflation,
has made only cautious, stimulative departures from
its basically monetarist program. In the face of con-
tinuing high interest rates, weak consumer demand,
and declining exports, business confidence is low.
According to the Colombian Chamber of Commerce,
first-quarter 1982 investment fell 13 percent in real
terms below that for the same period a year ago.
Declines of 64 percent and 28 percent were reported
in agriculture and manufacturing investment, respec-
tively. The important textile industry was hardest hit
as exports were made difficult by rising world protec-
tionism and slack demand in its export markets, while
cheaper, high-quality, smuggled goods captured much
of the domestic market. The collapse of both domestic
and foreign markets for Colombian cotton has led
growers, who have already reduced planting from a
peak of 300,000 hectares in 1977 to fewer than 70,000
last year and have seen export value during that period
drop from $120 million to $45 million, to threaten to
refuse to plant at all without purchase guarantees from
the government. Sugar growers have learned that the
new US sugar quotas will reduce their exports to the
United States from last year's approximately 200,000
tons to 65,000 tons for 1982. Prices for coffee, Colom-
bia's principal export, have recovered somewhat from
recent lows but markets remain soft and unpredict-
able. (See table 1.) Betancur's political honeymoon
may be of short duration if his programs for revitaliz-
ing industry and maximizing employment fail to
produce results.
9. Nevertheless, while most economic analysts are
markedly less optimistic about immediate prospects,
they stress the basic soundness of the Colombian
economy. They emphasize the adequacy of Colom-
bia's international currency reserves, its creditworthi-
ness, the relatively limited (although growing) role of
the public sector, the drive for economic diversifica-
tion, the size and potential of its domestic market, its
slowing population growth rate, the general health and
aptitude of its work force, and the quality and vigor of
its managerial and entrepreneurial sectors.
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Total Colombian Exports, 1980
(million dollars f.o.b.)
Coffee (green) .............................................................................. 2,360
Textiles and garments ................................................................. 258
Fuel oil ......................................................................................... 239
Raw sugar and molasses ............................................................. 202
Bananas ........................................................................................ 108
Fresh cut flowers ........................................................................ 102
Cotton fiber ................................................................................. 102
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals ................................................ 82
Electric machinery and materials ............................................. 70
Cardboard containers, books, and other printing ..................... 82
Frozen beef ................................................................................. 33
Motor vehicles, planes, and spare parts ..................................... 28
Emeralds ...................................................................................... 63
Tobacco leaf ................................................................................ 25
Others .......................................................................................... 472
Total ......................................................................................... 4,226
Source: INCOMEX (Colombian Foreign Trade Institute).
10. New petroleum projects and a shift to nonoil
(coal/hydro) sources for domestic energy requirements
should result in oil self-sufficiency within the next few
years with large, net foreign exchange savings. Colom-
bia is actively pursuing new export markets in the
Caribbean. The nation's agricultural resource base has
potential for considerable expansion. The National
Integration Plan (PIN) was adopted in 1979 in order to
stimulate aggregate demand through deficit spending,
while attempting through careful regulation of the
money supply to avoid an acceleration in inflation.
11. PIN emphasizes development of energy re-
sources and transportation, with major attention to the
social sectors (nutrition and health, water supply and
sewerage, housing and education). All these are com-
patible with Betancur's own program, which, if any-
thing, will be geared to even greater stimulation of
demand. PIN and associated projects call for public-
sector expenditures of $22 billion through 1985. Dur-
ing the same period the imports required to support
the developmental aspects of the plan will require an
average current account deficit of $1.865 billion annu-
ally and a rundown of international currency reserves
from present levels of a year's imports to only three
months by 1985. Overall external capital requirements
for the 1981-85 period are projected to total $10.3
billion in current prices. Recent stiffening of terms by
international lenders raises some question, though,
about the availability and costs of foreign borrowing.
12. The plan represents a sharp departure from
recent Colombian practice, which has emphasized
maintenance of a current account surplus, large re-
serves, and a low ratio of public debt to GDP. It was
based on assumptions, already revised downward, that
the Colombian economy would grow over the plan
period by an average 5.8 percent per year in real
terms. Any significant failure would be bound to have
profound and disruptive political effects. Further gov-
ernment attempts to ease credit-in the face of very
low demand for investment money at present-are
unlikely to result in increased production levels and
may only raise the inflation rate. Inflationary expecta-
tions are fueled by a recent increase in the money
supply; the already mentioned fiscal deficit, which, of
course, was planned and reached $1 billion in 1981;
the cost of social programs under PIN, with the
expected expansion of them by Betancur, particularly
in the area of housing; no apparent increase in lagging
agricultural production, with resultant higher food
prices; and increasing protectionism for an industrial
sector that seems unwilling to moderate prices or
increase production to meet domestic needs.
13. The key element in Colombia's economic plan-
ning is the development of its energy resources, par-
ticularly coal. Infrastructural work on the massive
Cerrejon coal project has already begun, with coal
shipments scheduled to start in 1986 and to reach a
capacity of 15 million tons per year by 1990. The
project is being carried out by an association of Exxon
Corporation, operating in Colombia as INTERCOR,
and a state-owned Colombian Corporation, CARBO-
COL, as equal partners. INTERCOR will provide half
the development costs, estimated by EXIM Bank at
$3.448 billion, and is responsible for operation of the
mine. CARBOCOL provides the other half of the
startup money. The project includes building (and
equipping) 150 kilometers of standard-gauge railway
and construction of a new major coal-handling port at
Portete on the Guajira Peninsula. Most of the construc-
tion is to be done by the US engineering firm Morri-
son-Knudsen, under contract to INTERCOR. Recently
CARBOCOL has begun to insist, in accordance with
the "buy Colombia" demands of domestic business,
that it have final say on the award of subcontracts in
order to involve more Colombian firms. This may add
to costs.
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14. Because of rapid depreciation, high debt-service
payments, and low early production levels, CARBO-
COL will not receive a profit until 1990 at the earliest.
The US Interagency Coal Export Task Force estimates
that the world market for good-quality steam coal of
the Cerrejon type, all of which is planned for export,
should be able to take the whole production at favor-
able prices. However, signs of softness in coal markets
and recent cutbacks in the more optimistic projections
of demand provide reasons for caution.
15. A related mining venture is the $300 million
Cerromatoso nickel operation, in which the Colom-
bian Government is 45-percent owner with Hanna
Mining Corporation and several other major foreign
partners. Cerromatoso officially went into production
on 20 June 1982, but the depressed state of the world
nickel market makes its profitability dubious.
