SOVIET MILITARY POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001101610018-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 113
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: September 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
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P-M
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SOVIET MILITARY POWER
First Edition
September 1981
SOVIET MILITARY POWER
Second Edition
March 1983
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
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CONTENTS
I SOVIET MILITARY POWER ................................... 5
H STRATEGIC FORCES ........................................ 13
III THEATER FORCES .......................................... 33
Western Theater ............................................ 35
Southern Theater ............................................ 48
For Eastern Theater ........................................ 51
General Naval Forces ........................................55
NATO/Warsaw Pact .......................................... 62
IV SOVIET SPACE SYSTEMS ..................................... 65
V RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY .............................. 71
VI SOVIET POWER PROJECTION ................................. 83
VII THE CHALLENGE ..........................................101
The illustrations of new Soviet weapons systems introducing each
chapter are derived from various US sources; while not precise in
every detail, they are as authentic as possible.
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PREFACE
"There is nothing hypothetical about the Soviet military machine. Its expansion, mod-
ernization, and contribution to projection of power beyond Soviet boundaries are obvious. A
clear understanding of Soviet Armed Forces, their doctrine, their capabilities, their strengths,
and their weaknesses is essential to the shaping and maintenance of effective US and Allied
armed forces."
Those words from Soviet Military Power, published in September 1981, provide a fitting
point of departure for this updated second edition. Soviet Military Power 1983 reports on the
size, capabilities, and deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces - arid documents the improve-
ments and the R&D which are shaping the increased capabilities of the Soviet Strategic
Rocket Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, and the
Navy-forces numbering more than 4.9 million men.
Since late 1981:
? The USSR has begun test flights of two new land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Mis-
siles, while continuing modernization of the deployed SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBM force.
? The USSR has begun test flights of a new generation of strategic, manned bombers -the
BLACKJACK bomber, larger than the US B-1.
? The USSR has begun test flights of a new generation of ground-, sea- and air-launched
cruise missiles, missiles with nuclear capability with ranges in excess of 1,600 kilometers, sig-
nificantly expanding the flexibility of Soviet strategic options.
? The first of the USSR's 25,000-ton TYPHOON-Class strategic ballistic missile subma-
rines has test fired its MIRVed, nuclear-warhead, 8,300 -kilometer- range, submarine-launch-
ed ballistic missiles. A second TYPHOON has been launched.
? Modernization and forward deployment of increasing numbers of Soviet intermediate
nuclear forces-land, sea, and air--have proceeded at an unparalleled pace.
? More than 330 mobile launchers for the SS-20 - a Longer-Range Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Force (LRINF) missile with three nuclear warheads and reloads for each launcher-
are now arrayed against Western Europe, the Middle East, parts of Africa, and most of Asia,
including China and Japan.
? Su-24/FENCER ground-attack aircraft have been forward-deployed to nations of East-
ern Europe and to border bases in Asia, extending the combat radius of these new nuclear-
capable aircraft to include Japan and most of NATO Europe.
? The USSR has introduced additional nuclear-capable weapons systems to its forward-de-
ployed divisions in Eastern Europe. The new SS-21 mobile, short-range ballistic missile system
is operational in Eastern Europe as is the 152-mm self-propelled gun, adding to Soviet con-
ventional, chemical, and nuclear war-fighting options.
? The USSR's T-80 main battle tank, in development in 1981, is in the field with Soviet
Tank Divisions in both the USSR and Eastern Europe, adding to the extended combat capa-
bilities of the more than 190 Soviet ground force divisions.
? In 1981, two Soviet KIEV-Class aircraft carriers were operational. Now, three units are on
the high seas; a fourth unit has been launched; and development continues on a newer, larger
class of aircraft carriers.
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In shipyards on the Baltic and Black Seas, series production continues on four new classes
of surface warships -a new generation of nuclear- and conventionally powered Soviet cruisers
and guided missile destroyers enhancing the Soviet Navy's air defense, antisubmarine war-
fare, and cruise-missile, surface-strike capabilities.
? Five Soviet shipyards have continued to produce new attack submarines for the world's
largest submarine force. In 1980, the first of the new, extremely large OSCAR-Class guided
missile submarines was launched, a submarine capable of firing up to 24 long-range antiship
cruise missiles while submerged. That lead unit is now on sea trials, and a second unit has
been launched.
? The USSR's military-related space program has grown in manned missions, more recon-
naissance/surveillance/targeting satellites and antisatellite space systems.
? The USSR's combat operations have continued to expand in Afghanistan, and now in-
volve more than 105,000 Soviet troops with some of the newest Soviet weapons.
? From Indochina to the Caribbean, the USSR has continued to expand its global military
presence. To cite just one example, a Soviet Navy task force operated in the Caribbean and
Gulf of Mexico from November 1982 to February 1983.
? Expansion of the USSR's technology and industrial production base has matched the
growth and deployment of its armed forces, reflecting a top priority investment in defense
production aided by continuing acquisition of Western technology.
? Despite economic difficulties, the USSR allocates an estimated 15 percent of GNP to its
military buildup, an increase from the 12-to-14 percent reported in 1981, which in turn repre-
sents a continuance of the trend of the last 21 years.
To place this modernization and growth of the USSR's Armed Forces in perspective, wiet
Military Power 1983 includes substantial data on US and Allied forces enhancement as well
as some comparative US-USSR and NATO-Warsaw Pact tables. Comprehensive information
on US forces, of course, is regularly made available to the public in such publications as the
Secretary of Defense's Annual Report and the Military Posture Statement of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ours is a free society; the Soviet Union is not. The updated facts
presented in this report leave no doubt as to the USSR's dedication to achieving military su-
periority in all fields.
It is our duty to have a full awareness of Soviet military growth, modernization and capabil-
ities and to shape our defense forces and our deterrent capabilities accordingly. We can do no
less if we are to provide fully and wisely for our security, and that of our Allies. Ours is a for-
midable task, made more difficult by a decade of our neglect coupled with two decades of
massive Soviet increases. But, we and our Allies can accomplish the task if we have the will,
the courage, and the resolution possessed in ample measure by our predecessors who won our
freedom, and who have kept it for us all. This is at once our most precious heritage and our
most solemn responsibility to posterity.
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I SOVIET MILITARY POW
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The continuing growth and modernization of
the Soviet military have enabled the Soviet
Union to structure and posture its forces for of-
fensive use on short notice. Consequently, the
need for the fullest possible information on the
mission, capabilities and deployment of the
Soviet Union's Armed Forces is today greater
than ever before.
In the nuclear area, the Soviets continue to
build far greater numbers of missiles and war-
heads than are necessary for a credible deter-
rent capability. Soviet conventional forces have
increased offensive capabilities, and the Soviets
have demonstrated detailed plans for the offen-
sive use of these forces. Soviet tactical air and
missile forces continue to acquire advanced
weapons systems and support systems designed
for the conduct of large-scale air offensives. So-
viet ground force modernization, deployment
and training permit rapid and sustained for-
ward movement from peacetime locations to
objectives well beyond Soviet/Warsaw Pact bor-
ders. At the same time, it is clear from Soviet
strategic planning and operations that its naval
ships and aircraft are committed to denying op-
posing navies use of adjacent seas and conduct-
ing strikes against enemy land targets.
In September 1981, Soviet Military Power
was published to make available to people
everywhere a factual report on the magnitude
of the Soviet military buildup and the changing
character of Soviet military objectives. That
first report:
? examined the Soviet and non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact military industrial base, the
The new Pushkin Antiballistic Missile Radar-
part of the continuing modernization of Soviet
military power-provides 380? strategic defense
coverage from the phased array radars in its four
sided structure 110 feet high and 500 feet wile.
Silo-launched interceptor missiles contribute to
this improved ABM defense of Moscow.
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world's largest in facilities and physical
size;
? described the organization of Soviet
Armed Forces, the USSR's strategic com-
mand structure, command and control,
logistic support and combat doctrine;
? described the Soviet conventional and
nuclear land, sea and air forces
designated for theater operations;
? reviewed the increasing capabilities
of Soviet strategic forces, including the
SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, and the
continuing modernization of the subma-
rine-launched ballistic missile force;
? described the research and develop-
ment effort behind the USSR's drive for
modern military technology;
? reported on the USSR's projection of
military power around the world; and
? summarized the challenge posed to
the United States and its Allies by the
Soviet Armed Forces.
Two fundamentally important considerations
have now led to this updated report, Soviet
Military Power 1983. First, the USSR during
the past year has pushed ahead with force
modernization, expansion and forward deploy-
ment on a scale even larger than before. Sec-
ond, the American people and free people
everywhere have continued to seek the most re-
cent information on Soviet military develop-
ments, as well as information comparing the
forces of the Warsaw Pact with forces of the
United States and other NATO nations to per-
mit a fuller appreciation of the magnitude of
the Soviet force buildup. Such comparative
data are included in this report.
The chart, "Soviet Military Forces," on pages
8 and 9 summarizes the size and composition of
the USSR's strategic nuclear forces, ground
forces, air forces, air defense forces, and naval
forces. Each chapter in this report develops a
different aspect of the current dimensions of
Soviet military power.
The US-USSR and NATO-Warsaw Pact
charts and tables in the chapters that follow
help to depict the shift in the military balance.
These charts are not all-inclusive. Comprehen-
sive information on US forces is regularly made
available to the people of the United States and
throughout the world in such publications as
the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report and
the Military Posture Statement of the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Soviet
Union does not make such information avail-
able. Thus, the focus of Soviet Military Power
1983 is on the Soviet Union's Armed Forces.
Weapons production, for example, is an indi-
cator of the shifting balance over the past
decade. The Soviets have manufactured ap-
proximately 2,000 ICBMs; 54,000 tanks and
other armored vehicles; 6,000 tactical combat
aircraft; 85 surface warships and 61 attack sub-
marines-with much of this stockpile of materi-
al comparable in quality to US counterpart
systems. US production over the same period
has been considerably less - approximately 350
ICBMs, 11,000 tanks and other armored vehi-
cles, 3,000 tactical combat aircraft, 72 surface
warships and 27 attack submarines.
In 1982, the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion published NATO and the Warsaw Pact-
Force Comparisons, a publication carrying the
conviction and authority of all the NATO na-
tions that participate in the integrated military
structure of the Alliance. In his foreword,
NATO Secretary General Joseph M.A.H. Luns
stated:
"The numerical balance of forces has mov-
ed slowly but steadily in favor of the War-
saw Pact over the past two decades. During
this period the members of the North At-
lantic Alliance have lost much of the tech-
nological edge which permitted NATO to
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rely on the view that quality could compen-
sate for quantity. It is clear that the trend
is dangerous. Nevertheless, the overall de-
terrent continues to safeguard peace."
NATO-Warsaw Pact comparative data from
this report - data that address the totality of
Soviet/Pact forces that could be brought to
bear against NATO in the event of war-are
presented in the concluding section of Chapter
III of this document.
The illustrations opening Chapters I and
II-the new ABM radar in the Moscow area
and the new strategic BLACKJACK bomber-
dramatize the continuing upgrade of Soviet
strategic force capabilities. Chapter II examines
Soviet strategic force developments in detail.
The third and fourth generations of Soviet
ICBMs currently deployed and under develop-
ment continue to emphasize the missile force
improvements of more than a decade-greatly
improved nuclear-warhead accuracy; multiple,
independently targetable re-entry vehicles
(MIRVs); reliability and survivability. At least
two new solid-propellant ICBMs are under de-
velopment; flight testing began in 1982 and
1983.
New, long-range, air-launched cruise missiles
currently under development and the strategic
BLACKJACK bomber will significantly enhance
the USSR's strategic offensive capabilities. The
BLACKJACK is a variable-geometry-wing-
swing-wing-aircraft similar to, but larger
than, the US B-1 bomber. It will be capable of
long-range subsonic cruise with supersonic
high-altitude dash and subsonic/ transonic low-
level penetration. This new bomber will likely
be a multiple-role aircraft that can deliver both
free-fall bombs and air-launched cruise missiles
to intercontinental range. It is particularly
significant given the weakness of North Ameri-
can air defense.
At the same time, the Soviets have steadily
modernized their sea-based strategic force. A
second TYPHOON-Class nuclear-powered bal-
listic missile submarine (SSBN) has been
launched at the Severodvinsk Shipyard, while
the first TYPHOON is now with the Northern
Fleet. Armed with 20 launchers for the MIRV-
ed SS-NX-20 solid-fueled submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM), the first submarine of
its class should be fully operational by the end
of 1983. Moreover, the 8,300 kilometer range of
the SS-NX-20 places all of NATO Europe,
North America and Asia well within TY-
PHOON's reach, even when operating in home
waters.
As detailed in Chapter II, the USSR's strate-
gic defense force is the most massive in the
world. It includes active defenses such as mod-
ern interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) and ballistic missile defense (BMD) sys-
tems; and passive defenses such as surveillance
and warning systems, hardened bunkers, elec-
tronic countermeasures (ECM) and civil defense.
In the first edition of Soviet Military Power,
more than 180 Soviet Ground Force divisions
and some 250 SS-20 LRINF missile launchers in
the field were identified. Today there are over
190 Soviet Ground Force divisions and more
than 330 SS-20 missile launchers positioned for
delivery of nuclear warheads against Western
Europe, the Middle East, parts of Africa, and
most of Asia including China and Japan. Chap-
ter III presents an updated review of the full ar-
ray of Soviet nuclear and conventional theater
forces and their readiness for deployment in the
three theaters of operations-the Western,
Southern and Far Eastern Theaters. These
forces, opposite NATO and arrayed against the
nations of Southwest Asia and East Asia, have
been further strengthened during 1982 by the
addition of new SS-20 launchers, and by the
forward deployment of additional nuclear-cap-
able weapons systems such as the long-range
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SOVIET
BALTIC FLEET
TOTAL SHIPS
554
NORTHERN FLEET
NAVAL AVIATION
275
TOTAL SHIPS 6D
NAVAL AVIATION 4D
BLACK SEA FLEET/
CASPIAN FLOTILLA
TOTAL SHIPS 542
NAVAL AVIATION 430
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
ICBMs
LRINF
SLBMs
STR
SS-11
550
SS-N-6
SS-13
60
SS-N-8
SS-17
150
SS-
232
SS-N-17 950+
SS-18
308
SS-5
16
SS-N-18
SS-19
330
SS-20
333
SS-NX-20
BACKFIRE
BISON
BEAR 100
BADGER/BLINDER 455
? 200+, including
Soviet Naval Aviation
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MILITARY FORCES
PACIFIC FLEET
TOTAL SHIPS 765
NAVAL AVIATION 445
NAVAL FORCES
INTERCEPTORS 1,200
SURFACE COMBATANTS 1,324
EL-
SUBMARINES
367
MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS
134
AUXILIARIES
77
TANK DIVISIONS
50
ABM
SAM
0
AIRBORNE DIVISIONS
7
LAUNCHERS 32
LAUNCHERS 9,600+
NAVAL. AVIATION
1,555
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\1\
The Soviet Navy's nuclear-powered, deep-diving,
titanium-hulled ALFA-Gass torpedo attack
submarine is the world's fastest, with
submerged speeds of over 40 knots.
FENCER ground attack aircraft, the SS-21
short-range ballistic missile system and the 152-
mm nuclear-capable, self-propelled gun. In lit-
tle more than a year, Soviet forces in combat in
Afghanistan have grown from 85,000 to more
than 105, 000. The weapon systems being used
in Afghanistan are among the most modern
available to the Soviet Armed Forces, including
the formidable Su-25/FROGFOOT ground at-
tack aircraft. New attack submarines, surface
ships and naval aircraft further strengthen not
only the USSR's theater military capabilities,
but also its capability to conduct aggressive sea
control and sea denial operations on the world's
oceans.
Chapter IV, Soviet Space Systems, examines
the serious threat posed by the USSR's increas-
ing use of space for military purposes. The
majority of Soviet space programs has been spe-
cifically designed to support terrestial military
operations. However, the long-term develop-
ment of an antisatellite system has extended
Soviet military use of space from support opera-
tions to a direct space warfare capability. The
relative scope of the overall military program is
demonstrated by a launch rate that is four-to-
five times that of the United States, and by an
annual payload weight placed into orbit:
660,000 pounds-ten times that of the United
States.
Chapter V reports on the magnitude of pro-
duction and the cost of supporting the USSR's
continuing military buildup. It reviews the
technology and industrial resources of the
USSR's defense industrial base; the effort being
dedicated to research, design and test programs
and the commitment to training needed scien-
tific and engineering manpower. It summarizes
the results of this effort in terms of the steady
delivery of new and modernized weapon systems
to Soviet forces, and in terms of future weapon
systems that will be available to the forces. It ex-
amines the intensity with which the USSR pur-
sues the acquisition of Western technology, and
the overall impact of its military program on
the Soviet economy. The USSR's current mili-
tary capabilities reflect the achievements of a
Research and Development (R&D) and indus-
trial base that has grown steadily since the late
1950s when top priority was accorded military
R&D and production. Soviet defense continues
to receive regular and large infusions of capital
investment allocations, legally and illegally ac-
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quired foreign technology and equipment and
the most highly qualified science and engineer-
ing graduates. In return, the defense industrial
establishment is justifying its preferential treat-
ment by producing a steady succession of new
and improved weapon systems for the Soviet ar-
senal. These continuing efforts reflect the cur-
rent high-priority Soviet intent and commit-
ment to the development and production of
future weapons.
The cumulative dollar costs of Soviet invest-
ment for the decade were 80 percent higher
than US investment outlays. The estimated dol-
lar costs for the Soviets were more than twice
the US outlays in the mid-1970s, but, because of
the slower growth of Soviet programs and
growth in US costs, this margin had decreased
somewhat by 1981. The slower growth of Soviet
programs during the period was due to the cy-
clical nature of Soviet military production. The
large Soviet research and development effort,
coupled with observed expansion in military
production facilities, suggests that the dollar
costs of Soviet military procurement may soon
resume their historical growth. The estimated
dollar costs for Soviet RDT&E were 70 percent
greater than US RDT&E outlays for the period
as a whole, and were more than twice as great in
1981. The dollar operating costs for Soviet ac-
tivities were about 25 percent higher both for
the period and in 1981.
The illustration at the opening of Chapter
VI, of a KIEV-Class aircraft carrier riding in a
Japanese-built floating drydock now serving
with the Soviet Pacific Fleet, symbolizes the
continuing growth of the Soviet Navy, and the
mounting capability of the USSR to project
military power wherever required in the world.
Chapter VI provides a detailed examination of
the USSR's multi-tiered approach to power pro-
jection ranging from Soviet "active measures,"
to the use of arms sales and military advisors,
the use of proxy forces, and the deployment of
military forces beyond the Soviet border.
Over the past decade, the growing capability
of Soviet armed forces to project power to great
distances has helped the USSR to sustain and
consolidate many new military outposts. This
geographic expansion of Soviet influence has
important military implications. The basing fa-
cilities now available to Soviet maritime forces
in Cuba, Vietnam, South Yemen, Angola,
Ethiopia, and elsewhere greatly extend the
reach and the staying power of Soviet naval and
air forces. While the Soviets' peacetime use of
these bases might not translate automatically to
wartime access, the potential for such access
places added burden on US and Allied forces.
This expanding access to basing facilities re-
mote from the Soviet periphery provides new
possibilities for long-range projection of Soviet
power. The Soviets have traditionally maintain-
ed their naval infantry and airborne forces at
high levels of readiness. Since 1972, naval infan-
try and airborne unit training, equipment, and
deployments have also been matched by com-
parable enhancements to Soviet airlift, sealift,
and mobility infrastructure. 7T he trend of Soviet
geographic expansion is especially apparent if
one recognizes that most of the Soviet Union's
new military outposts are in countries that once
supported the Western alliance system by pro-
viding transit rights or other facilities. Central
America and the Caribbean are now clearly the
target of a concerted Soviet-inspired penetra-
tion effort. Further spread of Soviet military
outposts throughout the world increasingly
threatens the lifelines of the Western alliances
and makes it even more difficult and costly to
defend essential national interests.
In Chapter VII, Soviet Military Power 1983
assesses the challenge posed by the continued
growth and modernization of the USSR's Arm-
ed Forces, and summarizes the nature of the re-
sponse which the United States and its Allies
must sustain to deter Soviet aggression.
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II STRATEGIC FORCES
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The buildup of Soviet strategic forces con-
tinues. The following introductory paragraphs
outline the long-standing policies and objectives
behind Soviet strategic nuclear force develop-
ment and provide the backdrop for Soviet activ-
ities since the First Edition of Soviet Military
Power was published.
Soviet leaders since Khrushchev's time have
followed a consistent policy for nuclear develop-
ment. Their main objective is to capitalize, in
peacetime, on the coercive leverage inherent in
powerful nuclear forces, to induce paralysis and
create disarray in the free societies. In wartime,
they regard employment of those forces as the
key to their survival and winning.
The Soviet policy calls for forces which are
designed to destroy Western nuclear forces on
the ground and in flight to their targets, and for
the capacity to survive should nuclear weapons
reach the Soviet homeland. The overall mis-
sions encompass the likelihood that interconti-
nental nuclear war would evolve from a general
East-West conflict across the face of Eurasia.
These missions are: protect the homeland, sup-
port the land war in Eurasia and eliminate the
United States' capability to conduct or support
warfare beyond its own shores.
Protection of the homeland. is the most diffi-
cult mission. The strengths and weaknesses of
Western forces determine the tasks of the
offensive and defensive forces assigned to it.
Hence, it is closely linked to Western weapons
development programs. Because of this, the
Soviets attach great importance to working
hard to keep Western modernization programs
to a minimum during peacetime.
With the flight testing of the new BLACKJACK A
swing-wing bomber during the past year, the
USSR is nearing production of a new-generation,
strategic manned bomber to add to Soviet offen-
sive power provided by new generations of land
based and sea-based strategic ballistic missile
nuclear forces.
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Strategic Nuclear Forces
17;19
erezhnya
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CENTER
Protection of the homeland in a nuclear war
would involve:
? disruption and destruction of the
enemy's nuclear-associated command,
control and communications,
? destruction or neutralization of as
many of the West's nuclear weapons as
possible on the ground or at sea before
they can be launched,
? interception and destruction of sur-
viving weapons -aircraft and missiles-
before they can reach targets,
? protection of the party, state, and in-
dustrial infrastructure and the essential
working population against those weap-
ons that reach their targets.
The forces and programs in place or under
SS-11,_
Gledkaya
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Uzhuv
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active development designed to accomplish
these tasks include:
? hard-target-capable ICBMs and
LRINF missiles,
? bombers capable of penetrating US
defensive systems and SLBMs which can
be postured for short flight times,
? antisubmarine forces capable of at-
tacking US SSBNs,
? air and missile defenses, including
early warning satellites and radars, inter-
ceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles,
ABM radars and interceptors, and some
anti-aircraft artillery,
? passive defense forces, including civil
defense forces, and troops and equipment
devoted to confusing incoming aircraft,
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? hardened facilities numbering in the
thousands, command vehicles, and evac-
uation plans designed to protect party,
military, governmental, and industrial
staffs, essential workers and, to the extent
possible, the general population.
