COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001403210042-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: February 23, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
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Special
14port No. 80
?
CONTENTS
Summary
1. A Case of Communist Military
Involvement in the Third World
II. Communist Military Intervention:
A Chronology
I. The Government: The Search for
Order and Democracy
IV. Some Conclusions
Summary
This special report presents definitive
evidence of the clandestine military sup-
port given by the Soviet Union, Cuba,
and their Communist allies to Marxist-
Leninist guerrillas now fighting to over-
throw the established Government of El
Salvador. The evidence, drawn from cap-
tured guerrilla documents and war
materiel and corroborated by intelligence
reports, underscores the central role
played by Cuba and other Communist
countries beginning in 1979 in the political
unification, military direction, and arming
of insurgent forces in El Salvador.
From the documents it is possible to
reconstruct chronologically the key stages
in the growth of the Communist involve-
ment:
? The direct tutelary role played by
Fidel Castro and the Cuban Government
in late 1979 and early 1980 in bringing the
averse Salvadoran guerrilla factions into
unified front;
Communist Interference
in El Salvador
February 23, 1981
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
? The assistance and advice given
the guerrillas in planning their military
operations;
? The series of contacts between
Salvadoran Communist leaders and key
officials of several Communist states that
resulted in commitments to supply the in-
surgents nearly 800 tons of the most
modern weapons and equipment;
? The covert delivery to El Salvador
of nearly 200 tons of those arms, mostly
through Cuba and Nicaragua, in prepara-
tion for the guerrillas' failed "general of-
fensive" of January 1981;
? The major Communist effort to
"cover" their involvement by providing
mostly arms of Western manufacture.
It is clear that over the past year the
insurgency in El Salvador has been pro-
gressively transformed into another case
of indirect armed aggression against a
small Third World country by Communist
powers acting through Cuba.
The United States considers it of
great importance that the American
people and the world community be
aware of the gravity of the actions of
Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Com-
munist states who are carrying out what
is clearly shown to be a well-coordinated,
covert effort to bring about the over-
throw of El Salvador's established gov-
ernment and to impose in its place a
Communist regime with no popular
support.
HONDURAS
Tegucigalpa
rT ~~O?
EL SALVADUH %
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I. A Case of Communist Military
Involvement in the Third World
The situation in El Salvador presents a
strikingly familiar case of Soviet, Cuban,
and other Communist military involve-
ment in a politically troubled Third World
country. By providing arms, training, and
direction to a local insurgency and by
supporting it with a global propaganda
campaign, the Communists have inten-
sified and widened the conflict, greatly
increased the suffering of the Salvadoran
people, and deceived much of the world
about the true nature of the revolution.
Their objective in El Salvador as else-
where is to bring about-at little cost to
themselves-the overthrow of the estab-
lished government and the imposition of a
Communist regime in defiance of the will
of the Salvadoran people.
The Guerrillas: Their Tactics and
Propaganda. El Salvador's extreme left,
which includes the long-established
Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES)
and several armed groups of more recent
origin, has become increasingly commit-
ted since 1976 to a military solution. A
campaign of terrorism-bombings, assas-
sinations, kidnappings, and seizures of
embassies-has disrupted national life
and claimed the lives of many innocent
people.
During 1980, previously fragmented
factions of the extreme left agreed to
coordinate their actions in support of a
joint military battle plan developed with
Cuban assistance. As a precondition for
large-scale Cuban aid, Salvadoran guer-
rilla leaders, meeting in Havana in May,
formed first the Unified Revolutionary
Directorate (DRU) as their central exec-
utive arm for political and military plan-
ning and, in late 1980, the Farabundo
Marti People's Liberation Front (FMLN),
as the coordinating body of the guerrilla
organizations. A front organization, the
Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR),
was also created to disseminate prop-
aganda abroad. For appearances sake,
three small non-Marxist-Leninist political
parties were brought into the front,
though they have no representation in the
DRU.
The Salvadoran guerrillas, speaking
through the FDR, have managed to de-
ceive many about what is happening in El
Salvador. They have been aided by
Nicaragua and by the worldwide prop-
aganda networks of Cuba, the Soviet
Union, and other Communist countries.
The guerrillas' propaganda aims at
legitimizing their violence and concealing
the Communist aid that makes it possi-
ble.. Other key aims are to discredit the
Salvadoran Government, to misrepresent
U.S. policies and actions, and to foster
the impression of overwhelming popular
support for the revolutionary movement.