16. A realistic assessment of Colombia's economic
prospects for the Betancur presidency, then, is that the
5.8-percent growth rate forecast for 1981-85 is unat-
tainable. It is unlikely that 1982 will show much, if
any, improvement over 1981's 2.5-percent rate. Betan-
cur, who espouses Keynesian beliefs, will probably
push ahead with spending plans, emphasizing housing
and employment-generating public construction pro-
grams. In so doing he runs the risk of higher inflation
rates. Given his general economic and political philos-
ophy, Betancur may opt for price controls to limit the
impact on the working classes. This inevitably will
contribute to capital flight and further private-sector
reluctance to invest. Scheduled public sector invest-
ment also calls for increased efficiency in tax collec-
tion, something sure to be resisted by businessmen.
Moreover, significantly lower growth rates will threat-
en the government's ability to collect sufficient reve-
nues to carry out projects without resort to further
borrowing.
17. Any hopes for real improvement over the 1981
economic performance depend less on the Colombian
Government than on the European and North Ameri-
can economies. Even with the recovery foreseen for
these economies by late 1982, or early 1983, Colombia
would be fortunate to sustain a rate of 4 to 4.5 percent
over the remainder of the plan period. Achievement
of this moderate growth, even accompanied by con-
tinuing inflation and a deterioration in the level of
reserves below the planned levels, would probably
contribute to national stability. The mere fact of
recovery from the very low levels prevailing at the
time he took office would be a plus for Betancur and
contribute to confidence in him and in the system.
That, and the hope that major energy investments,
such as Cerrejon, would begin to pay off in the near
future, should contribute to a sense of optimism and
accomplishment. There might have to be renegotiation
of some loans and some readjustment of programs, but
there would be visible accomplishment and a sense of
forward motion on which the administration could
capitalize politically.
18. However, it is reasonable to suggest a less
favorable scenario in which a delayed and weak global
recovery is reflected in Colombian growth rates of no
more than 2 to 2.5 percent. This rate of growth
probably would be insufficient to sustain the ambitious
development program. The economic viability of
major projects would have to be recalculated, and
some undoubtedly would be abandoned or cut back.
19. Under these circumstances, Betancur, with his
eclectic approach to politics and economics, might
well attempt populist experiments such as government
control over private banks or breaking up Colombia's
massive financial-industrial combines, which already
are under attack by both businessmen and politicians
for their alleged stranglehold on the economy. Failure
to do so would expose him to attack from Galan who
has proposed much more direct intervention in the
economy. However, attempts to restructure the exist-
ing economic system radically would be strongly
opposed by most of the elite in both parties. A
politicoeconomic crisis of this type could have serious
consequences, possibly forced resignation of the Presi-
dent, a military coup, an outbreak of large-scale
violence, or combinations of these. Even if the low-
growth scenario did not produce any political crisis, a
continuation through the mid-1980s of low growth and
high unemployment would greatly exacerbate the
underlying strains on Colombian society, enhancing
the potential for future violence and threatening the
US with the problem of instability in the largest of its
Caribbean Basin allies.
Criminality and Narcotics
20. Colombia has long been known for its high level
of crime. With its population of just under 30 million,
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Colombia has about 16,000 homicides annually. More
recently, it has become notorious for its role in the
production and export of illicit drugs. The high rate of
nonpolitical crime and violence, however, was not a
major political issue in the recent elections, hardly
being mentioned in the televised debates of the presi-
dential candidates. Nor did drugs, despite the signifi-
cant impact they have on the national economy and
their role as an issue in relationships between Colom-
bia and the United States, figure openly in the political
contest.
21. Much violent crime has political ramifications.
Insurgent groups traditionally have financed them-
selves through kidnapings for ransom and bank rob-
beries. In recent months, an organization calling itself
Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS-Death to Kidnapers),
ostensibly composed of members of drug-connected
groups (the so-called mafiosos) has resorted to the
assassination of suspected insurgents and their support-
ers in order to discourage kidnaping for ransom of
their own members. The appearance of MAS is a
symptom of the weakness of the Colombian criminal
justice system. Without major reform of law enforce-
ment, especially the courts, there can be little progress
toward crime control. Consequently, political pres-
sures for return to the state of siege and martial law
can be expected.
22. Control of the drug trade is probably the most
contentious issue between the United States and Co-
lombia and has the potential for producing deteriora-
tion in relations. The rapidity with which the drug
industry has sprung up and intruded into almost every
area of national life has severely disconcerted Colom-
bian society. An economy whose fiscal and monetary
policies were designed to limit inflation was over-
whelmed by the influx of hundreds of millions of
dollars. The drug traffic by 1980, when the value
(f.o.b.) of exports was an estimated $2 billion, involved
or in some way affected a large percentage of the
population.
23. National morale has been adversely affected by
drug-related corruption. In 1978 the Army took over
the task of patrolling the major marijuana production
areas from the police, but withdrew in early 1980
when it became clear that the fortunes to be made for
merely looking the other way were affecting its own
personnel. A leading financial association, the National
Association of Industrial Finance (ANIF), has recom-
mended legalization of the marijuana traffic as a
solution that would at least allow the nation to regular-
ize and profit from the situation. Although many
Colombians argue that the drug problem is basically
one of US demand, a 1975 Colombian Government
study found that 43.3 percent of Colombian secondary
school and college students used drugs.
24. During 1980 and 1981 US-Colombian joint drug
enforcement efforts disrupted marijuana exportation.
Allegedly, reduced prices nearly bankrupted some
Colombian operators. At least one of them turned to
transporting arms for insurgents apparently in return
for Cuban assistance in moving drugs to the United
States. However, the drug dealers and the insurgents
are not generally compatible. Insurgent groups con-
tinue to kidnap mafiosos for ransom, and the drug
traffickers have responded in kind by organizing the
MAS and summarily executing suspected insurgents
and their supporters.
25. Cocaine production is increasing. Processing
both of the domestic leaf and coca paste and of
cocaine base imported from Peru, Ecuador, and Bo-
livia goes on throughout the country. About $600
million (f.o.b.) worth of cocaine was exported from
Colombia in 1981 with a street value of as much as $10
billion. Colombian traffickers are involved in US
retailing. Increasingly, synthetic drugs such as
quaalude are illegedly manufactured and exported as
well. In 1981 the retail price of the 7 tons exported was
estimated at about $600 million. Recent official Co-
lombian bank calculations are that for the last year
about $329 million in narcotics profits remained in
Colombia. (Much greater amounts were banked or
invested abroad). By contrast, earnings from coffee
exports reached only $227 million.