Supporting a land war in Eurasia and elimi-
nating the United States' capability to fight
beyond its own shores require a capability to
employ intercontinental forces useful over a
variety of ranges and the destruction of:
? other military-associated command
and control,
? war-supporting industries, arsenals
and major military facilities,
? ports and airfields in the United
States and those along sea and air routes
to European and Asian theaters of war,
and
? satellite and ground-based surveil-
lance sensors and facilities and
communications.
Offensive forces (ICBMs, LRINF, SLBMs,
and bombers) and antisatellite weapons are
generally assigned these tasks although some
special operations troops could be used, es-
The BACKFIRE Bomber, Capable of Nuclear Strike, Conventional Attack, Anti-shipping, and
Reconnaissance Missions.
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pecially in Eurasia. These tasks are generally
less demanding than those for the first mission.
Soviet intercontinental forces are designed to
fulfill their missions under the best and worst of
circumstances. In the Soviet view, the most fav-
orable circumstance is a first or preemptive
strike; the least favorable is a follow-on strike
after nuclear weapons have hit the USSR. In be-
tween is the launch-under-attack circumstance:
that is, executing offensive forces after weapons
aimed at the USSR have been launched but be-
fore they hit their targets. The Soviets have
wide-ranging programs designed to provide
nuclear forces able to operate under each of
these circumstances. Moreover, the Soviets ap-
pear to believe that nuclear war might last for
weeks, even months, and have factored this into
their force development.
? In a first or preemptive strike, the es-
sentials are effective coordination of the
strike and sound intelligence of the
West's intentions. Soviet nuclear forces
practice almost constantly, emphasizing
command and control under various con-
ditions. During wartime, the main mis-
sion of Soviet intelligence is to determine
the West's nuclear attack intentions.
? The Soviets practice launching weap-
25,000-ton TYPHOON-Class SSBN Bring SS-NX-20
missile.
ons under the stringent time constraints
that would prevail under hypothetical
launch-under-attack circumstances. They
have established a satellite-based ICBM
launch detection system, have built an
over-the-horizon radar missile launch
detection system to back up the satellites,
and have large phased-array radars ring-
ing the USSR.
? Follow-on strikes stress the survivabil-
ity of the command, control and commu-
nications systems and that of the weapons
themselves. The Soviets have invested
heavily in providing this survivability.
The SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs are
housed in the world's hardest silos. Silo
deployment has been adopted for ABMs
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YANKEE-Class SSBN
as well. The SS-20 LRINF missile is
mobile, and a mobile strategic SAM is
being developed. The launch control fa-
cilities for offensive missiles are housed in
very hard silos or on off-road vehicles.
Communications are redundant and
hardened. Higher commands have multi-
ple hardened facilities and mobile com-
mand vehicles and aircraft available for
their use. Bombers have alert procedures
and dispersal airfields. Ballistic missile
submarines can be placed in tunnels near
their home ports, submerged in deep
fjords just off their piers, dispersed and
protected by Soviet surface and subma-
rine forces.
? The Soviet belief that war might be
protracted requires the survivability need-
ed for follow-on strikes, along with war
reserves, protection for people and equip-
ment, and the capacity to reload launch-
ers. For their ICBM, LRINF and air de-
fense forces, the Soviets have stocked ex-
tra missiles, propellants, and warheads
throughout the USSR. ICBM silo launch-
ers can be reloaded in a matter of days,
and provision has been made for the de-
contamination of those launchers. Plans
for the survival of necessary equipment
and personnel have been developed and
practiced. Resupply ships are available to
reload Soviet SSBNs in protected waters.
Despite these comprehensive warfighting ob-
jectives and ambitious development and deploy-
ment programs over the years, the Soviets are
continuing to modernize all aspects of their
strategic forces.
Much of what the Soviets have done since
September 1981 involves the consummation of
programs begun in the 1970s and offers the first
signs of new programs designed to help remedy
weaknesses still remaining and to allow them to
attain their own objectives in the face of pro-
spective Western programs.
Older programs:
? replacement of older missiles with SS-
19 Mod 3 and SS-18 Mod 4 MIRVed
ICBMs, the world's most lethal ICBMs,
? construction of DELTA III SSBNs,
fitted with 16 SS-N-18 MIRVed SLBMs,
with YANKEE and HOTEL SSBNs dis-
mantled in compensation,
? continuation of the SS-NX-20 MIRV-
ed SLBM testing program (The
TYPHOON/SS-NX-20 weapon system
will become operational in 1983.),
? continued production of BACKFIRE
bombers,
? further deployment of the SA-10 low-
altitude SAM around Moscow and
throughout the USSR,
? initial production of the 11-76/
MAINSTAY airborne warning and con-
trol systems (AWACS),
? continued development of a high-
speed ABM interceptor and a modified
version of the older GALOSH ABM
interceptor,
? additional construction of large
phased-array radars around the periphery
of the USSR,
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? continued construction of hardened
shelters and command posts for passive
defense.
New programs since 1981:
? first tests of a new solid-propellant
ICBM similar in size and payload to the
US MX,
? the first test of a new small solid-
propellant ICBM, which could be deploy-
ed on mobile transporters,
? preparations to begin testing other
new ICBMs, probably in 1983,
? development of a series of long-range
cruise missiles intended for ground, air
and sea launch platforms,
? preparations to begin testing another
new SLBM, probably in 1983,
? the first flight tests of the new
BLACKJACK strategic bomber,
? new ABM deployment around Mos-
cow to include a new, very large phased-
array radar and deployment of new ABM
interceptors,
? testing of high-energy laser systems
for land-based and sea-based air defense,
? Testing of a mobile version of the
SA-10 SAM,
? the initial deployment of the FOX-
HOUND interceptor which can identify
and track targets flying far beneath it
and fire air-to-air missiles against those
targets,
? testing of two additional new air de-
fense interceptor aircraft.
While these efforts have continued, the Soviet
leadership has also been directing an active
measures campaign to support and amplify on-
going anti-nuclear movements in the West, in
order to influence, delay, or frustrate Western
nuclear program developments. Using this two-
pronged approach, Moscow seeks a new gain in
relative capability despite the drive of Western
governments to redress the imbalance which has
developed over the past decade.
INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK
Since the late 1950s, the Soviets have devel-
oped and deployed nuclear attack forces having
two fundamental capabilities: strikes against
enemy nuclear arsenals and command and con-
trol systems and support of land warfare in
Eurasia. While the character, composition, and
technical sophistication of the forces have
changed over the years, the missions have not.
The development of capabilities to satisfy the
missions has been done with patience and pur-
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pose derived from a realization that not all goals
can be achieved at once. ICBMs have the mis-
sion to attack the ICBM force of the United
States and other hardened targets. ICBMs and
SLBMs are earmarked for strikes against com-
munications, command and control systems
and against the defense infrastructure of the
United States. Some ICBMs and SLBMs may
have been designated as strategic reserves. All
of the forces must operate in a variety of en-
vironments. Bombers have become a supple-
mentary force for ICBMs and SLBMs. Finally,
the majority of the systems have been designed
to be. capable for use not only at intercon-
tinental ranges against the United States but
also at shorter ranges against targets through-
out Europe and Asia.
US and Soviet ICBM Launcher and Reentry
Vehicle (RV/ Deployment 1968-1983
SS-18s, and 330 SS-19s. These missiles carry
some 6,000 nuclear warheads. Presently, the
great majority of the 17s, 18s and 19s are equip-
ped with MIRVs. By the mid-1980s the Soviets
are expected to complete their current ICBM
modernization programs for fourth-generation
systems. At that time, they will have 520 SS-11s,
60 SS-13s, 150 SS-17s, 308 SS-18s, and 360
SS-19s. When this deployment is finished, the
force will have some 6,400 warheads.
ICBM improvements may be measured in
terms of quantity, quality and survivability.
Quantitative Improvements: Deployment of
the Soviets' first (SS-6) and second (SS-7 and SS-
8) generation ICBMs began in the late 1950s
and early 1960s. By 1966, deployment of third
generation missiles (SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13) was
underway. With this generation, the Soviets
rapidly increased the number of ICBMs deploy-
ed. ICBM deployment reached its peak in the
mid-1970s at approximately 1,600 launchers.
After this, the number of launchers gradually
decreased to the current level of approximately
1,400 as the Soviets removed their less-capable
second generation missiles from the force. (The
first generation was phased out in the 1960s.)
From 1975 to the present, however, there has
been a dramatic increase in the number of
deliverable nuclear warheads as the MIRVed
versions of the fourth generation ICBMs (SS-17,
SS-18, and SS-19) have been deployed. Since
these missiles can carry up to 10 reentry vehicles
(RVs), the number of deployed ICBM nuclear
warheads has increased by a factor of four, not
withstanding the reduction in the number of
SALT-accountable launchers.
Qualitative Improvements: The dramatic
growth in nuclear warheads observed after 1975
could not have been possible without major
qualitative improvements. The first two genera-
tions of Soviet ICBMs were inaccurate, carried
relatively small payloads and required lengthy
ICBMS: The Soviet ICBM force has been
developed and deployed in four successive
generations, each representing significant ad-
vances. The Soviet ICBM force currently con-
sists of 550 SS-11s, 60 SS-13s, 150 SS-17s, 308
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METERS
30
MOD
2
NUMBER DEPLOYED 150
WARHEADS 4 1
4
MAX RANGE 1KM) 10,000 11,00
0 10,000
LAUNCH MODE Cold Cold
Cold
METERS
30
0
NUMBER DEPLOYED 49
WARHEADS 1
MAX RANGE (KM) 12,000
LAUNCH MODE
Fourth Generation ICBMs
qr~0 ' 550 in Development
1 3 Up to 10
12;500 14,000 14,000
Hot Hot Cold
launch procedures. To make up for these defi-
ciencies, reentry vehicles were fitted with
high-yield nuclear weapons. With the third
generation, both accuracy and payload capabil-
ity were improved to some degree. However, it
was not until the fourth generation that the
technology became available to the Soviets al-
lowing greater throw weight and greatly im-
proved accuracy so that high-yield MIR'Vs
could be carried by operational missiles. The
most accurate versions of the SS-18 and SS-19
are capable of destroying hard targets. To-
gether, these systems have the capability to de-
stroy most of the 1,000 US MINUTEMAN
ICBMs, using only a portion of the warheads
available. The Soviets follow an incremental
improvement policy in the development of their
forces. They improve those components of a
weapon system that need improving and retain
those portions that are satisfactory. In this man-
ner, they have greatly improved the reliability
and capability of their current ICBM force.
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0
Survivability Improvements: One of the most
important improvements made in the ICBM
force has been in the area of survivability. Most
of the first- and second-generation ICBMs were
deployed on above-ground launchers with no
real protection for the launcher or the missile.
During the deployment of the second-genera-
tion missiles the Soviets began to deploy missiles
at sites containing three underground silo
launchers. Third-generation missiles were de-
ployed in hardened, underground, single-silo
sites. By using hardened and widely-dispersed
launchers the Soviets increased the ICBM force
survivability. The fourth-generation ICBMs
were placed in launchers that, for the most
part, had been converted from third-generation
silos. In the process of conversion, the hardnesss
of the launchers was considerably increased to
improve missile and launcher survivability, up-
graded communications facilities were added,
and silo-based launch control facilities were
built. The Soviets have also undertaken several
programs to modernize and upgrade launchers
for their third-generation ICBMs. The result is
that the current Soviet ICBM force is vastly
more survivable than was the case a decade ago.
ICBM Reload Capability: The Soviets have
contingency plans for reloading and refiring
ICBMs from launchers that already have been
used to fire an initial round. The cold-launch
technique employed by the SS-17 and SS-18
lends itself to such a reload capability. Addi-
tionally, all currently deployed liquid-propel-
lant ICBMs-SS-11, SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19-
are contained in a launch canister within the
silo. This and the silo design minimize damage
to the launcher during the initial firing and give
the Soviets the capability to reload each of these
launchers. The Soviets probably cannot refurb-
ish and reload silo launchers in a period less
than a few days; nevertheless, they believe that
this capability is of significant value because
they anticipate that a nuclear war might be pro-
tracted. The Soviets have made provisions for
the delivery of reserve missiles, warheads and
propellants to ICBM complexes for reload pur-
poses. None of these extra missiles or warheads
are counted under SALT agreements. Only the
launchers are counted.
New ICBMs Under Development: Soviet
ICBMs will continue to emphasize the force im-
provements that have been observed since the
early 1960s: accuracy, MIRVing, reliability,
and survivability. Two new solid-propellant
ICBMs are currently being developed. One of
these is about the size of the US MX intended
for silo deployment; the other is a smaller
missile, which will probably be designed for
deployment on mobile launchers similar to
those used with the SS-20. Because of their
capability for dispersal, mobile missiles are
highly survivable. Furthermore, they have an
inherent reload capability, which is also a
significant force improvement. Testing pro-
grams for one or two additional ICBMs, prob-
ably based on the SS-18 and SS- 19, are expected
to begin in 1983.
SSBNs/SLBMs: Over the last two years the
Soviets have continued to modernize their
submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
force. A second TYPHOON-Class nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) has
been launched at the Severodvinsk Shipyard;
the first TYPHOON completed, its sea trials and
has moved to port facilities on the north coast of
the Kola Peninsula. Armed with 20 launchers
for the MIRVed SS-NX-20 solid-fueled SLBM,
the first submarine of this class will be fully op-
erational by the end of 1983. The range of the
SS-NX-20, 8,300 kilometers, places all of
NATO Europe, North America and Asia within
TYPHOON's reach.
While the TYPHOON SSBN production pro-
gram is still relatively new, the Soviets' earlier
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YANKEE 1130m 16 Tubes SS-N-6
F - YANKEE 11 130m 12 Tubes SS-N-17
DELTA CLASS
DELTA 1140m 12 Tubes SS-N-8-
DELTA 11 155m 16 Tubes SS-N-8-
DELTA III 155m 16 Tubes SS-N-18
SS-N-6
MOD
1 2 3
1 1 1 2MRVs
1,400 2,400 3,000 3,000
Ss-N>18
S.S:NX-20.".
1 1 1 3 MIRVs 1; 7 MIRVs 6.9
7,800 9;100 3900 6;500 8,000 6,500 i 8,300
DW Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Missiles
TRIDENT (Ohio Class) SSBN METERS
15
POSEIDON TRIDENT
SLBM C-3 SLBM CA
RV's
RANGE(KM)
RV's
RANGE (KM)
10 YANKEE
`ONio /
) OCEAN
10
4,000
DELTA-III program is nearing completion.
Thus far, 14 of these SSBNs have been launch-
ed; a few more will probably be built. Each car-
ries 16 liquid-fueled MIRVed SS-N-18 SLBMs.
Like the TYPHOON, the missiles on the
DELTA-III, as well as the DELTA I and II, can
reach targets in almost all of North America
from home waters. By contrast, only the TRI-
DENT C-4 has similar range capabilities. How-
ever, the bulk of US SLBMs is much less capa-
ble in terms of range, accuracy and yield.
Therefore, the quantitative US advantage
PAC[FIC
UUL ? Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Missiles
METERS
15
SS-IV-5
OCEAN
KK
DELLTAll~.
1 -i ic!vNRlItck"
1 TYPHao'AK-
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shown in the chart below should not mislead.
With the addition of each new SSBN, the So-
viet Navy has dismantled older submarines in
order to remain within the number of launchers
(950) and number of hulls (62) allowed under
provisions of the SALT-I Agreement, as ex-
tended. The addition to the force of some 200
reentry vehicles (RVs) on each TYPHOON,
however, greatly eclipses the temporary reduc-
tion caused by the dismantlement of one
YANKEE-Class SSBN (48 RVs) and of two
US and Soviet SLBM Launcher and Reentry
Vehicle (RV) Deployment 1968-1983
6,000,1 r 6,000
0 0
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1960 1982 1984
UNREFUELED
COMBAT RADIUS (KM)
HOTEL-II Class SSBNs (6 RVs) in compensa-
tion for a newly constructed TYPHOON. The
acquisition of each new SSBN equipped with
SS-N-18/SS-NX-20 SLBMs not only introduces
more RVs but also allows the Soviets greater
flexibility in the use of their new submarines.
Older SSBNs with shorter-ranged SLBMs have
to conduct lengthy transits in order to come
within range of targets in North America.
Future developments in Soviet SLBMs will
most likely center on improved :RV accuracy to
complement their estimated large nuclear yields
and on the fielding of solid-fueled SLBMs as
replacements for older liquid-fueled versions. A
new SLBM, possibly intended to replace the SS-
N-18, probably will begin testing in 1983.
Apart from its SLBMs, the Soviet Navy will
soon be the recipient of a sea-launched cruise
missile (SLCM) that is currently under develop-
ment, the SS-NX-21. With an estimated maxi-
mum range on the order of 3,000 kilometers, its
mission is primarily nuclear strike, and its size is
compatible with submarine torpedo tubes.
Bombers: The manned bomber has relin-
quished primary responsibility for nuclear at-
tack to missiles, but the Soviets still view it as a
USSR and US Long-Range Strike Aircraft"
USSR
MAX SPEED (KTS) 500 1,100
BISON, BADGER, BLINDER, FB-1118 not shown.
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//-
0
viable component of their nuclear forces. The
manned bomber provides them flexibility and
diversity in their nuclear attack forces not
available with ballistic missiles. Moreover, the
Soviets clearly are prepared to use bombers in a
variety of roles, to include conventional strikes
in the European and Asian theaters, antiship
operations, reconnaissance and nuclear opera-
tions in a protracted conflict.
Continuing Soviet interest in the manned
bomber is evidenced by the number of pro-
grams underway to upgrade the aging force, in-
cluding the development of a new strategic
bomber and long-range air-launched cruise
missiles. Moreover, sweeping organizational
changes in the command structure of the Soviet
air forces are in part intended better to in-
tegrate bombers into all types of air operations.
Deployment Trends: The current strategic
bomber force consists of almost 900 strike and
support aircraft. The overall size of the force
has remained relatively constant in recent years,
although modernization of the BACKFIRE and
upgrades in weapons have improved the qual-
ity. Three-fourths of the bombers are position-
ed opposite NATO, while the remainder are
based along the Chinese border. BADGER,
BLINDER, and BACKFIRE make up the bulk
of the force and would carry out missions pri-
marily against Europe and Asia. BEAR and
BISON could perform similiar missions as well,
but are reserved mainly for strategic maritime
or intercontinental operations.
Long-Range Bombers: The Tu-95/BEAR is
the primary intercontinental air threat to the
United States. Capable of delivering free-fall
bombs or air-to-surface missiles, under opti-
mum conditions this aircraft can cover virtually
all US targets on a two-way mission. Introduced
in the mid-1950s, it is both the largest and
longest-range Soviet bomber currently opera-
tional. The range and flexibility of some models
can be further increased with mid-air refueling.
Six variants of the BEAR have been produced:
three for strike missions, two for reconnais-
sance, and one for antisubmarine warfare. The
antisubmarine warfare variant has continued in
production in 1982.
Complementing the BEAR in intercontinen-
tal operations, the M-type/BISON is a four-
engine, swept-wing, turbojet-powered bomber
capable of delivering free-fall bombs. About 45
are still configured as bombers, while some 30
have been modified as air refueling tankers.
The Tupolev BACKFIRE is the latest addi-
tion to the currently operational strategic
bomber forces. Introduced in 1974, some 100
are deployed with the Soviet Air Force, with a
like number assigned to Soviet Naval Aviation.
Production of the BACKFIRE continues at a
rate of 30 per year. Most are based in the
western USSR, although over the last few years
the Soviets have deployed a sizable number in
the Far East.
The BACKFIRE is a long-range aircraft cap-
able of performing nuclear strike, conventional
attack, antiship, and reconnaissance missions.
Its low-level penetration features make it a
much more survivable system than its predeces-
sors. Carrying either bombs or AS-4/KITCHEN
air-to-surface missiles, it is a versatile strike air-
craft, currently intended for theater attack in
Europe and Asia but also capable of intercon-
tinental missions against the United States. The
BACKFIRE can be equipped with probes to
permit inflight refueling, which would further
increase its range and flexibility.
Intermediate-Range Bombers: The over 600
Tu-16/BADGER and Tu-22/BLINDER strike
and support aircraft represent a significant ca-
pability for use in theater attack. The BADGER
is by far the most numerous aircraft in the
force. The ten variants of this twin-jet, subsonic
aircraft have expanded its mission beyond
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Blackjack and Backfire Coverage from Soviet Bases
(2-Way Missions)
* Staged From
Arctic Bases
Backfire Base ? Arctic Base -9
standard bombing to include electronic wing, supersonic BLINDER has been deployed
countermeasures, air-to-surface missile deliv- in free-fall bomber, air-to-surface missile car-
ery, reconnaissance, and refueling. The swept- rier, reconnaissance and trainer versions. The
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BADGER and BLINDER, in conjunction with
BACKFIRE, form a potent force for air opera-
tions against NATO and the nations of Asia.
New Bomber Developments: Until the in-
troduction of the BACKFIRE, the most glaring
weakness in the Soviet bomber force was the age
of the aircraft. However, as early as the middle
1980s, major improvements are expected which
will give new life to the force and significantly
enhance Soviet long-range bomber and cruise
missile attack capability.
A new strategic bomber, designated the
BLACKJACK A by NATO, is currently under
development. The BLACKJACK is a large, var-
iable-geometry-wing aircraft. It will be capable
of long-range subsonic cruise with supersonic
high-altitude dash and subsonic/ transonic low-
(US and (LBS1 Intercontinental-
Capable Bombers'
Inventory Inventory
500 , r 500
level penetration. This new bomber is likely to
be a multiple-role aircraft that could deliver
both free-fall bombs and air-launched cruise
missiles to intercontinental range. The BLACK-
JACK could be introduced to the operational
force as early as 1986 or 1987.
The Soviets are developing at least one long-
range air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) with
a range of some 3,000 kilometers. Carried by
the BACKFIRE, the BLACKJACK and possibly
the BEAR, it would provide the Soviets with
greatly improved capabilities for low-level and
standoff attack in both theater and intercon-
tinental operations. ALCMs could be in the
operational force by the mid-1980s.
A new aerial refueling tanker based on the I1-
76/CANDID has been under development for
several years. If operationally deployed, the new
tanker could support either tactical or strategic
aircraft and would significantly improve the
ability of Soviet aircraft to conduct longer-
range operations.
US Strategic Deterrent Forces: By mid-1983,
US strategic deterrent forces will consist of:
?