Examples of the more extreme
claims of their propaganda apparatus-
echoed by Cuban, Soviet, and Nicara-
guan media-are:
? That the United States has mili-
tary bases and several hundred troops in
El Salvador (in fact, the United States
has no bases and fewer than 50 military
personnel there);
? That the government's security
forces were responsible for most of the
10,000 killings that occurred in 1980 (in
their own reports in 1980, the guerrillas
themselves claimed the killings of nearly
6,000 persons, including noncombatant
"informers" as well as government au-
thorities and military).
In addition to media propaganda,
Cuba and the Soviet Union promote the
insurgent cause at international forums,
with individual governments, and among
foreign opinion leaders. Cuba has an effi-
cient network for introducing and promot-
ing representatives of the Salvadoran left
all over the world. Havana and Moscow
also bring indirect pressure on some gov-
ernments to support the Salvadoran revo-
lutionaries by mobilizing local Communist
groups.
II. Communist Military Intervention:
A Chronology
Before September 1980 the diverse guer-
rilla groups in El Salvador were ill-
coordinated and ill-equipped, armed with
pistols and a varied assortment of hunt-
ing rifles and shotguns. At that time the
insurgents acquired weapons predomi-
nantly through purchases on the interna-
tional market and from dealers who par-
ticipated in the supply of arms to the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
By January 1981 when the guerrillas
launched their "general offensive," they
had acquired an impressive array of
modern weapons and supporting equip-
ment never before used in El Salvador by
either the insurgents or the military. Bel-
gian FAL rifles, German G-3 rifles, U.S.
M-1, M-16, and AR-15 semiautomatic
and automatic rifles, and the Israeli UZI
submachinegun and Galil assault rifle
Quantity Type
192 9mm pistols
1,620 AR-15 (M-16) semiautomatic
rifles
162 30-caliber machineguns
36 7.62mm M-60 machineguns
12 12.7-caliber M-50 antiair
machineguns
36 62mm mortars
12 81mm mortars
12 DKZ -57 antitank rocket
launchers
15,000 9mm rounds
1,500,000 AR-15 rounds (5.56mm)
240,000 7.62mm M-60 rounds
240,000 30-caliber rounds
130,000 12.7-caliber M-50 rounds
9,000 62mm mortar rounds
4,000 81mm mortar rounds
1,500 DKZ-57 antitank rocket
grenades
have all been confirmed in the guerrilla
inventory. In addition, they are known to
possess .30 to .50 caliber machineguns,
the U.S. M-60 machinegun, U.S. and
Russian hand grenades, the U.S. M-79
and Chinese RPG grenade launchers, and
the U.S. M -72 light antitank weapon and
81mm mortars. Captured ammunition in-
dicates the guerrillas probably possess
60mm and 82mm mortars and 57mm and
75mm recoilless rifles.
Recently acquired evidence has ena-
bled us to reconstruct the central role
played by Cuba, other Communist coun-
tries, and several radical states in the
political unification and military direction
of insurgent forces in El Salvador and in
equipping them in less than 6 months
with a panoply of modern weapons that
enabled the guerrillas to launch a well-
armed offensive.
This information, which we consider
incontrovertible, has been acquired over
the past year. Many key details, however,
have fallen into place as the result of the
guerrillas' own records. Two particularly
important document caches were recov-
ered from the Communist Party of El
Salvador in November 1980 and from the
Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ERP) in
January 1981. This mass of captured
documents includes battle plans, letters,
and reports of meetings and travels,
some written in cryptic language and
using code words.
1
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MODERN WEAPONS NOW IN
GUERRILLA INVENTORY
Belgian FALsemiautomatic rifle
German G-3 rifle
U.S. M-1, M-16, and AR-15
semiautomatic and automatic rifles
Israeli UZI submachinegun and Galil
assault rifle
30 and 50 caliber machineguns
U.S. M-60 machinegun
U.S. and Soviet hand grenades
U.S. and Chinese grenade launchers
U.S. M-72 light antitank weapon
U.S. 81mm mortars
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When deciphered and verified
agga~inst evidence from other intelligence
st Crces, the do iments bring to light the
chain of events leading to the guerrillas'
January 1981 offensive. What emerges is
a highly disturbing pattern of parallel and
coordinated action by a number of Com-
munist and some radical countries bent
on imposing a military solution.
