THE USSR AND THE FALL OF MARXIST ELEMENTS IN GRENADA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001502590085-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 85
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #7055-83
27 October 198:3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Stanley M. Moskowitz
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT: The USSR and the Fall of Marxist Elements in Grenada
1. The fall of the leftist/Marxist regime in Grenada is an important
blow to Soviet interests in Central America and the Caribbean. The "loss"
of Grenada is particularly troublesome to the USSR because:
It checks the Soviet/Cuban attempt to increase their power in the
region. It also exposes the fact that despite the great gains in
power projection capability over the past decade, the USSR still
cannot come close to matching US power in the Western hemisphere.
(The reverse is not true for the Eastern hemisphere).
It may result in recriminations with Cuba over the handling of the
Bishop government and the events of the past two weeks.
It interrupts a string of Soviet/Cuban "successes" stretching from
Angola to Ethiopia to Nicaragua, and Grenada. The expulsion of
Cubans from Suriname underlines the potential fall-out from the
events in Grenada.
It comes at a time when the Soviets seem headed for a major
reversal in Western Europe on the INF issue, and when the Soviet
clients are under considerable pressure in Angola, Mozambique, and
Nicaragua.
It suggests that the Reagan Administration has the political power
and the will to successfully pursue US interests -- even on the
heels of a bloody setback in another part of the world.
The US was able to work in concert with regional states, which will
somewhat offset the USSR's coming "gunboat diplomacy" propaganda
offensive.
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A Watershed in the. Third World?
2. The Politburo members who make Soviet foreign policy -- Andropov,
Gromyko, and Ustinov -- have experienced serious setbacks before; they will
riot be predisposed to change Soviet strategy in the Caribbean or the Third
World. Indeed, the Soviets are likely to see the events in Grenada as
additional evidence of the wisdom of their post-Chile emphasis on the
internal consolidation of power by local Marxists. For the Soviets, the
problem of Grenada was that they and the Cubans did not have sufficient
control over the principal wielders of power on the island; these things
happen in the Third World. Moreover,
o Grenada's intrinsic military importance to the USSR or to Cuba is
limited.
o The USSR had not committed itself to the defense of Grenada, nor
had it proclaimed the island a Marxist state whose socialist
character has become irreversible.
o_ Widespread criticism of the US action in the West, including from
some of our allies, mitigates the Soviet loss.
Cuba and Nicaragua
3. While a strategic reappraisal seems unlikely, events in Grenada
will almost certainly cause the Soviets to make tactical adjustments
elsewhere in the Caribbean and the Third World. Moscow will be concerned
that the US will be encouraged by the success in Grenada to increase the
pressure on other states friendly to the USSR in Latin America. Also, it
will want to send a message that the USSR is prepared to thwart any such
effort. Since the USSR's most important client is Cuba, a tangible way of
doing this is to acccelerate help being provided to Castro to strengthen his
defenses on Cuba; the early introduction of SA-5s and other sophisticated
air defense systems into Cuba is a possible response to the Grenada
development. The Soviets might also augment their military combat presence
in Cuba for deterrent purposes.
4. Nicaragua will be trickier. Events in Grenada will underline to
the Soviets the value of keeping a certain distance from unstable situations
in the US' backyard. They will also draw the lesson that it is sometimes
better to exercise restraint in the short-term for future gain -- i.e.,
Nicaragua and Cuba should concentrate on consolidating and defending the
revolution in Nicaragua and let El Salvador and the other Central American
countries ply the slow track to socialism.
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5. Urging restraint beyond Nicaragua's border is not inconsistent with
doing more to help the Sandinistas. The Soviets and the Cubans had been
under intense pressure from Ortega for more assistance, before Grenada. The
Soviets are now likely to find this pressure irresistible and it seems
likely that Moscow will want to strengthen Nicaragua's defensive
capabilities with additional hardware, and better air defense systems. The
Soviets -- brandishing the rationale that the US intervention in Grenada has
created a threat which they and Nicaragua have been compelled to respond to
-- may well introduce additional numbers of their own military advisors, and
technicians into Nicaragua.
6. The odds of the Soviets bowing to Sandinista pressure for high
performance jet aircraft, has increased because, as indicated,, the Soviets
will want to aemonstrate tangible support for progressive nations, and
because they now have a better rationale. Given the history of US
representations on this question, however, it is still unlikely the Soviets
will do so.
