PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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• Publication Date: May 1, 1983
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STAT
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Problems
of
Communism
MAY JUNE 1983
k\L
CHOICE AND CHANGE
IN SOVIET POLITICS
William E. Odom
Book Reviews
Nicholas Vaslef
Francis P. Hoeber &
Robert Dannenberg
Robert W. Campbell
Gordon B. Smith.
Samuel P Huntington
Oles Smolansky
Poland's Military Burden
Michael Checinski
Insurgency in
Europe in Soviet Eyes Southeast Asia
Adam Ulam Shee Poon Kim
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/,j
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MAY-JUNE 1983 VOL XXXII
Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941x) is a
bimonthly publication providing analyses and
significant information about the contemporary affairs
of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and
political movements. Views of contributors, as well as
geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily
reflect the policies of the United States Government.
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An annual index for Problems of Communism appears
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except in the case of the first three volumes, which are
covered in a combined index in the November-
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journal is also indexed in ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie
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Guide, and United States Political Science Documents.
Choice and Change in Soviet Politics
by William E. Odom
Europe in Soviet Eyes
by Adam Ulam
Poland's Military Burden
by Michael Checinski
Insurgency in Southeast Asia
by Shee Poon Kim
BOOKS
Soviet Strategic Style
by Nicholas Vaslef
Moscow and the Military Use of Space
by Francis P. Hoeber and Robert M. Dannenberg
Economic Issues in the USSR
by Robert W. Campbell
Technology Transfer and Soviet Innovation
by Gordon B. Smith
Weighing Power and Principle
by Samuel P. Huntington
Gulf Security and Outside Powers
by 0/es Smolansky
Cover: General Secretary Yuriy Andropov and
Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov at
the May Day 1983 parade in Moscow's Red
Square: Photo by Time.
EDITOR
Paul A. Smith, Jr.
MANAGING EDITOR SENIOR TEXT EDITOR
Wayne Hall Sophia Sluzar
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
David E. Pollock Richard Snyder
DESIGNER
Gary Soderstrom
PRODUCTION COORDINATOR EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Linda A. Raymond Gwenette Worthington
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Choice and Change
in Soviet Politics
by William E. Odom
Anticipated for several years, the post-Brezhnev
era is at last here. In the West it has been
awaited as a turning point, a time when new
policy initiatives and new political forces would come
into play. Many viewed it optimistically as a chance for
positive change in both Soviet foreign and domestic
policies. A new generation of younger leaders, it was
hoped, might bring a surge of imagination and energy
leading to significant reform internally and a new
detente with the West-with genuine concessions on
arms control and "rules of the game" for regional
competition permitting the USSR to draw back from
its rather extended commitments, especially in the
Third World-in order to give more attention to solving
accumulated domestic problems. Others anticipated a
rapid turnover of elites, internal reform, but no retreat
from an assertive foreign policy.
When Yuriy Andropov speedily succeeded Leonid
Brezhnev as party general secretary, it came as a sur-
prise to many, particularly those who expected posi-
tive change. How could this happen? How could
Andropov, long the head of the secret police (KGB),
achieve what his predecessor Lavrentiy Beria appar-
ently tried and failed to achieve after Stalin's death?
Surely his accession must be merely the first round in
the succession struggle. Surely the younger set
among the leadership will not let things settle down
until the geriatric Politburo has been repopulated with
a youthful membership. To be sure, old age is forcing
Major General William Odom is the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. His
works on Soviet affairs include The Soviet Volunteers
(1975) and articles in World Politics, Foreign Policy,
The Washington Quarterly, Problems of Communism,
and other journals. Gen. Odom's views do not neces-
sarily reflect the official position of the US government.
turnover in elites at an increasing rate; nevertheless,
the anticipated breakup of consensus in the Politburo
and of the policymaking system has yet to occur and
seems unlikely in the near future. The real surprise is
that students of Soviet affairs generally did not antic-
ipate what has happened thus far; namely, they did
not take the Andropov candidacy seriously and ex-
pected a much more erratic transfer of power.
Why Andropov?
Why, indeed, did Andropov win the first round? The
answer to this question lies primarily in the organiza-
tional and structural features of the Soviet party-state
system at its apex. All of Lenin's successors-Stalin,
Malenkov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov-
held positions in two key institutions: the Politburo
and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As Merle
Fainsod, Leonard Schapiro, and others have pointed
out, real power in the party-state system depends
above all on controlling party cadre assignments, that
is, personnel.' The institution offering that control is
the Secretariat. Lenin depended on Yakov Sverdlov to
manage cadres in the early years of the Soviet re-
gime.' After Sverdlov's death, Stalin gradually took
over this task, using the Organization Bureau and the
Secretariat to set up a comprehensive personnel sys-
tem. Challenges to his grip on cadres failed, and
Stalin slowly accumulated enough power to have him-
self named general secretary in 1922.
'See, e.g., Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press, 1963, pp. 180-84; and Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, New York, NY, Random House, 1960, pp. 548, 550-53.
'Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 243-50, and William E. Odom, "Sverdlov: Bolshevik Party
Organizer," Slavonic and East European Review (London), July 1966, pp. 421-43.
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Choice and Change in Soviet Politics
Key Soviet leaders at a wreath-laying during the December 1982 observances of the 60th anniversary of the
USSR, in the first row, from left to right: Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, Politburo member and Central Com-
mittee Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, General Secretary Yuriy Andropov, Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, and For-
eign Minister Andrey Gromyko.
The key to cadre control is the nomenklatura sys-
tem, institutionalized early in the Soviet regime. It is a
list of positions which can only be filled by persons
who have the approval of the higher party apparatus.'
One of the Secretariat's major roles is looking after the
hundreds of thousands of nomenklatura posts. They
include not just positions in the party apparatus but
also thousands of posts judged essential for
controlling state and economic institutions. The
nomenklatura system ensures for the Secretariat a
network of reliable agents in all institutions of conse-
quence who are beholden to the Secretariat for the
rank, stature, and privileges that accompany these
strategic posts. There is no sign that this system has
atrophied or weakened significantly since its incep-
tion. The Secretariat, therefore, remains key for any
aspirant to the top political post in the party. Without
it, he could not hope to make the Central Committee
and lower party officialdom sing his tune in choosing a
new general secretary. It goes without saying, then,
that any serious candidate in the post-Brezhnev suc-
cession had to be a party secretary. It goes equally
without saying that an aspirant for the highest post
had also to be a member of the Politburo, the top
policy- and decision-making body of the party. There
is no precedent in Soviet history of anyone who was
not a Politburo member becoming general secretary of
the CPSU.
Had Brezhnev died several years ago, Andropov
might well have failed to claim the General Secretary's
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mantle. There were other Politburo members also
holding party secretary posts who could have been se-
rious challengers. Mikhail Suslov's position was un-
doubtedly quite powerful in light of his long tenure in
both top party organs. Dmitriy Ustinov held both posts
for a time. Andrey Kirilenko was long judged a likely
successor precisely because he held both positions.
And Konstantin Chernenko's ascendancy as a poten-
tial successor derived from the same dual base.
However, in January 1982 Suslov died. Ustinov,
who became minister of defense in 1976, had yielded
his secretary post in the same year. Kirilenko has
been reported to have been in less than robust health
during the past few years, a factor that may account
for his failure to win the first post-Brezhnev round.
Chernenko certainly held the requisite posts, and had
to be taken seriously as a competitor, notwithstanding
his somewhat mousy character and clerk-like sub-
servience to Brezhnev.
Thus, the key question for a serious Kremlinologist
became "who would replace Suslov in the Secretari-
at?" This would be the critical clue to the nature of the
expected succession struggle. There were two dra-
matically different possibilities. One was unlikely but
had to be considered because, had it occurred, the
succession dynamics would have been altered funda-
mentally. This would have been to turn to the
Leningrad or Ukrainian party organization, both of
which have always played key roles in party factional
struggles. Grigoriy Romanov, reportedly a very tough
and hard-line younger Politburo member, might well
have been brought to Moscow from Leningrad to work
as secretary. But Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, first sec-
retary of the Ukrainian party, was a more likely candi-
date. Because he is relatively young, he could have
brought new energy to the top party apparatus.
Had either of these Politburo members captured
Suslov's post as secretary, we would be facing a quite
different situation in the post-Brezhnev era. They
would have worked rapidly during the last months of
Brezhnev's life to shuffle as many party posts as pos-
sible in preparation for the succession struggle. They
would have brought their own coterie of party
apparatchiki into the competition. The Moscow center
would have been under assault by cadres from a re-
gional center. In that circumstance, a quick and easy
transfer of power to a new general secretary would
have been virtually impossible. A period of uncertainty
would have been inevitable while the regional group
fought it out with Andropov, Chernenko, and others
who held the important ground in Moscow.
A second possibility is the one that did occur. A
new secretary was found in the small circle of those
Problems of Communism May June 1983
who were already well-entrenched in Moscow. Had
the choice been someone who was not also a Politbu-
ro member, that would have augured well for
Chernenko. Even Viktor Grishin, a Politburo member
and head of the Moscow city party organization, might
not have posed a serious challenge to Chernenko,
since he lacked two trump cards that Andropov
brought to the game.