The Cuban and Communist role in
preparing for and helping to organize the
abortive "general offensive" early this
year is spelled out in the following
chronology based' pn the contents of cap-
tured documents and other sources.
Initial Steps. The chronology of ex-
ternal support begins at the end of 1979.
With salutations of "brotherly and revolu-
tionary greetings" on December 16, 1979,
members of the Communist Party of El
Salvador (PCES), National Resistance
(FARN), and Popular Liberation Forces
(FPL) thank Fidel Castro in a letter for
his help and "the help of your party com-
rades ... by signing an agreement which
establishes very solid bases upon which
we begin building coordination and unity
of our organizations." The letter, written
in Havana, was signed by leaders of these
three revolutionary organizations.
At an April 1980 meeting at the
Hungarian Embassy in Mexico City,
guerrilla leaders made certain "requests"
(possibly for arms). Present at this meet-
ing were representatives of the German
Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Poland,
Vietnam, Hungary, Cuba, and the Soviet
Union.
In notes taken during an April 28,
1980 meeting of the Salvadoran Com-
munist Party, party leader Shafik Handal
mentions the need to "speed up reorgani-
zation and put the Party on a war foot-
ing." He added, "I'm in agreement with
taking advantage of the possibilities of
assistance from the socialist camp. I think
that their attitude is magnificent. We are
not yet taking advantage of it." In refer-
ence to a unification of the armed move-
ment, he asserts that "the idea of involv-
ing everyone in the area has already been
suggested to Fidel himself." Handal al-
ludes to the concept of unification and
notes, "Fidel thought well of the idea."
Guerrilla Contacts in Havana.
From May 5 to June 8, 1980, Salvadoran
guerrilla leaders report on meetings in
Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and
Nicaragua. They proceed to Havana and
meet several times with Fidel Castro; the
documents also note an interview with
the German Democratic Republic
(G.D.R.) Chairman Erich Honecker in
Havana. During the Havana portion of
their travels, the Salvadoran guerrilla
leadership meets twice with the Cuban
Directorate of Special Operations (DOE,
.the clandestine operations/,,s~ppecial forces
knit of the Cuban Ministry'f Interior) to
discuss guerrilla military plans. In addi-
tion, they meet with the Cuban "Chief of
Communications."
During this period (late May 1980),
the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP)
is admitted into the guerrilla coalition
after negotiations in Havana. The coali-
tion then assumes the name of the Un-
ified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU)
and meets with Fidel Castro on three
occasions.
After the Havana meetings, Shafik
Handal leaves Havana on May 30, 1980
for Moscow. The other Salvadoran guer-
rilla leaders in Havana leave for Man-
agua. During the visit of early June, the
DRU leaders meet with Nicaraguan revo-
lutionary leaders (Sandinistas) and dis-
cuss: (1) a headquarters with "all meas-
ures of security"; (2) an "international
field of operations, which they (Sandinis-
tas) control"; and (3) the willingness of
the Sandinistas to "contribute in material
terms" and to adopt "the cause of El Sal-
vador as its own." The meeting culmi-
nated with "dinner at Humberto's house"
(presumably Sandinista leader Humberto
Ortega).
Salvadoran Communist Party
Leader's Travels in the East. From June
2 to ,July 22, 1980, Shafik Handal visits
the U.S.S.R., Vietnam, the German
Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ethiopia to pro-
cure arms and seek support for the
movement.
On June 2, 1980, Handal meets in
Moscow with Mikhail Kudachkin, Deputy
Chief of the Latin American Section of
the Foreign Relations Department of the
CPSU Central Committee. Kudachkin
suggests that Handal travel to Vietnam
to seek arms and offers to pay for Han-
dal's trip. '~
Continuing his travels between Jun
9 and 15, ,Handal visits Vietnam where by
is received by Le Duan, Secretary Gen-
eral of the Vietnamese Communist Party;
Xuan Thuy, member of the Communist
Party Central Committee Secretariat;
and Vice Minister of National Defense
Tran Van Quang. The Vietnamese, as a
"first contribution," agree to provide 60
tons of arms. Handal adds that "the com-
rade requested air transport from the
USSR."
