IIA: GRENADA: THE SECURITY THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001502590012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRETI
Inc ire or o era intenigenze
Washington. D. C 20505
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
10 November 1983
GRENADA: THE SECURITY THREAT
OUTLINE
Preface
I. Key Judgments
II. Current Situation
III. Capabilities and Intentions of Opponents of the Interim Government
A. Cuban Staybehinds
B. Opposition from Grenadians on Island
C. Exile Activities
D. Infiltration
E. Other Potential Sources of Opposition
IV. Capabilities of Caribbean Forces
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*This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs. It was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for Latin America. The Assessment was coordinated at the
working level with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the US Army, the US Marine Corps, the US Air Force, the US Navy, the National
Security Agency, and the Department of State. Information available as of 1500
hours on 10 November 1983 was used in the preparation of this Assessment.
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SECRET] L
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C 20505
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
10 November 1983
GRENADA: THE SECURITY THREAT
Preface
The intention to remove US forces as soon as possible and the need to
ensure security in Grenada until a Peacekeeping Force is capable of taking
over led Assistant Secretary Langhorne Motley to ask for this Interagency
Intelligence Assessment of the short-term security threat in Grenada. This
paper will focus primarily on the immediate security threat -- up to the end
of this year.
KEY JUDGMENTS
-- There is no confirmed evidence of any staybehind or guerrilla force
on Grenada, whether made up of Cubans or of Grenadians. Cubans would
be unable to operate independently in Grenada for more than a brief
time. Opportunities for subversive actions in Grenada, however, will
increase as US forces depart.
-- The Cubans are not likely to infiltrate a landing party of any
description during the period of this estimate to initiate guerrilla
warfare in Grenada or to link up with any form of organized
resistance in Grenada. Cuban attacks on the interim government will
continue in the diplomatic and propaganda fields, however,
questioning its legitimacy and trying to prevent other governments
from extending formal recognition.
-- The People's Revolutionary Army and the militia are shattered
organizations and the New Jewel Movement is no longer viable. The-
disposition of the great majority of Grenadians is to accept the
interim government with relief, as they accepted the invasion
itself. Few if any would support subversion at this time and many
would probably report what they detect. Most surviving members of
the People's Revolutionary Army and the New Jewel Movement on the.
island have been interviewed or are under detention, and most of
those suspected of criminal acts are expected to remain in detention
until judicial proceedings are finished. Members of the People's
Revolutionary Army are afraid of reprisals from the people for their
actions in the past.
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-- Aside from problems of public order that could be handled by a police
force, a small combat unit with sea and air lift capability for
getting around the island would be needed mostly to investigate the
rumored threats that can be expected to continue in the current
excited state of the island. This unit is needed both to deal with
security problems and to give confidence to the interim government,
the population, and Caribbean forces there
Peacekeeping Force is in place. 25X1
Order may be disturbed in the short term by individual acts of protest or
other unsettling events such as sabotage, sniper attacks, or other terrorist
acts. During the period of this estimate, such actions against the interim
government are not likely to be undertaken by displaced members of the New
Jewel Movement. Some crimes of a grudg.-settlincL-nature may be seen as
political, even though they may not be. 25X1
II. Current Situation
Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, in coordination with the. US Embassy and
US and Caribbean forces on the island, has made major progress toward
restoring order in Grenada. St. Georges harbor reopened on 2 November,
commercial air traffic resumed at Pearls Airport on 7 November, and full
operations were to be restored there on 11 November. Some telecommunications
service has been reestablished, the schools are open, and commercial life is
returning to normal
A multitude of reports from various sources including observations by US
military, intelligence, and diplomatic officials state that Grenadian
civilians are openly cooperative and supportive of US actions in Grenada.
Those civilians who did not support the invasion have been fairly mild in
their criticism. US forces say that civilians continue to report on the
activities of PRA deserters and are bringing in abandoned weapons.
We are aware of only one report of a potentially hostile action aimed at
US forces or the interim government. US Embassy officials received an
unconfirmed report that a bomb -- not further described -- was found at a boys
school in Grenada on 7 November, as well as a false report of a bomb threat
at the telephone company in St. Georges. Since 31 October, there have been
occasional reports of sniper fire on US forces, some of which were later
proven inaccurate.
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III. Capabilities and Intentions of Opponents of the Interim Government
A. Cuban Staybehinds
We believe that few, if any, Cubans have eluded capture in Grenada.
