CUBAN ARMED FORCES AND THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001403210024-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 24
• Content Type: REPORT

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Cuban Armed Forces
I 'e
Soviet.,
',W-11.itary Presence
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Cuban Armed Forces and
the Soviet Military Presence
Summary
Cuba has by far the most formidable military force
in the Caribbean basin with the single exception of the
United States. In terms of size, its forces are larger than any
other Central American or Caribbean nation. In all of Latin
America, only Brazil-a country with a population 12 times
that of Cuba-has a larger military establishment. The
quantitative and qualitative improvement of the armed
feces and increasing Soviet-Cuban military ties have en-
d Cuba to assume a far more influential role on the
world scene than its size and resources would otherwise
dictate.
Since 1975 the USSR has undertaken a major mod-
ernization of all branches of the Cuban military, transform-
ing it from a home-defense force into the best equipped
military establishment in Latin America, one with signifi-
cant offensive capabilities. Equipment delivered to the
ground forces has enhanced both its mobility and firepow-
er. The Air Force now is.probably the best equipped in
Latin America, possessing some 200 Soviet-supplied MiG
jet fighters. The Navy has acquired two torpedo attack
submarines and a Koni-class frigate, all of which will be able
to sustain operations throughout the Caribbean Basin and
will enable Cuba to project power far beyond its shores,
posing a threat to shipping in the Caribbean as well as
intimidating and threatening neighbors.
As a result of this modernization program and Cu-
ba's combat experience in Angola and Ethiopia, the Castro
regime possesses a significant regional intervention capa-
bility. Havana has increased the size of its airborne-trained
forces to a current level of some 3,000 to 4,000 troops, and
has significantly improved its airlift and sealift capability as
well. Although this capability is modest by Western stan-
dards, it is impressive in the Central American or Caribbe-
an context. This capability would be most effectively em-
ployed in aiding an ally in the region against an external
Sion or in the suppression of internal conflict. Cuba
Os snot have the wherewithal to conduct an outright inva-
sion of another nation in the region except for the Caribbe-
an micro-states. Havana does not have sufficient amphibi-
ous assault landing craft or aircraft capable of transporting
heavy equipment.
Cuba has on occasion demonstrated some reckless-
ness in the utilization of its capabilities. The most recent
example occurred May 10, 1980, when Cuban Air Force jet
fighters attacked and sank a clearly marked Bahamian pa-
trol vessel inside Bahamian territorial waters in broad day-
light. Four crewmembers died in the attack. The following
day, Cuban MiGs buzzed for a prolonged period a populat-
ed island belonging to the Bahamas. In addition, a Cuban
helicopter carrying Cuban troops landed on the same is-
land in pursuit of the surviving crewmembers of the sunk-
en patrol vessel.
The Cuban Military
Since the mid-1970's, when Cuba intervened in An-
gola on a large s.:ale and the Soviet Union began to mod-
ernize Cuba's armed forces with new equipment, the Cu-
ban military has changed from a predominantly home-de-
fense force into a formidable power relative to its Latin
American neighbors. The deliveries of Soviet military
equipment that have taken place in recent months are the
latest in a surge of deliveries to Cuba over the past year.
During 1981, Soviet merchant ships delivered some 66,000
tons of military equipment, as compared with the previous
10-year annual average of 15,000 tons. The large amount
of weapons delivered in 1981 represents the most signifi-
cant Soviet military supply effort to Cuba since a record
quarter of a million tons was shipped in 1962 (see chart 1 in
appendix).
There are several reasons for this increase:
-the beginning of a new five-year upgrading and replace-
ment cycle;
-additional arms to equip the new Cuban territorial mili-
tia, which Cuba claims to be 500,000 strong but which Cuba
expects to reach 1 million;
-increasing military stockpiles, part of which is passed to
Nicaragua;
-a convincing demonstration of Moscow's continuing sup-
port for the Havana regime.
In addition to major weapons systems, large quanti-
ties of ammunition, small arms, spares and support equip-
ment probably were delivered. Cuba's armed forces cur-
1
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rently total more than 225,000 personnel-200,000 Army,
15,000 Air Force and Air Defense, and 10,00() Navy-in-
cluding both those on active duty either in Cuba or over-
seas and those belonging to the ready reserves, subject to
immediate mobilization. With a population of just under
ten million, Cuba has by far the largest military force in the
Caribbean Basin and the second largest in Latin America
after Brazil, which has a population of more than 120 mil-
lion. More than 2 percent of the Cuban population belongs
to the active-duty military and ready reserves, compared
with an average of under 0.4 percent in other countries in
the Caribbean basin (see charts 2 and 3). In addition, Cu-
ba's large paramilitary organizations and reserves would be
available to support the military internally.