1,000 MINUTEMAN ICBMs
?
43 TITAN ICBMs
USSR (INCLUDING
uS
?
241 B-52G/H model bombers
BACKFIRE
?
56 FB-111 bombers
ASSIGNED TO
NAVAL AVIATION)
???
?
?
496 POSEIDON (C-3 and C-4) Fleet
??
Ballistic Launchers
? 72 TRIDENT Fleet Ballistic
Launchers
The US force structure dates from the 1960s.
The TITAN ICBMs and the B-52D-model
bombers are being retired in view of their age
and declining military effectiveness. The B-52D
is scheduled for retirement this year and the
TITANS by 1987. The aging B-52G/H bombers
will not be capable of effectively penetrating the
Soviet air defenses in the mid-1980s. The MIN-
UTEMAN force is increasingly vulnerable to a
Soviet ICBM attack.
0 i0
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Year
US data include B-52, FB-111a ; Soviet data include Soviet Air Force,
BEAR, BISON, and BACKFIRE.
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To redress the imbalances and US force vul-
nerabilities which have resulted from the Soviet
drive for strategic superiority, the United States
has initiated a comprehensive and integrated
strategic modernization program. In the area of
US strategic retaliatory forces this program
includes:
? Deployment of more survivable and
effective command, control, and commu-
nications systems,
? Development of the new TRIDENT-
Class submarine-launched ballistic missile
and continued procurement of TRI-
DENT-Class submarines,
? Procurement of 100 B-1B bombers in
the near-term and deployment of the Ad-
vanced Technology Bomber (ATB) for
the 1990s. Similarly, selected B-52
bombers are being modernized and the
air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) in-
troduced into the force,
? Deployment of the new PEACE-
KEEPER (MX) land-based missile as soon
as possible.
Other Nuclear Forces: China maintains its
own long-range nuclear force, which is not part
of any alliance. In planning for theater opera-
tions, the Soviets take this force into account.
Nuclear forces in Europe include four United
Kingdom submarines carrying 64 POLARIS
A-3 missiles. The POLARIS missiles themselves
are being modified to upgrade warhead surviv-
ability and effectiveness on target. Plans call for
replacement of the POLARIS SLBM, but this
program is not scheduled until the 1990s.
France also maintains both land-based inter-
mediate-range nuclear forces and submarines
with ballistic missiles.
STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES
Since the end of World War II, the Soviets
have built and maintained the world's largest
strategic defense force. It includes active de-
fenses such as interceptor aircraft, surface-to-
air missiles (SAMs) and antiballistic missile
(ABM) and passive defenses such as surveillance
and warning systems, hardening, electronic
countermeasures (ECM), and civil defense.
When combined with the strong counterforce
orientation of Soviet strategic offensive forces,
these efforts point to a strategic concept of
layered, in-depth defense of the homeland.
Early Warning: The Soviets have about
7,000 radars throughout the USSR dedicated to
detecting and supporting the engagement of
enemy aircraft. The Soviets have steadily im-
proved their ability to overcome the many dif -
ficulties associated with providing air warning
for such a large country. The chief improve-
ments are the continued development of an Air-
borne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
aboard the I1-76/CANDID airframe, which
could begin deployment soon, and the deploy-
ment of many new types of ground-based air
warning radars and control systems.
For detecting and tracking ballistic missiles,
the Soviets have a redundant system of sensors.
The first layer is the large over-the-horizon
(OTH) radars that can detect: the launch of US
and Chinese ICBMs. These have been supple-
mented recently by a launch detection satellite
system. The second layer is the network of HEN
HOUSE radars near the borders of the USSR.
The Soviets have made a major commitment to
improving this network by building new phas-
ed-array radars on the borders. These large
radars, about the size of a football field set on
edge, take years to complete. When finished,
they will close gaps in HEN HOUSE radar cov-
erage and provide Soviet leaders with better in-
formation about the size and objectives of any
enemy missile attacks.
Ballistic Missile Defense: In conjunction with
ballistic missile detection and tracking systems,
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Coverage of Ballistic Missile Detection
and Tracking Systems
Over-the-horizon radars
Hen House radar
New phased-array radars under construction
Moscow ABM radars
the Soviets maintain at Moscow the world's only
operational antiballistic missile (ABM) system.
The Moscow defenses currently include battle
management radars and four launch complexes
containing engagement radars and ABM-113/
GALOSH interceptor missiles. The system can-
not presently cope with a massive attack, how-
ever, and the Soviets have continued to pursue
extensive ABM research and development pro-
grams, including a rapidly deployable ABM
system and improvements for the Moscow
defenses.
Some of these ABM developmental programs
are coming to fruition, as the Soviets are in the
process of upgrading the Moscow ABM de-
fenses. They are building additional ABM sites
and are retrofitting sites with new silo launch-
ers. To support these launch sites, the Soviets
are building the new ABM radar in the Moscow
area shown in the illustration opening Chapter I
of this report. It is a phased-array radar with
360 degree coverage, somewhat like the Missile
Site Radar from the now defunct US SAFE-
GUARD ABM system, although the Moscow
radar is about twice as large. These improve-
ments to the Moscow defenses, which could be
completed by the mid-1980s, are allowed by the
1972 ABM Treaty as long as the number of
launchers does not exceed 100.
Air Defense: Soviet air defenses are the most
massive in the world. They include an extensive
variety of aircraft and missile weapon systems
with mutually supporting capabilities. Heaviest
concentrations are in the European USSR and
the military/industrial areas east of the Urals.
Qualitatively improved weapon systems are be-
ing developed and will continue to be introduc-
ed into the force.
The Soviet air defense system should not be
confused with those employed by client states
using some Soviet equipment. No Soviet client
state has been provided with anything compar-
able to the highly integrated Soviet air defense
system. Examples of the failure of air defenses
in those states when faced with attacks by first-
line aircraft should not be used to judge Soviet
air defense capabilities.
Aircraft: Evolutionary changes continue in
the interceptor force. Approximately 600 mod-
ern, strategic air defense interceptors with at
least some ability to engage low-altitude targets
now make up half of the force. The Soviets have
been converting FOXBAT A aircraft, originally
designed to counter high-altitude threats, to
FOXBAT E, giving them limited low-altitude
capabilities somewhat comparable to FLOG-
GER. The Soviets have begun deployment of
the FOXHOUND A, their first interceptor with
a true look-down/shoot-down capability. Two
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more look-down/shoot-down fighters are cur-
rently in development and should enter service
soon. As these three types of aircraft replace or
augment older types, the Soviet capability to
defend against low-altitude aircraft, including
cruise missiles, will increase.
SAMs: As in the interceptor force, im-
provements in the Soviet surface-to-air missile
(SAM) force are continuing. Again, the primary
emphasis appears to be a counter to low-alti-
tude targets. Newer systems demonstrate longer
range, particularly at low altitude; improved
mobility; increased target handling capability
and increased firepower. Deployment of the
SA-10 system, which can engage multiple air-
craft and possibly cruise missiles at any altitude,
has steadily increased. In addition to deploy-
ment around the USSR, the system is replacing
the 30-year-old SA-is around Moscow. Devel-
opment of a mobile SA-10 is underway.
Passive Defense: The Soviet Ministry of De-
fense controls the nationwide civil defense pro-
grams of the USSR. The Chief of Civil Defense
is a Deputy Minister of Defense and general of
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 the army. Full-time civil defense staffs exist at
each echelon of the Soviet administrative struc-
ture. Civil defense staffs also exist at significant
industrial, utility and other installations. In
wartime, the civil defense administrative struc-
ture, assimilated into an integrated command
system, would play a significant role in mainte-
nance of the government and the economy.
This goal is supported by the protection provid-
ed leadership through deep, hard, urban shel-
tering and an extensive network of hardened
relocation sites outside the cities, with redun-
dant communications systems. The program
also provides for continuity of support for the
economy in wartime through the protection. of
the essential workforce by sheltering at work
and by the dispersal of off-shift workers to areas
away from worksites. Although much urban
shelter space is available for the use of general
urban populations, their protection is to be
achieved primarily through mass evacuation of
cities. In peacetime, more than 150,000 people
work full-time in the civil defense program. In
wartime, the numbers could swell to 16 million.
The program costs the equivalent of $3 billion
annually.
US Defense Forces: The United States deploys
fewer than 120 ground and AWACS air defense
radars, no SAMs for defense of North America
and less than 300 interceptors (most 1950s vin-
USSR Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft
METERS
20
SPEED(KTS)
RADIUS (KM)
ARMAMENT
WINGSPAN (M)
1,150
925
5 AAMs
12
Tu?128
FIDDLER B
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0
SPEED(KTS)
RADIUS (KM)
ARMAMENT
WINGSPAN (M)
MiG-25
FOXBAT A/E
1,625
1,450
4 AAMs
14
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EFFECTIVE LOW-TO- MEDIUM.
ALTITUDE MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM TO-HIGH
MEDIUM-TO-
HIGH
tage). Moreover, the US has had no ballistic
missile defense (BMD) capability since 1976,
when the single SAFEGUARD site was closed.
The US currently has almost no civil defense
capability.
The US strategic modernization program ad-
dresses some of the major deficiencies in strate-
gic defense, the most critical being lack of
adequate air defense. Programmed initiatives
to improve long-range surveillance include
modern microwave radars for the DEW Line
and over-the-horizon-back-scatter (0TH-B)
radars looking east, west, and south. The US
TO-HIGH MEDIUM LOW LOW HIGI- MEDIUM LOW
LOW-TO-
MEDIUM LOW
LOW-TO-
HIGH
and Canada have developed a North American
Air Defense Master Plan. At least six additional
AWACS aircraft will be procured to augment
current forces available for surveillance and
command and control for the air defense of
North America. In all, five squadrons of F-15
interceptors will replace the 1958-vintage
F-106. The strategic modernization program.
also provides for the vigorous pursuit of
research and development on BMD.
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//l
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CES
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0
In 1981, Soviet Military Power described So-
viet theater forces by category. Soviet Military
Power 1983 examines these forces as regionally
deployed. For military purposes, the Soviets
have divided Eurasia into three theaters: West-
ern, Southern, and Far Eastern. Each theater
has its own political and economic significance
that determines Soviet military goals and objec-
tives in the area and the strategy employed to
achieve them.
The forces positioned for operations against
NATO continue to be given the highest priority
in receiving the newest and most capable sys-
tems. For example, since 1981 the Soviets have
produced 4,500 tanks, including the T-80 de-
ployed to forces opposite NATO. At the same
time they have introduced new ground-attack
aircraft and armored fighting vehicles into Af-
ghanistan and are modernizing their forces in
the Far East. This strengthening of forces is in-
tended to enable the Soviets to achieve their po-
litical/military objectives as rapidly as possible
with the most modern and capable theater
forces, either through intimidation or direct
military action.
A Renewed Concept for Combined Arms
Combat: Capitalizing on their improved and
modernized forces, , the Soviets have reintro-
duced the World War II Mobile Group concept
in the form of Operational Maneuver Groups
(OMGs). OMGs are task-organized, self-sus-
taining, tank-heavy raiding forces constituting
division- and corps-size formations at army and
front levels, respectively. Organized for com-
mitment from the outset, OMGs would be ex-
The new Su-25/FROGFOOT ground attack aircraft,
armed with 30-mm gun, rockets, bombs and mis-
siles, is deployed to forward bases in Afghanistan
to provide close air support to the more than
105,0D0 Soviet troops engaged in intensive ground
combat operations in Afghanistan.
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pected to penetrate the enemy rear areas quick-
ly and independently of the main body of
forces.
The Soviets believe that successful OMG op-
erations could severely disrupt the NATO rear
area, thereby increasing the likelihood of main-
taining a rapid advance without early resort. to
nuclear warfare. Operationally, the OMG
would facilitate commitment of reinforcements
by securing terrain over which additional Soviet
forces must pass while hindering NATO's ef-
forts to reinforce its forces. Additionally,
although the OMG concept has been developed
for conventional offensive operations, it is also
well-suited for exploitation of nuclear strikes..
SOVIET THEATERS
The Western Theater encompasses all of
Europe. Because it contains those nations that
possess a substantial portion of the world's
wealth, technology, industrial capacity, and
military power, it is the focal point of Soviet
strategic planning. The Soviet goal in the
Western Theater is to weaken the Atlantic
Alliance to the point that it is no longer a viable
military entity. In wartime, the primary Soviet
objective would be to seize the initiative quickly
and defeat NATO forces before they could be
substantially mobilized or reinforced. To man-
age military operations against NATO, the
Soviets subdivide the Western Theater into sev-
SOVIET THEATER FORCES
S IET
vI IONS
N -SOVIET
SAW PO ACT
VISIONS
FLOTILL
TOTAL SHIPS
OVIET
I RN FORCES
BALTIC FLEET NORTHERN FLEET
FAR EAST 52 DIVISIONS
FRONTAL AVIATION 1.715
SS?20.' 95+
INCLUDES FORCES
LOCATED IN MONGOLIA
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eral Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs) -
continental, oceanic and intercontinental - in
which designated forces operate to achieve spe-
cific military objectives derived from political
goals.
The Southern Theater encompasses South-
west Asia, to include the Arabian Peninsula. In
this theater, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan
are of particular importance because of their
proximity to the Soviet border and their loca-
tion near Persian Gulf oil reserves. Moscow's
long-range aim in the region is to establish itself
as the dominant power at the expense of the
West. To further this aim, the Soviets' policy is
to modernize and strengthen their military ca-
pabilities, promote dependence upon the
USSR, expand ties with sympathetic pro-Soviet
elements, orchestrate anti-Western propaganda
and obtain access to strategic port and air
facilities in the nations of the Indian Ocean
basin.
The Far Eastern Theater encompasses China,
Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia. The Soviets'
political goals are to improve relations with the
PRC at the expense of US/PRC ties, to prevent
Japan from increasing its contribution to West-
ern security, to unify Korea under communist
rule, and to expand Soviet influence in South-
east Asia. In the event of war, the Soviets would
strive to control western and northeastern
China, to preclude Japanese participation in a
war in Asia and to defeat US and South Korean
forces in Korea.
THE WESTERN THEATER
Soviet forces in the Western Theater are
those that pose the most direct threat to NATO
and encompass all forces located primarily in
the Western USSR and Eastern Europe. Soviet
forces from other areas of the USSR can, of
course, be shifted to combat against NATO.
The following review of the Soviet force mod-
ernization program for the Western Theater
will show that the Soviets are balancing their
conventional and nuclear forces to be able to
fight a range of conflicts.
Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force
(INF) Missiles: The Soviets will employ these
systems to achieve strategic objectives within the
theater. Since late 1977, the nuclear striking
Longer-Range: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
0
REENTRY VEHICLES 7 1
RANGE (KM) 2,000'; 4;100
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///
Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Deployments
200 400 600 800 1000 1200
200 400 600 800
Deployment
1978
Deployment
and Target Coverage
1983
REENTRY VEHICLES H BASES
SS-4 SS-4
SS-5 SS-5
SS-20 0 _SS-20
power of the Soviet Long-Range INF missiles multiple, independently targetable reentry
has more than doubled, even though the total vehicles (MIRVs).
number of launchers has decreased. This mark- Today's LRINF missiles, consisting of 248
ed increase in force capability is due to deploy- older SS-4 and SS-5 launchers, and more than
ment of the SS-20 missile with its three, 330 mobile SS-20s, can deliver an initial salvo of
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some 1,250 nuclear warheads. Of the total
number of launchers, more than two-thirds are
presently located within range of NATO, and
nearly one-fourth of them have been deployed
since 1981. The accuracy and reaction time of
the SS-20 provide a marked improvement over
the older systems. In addition, the mobility of
the SS-20 greatly enhances survivability. Fur-
thermore, each SS-20 unit is assessed to be
equipped with refire missiles-one per
launcher-and each refire missile also carries
three warheads.
Ground Forces: The full impact of improve-
ments to Soviet ground forces opposite NATO
must be viewed in the context of the total
ground forces available. Out of the total of over
190 active divisions in the Soviet force, 94 are
located opposite the Central and Northern re-
gions of NATO. Another twenty divisions are
located in the Transcaucasus and North Cau-
casus Military Districts; these divisions could
likely be committed against Turkey or South-
west Asia. Some 16 additional divisions that can
be allocated to combat operations in Europe
constitute the Strategic Reserve and are central-
ly located. The six Warsaw Pact Allies of the
Soviet Union have a total of 55 active divisions.
In 1982, the NATO Allies in their force com-
parison counted a total of 173 USSR/Warsaw
Pact divisions which could be mobilized against
NATO. Today, that number has risen.
Since 1978, the Soviets have made major
quantitative and qualitative advances in their
ground forces. While technological improve-
ments to hardware continue unabated through-
out the Soviet force, priority is given to the
forces opposite NATO, enabling them to con-
duct rapid offensive operations, characterized
by shock action, massive firepower and high
mobility. These recent improvements in West-
ern Theater ground forces are highlighted in
the areas of surface-to-air, surface-to-surface
missiles, tanks, artillery and helicopters.
Surface-to-Surface Missiles: Complementing
the formidable array of intermediate and medi-
um range systems, the Soviets are continuing to
upgrade their tactical nuclear-capable surface-
to-surface missile force.
? The SS-21 is replacing the FROG-7
in the Western Theater. The SS-21 has a
SS-21 Transporter-Erector-Launcher
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range of about 120 kilometers, 50
kilometers greater than the FROG-7, and
it is more accurate, thus enabling greater
targeting flexibility and deeper strikes.
? The SCUD, normally deployed in
brigades at army and front level, is be-
ing replaced by the SS-23; a tactical
surface-to-surface missile with improved
accuracy and a range of 500 kilometers,
versus the SCUD's 300 kilometers.
? Soviet SS-12/SCALEBOARD :missiles,
with a range of about 900 kilometers, are
expected to be replaced by the SS-22 of
similar range but greater accuracy.
Tactical Air Defense: The Soviets have de-
veloped a massive, layered air defense for their
ground forces to provide air superiority over the
battlefield. They have integrated frontal avia-
tion, radioelectronic combat, SAMs and associ-
ated radars and anti-aircraft artillery into an
unparalleled tactical air defense system. Soviet
tactical SAMs-SA-4, SA-6, SA-8, SA-9, SA-
11, and SA-13-shown on page 31 are mobile
and are a functional part of ground force units
at several levels of command. The ZSU-23-4
supplements the SAMs and interceptors de-
scribed below. These defenses will continue to
be modernized in the future. Of particular note
is the development of a new SAM with enhanc-
ed low-altitude capabilities and with the poten-
WEIGHT (TONS)
35
SPEED (KM/HR)
50
MAIN ARMAMENT
100-min
TANK GUN
115-mm
SMOOTHBORE
125-mm
SMOOTHBORE
125-mm
SMOOTHBORE
125-mm
SMOOTHBORE
MUZZLE VELOCITY
1,400,
1,600
1,750
1,750
tial to defend against tactical ballistic missiles.
Tanks: The Soviet tank force has been
undergoing a major upgrade since the mid-
1960s when the first truly modern post-World
War II tank, the T-64, was introduced. The
first model of the T-64 was followed by at least
one improved version, the T-64A, and several
known variants of the T-72. The most modern
Soviet tank, the T-80, featuring collective
nuclear/biological/chemical protection, en-
hanced firepower and survivability, is in pro-
duction, and at least several hundred have been
deployed to the Soviet Groups of Forces in
Eastern Europe. A dramatic shift in the propor-
tion of these modern tanks, as part of the total
Soviet inventory opposite NATO, has occurred.
The impact on the most critical area-the one
opposite the NATO center-is particularly sig-
nificant. In this area T-64/72/80 tanks make
up about 50 percent of the total, and continued
deployment of the T-80 will increase the pro-
portion of modern main battle tanks.
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Artillery: The Soviets are pursuing a com-
prehensive program of upgrading and expand-
ing the artillery fire support available to ground
forces. Several new artillery pieces, some of
which are nuclear capable, and one new multi-
ple rocket launcher are being introduced.
Simultaneously, an ongoing divisional reorgani-
zation has resulted in increases in the towed and
self-propelled gun firepower of artillery assets.
The addition of artillery battalions to tank
regiments is intended to make tank and motor-
ized rifle divisions fully capable combined arms
forces. The multi-faceted reorganization has
resulted in a 30 percent increase in the com-
bined tube artillery, multiple rocket launcher
and heavy mortar assets since 1978.
In addition to the increase in numbers, sever-
al developments illustrate Soviet emphasis on
technologically improving the artillery force.
Two new 152-mm guns, one self-propelled and
one towed, have been fielded since 1978, and
both are deployed with Soviet forces in Eastern
Europe. They are nuclear capable and replace
older pieces which were not nuclear capable.
152-mm Self-Propelled Guns
152-mm Self-Propelled Howitzer
122-mm Self-Propelled Howitzer
As an additional complement to surface-to-
surface missiles, the Soviets are continuing
deployment of nuclear-capable heavy artillery
brigades armed with the mobile 240-mm self-
propelled mortar and the 203-mm self-propell-
ed gun. The recent deployment of the 203-mm
gun outside the USSR, coupled with the ap-
pearance of the new 152-mm guns, indicates the
importance Soviet doctrine places on the capa-
bility to deliver low-yield nuclear strikes rela-
tively close to Soviet forces.
A new 220-mm multiple rocket launcher has
been deployed opposite NATO since 1978. Each
mobile launcher has 16 tubes and can fire
chemical as well as conventional high explosive
munitions.
The Soviets are also increasing the strength of
their artillery units. For example, army level ar-
tillery regiments are being expanded to bri-
gades -involving an increase of 30 to 80 percent
of their previous strength.
Helicopters: While other Soviet weapon sys-
tems and assets have been upgraded substan-
tially, the attack helicopter force has been
approximately doubled in size and technologi-
cally upgraded. The total attack force opposite
NATO has grown from 400 helicopters in 1978
to a current level of 800. Many of the attack
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Mi-8/HIP E Attack Helicopter
helicopters are now divisional assets due to a
general reorganization of air assets and the
creation of Army Aviation.
The establishment of Army Aviation repre-
sents the most dramatic change regarding heli-
copters and further reflects Soviet emphasis on
creating well balanced combined arms forces at
many organizational levels. Inclusion of six Mi-
24/HIND attack helicopters in divisional heli-
copter squadrons is a tangible manifestation of
this combined arms capability, comparable to
the previously mentioned establishment of artil-
lery battalions in tank regiments.
Most attack helicopters opposite NATO are
the heavily armed Mi-24/HIND D/E and Mi-
8/HIP E. All three aircraft are armed with 57-
mm unguided rockets, which are effective
against personnel and lightly armored targets,
and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). The
ATGMs and rocket pods can be replaced with a
mix of up to 750 kilograms of chemical or con-
ventional bombs on each wing. Other arma-
ment on the HIND D/E is a multi-barrel
M126/HALO A Heavy-Lift Helicopter
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12.7-mm turreted nose gun; the HIP E has a
single-barrel 12.7-mm gun.