Andropov's first card was obvious: his many years
as head of the KGB. This provided him with the power
that comes from KGB counterintelligence work within
all state, party, and military organizations. The inter-
nal counterintelligence role gave Andropov a far
stronger position than is generally recognized by
Western analysts. It made him very knowledgeable of
nomenklatura and cadre assignments because clear-
ance for such assignments involves a KGB security
check. It also gave Andropov familiarity with the daily
institutional activities of all the organizations that his
agents watch, that is, virtually the entire state appara-
tus. In this respect, Andropov had a much closer ac-
quaintance with the operation of the Soviet economy
than one might ordinarily suppose. The view occa-
sionally expressed in the West that he has no experi-
ence with the economy is factually inaccurate:
Andropov has vast experience with the way the eco-
nomic bureaucrats and factory managers cheat the
system, falsify reports, and fulfill their plans in ap-
pearance if not in reality. Another little-understood
role that Andropov played in the economy as head of
the KGB concerns acquisition of Western technology,
legally and illegally. The Ministry of Foreign Trade en-
joys only a subordinate role in this regard, since the
KGB and the Ministry of Defense dominate foreign
trade decisions.4
Andropov's second card was less obvious. He
seems to have been a key figure in the Defense Coun-
cil. His position on this body may well have been the
most significant factor in Andropov's quick gaining of
power. To understand the basis for this judgment re-
quires some background on the Defense Council's
role and composition. It is the lineal descendant of the
Council of Labor and Defense (STO) from the early
days of the regime. During World War II, the State De-
fense Committee (GKO) had a similar role. After the
war, the GKO disappeared, at least from public view.
The STO and GKO both consisted of a small subset of
Politburo members who coordinated manpower, in-
dustry, and agriculture on the one hand, with military
`Michael Sadykiewicz, "Soviet Military Politics," Survey (London), No. 26, Winter
1982, p. 193, shows the Foreign Trade Ministry's intelligence role and its linkage to
the Defense Council.
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Choice and Change in Soviet Politics
requirements on the other. Both were extremely pow-
erful bodies whose decisions were not challenged by
the Politburo as a whole. They could dictate to the
economic and industrial planning apparatus. And they
were the highest court of appeal on the allocation of
resources for the military.5
By the early 1970's, and perhaps even earlier, this
old organizational device became operative again. The
Military Industrial Commission, headed by the deputy
chairman of the Council of Ministers, gave the military
industries a corporate executive at the highest level.
The Military Collegium in the Ministry of Defense pro-
vided a parallel corporate executive for the military
leadership. The two institutions undoubtedly work in
considerable harmony, but issues are bound to arise
that transcend that harmony or require a higher policy
decision. Such decisions are made in the Defense
Council."
When Andrey Gromyko, Andrey Grechko, and An-
dropov were elected to the Politburo in 1973, it was
not difficult to infer that this old organizational system
was reemerging. These men made up the foreign-
policy/military/police clique which had formed the
STO and GKO in the past.7 It made sense for Brezh-
nev to bring them into the Politburo where they could
help him carry the vote on his foreign and military pol-
icies. In 1974, the Defense Council was mentioned in
the Soviet press and its existence has been public
knowledge since that time."
We cannot be entirely sure about the make-up of
the Defense Council, but it seems logical that
Andropov, Gromyko, and-after Grechko's death-
Ustinov must have joined Brezhnev to form this body.
Possibly Suslov and Aleksey Kosygin were members.
In any event, this group includes those who are knowl-
edgeable about military and foreign policy, as well as
economic issues, by virtue of their state duties. Every
Politburo member does not have time to immerse
himself in these areas. The Defense Council subset of
the Politburo, therefore, probably has a free hand in
foreign policy and military issues since other Politburo
members are not in a position to gain adequate infor-
mation and staff support to challenge the arguments
on such matters by the Council members.
Had an outsider like Shcherbytskyi come to the
Secretariat, he would have had to abolish the Defense
Council or quickly make it subordinate to his wishes.
Otherwise, his chances of gaining the top post in the
party would have been small. If Chernenko was not a
member of the Defense Council, this would have con-
tributed to his political weakness; however, it is proba-
ble that Brezhnev had included him.
Speculation has been widespread that Ustinov and
the military establishment threw their lot in with
Andropov, making his ascendancy possible. Whatever
the case, one can assume that Andropov and Ustinov
had worked together in considerable harmony for sev-
eral years. Moreover, if Ustinov did play a key role in
Andropov's selection as general secretary, his person-
al support sufficed; "military" support in the broader
sense was not necessary. And unless Ustinov truly de-
tested Andropov, he was unlikely to have backed a re-
gional party chief like Shcherbytskyi or Romanov giv-
en the uncertainty and turmoil that the ascendancy of
such a leader would bring to the central party appara-
tus. In fact, one may wonder why Ustinov himself did
not bid for the top post, since institutionally he was in
a strong position to do so, having served not long ago
as a party secretary.
In any event, the uncertainty of the situation was
greatly reduced in the spring of 1982 when Andropov
became a party secretary. From that point, there was
no real possibility of another challenger making a seri-
ous bid. Andropov offered a smooth institutional tran-
sition, the least turmoil in the succession process.
Furthermore, it is improbable that Andropov, Ustinov,
and other key figures had not been working out a suc-
cession sequence months if not years before Brezh-
nev died. The succession struggle-to the degree
there is one-did not begin with Brezhnev's death; it
had been in progress for some time.
However, Andropov himself is not a young man,
and the next succession cannot be far off. Will it pro-
ceed as smoothly? This depends on who is brought
into the Secretariat and the Politburo. If new people
can be co-opted in an orderly fashion, the next suc-
cession, too, ought to be smooth. Certainly, the organ-
izational structure is such that it can be. A series of
'Ibid., pp. 179-212; Victor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army, New York, NY,
Macmillan, 1983; Sergei Freidzon, "Estimating the Current and Long-run Limitations
of the Soviet Defense Burden," prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Net Assessment, Washington, DC, 1981, pp. 37-57; M. V. Zakharov, et al., 50 let
Vooruzhennykh sit SSSR (50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR), Moscow,
Voyenizdat, 1968; Edward L. Warner, III, The Military in Contemporary Soviet
Politics, New York, NY, Praeger Special Studies, 1977, pp. 272-74. There has been
a certain amount of confusion in Western literature on lineal descendancy of the
Defense Council. Sometimes, as in Warner's case, the STO is seen as the antecedent
of the present-day Military Industrial Commission, sometimes of the Military
Collegium. Neither is accurate. The Military Industrial Commission traces back
through the state economic apparatus, while the Military Collegium is within the
Ministry of Defense and traces back to the Revolutionary Military Council. The top-
level military/economic/scientific infrastructure is more complex than I have
portrayed here. Freidzon gives a good description, especially of the state side
including Gosplan, the supply system, and the Council of Ministers. Sadykiewicz
gives a particularly interesting analysis of the Defense Council's relationship to the
rest of the state and party hierarchy.
'Sadykiewicz, loc. cit.
'See William E. Odom, "Who Controls Whom in Moscow?" Foreign Policy
(Washington, DC), Summer 175, esp., pp. 119-23.
V. G. Kulikov, "The Brain of the Army," Pravda (Moscow), Nov. 13, 1974.
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Problems of Communism May June 1983
ommoulwAi?Wiia
West German Chancellor Willy Brandt meets with Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev in the Crimea in
September 1971.
deaths among the Politburo members, of course,
could force the pace of change, making the co-
optation process difficult to manage. But even in that
event, the institutional arrangements will remain to
define the playing field on which the struggle for the
general secretary's position is carried out. The need to
organize the society for military-command affairs, for
an aggressive foreign policy, and for the continued
modernization of Soviet military forces provides strong
institutional imperatives that challengers cannot easily
dismiss or throw into disarray without consequences
they would not desire. The breakup of the central
policymaking system, therefore, may not be as likely
as some have anticipated.'
Brezhnevism: A Legacy
In order to judge prospects for the post-Brezhnev
period, it is necessary to define the basic nature of the
Brezhnev era. In brief, it combined foreign policy
mobilism with domestic policy immobilism.
'See Seweryn Bialer, "The Harsh Decade: Soviet Policies in the 1980$," Foreign
Affairs (New York, NY), Summer 1981, pp. 1012-15.
In the international arena, Brezhnev scored remark-
able gains for the USSR. They were not all of his mak-
ing, but he certainly took advantage of key opportuni-
ties that arose. With the coming to power of the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) in West Germany, he re-
versed Soviet policy toward Bonn and offered small
rewards for the SPD's new Ostpolitik. At the same
time, he utilized the American opening on strategic
arms control to relax tensions between the superpow-
ers. In turn, he got a slowing of US strategic pro-
grams, acknowledgment that the USSR was a super-
power, and a surge of East-West economic interaction
financed by the West. At the same time, he brought
the West to recognize more formally (at Helsinki) the
post-World War II frontiers in Europe, something
Khrushchev tried and failed to achieve.10
In the Third World, the projection of Soviet power
grew unabated. As the United States turned its mili-
tary attention away from NATO and toward Vietnam,
Brezhnev was undoubtedly delighted, not only be-
cause it weakened NATO but also because it affected
US public attitudes toward an assertive US foreign
"See Adam Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War ll, New York,
NY, The Viking Press, 1971, pp. 299-340, for an account of Khrushchev's scheme
to force Western recognition of East Germany.
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Choice and Change in Soviet Politics
policy. While appearing to cooperate with the United
States on a settlement in Vietnam, Brezhnev kept an
abundant supply of military materiel flowing to his
North Vietnamese allies.