According to US officials and press reports, 742 Cubans had
returned a as of 9 November, and 3 Cubans -- a diplomat, a
communicator, and a cook -- remain at the Cuban Mission. The number of Cuban
dead most likely is less than 50. Cuban officials reportedly believe that at
least 25 Cubans were killed in the fighting, and the State Department
spokesman on the island claims to have identified 42 probable Cuban bodies.
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We doubt~reports that as many as 20 to 40 Cubans are still at 25X1
large, especially in areas heavily patrolled by US forces such as those cited
in the reports.* In our view, Cubans that still might be on the island are
incapable of launching a coordinated or significant attack on US or other
forces, although they could carry out isolated bombings or other acts of
terrorism. We cannot rule out the possibility, however, that some Cubans or
Grenadians on the island were -- or still are -- communicating clandestinely
with Cuban personnel on or off the island. If the Cubans had intended to
leave a force on the island to harass US forces, Colonel Tortolo would have
been a natural candidate to lead such a group. His decision to seek refuge in
the Soviet Mission -- along with 52 other Cubans, most of whom had automatic
weapons -- argues against the existence of such a group. 25X1
State/INR believes t at it is too soon to dismiss the possibility that some 20 to
40 Cubans may still be at large on the island.
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B. Opposition from Grenadians on Island
There is little likelihood of a major threat from former members of the
People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) or militia members. The PRA and the militia
are shattered organizations. US Commanders judge that the PRA lost heart
after the initial fighting, and many members took off their uniforms and went
home. The militia did not even respond to General Hudson Austin's call-up
when the US invasion became apparent. There is one reference in a document
taken at the house of LTC Liam James, Chief of PRA Security Forces, to have
someone ". . . go underground in case the enemy takes the country? He will
organize resistance." Yet in none of the documents captured are. there
contingency plans,f or insurgent or terrorist activity in the event the PRG
were overthrown.
US forces have accounted for nearly a thousand PRA/militiia
members.* As of 9 November, 400 PRA cadre have been screened, and
230 of those were held over for further interviews. Of those, 170
have been released. While this leaves hundreds of persons with
military training not yet accounted for, they are not considered to
be a threat during the period of this estimate. The US forces have
lists of names and addresses of most of these persons. All PRA staff
officers, save one, are under detention, and he was to be picked up
on 9 November. Actually, it is the PRA members themselves who fear
reprisals from the people
The New Jewel Movement is in a similar state. Almost all the major
leaders are either dead or under detention. The event of October,
interviews, and documents show that there were deep rifts in the NJM
before Maurice Bishop's death and much deeper ones thereafter. The
NJM is no longer a viable party with the death of its charismatic
leader and the consequent shattering of the Central Committee. In
the wake of the party's demise, center-left politics and social
democratic philosophy are likely to prosper.
C. Exile Activities
We have reliable reports that some former Grenadian Ambassadors and High
Commissioners have agreed to establish a government-in-exile which will have
as its principal aim the disruption of future elections through terrorist acts
carried out by remnants of the Armed Forces or New Jewel Movement still on the
island. The Cubans will play a role in helping to organize such a group, in
establishing contact with sympathizers on the island, arranging meetings,
facilitating communications and transportation, and providing advice and other
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*Before the invasion we estimated that Grenada had 1,000 - 1,200 individuals in its
army and 2,000 - 4,000 militia members. Evidence that the military was plagued by
dissension and that militia morale was at a low ebb contribute to our judgment that
those members of the armed forces still at large do not pose a viable threat in the
near term.
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 support. The Cubans also are likely to offer their island as a refuge for
such exiles in hopes this will help unify the resistance while enhancing Cuban_
influence over their activities. Havana may have already organized one such
meeting in Havana which reportedly was attended by the former Grenadian
Ambassador to the OAS, Dessima Williams, and the wife of Grenada's former
Ambassador to Cuba, Valerie Cornwall. who has now declared herself the new
Grenadian Ambassador to Cuba.
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With the,remnants of the Bishop regime in disarray, discussions abroad
over the New Jewel Movement's future are just beginning.
ormer Ambassador to the European Communities, George Bullen, believes that
the party should push for the total exclusion of Bernard Coard and his Marxist
supporters from the Movement, as well as completely sever the party's ties
with Cuba and the USSR. At least two officials have also rejected invitations
by the former Grenadian Ambassador to the USSR to attend an organizational
meeting of Grenadian diplomats in Moscow.