Soviet emphasis on a heavy-lift helicopter
transport capability is reflected in the develop-
ment and recent appearance of the Mi-26/
HALO. It is the world's largest helicopter, cap-
able of carrying internally two airborne infantry
combat vehicles or about 100 combat-loaded
troops.
Combat and Support Helicopters
SPEED (KM-H) 250
RANGE (KM) 200
COMBAT-LOADED
SOLDIERS 26
Mi-24/HIND
SPEED (KM-H) 320
RANGE (KM) 160
COMBAT-LOADED
Mi-6/HOOK
SPEED (KM-H)
RANGEIKM) 300
COMBAT-LOADED
SOLDIERS 70
Mi-26/HALO
SPEED (KM-H)
RANGE (KM) 200
COMBAT-LOADED
SOLDIERS 100+
Frontal Aviation: Frontal Aviation has been
the focus of comprehensive modernization and
reorganization programs. The most impressive
changes have occurred in the last five years, and
are a result of the new Soviet emphasis on offen-
sive capabilities. These changes, in the areas of
equipment, training, tactics, and organization,
have not occurred spontaneously, but are the
result of careful, long-range planning to in-
crease frontal aviation capabilities against
NATO.
Since 1978, the Soviets have introduced two
new fighters and three new versions of recon-
naissance/ground attack aircraft. These air-
craft have increased range, improved avionics,
and better altitude and all-weather capabilities
than previous Soviet models.
Soviet Ground Attack Aircraft
(Capabilities Against NATO)
(NATO-Lo-Lo-High Profile)
? The FENCER A/C, FLOGGER J
and FITTER H have had a particularly
profound impact on Soviet offensive
capabilities. The FENCER with its all-
weather, low-altitude penetration capa-
bility manifestly increases Soviet ability to
carry out deep strikes into NATO terri-
tory with little advance warning.
? The Su-25/FROGFOOT ground at-
tack aircraft, currently in use in Afghan-
istan, may eventually be deployed in the
Western Theater. Its role there would
continue to be close air support to the
ground forces.
? The MiG-29/FULCRUM and the Su-
27/FLANKER fighters, currently being
tested, are twin-engine jets with improved
range, thrust-to-weight ratios and maneu-
verability. They represent a concerted ef-
fort by the Soviets to close the technology
gap with the West.
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Frontal Aviation Aircraft
SPEED (KTS)
RADIUS (KM)
ARMAMENT
WINGSPAN (M)
Su-24 MIG-23 MIG-27 MIG-25
1,250
1,350
980
1,200
1,800
1,300
1,200
700
2,500 KG
6 AAMs
3,000 KG
3,000 KG
Bombs
Bombs
Bombs
10 (swept)
8 (swept)
8 (swept)
10 (swept)
Changes have also occurred in tactics and
training that are less visible than equipment up-
grades, but have a potentially far greater effect
on frontal aviation effectiveness. Soviet doctrine
places great emphasis on achieving air superior-
ity from the very outset. To implement doc-
trine, the Soviets have recently made significant
changes in their air combat tactics and training
programs. Pilot independence and initiative are
now stressed. The continual technological up-
grading of equipment and increasing proficien-
cy in combat employment of that equipment
have resulted in greatly increased Soviet avia-
tion capabilities in the Western Theater, partic-
ularly the ability to strike into the NATO rear
area.
Improvements in tactics and training are
aimed toward maximizing performance of a
new generation of Soviet aircraft that will have
better penetration capabilities. Two new fighter
aircraft, the FLANKER and the FULCRUM,
are expected to become operational in the mid-
1980s and will probably be widely deployed in-
the Western Theater by the late 1980s. These
aircraft will be supersonic, all-weather counter-
air fighters with look-down/shoot-down weapon
systems and beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-
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MIG 21 -~ ~Su 25
air missiles. They may have a secondary ground
attack role; in particular, the FULCRUM may
have a true dual role capability similar to that
of the US F-16 and F-18.
BACKFIRE Bomber: Used in a theater role,
the BACKFIRE has a greater combat range and
payload capability than the Soviet BADGER
and BLINDER medium bombers. It also has
better capability to penetrate modern air
defenses in that it can fly at high subsonic
speeds at low altitude. The BACKFIRE's capa-
bilities will continually improve during its ex-
pected in-service life.
Reorganization of Air Forces: A recent ma-
jor reorganization of the command structure for
Soviet air and air defense forces will signifi-
cantly improve Soviet air warfare capabilities.
The new structure provides the Soviets with a
peacetime organization that closely approxi-
mates their anticipated wartime structure for
the employment of air power. This will allow a
more rapid transition to a wartime posture and
will enhance operational flexibility and coordi-
nation through centralized control of air assets
at front and theater levels.
Soviet Navy: The Soviet Navy surface ships,
submarines and aircraft arrayed against NATO
are in the Northern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet and
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Su-24/FENCER Fighter/Bomber
the Black Sea Fleet. Improvements in these
forces during the course of the past five years
have encompassed all aspects of naval warfare
and have involved numerous individual weapon
systems. The principal missions of Soviet sur-
face combatants, attack submarines and Soviet
naval aviation include the protection of the sea-
borne approaches to the Soviet Union and War-
saw Pact Allies and the isolation of NATO
forces from reinforcement and resupply.
In addition to submarines and major surface
combatants, Soviet construction programs have
produced minor combatants well suited to
theater level combat operations. Since 1978,
units of four new classes of ocean and coastal
patrol craft have entered service, including
guided-missile patrol combatants, missile-
equipped hydrofoil patrol craft, torpedo-
equipped patrol hydrofoils and antisubmarine
warfare patrol combatants. In addition to pro-
viding modern platforms with significant offen-
sive firepower to supplant or replace obsolescent
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units, all of these minor combatants demon-
strate improved air defense capabilities.
A major responsibility of the Soviet Navy is
support to Warsaw Pact ground forces to in-
clude defense of their maritime flanks and the
conduct of amphibious warfare operations.
Soviet Naval Infantry units assigned to the
Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets have
undergone a major reorganization, resulting in
an increase in organic firepower. These units
have received self-propelled howitzers and addi-
tional multiple rocket launchers, antitank
weapons and medium tanks.
Chemical Warfare: Soviet ground forces are
the world's best equipped for the employment
of chemical munitions. The forces are also
capable of operating effectively in toxic
environments.
Soviet doctrine calls for the use of toxic
chemical warfare agents in both offensive and
defensive situations. They are to be used in close
coordination with high explosive and nuclear
strikes.
This reflects the Soviet assessment that chem-
ical operations have a distinct advantage over
nuclear weapons in limiting structural damage.
Soviet doctrine indicates that nonpersistent
chemical agents would be used prior to front-
line combat engagements. Persistent CW agents
would be used in the deep rear and along troop
flanks to protect advancing echelons.
There are over 80,000 chemical defense per-
sonnel in the Soviet Ground Forces. This num-
ber would significantly increase during periods
of war. In addition, the navy and the air forces
have personnel who perform chemical defense
duties.
Radioelectronic Combat: In Soviet doctrine,
radioelectronic combat (REC), is designed to
systematically disrupt vital NATO command
and control at critical times during a battle.
The Soviets plan to accomplish this disruption
of control through the integrated use of physical
destruction, electronic jamming, and decep-
tion, while concurrently providing protection of
their own command, control and communica-
tions (C3) Systems.
To implement their REC doctrine, the Sovi-
ets have developed an impressive capability and
continue to field new systems for intelligence
collection, and electronic countermeasures, as
well as physical destruction of enemy assets.
Transport Aviation: Soviet Military Trans-
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port Aviation (VTA) is responsible for provid-
ing airlift for Soviet airborne forces and air
assault brigades as well as the air logistics system
for the armed forces as a whole. VTA continues
to modernize its air transport inventory. The
number of An-22/COCK long-range heavy lift
turboprop transports has remained constant in
recent years. The medium-range An-12/CUB
turboprop transport is being replaced by the I1-
76/CANDID long-range jet transport at the
rate of about 30 aircraft per year. The CAN-
DID can carry twice the CUB's maximum pay-
load about three and one-half times as far.
While the overall VTA inventory has declined
by about 60 transports in the last five years, its
carrying capacity, measured in ton-kilometers,
has risen almost 50 percent.
The Soviets are also developing a new long-
range heavy-lift transport comparable to the US
C-5A, which should enter service in the mid-to-
late 1980s. When available in significant num-
bers, it will enhance VTA's capability to carry
outsized, very heavy loads. It will increase the
airlift potential in support of power-projection
goals and provide greater wartime capacity to
METERS
75
NEW HEAVY
TRANSPORT
45'
lift airborne combat divisions in time of war.
US and Allied Force Improvements: US and
NATO allied forces have also been strengthen-
ed in recent years, but at a less rapid and im-
pressive rate than the Warsaw Pact's. For the
1980s, the goal is to accelerate NATO's rapid
reinforcement capabilities, to modernize US
and allied forces significantly, and to achieve
greater readiness and sustainability. NATO's
longer-range intermediate range nuclear forces
also are to be upgraded in the near future.
US ground and tactical air forces, in par-
ticular, are programmed for major moderniza-
tion over the next few years. An accelerated
procurement effort will introduce larger
numbers of new tanks, combat aircraft and
other systems. The Army is receiving the new
M-1 tank and Bradley fighting vehicles and will
be receiving the Multiple Launch Rocket
System, improved anti-tank weapons, modern
helicopters and air defense weapons. The result
will be US forces that are more combat effec-
tive, more ready and better configured for their
NATO missions. For example, the M60A3
tank, first introduced into Western Europe in
Tianssport Aircraft An=22COCK'.
oN4
11-76 CANDID
e_
TROOP/PARATROOP CAPACITY. 2DO/200
1!75/?175 ' 125/:140
4,200 4?90~
20'
90/60
1,400
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US Forces for Theater Warfare
J 10 TACT L FIGHTER SQUADRONS
1 MA AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
S THWEST ASIA/
INDIAN OCEAN
4 CARRIER
BATTLE GROUPS
PACIFIC
OCEAN
US/WESTERN
HEMISPHERE.
5 CARRIER
BATTLE GROUPS
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
1
AIRBORNE DIVISION
1
AIRBORNE ASSAULT DI
4
ARMORED DIVISIONS
13
MECHANIZED/INFANTRY DIV IONS
80
TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUAD ONS
3
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FOR ES
1979, constitutes about 30 percent of the 5,000
US tanks now in Europe. Although, it features
many technological improvements over earlier
M60s, it still lacks laminated armor and is
equipped with the NATO standard 105-mm
gun. The M-1 tank has many technological im-
provements, including improved armor and fire
control; eventually it will mount the 120-mm
smoothbore gun.
US tactical air forces retain a qualitative ad-
vantage over those of the Soviet Union both in
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28 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUAD ONS
I or 2 CARRIER BATTLE GROUP
aircraft and weapons and-more important-
in personnel and training. The US F-14, F-15,
F-16, and F-18 today are among the best air su-
periority aircraft in the world. They began en-
tering service during the later 1970s, and new
variants of the F-15 now are deployed as well.
The F-15C/D first joined US Air Forces Europe
(USAFE) in 1981; the F-16A/13 also joined in
1981.
The US tactical air forces' ordnance today is
believed to be better than that available to the
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Pact. The AIM-9L Sidewinder has been dem-
onstrated recently to be a highly lethal close-in
weapon.
Completion of the rapid reinforcement pro-
gram, including all division sets of preposition-
ed equipment, strategic airlift programs, and
the Host Nation Support agreements will enable
US forces to deploy quickly to Europe and
elsewhere.
Improvements in allied forces are significant.
In general, allied ground forces will be receiv-
ing more modern tanks, artillery, and anti-tank
systems. The European NATO F-16 fighter pro-
gram is well along, with a total of over 300 air-
craft planned. Other NATO nations are begin-
ning to introduce into service the Tornado
strike fighter, an adverse-weather, day/night
attack aircraft analogous to the Soviet Su-
24/FENCER'. There are procurement plans for
some 800 Tornados, including 165 air defense
variants.
These combined US and allied measures will
significantly strengthen NATO's forward de-
fense capabilities, and help reverse the negative
trends in the NATO-Warsaw Pact force bal-
ance that have been experienced over the past
decade.
US European intermediate- range nuclear
forces are scheduled to be upgraded starting in
late 1983. NATO has endorsed the deployment
of 108 US Pershing II ballistic missile launchers
to the Federal Republic of Germany and 464 US
Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) to
five European countries unless a satisfactory
INF Agreement is achieved. Both systems will
have improved accuracy, and the GLCMs, in
particular, are suitable for attacking some fixed
targets now covered by aircraft.
THE SOUTHERN THEATER
While the modernization of the Soviet forces
opposite NATO receives priority attention,
forces for operations in the Arabian Sea/Per-
sian Gulf have also been upgraded, in par-
ticular, in air power. Soviet developments in
this area reflect, in part, Soviet involvement in
Afghanistan but in greater part, the Soviet
long-range aim of gaining dominance in the
area. The Soviets will no doubt continue to
develop and refine military plans for operations
in this area in the event the opportunity for
direct or indirect military intervention should
arise. There is no better example of the Soviet
willingness to use military force to achieve
political objectives in this unstable region than
the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.
SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN
In April 1978, a successful communist coup
toppled the independent government of Af -
ghanistan. A second coup in September 1979
resulted in a less pro-Soviet regime. In Decem-
ber 1979, the Soviets invaded and installed a
puppet communist regime in Afghanistan.
After more than three years, the Soviets find
themselves embroiled in a counterinsurgency
campaign that cannot be won with current
force levels. Moscow is unable to control the
Afghan countryside or to install a regime whose
influence extends more than a few miles from
major population centers. However, current
Soviet levels of commitment and combat losses
are probably acceptable to Moscow. The Soviets
control the major cities and are working to win
through the attrition of the Afghan Freedom
Fighters, the Mujahideen, and by indoc-
trinating a new generation of Afghans to accept
life under a communist regime.
The Soviet invasion army was equipped and
trained to wage war on the North German or
Manchurian plains, and adaptation to combat
against the Freedom Fighters and terrain has
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been difficult. The Soviet 40th Army in Af-
ghanistan currently has more than 105,000
troops-an increase of about 25,000-30,000
since the 1979 invasion. The increase is due pri-
marily to augmentation by separate security
units, including Ministry of Interior (MVD) and
State Security (KGB) troops, which assumed
protection and security missions, thus releasing
combat units from those functions. Through
trial and error, the 40th Army has evolved into
a force that is often task-organized, supported
by artillery and air assets, the latter in the form
of ground support aircraft, including the new
FROGFOOT and the already proven HIND at-
tack helicopter.
The Mujahideen are short of money, weap-
ons, and military sophistication but not courage
and zeal. They draw their strength from a long
history of independent thinking and a fierce
resistance to invasion, all tied within the
framework of Islam. The Mujahideen are armed
with a variety of weapons that range from turn-
of -the-century rifles to the most modern assault
weapons captured from the Soviet or Afghan
armies or brought into Mujahideen camps by
deserters and defectors.
The Soviet-controlled Afghan army is more a
liability than an asset. Dwindling through de-
fection and desertion, the effective combat
forces of the Afghan army now number about
30,000, down from the pre-invasion level of
over 100, 000. Forced induction of Afghan
males ranging from early teens to middle age
has failed to fill the Afghan army ranks and has
further alienated an already hostile population.
Poorly trained and equipped and with little
stomach for fighting their own countrymen, the
Afghan army still contributes some forces to
combined Soviet/Afghan operations against the
insurgents.
New or modified equipment has been intro-
duced to Afghanistan. The subsonic close air
Mi-a/HIND E Ground Attack Helicopter
support FROGFOOT aircraft, roughly similar
to the US A-10, provides timely and accurate
support with bombs, rockets, napalm and can-
non fire. The AGS-17 automatic grenade
launcher and the 82-mm automatic mortar pro-
vide the high trajectory firepower suited for the
terrain. Although the Soviets continue to use an
older generation of tanks, the latest models of
wheeled and tracked armored personnel car-
riers and self-propelled artillery have found ser-
vice in Afghanistan.
In violation of international law and basic
human rights, the Soviets have made use of
lethal chemical agents to destroy Mujahideen
who have taken refuge in ravines and caves, and
to deny access to or through key terrain. Other
chemicals are also used that destroy crops, kill
domestic animals and poison waiter sources.
In 1982, the Soviets resorted to scorched-
earth tactics, intended to deny the Mujahideen
sources of sustenance. Soviet aircraft conducted
airstrikes against villages, often reducing entire
settlements to rubble. In these operations,
ground forces rapidly move in and systematical-
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ly destroy crops and irrigation systems. Water
sources are contaminated, flocks decimated,
and people killed or forced to flee to the hills.
These ruthless tactics have accelerated the ex-
odus of the brave Afghan populace to Pakistan.
The Soviets continue to improve and expand
their logistic infrastructure in Afghanistan, thus
providing further evidence that they intend to
remain for a long time. Airfields are being ex-
panded and supplies stockpiled. Rail lines and
POL storage sites at transshipment points near
the Soviet-Afghan border are being expanded.
Permanent bridging spans the border river.
With an improved and more efficient sustain-
ability base, the Soviets could increase the num-
ber of combatants that are now currently
employed, or use Afghanistan as a staging area
for intervention in other Southwest Asian
nations.
Three years of fighting has had its effect
upon the Soviet soldier involved in combat. In
Afghanistan he is usually a young conscript who
is ill-prepared to cope with the frustration of the
counterinsurgency war. He is told by his superi-
ors that he will be fighting against Chinese and
Americans backing the Afghan counterrevolu-
tion. When confronted with reality, the soldier
loses enthusiasm and morale. Corruption in the
ranks accounts for some loss of Soviet war mate-
riel. Accounts from Afghanistan tell of troops
selling arms, equipment, and gasoline for
alcohol, drugs, and occasionally, Western con-
sumer goods. Poor morale also is evident on the
battlefield where the soldiers hesitate to leave
the relative safety of armored personnel carriers
to close with a highly skilled and motivated foe;
where the night belongs to the Freedom
Fighters; and where emphasis is placed upon
the indiscriminate use of firepower instead of
sound infantry and combined arms tactics.
Despite this, Afghanistan provides a live-fire
test bed for Soviet weapons, equipment and
doctrine. It further provides the Soviet Army
with a pool of battle-tested officers, non-com-
missioned officers and soldiers. The Soviets will
continue to maintain their presence in Afghan-
istan to keep the Afghan regime under Soviet
control. They will use Afghanistan to extend
their own zone of security, as a potential staging
area for power projection to South and South-
west Asia and to intimidate the regional states.
By Soviet standards the war in Afghanistan is
relatively cheap-in money, men and equip-
ment. Since December 1979, only 5,000 Soviets
have been killed and some 10,000 wounded, but
the number of Afghan dead and wounded is far
greater.
Other than Afghanistan, Soviet forces for op-
erations in the Southern Theater of war are
deployed in the southern Military Districts of
the USSR. Twenty-nine divisions, more than
800 tactical aircraft, and some 400 helicopters
are available to strike Iran, Pakistan, or Iraq
and could continue southward into other Gulf
states. Such an effort would be supported by the
Caspian Sea Flotilla, the Soviet Indian Ocean
Squadron, and a full range of air capabilities
including heavy-lift air transport.
Although most of the divisions in the North
Caucasus, Transcaucasus, and Turkestan Mili-
tary Districts (excluding forces in Afghanistan)
are at relatively low readiness levels, adequate
forces could be generated for offensive opera-
tions in several weeks. Units are receiving more
modern tanks, armored personnel carriers and
other replacements for outdated equipment.
More significant improvements have been
made in Soviet air power in the region. Several
air defense regiments equipped with older
aircraft have been replaced by ground-attack
regiments and airfields have been modified ac-
cordingly. The deep-strike interdiction
FENCER is also deployed in the southern USSR
and could attack targets in Iran, Pakistan, and
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the Gulf oil-producing states. The range of
other tactical aircraft can also be extended by
using airfields in Afghanistan.
US Forces: The US Navy maintains a con-
tinuous presence in the Northwest Indian
Ocean of at least one Carrier Battle Group in
addition to minor forces in the Persian Gulf.
While there are no US combat land forces in the
area, there are periodic deployments of US
Marine combat elements to the region. Progress
has been made in the last few years to enhance
capabilities to respond to the requests of nations
in the region faced with direct or indirect ag-
gression. A US-based major headquarters has
been established and dedicated to. contingency
planning for the area. Additionally, preposi-
tioning of supplies and equipment, both ashore
and afloat, continues on an accelerated basis,
and negotiations for arrangements for access
and use of bases and facilities are in train.
FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
In the Far East, as elsewhere, the Soviet lead-
ership views its growing military power as a key
means of accomplishing political and economic
as well as military objectives. At present, Soviet
military forces in the Far East are second only to
those forces opposite NATO in size, moderniza-
tion and capability.
Soviet forces in the Far East have been sub-
stantially expanded and improved since 1965
and are now capable of large-scale offensive as
well as defensive operations. During the 15 years
between 1965 and 1980, for example, the num-
ber of Soviet divisions opposite China more than
doubled, while the number of tactical, fixed-
wing aircraft more than tripled. The Soviet
buildup in the Far East was largely the result of
the Sino-Soviet rift in the 1960s and continuing
bad relations to this day. Moscow was not pleased
by the reestablishment of diplomatic relations
between China and the US. Further, Moscow
fears the establishment of a US-China or US-
China-Japan security association. In this
regard, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and
Friendship signed in August 1978 heightened
Soviet concern over possible Beijing-Tokyo col-
lusion against Soviet interests in the Far East.
Finally, the Soviets see China's search for ad-
vanced military technology as an unsettling
development.
The Soviets' reaction to these developments
has been consistent with their belief that any
enemy, or potential combination of enemies,
can be intimidated, without a shot being fired,
if the Soviets are perceived to have military
superiority. Thus, the USSR has demonstrated
a growing inclination to rely on its military
power in the region to achieve political goals.
The Soviet Union now bases close to 40 per-
cent of its SSBNs in the Pacific and has built up
considerable naval and air forces to protect
them. Soviet actions in the Kurils and adjacent
areas are also related to their concerns for the
security of the Pacific SSBN force.
The Soviet buildup of forces on Japan's
Northern Territories -four islands off the
northeastern coast of the Japanese island of
Hokkaido-is a vivid demonstration of Mos-
cow's use of military power for political coer-
cion. The islands close to the Soviet Kurils are
Japanese but have been occupied by the Soviets
since the end of World War II. In 1978, the
Soviets began deploying troops to the islands
and constructing military support facilities.
Moscow continued that military buildup during
1979 and currently has about 10,000 troops on
the islands, including a coastal. defense division.