From June 19 to June 24, 1980,
Handal visits the German Democratic
Republic (G.D.R.), where he is received
by Hermann Axen, member of the
G.D.R. Politburo. Axen states that the
G.D.R. has already sent 1.9 tons of
supplies to Managua. On July 21, G.D.R.
leader Honecker writes the G.D.R. Em-
bassy in Moscow that additional supplies
will be sent and that the German Demo-
cratic Republic will provide military
training, particularly in clandestine oper-
ations. The G.D.R. telegram adds that
although Berlin possesses no Western-
manufactured weapons-which the Sal-
vadoran guerrillas are seeking-efforts
will be undertaken to find a "solution to
this problem." (NOTE: The emphasis on
Western arms reflects the desire to main
tain plausible denial.)
From June 24-27, 1980, Handal visits
Czechoslovakia where he is received by
Vasil Bilak, Second Secretary of the
Czech Communist Party. Bilak says that
some Czech arms circulating in the world
market will be provided so that these
arms will not be traced back to Czechos-
lovakia as the donor country. Transporta-
tion will be coordinated with the German
Democratic Republic.
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1k
Handal proceeds to Bulgaria from
June 27 to June 30 ,1980. He is received
Dimitir Stanich , member of the Cen-
Committee Secretariat. The Bulga-
s agree to supply German-origin
apons and other supplies, again in an
apparent effort to conceal their sources.
In Hungary, from June 30 to July 3,
1980, Handal is received by Communist
Party General Secretary Janos Kadar and
"Guesel" (probably Central Committee
Secretary for Foreign Affairs Andras
Gyenes). The latter offers radios and
other supplies and indicates Hungarian
willingness to trade arms with Ethiopia
or Angola in order to obtain Western-
origin arms for the Salvadoran guerrillas.
"Guesel" promises to resolve the trade
with the Ethiopians and Angolans him-
self, "since we want to be a part of pro-
viding this aid." Additionally, Handal se-
cures the promise of 10,000 uniforms to be
made by the Hungarians according to
Handal,s specifications.
Handal then travels to Ethiopia,
July 3 to July 6. He meets Chairman
In late January, Honduran authorities seized
a refrigerated trailer truck which was being
#serd to smuggle arms to the Salvadoran
rrillas. Approximately 100 M-16 rifles,
e of which were traceable to Vietnam,
g with a large cache of ammunition and
mortar rounds, were discovered in the
hollowed-out insulation on the top of the
truck. The truck also contained extra sets of
license plates from the Central American
area as well as quantities of Communist
propaganda materials.
Right: View of truck from rear.
Below: New of truck from above.
Mengistu and receives "a warm recep-
tion." Mengistu. offers "several thousand
weapons," including: 150 Thompson sub-
machineguns with 300 cartridge clips,
1,500 M-1 rifles, 1,000 M-14 rifles, and
ammunition for these weapons. In addi-
tion, the Ethiopians agree to supply all
necessary spare parts for these arms.
Handal returns to Moscow on
July 22, 1980 and is received again by
Mikhail Kudachkin. The Soviet official
asks if 30 Communist youth currently
studying in the U.S.S.R. could take part
in the war in El Salvador. Before leaving
Moscow, Handal receives assurances that
the Soviets agree in principle to trans-
port the Vietnamese arms.
Further Contacts in Nicaragua. On
July 13, representatives of the DRU ar-
rive in Managua amidst preparations for
the first anniversary celebration of Somo-
,za's overthrow. The DRU leaders wait
until July 23 to meet with "Comrade
Bayardo" (presumably Bayardo Arce,
member of the Sandinista Directorate).
They complain that the Sandinistas ap-
pear to be restricting their access to visit-
ing world dignitaries and demanding that
all contacts be cleared through them.
During the meeting, Arce promises am-
munition to the guerrillas and arranges a
meeting for them with the Sandinista
"Military Commission." Arce indicates
that, since the guerrillas will receive
some arms manufactured by the Com-
munist countries, the Sandinista Army
(EPS) will consider absorbing some of
these weapons and providing to the Sal-
vadorans Western-manufactured arms
held by the EPS in exchange. (In January
1981 the Popular Sandinista Army indeed
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This sample page is part of two large caches of guerrilla documents that have been captured
in recent months, providing substantiating evidence of the full involvement of several
Communist countries in the arming of the Salvadoran guerrillas.
IX - sr ec a -; l Fa del C MME i ,.~ ent..d4..Vt Nam (5 de septiembre estarIn en Esmeralda)
~..--. ?