26. While Betancur is expected to be more coopera-
tive in narcotics control programs than Lopez would
have been, Colombia will remain a major factor in the
world drug trade, and the drug issue will continue to
complicate relations with the United States. Even if
the marijuana industry on the north coast declines,
Colombia's importance as a cocaine producer and
transshipper is growing rapidly. Since the cocaine
traffic involves movement across several international
borders and operations in very remote areas of Vaupes
and Cauca where Communist Party-linked guerrillas
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of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) have for years exercised effective control, the
ability of the government to attack the situation is
limited. olombian
cocaine production potential has more than doubled
and estimates that by 1985 more than 13 metric tons
of domestically produced cocaine will be exported-as
compared with the 5 metric tons reported for 1980.
This is small relative to the 79 and 73 tons estimated
for Bolivia and Peru, respectively, but the new pro-
duction, added to the increases predicted for Bolivia
and Peru, is expected to flood the world market and
pose a more difficult drug problem for the United
States.
27. Even if Betancur proves cooperative, several
factors militate against dramatic reduction of the drug
traffic. The recessed economy will make it more
difficult to get marijuana growers to turn to other
crops. Indeed, the decline of cotton raising on the
north coast makes more land available for marijuana.
Moreover, with the need for foreign exchange grow-
ing, the temptation to adopt the ANIF proposals, even
if only informally and indirectly, will increase. A
financially hard-pressed administration will be reluc-
tant to commit scarce resources to drug-eradication
programs having the further drawback of potentially
adverse political consequences. Links between some
politicians, local officials, and drug dealers are strong
and make enforcement difficult
28. There is legitimate reason for concern for the
safety of US life and property, especially as increased
numbers of US citizens and firms become involved in
the development of the Cerrejon complex. The Gua-
jira Peninsula is notorious for its lawlessness, and US
concerns can expect to suffer property losses from
criminal activity. In June of this year, for example,
pirates boarded a US ship in Cartagena harbor, injur-
ing crew members and making off with some of the
cargo. Truck hijacking has become extensive in the
Barranquilla area, also on the north coast. There is,
moreover, the danger that drug dealers may recruit US
personnel working on the Cerrejon project.
will be made to ensure the safety of foreign persons
and property involved in the development program in
order not to discourage investment.
The Extreme Left and Insurgency
30. Low-level armed rural activity is endemic in
Colombia. Since the mid-1950s, security forces have
been able to contain it but never to eradicate it
altogether. Occasionally, insurgent groups have carried
out some spectacular action that temporarily embar-
rassed government forces or, when police or Army
attempted to penetrate their remote strongholds, have
been able to bloody the military in small actions. From
time to time, they have attracted international sup-
port. However, their armed strength (a combined total
at the end of 1981 of about 2,000, probably now
reduced somewhat) and organized supporters (about
6,000) have fluctuated in a narrow range over the
years, and they have generally been confined to the
same geographic areas.
31. There are five insurgent groups operating in
Colombia today. These are the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC); the 19th of April Move-
ment (M-19); the National Liberation Army (ELN); the
People's Liberation Army (EPL); and the Armed
Workers Movement (MAO). (See table 2.) There have
been tentative efforts at unification of the armed
groups, but to date these have been generally
unsuccessful.
32. FARC was formed from existing armed groups
professing Communist or radical leftist orientation in
1966 as a result of the mid-1960s ideological contro-
versy about the role of the armed struggle in less
29. It is doubtful that the Betancur administration
will regard crime as a priority issue. However, efforts
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developed countries. The Colombian Communist Party
(PCC), committed to the parliamentary path since its
founding in the 1930s but with a dissident minority
calling for revolution, at its 10th Congress in 1966
declared that in certain areas, those where guerrillas
were already active, armed struggle was valid. The
PCC sought out "Communist" guerrilla leaders and
persuaded them to join in a confederation-FARC-
which, in return for some financial and propaganda
support from the PCC acknowledged its nominal
authority. Some FARC leaders reportedly have re-
ceived training in the USSR, and the PCC provides a
link to the Soviets.
33. FARC is allied with but not closely controlled
by the PCC and, in general, pursues its own interests.
These seem to involve more a policy of maintaining
control over its traditional areas and reacting defen-
sively to security force intrusions into them than to
carrying out the "mobile guerrilla warfare in a wide
area of operations ..." mandated in its 1966 charter.
To date, FARC has avoided attacks on dams, bridges,
electric grids, oil pipelines, highways, railroads, or
other "nerve centers." It confines its efforts to targets
that provide food and medicines, occasionally striking
at small military units, either to get arms or to
discourage security force activity near its refuges.
Bank robberies and kidnapings provide it with funds
and, increasingly, FARC groups appear to be getting
money from cocaine producers in the regions in which
both operate. After its severe electoral losses, the PCC
has purged many nonactivist intellectuals, and it is
possible that this will be reflected in an upsurge in
FARC violence. While there are reports of a buildup
in FARC strength (now estimated at about 1,400), it is
unlikely that the canny FARC leadership will under-
take actions that pose high military risks to the
guerrilla group.
34. The ELN and EPL continue marginal exist-
ences. Together with a small Armed Workers Move-
ment (MAO, known sometimes as ADO)-a group
loosely connected with the radical labor organization
Movement of Left Revolutionary Workers (MOIR)-
they all three probably number fewer than 300 guer-
rillas, operating chiefly in Tolima, Santander, and
Antioquia Departments. MAO's last known leader at
large was captured in May, and the group is consid-
ered nearly dismantled. Both ELN and EPL date from
the 1960s period of romantic revolution. The EPL
espoused a Maoist line and may have had some
Chinese backing at one time. The ELN was founded
by adical student 25X1
leaders at Santander University, with high ideals of
marginal, semibrigand status. Early in 1982, Colombi-
an authorities claimed to have destroyed its last net-
work in Bogota. A preelection appearance by 20
armed ELN members on the National University
campus shows the group is still alive. Of more interest,
though, is the fact that they were ignored by the
students they had hoped to rally.
35. M-19 had its origin in the youth wing of
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's National Popular Alli-
ance (ANAPO), a Conservative Party faction. It is
generally believed that ANAPO-basically a cross-
and-flag socially conservative, economically populist
movement-was cheated of victory in the 1970 na-
tional elections. The political background gave M-19 a
certain legitimacy based on the "stolen election" of
1970, when it was founded by Carlos Toledo Plata, a
congressman from the leftwing ANAPO Socialista
Faction. Toledo, now in prison, was one of three
congressmen on M-19's directorate in the early 1970s.