These forces serve as a very visible reminder to
Japan of Moscow's intention to support its claim
to the islands with military force. Moreover,
these islands have strategic value for the Soviets.
They form a gateway between the Sea of Okhot-
sk and the Pacific Ocean. In addition to an ac-
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0
cess to the Pacific, they form a defensive barrier
protecting the Eastern USSR and a vital link for
securing Pacific Fleet operations.
The following is a synopsis of Soviet force
modernization in the Far East and the threat
these forces pose to Asian and US interests.
LRINF Missiles: Soviet Strategic Rocket
Forces pose a major potential threat to the Pa-
cific Region. Over the past decade, a number of
missile systems have been deployed that have
the capability to reach targets in much of Asia.
Starting in 1977, the mobile SS-20 was deployed
to the Far East and is the only operational
LRINF missile in this region. With its three
warheads and increased survivability, this sys-
tem represents an important qualitative im-
provement in Soviet missile forces. Of the more
than 330 SS-20 launchers in the Soviet inventory
about one-third are deployed in the Far East.
Ground Forces: The Far Eastern Theater en-
compasses forces in the four Military Districts
bordering China-Central Asia, Siberia,
Transbaikal, and the Far East-plus Soviet
forces in Mongolia. These forces are primarily
oriented toward operations against China.
More than 50 active divisions are garrisoned in
this region, compared to 20 divisions in 1965.
Most of the dramatic growth in this force oc-
curred during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Since then, Moscow has emphasized qualitative
improvement while continuing gradually to in-
crease the size of the force.
The T-72, one of the most modern Soviet
tanks, was introduced into the Far East in 1982.
Most of the armored personnel carriers in the
region are modern versions. Some divisions in
this area now have modern surface-to-air mis-
sile regiments in lieu of antiaircraft artillery.
Divisional towed artillery pieces are also being
replaced with more mobile and capable self-
propelled weapons. A significant portion of the
inventory of 130-mm field guns has been replaced
T-72 Main Battle Tank: Nuclear/Biological/
Chemical Warfare Training Exercise
by nuclear-capable 152-mm guns which con-
stitute an important upgrading of conventional
and nuclear delivery systems in this region. At-
tack helicopter regiments were deployed to the
Far East in the mid-1970s to provide fire sup-
port to ground maneuver formations.
Air Forces: Since the late 1960s, the Soviets
have also carried out an impressive buildup and
modernization program in their air forces in the
Far East. The tactical aviation fixed-wing force
has dramatically increased from less than 300
aircraft in 1966 to about 1,200 today. There are
also over 500 interceptors, bringing the total
Frontal Aviation in the Far Eastern Theater to
more than 1,700 aircraft. Although the growth
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pattern of the past 15 years is not anticipated,
force modernization with newer aircraft such as
FLOGGER and FENCER will continue. Signifi-
cantly, over 90 percent of tactical aircraft is
third-generation, compared to about 50 per-
cent in 1978. The size of the bomber force has
remained relatively stable, but. there have been
significant qualitative improvements. There are
now about 40 BACKFIRE bombers with the So-
viet Air Force in the region. Combined with
older BADGERS and other aircraft, the BACK-
FIRES pose a substantial threat to targets in
China, Japan, Korea and the Philippines.
Naval Forces: The Pacific Ocean Fleet, the
largest of the Soviet Navy's four fleets, has
grown steadily since the mid-1960s from about
50 principal surface combatants to over 80 to-
day. The 1979 assignment of the KIEV-Class
aircraft carrier MINSK to the Pacific Fleet
highlights the qualitative aspects of the im-
provements that have taken place. The MINSK
is equipped with FORGER VTOL attack air-
craft and HORMONE antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) helicopters. A second carrier of this class
will likely join the Pacific Fleet during this
decade. Three KARA-Class guided missile
ASW cruisers have also joined the fleet since 1978.
Equally impressive have been the improve-
ments in the Soviet submarine force in the
Pacific, which numbers over 30 ballistic missile
submarines, and over 90 attack submarines-
including substantial numbers of modern VIC-
TOR III nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSN), CHARLIE I nuclear-powered cruise
missile submarines (SSGN), and the new diesel-
electric powered KILO conventional attack
submarine. These submarines give the Pacific
Fleet a substantially improved capability in
antisubmarine and anti-carrier warfare.
M1G 23/FLOGGER G All-Weather Counterair
Fighter
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Soviet Naval Aviation has grown by over 50 the Far East since 1980-in addition to the Air
percent since the mid-1960s to a current force Force BACKFIRES in the region-has signifi-
of about 400 aircraft. The deployment of over cantly increased the threat to shipping in large
30 naval long-range BACKFIRE B aircraft to expanses of the Pacific.
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The Pacific Fleet also includes the largest
contingent of naval infantry in the Soviet
Navy-an 8,000 man division based near Vladi-
vostok. Elements of this elite, well-trained force
deploy with naval forces in the Pacific and, on a
limited scale, can rapidly respond to local
contingencies.
The quality and quantity of Soviet forces in
the Far East have been substantially improved,
and these trends will continue in the future.
The Soviets have a formidable capability to
wage wars simultaneously in the West and East.
Moreover, the Soviets have projected their mili-
tary power in the Far East beyond their historic
sphere of influence and have thereby enhanced
their capability to challenge any nation or com-
bination of nations in this region.
US and Allied forces capable of countering
Soviet adventurism in the Far East are those
forces depicted on page 56.
GENERAL NAVAL FORCES
The missions of the Soviet Navy are two-fold:
first, to protect the seaward approaches to War-
saw Pact territory and coastal waters including
SSBN patrol areas and, second, to neutralize
Allied maritime forces which could threaten the
success of Soviet military operations. Each of
these two major missions requires distinct
groups of ships and aircraft. Generally, the
forces protecting the sea approaches are larger
in number, smaller in size, more oriented to a
single task and less capable in terms of weapons
and endurance. These forces are designed to
gain and maintain control of waters contiguous
to Warsaw Pact states and along the coastal
flanks of ground force movements.
The second wartime mission results in an in-
creasing trend toward sustained operations by
large naval formations in all the world's major
oceans. These forces comprise hundreds of
strike bombers, attack submarines and surface
warships. They are forces capable of firing eight
types of medium and long-range nuclear-cap-
able antiship cruise missiles and four types of
missile-delivered long-range ASW weapons.
These modern forces have been created as a re-
sult of improved design efforts and Soviet
advances in nuclear and other technologies.
Concurrently, the Soviets have constantly ex-
187 Meters
Displacement 12,500 Tons
155 Meters
Displacement 7,500 Tons
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US and Selected non-US Forces in the Far East Theater
AF/ALASKA
2 Tac Ftr Sqdns
1 Tac Air Spt Sqdn
1 Tac Airlift Sqdn
1 Strat Recon
Wing
ALASKA
1 Army Inf Bde
19 Surface Combatants
400 Fighter/Fighter Bombers
ROK FORCES
23 Divs
OKINAWA
1 Marine Div
J`V
US 8TH ARMY
(KOREA)
1 Inf Div
''JAPANESE
MARINES/PAC
1 Marine Divy ?R
MARINES/PAC
2 Atk Helo Sqdns
13 Lift Helo Sqdns
7 Attack Sqdns
7 Ftr/Atk Sqdns
1 Photo Recon Sqdn
SELF DEFENSE
FORCES
13 Divs
54 SurfaceCombatants
14 Submarines
360 Fighter/Fighter Bombers
WESTER P. -CIFI .`.O
Marine Landing '
Force Seventh Fleet
PACIFIC/INDIAN OCEAN AREAS _
6 Carriers
89 Surface Combatants
32 Amphibious Types
42 Attack Submarines
1 FBM Submarine
HAWAII
1 Marine Bde
1 Army Inf Div
AF/PACIFIC
9 Tac Ftr Sqdns
'-2 Tac Air Spt Sqdns
1 Tac Flacon Sqdn
2 Tac Airlift Sqdns
1 Strat.Bmb Wg
-'1- Air Ref Wg
PACFLT(based on 7 CVs)
21 Attack Sqdns
9 Tac EW Sqdns
7 Early Wrng Sqdns
fighter Sqdns
Patrol Sqdns
~1 Fit Air Recon Sqdn
2 Flt Log Spt Sqdns
6 ASW Sqdns
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Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile Cruiser KIROV
panded their distant area operations to main- maintained a large naval construction pro-
tain a significant naval presence in the Mediter- gram. This vigorous program now comprises
ranean Sea, Indian Ocean, South China Sea seven classes of surface warships., five classes of
and in the South Atlantic. submarines and four aircraft types. Among the
During the past several years, the Soviets have surface warship programs is the KIEV-Class
57 III THEATER FORCES-1983
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Guided Missile Destroyer UDALOY
37,000-ton V/STOL aircraft carrier. In 1982,
the third KIEV unit joined the fleet with the
fourth unit expected to do so in 1984.
The second unit of the 23,000-ton KIROV-
Class cruiser-the first Soviet nuclear-powered
surface warship-is nearing completion. This
unit will have a significantly improved surface-
to-air missile defense capability, and it is being
fitted with a new SAM believed to be optimized
to defend against sea-skimming cruise missiles.
The first ship of the 13,000-ton gas-turbine-
powered guided missile cruiser of the K.RA-
SINA-Class has also entered service. This ship
carries 16 antiship cruise missiles and an. ad-
vanced vertical launch SAM system of the same
type as that on the KIROV-Class. Additional
units of two classes of guided missile destroyers,
the SOVREMENNYY (antisurface warfare)
and the UDALOY (antisubmarine warfare),
continue to augment the fleet.
Ka-27/HELIX Anti-Submarine Warfare Helicopter
on UDALOY
Of the three nuclear and two diesel classes of
attack submarines being produced, the most
impressive is the 12-14,000-ton OSCAR-Class
carrying 24 SS-N-19 antiship cruise missiles with
a range of 500 kilometers. This is more than
three times as many cruise missiles than have
been fitted on previous classes of series-pro-
duced Soviet submarines. Additionally the nu-
clear-powered, titanium-hulled ALFA-Class
torpedo attack submarines-at 40 knots the
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Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Launchers
US air launched
US submarine launched
Soviet air launched'
Soviet submarine launched'
Soviet surface warship launched2
Range less than 100 NM I F--
All Soviet weapons in these categories are nuclear cabable.
2 Includes carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates.
Guided Missile Destroyer SOVREMENNYY
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Comparative Surface Warship'
Includes carriers, cruisers, destroyers and frigates.
2 Counts each arm of launcher.
world's fastest-and the VICTOR III, fitted
with the Soviets' first towed-array ASW sensor,
are still entering the fleet at a rate of three per
year. The TANGO-and KILO-Classes of diesel-
powered attack submarines also continue to be
constructed. The latter is currently being built
and deployed only in the Far East, although de-
ployments are expected to include the western
fleets by 1984.
Among the aircraft still being built for Soviet
Naval Aviation are the supersonic, variable-
geometry wing BACKFIRE capable of carrying
Comparative
Out-of-Area Ship Days
I
W
Others-
Auxiliaries-
60,0001 Amphibious
1970 1975 1980
NOTE: 1970 and 1975 excludes auxiliaries and support ships.
three 300-kilometer-range, MACH-3 air-to-sur-
face antiship cruise missiles. The FORGER
fighter-bomber also continues to be built to fill
the air wings on the KIEV-Class carrier. In late
1982, this aircraft, carrying air-to-air missiles,
conducted a close-range interception of a US
Navy aircraft over the Indian Ocean.
In the near future, a new attack submarine
will begin series production at two shipyards.
This class will have significantly more capability
than the older VICTOR III.
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KIEV, Lead Ship of the KIEV-Class Guided Missile VSTOL Aircraft Carriers; at top, MINSK.
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The Soviets soon will begin construction of a
large, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier that will
carry conventional take-off and landing high-
performance jet fighters. The first ship of this
new class will probably enter naval service late
in the decade. The Soviets will also continue to
improve the combat capabilities of their anti-
ship and antisubmarine weapons and sensors so
that by the 1990s they will have greater capa-
bilities to fight naval battles on the high seas far
from home waters.
NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT
In May 1982, the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization published the NATO and the
Warsaw Pact -Force Comparison study, which
portrayed the magnitude of the threat posed by
the Warsaw Pact. This publication comparing
NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces carried the au-
thority of all the NATO nations that participate
in the integrated military structure of the
Alliance. The US position at the US-Soviet INF
talks in Geneva was developed in coordination
with the NATO Allies and is based on the Al-
liance estimate of the Warsaw Pact threat dis-
cussed in this study. The NATO Alliance will
soon update this force comparison study to re-
flect the changes that have occurred since it was
issued. While specific data may change, the
magnitude of the threat will not. Displayed in
the following charts and graphs is the compar-
ison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces that was
carried in the 1982 NATO study.
NATO/Warsaw Pact Combat Aircraft
in Place in Europe
Fighter-Bomber
Ground-Attack
Interceptor'
Reconnaissance
Bomber
NATO
1,950
740
285
-
Warsaw
Pact
1,920
4,370
600
350
NATO Naval Forces'
7
Aircraft carriers
Helicopter carriers
6
2
Cruisers
11
15
Destroyers/ frigates
381
274
Coastal escorts and fast patrol boats
180
167
Amphibious ships
Ocean-going
24
41
Independent coastal craft
62
69
Mine warfare ships
349
257
Total submarines
195
190
Ballistic missile submarines
382
352
Long-range attack submarines
72
60
Other types
85
95
% NATO submarines nuclear powered
50%
49%
Sea-based, tactical and support aircraft
including helicopters
801
712
Land-based tactical and support aircraft
112
180
Land-based anti-submarine warfare fixed-
wing aircraft and helicopters
471
450
1 Includes forces allocated to the European and Atlantic areas.
2 Also referred to in the section on Nuclear Forces.
Warsaw Pact Naval Forces'
1981
1971
1981
Kiev class ships
0
2
Helicopter carriers
2
2
Cruisers
20
21
Destroyers and frigates
142
182
Coastal escorts and fast patrol boats
553
551
Amphibious ships
Ocean-going
7
16
Independent coastal craft
190
155
Mine warfare ships
374
360
Total submarines (all types)
248
258
Ballistic missile submarines
382
522
Long-range attack submarines
115
149
Other types
95
57
% Submarines nuclear powered
32%
45%
Sea-based, tactical and support aircraft
including helicopters
Land-based tactical and support aircraft
(including some transport aircraft and
transport helicopters)
Land-based anti-submarine warfare fixed-
wing aircraft and helicopters
1 Excluding the Pacific Fleet.
2 Also referred to in the section on Nuclear Forces.
? About 300 of these are bombers.
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NATO-WARSAW PACT Force Comparison (in place in Europe-1981)
NATO Countries
WARSAW PACT Countries
1,000
Transport/
Support
700
Attack
MAIN BATTLE TANKS ANTI-TANK ARTILLERY/MORTARS
(Main armament 90-mm GUIDED WEAPON (tubes 100- mm
and above) LAUNCHERS and above including
(Crew served Rocket Launchers)
and/or mounted)
NATO
Aircraft
F-111, VULCAN, FA
F-104, JAGUAR BUCCANEER
ARMORED
PERSONNEL
CARRIERS &
INFANTRY
FIGHTING
VEHICLES
NOTES: Warsaw Pact Divisions normally consist of fewer personnel than many NATO Divisions but contain more tanks and artillery, thereby
obtaining similar combat power.
Forces in place in NATO Europe, Warsaw Pact Forces as far east as but excluding the 3 Western Military Districts in Western Russia
(Moscow, Volga and Ural Military Districts).
Number of Short-Range Nuclear Forces
(SNFI at End of 1981,
NATO
Missiles.
LANCE, HONEST JOHN
Artillery155-mm, 203-mm
WARSAW PACT
Missiles
FROG/SS-21
Artillery203-mm, 240-mm
'For NATO the data reflect forces deployed in NATO Europe; for the Warsaw Pact
forces facing NATO Europe.
WARSAW PACT Aircraftz
BADGER, BLINDER, FISHBED,
FITTER, FLOGGER,
FENCER, BREWER
Up to
2.500
' Numbers include land-based maritime aircraft.
' The BACKFIRE bomber has been included in the strategic section because it has
an inherent inter-continental capability although in its maritime and European
land-attack roles it poses a serious threat to NATO Europe.
63 III THEATER FORCES-1983
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IV SOVIET SPACE SYSTE
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s
The Soviet quest for military supremacy has
expanded into space. With the development
and employment of an orbital antisatellite
(ASAT) weapon over a decade ago, the Soviet
Union clearly signaled its recognition of space
as an arena in which to conduct war.
In the past ten years, the USSR has been
launching more than 75 spacecraft per year, a
rate of four-to-five times that of the United
States. Over the past few years, the rate has
been close to 100 annually. The annual payload
weight placed into orbit by the Soviets is even
more impressive - 660,000 pounds-ten times
that of the United States. This level of effort
reflects the importance the Soviets attach to
their space programs; it also reflects some
technological weakness in the areas of longevity
and flexibility. Soviet military and military-
related space programs range from extended
manned missions, to meteorological, communi-
cations, navigational, reconnaissance, surveil-
lance, targeting and antisatellite missions. The
magnitude of the Soviet space program comes
into even clearer focus with the realization that
the USSR currently has under development a
heavy-lift space launch system, comparable to
the US SATURN V, that will be able to place
payloads at least six to seven times the weight of
those of the US space shuttle into orbit.
Since the USSR's successful launch of SPUT-
NIK 1 in 1957, the Soviets have pursued a
vigorous, deliberate and methodical program to
exploit space for military purposes. The initial
Soviet use of space for military applications oc-
curred in 1961 with the launch of their first pho-
tographic reconnaissance satellite. Throughout
Soviet military space capabilities pose an ever-
increasing threat to US land, sea and air forces and
US space missions. The USSR's orbital antisatel-
lite (ASA17 weapon is now operational and tested
each year, it is designed to destroy space targets
with a multi pellet blast.
65 IV SOVIET SPACE SYSTEMS-1983
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the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet military space pro-
grams expanded in both scope and numbers. By
the advent of the space shuttle era, these pro-
grams had developed into mature, integrated
systems for the direct and indirect support of
Soviet military forces, and with the capability to
threaten low-altitude US and allied satellites.
The military, political, and economic value
of Soviet space programs dictates that general
control and direction of the Soviet space effort
rest with the Politburo. The fundamental deci-
sions for military space system research, design,
development, testing, and production at the na-
tional level are made in the Soviet Defense
Council. Both of these organs are headed by
General Secretary Andropov. Actual program
management, however, is overseen by the Mili-
tary Industrial Commission, which reports
directly to the Council of Ministers. All five
components of the Armed Forces take part in
the development and operation of the Soviet
space program. The Strategic Rocket Forces
provide the launch and tracking support.
The USSR has invested heavily in three ex-
tensive space assembly and launch complexes at
Tyuratum, Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar. Each of
these complexes is protected from external at-
tack by surrounding networks of air defense,
including manned interceptor bases and sur-
face-to-air missile complexes. New launch facil-
ities are being built at Tyuratam to handle the
newest generation of Soviet heavy-lift space
boosters that will move from the developmental
to the operational stage in the second half of
this decade. These boosters include one in the
SATURN V class, another somewhat smaller
expendable booster and a reusable system simi-
lar to the US shuttle. Additional developments
include newer spacecraft with greater flexibil-
ity; upgrading of command, control and track-
ing sites; upgrading of ships dedicated to
supporting space activities and expansion of
production, research, development and test
facilities.
On any given day, 70-110 Soviet satellites are
in orbit, more than half of which serve military
purposes solely. Some 85 percent of all Soviet
space launches are exclusively military or joint
military/civilian missions. The resources re-
quired to sustain this effort are enormous. The
Soviet space program in the past has relied
heavily on modified ballistic missiles for space
system boosters. Eleven of 14 launch systems
successfully flown by the Soviets have used
stages from ballistic missiles. The two new ex-
pendable systems expected to have their first
flights in the 1984-87 time period have been
designed from the ground up as space systems.
In keeping with past Soviet practice, several ver-
sions of each of these systems will probably be
developed to support many different space
missions.
Current evidence indicates that the Soviets
are developing a reuseable space system, similar
to the US space shuttle and a smaller space
plane. Orbital developmental test flights of the
smaller vehicle have already occurred. These
systems could be in regular use within a decade
and will further expand the military flexibility
and capability of the Soviet space effort.
Soviet manned space missions are becoming
increasingly complex and constitute the single
most extensive element of the Soviet space pro-
gram. After accomplishing many firsts in the
early 1960s, including the first man in space,
the Soviet manned program was overshadowed
by the US manned program during the late
1960s. Since 1971, the Soviets have placed seven
space stations in orbit. Indeed, there was not
one US manned space mission from 1975 to
1981. The first SALYUT-I manned space sta-
tion was launched in 1971. A second type of
SALYUT station was launched in 1973. Both
were capable of conducting military research.
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In 1977, the Soviets launched SALYUT-6, a
small space station complex, which had a sec-
ond docking collar to accommodate the PRO-
GRESS cargo vehicle and the SOYUZ cosmonaut
ferry. These features provided the Soviets with
the capability to resupply and exchange person-
nel on their SALYUT space stations. On three
occasions the Soviets have conducted manned
missions lasting as long as six months, with the
longest mission 211 days, almost three times
greater than the longest, 84-day, manned US
mission in 1974. Soviet cosmonauts have amass-
ed twice as many man-hours in space as US
astronauts.
The Soviet commitment to their manned
space program is growing. The development of
a large manned space station by about 1990 to
maintain a military presence in space is one of
the goals of the new heavy-lift launcher systems
now in development. In addition to space sta-
tions expected by 1990, the Soviets will use the
heavy-lift space boosters to orbit even larger
space stations and space modules before the end
of the century. Such space stations could weigh
more than 100 tons and be able to support a
large crew for extended periods without
replenishment.
The USSR's introduction, application and
known future development of space weapon sys-
tems point to a coordinated program involving:
? the present generation of antisatellite
vehicles, now operational and designed to
destroy low-orbiting satellites,
? a very large, directed energy research
program including the development of
laser-beam weapons systems which could
be based either in the USSR, aboard the
next generation of Soviet ASATs or
aboard the next generation of Soviet
manned space stations.
The ASAT system, which is now operational,
has the capability to seek and destroy US space
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100
New UO and Za[vft Space Launch Vehicles
HEAVY-LIFT
LAUNCH VEHICLE
MEDIUM-LIFT
LAUNCH VEHICLE
USSR
HEAVY-LIFT
LAUNCH VEHICLE
--- -HEAVY._LI ,_.___
LAUNCH VEHICLE*
WITH 2-3
STRAP ONS
400,000
1,500,000
LIFT-OFF THRUST IBS)
6,925,000
1,300,000.
