THE US AND NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001403210049-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: April 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/11/05: CIA-RDP85M00363R001403210049-2
A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations
Not a comprehensive policy statement
Bureau of Public Affairs ? Department of State
The US and Nicaragua April 1982
Background: Toward the end of the Nicaraguan civil war, the OAS passed
a resolution in June 1979 calling for "immediate and definitive
replacement of the Somoza regime"; "guarantee of the respect for human
rights of all Nicaraguans without exception"; and "the holding of free
elections as soon as possible, that will lead to the establishment of a
truly democratic government that guarantees peace, freedom and
justice." In a letter to the OAS in July 1979, before assuming power,
the Provisional Government of National Reconstruction promised to
"install a regime of democracy, justice and social progress in which
there is full guarantee for the right of all Nicaraguans to political
participation and universal suffrage"? "guarantee the full exercise of--
human rights and fundamental freedoms"; and organize "a mixed economy."
The Sandinista leaders have reneged on these promises. They have
ignored a basic tenet of the inter-American system--nonintervention in
the affairs of other states--by providing materiel and other support
for subversion in El Salvador and elsewhere. Nicaragua also is engaged
in a rapid arms buildup which threatens the security of its neighbors.
Rather than strengthening democracy, the Sandinistas have concentrated
on consolidating political power, imposing heavy constraints on
opposition activity and postponing elections. This trend led Eden
Pastora, a founder and popular hero of the Sandinista movement, to
break publicly with them in April 1982, accusing them of betraying
their promises of freedom and progress. The economy has done poorly
despite more than $125 million in US aid and several hundred million
from other Western donors. Production is well below prerevolutionary
levels. Largely because of the regime's hostility, private internal
and external investment is almost nonexistent.
Intervention in El Salvador: Nicaragua is the support and command base
for the Salvadoran guerrillas. Arms and supplies are received in
Nicaragua and transshipped by land, air, and sea to El Salvador. The
guerri-l-l-a.-s_-U-n-i-fi-ed -Revo-l-u-tionary -li-re-c_torate_ has--it.s_-headquarters-n.ear
Managua; with the help of Cuban and Nicaraguan officers, it coordinates
logistical support, including food, medicine, clothing, money, and
munitions, and selects targets to be attacked. Salvadoran guerrillas
move through Nicaragua to Cuba and elsewhere for training; some
training is conducted in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas also provide
support for leftist extremists in Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica.
Military buildup: Nicaragua, with a population of 2.7 million, has
expanded its active duty forces to 20,000-25,000--at least twice the
size of Somoza's National Guard; reservists and militia exceed 50,000.
To accommodate this force, the Sandinistas have built 36 new Cuban-
designed military garrisons, in addition to 13 garrisons inherited from
the National Guard. In contrast, Costa Rica has no standing army, and
Honduras, with 1 million more people than Nicaragua, has total forces
of about 17,500. Some 2,000 Cuban military and internal security
advisers are in Nicaragua, and several hundred Nicaraguan military are
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training in Cuba. Sophisticated weapons, including Soviet-made T-55
tanks, amphibious ferries, and transport aircraft, have been added to
Nicaragua's arsenal. Airfields have been lengthened to handle MiG
aircraft; Nicaraguan pilots are training in Eastern Europe. Recently,
Nicaragua also has purchased rocket-launchers, helicopters, and patrol
boats from France.
Attacks on pluralism: It is.increasingly clear that the country is
controlled by the Sandinistas' nine-member Directorate--all
Marxists--and not by the government's official structures, the
Coordinating Junta or Cabinet. The trend is toward a one-party state.
- Elections have been postponed until at least 1985.
- The respected, independent newspaper La Prensa, for years the voice
of opposition to the Somozas, has been closed down repeatedly for
carrying unwelcome news; La Prensa and independent radio news
services are now heavily censored.
- Archbishop Obando y Bravo was banned from performing mass on
television, and the Catholic Church's radio was temporarily closed.
- Independent political parties are harassed and denied permission to
hold public rallies; their headquarters have been attacked by
Sandinista-orchestrated mobs, and their leaders refused permission to
travel abroad.
- In October 1981, five leaders of COSEP, the umbrella private sector
organization, were arrested and some jailed for 4 months, because
they issued a statement criticizing official policy.
- Cuban-style block committees have been set up to monitor political
activities at the community level.
- Three years after the Sandinistas took power, there are still some
4,200 political prisoners; allegations of political arrests and
disappearances have increased.
- Tightly controlled Sandinista labor and peasant organizations have.
been established.
- The Sandinistas have engaged in a systematic destruction of the way
of life of the isolated Miskito Indian tribe. At least 26 of their
villages are now deserted--most burned to the ground. Some 10,000
Miskitos have been detained in "relocation" centers, and as many as
12,000 have fled into Honduras.
US policy: While the US had shared the hopes for a pluralistic,
nonaligned Nicaragua, we have been increasingly concerned with the
deteriorating conditions and have repeatedly called our concerns to the
Sandinistas' attention. Assistant Secretary of State Enders went to
Managua in August 1981 to meet with Nicaraguan leaders. Against the
background of increasing restrictions on domestic dissent, the dis-
cussions focused on the regional security problems caused by Nica-
ragua's military buildup and arms supply to Salvadoran guerrillas. In
exchange for Nicaraguan action on our concerns, the US offered re-
sumption of economic aid and cultural/technical exchanges and assur-
ances we would not aid groups seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan
Government. In March 1982, although the Sandinistas had demonstrated
no willingness to address our concerns, Secretary Haig reaffirmed US
willingness to discuss outstanding issues, and in April our Ambassador
presented specific proposals to the Nicaraguan Government. The new
eight-point US plan includes a proposed regional arrangement for arms
limitations and international verification. We would welcome coopera-
tion with a pluralistic Nicaragua committed to peace and friendship
with its neighbors.
Approved For Release 2007/11/05: CIA-RDP85M00363R001403210049-2