Under the leadership of Jaime Bateman Cayon, a
lawyer and former officer of the PCC youth organiza-
tion trained both in Cuba and the USSR, M-19 made
idealistic appeals to Colombian youth-social justice,
honest elections, an end to corruption. Unlike the
rural-based ELN, M-19 stayed in the cities. In the
worldwide New Left pattern, it concentrated on spec-
tacular acts to attract the media. In February 1980 it
carried out a sensational occupation of the Dominican
Embassy in Bogota, holding the US Ambassador and
other diplomats as hostages.
36. After some five years of urban activity the
movement had grown to 600 to 800 activists and a
support network of around 2,000. Probably influenced
by the Sandinista success in Nicaragua, M-19 decided
in the spring of 1981 to embark on rural guerrilla
warfare.
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38. More than ever, the PCC and FARC kept their
distance from M-19 and the specter of a united armed
left receded. Through the spring of 1982, more and
more M-19 members surrendered or were killed or
taken prisoner, and large numbers of weapons were
captured.
39. Meanwhile, the Robin Hood image of M-19 was
suffering. The public was revolted by published photo-
graphs of M-19's execution of two Army intelligence
agents. Also damaging were revelations that Bateman
and his childhood friend, narcotics trafficker Jaime
Guillot Lara, had arranged Cuban assistance for Guil-
lot's drug running in return for use of his boats in the
delivery of weapons to the M-19.
40. The M-19 attempt to convert itself from an
urban terrorist movement to a viable insurgent force
has failed, at least for now. Between October 1981 and
April 1982 the Army reported killing or capturing 388
M-19 members.
disrupt the elections, as it had threatened o do, u y
exposed its weakness and enhanced Army prestige. On
7 June, acting quickly before the lifting of the state of
siege ended its jurisdiction, the Army concluded court-
martial proceedings against almost 200 M-19 mem-
bers. Most had already been released, but more than
70 received sentences ranging from 30 years for
Bateman in absentia down to two months. Toledo
Plata and other top leaders were sentenced to 26 years
each.
41. The similar histories of M-19 and ELN demon-
strate the persistent attraction of revolution for Colom-
bia's educated youth. The experience of both groups
seems also to show the government's ability to contain
the threat posed by this appeal. So far, no group has
been able to build a viable support or recruitment base
among the peasants, the urban poor, or the Indian
tribes. Nor have armed groups been able to make
inroads among the unions to any great extent. The
42. The Guillot Lara case, which is not yet fully
resolved, played a part in discrediting M-19, as well as
tarnishing Castro's image in Colombia. There does not
seem to be any permanent alliance between insurgent
groups and the drug traffickers. If anything
there is intense hostility,
at least between an the mafiosos. As the
expansion of coca growing and processing in FARC-
controlled areas continues, however, it is probable that
FARC will become more deeply involved, even if only
as a collector of "protection."
43. In summary, the insurgent threat continues but
does not pose an immediate danger to the govern-
ment's survival. Of the major groups only FARC
remains intact. Its leadership has plans to increase its
membership. M-19 retains an urban network that has
the capability to stage occasional spectacular terrorist
incidents, especially in Bogota.
The Betancur Government's Probable Policies
44. Betancur's independent political status is proba-
bly more advantageous than disadvantageous since he
does not have to repay favors for years of factional
support. However, although more inclined to the
relatively liberal Pastranista wing than the doctrinaire
rightist views of Gomez, Betancur may owe Gomez
some political payment in return for the latter's
bowing out of contention in order to give him the
nomination on the first ballot at the Conservative
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Party nominating convention last fall. As he forms his
cabinet Betancur will also have to consider the Liber-
als, who, under the Colombian system, have a right to
a proportional share of offices. It is likely that he will
favor the followers of Galan rather than Lopez in
making such appointments. It is almost certain that the
current Army Chief of Staff, Fernando Landazabal
Reyes, will assume the post of minister of defense,
suggesting that, despite the lifting of the state of siege,
current security policies will tontine.
45. In the short term, Betancur's political strengths
are great. He can claim an electoral mandate. While
leaders of both wings of the Conservative Party have
reservations about his policies, after long years in the
political wilderness they have to be seen, at least for a
decent interval, as supporting their president. Galan
will support the thrust of Betancur's domestic poli-
cies-indeed, will want to push ahead even further.
The sudden and rather unexpected lifting of the state
of siege and conclusion of the M-19 military trials
effectively has removed the controversial amnesty
question from political contention.
46. In the longer run, Betancur has the vast powers
of his office, his reputation for integrity, and a known
willingness to undertake pragmatic and creative ap-
proaches to problems. Also important is that Betan-
cur's programs, emphases aside, are to a large extent
continuations, as they would be expected to be under
the Colombian bipartisan system, of those initiated by
the Turbay government. Mechanisms are already in
place to carry out the PIN. There is no sense of a
wrenching and divisive change.
anticipated resistance to the improved tax collection
system vital to the PIN will demand the use of all
Betancur's vaunted persuasive and conciliatory skills.
48. The high exposure of foreign, including US,
firms in major development projects is a latent issue.
Betancur has strong nationalistic instincts and can be
expected to respond favorably to domestic business
demands for a greater share of the contracts surround-
ing these projects. Galan forthrightly denounced the
major contracts involving US firms during his cam-
paign and, should their pace or profitability falter,
could be expected to renew his attack. Since the
contracts originally were negotiated by Lopez, Betan-
cur has no political reason to defend them.
49. The next four years will be ones of economic
uncertainty, with both threats and opportunities.
Betancur's administration, more so than for any that
have preceded it, will test whether Colombia can
make the difficult transition from less developed status
to that of newly industrialized country.
Narcotics and Corruption
50. The drug problem will grow and become more
complex as Colombia moves into the front ranks of
cocaine producers. Betancur is committed to an anti-
narcotics policy and will cooperate with the United
States in interdiction and eradication efforts. He might
consider an airborne-spraying program, if not on the
politically sensitive north coast marijuana fields at
least on the jungle coca clearings. His administration
also has an opportunity to replace known corrupt local
officials.
Economic Approaches
47. Revitalizing the economy in the context of
lagging world recovery poses the greatest immediate
challenges. Betancur is committed to expansionist full-
employment policies, and Colombia, under the PIN,
has already accepted a deficit-financed development
program. Betancur is faced not so much with a
problem of analysis and planning as one of execution.
In the short term, his government can both draw down
foreign currency reserves and use the good credit those
reserves give the nation to attract foreign capital.