4^6,000,000";
.8.9,000;000
PAYLOAD TO 180 KILOMETERS (KG)
29,485
13,000
60,000..
n
130-150.000 ,,
systems in near-earth orbit. The Soviets conduct
yearly tests to practice satellite interception and
to refine the ASAT system. One direction of the
Soviet Union's space weapons program is to-
ward the development and deployment of a
space-based laser system. The Soviets could
launch the first prototype of a space-based laser
antisatellite system in the late 1980s or very
early 1990s. An operational system capable of
attacking other satellites within a few thousand
kilometers range could be established in the
early 1990s. Space-based ABM systems could be
tested in the 1990s, but probably would not be
operational until the turn of the century.
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The Soviets have steadily increased their
space photographic and electronic reconnais-
sance effort since the early 1960s. Each year
over 50 of these satellites are launched to sup-
port military forces on a daily basis. The several
different satellite systems in use provide target
location, target identification and characteriza-
tion, order-of-battle, force monitoring, crisis
monitoring and situation assessment, geodetic
information for ICBM targeting and mapping
for military forces.
The Soviet military space program also re-
flects an ever-increasing use of space for world-
wide surveillance and warning. The Soviets
have brought a number of US and Allied mili-
tary forces under surveillance by these space-
based systems. The surveillance satellites
include an ICBM launch detection system and
ocean surveillance systems, such as the two
RORSAT satellites with nuclear-powered gen-
erators that caused worldwide alerts during
their breakup and reentries to earth in 1978 and
early 1983. Soviet efforts in the surveillance
field are expected to lead to a multi-satellite de-
tection, surveillance and attack-warning system
against strategic and non-strategic ballistic mis-
siles and possibly bombers, as well.
The Soviets are increasing their use of space
systems for command, control, and communi-
cations. Since the mid-1960s when the first
Soviet MOLNIYA communications satellite was
launched, the USSR has continued to improve
and expand its communications satellite pro-
grams to support its political leadership and its
military, diplomatic and intelligence missions.
The Soviets are emphasizing the development
of communications networks using satellite sys-
tems that will be placed in geostationary orbits.
Currently, the geostationary satellites-GORI-
ZONT, RADUGA, and EKRANs-occupy or-
bits with the announced function of fulfilling
part of the Soviet domestic and international
Final Testing of SALYUT-7 Before Launch
communications requirements. These satellites
could also provide military communications to
ground, sea and air elements of the Soviet Arm-
ed Forces.
The Soviets have embarked. on an ambitious
expansion of their communication satellite pro-
gram that will add measureably to their global
command, control and communications capa-
bility. Over the next ten years, the Soviets will
develop and deploy an even more advanced
series of communication satellites, some of
which might relay transmissions from manned
orbital command and control platforms.
The majority of Soviet military space pro-
grams has been specifically designed to support
terrestial military operations. However, the de-
velopment of an antisatellite system has extend-
ed Soviet military use of space to a capability for
direct space warfare operations. It is important
to re-emphasize the size of the Soviet program,
demonstrated by a launch rate that is four-to-
five times that of the United States, and the size
of the Soviet annual payload weight placed into
orbit, 660,000 pounds-ten times that of the
United States.
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V RESOURCES AND TEC
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HNOLOGY
For the Soviet Union, the goal of world lead-
ership in science and technology includes a high
level of resource commitment that essentially
involves the integration of two approaches:
? The establishment and expansion of
a large indigenous technology and
production base to support their in-
dustrial and military development
programs.
? The acquisition and assimilation of
Western technologies to reduce the time,
cost and risk involved in supporting their
industrial and military programs. The
Soviet political and military intelligence
organizations, the KGB and the GRU,
have for years been training scientists and
engineers to target and acquire advanc-
ed, militarily useful technology from the
United States, Western Europe, Japan,
and elsewhere. In this way, they have ac-
quired technology worth many billions of
dollars, some of it by purchase, legal or
illegal, or by theft, espionage, bribery,
scientific exchanges and exploitation of
US open literature. The USSR is thus
able to design and produce new Soviet
weapons, saving a great deal of time, ef-
fort and resources in the development
stages. For example, the Soviets have
achieved new capabilities through ex-
ploitation of Western guidance and radar
systems and Western production
methods.
The result has been a sharp narrowing of the
technological gap between the US and USSR.
Although the US continues to lead the Soviets
The second unit of the USSR's newest OSCAR-
Class nuclear-powered cruise missile attack sub-
marines is fitting out at the Severodvinsk Shipyard
on the White Sea. This yard is one of five in the
USSR providing the Soviet Navy with the world's
largest submarine force.
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in most basic technologies, such as the militarily
critical area of electronics, this lead is now not
nearly so apparent in the modern, highly cap-
able weapon systems fielded by the Soviet Union
in recent years. The number and quality of new
ground, naval and aerospace weapon systems
developed by the Soviets are impressive by any
standard.
To support their extensive military build-up,
the Soviets have a well-established, centrally
controlled system that includes a core of nine
industrial ministries heavily involved in military
programs-the Soviet "Defense Industrial Sec-
tor." Subject to Soviet defense direction, these
ministries design the weapons, develop the pro-
totypes, and, as they pass the Ministry of De-
fense evaluation trials, produce the weapons.
Manpower and Production Resources: The
Soviets have the world's largest R&D manpower
base-estimated at over 900,000 scientists and
engineers in 1982, compared to less than
700,000 in the United States. The percentage of
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Soviet R&D manpower engaged in defense-re-
lated work is high-estimates range from 50-to-
75 percent of the USSR's scientific and
technical force. In 1982, the Soviets graduated
over 300,000 engineers from their five-year,
first degree engineering schools-nearly five
times the number graduated by the United
States. Approximately 80 percent of Soviet ad-
vanced degrees last year were in scientific and
technical fields as compared with about 40'
percent of the US advanced degrees. The US,
The foredeck of the aircraft carrier MINSK
presents a broad spectrum of the Soviet ship-
board weaponry: (from right to leftl RBU-6000
ASW rocket launchers, SUW-N-1 long-range
rocket launchers, twin 76-mm dual purpose gun,
four dual SS-N-12 surface-to-surface missile
launchers, SA-N-3 surface-to-air missile
launchers, and 30-mm ADGM Galling guns.
however, graduates significantly more with ad-
vanced managerial degrees than the Soviets,
highlighting US managerial strength and com-
parative Soviet weakness in this field.
Soviet capital investments in those ministries
responsible for ground, naval and aerospace
weapon systems have continued at a rate un-
matched by any other country for at least two
decades. In the strategically important aero-
space sector, Soviet research institutes, design
bureaus and test facilities have expanded signif-
icantly over the past decade allone. The ground
and naval research, development and technol-
ogy (RD&T) bases have also expanded at an im-
pressive rate.
In order to support their growth in military
power, the Soviets have built the world's largest
military industrial base. This base has grown
steadily and consistently over the past 20 to 25
years. The cyclical production of new and up-
graded weapons, continuing facility growth,
and high rate of production keep the arms in-
dustry in a state of constant operation. The in-
dustry now includes over 150 major plants
throughout the USSR, producing ships, air-
craft, missiles, armored vehicles, artillery, am-
munition and explosives. These plants are sup-
ported by a network of thousands of feeder
plants. In addition, the Soviet Union has a large
industrial base providing the electronics and
telecommunication gear required to support its
military operational requirements as well as a
large and still expanding truck industry largely
buik with Western technology; the Kama River
Truck Plant is the most recent example.
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0
The industrial floorspace committed to pro-
duction of the Army's weapons has continued to
expand since the mid-1970s. In 1982, the
Nizhniy Tagil Railroad Car and Tank Plant
manufactured 2,000 main battle tanks-the
T-72, and the latest Soviet tank, the T-80.
Construction at the Severodvinsk Naval Ship-
yard, the world's largest shipyard geared for
submarine production, illustrates the growth of
naval sector facilities. Since 1967, floorspace
has increased by several hundred thousand
square meters, or approximately three-quarters
again the yard's size in 1965. Moreover, Sever-
odvinsk is only one of several Soviet yards pro-
ducing submarines. Twenty-three other major
shipyards have been expanded during the same
period; four new yards have been built.
In the aerospace industry, new, large final-
assembly buildings have been built at nearly
every established plant. A wholly new, large air-
craft plant is under construction. This plant,
when completed, will probably be used to fabri-
cate and assemble large aircraft - transports
and bombers. Qualitative improvements in pro-
duction technology, which typically accompany
new and more sophisticated aircraft, have
paralleled the physical growth of the industry.
In recent years, the military has absorbed. 15
percent of the Gross National Product as com-
pared to less than seven percent for the United
States-and if current trends continue, the
Soviet military's share of the GNP will approach
20 percent by the late 1980s.
The cumulative dollar costs of Soviet invest-
ment for the decade were 80 percent higher
than US investment outlays. The estimated dol-
lar costs for the Soviets were more than twice
the US outlays in the mid-1970s, but, because of
the slower growth of Soviet programs and
growth in US costs, this margin had decreased
somewhat by 1981. The slower growth of Soviet
programs during the period was due to the cy-
clical nature of Soviet military production. The
large Soviet research and development effort,
coupled with observed expansion in military
production facilities, suggests that the dollar
costs of Soviet military procurement activities
may soon resume their historical growth. The
estimated dollar costs for Soviet RDT&E were
70 percent greater than US RDT&E outlays for
the period as a whole, and were more than twice
as great in 1981. The dollar operating costs for
Soviet activities were about 25 percent higher
both for the period and in 1981. The defense
sector is unquestionably the first priority of
Soviet industrial production, whatever the cost
to other sectors of the Soviet economy.
The Soviet Union and the countries of the
Warsaw Pact have, over the past decade, faced
deteriorating economic performance while at
the same time sustaining high levels of military
equipment production for an across-the-board
force modernization. The Soviet economy is
besieged by growing resource scarcities, higher
production costs and by competing priorities
between sectors. Food shortages, low labor
productivity and transportation disruptions
have combined to bring industrial growth to a
post-1945 low. Externally, the high cost of sup-
porting other Communist regimes, also in diffi-
culty, such as Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan,
and Poland, create an additional burden.
TECHNOLOGY
The large, sustained Soviet investments in
manpower, fiscal and material resources have
narrowed and in some cases closed the techno-
logical gap between the West and the USSR
over the past decade. Technology transfer has
played a central role. In many key technologies
used in deployed weapons systems there is no
gap at all. The difference between the general
and the military technological levels of the West
and the USSR results from the top priority the
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Soviets place on technologies and production
critical to weapons performance. One cannot
judge relative military technological capability
by looking at an overall comparison alone.
In electronics, the Soviets are behind the
West in overall capability, but are about equal
in terms of electronics used in deployed weap-
ons. Deployed Soviet military computers are no
less capable than those used in the West even
though Western computer capabilities in gener-
al exceed those of the USSR. This is because
Soviet military computers are on the leading
edge of their technology while those in the West
tend to lag the state-of-the-art by a wide
margin. The same circumstances apply to com-
munications equipment. Soviet propulsion
capabilities reflect Moscow's emphasis on
ballistic and cruise missiles and on a variety of
naval combatants. In these areas the Soviets
rival the West and in some-liquid missile pro-
pulsion, for example-Soviet capabilities are
superior.
Directed Energy: For well over a decade
now, the Soviets have devoted subtantial re-
sources to those technologies applicable to di-
rected energy weapons. Indications of Soviet
interest in radio frequency technologies, partic-
ularly the capability to develop very high peak-
power microwave generators, indicate that the
Soviets intend to develop such a weapon. There
is also a considerable research effort within the
Soviet Union into technologies relevant to the
development of particle-beam weapons.
For many years, the Soviets have devoted sig-
nificant resources to the development of laser-
beam weapons. Their high energy laser program
is three-to-five times the US effort. They have
built numerous classified facilities dedicated to
the development of these weapons.
The Soviet program began in the mid-1960s.
They are pursuing chemical laser development
and have continued to work on the earlier high
energy laser candidates, the gas dynamic laser
and the electric discharge laser. They are also
pursuing related technologies such as the devel-
opment of efficient electrical power sources and
the capability to produce high-quality optical
components in quantity. They have developed a
rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic (MHD)
generator which produces 15 megawatts of short
term electric power-a device that has no
counterpart in the West. The Soviets are com-
mitted to the development of specific laser
weapon systems. Soviet development of moder-
ate-power weapons capable of short-range
ground-based applications such as tactical air
defense and anti-personnel weapons, may well
be far enough along for such systems to be field-
ed in the mid-1980s. In the latter half of this
decade, it is possible that the Soviets could pro-
duce laser weapons for several other ground,
ship and aerospace applications.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Soviet foreign technology acquisition policy,
for both legal and illegal acquisitions, is
directed first and foremost at enhancing mili-
tary industrial capabilities. Western technology
transfer contributes to Soviet military industrial
capabilities: 1) by yielding a direct near-term
military advantage through transfers leading to
a Soviet technological breakthrough, filling a
gap or overcoming a bottleneck. in a mature So-
viet technology; 2) by providing an indirect,
long-term military advantage in helping to
overcome technological lags in the Soviet indus-
trial infrastructure; 3) by contributing to the
overall growth of the Soviet economy by en-
hancing productivity; and 4) by releasing funds
for military production.
The flow of Western technology, equipment
and materials to the Soviet Union has made a
considerable contribution to Soviet military-in-
dustrial capabilities. Industrial. machinery and
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products imported for the civilian industry
often directly support the defense industries.
Since a significant amount of defense produc-
tion occurs in the machinery sector, it: is likely
that at least half of the machinery acquired
from the West contributes to defense produc-
tion. Western, government-backed, low interest
credits and loans provided to the Soviets have
underwritten this trade and greatly facilitated
the development and serial production of mod-
ern weapons. For example, since the mid- 1970s,
the US, its Western Allies and Japan together
have been the source of one-fourth of total
Soviet machinery imports. This one-fourth rep-
resents the most advanced machinery that the
Soviets have been able to acquire. More than 40
percent of these Western machinery imports
have been for the metalworking and chemical
industries-major contributors to Soviet de-
fense production. Much of the remainder of
Soviet machinery imports were acquired from
East European sources, the technology of which
generally falls well below that of Western and
Japanese machinery.
The Soviet Union has undertaken a large-
scale program to acquire Western technology
by covert means in addition to its legal acquisi-
tion efforts. The Soviet intelligence services
USSR: Imports from NATO Countries and Japan
by Major Machinery Import Categories,
1976-1980 and 1981
(percent)
Major Machinery Import 1976-1980 1981
Categories (annual average)
Chemicals
Metalworking
Heavy Vehicles
Oil Drilling & Exploration
Other Machinery2
TOTAL
32.1'
9.7
3.7
3.5
51.0
1 These imports of Western chemical equipment represent 67 percent
of the total Soviet investment in chemical equipment over the 5-year
period -1976-1980.
2 Includes over 20 sub-branches of machinery production, ranging
from power machinery and precision instrumentation to machinery
for the light and food industries.
Defense Production Responsibilities of Civilian Industry
Civilian Ministry
Automotive Industry
Chemical and Petroleum
Construction, Road and Municipal Machine
Building
Electrical Equipment Industry
Instrument Building, Automation Equipment and
Control Systems
Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry
Machine Building for Light and Food Industry
and Household Appliances
Power Machine Building
Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building
Examples of Military Product Lines
Armored personnel carriers, military trucks.
Missile fuels and components, military and civil explosives.
Military support equipment (trailers and missile launchers).
Aerospace, naval electrical systems; hydraulic mechanisms
for gun-systems.
Tanks, tank destroyers, military support equipment (launch-
ers, trailers, garages); turbines and pumps for submarines.
Military computer-related equipment.
Machine tools for defense industry.
Military logistical equipment.
Military generators.
Tracked personnel carriers, artillery, reconnaissance vehic-
les, off-road vehicles.
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(KGB and GRU) along with the Eastern Euro-
pean intelligence services now have several
thousand technology collection officers under a
variety of covers ranging from diplomats to
journalists and from trade officials to scientists
and engineers. Acquisitions through illegal
trade channels can have both military and in-
dustrial applications.
A former Soviet intelligence officer revealed
an estimate that Western military-related tech-
nology acquired by Soviet intelligence has saved
the Soviet defense industry hundreds of millions
of dollars: for example, classified reports on
advanced US weapon systems still under devel-
opment. The classified reports included infor-
mation on the F-15 look-down / shoot-down
radar system, the B-1 bomber radar system, the
PHOENIX air-to-air missiles, PATRIOT sur-
face-to-air missiles, the improved HAWK
surface-to-air missiles, and a NATO air-defense
system. The Soviets stand to save hundreds of
millions, if not billions, of dollars by now being
able to utilize proven US designs to field
counterpart systems-as well as effective de-
fense and countermeasure systems-in a much
shorter time and with less risk.
In other cases, Soviets have acquired image
intensifier and processing devices, infrared
detector materials, frequency analyzers, radar
technology and remote sensing processing
equipment-all with significant military appli-
cations. Soviet acquisitions have included
finished semiconductors, integrated circuits,
and the related manufacturing equipment and
complete production plants, wire memory and
magnetic bubble memory technology, com-
puter software and computer-aided design and
manufacturing technology. The Soviets have
acquired hundreds - perhaps thousands-of
computers and microprocessors, and in a num-
ber of instances have reverse-engineered these
items for their own manufacture and use.
Propulsion: Such technologies as turbine
blade-coating technology have been acquired as
well as information on ceramic: core and mold
technologies for casting aircraft turbine blades.
The Soviets may have acquired not only techni-
cal information on high-bypass-ratio, high-
thrust turbofan engines, but an actual Western
high-bypass turbofan engine as well.
Materials: In the field of composite materials
and associated equipment, the Soviets have ob-
tained technology, materials and equipment in-
volving graphite fiber production, powder
metallurgy, glass technology, protective and
radar absorptive coatings and materials testing
equipment.
Chemical: Entire Western chemical plants
and related chemical processing equipment
have been purchased by the Soviets. Their ac-
quisition of Western technologies, such as
chemical catalyst processes, has had a major
impact on the capabilities of the Soviet chemi-
cal industry. The industry benefited from an
eight-fold increase in Western purchases be-
tween 1970 and 1978. Western purchases rep-
resented more than two-thirds of total Soviet
chemical machinery investments between 1975
and 1980.
Production/Manufacturing: Soviet acquisi-
tion of Western precision machining, drilling,
milling, grinding, gear cutting and reaming
equipment has had significant impact on im-
provements in their manufacturing capabilities.
Acquisition of precision ball bearing grinding
machines, printed circuit board equipment,
precision measuring and nondestructive testing
equipment has also improved Soviet capabilities
significantly.
Military Equipment: Weapons have been ac-
quired legally in some cases, clandestinely in
others, and through losses of US and other
forces such as in Vietnam. Important technical
information was gained on Western fuel-air ex-
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plosives. A number of Soviet weapon systems,
including their ATOLL air-to-air missile and
several surface-to-air missiles reflect near
mirror-imaging of deployed Western systems
and their technologies. Many Soviet antiperson-
nel mines, antitank weapons and grenade
Soviet RPG-18 Antitank Rocket, a close copy of
the US LAW antitank weapon.
launchers are close copies of Western equip-
ment. A number of Soviet aircraft closely
resemble deployed Western aircraft. The simi-
larities are far greater than would be expected
as the result of independent development ef-
forts. A number of naval support systems have
also been acquired, including large floating
drydocks built by Japan and Sweden, which are
being used to service some of the largest Soviet
naval combatants. An illustration of a KIEV-
Class carrier in one of these drydocks introduces
the next chapter of this report. In ground trans-
port, the Kama River Truck plant, built almost
exclusively with Western technology, produces
the Kamaz truck, now widely used in military
transport roles.
DEFENSE PRODUCTION
By any standard, Soviet military production
over the past decade has been enormous and
impressive, reflecting major investments made
in the late 1950s and 1960s and the highest pri-
ority effort to the present day. The Soviets have
systematically implemented their technological
advances-taking advantage of emerging tech-
nologies-to improve their tactical and strate-
gic forces. The following are a sampling of new
weapons development milestones and achieve-
ments since 1970:
Fighter Aircraft: Six new series of advanced
fighter aircraft have become operational. This
includes the new close air support fighter-
bomber Su-25/FROGFOOT, and the new
MiG-25 variant FOXHOUND A look-down/
shoot-down interceptor.
Bomber Aircraft: Two new bombers, the
highly versatile BACKFIRE and the FENCER
A which has capabilities as both a fighter-
bomber and a mid-range bomber, have reached
operational status. The new BLACKJACK stra-
tegic bomber is now undergoing test flights.
Transport Aircraft: Some 10 new types of
transport aircraft, including the wide-body Il-
86/CAMBER and the I1-76/CANDID, have be-
Aircraft Production
USSR and NATO
Aircraft Type
19781
19791
1980'
1961
1982
Bombers
30
30
30
30
30
Fighters/
Fighter-Bombers 1,250
1,300
1,300
1,350
1,100
Transports
400
400
350
350
350
Trainers
50
25
25
25
25
ASW
10
10
10
10
10
Helicopters
650
750
750
750
700
Utility
100
100
50
25
25
Total
2,490
2,615
2,515
2,540
2,240
19IB1 1
NAT02!
0
900
300
1 10
; 800
..100
2,140
'Revised to reflect current information.
2 Includes that produced by the United States; excludes France.
come operational. A new wide-body transport is
in prototype production. An AWAC version of
the CANDID is likely to reach operational
status in the very near future.
Helicopters: Thee USSR has produced ap-
proximately two new series of helicopters every
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five years. This includes the extremely capable
Mi-24/HIND attack helicopter and the Mi-26/
HALO-A heavy-lift helicopters. The HALO-A,
which became operational in 1982, is about
twice the size of the largest US helicopter and
more than doubles the Soviet's Mi-6/HOOK's
lifting capacity.
Ballistic Missiles: The Soviets have deployed
three new Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs), one new Long-Range INF missile,
several new Short Range Ballistic Missiles
(SRBM5), and four new Submarine Launched
Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)-a total of 10 new
ballistic missile systems. In addition, there have
been 13 ICBM modifications and five SLBM
modifications. Two new ICBMs are now being
test flown, and testing of others is expected to
begin within the next year.
Missile Production
USSR and NATO
r
Missile Type
19781
19791
1980'
1981 1982 i
NATO
0
LRI N F
100
100
100
100 100
U
SRBMs
250
300
300
300 300
0
-
--
600
700
750
750 800
700
SLBMs
250
200
200
175 175
--
90
i
53,000
53,000
53,000
53,000 53,000 1 6,900
1 Revised to reflect current information.
2 Includes that produced by the United States; excludes France.
Cruise Missiles: Soviet cruise missile develop-
ment efforts have averaged four new systems
every five years over the past decade. Techno-
logical advances have permitted the progressive
development of missiles with longer ranges, in-
creased reliability and increased accuracy.