5.92 pistolas 9 nun..
ACWS ; AR 15
0224 ametralladoras M 30
70 - pesadas M60
I 'P !21 M50.calibre 12.7
morteros de 62 mm.
morteros de 81 nan.
lanzacohetes an ti-tnaque DKZ-57
' DD, cartuchos de 9 ran..
de AR 15
00 Para ametralladcra M 30
is M 60 (7.62)
~, ametralladora M 50 (12.7)
r&D buses pare morteros de 61ran.
anti-tanques DKZ-',-7
F-3'd 60 Toneladas
5G -subametralladoras Tompson con 300 cargadores.
o07 fusiles Ml
7J04 " M 14
-:000 4tiros calibre, 45 Para las Tompson
j300~'0001 x
-D 0 1d con 200 cargadores.
Piezas de repuesto
El 15 de agosto salsa este cargamento Para Habana.
MZX,.asuhame.ralladoras de fabricaci6n alemana con 200.000
!~-tiros .
'1D-comet. calibre 30 con 50.000 tiros
}uniformes
0'15otiquine:s individuates Para combatientes
Estos dos filtimos rubros serAn enviados cuando se le propor-
cione modelos.
"~coeslYivaa~ia--2
Enviaran arenas checas.. No pueden cambiar en occidentales.
No precisarcn' .cantidad en arenas.
Radio-comunicadores de ondas cortas y ultra corta.
bIcortas y 12 ultracortas
0. 00 iiformes. conforme modelos y talla que se envien
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switched from using U.S.-made weapons
to those of Soviet and East European
rigin.)
The DRU representatives also meet
th visiting Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO) leader Yasir Arafat in
Managua on July 22, 1980. Arafat prom-
ises military equipment, including arms
and aircraft. (A Salvadoran guerrilla
leader met with FATAH leaders in Beirut
in August and November, and the PLO
has trained selected Salvadorans in the
Near East and in Nicaragua.)
On July 27, the guerrilla General
Staff delegation departs from Managua
for Havana, where Cuban "specialists"
add final touches to the military plans
formulated during the May meetings in
Havana.
Arms Deliveries Begin. In mid-
August 1980, Shafik Handal's arms-
shopping expedition begins to bear fruit.
On August 15, 1980, Ethiopian arms de-
part for Cuba. Three weeks later the 60
tons of captured U.S. arms sent from
Vietnam are scheduled to arrive in Cuba.
As a result of a Salvadoran dele-
gation's trip to Iraq earlier in the year,
the guerrillas receive a $500,000 logistics
donation. The funds are distributed to the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua and within El
Aftlvador.
W By mid-September, substantial quan-
ies of the arms promised to Handal are
well on the way to Cuba and Nicaragua.
The guerrilla logistics coordinator in
Nicaragua informs his Joint General Staff
on September 26 that 130 tons of arms
and other military material supplied by
the Communist countries have arrived in
Nicaragua for shipment to El Salvador.
According to the captured documents,
this represents one-sixth of the commit-
ments to the guerrillas by the Communist
countries. (NOTE: To get an idea of the
magnitude of this commitment, the Viet-
namese offer of only 60 tons included 2
million rifle and machinegun bullets,
14,500 mortar shells, 1,620 rifles, 210 ma-
chineguns, 48 mortars, 12 rocket launch-
ers, and 192 pistols.)
In September and October, the
number of flights to Nicaragua from Cuba
increased sharply. These flights had the
capacity to transport several hundred
tons of cargo.
At the end of September, despite ap-
peals from the guerrillas, the Sandinistas
suspend their weapons deliveries to El
Salvador for 1 month, after the U.S.
Government lodges a protest to Nicara-
a on the arms trafficking.
When the shipments resume in Octo-
as much as 120 tons of weapons and
ateriel are still in Nicaragua and some
300-400 tons are in Cuba. Because of the
difficulty of moving such large quantities
overland, Nicaragua-with Cuban sup-
port-begins airlifting arms from
Nicaragua into El Salvador. In Novem-
ber, about 2.5 tons of arms are delivered
by air before accidents force a brief halt
in the airlift.