However, these are assets that can waste rapidly. The
evident lack of Colombian business confidence, the
protectionist instincts of Colombian industry, and the
51. However, the nationalistic Betancur will not
allow himself to appear to be pushed by the United
States in this endeavor. Moreover, he will not allow an
antidrug campaign to divert resources from economic
priorities. Despite his personal dislike for the drug
traffic, should the economic slump continue or deepen
there is the possibility that the contributions narcotics
earnings make to the Colombian economy would be
given some consideration.
52. A second major area of corruption besides that
connected with narcotics involves widespread tax eva-
sion, particularly among the Colombian wealthy. Im-
provement of the tax collection system is vital to the
PIN. However, since the initiation of a reformed and
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perhaps too harsh tax system in 1974, Colombian
businessmen have been flagrant in their refusal to pay,
with the result that the proportion of GDP collected in
taxes has dropped despite the intent of the reforms.
Here again, Betancur will have to move carefully since
his own party will probably provide the most deter-
mined opposition.
Internal Security
53. The insurgency situation presents less of a real or
perceived problem for the new President than observers
a year or so ago would have predicted. The M-19, while
still capable of spectacular terrorist acts, has been
militarily battered and has lost political credit. FARC
remains in its strongholds, but the PCC's electoral fiasco
and the ideological disarray into which it has fallen as a
result argue against stepped-up armed action now. An
active government drug-eradication program will in-
crease chances of clashes and may provide the govern-
ment with a rationale for a determined anti-FARC
effort. While FARC does not represent a serious threat
at this time, it is possible that the Army, its confidence
higher after its successful M-19 campaign, may under-
take a major operation against FARC.
54. Other insurgent groups are of little current
significance. However, Communist influence is grow-
ing in the labor unions and as the exposure of US firms
in the traditionally violent Guajira increases, the po-
tential of possible union links with armed movements
should be kept in mind. In any event, the possibility of
violent labor confrontations in the politically sensitive
Cerrejon region exists. It is in this area that the greatest
immediate danger to US interests from actual or
potential insurgency lies.
55. Overall, the domestic insurgent threat will
probably remain low unless there are some Commu-
nist insurgent successes in Central America to encour-
age the domestic left and an increase in their external
support. There is a general belief among many Colom-
bian leaders that the battle for Colombian security will
be won or lost in El Salvador. A corollary to this belief
is that support for counterinsurgent forces in Central
America is Colombia's best defense.
Foreign Policy and Implications for the
United States
56. In recent years, Colombia's foreign policy has
shifted from its traditional Andean orientation toward
the Caribbean and Central America. This is now seen
as the region from which the greatest threat arises, in
the form of Cuban and Nicaraguan subversion and
expansionism. It is also seen, however, as the region in
which there are great opportunities for Colombia to
expand its trade and influence, and through which
Colombia's growing commerce with Europe and the
United States passes. Increasingly, Colombia seeks to
identify itself as a Caribbean power. Such a perception
complements US policy goals in the area.
57. Colombia's regional rival for influence is Vene-
zuela. One outstanding issue between the two is an
unresolved boundary dispute in the Gulf of Venezuela
which will probably lie dormant until inauguration of
a new Venezuelan administration in 1984. Another is
the illegal presence of 2 million or more Colombian
workers in Venezuela. The latter situation has served
Colombia as a useful safety valve for worker and
peasant discontent and provided Venezuela with de-
sired cheap labor during its oil boom. The economic
slump in Venezuela will produce increasing pressure
on these migrants to leave, creating problems of
absorption of the returnees into the Colombian job
market and probably exacerbating the persistent issue
of violation of the human rights of Colombian aliens
by Venezuelan officials.
58. The two countries have differing perceptions of
Colombia's role in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)
and have taken vastly different approaches to the
Falkland Islands problem in the OAS and other inter-
national forums. Relations could cool further if Vene-
zuela's territorial claims on Guyana should produce a
crisis, since it is probable that Colombia would oppose
the Venezuelan position. Prospects are that Betancur
will have some difficult relations with Venezuela
despite his close friendship with Venezuela's President
Luis Herrera Campins and their common desire to
negotiate a solution to the boundary dispute. It is
unlikely, though, that any crisis between the two
nations will arise. Publicly, Betancur has declared he
will follow "a cordial but firm policy" toward
Venezuela.
59. Betancur has already pledged not to restore full
relations with Cuba, and Colombia under his adminis-
tration will continue to support efforts to reduce
Cuban influence in the region. Betancur, however, is
unlikely to be as enthusiastic in such measures as
President Turbay, who has a strong personal antipathy
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toward Fidel Castro. Betancur is more likely to try to
work with other Latin American countries in develop-
ing security policies in the region and to reject ap-
proaches he would regard as smacking of US
intervention.
60. The Betancur administration will maintain
normal relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviets
have close ties with the PCC, but the extent of their
dealings with FARC is not clear. We know that some
FARC leaders have received training in the USSR, and
Moscow has contact with FARC through the PCC. The
Soviets also lend support to Communist-oriented
unions. Despite this there has been little friction
between Bogota and Moscow. The Soviets are negotiat-
ing for a major hydroelectric construction contract in
Cordoba Department. They may also attempt to sell
military supplies to Colombia but are unlikely to be
successful.
61. Relations with Nicaragua are unlikely to im-
prove so long as that country is seen to be acting as a
Cuban surrogate. The outstanding issue between the
two nations is the Nicaraguan claim to San Andres and
Providencia Islands and the Quita Sueno keys. The
Colombian military has used the Nicaraguan threat to
justify a buildup of their Caribbean sea and air forces.
They are also willing to negotiate airbase privileges for
the United States on San Andres with the same
justification. Although Betancur's position on base
rights is not known, the military will probably be able
to complete the arrangement with the United States if
they insist.
62. The Nicaraguan situation, particularly since the
emergence of Eden Pastora as a Sandinista leader in
exile, is increasingly volatile. Betancur is a friend of
Spanish Socialist leader Felipe Gonzales, who is known
to favor Pastora, and it is possible that should Pastora
develop a credible opposition movement he would get
some degree of support from Betancur.
63. Under Turbay, Colombia has been friendly to
foreign trade and investment. Betancur is likely to be
somewhat less so, responding both to his own national-
ism and the protectionist sentiments of Colombian
business. Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that he will
retreat to the economic regionalism and protectionism
of the Andean Pact.
64. Betancur's administration will probably con-
tinue Colombia's friendly attitude toward the concept
of the Central American Democratic Community and
other efforts to support democracy in the region. He
has suggested a regional University of the Caribbean to
be located at Cartagena.
65. On the major issue of opposition to Cuba in the
Caribbean, the Betancur administration will be sup-
portive of the United States. It is also likely to be
cooperative on drug matters. Economic relations, in-
cluding access of US business to the Colombian mar-
ket, will continue to be generally good.