Air-to-Air and Air-to-Surface Missiles: The
Soviets have developed and fielded four new air-
to-air missiles and eight variants. In addition,
they have developed seven new tactical air-to-
surface missiles.
Surface-to-Air Missiles: The Soviets have de-
veloped and deployed six new surface-to-air
missile systems since 1970.
Submarines: The Soviets have developed and
deployed a total of 14 new submarine classes
since 1970. The new classes developed include
the full range of nuclear-powered SSBNs,
SSGNs, SSNs and diesel attack submarines.
Major Surface Combatants: Since 1970, the
Soviets have developed and deployed at least 10
major classes of surface combatants including
the nuclear-powered KIROV-Class cruiser, the
KRASINA-Class cruiser, the KIEV-Class guid-
ed missile aircraft carrier and the UDALOY-
Class and SOVREMENNY-Class destroyers.
Other Surface Combatants: Additionally, the
Naval Ship Construction
USSR and NATO
19781
19791
1980'
1981
1982
19iB1
NAT02 j
Submarines
13
12
13
11
8
10 ,
Major
Combatants
11
11
11
9
8
Minor
Combatants
50
55
65
45
55
40
I
Auxiliaries
5
-4
0
I Revised to reflect current information.
2 Includes that produced by the United States; excludes France.
Soviets have developed a steady stream of pa-
trol, mine warfare and amphibious assault
classes of combatants-an average of two new
classes each year. The IVAN ROGOV-Class of
amphibious assault ship is capable of carrying
an entire naval infantry battalion and support-
ing vehicles, including air-cushion vehicles.
Armored Vehicles: Since 1970, the Soviets
have produced an impressive series of armored
combat vehicles-an average of one new system
every two years.
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Field Artillery: Since 1970, the Soviets have
developed and deployed nine new artillery
weapons systems-at least five of which are self-
propelled. The new gun systems range in cali-
ber from an 85-mm antitank gun to a 240-mm
mortar. Several of the new systems are able to
fire nuclear-warhead ammunition.
Tanks: For nearly two decades, the Soviets
have been developing an average of one new
tank every five years. During the 1970s, they de-
veloped and fielded first the T-64A and then
the T-72 with their 125-mm smoothbore gun,
automatic loaders and optical fire-control sys-
tems. A laser rangefinder is in use on some of
these tanks. The Soviet Union's newest tank, the
T-80, is now being fielded.
The Soviet military industry has grown stead-
ily and consistently over the past 20-to-25 years.
Its physical growth and the commitment of
large quantities of financial and human re-
sources are its most dynamic aspect, but its
cyclical production is its most important. Pro-
duction plants remain at work. As old weapons
programs are phased out, new ones are begun,
leaving no down times or long periods of layoffs
and inactivity, although this procedure does
produce plateaus and valleys in weapons pro-
curement during the transition to new systems.
The cyclical process, the continuing facility
growth and the high rates of production keep
the arms industry in a high state of readiness to
meet any contingency and any demand for new
weapons. The military production industry in-
cludes more than 150 major final assembly
plants involved in producing weapons as end
products. Over 3,500 individual factories and
related installations provide support to these
final assembly plants.
Production of Ground Forces Materiel
USSR/Non-Soveelt Warsaw Pact and NATO
19781 19791
USSR
NSWP
USSR
NSWP
USSR
NSWP
USSR
Tanks
3,000
800
3,500
800
3,100
700
2,000
T-55
500
800
500
800
T-64
1,000
-
1,000
-
500
-
200
T-72
1,500
-
2,000
-
2,300
-
1,400
T-80
Other Armored
Fighting Vehicles
Self-Propelled Field
-
-
Trial
Output
-
300
-
400
Artillery
Multiple Rocket
Launchers
Self-Propelled AA
700
-
500
10
300
50
400
Towed-AA Artillery
100
200
-
200
19801 1981 1982 1981
1 Revised to reflect current information.
2 Includes that produced by the United States; excludes France.
NSWP USSR NSWP ;NATO2.
i
520 2,500 600 760
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Defense production includes the new IVAN ROGOV-Class amphibious assault ship. Judging by IVAN
ROGOV's characteristics, the ship can carry three air-cushion landing craft, a Naval Infantry Battalion,
armored personnel carriers, tanks and helicopters.
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VI SOVIET POWER PROJ
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ECTION
Soviet development of increasingly capable
armed forces has enhanced Moscow's ability to
press its challenge to Western interests in nearly
every corner of the globe. Indeed, the Soviet
drive to build these forces and to press their
modernization and growth flows in part from
the recognition that powerful armed forces
underwrite the USSR's status as a superpower
and its ability to satisfy global objectives. The
Soviet long-term goal has remained relatively
consistent-to attain pre-eminent influence in
world affairs. In pursuit of this goal, the Soviets
have vigorously sought to erode the Western al-
liance system, to split Europe from the US, to
promote instability in the Third World, and to
accelerate the expansion of communist socie-
ties. Soviet techniques to implement this overall
strategy have become more numerous and in-
creasingly more flexible, sophisticated, and
pragmatic.
The Third World has emerged as a vital area
for the execution of Soviet global strategy, be-
cause it offers ripe opportunities for expansion
with fewer constraints and lower risks of super-
power confrontation. The Soviets are adept at
exploiting opportunities using coordinated
overt and covert means to aggrandize the power
of the USSR.
The Soviets view power projection as a dy-
namic and coordinated application of various
means including military force, diplomacy,
military advisers and aid, treaties and legal ties,
economic aid, and cultural, media and educa-
A KIEV-Class aircraft carrier rides in an W,000-ton
floating drydock built in Japan in the late 1970s
and now serving with the Soviet Pacific Fleet Ac-
cess to such Western technology is one of many
assets contributing to the enhanced ability of the
Soviet Armed Forces to project power more effec-
tively wherever required in the world.
83 VI SOVIET POWER PROJECTION-1983
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SOVIET GLOBAL
0 Shi yrerage,
West Africa
(5-8 Ships, Avers
(Est.)
Latin America (including Cuba) ......................... 4,700
Sub-Saharan Africa ............................... 3,8004,000
Mideast and North Africa .............................. 8,000
Asia* (including Vietnam) .....?.??????????????????-????2.500
* Afghanistan ........................................ 105,000
Latin America ......................................... 2,000
Sub-Saharan Africa ............................. 35,000-40,000
Mideast and North Africa ................................ 300
Asia .................................................... 100
j t '-,-Republic
ize(U.K.) lamafca St Luae-" Dominica
n ras ..... . ~:.
SOUTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
$50 million $1 billion... ..
Soviet Treaties of friendship.......... .
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad ..... .
Mutual Deese Treaties ...............
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 Poland
Ihda
Kenya
'
Burundi
Tanzania
mbique
alaysi
ingapo
P"lapan
South China Sea
? (15 Ships, Average(
Philippines
PIP
Ney.Galnea
PACIFIC
OCEAN
Kiriba
Tuvalu
POWER PROJECTION
J Niger
10
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Seychelles
Comoros
ada'ascar
,Mauritius
U dia
lndl~ Oce
INDIAN
OCEAN
Major Cuban Presence ...............................
Major Soviet Naval Operating Areas ................. .
Deployed Soviet Naval Forces .........................
Nuclearuubmarine Operating Areas ..................>q\'
Soviet Naval Access .................................. sy
Airfield Access for Reconnaissance Deployments......
ARCTIC
OCEAN
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New
Zealand
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tional exchanges. Added to these are covert
activities by the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the
Committee for State Security (KGB) and Main
Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General
Staff (GRU), to include direct and indirect sup-
port for terrorists and anti-Western or pro-Sovi-
et insurgent groups; the use of what the Soviets
call active measures such as disinformation, for-
geries, manipulation of the media and mass
organizations, the use of foreign communist
parties and front organizations and other politi-
cal influence operations.
Under Leonid Brezhnev, Soviet power projec-
tion increased significantly. In his first major
foreign policy speech, after succeeding Khrush-
chev as the top party leader, on November 6,
1964, Brezhnev signaled his intention to inte-
grate more firmly the Soviet Armed Forces with
diplomacy. Henceforth, he said, Soviet policy
would proceed on the "basis of the military
power of the countries of the socialist camp."
On November 12, 1982, Yuriy Andropov, for
15 years Chief of the KGB and Ambassador to
Hungary during the suppression of the Freedom
Fighters in 1956, succeeded Brezhnev as Gener-
al Secretary of the CPSU. The new Soviet leader
has brought to the top post particularly strong
qualifications in foreign and military policy.
His tenure as KGB chief coincided with major
changes in that organization, including a dra-
matic expansion of Soviet espionage and active
measures operations throughout the world.
Andropov's actions since his appointment --es-
pecially his intensification of the anti-INF cam-
paign in Europe and his pursuit of Brezhnev's
bid to improve relations with the Peoples Re-
public of China after two decades of hostility-
indicate that he intends to provide the USSR
with vigorous leadership in foreign affairs. His
background, his appreciation of the political
utility of military power and his foreign policy
initiatives to date, indicate that he will effec-
tively manage the pursuit of Soviet objectives
abroad.
ACTIVE MEASURES
Moscow views active measures as an offensive
tool of its foreign policy aimed at influencing
the decisions of governments, discrediting and
undermining confidence in leaders and institu-
tions and disrupting relations among countries.
Active measures encompass both covert and
overt activities such as propaganda, activities of
accredited diplomats and officials, friendship
and cultural societies, manipulation of the media
and forgeries, use of military operations, com-
munist parties and front organizations. One of
the most important Soviet considerations in exe-
cuting active measures operations is the ability
to mask the Soviet government's involvement
and to ensure that they appear genuine.
Active measures are an adjunct to the conven-
tional diplomatic methods used by the Soviets.
The objectives of active measures operations are
to weaken the opponents of the USSR, the US in
particular, and to create an environment which
is favorable to Soviet views and interests.
Policy decisions on active measures are made
at the Politburo level, where the general
direction and themes of major campaigns are
approved. The powerful International Depart-
ment (ID) of the Central Committee, headed by
Boris Ponomarev, serves the Politburo by re-
ceiving and coordinating inputs on Soviet for-
eign policy matters and by integrating the
broad range of active measures and carrying
out Moscow's foreign policy intentions. The In-
ternational Information Department (IID), an-
other Central Committee instrumentality, is
charged with formulating, disseminating and
improving the effectiveness of overt and covert
propaganda worldwide. In coordination with
the ID and the IID, Service A of the KGB First
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Chief Directorate is responsible for those active
measures which must be carried out covertly.
Since early 1980, the Soviets have often em-
ployed forgeries in attempts to aggravate rela-
tions between the US and its NATO allies and
to derail NATO's INF modernization program.
Soviet disinformation techniques attempt to dis-
credit individuals, governments or policies by
purveying false or misleading information.
Clandestine radio stations such as the National
Voice of Iran (NVOI) pass on information to
domestic leftist groups, attempt to incite unrest
among the population and broadcast inflam-
matory anti-US propaganda. NVOI was used to
encourage and incite the Iranians who stormed
the US Embassy in Teheran in 1979.
Active measures may include military opera-
tions in order to pressure a target country to
adopt certain policies which Moscow supports.
Other Soviet active measures include political
and economic influence operations that at-
tempt to promote Soviet interests. The USSR
has frequently used its academics, who are
trusted party and government members and its
journalists to promote Soviet positions and as
KGB covers.
A more indirect form of Soviet active mea-
sure operations is the use of intermediaries who
will undertake activities to support Soviet objec-
tives without Moscow being directly involved in
them. One such method is the use of the more
than 70 pro-Soviet communist parties through-
out the world. Activities of international and
local front organizations dominated by pro-
Soviet communists are yet another and one of
the most effective the Soviets have devised to in-
fluence those who are not themselves Soviet
sympathizers. These organizations are not
openly pro-Soviet and are designed to attract
members from a broad political spectrum. The
largest and most important of these front orga-
nizations are the World Peace Council (WPC)
with affiliates in over 130 countries, the World
Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federa-
tion of Democratic Youth and the Women's In-
ternational Democratic Federation.
The Soviet "peace campaign" has made use
of every resource available to Moscow: the WPC
and its affiliates, the other front organizations
and communist parties have all played an im-
portant role in organizing demonstrations and
conferences against strengthening NATO mili-
tarily. In their present campaign, the Soviets
have employed the fronts to support a variety of
well-meaning religious groups, antinuclear
movements, pacifists, environmentalists, youth
and women's groups, and others. It must be
noted that similar groups are not permitted to
operate freely in the USSR and Eastern Europe
to provide a counterpoint to Soviet military,
and especially nuclear, programs.
Over the next several months, Moscow can be
expected to make a determined effort to mobil-
ize mass demonstrations, civill disobedience,
and possibly violence in Western Europe as part
of a major active measures campaign. It will at-
tempt to stress anti-US themes in the "peace
campaign" while deflecting world attention
from Soviet defense programs and expendi-
tures. Active measures permit the Soviets to in-
troduce their ideas into the Western domain in
such a way that the ideas are identified as West-
ern. Soviet foreign policy will benefit from
General Secretary Andropov's proven ability to
direct active measures. The continuation of
such measures can thus be anticipated, espe-
cially as they relate to the frustration of Western
defense initiatives.
LATIN AMERICA
The significance of Latin America in Soviet
strategy has increased measurably in recent
years. The Soviets along with their Cuban sur-
rogates, have encouraged, directed, and ex-
0
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WK SOVIET
4+![ REVETTED HARDSTAND
ANTIAIR,
BERGUN
SOVIET
4NTIAIRCRAF
- GUNS
Sandino Airfield, Nicaragua, upgraded with Soviet equipment
ploited leftist groups in countries where Moscow
sees a potential for bringing revolutionary
regimes to power. Soviet and Cuban efforts re-
ceived a major boost from the July 1979 San-
dinista victory in Nicaragua. With willing help
from Nicaragua the focus shifted to El Salva-
dor, and plans were laid for similar outbreaks of
communist-led revolts in Guatemala, Honduras
and Costa Rica.
To avoid greater visibility and protect itself
from possible negative repercussions, the USSR
has used Cuba as the instrument to execute So-
viet strategy in the region. Cuba also serves as a-
base for cadre training and weapons transship-
ments to regional subversive insurgent groups.
The best known element of the Soviet mili-
tary presence in Cuba is the 2,600-man brigade.
The primary objectives of this unit, essentially a
reinforced motorized rifle regiment, are to serve
as a sign of Moscow's support to Cuba and to
protect Soviet installations and personnel. The
brigade is located in the Havana area, where
some of the 8,000-to-10,000 Soviet military and
civilian advisers are also located.
Cuban assistance in the pursuit of the Soviet
Union's objectives worldwide has been hand-
somely rewarded. In addition to approximately
$3.5 billion in annual economic aid to Cuba,
the USSR has provided grants of more than $3
billion in arms since the early 1960s. More than
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The Soviet Union has continued to add to Cuba's military stren
and the SA eapons the SAms as the
FOXTROT-Class submarine, KONI-Class frigate, SS-N-2 STYX naval cruise such missile weapons
-3/GOA
surface-to-air missile.
$1 billion of this aid has come during the past
two years. In 1981, and again in 1982, Cuba re-
ceived more than 60,000 tons of arms from the
USSR, more than in any other year since the
1962 missile crisis. Because of the deliveries,
Cuba now has the military capability to inter-
fere with shipping in the Caribbean, Gulf of
Mexico and nearby portions of the Atlantic
Ocean. Moreover, Cuba has acquired a capa-
bility to project combat forces in the region by
both sea and air lift. In addition to numerous
transport aircraft and a sizable merchant ma-
rine, Cuba acquired two POLNOCNY-Class
amphibious assault ships in 1982.
In Nicaragua, the Soviets rely on the Cubans
to provide primarily overt assistance, although
last year the Soviets became more openly sup-
portive of the Sandinista regime by agreeing to
economic and military aid programs and by
praising the regime's achievements and ideolog-
ical development. Since 1980, increasing quan-
tities of Soviet-made military equipment have
been transshipped to Nicaragua through Cuba
and other third countries.
Soviet assistance to Grenada has taken the
form of supplying weapons, construction equip-
ment, the promise of a satellite earth station
and development of an airfield and a seaport on
the east coast of Grenada. The principal Cuban
project in Grenada is the Point Salines Airport
project which was begun in January 1980; sev-
eral hundred Cuban construction workers and
technicians are currently working at the site.
Twenty-five percent of Grenada's national bud-
get is allocated to this project. When complet-
ed, the airport will have a 9,800-foot runway,
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Identified Soviet Military
Deliveries to Cuba
0
O 20
Military-associated equipment
(vehicles, field kitchens, uniforms,
radios, and related spare parts)
P1
and will be able to support Cuban troop flights
to Africa, Soviet reconnaissance flights and
fighter aircraft. The rapid buildup of Gre-
nada's military potential is unrelated to any
conceivable threat to the island and totally at
odds with the pattern of other Eastern Carib-
bean States, most of which are unarmed. The
Soviet/Cuban militarization of Grenada, in
short, can only be seen as power projection into
the region.
Between 125 and 150 Soviet military advisers
are in Peru at any given time; this exceeds the
total number of US security assistance personnel
throughout the entire Latin American region.
Overall, Moscow has stated openly that its
policies in Latin America have brought positive
results. While promotion of anti-US policies by
the governments in the Western Hemisphere
will continue to be the Soviet near-term objec-
tive, the creation of pro-Soviet regimes will re-
main Moscow's ultimate goal.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Soviet strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa is
motivated by traditional ideological factors as
well as pragmatic considerations. The sub-con-
tinent is not directly vital to the military defense
of the Soviet Union, but it is important for other
reasons. First, Western countries are heavily de-
pendent upon African strategic resources. The
sea routes around Africa, which carry many
strategic resources, including oil, are potential-
ly vulnerable to interdiction. Western Europe
receives about 50 percent of its cobalt from the
area; the US receives about 60 percent; and
Japan, 68 percent. Cobalt is particularly impor-
tant in the production of jet engines. Similar
resource dependencies exist for chromite, in-
dustrial diamonds, platinum group metals, and
manganese. Second, Sub-Saharan Africa con-
tains nearly half of the countries in the Third
World and is thus an important Soviet target
for expansion and exploitation.
Current Soviet policy in Africa seeks to elim-
inate Western and Chinese influence and West-
ern military access, to increase Soviet influence
and military, political, commercial and cul-
tural access, to establish pro-Soviet or anti-
Western regimes, and to achieve the ability to
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disrupt Western and Japanese access to vital
sources of strategic raw materials. To attain
these objectives, the Soviets rely on both mili-
tary and political instruments. Moscow cannot
compete with the West in providing economic
aid. To compensate, the USSR blames Western
colonialism for African poverty and claims that
it is the West's responsibility to provide econom-
ic assistance. Moscow prefers to commit its
limited economic aid to high visibility projects,
especially those related to the development of
heavy industry.
Military sales and assistance programs are the
most visible and important means by which
Moscow has penetrated Sub-Saharan Africa.
The Soviet Union is the dominant arms sup-
plier, trainer of indigenous military personnel
and, in combination with Cuba, supplier of
military advisers to the region. The Soviets have
entered into military aid programs with nearly
half the states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia,
Angola, and Mozambique are the USSR's most
important arms clients, with Ethiopia account-
ing for over 60 percent of the nearly $6 billion
worth of Soviet military sales to the region since
1977.
Overt political ties remain an important part
of Soviet activity. In this regard, the USSR has
diplomatic relations with most countries in the
region. The bulk of Soviet overt activity is car-
Major Soviet Equipment Delivered to the Third World 1977-1982
Near East
and Sub-Saharan
Total South Asia Africa
East Asia
Latin and
America Pacific
Tanks/Self-propelled guns
7,065
5,205
1,140
640
Light Armor
8,660
6,500
1,590
175
Artillery (100-mm and over)
9,590
5,115
3,510
420
Major Surface Combatants
5
6
3
Supersonic Combat Aircraft
2,235
1,635
--
220
-
130
Subsonic Combat Aircraft--.--
290
- --
150
-
' 80
- --
- 5
55
Helicopters
910
620
- 125
- -
35
------
-
--`----
Other Military Aircraft
345
100
70
65
110
Surface-to-Air Missiles
11,680
9,495 -
-- v
1,575
175
Military Sales Agreements 1977-1982
(billions of $)
Arms Sales Agreements with Select Countries 1977-1982
(billions of $)
Mideast/North Africa 25.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.6
Ethiopia
3.7
Southwest Asia 8.1
Others
.86
South Asia 3.4
Benin
.33
Southeast Asia 2.2
Tanzania
.26
Latin America .8
Mozambique
.17
Cuba 1.7
Angola
.27
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ried out by ambassadors and intermediate level
government and party delegations. However,
diplomatic personnel make up only a fraction of
the total East Bloc civilian presence of 27,000.
The greatest part of this number consists of eco-
nomic advisers and technicians, a number of
whom are undercover intelligence personnel
who engage in covert operations.
There is firm evidence of continuing covert
Soviet support for insurgent and dissident orga-
nizations targeted against South Africa, Zaire,
Somalia, Sudan and Chad. This support is co-
ordinated to varying degrees with Cuba, East
Germany, Libya and Ethiopia. Active measures
in Sub-Saharan Africa also remain a staple of
Soviet activities. For example, disinformation
campaigns have alleged US Government efforts
to overthrow the governments of Angola and
the Seychelles.
Soviet proxies are particularly active in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The most important of these
are Cuba and East Germany, although Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland also
participate to a lesser degree. These nations'
major activities are directed by the Kremlin.
Proxy activities reveal a division of labor within
the Bloc, particularly between the USSR, East
Soviet and East Bloc military advisers train the
Angolan armed forces.
Germany and Cuba. East German advisers help
to develop internal security forces, intelligence
organizations, Marxist-style political organiza-
tions, public services and economic institutions.
The Cubans, although they perform many ad-
visory functions, are most important because
they provide the manpower for military opera-
tions with approximately 36,000 troops sta-
tioned in Angola and Ethiopia.
Soviet activities are most directly focused on
bolstering the client regimes in Angola, Mo-
zambique and Ethiopia. Continuing military
aid to Angola has been supplemented by a $2
billion economic aid agreement for the period
1982 to 1990, designed to reverse Angolan incli-
nations to seek closer ties with the West, al-
though it is questionable whether the Soviets
will, in fact, provide this full amount. Angola
harbors the Marxist-oriented South West
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01-
African People's Organization (SWAPO), which
seeks power in Namibia, and provides the USSR
with access to military facilities.
The port of Luanda is the primary logistical
and maintenance base of the Soviet Navy's West
Africa Patrol, which usually numbers five to
seven units. The patrol's mission is to maintain
a Soviet presence and to provide a contingency
show of force. In wartime, however, the force
could disrupt the surface lines of communica-
tion pending the arrival of a Western counter-
force. Surveillance of international shipping in
these waters is conducted by Soviet naval recon-
naissance Tu-95/BEAR Ds which periodically
deploy to Luanda.