The quantitative and qualitative upgrading of the
armed forces since the mid-1970's, and their recent combat
experience in Angola and Ethiopia, give the Cuban military
definite advantages over its neighbors in Latin America.
Cuba is the only country in Latin America to have under-
taken a major military effort abroad since World War II,
giving both Army and Air Force personnel recent combat
experience in operating many of the weapons currently in
their inventories. About 70 percent of Cuban troops that
have served in Africa have been reservists who were called
to active duty. Cuban reservists generally spend about 45
days per year on active duty and can be readily integrated
into the armed forces. Cuba has effectively used its civilian
enterprises, such as Cubana Airlines and the merchant ma-
rine, to support military operations. Havana has dedicated
significant resources to modernize and professionalize its
armed forces and to maintain a well-prepared reserve.
Cuba has demonstrated that, when supported by the Soviet
Union logistically, it has both the capability and the will to
deploy large numbers of troops, and can be expected to do
so whenever the Castro government believes it to be in
Cuba's best interest.
The cost of Soviet arms delivered to Cuba since 1960
exceeds $2.5 thousand million, and all of the deliveries
have taken place on a grant basis. Soviet arms deliveries,
plus Cuba's $3 thousand-million annual Soviet economic
subsidy, are tied to Cuba's ongoing military and political
role abroad in support of Soviet objectives.
Equipment delivered to the Army since the mid-
1970's, such as T-62 tanks, BMP infantry combat vehicles,
BRDM armored reconnaissance vehicles, anti-tank guns,
towed field guns, BM-21 multiple rocket launchers and
ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, have begun to
alleviate earlier deficiencies in Cuba's mechanized capabili-
ty, as well as providing increased firepower. In addition to
its qualitative advantage, the Cuban Army has an over-
whelming numerical superiority in weapons over all of its
Latin American neighbors.
The Cuban Air Force is one of the largest and prob-
ably the best, equipped in all Latin America. Its inventory
includes some 200 Soviet-supplied MiG jet fighters, with
two squadrons of FLOGGERs (exact model of second
squadron recently delivered is not yet determined). The
MiG-23s have the capability to reach portions of the south-
eastern United States, most of Central America and most
Caribbean nations (see chart 4). Cuban-based aircraft, how-
ever, would be capable of conducting only limited air en-
BMP infantry combat vehicle.
gagements in Central America on a round-trip mission.
Cuba's fighter aircraft could be effectively employed in
either a ground-attack or air superiority role, however, if
based on Central American soil-a feasible option given the
closeness of Cuban-Nicaraguan relations. A similar ar-
rangement would be possible in Grenada once Cuban
workers complete the construction of an airfield with a
2,700-meter runway there. If the MiG-23s were based in
Nicaragua and Grenada, their combat radius would
be expanded to include all of Central America, including
the northern tier of South America.
Cuban defenses have been strengthened by the ad-
ditions of mobile SA-6 missile launchers and radars for that
air defense missile, additional SA-2 transporters, SA-2 mis-
sile cannisters, new early warning and height-finding radar
stations, and electronic warfare vans.
The Cuban Navy, with a strength of about 10,000
personnel, remains essentially a defensive force, although
its two recently acquired FOXTROT-class submarines
single Koni-class frigate, once fully integrated into
operational force, will be able to sustain operations
throughout the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Mexico, and,
to a limited extent, the Atlantic. The Koni, for example, has
an operating range of 2,000 nautical miles without refuel-
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MiG-23, shown here shortly before shipment to Cuba, is one of some 200 Mig jet fighters supplied to Cuba by the Soviet Union.
ing or replenishment. The FOXTROTS have a range of
9,000 nautical miles at seven knots per hour and a patrol
duration of 70 days.
* The primary vessels for carrying out the Navy's de-
ive missions are Osa- and Komar-class missile attack
boats whose range can extend well into the Caribbean.
They are armed with SS-N-2 STYX ship-to-ship missiles
(see chart 5). Cuba has received, in addition, Turya-class
hydrofoil torpedo boats, Yevgenya-class inshore mine-
sweepers and a Sonya-class minesweeper. Although not
equipped for sustained operations away from its main
bases, the Cuban Navy could conduct limited interdiction
missions in the Caribbean. In addition to the Navy, Cuba
has a 3,000-man coast guard organization.
