NICARAGUA: EXPORT OF SUBVERSION TO EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001403210029-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 29
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/01/30: CIA-RDP85M00363R001403210029-4
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Nicaragua: Export of Subversion to El Salvador
In El Salvador, during the early part of 1982, the Salvadoran FMLN
guerrillas numbered about 5,000 full time fighters and an estimated 5,000 to
10,000 part time activists who provided logistical and political as well as
combat services. The FMLN headquarters in Nicaragua had by then evolved into
an extremely sophisticated command and control center -- in fact, this system
is more elaborate than that used by the Sandinistas against Somoza. Planning
and operations are guided from this headquarters in Nicaragua, where Cuban and
.Nicaraguan officers are involved in. command and control. The guidance flows
to guerrilla units widely spread throughout El Salvador. FMLN headquarters
coordinates logistical support for the insurgents to include food, medicines,
clothing, money -- and most importantly -- weapons and ammunition. Although
some spontaneous guerrilla actions continue as targets of opportunity appear,
the headquarters in Nicaragua decides on locations to be attacked and
coordinates supply deliveries. Evidence of centralized control also comes
from the'Salvadoran guerrillas themselves. On March 14, 1982 the FMLN
clandestine Radio Venceremos then located in El Salvador broadcast a message
to guerrillas in El Salvador urging them "to maintain their fighting spirit 24
hours a day to carry out the missions ordered by the FMLN general command
(emphasis supplied)."
In December 1981, Fidel Castro directed, after meetings in Havana with
Salvadoran guerrilla leaders, that external supplies of arms to FMLN units
should be stepped up to make possible an offensive to disrupt any chance for a
peaceful vote in the March 1982 elections. Extreme leftist groups throughout
Central America were mobilized to support the effort.
*These are excerpts from
the February 1983 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
compendium--ALA said this was
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During the first three months of 1982, shipments of arms into El Salvador
surged. During the past several years, we have closely monitored the
deliveries of arms to the Salvadoran insurgents. The recent Cuban-Nicaraguan
arms flow into El Salvador has emphasized sea, air and -- once again --
overland routes through Honduras. Early in March 1982, for example, a
guerrilla unit in El Salvador received several thousand sticks of TNT and
detonators (only five sticks of TNT are sufficient to blow up an electrical
pylon). In February 1982, a Salvadoran guerrilla group picked up a large
shipment of arms on the Salvadoran coast after the shipment arrived by sea
from Nicaragua.
In addition to vitally-needed ammunition, these guerrilla supply
operations included greater quantities of more sophisticated heavier
weapons. Recent deliveries have included M-60 machine guns, M-79 grenade
launchers, and M-72 antitank weapons, thus significantly increasing guerrilla
firepower. Individual units also regularly receive tens of thousands of
dollars for routine purchases of non-lethal supplies on commercial markets and
payments (including bribes) to enable the clandestine pipeline to function.
On March 15, 1982, the Costa Rican Judicial Police announced the discovery of
a house in San Jose, Costa Rica with a sizable cache of arms, explosives,
uniforms, passports, documents, false immigration stamps from more than thirty
countries, and vehicles with hidden compartments -- all connected with ongoing
arms traffic through Costa Rican territory to Salvadoran guerrillas.
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VUK UrrIUTAL UJL UNLY
During 1982, specific examples of the Cuban/Nicaraguan support have
been provided by two high-level FMLN leaders captured in mid-1982. One
of them, called "Alejandro Montenegro," was seized in Honduras on
22 August 1982 in conjunction with a raid on a Salvadoran insurgent
safehouse. Montenegro provided some significant information:
--He said that the Cubans played a major role in training those who
conducted the successful 27 January 1982 raid on the Salvadoran air
base at Ilopango, when a dozen aircraft were damaged or destroyed.
--Montenegro himself, directed the attack, using an eight-man insurgent
team which had received five months of special infiltration and
sabotage training in Cuba.
--He said that he personally attended two high level meetings with
Cuban officials in 1981 - one, in Havana and the other in Managua - to
discuss the situation in El Salvador and receive strategic advice.
Montenegro also confirmed that Nicaragua remains the primary source of
insurgent weapons and ammunition.
--One of the insurgents captured with Montenegro made five trips to
Managua in 1982 to pick up arms for the insurgents.
--He used a truck modified by the Sandinistas to carry concealed
weapons.
the Sandinistas have three repair shops
for such modifications under direction of a special section at the
Ministry of Defense.
The other captured Salvadoran guerrilla leader, Lopez Arriola, admitted
attending a platoon leaders course in Cuba in July 1979. He also said that:
--Hundreds of Salvadoran insurgents have received guerrilla training in
Cuba;
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 --Cubans give special courses for combatants, commanders, staff
officers, and intelligence officials;
--He had attended a top-level insurgent strategy meeting with Fidel
Castro in Havana in June 1981. Lopez Arriola revealed that the
Sandinistas have control of weapons delivered from Vietnam to Nicaragua
for the Salvadoran insurgents,
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nevertheless give the insurgents an extensive base of operations in and
around Managua, and even provide a school for their children.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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