In December, Salvadoran guerrillas,
encouraged by Cuba, begin plans for a
general offensive in early 1981. To provide
the increased support necessary, the San-
dinistas revive the airlift into El Sal-
vador. Salvadoran insurgents protest that
they cannot absorb the increased flow of
arms, but guerrilla liaison members in
Managua urge them to increase their ef-
forts as several East European nations
are providing unprecedented assistance.
A revolutionary radio station-
Radio Liberacion-operating in
Nicaragua begins broadcasting to El Sal-
vador on December 15, 1980. It exhorts
the populace to mount a massive insur-
rection against the government. (Refer-
ences to the Sandinistas sharing the ex-
penses of a revolutionary radio station
appear in the captured documents.)
On January 24, 1981, a Cessna from
Nicaragua crashes on takeoff in El Sal-
vador after unloading passengers and
possibly weapons. A second plane is
strafed by the Salvadoran Air Force, and
the pilot and numerous weapons are cap-
tured. The pilot admits to being an em-
ployee of the Nicaraguan national airline
and concedes that the flight originated
from Sandino International Airport in
Managua. He further admits to flying
two earlier arms deliveries.
Air supply is playing a key role, but
infiltration by land and sea also con-
tinues. Small launches operating out of
several Nicaraguan Pacific ports traverse
the Gulf of Fonseca at night, carrying
arms, ammunition, and personnel. Dur-
ing the general offensive on January 13,
several dozen well-armed guerrillas
landed on El Salvador's southeastern
coast on the Gulf of Fonseca, adjacent to
Nicaragua.
Overland arms shipments also con-
tinue through Honduras from Nicaragua
and Costa Rica. In late January, Hondu-
ran security forces uncover an arms infil-
tration operation run by Salvadorans
working through Nicaragua and directed
by Cubans. In this operation, a trailer
truck is discovered carrying weapons and
ammunition destined for Salvadoran
guerrillas. Weapons include 100 U.S.
M-16 rifles and 81mm mortar ammuni-
tion. These arms are a portion of the
Vietnamese shipment: A trace of the
M-16s reveals that several of them were
shipped to U.S. units in Vietnam where
they were captured or left behind. Using
this network, perhaps five truckloads of
arms may have reached the Salvadoran
guerrillas.
The availability of weapons and
materiel significantly increases the mili-
tary capabilities of the Salvadoran insur-
gents. While attacks raged throughout
the country during the "general offen-
sive" that began on January 10, it soon
became clear that the DRU could not sus-
tain the level of violence without suffer-
ing costly losses in personnel. By the end
of January, DRU leaders apparently de-
cided to avoid direct confrontation with
government forces and reverted to
sporadic guerrilla terrorist tactics that
would reduce the possibility of suffering
heavy casualties.
III. The Government: The Search for
Order and Democracy
Central America's smallest and most
densely populated country is El Salvador.
Since its independence in 1821, the coun-
try has experienced chronic political in-
stability and repression, widespread pov-
erty, and concentration of wealth and
power in the hands of a few families. Al-
though considerable economic progress
took place in the 1960s, the political sys-
tem remained in the hands of a traditional
economic elite backed by the military.
During the 1970s, both the legitimate
grievances of the poor and landless and
the growing aspirations of the expanding
middle classes met increasingly with re-
pression. El Salvador has long been a vio-
lent country with political, economic, and
personal disputes often resulting in
murders.
The Present Government. Aware of
the need for change and alarmed by the
prospect of Nicaragua-like chaos, pro-
gressive Salvadoran military officers and
civilians overthrew the authoritarian re-
gime of General Carlos Humberto Rom-
ero in October 1979 and ousted nearly 100
conservative senior officers.
After an initial period of instability,
the new government stabilized around a
coalition that includes military partici-
pants in the October 1979 coup, the
Christian Democratic Party, and inde-
pendent civilians. Since March 1980, this
coalition has begun broad social changes:
conversion of large estates into peasant
cooperatives, distribution of land to ten-
ant farmers, and nationalization of for-
eign trade and banking.
Four Marxist-Leninist guerrilla
groups are using violence and terrorism
against the Salvadoran Government and
its reforms. Three small'non-Marxist-
Leninist political parties-including a So-
cial Democratic Party-work with guer-
rilla organizations and their political
fronts through the Democratic Revolu-
tionary Front (FDR), most of whose ac-
tivities take place outside El Salvador.