66. However, Betancur will not want to appear too
responsive to US leadership. He will insist on more
consultation and would reject specific initiatives that
could be interpreted as Colombian support for US
intervention. He will very likely continue to empha-
size Colombian involvement in the CBI, but will
probably try to have CBI seen more as a regional
effort with US and other outside support rather than as
a US initiative and aid program. Colombia will be
motivated as well by a desire to offset the influence of
both Venezuela and Mexico. CBI or no CBI, Colombia
under Betancur will stress development of its trade
relations with the Caribbean and Central America. It
will also probably be active in the United Nations,
occasionally in opposition to the United States. For
example, Betancur attaches great importance to the
law of the sea and will work against US policy on that
subject.
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ANNEX '
Social, Economic, and Political Trends
1. The turning point of modern Colombian history
was la violencia, the civil warfare that was waged
between the Liberal and Conservative parties for a
decade after World War II and which claimed
200,000 or more lives. Political breakdown led to a
military coup in 1953 headed by General Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla. Initially welcomed in the hope they
would end the carnage, Rojas and the Army were
discredited as their regime became inept and dicta-
torial. In 1958, Rojas was ousted by moderate officers
who returned government to the old political leaders
after they had resolved their enmities in a compromise
that established the National Front. A constitutional
change required that until 1974 the Conservatives and
Liberals would alternate in the presidency every four
years and divide other major government offices
equally. Since 1974, under Article 120 of the constitu-
tion, the presidency is contested, but cabinet and other
major offices are shared in proportion to the number
of seats won by each party in the two-house national
legislature. Only in 1970 when General Rojas tried a
comeback with his Peronist-style National Popular
Alliance (ANAPO) has the Colombian experiment in
consensus politics been seriously threatened.
2. The generation of the National Front and its
Article 120 aftermath has been one of almost uninter-
rupted economic growth for Colombia. A series of
coffee booms and the development of expanded mar-
kets in Europe have kept Colombia's traditional staple
industry generally healthy. Nontraditional agricultural
exports developed, particularly cut flowers, bananas,
and sugar. Manufacturing, artificially stimulated to
some extent by import substitution policies and adher-
ence to the protectionism of the Andean Pact, grew
rapidly until the mid-1970s. Burgeoning urban growth
helped the construction industry and provided jobs for
unskilled labor migrating from the rural areas. Begin-
ning in the 1970s, Colombia's economy received fur-
ther stimulus from increases in the illicit production
and export of narcotics, particularly marijuana, but
increasingly involving cocaine and synthetic drugs as
well.
3. During the 1960s Colombia's average annual
GDP growth of 5.2 percent was slightly below the
Middle Income Developing Country (MIDC) 2 norm of
6.1. From 1970 to 1979, Colombia's annual average
GDP increase improved to 6.0 percent, as compared
with the 7.1 percent registered by the group. In the
meantime, the population growth rate declined from
more than 3 percent in the mid-1960s to just under 2
percent.
4. While aggregate growth performance and em-
ployment generation through 1979 were generally
successful, income distribution continued to be among
the most skewed in Latin America, with the lowest
quintile receiving only 3.5 of national income in 1970,
as compared with 2.1 percent in 1960. Inflation, which
reached rates of about 25 percent during the 1970s
and has remained at about that level, and the very
rapid increase in additions to the urban labor force are
the two chief culprits. Real wages for urban workers
fell from 1970 to 1975. Most of the absolute loss was
made up during the next five years, but the relative
differential continued with the result that much of the
population has had a disproportionately small share in
the economic growth of the past decade.
5. Economic growth rates began to decline in 1979,
when they dipped to 5.1 percent. The 1980 rate was 4
percent while that of 1981 sagged to 2.5 percent, the
lowest since 1958. Manufacturing, agriculture, and
construction were the hardest hit sectors. In the face of
this record, official unemployment figures (kept only
for the seven largest cities and counting all jobseekers
over 10 years of age) showing a decline from 10.8
percent in 1976 to 8.5 percent in 1981 are probably
low. In any case, the rate is distorted by including as
employed the armies of street vendors whose situation
in many instances is not far removed from begging.
According to the Colombian Government, 61 percent
' Defined by the World Bank as countries with per capita incomes
between $551 and $1,135.
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of urban workers earn less than the official minimum
wage of approximately $120 per month.
6. The decline in the population growth rate allows
hope for some relaxation in the pressures of urbaniza-
tion. However, shortages of housing, schools, water
and sewage systems, and other basic human services
are very great. Colombia has yet to adjust to its rapid
change from a predominantly rural country to one in
which most of the population lives in major urban
centers.
7. Despite shortcomings, quality-of-life indexes
have shown marked improvement. Life expectancy in
1950 was 48 years; today it is 63 years. Over the same
period infant mortality declined from 124 to 65 per
1,000, and, by the late 1970s, 91 percent of urban
children aged 7 to 14 were enrolled in school. Accord-
ing to a recent World Bank study, increased govern-
ment expenditures on electricity, public water
supplies, education, and health care have more than
offset the decline in real wages for most of the urban
poor. Rural populations, however, have not benefited
to the same extent.
Major Political Institutions and Groups
8. The Colombian political system is built around a
combination of traditional, well-organized Conserva-
tive and Liberal political parties. These are usually
divided into personalistic factions, but remain essen-
tially unified, both within themselves and in relation
to each other, in program and ideology. The parties
are supported by, and to some extent must acknowl-
edge limitations imposed by, a professional military
force at once integrated with but self-consciously apart
from the government it serves. The parties have strong
links with a loosely coordinated but ideologically
united business community, well able through a multi-
tude of organizations to articulate its interests and to
ensure that these interests are protected. Organized
labor, peasant groups, students, urban organizations,
and the Catholic Church are all linked with the parties
but are less directly influential than either the military
or business.
9. Close cooperation between the two parties since
creation of the National Front and the proportional
sharing of cabinet posts has meant there has been no
true opposition to the administration in any parlia-
mentary sense. This, combined with the relative weak-
ness of the legislature, leaves government increasingly
to be conducted by the executive in partnership with a
technocratic bureaucracy. Since the bureaucracy is
linked informally but closely with major private or-
ganizations, particularly the business federations
(gremios) and the military, chances that major alterna-
tive policies or initiatives will be adopted or even
debated meaningfully in public, are few. The various
minor parties, including the Communist Party, have
little chance of gaining influence through coalition
with either of the major parties.