The major setback for Brezhnev came in 1972 in
the Middle East when Anwar al-Sadat ordered Soviet
advisers out of Egypt. Having invested a great deal
there as a strategic anchor for Soviet policy in the
Middle East, the USSR found itself abruptly expelled
from a key position in the region. By the end of the
decade, however, with the help of Cuban forces,
Brezhnev had reasserted Soviet influence in the re-
gion, gaining important positions in Ethiopia and
South Yemen while holding on to significant influence
in Syria and Iraq. And, of course, the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan created new pressure on the north side
of the Persian Gulf region. The Soviet-Cuban venture
in Angola made the USSR a larger factor than had
been the case previously in southern Africa. After
General Anastasio Somoza's fall in Nicaragua in 1979,
Brezhnev was able to launch the Soviet-Cuban part-
nership on a new offensive in the Caribbean region.
The US withdrawal from Vietnam gave the USSR,
through its client regime in Hanoi, hegemony in
Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea.
Other than Egypt, the only major negative develop-
ment from the Soviet viewpoint was the normalization
of relations between the United States and China.
Brezhnev, of course, inherited the Sino-Soviet split.
Apparently accepting it as irreversible in the short run,
he set about containing China, establishing a strong
position in Southern Asia-in India and Afghanis-
tan-and reducing tensions in Europe while expand-
ing the size of Soviet military forces on the Sino-Soviet
border more than threefold."
The backdrop for this foreign policy offensive was
the steady Soviet military buildup. In almost all cate-
"See Thomas W. Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," in Stephen Kaplan,
Ed., Diplomacy of Power, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1981, p. 287.
Soviet BTR-70 armored personnel carriers come ashore from a hovercraft during 1981 Warsaw Pact maneuvers
on the Baltic Coast of Poland.
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gories of military power, the USSR equaled the United
States and exceeded it in some.12 In a real sense, the
Soviet military buildup in the 1970's marks a qualita-
tive change in the postwar East-West military balance,
no mean achievement for Brezhnev.
The Brezhnev era indeed was a time of great Soviet
foreign policy mobilism. Moscow showed astuteness
in reading the political climate in the West and in en-
couraging "realistic" circles there to curb any serious
Western attempt to match or check Soviet assertive-
ness. In the Third World, Moscow not only replaced
US influence almost entirely in southeast Asia but also
created a major geopolitical challenge to vital Western
interests in the Persian Gulf region. Although he lived
only long enough to see it begin, Brezhnev threw the
USSR into a new offensive for influence in Central
America.
On the domestic front Brezhnev left quite another
record. The economy certainly enjoyed an infusion of
Western technology, but on the whole, economic en-
tropy seems to have been the dominant trend. The
"second economy" and massive corruption have
grown to proportions that appear to exceed the re-
gime's capacity (or will) to repress them with punitive
and "administrative" methods. Two attempts at re-
form came to nothing. In the 1960's, a number of re-
forms, associated with the name of economist Yevsey
Liberman, were introduced with little apparent result.
In the early 1970's, great press fanfare accompanied
the concept of production associations and the freeing
of inefficient labor from economic enterprises. Many
officials in the central economic apparatus were to
move closer to production, away from Moscow. In any
event, little of note happened in response to these or-
ganizational measures for economic improvement.13
Symptomatic of the decay in the economy was the
discussion of the need to shift from an "extensive" to
an "intensive" approach to economic growth. Abram
Bergson's estimates of the trends in Soviet factor pro-
ductivity cut to the root of the problem.14 The decline
in factor productivity meant that larger and larger
amounts of capital would be required to sustain
growth, and-at best-the rate of growth would con-
tinue to decline unless some significant changes were
introduced in the Soviet growth model. By 1975, mat-
ters reached a point where the leadership, faced with
"See Soviet Military Power, 2nd ed., Washington, DC, US Government Printing
Office, 1983.
"See Gertrude Schroeder, "The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of 'Reforms,' " US
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy in a Time of Change,
Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, Vol. 1, pp. 329-40.
"See Bergson, "Toward a New Growth Model," Problems of Communism
(Washington, DC), March-April 1973, pp. 1-9.
Problems of Communism May June 1983
the necessity to cut back in at least one major sec-
tor-investment, consumption, or defense-decided
to reduce investment in favor of consumption without
touching defense.15
This decision tells us a lot about Brezhnevism. The
General Secretary realized that the economy was in
serious difficulty. Yet he would not touch defense allo-
cations. Rather, he reduced investment to save con-
sumption. This was a sign not of aggressive economic
leadership but of resignation-perhaps temporary-
in the face of stagnation, lethargy, and inefficiency. It
is also possible that the economic planners had con-
cluded that the return on larger investment had be-
come too small to make the pain of sacrifice else-
where worth it. Defense expenditures, of course, were
paying off abroad, earning money from arms sales
and bringing increased prestige to the USSR as a mili-
tary superpower.
Added to Brezhnev's economic woes were a num-
ber of bad harvest years and bottlenecks in oil and
gas production. Both problems required foreign cur-
rency: to buy grain and to import energy production
equipment. The overall energy problem brought sharp
shifts in resource allocations in 1981-82 aimed at
relieving bottlenecks, but the result is meager thus
far.16 The great agricultural program for the non-black
earth region, an attempt to ameliorate the agricultural
problem, and other schemes have accomplished little,
compelling the USSR to rely on imports.17
Perhaps the most dramatic sign of domestic policy
immobilism is to be found in the growth of corruption
and the so-called second economy. Konstantin Simis
offers an inside account of corruption, its dimensions
and the regime's unwillingness to move against it. The
party elite seems to be the most corrupt and the least
punished when caught. Even the Georgian affair-in
which Vasiliy Mzhavanadze, a candidate member of
the CPSU Politburo, was implicated-did not bring in-
dictment or loss of party membership to the most
heavily involved.1' Ironically, at about the same
time-in 1972-Brezhnev initiated a party "docu-
ments exchange" which he described as not simply a
"technical" affair but as a "politically principled in-
spection of the party's ranks."19 Traditionally such ex-
"Myron Rush, "Guns over Growth in Soviet Policy," International Security
(Cambridge, MA), Winter 1982-83, pp. 167-79.
"Karl-Eugene Wadekin, "Soviet Agriculture: Dependence on the West," Foreign
Affairs, No. 60, Spring, 1982, pp. 882-903, provides an analysis of Soviet agrarian
problems and performances.
"Ibid.
"Simis, USSR: The Corrupt Society, New York, NY, Simon and Shuster, 1982,
pp. 53-60.
"See the lead editorials in Pravda, June 24, 1972 and Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow),
June 29, 1972.
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Choice and Change in Soviet Politics
Soviet and Czechoslovak party delegations discuss the political crisis in Czechoslovakia at the July 29-
August 1, 1968, meeting in Cierna nad Tissou just west of the border with the USSR. Among those accompa-
nying Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev (second from left) are, to his right, Nikolay Podgornyy, and to his
left, Alexsey Kosygin, Mikhail Suslov, Petro Shelest, Konstantin Katushev, Boris Ponomarev, and Konstantin
Rusakov; leading the Czechoslovak delegation was Alexander Dubaek (fourth from the foreground at the right)
changes were implemented as purges, designed to re-
invigorate the party apparatus, to bring it back to
Leninist norms of self-sacrifice and revolutionary dedi-
cation. The Brezhnev documents exchange dragged
on for two years and was still receiving press attention
in 1975.20 Notwithstanding this ''principled inspec-
tion" of the party's ranks, few if any party members
were expelled, and corruption continued unabated.
The contrast with the Krushchev and Stalin shake-ups
of the party could hardly have been greater.
The Soviet dissident movement offers ambiguous
evidence about the Brezhnev regime's inability to pre-
vent internal decay.21 Judgments vary on the extent
and importance of this movement, but it did test Sovi-
et repressive capabilities. In the last few years, its vi-
tality has been sapped by the KGB. In fact, the regime
has displayed considerable ingenuity in breaking it up
and, in this regard, the dissidents appear to have
found and exceeded the regime's limits of toleration.
Nevertheless, the mere emergence of the movement
indicates a degree of internal decay.
The Brezhnev period also witnessed serious chal-
lenges to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Al-
though Brezhnev proved willing to use force to break
resistance in Prague, he had to take the entire Polit-
buro with him to negotiate with Alexander Dubaek on
the Czech-Soviet border in the spring of 1968: clearly
he did not have unrestrained power to act on his own,
and he also may have wanted to spread the responsi-
bility among his colleagues. Problems in Poland, be-
ginning in the winter of 1970-71, reemerged in far
"See Pravda, and Krasnaya zvezda, Feb. 7, 1975.
"See Andrei Amalrik, Notes of a Revolutionary, trans. by Guy Daniels, New York,
NY, Knopf, 1982.
more threatening dimensions in 1980. Political and
police "salami tactics" exercised through Polish au-
thorities have whittled down organized opposition and
brought matters in Poland under temporary control,
but the mere fact that such developments could occur
indicates the degree of immobilism in bloc policy that
beset Brezhnev's leadership.