Other Beleagured Clients
7. The logic of events will most likely push the Soviets into a
greater effort to maintain their clients and surrogates which will increase
the cost of new setbacks. Similarly, the Soviets will also want to have
greater control over local events, which will increase the risk of mischance
and doing more harm than good. (Indeed, there is a report that the Soviets
were involved in the move to oust Bishop, presumably because of his
inconstancy. If true, then Grenada is evidence of the great risk of playing
Kingmaker when you have incomplete control over the situation and little
power to bring to bear in event of mischance. But as we take Soviet
ruthlessness for granted, so too must we take into account their capacity
for overestimating their ability to control events. Also, if the Soviets
acted, as this report implies, without closely coordinating with the Cubans,
then there is likely to be some fallout in Soviet/Cuban relations, in due
course).
8. The Grenada episode will increase Moscow's sensitivity to the
troubles of its African clients -- Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. The
Soviets have already in recent months increased the quality of its military
assistance to Angola and Mozambique. They will be even more convinced than
before to keep the Dos Santos and Machel regimes afloat and we can
anticipate greater assistance if its needed. (This will put a greater
premium on Cuban assistance, and on keeping the Castro connection strong,
which will, incidentally, make it more difficult for the Soviets to cut back
their subsidy to Cuba.) The Soviets will also be more suspicious of Dos
Santos -- whom they do not trust totally -- and increasingly sensitive to
any Angolan overtures to the West.
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The Middle East and Afghanistan
10. The Grenada set-back is not likely to affect, except in the most
marginal of ways, the Soviet approach to the Middle East or Afghanistan.
Moscow will have somewhat more reason to see US interests thwarted in the
Middle East, but this has been the root of their policy for many years
anyway. While Grenada is a reminder of the vagaries of Third World
politics, the Soviets have long since learned this about Afghanistan and
their commitment there is far too deep (and costly) to be significantly
affected by a tiny island in the eastern Caribbean.
Relations with the United States
11. For the Soviets, the linchpin of their foreign policy is the
relationship with the United States. As they demonstrated in 1972, when
they went ahead with the Summit with President Nixon after the bombing of
Haiphong, their long-term objectives vis-a-vis the US takes presedence over
their interests in the Third World. The Soviets have long expected the US
to accept their view that competition between the two superpowers in the
Third World is immutable and should not be allowed to interfere with the
bilateral relationship. This was easy enough for the Soviets when they were
making the inroads (Angola, Somalia, Ethiopia, etc), but when it's their
interests and gains that are being eroded?
11. It is unlikely that the loss of Grenada will have a significant
impact on Soviet tactics vis-a-vis the US. As the premier realpoliticians
in the world, the Kremlin leaders will be impressed by the Administration's
display of will and power. It will reinforce their appreciation that the
US, and in particular this Administration, is set on a course of challenging
Soviet efforts to change the correlation of forces. Hence, it will bias
Moscow, as did the US reaction to the KAL shootdown, in the direction of
being nastier and even less accommodating to the US, lest it appear that the
President's policies are working. They will be even more inclined than
before to avoid agreements or accommodations before the Presidential
election.
12. Moscow will have an increased interest in creating problems for the
US, but at the same time, a greater concern over US countermeasures. It may
strengthen Soviet resolve to support subversive elements in the Third World
and encourage more mischief-making on their part, even if it proves
counter-productive. The invasion of Grenada will probably make the Soviets
more cautious about making "analagous responses" to the INF deployment that
involve Cuba or Nicaragua.
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Internal Implications
13. Foreign policy reversals do not usually reverberate politically in
the Kremlin. Grenada, however, comes on the heels of the KAL fiasco and the
profound set-back on INF (although that game will continue into 1984). In
view of Andropov's prolonged absence and physical infirmity, and the unusual
semi-public recriminations on the KAL, it is possible that Grenada will have
some political fall-out. The odds will increase somewhat if it is true that
the Soviets initated the removal of Bishop.
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DCI/NIC/NIO/USSR-EE/SMMoskowitz;bb, 26 Oct 83
Distribution:
Orig. - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - C/NIC
1 - USSR-EE Chrono
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