10. Factional struggles within the parties, although
often fierce-as between the followers of Alfonso
Lopez Michelsen (Lopistas) and Carlos Lleras Restrepo
(Lleristas) among the Liberals and between Alvaro
Gomez Hurtado (Gomecistas) and Misael Pastrana
Borrano (Pastranistas) among the Conservatives-are
more personal than doctrinal in nature. While the
differences may be politically significant, they tend to
be within the bounds of a rather narrow range of
reformist or conservative tendencies. To the extent
that the system has eliminated traditional partisan
conflict it represents a force for stability. However, it
incorporates also a tendency toward immobility. To
their credit, Colombia's leaders during the 1960s and
1970s have shown ability to transcend the theoretical
limitations of the system and displayed considerable
flexibility, especially in the face of changing economic
conditions.
11. The recent election supports a conclusion that
the traditional parties will continue to withstand politi-
cal or insurgent challenges. A military coup represents
the only credible threat but the possibility of one
occurring at this time appears remote. While political
control seems sure, the success of the system leadership
in grappling with problems of economic development
and social welfare during the 1980s is less certain.
Nevertheless, a combination of superior co-optative
and repressive powers, even in the event of social or
economic difficulties, should enable the current elite
to prevent discontented groups from coalescing into a
movement sufficient either to replace them or cause
them to move drastically leftward.
12. Almost all the organized political opposition to
the two major parties is on the left. The Colombian
Communist Party under the leadership of the aging
Gilberto Vieira White follows a rigid pro-Soviet line.
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In the aftermath of its recent electoral disaster, the
party has purged dissident intellectuals who have
argued for a more independent line. Despite its avow-
al of a nonviolent policy, the PCC maintains links with
the insurgent Armed Forces of the Colombian Revolu-
tion (FARC).
13. The small Left Revolutionary Workers Move-
ment (MOIR) was founded as a pro-Chinese party in
1968. Other leftist groups include FIRMES, an
ANAPO faction, and the Liberal Independent Move-
ment. On the center and right, a tiny Social Christian
Democratic Party exists. It supported Betancur in the
recent election. Rojas Pinilla's daughter, Maria Euge-
nia, is nominal leader of the nearly defunct ANAPO
movement, which can be viewed as a Conservative
Party faction of a sort. She, too, supported Betancur.
The Army
14. Allegedly chastened by memories of inept mili-
tary government from 1953 to 1958, and in the
absence of any political or social crisis that would
justify such a move, senior officers of the 50,000-man
Army are not seen likely to try to take power. In any
event, military influence over internal security affairs
and the security-related aspects of foreign relations is
and probably will continue to be strong enough to
preclude any need for the generals to seek a more
active governmental role. Until 20 June, Colombia was
technically under a constitutional state of siege (last
proclaimed by former President Alfonso Lopez
Michelsen in 1975 as a strike-control measure) which
gave the armed forces virtually carte blanche in
dealing with imminent or actual civil disturbance for
25 of the past 30 years. Under the Security Statute of
1978, all persons charged with terrorism or insurgency
are under jurisdiction of military courts. Depart-
ments-such as Caqueta-in which insurgent groups
operate in any significant strength are under martial
law, which allows the Army to control the movement
of people and goods and to bar journalists and other
outside observers. The end of the state of siege repre-
sents a significant change, but it is probable the
military did not agree to it without securing guaran-
tees satisfactory to it.
are under the jurisdiction of the ministry of Defense.
The Army is an essential part of the civil-governing
system and plays an important role in determining and
administering those government policies of interest to
it. At the same time, it maintains the fiction that it is
outside and above politics. It thus enjoys great author-
ity without having to accept commensurate responsi-
bility. Ranking officers do not scruple to criticize
governmental shortcomings publicly. Individual offi-
cers in recent years have had to accept presidential
demands for resignation when their criticism was
deemed excessive, but such acknowledgment of civil
control does not obscure the fact of integral military
power within the government.
16. Army links with the private business sector are
strong and well tended. Each year, selected represen-
tatives from the major business associations attend a
six-month course at the military academy with the
group of colonels selected for promotion to general. In
turn, the colonels are guests at orientation visits to the
headquarters of the business associations. A semioffi-
cial series of dinners and other social events allows for
frequent business-military exchange of views. Another
important institution for the solidification of Army-
business ties is the special reserve battalion in which
carefully selected businessmen are commissioned.
17. The Colombian business sector shows some of
the same characteristics as the political system. The
National Association of Industry (ANDI) represents
much of the private sector, but a host of organizations
with both local and national branches speaks for
individual agricultural, commercial, and industrial
groups. They are bipartisan in both membership and
activity. There is usually a balance of Conservatives
and Liberals on boards of directors, and the associa-
tions do not endorse any one candidate or platform
during elections. Rather, they use their political ties to
make sure that the programs of both parties are
acceptable. The economic platforms of all three lead-
ing candidates in this year's presidential election (al-
though criticized by business leaders for not treating
with sufficient seriousness the recessed state of busi-
ness and what they saw as its causes) were uniformly
probusiness and protectionist.
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18. The producer associations are also represented
on many governmental boards and committees, both
nationally and at lower levels. Government and the
private sector interact directly. As a result of their
formal and informal integration into government, the
associations have a near veto over programs affecting
them. The continuing recession has put unusual strains
on business-government relations, however. A recent
analysis published by leading business groups attacked
the growth of the public sector and deficit spending,
called for more protection for Colombian industry and
establishment of a "buy Colombian" policy on public
works projects. It is probable that there will be
movement in those directions. Continuing high inter-
est rates have lately focused attention on the financial
sector and sparked demands for major banking
reforms.
19. Although a Liberal administration first legalized
unions in the 1930s and the Liberal Party has a
tradition of being more prolabor than the Conserva-
tives, the heads of all three major non-Communist
unions in Colombia are, paradoxically, Conservative
Party activists. The executive boards of the democratic
confederations are mixed Conservative and Liberal,
but, unlike the business associations, labor unions in
Colombia have little influence on party politics; rather
it is the reverse.
20. Traditionally, Colombia's approximately 1.5
million organized workers (about 25 percent of the
labor force) have followed the leadership of one of the
two unions-the Colombian Workers Confederation
(CTC) and the Union of Colombian Workers (UTC)-
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free
Trade Union (ICFTU). However, in recent years, as
real wages have fallen, workers in growing numbers
have defected to the Communist-led Syndical Confed-
eration of Colombian Workers (CSTC), which now
represents about 15 percent of union workers, while
the CTC and UTC have declined. (See table 3.) Early
in 1982 the UTC and CTC unions in Santander
Department defied their national leadership to merge
in a CSTC-dominated regional confederation. In May
1982, CTC President Manuel Felipe Hurtado, al-
though a Conservative Party congressional candidate
this year, announced his intention to merge his union
with the CSTC.