Today the Soviet leadership is confronted with both
the successes and failures of Brezhnevism. The suc-
cesses derived from a highly flexible and assertive for-
eign policy accompanied by the largest and most
comprehensive military buildup ever witnessed. The
failures can be attributed to the retention of the Lenin-
ist and Stalinist party/police/state structure resting on
a centrally planned economy without retention of the
system's mechanisms for revitalization, that is, purges
of the party elite and rigid enforcement of labor disci-
pline. This is not to suggest that the system would
have been more successful with the retention of full-
blown Stalinism, but it is to identify the basic change
that permitted domestic policy immobilism and decay
to reach their present dimensions.
Factors of Change and Continuity
The prospects for the Andropov regime and its suc-
cessors are constrained to a large degree by the ob-
jective factors of change that have accompanied
Brezhnevism. Western analysis of these factors has
not proven very perspicacious. In the 1960's, it be-
came popular among Western specialists on the Sovi-
et Union to take the "group approach" to the political
analysis of change in the USSR. De-Stalinization,
many agreed, had introduced conditions for signif-
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icant change in the Soviet system. The task of analysis
was to discover what these conditions were and antic-
ipate the political development of the system. A review
of such endeavors based on the group theory of poli-
tics led me to the conclusion that the approach antic-
ipated the results before the evidence was thoroughly
examined.22 Despite the failure of pluralism to develop
in the USSR, many analysts still cling to the interest-
group approach in analyzing Soviet politics. Some an-
alysts dismiss critiques of the group approach as be-
ing an assertion that the system remains "monolithic,"
an assertion undercut by signs of the diffusion of
power.
The important question, however, is not whether
power is diffused but how it is diffusing. Pluralism is
only one way for power to be diffused, and it depends
on very particular circumstances in a polity whether
the pluralist variant of diffusion takes place. Bureau-
cratic decay is another way for power to be diffused in
a monolithic system. Regionalism is yet another way,
and when regionalism is reinforced by nationalism,
that represents yet another diffusion mechanism not
very compatible with the pluralistic model. A review of
key institutional, economic, and social factors in the
USSR demonstrates that while much has changed
and power has diffused within the system, continuity
also remains strong and the diffusion of power has
hardly followed pluralist patterns.
In assessing the extent to which institutional change
has occurred, one must look, above all, at the central-
ly planned economy. While hundreds of small policy
changes have been introduced to cope with undesired
organizational consequences and behavior, the es-
sential institutional structure remains unaltered. There
has been no significant expansion of market pricing,
not even in the marginal manner observed in some
East European states, most notably Hungary. The
USSR State Planning Commission (Gosplan) retains
its dominant role in setting prices and allocating re-
sources. Although "economic success indicators"
have been modified in many ways in an unending
search for more efficiency, the essential character of
the system has been carefully preserved.23 This lack
of institutional change, of course, is a reflection of the
leadership's strong preference for the kind of political
control the system affords for directing the economy,
for making its structural development and its output
"See William E. Odom, "A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet
Politics," World Politics (Princeton, NJ). July 1976, pp. 542-67.
"See Fyodor I. Kushnirsky, Soviet Economic Planning, 1965-1980, Boulder, CO,
Westview Press, 1982, for an insider's account of the search for efficiency while
avoiding fundamental reform.
Problems of Communism May June 1983
conform to "planners' preferences" as opposed to
consumers' preferences."
The most dramatic change is found in what the
unchanged planning institutions are capable of doing.
In the 1950's, American graduate students studying
the Soviet economy were taught that central planning
in the USSR permitted directing a higher investment
rate at those sectors that the planners desired to ex-
pand.24 Problem areas such. as agriculture and effi-
ciency of capital investment were not ignored, but
professors left their students with the impression that
the Soviet system could mobilize resources and direct
them more or less as the leaders chose, notwithstand-
ing consumer and other demands. That was probably
a fairly accurate assessment of the Soviet economic
system in its first three or four decades. Today, it no
longer adequately describes the system.
The dialectics of growth have brought a major
change in the economic system. As the aggregate
capital stock has grown, it has required ever larger
amounts of new investment to make a proportional
change in the structure of the capital stock. In other
words, the central planners' ability to shift investment
significantly from one sector to another is not as great
as it was earlier. The discretion they retain in altering
the capital-stock structure declines each year. The ex-
traordinary restructuring of the economy in the 1930's
and in the postwar reconstruction period can not be
easily repeated, and is perhaps impossible, today.
This diminution of planners' discretion is not only
the result of the size of the economy. It is perhaps
equally the result of what economist Fyodor
Kushnirsky calls the absence of managerial responsi-
bility.25 It seems to be beyond the power of Soviet
planners to close down inefficient economic activities.
They may expand activities and create new ones, but
they seldom cause a firm to go bankrupt. The forces
against bankruptcy action include not only diffusion of
responsibility within the managerial system but also
regional party influence and the fear of creating
unemployment. Official acknowledgment of the de-
cline of planners' discretion is implicit in the slogan
that growth now depends on "intensive" methods
rather than traditional "extensive" methods of eco-
nomic development. The call for greater labor produc-
tivity is inspired by keen awareness of the decline in
discretionary factor inputs at the disposal of planners.
"See, e.g., Maurice Dobbs, Soviet Economic Development since 1917, New York,
NY, International Publishers, 1948; Harry Schwartz, Russia's Soviet Economy,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hill, 1950, p. 54; and Abram Bergson, Ed., Soviet
Economic Growth, Evanston, II, Row, Peterson, 1953.
"Kushnirsky, op. cit., pp. 136 ff.
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Choice and Change in Soviet Politics
A formation of BTR-70 armored personnel carriers and BMP-A mechanized infantry combat vehicles (at the
rear) moves through Red Square during the November 7, 1980, Revolution Day parade. The gigantic poster to
the rear calls for "A Worthy Welcome to the 26th CPSU Congress! The people and the party united! Realize the
plans of the party! Glory to the CPSU! A resounding finish to the 10th Five-Year Plan."
Yet another change is the expansion of the ''sec-
ond economy" alluded to earlier. Irregular economic
activity seems to have taken root at every level in Sovi-
et society.26 Naturally, this means that resources are
diverted from the purposes intended by the central
planners. We do not know the size of the second
economy; therefore, it is impossible to judge precisely
how great a factor it has become in shifting resources
away from investment and plan fulfillment. But the
impressionistic writings on this subject encourage us
to believe that it is not trivial.27
The military economy is an objective factor of both
continuity and change. Probably the greatest failing of
Western study of the Soviet Union lies in lack of atten-
tion to the military-industrial sector. True, very little in-
formation about it is in the public domain, but a great
deal of information has long been available about its
product: Soviet military forces. They have grown
steadily in size, and they are receiving technology in
many cases not yet fielded in Western armies.28 Con-
siderable information is also available about institu-
tional arrangements within the military-industrial sec-
tor and its relationship to the rest of the economy.29
The striking thing about this growing sector is its
structural continuity. The essential structure was de-
veloped during World War I and the Civil War. During
the ensuing New Economic Policy period, the "military
industries" were not demobilized but kept under a
single trust. During the First Five-Year Plan, military
industry was accorded bureaucratic primacy and pri-
ority access to investment allocations. "Military repre-
sentatives" (voyenpredy) formed a vast apparatus that
"See Dimitri Simes, "The Soviet Parallel Market," Survey, Summer 1975,
pp. 42-52.
"See, e.g., Gregory Grossman, "The 'Second Economy' of the USSR," Problems of
Communism, September-October 1977, pp. 25-40; and idem, "Notes on the Illegal
Private Economy and Corruption," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 834-55.
"See Soviet Military Power, op. cit.
"See David Holloway, "Innovation in the Defense Sector," in R. Amann and J.
Cooper, Eds., Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union, New Haven, CT, Yale
University Press, 1982, pp. 303-21; and Sergei Freidzon, op. cit. Also Suvorov,
op. cit.; and Karl F. Spielmann, "Defense Industrialists in the USSR," Problems of
Communism, September-October 1976, pp. 52-69.
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penetrated all industrial activities contributing to the
military. They gave the military enormous control over
quality, design, and pricing of military goods. They
created a supply system of inputs to military indus-
tries that ensured priority of allocation. Thus, a siphon
system came into being that could pump out of the ci-
vilian sector whatever resources the Politburo desired
that the military receive.
This system remains essentially unchanged. With-
out it, the recent Soviet military buildup would have
been impossible. And without taking this system into
account, no complete understanding of the perform-
ance of the Soviet economy is possible. At its apex,
three institutions give it unchallengeable power. First,
the Military Industrial Commission, chaired by the
deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, provides
central focus and management for military require-
ments within the state economic bureaucracy. Sec-
ond, the General Staff of the Armed Forces generates
the military doctrine that dictates military require-
ments. Through the Ministry of Defense, these re-
quirements are levied on the Military Industrial Com-
mission. Finally, the Defense Council provides
guidance over the entire process. The Defense Indus-
tries Section of the Secretariat, of course, provides the.
Politburo and Defense Council with party control over'
the defense hierarchy. Today, this structural arrange-
ment looks more like the one operative in the late
1920's than the one existing in the 1950's.3? Continui-
ty, therefore, has reasserted itself.
What has changed is the size and complexity of the
military-industrial complex. The military grip on the re-
search and development sector, including the USSR
Academy of Sciences, has tightened as modern mili-
tary technology has increased in diversity and impor-
tance. The size of the military-industrial production
base, naturally, has grown enormously. This has not
been independent of the remainder of the economy.
