CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN GRENADA BEFORE THE ONSET OF HOSTILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000601010026-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 26
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/02/21: CIA-RDP85M00364R000601010026-9
1 November 1983
Talking Points DCI
Cuban Involvement in Grenada Before the Onset of Hostilities
Military Activities
Our information before the invasion on 25 October indicated
that Havana and Moscow were stepping up training and aid to
Grenada's armed forces at a level beyond the legitimate security
needs of such a small island. In late 1982 we published our
judgment that the principal objectives of the military buildup
were:
To check any external threats to the Bishop regime and
oppose internal insurrection.
To establish Grenada as a training site for
revolutionary-minded radical groups from neighboring
islands.
To provide an operational base enabling the Cubans and
Soviets to exploit Bishop's government and serve their
own interests.
This analysis has subsequently been supported by captured
documents revealing the existence of separate secret military
agreements between Grenada and the Soviet Union, Cuba, and North
Korea.
These agreements contain promises of some $37.8 million
worth of military equipment including artillery and
small arms, anti-aircraft armament, and armored
personnel carriers.
Preliminary reporting since the invasion confirms the
presence of most of the types of weaponry cited in the
secret treaties.
We also reported in late 1982 that Cuba's military
involvement with Grenada appeared to increase sharply in mid-
1982.
Most significantly, the largest single shipment of
military equipment was delivered in August.
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In addition, leftists from St. Lucia, Dominica, and possibly
other islands reportedly were receiving basic training from the
Grenadian army.
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-- Reporting also indicated that some small groups from the
Eastern Caribbean may have been receiving indoctrination
and military training at Calivigny.
Political Activities
We have no evidence--and indeed strongly doubt--that the
Castro regime sponsored the coup against Maurice Bishop, but
Havana's failure to act more assertively in supporting him may
have inadvertently sealed his fate.
By early October the Cubans were almost certainly aware
that a serious power struggle was underway among the
Grenadian leadership. .
Bishop's rival, the more radical Bernard Coard, was
pressing Bishop to yield his post as party leader, and
we are persuaded that Havana--although perhaps somewhat
reluctantly--had concluded that collegial leadership was
necessary in view of Bishop's waning support in the New
Jewel Movement.
Castro reacted to the killing of Bishop and his top cabinet
ministers on 19 October by attempting to distance himself
publicly from Grenada's new leaders.
The meeting of leaders of the governments of the Eastern
Caribbean on 22-23 October evidently convinced Castro that an
invasion was imminent, and Colonel Tortola Comas and several
other officers were rushed to Grenada on 24 October to organize
resistance.
-- Shortly therafter, Cuban military elements in Grenada
were instructed to improve their defenses.
Castro's decision to fight apparently was triggered by
concern that a supine capitulation to a US invasion would
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undermine Cuba's revolutionary reputation, raise grave doubts
among the Sandinistas and others about Cuba's reliability as a
military protector, and whet the appetite of the US for greater
military involvement in Central America.
Before the onset of hostilities we estimated that the Cuban
presence in Grenada probably totaled 400 to 600.
-- We now believe that the Castro government's
acknowledgment on 28 October of 784 Cubans in Grenada is
probably close to the mark.
The most plausible explanation for this discrepancy is
that the approximately 200 Cuban construction workers
whom we thought had rotated home last January either did
not leave or were replaced without our knowledge.
According to the Cuban's own admission, the 43-man Cuban
military mission was about four times the size indicated
by previous reporting. (The recently captured secret
military treaty between Grenada and Cuba also provides
for a Cuban military advisory group of about 40).
Additional Cuban military personnel may have been
clandestinely infiltrated into Grenada in October aboard
any of three Cuban-associated ships, but the
circumstances of those voyages make this unlikely.
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Approved For Release 2008/02/21: CIA-RDP85M00364R000601010026-9