Membership in Colombian Labor Unions,
September 1981 a
UTC ....................................................................................... 450,156
CTC ....................................................................................... 211,625
CSTC ..................................................................................... 153,864 b
CGT ....................................................................................... 102,676
Independents ......................................................................... 302,850 c
a Source: Colombian Ministry of Labor.
b CSTC membership probably is understated in this Colombian
figure. Most observers rank it ahead of the CTC.
c Unofficial estimates put independent membership at more than
500,000.
21. The General Confederation of Labor (CGT),
also showing strong growth, is a Christian Socialist
union affiliated with the World Confederation of
Labor (WCL) and its Congress of Latin American
Workers (CLAT). CGT had its greatest gain in late
1980 when the powerful Union of Cundinamarta
Workers (UTRACUN) broke with the UTC and
merged with it. There are about a half million workers
in independent unions or labor organizations, some of
them more to the left than CSTC, such as the Maoist
MOIR. The Federation of Colombian Educators
(FECODE) is strongly Marxist.
22. In industry, utilities, transportation, communi-
cations, finance, and government, about half the work
force is organized. The right to strike is severely
restricted, except in industry, but illegal strikes are
common. Most disputes are settled through arbitration
and conciliation. Representatives of CTC, UTC, and
CGT serve on the National Salary Council that arbi-
trates the official minimum wage.
23. The growth of the CSTC, especially if its recent,
planned merger with the CTC comes about, has led to
fears that organized labor will become a more disrup-
tive force in Colombia. These fears will become more
real if, as expected, the CSTC organizes the workers at
the Cerrejon coal complex. Despite this, organized
labor is weak. Divided within itself, it is faced by a
powerful and basically hostile security structure. The
end of the state of siege obviously will give the unions
more freedom of action, but, despite the growing
power of the Communists within the labor movement,
Colombian union activity will continue to be easily
controlled by the government.
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Other Groups
29. Peasant-campesino-organizations play only a
small role in Colombia. In response to the rapid
expansion of commercial farming, concentration of 25X1
landholding, and essential abandonment by the gov-
ernment of the rather mild distributionist land-reform
programs of the 1960s, a peasant organization, the 25X1
National Association of Landless Campesinos (ANUC),
was organized in 1968. It quickly developed a radical,
direct-action branch, the Linea Sincelejo, which orga-
nized rural strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and the
like to press for a return to land redistribution.
30. Despite Colombia's history of rural violence and
the attempts of guerrilla groups to exploit the move-
ment, ANUC and the Linea Sincelejo have all but
disappeared. The expanding middle class of commer-
cial farmers is strongly opposed to the campesino
movement and well organized. The important agro-
business groups (FEDERCAFE, the coffeegrowers
association; SAC, the Farmers Association; and
FEDEGAN, the Cattlemen's Federation) are major
contributors to both the Conservatives and Liberals.
Governmerr co-optation of peasant leaders, extraoffi-
cial repression that has resulted in the assassination of
about 100 peasant and Indian leaders over the past
five years, and the jailing of many ANUC officials
under the Security Statute have nearly eliminated the
peasant movement.
31. Activism on the part of peasants also has been
diluted by the heavy urban migration of many of the
more ambitious ones, as well as the alternative oppor-
tunities for farm labor in Venezuela, where 2 million
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or more Colombians are thought to be working at any
one time. It should be noted, though, that the absolute
number of campesinos has increased even while the
relative numbers of the rural population have declined
in the population. Their poverty and lack of access to
education and health care would appear to make them
a source of potential recruits for insurgent movements.
However, the various leftist attempts to build a peas-
ant base have failed over the years. FARC, it is true,
does control a rural population in its traditional bases,
but it is small.
32. Universities and secondary schools are tradi-
tional centers of radical activity in Colombia. Teacher
unions (FECODE) are Marxist controlled, and both
civil and military authorities have continually ex-
pressed alarm at the heavy Marxist content of teaching
at all levels of the educational system-even, to a
surprising extent, in Church-run institutions. However,
tight control has been maintained over the universities.
Indeed, the frequency with which national universities
have been closed for political/security reasons has led
to a situation in which it takes an average of eight
years to complete an undergraduate degree.
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Colombia: Indicators of Progress and Problems
Indicators of Economic Progress
Total gross domestic product, 1980: $34 billion
GDP per capita, 1980: $1,254
Annual GDP growth: 5.2% in 1960-70 (average)
5.8% in 1970-76 (average)
9.0% in 1978
5.1% in 1979
4.0% in 1980
2.5% in 1981
3.0% in 1982 (estimated)
Debt relative to gross national product: 21.4% in 1973
15.9% in 1977
13.5% in 1980
Indicators of Social Progress
Life expectancy: 56 in 1960
59 in 1975
63 in 1981
Secondary-school enrollment (in percent of population of secondary-school age): 12% in 1960
23% in 1975
43% in 1978
College enrollment (in percent of population
of college age): 2% in 1960
10% in 1977
Workers covered by social insurance: 700,000 in 1968
1,200,000 in 1973
Indicators of Economic Problems
Foreign public and private debt: $2.1 billion in 1973
$2.9 billion in 1976
$3.6 billion in 1979
$4.3 billion in 1980
$4.9 billion in 1981
$7.0 billion in 1982 (estimated)
Inflation rate: 11.2% in 1960-70 (annual average)
18.2% in 1970-76 (annual average)
33% in 1977
18% in 1978
26% in 1981
25-30% in 1982 (estimated)
Indicators of Social Problems
Population: 16 million in 1960
27 million in 1980
30 million in 1985 (estimated)
40 million in 2000 (estimated)
Urbanization rate (percent of total population): 48% in 1960
65% in 1975
70% in 1980
Income distribution (1974): 54% earned by top population quintile
5% earned by bottom population quintile
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Figure 1
Real GDP Growth
Percent
Consumer Price Inflation
Percent
Current Account Balance Excluding
Official Transfers
Percent
u
Debt Service Ratio
Percent
Note: Data for 1982 are estimated. Data for GDP growth take into account
the flurry of election-year public spending.
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Figure 2
Legend Adult Literacy
Percent of adult population
U 1960
1970
1980
252
0 346
Primary-School Enrollment
Percent of population of primary-school age
41.7
146.0
a Reflects enrollment in adult education and other programs of persons over
primary-school age.
Urbanization Rate
Percent of population living in urban areas
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