In fact, most Soviet civilian industries have military
production lines, active in some cases, on standby in
others.31 The leadership's concern for war mobiliza-
tion has constrained the profile of Soviet industry per-
haps more than any other factor. Military production
and mobilization requirements come first. Other pro-
duction considerations are secondary.
"See N. Suleiman, Tyl i snabzheniye deyistvuyushchey armii (Rear Services and
Supply for a Combat Army), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1927, Charts 31, 34; A. Vol'pe,
"The Bases for Mobilizing Industry in the USSR," Voyna i revolutsii (Moscow), No. 7,
November-December 1925, p. 75; M. V. Zakharov, "The Communist Party and the
Technical Re-equipment of the Army and Navy during the Prewar Five-Year Plans,"
Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal (Moscow), No. 2, 1971, pp. 3-12. Compare these
with Holloway, loc. cit., Freidzon, loc. cit., and Sadykiewicz, loc. cit.
"See Holloway, loc. cit., p. 304.
Problems of Communism May June 1983
The
primacy enjoyed by Soviet military
industry
goes
far in explaining some dysfunctions
in other
parts of the economy. The leadership, including sen-
ior military figures, is not indifferent to the health of
the economy as a whole. This should be borne in
mind in interpreting recent statements of Soviet mili-
tary leaders about the economy. Marshal Nikolay
Ogarkov, the Chief of the General Staff, was quite can-
did in expressing concern about the Soviet
economy.32 Was he, as some observers have sug-
gested, defending the Soviet military budget? Was he
anticipating demands by reformers to shift resources
away from military production? Or was he, in fact,
articulating a general worry within senior military cir-
cles that without reforms and increased labor disci-
pline in the overall economy, the military sector would
also suffer? The last interpretation seems the most
compelling as one looks more closely into the struc-
ture of the system. Marshal Ogarkov and the Minister
of Defense, Marshal Ustinov, must be as concerned
as other senior leaders about problems in the econ-
omy as a whole. Unless institutional reforms are
proposed that include the breakup of the Military In-
dustrial Commission and the Ministry of Defense's ap-
paratus of "military representatives" throughout the
industrial and the research-and-development sectors,
the defense budget is not likely to suffer in ways that
military leaders would oppose. Discussions of eco-
nomic reform to date have not suggested any such
radical change; rather, they have been directed to-
ward getting the present system to produce more effi-
ciently. Ustinov and Ogarkov surely would desire that
.kind of change, and they might even support Politburo
decisions that trade off present military production for
greater future production. There are precedents for
such support by the top military in the 1920's, the late
1940's, and possibly in the late 1950's.33
The new intelligentsia has been seen by many
Western observers as a source of change. Most often
this anticipation takes the form of discussions about
"generational change," that is, how younger age co-
horts, as their members move into positions of power,
"N. Ogarkov, "Defending Peaceful Endeavor," Kommunist (Moscow), No. 10,
July 1981, pp. 80-91.
"I. B. Berkhin, Voyennaya reforma v SSSR, 1924-26 (Military Reform in the
USSR, 1924-26), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1958, pp. 46-47, details the rationale of the
dramatic demobilization of the Red Army in 1921-23: to redirect resources toward
technical modernization for a future larger force. Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's
Postwar Army Reappraised," International Security, Winter 1982-83, pp. 110-138,
discusses the extent of Soviet demobilization in 1947-48. Oleg Penkovskiy, The
Penkovskiy Papers, Garden City, NJ, Doubleday, 1965, pp. 234-43, gives some
insight into Khrushchev's manpower reductions in the late 1950's, which, it can be
inferred, were aimed at cost reductions and higher technical competence in the
officer corps.
11
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Choice and Change in Soviet Politics
will alter Soviet poIicy. 34 Analysts who place emphasis
on this source of change tend to expect it to have a
liberalizing effect on both domestic policy and Soviet
relations with the West. Jerry Hough, for example, ex-
pects that generational change will have a moderating
effect on Soviet foreign policy-although it will cer-
tainly not usher in "a period of bliss in Russian-
American relations"-and will be conducive to signifi-
cant economic reform on the domestic front. The
better-educated younger intelligentsia, particularly in
the foreign policy establishment, is not, in Hough's
view, as ideological and tough-minded regarding East-
West competition as the older generation.35
Quite a different interpretation can be placed on the
apparent growing sophistication of the younger gener-
ation in foreign affairs. John Lenczowski, for example,
finds the younger Soviet analysts of Western affairs
much abler in understanding and exploiting Western
political groups and governments. He finds riot so
much a decline in the role of Marxism-Leninism as a
greater sophistication in the use of its categories for
analysis of the "international class struggle."36 While
Hough is encouraged by the pro-detente attitudes he
finds among younger Soviet analysts, Lenczowski as-
sesses detente as a major Soviet gain in the East-West
competition achieved in part thanks to the more so-
phisticated insights brought to Soviet policymaking by
these younger analysts.
The attempt to anticipate Soviet policy as a function
of a generational change is likely to fail. Generations
do not make policy. A few individuals in the Soviet
system make policy, and even their staffs, although
quite large in number, may not be a representative
sample of their own generation. Moreover, because of
the authoritarian character of the Soviet regime and
the lack of competitive interest-articulation by social
groups, generational change is less likely to have a di-
rect effect on Soviet policymaking than it has in West-
ern liberal democracies. "Generation" is a useful cat-
egory for sociological analysis, but for political analysis
its utility is distinctly limited.
How are we to deal analytically with the new Soviet
intelligentsia? No one disputes that it is different from
the older generation of educated elites. Better educa-
tion, greater exposure to Western influences, less
sharp memories of the Stalinist period, a larger pro-
portion growing up in an urban environment, less ide-
alism about the official ideology-these and other fac-
tors undoubtedly are causing significant differences
between "fathers" and "sons" in the Soviet intelligen-
tsia. Hough suggests that reform on the domestic
front-and specifically of the economy-"would tend
to benefit the most skilled and the best educated....
Since they have every incentive to think of reasons
why reform would serve the interests of others and of
the economy as a whole, it is difficult to believe that
they will not do so. The combination of a demographic
problem and an energy crisis will provide them with a
golden opportunity to make the case for greater effi-
ciency."37 This line of reasoning may well occur to
many of the new Soviet intelligentsia. Yet, for reasons
we shall offer below, such reform is unlikely to occur,
notwithstanding the "golden opportunity."
How will the intelligentsia react to frustration and
disappointment? This is the critical factor that the
leadership must face, and it is the crux of the kind of
change that the new generation will bring to the sys-
tem. While no one knows how they will react, we are
not without historical parallels to stimulate our think-
ing about the possibilities. Throughout the 19th cen-
tury, the autocracy frustrated the intelligentsia by re-
jecting reform or by failing to carry through when
reform was introduced. In the last several decades of
the empire, the intelligentsia had more institutional
bases for pursuing reform than is now the case in the
USSR or is likely to be the case in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Nonetheless, it did not unite behind enlightened
reform. Rather, the intelligentsia tended to polarize
into radical wings. The left wing turned to revolution-
ary activity. The right wing became more reactionary
in defense of autocracy. Nothing as dramatic as the
Great Reforms of the 1860's is really to be expected in
the 1980's, and even that kind of progress left the
19th-century intelligentsia in despair. Are not the con-
ditions for polarization even greater in the 1980's?
More than a little evidence is available to suggest
exactly such a social development in the USSR. The
dissident movement reflects the anti-regime wing of
the new Soviet intelligentsia'38 while Lenczowski's
analysis of the younger generation of Marxist-Leninist
foreign policy analysts identifies the pro-regime wing.
Its members have been described by many emigres.
The younger KGB personnel show remarkable sophis-
tication in dealing with dissidents. Soviet diplomatic
officials abroad today are a much more sophisticated
and no less uncompromising generation of operatives
"See, e.g., Bialer, loc. cit.
"Jerry Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition, Washington, DC. The Brookings
Institution, 1980, pp. 127-30, 144 ff.
"John Lenczowski, Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy, Ithaca, NY, Cornell
University Press, 1982.
"Hough, op. cit., p. 138.
"See also Rudolf L. TOkes, Ed., Dissent in the USSR, Baltimore, MD, The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1975, p. 11, for an ideological spectrum of Soviet
dissident views.
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for the regime than were their Stalinist predecessors.
One can also detect a new confidence and assertive
arrogance in the younger officials, as well as a deep
cynicism that is perhaps more vicious than that of im-
perial officials and secret police.
There is little middle ground for the younger in-
telligentsia. Either they choose the highly principled
path of the dissident movement and sacrifice all hope
of the comforts of modern society or they submit to
the morally debasing standards of success and up-
ward mobility within the Soviet system. Alexander
Solzhenitsyn traces the psychological trauma of Novyy
mir editor Aleksandr Tvardovskiy as he sought to find
a middle ground. In the end, Tvardovskiy failed.39
Where this polarization will eventually lead is difficult
to anticipate, but it certainly does not augur well for
reform. Instead, at least for a decade or so, it would
seem to encourage a heightened struggle between the
regime and its loyalists on the one hand and periodi-
cally emerging dissident groups on the other. In any
event, the appearance of a better-educated intelli-
gentsia is an important factor of change within the
system, one which the regime is already devising new
means of managing.