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The Government of El Salvador-
headed since last December by Jose
Napoleon Duarte, the respked Christ-
ian Democrat denied office by the mili-
tary in the Presidential elections of 1972
-faces armed opposition from the ex-
treme right as well as from the left. Ex-
ploiting their traditional ties to the secu-
rity forces and the tendency of some
members of the security forces to abuse
their authority, some wealthy Salvador-
ans affected by the Duarte government's
reforms have sponsored terrorist ac-
tivities against supporters of the agrarian
and banking reforms and against the gov-
ernment itself.
A symbiotic relationship has devel-
oped between the terrorism practised by
extremists of both left and right. Thou-
sands have died without regard to class,
creed, nationality, or politics. Brutal an
still unexplained murders in December of
four American churchwomen-and in
January of two American trade unionists
-added U.S. citizens to the toll of this
tragic violence. The United States has
made clear its interest in a complete in-
vestigation of these killings and the pun-
ishment of those responsible.
Despite bitter resistance from right
and left, the Duarte government has
stuck to its reform programs and has
adopted emergency measures to ease the
lot of the poor through public works,
housing projects, and aid to marginal
communities. On the political front, it has
offered amnesty to its opponents, sched-
uled elections for a constituent assembly
in 1982, and pledged to hand power over
to a popularly elected government no
later than mid-1983.
The government's pursuit of progress
with order has been further hampered by
the virtual breakdown of the law en-
forcement and judicial system and by the
lack of an effective civil service.
The introduction of the reforms-
some of which are now clearly irreversi-
ble-has reduced popular support for
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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
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please indicate change.
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those who argue that change can only
come about through violence. Few Sal-
vadorans ticipate in antigovernment::
demonstrations. Repeated calls by the
guerrillas for general strikes in mid- and
late 1980 went unheeded. The Duarte
government, moreover, has made clear its
willingness to negotiate the terms of fu-
ture political processes with democratic
members of all opposition forces-most
notably, by accepting the offer of El Sal-
vador's Council of Bishops to mediate be-
tween the government and the Demo-
cratic Revolutionary Front.
In sum, the Duarte government is
working hard and with some success to
deal with the serious political, social, and
economic problems that most concern the
people of El Salvador.
U.S. Support. In its commitment to
reform and democracy, the Government
of El Salvador has had the political sup-
port of the United States ever since the
October 1979 revolution. Because we give
primary emphasis to helping the people of
El Salvador, most of our assistance has
been economic. In 1980, the United
States provided nearly $56 million in aid,
aimed at easing the conditions that under-
lie unrest and extremism. This assistance
has helped create jobs, feed the hungry,
improve health and housing and educa-
tion, and support the reforms that are
opening and modernizing El Salvador's
economy. The United States will continue
to work with the Salvadoran Government
toward economic betterment, social jus-
tice, and peace.
Because the solution in El Salvador
should be of the Salvadorans' own making
and nonviolent, the United States has
carefully limited its military support. In
January, mounting evidence of Com-
munist involvement compelled President
Carter to authorize a resupply of
weapons and ammunition to El Salvador
-the first provision of lethal items since
1977.
IV. Some Conclusions
The foregoing record leaves little doubt
that the Salvadoran insurgency has
come the object of a large-scale commit
ment by Communist states outside La
America.
? The political direction, organiza-
tion, and arming of the insurgency is
coordinated and heavily influenced by
Cuba-with active support of the Soviet
Union, East Germany, Vietnam, and
other Communist states.
? The massing and delivery of arms
to the Salvadoran guerrillas by those
states must be judged against the fact
that from 1977 until January 1981 the
United States provided no weapons or
ammunition to the Salvadoran Armed
Forces.
? A major effort has been made to
provide "cover" for this operation by
supplying arms of Western manufacture
and by supporting a front organization
known as the Democratic Revolutionary
Front to seek non-Communist political
support through propaganda.
? Although some non-Communist
states have also provided material sup-
port, the organization and delivery of this
assistance, like the overwhelming mass of
arms, are in the hands of Communist-
controlled networks.
In short, over the past year, the i
surgency in El Salvador has been pro-
gressively transformed into a textbook
case of indirect armed aggression by
Communist powers through Cuba. ^
P'iblished by the United States Department of
State ? Bureau of Public Affairs ? Office of
Public Communication ? Editorial Division ?
Washington, D.C. ? February 1981 ?
Editors: Norman Howard and Colleen
Sussman
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Department of State
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