We doubt that Cuba would be able to use such exile groups effectively
over the short term to threaten security in Grenada. New leaders will have to
be identified; new groups, political parties, and front groups formed; and new
relationships established before the Cubans can implement an effective
program. In the next few months, the Cubans probably will lack the assets and
the subversive network in the region to influence political developments in
Grenada significantly other than through random terrorist acts.
D. Infiltration
Cuban or Grenadian capabilities to infiltrate insurgents or saboteurs at
this time appear slight, although the opportunities will probably increase as
US forces depart. Individuals or a small team probably could be infiltrated
clandestinely with the necessary supplies to carry out isolated acts of
sabotage or terrorism. Moreover, there are many Grenadians overseas with
legitimate reasons to return who could become vehicles for Cuban operations.
It would be extremely difficult, however, to sustain an organized
resistance or establish a guerrilla movement on the island. Such a force
would be easy to detect because of the smallness of the island; the dearth of
popular support for radical leftists; possible language and cultural
differences if any non-Grenadians were involved; and the alertness of the
interim government to such a threat. Moreover, the nucleus from which such a
movement would draw support -- the New Jewel Movement and the army -- has been
shattered, and potential Cuban, Soviet other advisers have
been expelled from the island.
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E. Other Potential Sources of Opposition
Guyana's President Forbes Burnham, who was sharply critical of the US
intervention and supportive of Cuba's role, might be willing to provide
training, advice, or other support to former New Jewel Movement members
seeking to destabilize the new government. Prospects for close cooperation
between Guyana and Cuba in such an endeavor, however, must be viewed against
the background of considerable' mistrust that has characterized relations
between the two governments. Over time, Burnham must also weigh the risk that
such a course of action will further isolate him in the Caribbean Community.
The Cubans and the Guyanese have close ties to other radical and Marxist
East Caribbean activists, such as George Odium of Saint Lucia, Bobby Clarke of
Barbados, Tim Hector of Antigua, and Roosevelt Douglas in Dominica. These
individuals and organizations probably could help in the propaganda field, but
they lack the resources to conduct any major subversive operations in
Grenada. Trevor Munroe's Jamaican Marxist Workers' Party might also provide a
base for anti-Grenadian activity, but a dominant Jamaican hand in such
operations would almost certainly be resented by Grenadian radicals
involved. Moreover, Havana and Moscow reportedly have criticized Munroe and
other Marxists in Jamaica for their role in the Grenadian revolution, and the
Cubans and the Soviets reportedly have decided to cut off financial support to
them, shifting it to Michael Manley's party.
IV. Capabilities of Caribbean Forces
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados are the only governments in
the English-speaking Caribbean that are capable of making a meaningful
contribution to a joint security force. The small island states such as
Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent have small constabularies and could make only
symbolic contributions. Any drawdown of these forces would impact on security
needs at home.
The largest component of any joint security force would probably have to
come from Jamaica. The Jamaican Defense Force (JDF) has a strength of about
3,400 personnel (including some 1,000 reserves) and the Jamaican Constabulary
(JCF) consists of over 6,000 active personnel and 4,000 reserves.* Although
Kingston probably could provide several hundred individuals temporarily, both
the JDF and JCF already are stretched thin. We judge that the JDF and JCF are
capable of coping with most contingencies likely to arise in Grenada over the
short term. Both benefit from competent and professional leadership at the
top and are instilled with the British tradition of apolitical behavior. The
JCF has had considerable experience in dealing with political violence and
crime.
*Trinidad and Tobago has a defense force of about 2,000 personnel, including its
Coast Guard, and a police force of about 2,400, including auxiliaries -- private
sector security personnel. (S/NF)
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composition of the peacekeeping force to the Commonwealth Secretariat. 25X1
Barbados has a small defense force consisting of about 275 (plus about
300 reserves) and a 90-man Coast Guard. Its police force numbers about 165. -
Prime Minister Seaga and Grenadian Governor General Scoon oppose any military
role for Trinidad and Tobago because Prime Minister Chambers originally
opposed the intervention, but they may be amenable to participation by
Trinidadian police officers. Scoon also would be strongly opposed to any
A joint security force that consists of personnel from Jamaica, Barbados,
Trinidad and Tobago, and some of the small eastern Caribbean states would
require considerable external logistical support, and financing, and some
training. Air mobility could be a key shortcoming. The Jamaican security
forces have only a few helicopters and an unknown number of qualified
pilots. It is unlikely that the helicopters could be spared unless they were
quickly replaced. The Caribbean governments also will have some difficulty in
providing more than a few coastal patrol vessels. Other likely requirements
would include medical facilities and personnel as well as field engineering
equipment.
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