It is important to remember that the military intelli-
gentsia is not immune to the general social and politi-
cal dilemmas that confront the Soviet intelligentsia as
a whole. The imperatives of modern military technolo-
gy have led to a dramatic growth in the system of offi-
cer education, not just in size but also in sophistica-
tion.40 Officers probably feel sufficiently secure
personally to explore unorthodox ideas more readily
than many of their civilian contemporaries. The Riga
naval officers' group of dissidents and Major General
Petro Grigorenko provide examples, albeit small in
number.41 While most officers are likely to tilt to the
pro-regime wing of the intelligentsia, some of them are
likely to join the anti-regime wing. It seems most un-
likely, however, that this polarization will affect the
policy orientation of the senior military leadership.
Rather, the anti-regime elements will be expelled from
the military as they are discovered, and will lend their
support-those who have the courage-to dissident
groups in the civilian sector, provided such groups
continue to exist either openly or furtively.
Much attention has been given to demographic
change in the USSR. The expanding Central Asian
ethnic groups stand in contrast to the slower-growing
"The Oak and the Calf,New York, NY, Harper & Row, 1975.
"See William E. Odom, "The 'Militarization' of Soviet Society," Problems of
Communism, September-October 1976, pp. 34-51.
"Peter Reddaway, ED., Uncensored Russia, London, Jonathan Cape, 1972,
pp. 127 ff, 171 ff.
Problems of Communism May June 1983
Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, former editor of Novyy mir.
Slavic ethnic groups. Employment opportunities are
greater in the Slavic area, leading some analysts to
anticipate migrations from Central Asia into the Euro-
pean part of the USSR. Such a migration, however,
has not occurred at a dramatic level; it is also possible
to infer that hidden unemployment exists in the large
industrial centers.42 It does not seem, therefore, that
labor migration would necessarily help the Soviet
economy. Demography may eventually have a signifi-
cant impact on Soviet politics, but we are not likely to
see this in the 1980's. It is not likely to have much of
an impact on Soviet military manpower policy.43 In
fact, the trained reserve manpower pool is sufficiently
large for the baby booms and busts to be absorbed
without a noticeable effect on force levels or change in
"Murray Feshbach, "Soviet Dynamics in the USSR," paper presented at the
conference, "The Soviet Union in the 1980's," January 14, 1983, Washington, DC,
sponsored by the US Information Agency, with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Georgetown University, and the Kennan Institute for Advanced
Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center for Advanced International Studies.
"See Ellen Jones, "Manning the Soviet Military," International Security, No. 7,
Summer 1982, pp. 105-31.
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Choice and Change in Soviet Politics
military-service policy. Demography may have some
effect on policies toward minority nationalities and on
regional party politics, but it does not promise to be a
large factor in Soviet political development in the
Andropov period, and perhaps not even during the
rule of his successor.
Alcoholism and a high male death rate have been
cited by Vladimir Treml as significant factors in Soviet
demography.44 They definitely indicate social and
moral fatigue resulting from low Soviet living stand-
ards and impose a resource constraint on the Politbu-
ro, but are not likely to cause a policy crisis.
Nationalism ought not to be discounted as a factor
for change. Although anti-Russification sentiment is
strong in many of the national minority regions, the
centrifugal political forces it generates are not likely to
create a major crisis of legitimacy for the USSR. (Such
a crisis could, however, occur if a war or some similar
shock revealed Moscow's instruments of control to be
weak.) A more significant effect of nationalism is in in-
stances where it underpins and reinforces deviant be-
havior, such as corruption and bribery. Konstantin
Simis's account of Mzhavanadze's Georgian circle of
corruption is a case in point.45 Ethnic and clan ties
provided the social structure for cooperative efforts in
corruption and proved surprisingly resilient against
party, police, and KGB instruments of control; they
were even able to gain a grip on Mzhavanadze, a Po-
litburo candidate member. This form of active ethnic
and national sentiment is probably more difficult for
the regime to suppress than the separatist sentiments
and overt hostility to Russification found in the Baltic
republics.
There is a tendency to overlook religion as a factor
for change and resistance to Soviet authority. Sectari-
an activities can, of course, be lumped together under
the general category of the dissident movement, but
they appeal to quite different and broader social stra-
ta. The dissident ''democratic movement" was com-
posed almost wholly of the intelligentsia. Baptist sects
recruit from much less sophisticated social circles.
The Orthodox Church also plays a highly complex role,
dissident in some regards, more ambiguous in others,
especially in its implicit support of Soviet foreign poli-
cy through its external relations bureau. It attracts a
large number of people from the ranks of the intelli-
gentsia, and not just from those tending toward anti-
regime sentiments. A strain of neo-Slavophilism,
supportive of the Russian church as well as the re-
gime, has been alleged to exist and to find sympathy
among the military and the KGB.46 To be sure, some
of the intelligentsia find in Orthodoxy an alternative to
the official ideology, a source of cultural and historical
roots, and a haven for "internal immigration." While
religion poses no serious threat to the regime's con-
trol, it does create a nuisance politically and
ideologically. The impressionistic view one gains in
the Soviet Union is that religion has grown both in its
social and spiritual attraction as well as in institutional
size. We may well misjudge both the degree and na-
ture of religious influence. If it is true that Moscow in-
spired the attempt on the Pope's life, that act reflects
the deep concern the leadership feels about the politi-
cal strength of the Polish Catholic Church and prob-
ably about Catholics in the Soviet Union. And, of
course, Muslim groups have a model in Iran that does
not comfort Moscow, even if an Iranian-style upheaval
is most unlikely in Central Asia or the Caucasus.
Finally, ideology is thought by many to be changing,
that is, declining in influence. Measuring such change
is difficult, and most judgments about its decline are
based on impressionistic observations. Whatever the
case, the language of the Soviet press shows no lack
of adherence to the traditional ideological norms. Nor
has the time devoted to ideological training in Soviet
institutions decreased.
Two realities should be kept in mind before pro-
nouncing Marxism-Leninism dead. First, a multi-
national empire like the Soviet Union requires a legiti-
macy principle for maintaining its rule over
non-Russian peoples in an age when nationalism is
the most prevalent legitimacy principle in the world.
Marxist-Leninist ''internationalism" provides such a
theory. Also critically important for Moscow's power is
the Marxist-Leninist view of property. State control of
property is the cornerstone of the entire edifice of eco-
nomic and police instrumentalities. It is difficult to im-
agine even a marginal retreat from the basic tenets of
the official ideology in light of these considerations of
its positive role for Soviet power.
Second, Marxism-Leninism offers a sophisticated
set of categories and assumptions for political analy-
sis. The same Soviet citizen who confides in private
that he is not really a Marxist-Leninist will proceed to
discuss international affairs and domestic politics of
other countries in Marxist-Leninist categories, appar-
ently having internalized them so fully that he does
not recognize them for what they are. Many Soviet of-
ficials clearly believe that Marxist-Leninist categories
"See his Alcohol in the USSR: A Statistical Study, Durham, NC, Duke Press Policy
Studies, 1982.
'?Simis, op. cit.
"Hedrick Smith, The Russians, New York, NY, Quadrangle, 1976, pp. 429-30;
Robert G. Kaiser, Russia, New York, NY, Atheneum, 1976, pp. 166-63.
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Problems of Communism May June 1983
Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and All-Russia celebrates Easter on April 6, 1980 at Moscow's Bogoyavlenskiy
Cathedral. -TASS from Sovfete.
are superior tools of analysis, which provide them with
a clear advantage in strategic thinking. Thus, it is too
soon to accept the view that the ideology is dead. On
the contrary, it may not be dying but rather becoming
more fully internalized in Soviet society.
Andropov's Options
Given the heritage of Brezhnevism and the objective
factors of change and continuity, what can Andropov
do? What must he do? These questions have received
no little speculation in the West in recent years, even
before Andropov assumed power. The natural tenden-
cy has been to focus on the backlog of problems, pri-
marily economic but also social, and to anticipate sig-
nificant change. Hough has taken a view shared by
many that the post-Brezhnev period presents an op-
portunity for marked improvements, not exactly for a
"Prague Spring" but at least for a pragmatic assess-
ment and exploitation of opportunities by a new
leader." Trimming back foreign adventures and de-
vising solutions to discrete domestic problems, includ-
ing cutbacks in the military sector in favor of the civil-
ian sector, seem to be what Hough anticipates. Bialer
gives even more emphasis to the enormity of the prob-
lems facing the Politburo in the 1980's.48 While he
does not fully share Hough's optimism, he sees the re-
gime at a crossroads. To solve many of the domestic
problems, he believes, some factions will press for a
reduction in the military sector and for continued ac-
cess to Western economies for credits, technology,
and trade. Yet he does not rule out a continued mili-
tary buildup and an assertive foreign policy. Bialer's
strong implication is that significant change in Soviet
politics is bound to occur, although he does not ven-
ture to predict its direction.
Andropov's ascendancy, however, has not encour-
aged us to expect the leadership to make a clear
"Hough, op. cit.
"Bialer, loc. cit.
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Choice and Change in Soviet Politics
choice between the horns of the many dilemmas. It
has not weakened the Defense Council and military-
industrial complex as a contending regional party
leader might have done in the succession struggle.
Nor has it necessarily signaled a larger military role,
as is occasionally suggested. Rather, it means that the
Brezhnev policymaking system is still intact.
But are the growing problems and forces of change
so great that they will soon break up this system? In
other words, are the dilemmas so urgent that funda-
mental choices cannot be avoided? Or can Brezh-
nevism be sustained for another decade?