Mozambique's ruler, Samora Machel, has
sought to maintain his non-aligned credentials
and has avoided becoming as closely tied to the
Soviets as are the Angolans. However, military
successes by the National Resistance of Mozam-
bique (NRM) may eventually force Machel to
call for Cuban combat forces and increased So-
viet aid. In return, Moscow seeks permanent
naval access to port facilities. Mozambique, like
Angola, controls ports of access to southern
Africa's strategic minerals and provides a base
of operations for the Marxist African National
Congress (ANC), which seeks to supplant the
government of South Africa. The USSR sup-
ports the more radical wing of the ANC and
seems interested in frustrating a political settle-
ment through bloodshed.
The Soviet Union has made Ethiopia the
militarily dominant country in the. Horn of
Africa. The pro-Soviet regime of Chairman
Mengistu is deeply in debt to Moscow for its
military arsenal and roundly praises Soviet ac-
tivities and policies. Ethiopia serves as a home
base for the destabilization of Somalia, Djibouti
and the Sudan.
In Ethiopia, the Soviets use the airfield at
Asmara, and have exclusive use of the naval
facilities they constructed on the Dahlak Ar-
chipelago. Soviet 11-38 anti-submarine warfare
aircraft are usually deployed to Asmara and fly
patrols over the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and
the Arabian Sea. At the Dahlak base, the
Soviets have been improving naval support
facilities over the past six years. A floating
drydock, barracks, helicopter pads, floating
piers, and navigational aids have increased the
usefulness of the facility, which handled about
87 Soviet naval ship visits in 1982.
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In sum, Soviet influence and involvement in
Sub-Saharan Africa have increased greatly
since 1975, when the Marxist regime in Angola
came to power with Cuban and Soviet assist-
ance. Although Moscow has suffered setbacks in
the Sudan, Somalia, Guinea and Zimbabwe, re-
gional instability makes Africa a lucrative tar-
get for Soviet expansionism.
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
Over the long term, the Soviets aspire to have
the prevailing military presence in the region in
order to influence the policies of the countries
in the area. To achieve their goal, the Soviets
are attempting to attain several short-term ob-
jectives. The Soviets are anxious to play a
leading role in any Middle East peace process in
order to tailor events to their liking. Although
the Soviets seek to establish diplomatic relations
with moderate Arab regimes, they would like to
see these regimes replaced with ones more
favorable to the Soviet Union. The Soviets also
strongly support already established pro-Soviet
regimes in the region and strive to gain addi-
tional access to port and air facilities. Arab
countries have been the largest purchasers of
Soviet military equipment.
Since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Soviets
have paid close attention to the PLO. As the US
influence in the region grew, the Soviet-PLO, re-
lationship grew. This culminated in 1981 with
full diplomatic status being granted the PLC) by
the USSR.
Soviet-Syrian relations were buttressed by the
October 1980 treaty of friendship and coopera-
tion between the two nations. This treaty was
cited by a Soviet spokesman as the basis for the
first joint Soviet-Syrian amphibious exercise,
held in waters off Syria in July 1981.
Soviet-PLO, as well as Soviet-Syrian rela-
tions, were strained by the June 1982 Israeli in-
vasion of Lebanon. The Soviets were concerned
over their inability effectively to aid their PLO
and Syrian clients. In order to recoup their posi-
tion in Syria, the Soviets have placed advanced
air defense equipment, most notably SA-5 sur-
face-to-air missiles, with Soviet technicians in
the country. Provision of this equipment is in
addition to replacements for Syria's losses in the
June 1982 campaign.
11-76/CANDID Long-Range Jet Transport
The USSR's two major arms clients in North
Africa, Libya and Algeria, have accounted for
the bulk of Soviet military sales to the Middle
East. Both countries also rely upon Soviet advis-
ers to maintain their equipment and train their
troops. In July 1981, two Soviet naval com-
batants entered a Libyan port for the first time
since 1970. Soviet naval visits to Libya have
since become a regular occurrence.
The USSR's increased military presence in
Syria provides it with a valuable weapon in en-
suring its place in any Middle East peace nego-
tiation. While relations with the PLO are not as
good as before June 1982, that organization still
needs Soviet political support, and thus is sub-
ject to Soviet influence. Soviet presence in and
additional access to facilities in Libya and Syria
can restore the USSR's military position on the
Mediterranean littoral lost with their 1976 ex-
pulsion from Egypt.
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SOUTHWEST ASIA AND THE
INDIAN OCEAN
The Soviet Union views Southwest Asia as a
region of great strategic significance. Iran is im-
portant because it has oil resources, is adjacent
to the USSR and dominates the Persian Gulf oil
chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz. Iraq is a
major source of hard currency for Moscow in re-
turn for Soviet military aid. Afghanistan is sig-
nificant as a potential base for future military
actions against Persian Gulf countries, as a way
to further isolate China, and as a base for sub-
versive activities against neighboring Pakistan.
North and South Yemen offer control over the
Bab el Mandeb Strait and access to the Red
Sea/Suez Canal as well as potential strategic
and diplomatic leverage on the oil-rich Arabian
peninsula. Moscow also sees Southwest Asia as a
key link between the USSR and the African con-
tinent as well as the Indian Ocean. Moreover,
Soviet leaders believe that the area lends itself to
the exploitation of Western vulnerabilities, par-
ticularly the dependence of NATO members
and Japan on its oil.
For these reasons, the Soviet Union is working
hard to establish itself as the principal power in
the region. The proximity of Soviet military
forces gives Moscow unique political leverage in
this respect. The presence of 105,000 Soviet
troops in Afghanistan, the ground forces and
Soviet air regiments in neighboring Soviet Mili-
tary Districts, and the Soviet naval forces oper-
ating in the Indian Ocean are a vivid reminder
of Soviet capability to act militarily in South-
west Asia and the need for countries in that
region to keep Soviet objectives in mind.
Arms sales provide the rationale for the dis-
patch of Soviet military personnel to Southwest
Asia. Soviets serve as instructors, advisers, and
technicians who conduct military training,
monitor the arms supply and inventory system,
and help with the delivery, assembly and
maintenance of equipment. Excluding Afghan-
istan, there are currently some 2,500 Soviet ad-
visory personnel working in Southwest Asia,
with most of these in South Yemen and Iraq.
As another means of fostering ties to the re-
gion, the Soviets extend economic aid, to in-
clude the sending of thousands of economic
technicians as well as training in the USSR it-
self. Projects normally are concentrated on
basic infrastructure development such as dams,
powerplants, steel mills and oil production. Be-
tween 1977 and 1981, approximately $1.5 bil-
lion in economic aid was extended. Over 16,000
Soviet technicians are working on various indus-
trial projects in Southwest Asia.
The USSR also promotes ties between "pro-
gressive" pro-Soviet states in the region. In early
1981, the Soviets helped lay the groundwork for
a political/economic/military alliance among
three Soviet client states. The effort culminated
in the formation of the Tripartite Agreement
signed by Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen on
19 August 1981, which provided for coor-
dinated military activities and other efforts
against pro-Western countries in Southwest
Asia and the Middle East.
South Yemen, which brokered the Tripartite
Agreement, is a major Soviet arms client and
supporter of Soviet policies in Southwest Asia.
Since 1967, Aden has signed close to $1 billion
in arms agreements with Moscow, and for the
past six years the USSR and its Eastern Euro-
pean allies have been South Yemen's sole source
of weapons. Approximately 2,000 Soviet mili-
tary personnel are in country. Soviet influence
and control in South Yemen are more pervasive
than in any other nation in the region, and
Moscow enjoys ready access to Aden's air and
naval facilities.
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Ships such as the BALZAM-
Class intelligence collector, the
freighter VOSTOK and the
MIKHAIL KALININ-Class trans-
port (top to bottom) provide
direct support to the Soviet
armed forces. The Soviet mer-
chant, research, fisheries and
intelligence collector fleet
numbers in the thousands and
contributes both to the USSR's
military capabilities and the
projection of Soviet influence.
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strument of political penetration in Southwest
Asia, active measures, again, are next in impor-
tance. These subversive activities focus mainly
on Iran and Pakistan where the Soviets face
governments particularly opposed to the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan.
ASIA
Soviet activities in Asia continue to be condi-
tioned by two overriding factors, Sino-Soviet re-
lations and the geographic remoteness of the
USSR from many of the key nations in the
region. Efforts to improve relations with China
were an important aspect of Soviet foreign
policy in 1982. Throughout the year the Soviets
orchestrated a number of exchanges, sent a
series of positive signals through major leader-
ship speeches, reestablished contacts at the
deputy foreign minister level, and took the op-
portunity of Brezhnev's funeral to give special
attention to the Chinese delegation. In spite of
this flurry of activity, the Soviet Union has
made only token gestures to improve relations.
The reality of the relationship remains the con-
tinued military presence of more than 50 Soviet
divisions along the Sino-Soviet border, sup-
ported by some 1,700 aircraft, excluding the
BACKFIRE, and about one-third of the SS-20
force. These forces demonstrate that in Sino-
Soviet relations, as in most other regions, Soviet
military power remains the fundamental sup-
port for Soviet policy.
The Chinese clearly recognize the threat pos-
ed by Soviet military forces in Asia and have
made discussions on these issues a precondition
for improvements in relations. The USSR may
propose cosmetic adjustments in its forces along
the border, but will be unlikely to undertake
more than token force reductions. In this con-
nection, the Soviets have made major strides in
expanding their military presence in Asia since
1979 in pursuit of their long held goal of encir-
cling China.
The major focus of Soviet activity in Indo-
china has been the strengthening of ties with
Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. Moscow views
these states as a base from which expansion can
occur. Further, support for these communist re-
gimes boosts Moscow's ideological credentials
and demonstrates the "forward march of
socialism." Since these Indochinese regimes are
also anti-Chinese, Moscow's support furthers its
goal of encircling China.
Moscow has invested considerable resources
in Indochina. Since 1979, over $2 billion in
military aid, supported by approximately 2,500
military advisers, has been channeled to com-
munist states in Southeast Asia. Since 1976, ap-
proximately $5 billion in economic aid and
3,750 economic advisers have been provided to
these nations. As a result, Vietnam has become
dependent on Moscow and its Eastern European
allies for military and economic support. Soviet
aid programs currently surpass the peak war
years and provide Moscow with leverage over
Vietnamese policies.
In return for this support, the Soviets have
gained access to several facilities in Vietnam,
Cam Ranh Bay being the most noteworthy ex-
ample. At Cam Ranh, they have established a
facility with improved communications and
intelligence collection capabilities to support
operations in the South China Sea and Indian
Ocean. Soviet naval aviation BEAR D and F
aircraft maintain a nearly continuous deploy-
ment to Cam Ranh, from which they conduct
intelligence collection and antisubmarine war-
fare missions. Over 100 of these aircraft have
deployed to Vietnam since 1979. In the same
year, the USSR established a permanent naval
presence of approximately 15 warships and aux-
iliaries in the South China Sea.
0
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Tu-95/BEAR D and F long-range reconnaissance and ASW aircraft operate from Cam Ranh, Vietnam.
The Soviets have been unable to promote
arms sales or economic ties to gain influence in
Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singa-
pore or the Philippines. The USSR's political ef-
forts have been thwarted by the anticommunist
orientation of these states, which has been
strengthened since the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan. Soviet political penetration has also
been hampered by regional repugnance of the
Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. Conse-
quently, the USSR's activities in noncommunist
Southeast Asia have centered on open diploma-
cy and active measures.
Lack of similar access has constrained Soviet
actions in South Asia. As in other regions, mili-
tary sales remain the most important Soviet tool
for penetration. Virtually all their efforts in
South Asia have been directed toward India,
which is the USSR's fourth largest arms client in
the Third World. Recently, India began a well
publicized arms diversification effort which re-
vealed the importance of the arms relationship
to Moscow. In March 1982, a high-powered
military delegation led by the Soviet Minister of
Defense, Marshal Ustinov, visited New Delhi in
an effort to limit Indian purchases of Western
equipment. New Delhi is aware of the political
significance Moscow attaches to arms sales and
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has taken steps to control the number of mili-
tary technicians Moscow prefers to dispatch to
assist in implementing arms agreements. Mos-
cow has also provided India with more econom-
ic aid than any other noncommunist recipient,
about 15 percent of India's total, and the Sovi-
ets are a major trading partner with India.
In 1980, Japan publicly revealed that the So-
viets had undertaken a considerable military
buildup on its Northern Territories-four is-
lands immediately to the east of Hokkaido oc-
cupied by Soviet forces. A principal reason for
this buildup has been to provide the Soviets with
an assured sanctuary in the Sea of Okhotsk
for DELTA-Class ballistic missile submarines.
However, the buildup also underscored the
USSR's intention to maintain possession of the
disputed Northern Territories. In addition to
this military activity, the Soviets have conduct-
ed a wide variety of active measures in Japan,
some of which were publicly exposed in 1982 by
a KGB officer who defected.
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VII THE CHALLENGE
,ry 4 ':r a r
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As a result of the 20-year buildup of the
USSR's Armed Forces, the global military bal-
ance has been shifting steadily against the
United States and its Allies. As the words of the
NATO Secretary General in his foreword to the
official 1982 NATO publication NATO and the
Warsaw Pact-Force Comparisons underscor-
ed, the deterrent strength of the Atlantic
Alliance is increasingly threatened. Moreover,
regions that once were free from the threat of
Soviet Armed Forces have now come under its
ominous shadow.
General Secretary Andropov, in his first
statement to an assemblage of the top echelon
of the USSR, after his selection as Brezhnev's
successor, reaffirmed the continuity of funda-
mental Soviet military goals. He pledged not
only to stand behind but also to carry forward
the military policies of his predecessor. He told
the Central Committee plenum that met on No-
vember 22, 1982:
"As always, the needs of defense have been
taken into account to a sufficient extent.
The Politburo has considered and con-
siders it obligatory, particularly in the
present-day international situation, to pro-
vide the Army and Navy with everything
necessary.
One month later, the Secretary General had
this to say:
"The allegation of a 'lag' behind the USSR
which the Americans must close is a delib-
erate untruth .... We will be compelled
to counter the challenge of the American
More than 330 mobile, SS-20 Long-Range INF mis-
sile launchers-with three nuclear warheads on
each missile and with reloads for each launcher-
are now in the field targeted against Western
Europe, China and Japan. The highly accurate
SS-20 when field deployed has great mobility to
ensure survivability.
101 VII THE CHALLENGE-1983
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side by deploying corresponding weapons
systems of our own, an analogous missile to
counter the MX missile, and our own long-
range cruise missile, which we are already
testing, to counter the US long-range
cruise missile .... Any policy directed
against securing military superiority over
the Soviet Union has no future and can
only heighten the threat of war."
He made no mention of the complete mod-
ernization and MIRVing of the Soviet IC13M
force at a time when many in the West believed
that such strengthening of strategic offensive
forces had been set aside by the strategic arms
agreements which the USSR had signed.
Nor did he mention the Soviet Union's in-
crease of deployed SS-20 Long-Range INF mis-
sile launchers from 250 to more than 330 in
little more than a year when related negotia-
tions were in progress.
He failed to discuss the USSR's continuing
deployment of an offensive chemical warfare
capability to its forward-deployed forces in
Eastern Europe and the use of chemical warfare
in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.
And, no mention was made of the increasing
forward deployment of other ground-, air- and
sea-based nuclear-capable weapon systems
closer to the borders of the nations of Western
Europe and Japan.
The relentless increase in Soviet military
power belies the General Secretary's words. In
shaping US defenses and in consulting and co-
operating with Allies on the common defense,
the US must heed Soviet actions, not Soviet
propaganda and active measures campaigns.
The buildup and modernization of the USSR's
strategic forces, theater forces and space sys-
tems have been catalogued in the preceding
chapters of this report as have the increases in
allocations of resources to the Soviet military
and in the capacity for projection of Soviet mili-
tary power around the world.
The Soviet military modernization program
has resulted in a significant shift upward in the
quantity and quality of all Soviet forces. More-
over, improvements in Soviet military capabil-
ities have not been limited to weapon systems.
They are also reflected in the reorganizations of
their command structure to facilitate a transi-
tion to war and to achieve more effective con-
trol of 'operations.
In the brief period since the First Edition of
Soviet Military Power was issued in 1981, the
rate of upgrade of all elements of the Soviet war
machine has been extraordinary. The recent
change in Soviet leadership gives every indica-
tion that neither the direction or the pace of
military programs is likely to slacken.
While the quest for effective and equitable
arms control agreements has continued, the
Soviets have modernized every component of
their armed forces and explored the potential
for producing even more capable and sophisti-
cated systems.
? Their ICBM force continues to be
modernized with the deployment of the
SS-18 Mod 4 and SS-19 Mod 3 in super-
hardened silos. Flight testing of two new
solid-propellant ICBMs has begun.
? Their SSBN force continues to be
modernized with the production of addi-
tional units of the TYPHOON-Class sub-
marine, with 20 MIRVed SS-NX-20
nuclear ballistic missiles in each
submarine.
? Their bomber force is being modern-
ized with the development of the new
long-range BLACKJACK strategic bomb-
er, and the continued production of
BACKFIRE bombers.
? Their strategic defenses are being
modernized through improvements in
their ABM complex, surface-to-air mis-
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siles, phased-array radar networks, new
interceptors and the construction of har-
dened, buried bunkers for key personnel.
? The Soviets continue to produce and
deploy the three warhead SS-20 in both
the Western and Far Eastern Theaters
and are likely to construct additional
complexes beyond those presently under
construction.
? Their ground forces are being up-
graded with the T-80 tank, the nuclear-
capable SP-152 self-propelled gun, im-
proved armored personnel carriers and
the HIND and HIP attack helicopters
and better comunications and electronic
warfare equipment.
? Their Air Forces are becoming in-
creasingly more capable with the contin-
ued deployment of the FLOGGER and
FENCER aircraft, with the production of
the FROGFOOT ground attack aircraft
and with the flight testing of the
FLANKER and 'FULCRUM high-per-
formance interceptors.
The Tupolev BACKFIRE Swing-Wing Bomber with fuselage-mounted AS4 air-to-surface missile.
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The new OSCAR-Class nuclear-powered cruise-nnissile attack submarine running with sail surfaced.
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? Their Navy is being upgraded and
increased in size with additional units of
the KIEV-Class carrier, KIROV-Class
and KRASINA-Class cruisers and the
SOVREMENNYY- and UDALOY-Class
destroyers. Their modern attack subma-
rine fleet continues to grow with the ad-
dition of OSCAR-and VICTOR-Class
cruise missile units. In addition, develop-
ment continues on a larger, more capable
aircraft carrier.
? With one antisatellite (ASAT) system
already operational, development con-
tinues on more advanced applications of
Soviet n:: %itary power in space.
THE RESPONSE
The facts are clear. What they portend is
equally clear.
Military power continues to be the principal
instrument of Soviet expansionist policy. Year
in and year out, for the past two decades, the
Soviet Armed Forces have been accorded an in-
ordinately large share of the national resources.
The capab'_!rties of those forces-relative to our
own and those of our allies-have been steadily
augmented in every dimension; and there is no
sign of abatement of the scope of buildup. They
have been readied for war at any level and at
any time. Doctrine, structure and offensive
posture combine to constitute a threat of direct
military action that is of unprecedented propor-
tions. However, the Politburo's grand strategy is
to win, if possible, without wholesale shedding
of more Russian blood save as necessary to com-
plete the subjugation of Afghanistan. Thus, the
main operative role of that formidable war
machine is to undergird, by its very presence,
the step by step extension of Soviet influence
and control by instilling fear and promoting
paralysis, by sapping the vitality of collective
security arrangements, by subversion, by coer-
cive political actions of every genre.
The lengthening shadow of Soviet military
power cannot be wished away or ignored. But
neither does it provide the slightest basis for
despair. We have the capacity to restore a stable
balance and to do so without jeopardizing our
other national goals. The combined resources
of the United States and its Allies dwarf those of
the Soviet orbit. More to the point, we have
reservoirs of strength without counterpart in the
Soviet Union: the concepts and values of the
great civilizations which are our priceless
legacy.
We must - and we can - invalidate the Soviet
strategy. In conjunction with our Allies, we
must - and we can - convince the Soviet Union
that it cannot profit from the use of force or the
threat of force in the international arena. We
must stay the course our predecessors had the
wisdom to plot in forging the North Atlantic
Treaty, the Rio Treaty, the ANZUS Treaty and
the bilateral pacts with our Asian Allies to pro-
vide for the common defense.
Deterrence of direct attack on US interests
and those of our Allies must command our
priority attention and shape our defense pro-
grams. The capabilities needed to prevent
war-war which we will never initiate-are fun-
damentally different from those that drive
Soviet force development and deployment.
Given these asymmetries, there is no require-
ment to match the Soviets unit for unit, weap-
ons systems for weapons systems. What is
required is a nuclear and conventional posture
that makes any Soviet military option too uncer-
tain of outcome and too high of cost to be pur-
sued. That posture is in part military sinew and
in part national resolve. The combination must
convince the aggressor that we have the stamina
to withstand an initial onslaught and the will to
respond in a manner that denies attainment of
the objective of aggression.
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Apart from the deterrence of direct attack,
we must prevent the Soviet Union from exploit-
ing its growing military strength-on and off
the Eurasian land mass-to further its objec-
tives through coercion and other indirect
means. Our collective security arrangements-
strengthened by the mutually supporting assets
of our Allies, our forward deployments and our
rapid reinforcement capabilities -provide the
barrier against such threats. Our alliance struc-
tures must continue to make evident to the en-
tire world that we stand together against all
threats to the territorial integrity or internal
security of any members.
The defense programs we have set in train
will help to redress the adverse trends in the mil-
itary balance and assure that the Soviet Union
cannot capitalize on the power of its armed
forces for political advantage. Our programs
thus promote the security and stability of the
world community.
Those programs reflect difficult choices.
Given the immediacy of the threat and the in-
herited deficiencies of our force structure, first
priority has been placed on the modernization
of all three components of our strategic nuclear
forces and associated command and control sys-
tems, and the readiness upgrade of our conven-
tional forces. But we have also recognized that
defense is a long-term effort, unless and until
the Soviet Union becomes a fully cooperating
member of a world community of nations func-
tioning under the rule of law. Thus, we and our
Allies have also begun to modernize our conven-
tional forces, increase their staying power and
expand their numbers to be able to cope with
the continuing growth of Soviet military power.
We must demonstrate a constancy in our own
programs. Of equal importance, we must have
the resolve to work unceasingly for the security
of all free nations. Only then will the Soviets be
convinced that their military buildup is futile
and the way be paved for restoring peace at the
lowest level of armaments.
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