The dissident intelligentsia, demographic factors,
nationalism, and religion create centrifugal pressures
on the regime, but neither singly nor in the aggregate
will these pressures prove unmanageable in the com-
ing decade. A major shock to the regime, such as a
war, might give these forces such vent that they could
become critical for political stability; but short of such
a crisis, they have almost no chance of causing major
changes.
They cannot, however, be ignored by the regime.
They present serious problems and challenges. Co-
optation of some of these forces has long been a re-
gime practice, but only if the price was not too high.49
Coupled with this tactic is repression. As these forces
pose more serious problems for the regime, is
Andropov likely to abandon the traditional two-tactic
policy? Will he merely shift the mix toward more re-
pression as co-optation proves less effective? Does he
have an alternative? Genuine concessions to these
forces could endanger the system. Is he willing to risk
that? Could he bring off an evolutionary systemic
change? These forces, if given full expression, are
more likely to fragment the system than to take the
gradualist road of liberal change. We are compelled,
therefore, to expect that Andropov, as well as
Andropov's successor, will continue the traditional
policy, merely devising new variations on it.
Next, consider ideology. As a source of idealistic
fervor, it offers little to the regime. But in a number of
other ways its retention remains imperative. There is
every reason for Andropov to cling to it. The ideologic-
al factor, therefore, works for continuity and against
change. It tends to blur the sharp dilemmas Bialer de-
scribes, or at least it gives them a unique perspective
in Politburo eyes.
Finally, let us consider the economy, including the
military sector. Are the economic problems so critical
that they demand dramatic changes in policy? Or can
the symptoms be treated for another decade while the
disease is allowed to persist? In fact, the Soviet
economy continues to grow, although at a declining
rate. If a real decline-negative growth-occurred,
would that bring the regime to dramatic, perhaps sys-
temic, change? It certainly would create enormous do-
mestic political pressures, but what would be the al-
ternative to persevering with the present system? Most
Western economic analysts agree that a significant re-
laxation of central control over resource allocations
and prices would carry errormous political risks for the
regime. Could the Politburo return to some form of
Lenin's New Economic Policy, letting the agricultural
sector de-collectivize and allowing small private enter-
prises to develop in the consumer goods sector? Con-
ceivably that would not topple the regime in the short
run, but what dilemmas of power would follow a few
years later? Another ''scissors crisis," as in 1922-23,
when the peasants refused to supply products to the
urban areas?5? Would not the frightened party elite
look for another Stalin to reassert central control?
Would the West provide a manifold Marshall Plan to
rescue the Politburo from its crisis of decentralization?
Could the party's legitimacy survive such a dramatic
turn of events?
These possibilities would not appeal to Andropov.
Nor is it easy to imagine a post-Andropov leadership
willing to confront them. A major step in the direction
of treating the fundamental ills of the economy would
be a step down a very slippery slope. The next step
would be difficult to avoid, yet returning up the slope
could cause complete loss of footing. Any Politburo
will struggle to avoid that course even if it means a
lengthy period of economic stagnation and a return to
more repressive measures against poor labor disci-
pline, bribery, corruption, and other disorders in the
system. Andropov's early moves against corruption, of
course, are precisely what should have been ex-
pected. The next gambit may be the appearance of
"reform," that is, organizational change in the eco-
nomic apparatus based on new ideas about how to
make the old system work. Some shifts in economic
policy and organization may provide a moderate arrest
of certain economic disorders. Recent investment em-
phasis on energy and transportation may reduce bot-
tlenecks sufficiently to sustain overall growth, even if
only at a declining rate. Measures of this sort may
continue for several years before their ultimate failure
is demonstrated beyond dispute. In a word, crisis is
not as imminent as has sometimes been anticipated.
Agriculture may be an exception. Failure to meet in-
dustrial growth plans would not have the immediate
"See Amalrik, op. cit., for an account of the KGB effort to co-opt him that lasted
until his final days in the USSR.
-Dobbs, op. cit., pp. 149-76.
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Problems of Communism May-June 1983
Soviet humor magazine Krokodil highlights problems of crime and corruption in the USSR. The two scenes
bear the captions "Loaded" and "Unloaded."
social consequences that a crop failure would. The
seriousness of the agricultural failures is indicated by
Soviet willingness to continue to import large quanti-
ties of grain even though Soviet hard-currency re-
serves are declining. Among reform efforts, we should
expect the greatest emphasis in agriculture.
The Soviet military-industrial complex cannot re-
main unaffected by the overall economic situation.
But can it, as is frequently suggested, provide a
source. of relief for other ailing sectors? The answer is
some but not much. Unfortunately, economists have
not explored extensively the relationship between de-
fense spending and overall economic performance,
not just in the USSR but elsewhere as well. The ab-
sence of such scholarly work leaves not only pundits
but also many Western specialists on the Soviet Union
leaning toward assumptions that what goes to defense
is a loss to the rest of the economy; that defense
spending is an unambiguous "burden"; and that
changing the mix of "guns and butter" is a simple and
easy policy choice. Yet, while examples can be found
of polities where large defense spending correlates
with slower economic growth, examples of the contra-
ry correlation can also be found. Most of the history of
the Soviet economy presents a case of rapid economic
growth coupled with large military spending. In the
last two decades, military spending has increased
while growth has slowed, but it is not at all clear that
the military sector is the major cause of the decline. It
is a contributing cause, however, if one assumes that
the centrally planned economic system is essential for
the military sector. Such an assumption is compelling.
The military product is clearly the preferred choice of
the planners. And it is doubtful that military growth
could have been sustained at its historical rate had
the preferences of Soviet consumers determined re-
source allocations.
Here we have a bit of a puzzle. Why should we ar-
gue that Soviet defense spending has been a "bur-
den" if planners prefer it? Is not the Soviet military
buildup a real measure of Soviet economic success?
Could one not argue with equal cogency that social
costs (environmental, health, etc.) of some sectors of
American industry are a "burden"? Of course, but
would it follow that the output of those sectors should
be considered a "burden" to the gross national prod-
uct? Certainly not. To understand how the Politburo
looks at the Soviet defense "burden," we must keep
this analogy in mind. As long as consumers in the
United States desire the products of the socially costly
industries, these industries are likely to survive. To be
sure, interest groups could bring political pressure to
bear to reduce those social costs. They would try to
make the industries pay for "clean up" or reduction of
the social costs. Does not the same thing hold for the
Soviet guns and butter relationship?
In part it does, but only in part. First, the Soviet Un-
ion does not have-as does the West-institutions for
interest articulation that could make the military pay
for social costs. Planners can assert their preferences
until things become quite bad for the remainder of the
economy. Among the elite, those most likely to press
the planners for a corrective action are the Defense
Council members and military leaders in a position to
recognize the danger to future military power arising
from too much present neglect of the social costs.
Even then, it is not easy in the short run to shift suffi-
cient resources from the military sector to solve prob-
lems in another sector. To. be sure, there are excep-
tions. Some military industries could shift production
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Choice and Change in Soviet Politics
A poster in Naberezhnyye Chelny (renamed Brezhnevsk) states: "... the years will pass, but all Soviet people
will remember the labor exploits on the Kama." The city is the site of the Kama Truck Plant, a major project
constructed with large infusions of Western technology and capable of producing civilian and military vehicles.
to civilian goods. Tank factories could begin produc-
ing more tractors on fairly short notice. When the size
and character of Soviet economic problems are con-
sidered, however, it is clear that such redirection of
production capacity would ameliorate only a few of the
problems. For example, radar factories might produce
more TV sets, but that would do very little for critical
problems of labor discipline and factor productivity in
the civilian sector.
Second, military factories are apparently more mod-
ern and efficient than other factories. Does it make
sense to shift large amounts of capital from the effi-
cient to the inefficient sectors? That would be a bit like
selling stocks that are rising in price, to buy ailing
stocks in order to force up their price. The analogy is
not perfect, but it may reveal something about the di-
lemmas faced by Soviet planners in making capital
allocations.
We can probably expect some shifts of the produc-
tion mix in the military sector, but such shifts promise
only modest relief for the overall economy. A large
shift of industrial infrastructure could not take place
overnight. It would require years. And, it would not
necessarily solve many of the structural problems of
the economy. We can also expect that senior military
leaders will accept minor shifts, perhaps even large
cuts in equipment production. They will do so willingly
if they see it as the necessary price for the long-term
health of the system that has given them the forces
they now have.
On balance, these factors seem less likely to beget
major policy changes than to elicit a series of efforts to
hold the line in defense of the basic system. In other
words, the incentives are strong for Andropov to try to
muddle through. Whether he sticks to a "muddle-
through" policy, or tries significant initiatives to miti-
gate or reverse some of the adverse trends within the
system, one problem cannot be easily avoided: the
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declining vitality and responsiveness of the party
apparatus.
There are signs that Andropov understands this and
intends to deal aggressively with entrenched
bureaucrats-party and non-party. Anticorruption
campaigns clearly have the aim of restoring greater
administrative efficacy in the state and party appara-
tus. If they are to achieve notable results, they will
have to be sweeping and sustained, and they will cre-
ate resistance in many party circles. Should they
prove ineffective and half-hearted, then "Brezh-
nevism" will persist under Andropov. Yet, to allow it to
persist indefinitely is to risk eventually greater dangers
for the system-dangers of a kind that developed for
the Polish party.
In Poland, when the party proved no longer able to
defeat dissident activity or keep it from large-scale or-
ganizational expression, the military had to supply the
civilian sector with cadres, that is, with personnel re-
sponsive to central party direction. In other words, the
Polish leadership turned to its last remaining source
of reliable party workers: the officer corps and the po-
lice. It remains to be seen if this policy can rebuild a
more effective Polish party apparatus.
The Soviet Union does not yet appear to be near the
point where such a dramatic move is required. Still,
the comparison is instructive in that it tends to sharp-
en our appreciation of what Andropov is up against.
Stalin relied on blood purges to deal with problems of
"localism," "careerism," and "drift" in party work.
Khrushchev promised the party ranks no more blood
purges, but he tried to develop a surrogate through re-
organizations and formal requirements for frequent
turnover of party and state cadres. Brezhnev was will-
ing to spare the party apparatus even such bloodless
purges. Thus, the lower and middle ranks of the party
have achieved considerable success in limiting "true
Leninist norms" of "democratic centralism"-the
principle that made the Bolsheviks a powerful instru-
ment of control and dictatorial policy execution.
Western analysts, by taking the "group approach"
to Soviet politics in order to explain the post-Stalin dif-
fusion of power, have tended to miss its key dynamic
feature. Conflict is less severe between institutions
and incipient groups than it is between higher and
lower strata in the hierarchical Soviet system. In the
early years of the regime, the narrow top stratum held
the initiative. In the Brezhnev years, the middle and
lower strata gained significant ground against the
party center.51 The greatest change in Soviet politics
"William E. Odom, The Soviet Volunteers, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
Press, 1973, pp. 264-328.
Problems of Communism May June 1983
has come from this loss of control by the party's Sec-
retariat. It can appoint whom it chooses to
nomenklatura posts, but soon small face-to-face
cliques or "family circles," as the Soviet press calls
them, develop to get around the impossible output
goals demanded by party direction. These cliques do
not aggregate into "groups" in the Western political
sense; rather, they thrive within the hierarchical bu-
reaucratic system, reinforcing it.
If Andropov (or his successor) fails to restore party
discipline, will he eventually be forced-as were the
Poles-to turn to the military and the KGB? We can-
not rule out this possibility, although it does not look
imminent. If this did occur, it would not be a military
takeover in the sense usually meant by a coup. In-
stead it would be, as in Poland, a shift of party cadres
within the system. If this did not lead to an effective
purge and rebuilding of the party in a short time, the
effects on the military would be severe. The officer
corps has a momentous task in simply managing a
large and modern military establishment. It does not
have cadres to spare. And how long would it be before
the officers were trapped in the same "family circles"
that they had been sent to eradicate from the party
apparatus? This dilemma is so sharp and unpleasant
for any Soviet leader that it is difficult to believe he
would not use neo-Stalinist methods on the party ap-.
paratus before such a crisis arose.
In any event, the central focus for Soviet domestic
policy has to be the party cadre problem, that is, the
lack of cadre responsiveness to the party center. In
the short run, a crisis can be avoided. Andropov can
try and fail to reassert effective discipline for a num-
ber of years. So can his successor. Yet, unless dealt
with, the problem will remain a threat to the very sta-
bility of the system.
If that is the outlook for Soviet domestic policy, what
must Andropov do in foreign policy? The brief answer
is "more of the same," that is, continue Brezhnev's
foreign policy "mobilism." Can Andropov do this?
Does not domestic stagnation place a drag on Soviet
foreign policy? Will not concern with sorting out do-
mestic problems cause the Andropov regime to look
for ways to cut back on foreign policy commitments,
to reduce costly and dangerous ventures abroad in or-
der to make resources available for dealing with do-
mestic bottlenecks? It is not clear that cutting foreign
commitments would create resources that would alle-
viate some of the domestic resource problems. The
sale of Soviet arms, for example, generates hard-
currency earnings that would be lost if some commit-
ments were reduced. The fungibility of other foreign
policy resources may also not be great. Could hun-
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Choice and Change in Soviet Politics
LVEM
A May Day 1980 display in Moscow's Red Square proclaims: "We are with you, the revolutionary people of
Afghanistan."
dreds and thousands of military advisers and KGB op-
eratives be easily shifted to industrial problem-solving
on the domestic front? The key point here is that there
is no way to establish a predictable causal relationship
between Moscow's situation at home and its degree of
assertiveness abroad.52 To the extent one were to es-
tablish a correlation between the two from Russian
and Soviet history, the data are likely to favor the
proposition that internal weakness correlates with ex-
ternal assertiveness.
Andropov's views on foreign policy are probably driven
less by domestic concerns than by the changing dy-
namics of Soviet detente policy. That policy should be
"In a larger sense we can establish connections between historically rooted
domestic structural dynamics in the USSR and the likelihood of the USSR becoming
a nonassertive status quo power. I have outlined the dynamics elsewhere and
conclude that without fundamental structural change, the USSR cannot become a
status quo power. See "Whither the Soviet Union?" Washington Quarterly, No. 4,
Spring 1981. It is another question to determine at specific times whether domestic
difficulties will temporarily reduce assertiveness in Soviet foreign policy behavior.
put in the larger context of the long-standing Soviet
concept of "peaceful coexistence," which had its ori-
gins in the early 1920's. Finding himself clearly with-
out the power to precipitate a revolution in Western
Europe-where he had expected it-Lenin designed
a new strategy. In dealing with the advanced industrial
states, he would seek correct state-to-state relations,
trade and aid, and construction of a Soviet industrial
base. Stalin, of course, gave this policy the label of
"socialism in one country." But peaceful coexistence
had another component that is sometimes forgotten:
continued revolutionary struggle in what is now called
the Third World and what Lenin called the "weak link"
in "imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism." That
policy was pursued in various forms until the start of
World War II.
By the mid-1950's, Moscow returned to the original
thrust of the "peaceful coexistence" policy, although
initially this policy excluded West Germany. Only after
the Czech crisis of 1968 and the coming to power of
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Problems of Communism May June 1983
the SPD in Bonn was Moscow able to reestablish the
former broad-based approach to "peaceful coexist-
ence" in Europe. Furthermore, the United States was
drawn in as well. For a decade this alternative form of
the "international class struggle" (the official defini-
tion of "peaceful coexistence") yielded considerable
benefits to the USSR. The disenchantment in the
United States, however, and the debt problems in East
Europe have raised serious questions as to whether
the policy can continue to bring Moscow the profits
necessary to make it worthwhile.
To date there is no significant evidence of a funda-
mental Soviet review of the current form of "peaceful
coexistence." Andropov is pursuing, although some-
.what more aggressively, the Brezhnev policy of trying
to split Europe from the United States. The German
elections of 1983, bringing a Christian Democratic
Union/Christian Social Union coalition to power, were
a setback; but the deployment of Intermediate-range
Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe has not yet been ac-
complished and, to all appearances, Andropov will do
what he can to prevent or delay it. If the missiles are
deployed, then the Politburo might well begin a basic
review. The inclination to do so will be all the greater if
economic interaction with the West is stymied or de-
clining, due either to Western trade policies or Soviet
lack of credits. The outcome of a basic review of strat-
egy would not be apparent for several months, or even
a year or two.
What could it yield? Continuation of detente is not to
be discounted. Although detente's "high-yield" years
may be past, severe tensions in central Europe would
not offer greater yields and modest economic gains at
the present level of trade are not to be lightly thrown
away. In the Third World, there are no good reasons
for Moscow to draw back, except here and there for
tactical purposes. The re-arming of Syria and the
greater Soviet military involvement there indicate a
willingness to run quite high risks of an East-West
confrontation. The Iraq-Iran war grinds on, supplied
largely by the USSR and its surrogates, creating what
Moscow may see as long-term "progressive develop-
ments" in Iraq and especially in Iran-the real stra-
tegic prize.
In Central America, the Soviets and Cubans seem
committed to exploiting the large opening created by
the Sandinist victory in Nicaragua. The danger in
these two regions-the Middle East and Central
America-is that Soviet success might create a back-
lash in the United States and a policy consensus that
Soviet power projection is indeed endangering the
Western international order. Thus far, however,
Moscow has been able to prevent that, in part by
working hard to keep the nuclear weapon and arms
control issues at the center of public attention.
On the whole, the Brezhnev variant of "peaceful co-
existence" still has much to offer, and its tactical and
strategic "mobilism" probably will retain its appeal for
Andropov. It has been an offensive strategy, and its
gambits are still far from played out. The odds, there-
fore, seem to be on the side of a continuation of this
policy, with many tactical shifts and changes as differ-
ent situations require. The major worry Andropov
must have is the possibility of a reemergence (in the
United States in particular, but also in Europe) of a
broad-based public and media reaction against Soviet
policy. If the attentive public and the media became
convinced that assertive projection of Soviet power,
rather than the nuclear issue, is the most pressing
danger to peace and stability, then NATO might well
be able to offset some of the Soviet conventional mili-
tary advantage, and the United States would probably
allocate much larger resources to competition with the
Soviet Union in the Third World. That indeed would
prompt a fundamental review of foreign policy in the
Kremlin.
In sum, the prospects for the post-Brezhnev era
seem to be sound and fury about domestic reform ac-
companied by little actual change. In external policy,
we can expect threats to end detente while Moscow
hangs on to its economic access to the industrial West
and competes more aggressively in the Third World.
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