Cuba's capability to intervene in a hostile environ-
ment using its indigenous transport assets is modest by
Western standards, but considerably more formidable in
the Central American context. As in 1975, when a single
battalion of Cuban airborne troops airlifted to Luanda at a
critical moment played a role far out of proportion to its
size, a battle-tested Cuban force injected quickly into a com-
bat situation in Central America could prove a decisive
factor. Moreover, since the Angolan experience, Havana
has increased the training of airborne-qualified forces,
which now number some 3,000 to 4,000 troops and consist
of a Special Troops Contingent and a Landing and Assault
Brigade. In addition, Cuba has improved its airlift and
sealift capability.
Cuba continues to lack sufficient transport aircraft
that can support long-range, large-scale troop movements
and would have to turn to the Soviets to achieve such a
W bility. Cuba does have the ability to transport large
bers of troops and supplies within the Caribbean re-
gion, however, using its military and civilian aircraft. Since
1975, the Cuban commercial air fleet has acquired seven
IL-62 long-range jet transport aircraft and some TU-154
medium-to-long-range transport aircraft, each capable of
carrying 150 to 200 combat-equipped troops. (By compari-
son, Cuba conducted the airlift to Luanda in 1975 with only
five medium-range aircraft, each having a maximum ca-
pacity of 100 troops.) Cuba has recently acquired the AN-
26 short-range transport. The most effective use of this
aircraft from Cuban bases would be in transporting troops
or supplies to a friendly country, but it is capable, with full
payload, of airdropping troops on portions of Florida,
Belize, Jamaica, Haiti, the Bahamas, and most of the
Dominican Republic (see chart 6). If based in Nicaragua,
however, the AN-26s would be capable of reaching virtual-
ly all of Central America in either role. In addition, more
than 30 smaller military and civilian transport planes, in-
cluding the aircraft of the Angola conflict, also could be
used to fly troops and munitions to Central America.
Introduction of sophisticated Soviet weapons geared
toward mobility and offensive missions has improved Cu-
Soviet T-62 tanks, shown here during Warsaw Pact maneuvers.
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ban ability to conduct military operations off the island.
The recent Soviet military deliveries, specifically, could im-
prove the effectiveness of Cuban forces already abroad. In
Angola the mobile SA-6 surface-to-air missile system oper-
ated by Cubans could provide a valuable complement to
other less effective air defense systems. They also would
enable Havana to continue assistance to Nicaragua. The
MiG-23 and MiG-21 fighters probably would be most effec-
tive in aiding the Sandinista regime. The deployment of a
few dozen MiGs would not seriously reduce Cuba's de-
fenses, and Cuban-piloted MiGs would enable Nicaragua to
counter virtually any threat from within the region.
In early 1982 Cuba received some Mi-24 HIND-D
helicopters. This is the first true assault helicopter in Cuba's
inventory, although Cuba also has Mi-8 helicopters. Pri-
marily a gunship, the Mi-24 is also designed to carry a
combat squad of eight men. It is armed with a 57 mm
cannon, mini-gun and rocket pods. It will provide Cuba
with improved ground support and offensive combat oper-
ations capabilities
Cuba's ability to mount an amphibious assault is con- Osa-class missile attack boat.
strained both by the small number of naval infantry per-
sonnel and by a dearth of suitable landing craft. Cuba
would, however, be capable of transporting significant
numbers of troops and supplies-using ships belonging to
the merchant marine and navy-to ports secured by
friendly forces if the United States did not become in-
volved.
Cuba's Paramilitary Organizations
Cuba's several paramilitary organizations involve
hundreds of thousands of civilian personnel during peace-
time who would be available to support the military during
times of crisis. Although these groups would be far less
combat-capable than any segment of the military, they do
provide at least rudimentary military training and disci-
pline to the civilian population. The primary orientation
these paramilitary organizations is internal security and
cal defense (see chart 7).
The extent to which the military is involved in the
civilian sector is further reflected by its activity within the
economic sphere. In addition to uniformed personnel, the
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SA-6 surface-to-air missiles on display.
Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR)
has over 30,000 civilian workers employed in factories and
repair facilities in Cuba and in building roads and airfields
.Wfrica. Many are employees of MINFAR's Central Di-
orate for Housing and Construction which, in addition
to military construction, builds housing and apartment
complexes for military and civilian personnel of both MIN-
FAR and the Ministry of the Interior. The Youth Labor
Army also contributes to economic development by engag-
ing in agricultural, industrial and construction projects.
The Soviet Presence
The Soviet military presence in Cuba includes a
ground forces brigade, a military advisory group and an
intelligence collection facility. There are 6,000 to 8,000 So-
viet civilian advisors and 2,000 Soviet military advisors in
Cuba. Military deployments to Cuba consist of periodic
visits by naval reconnaissance aircraft and task groups.
The ground forces brigade, located near Havana,
has approximately 2,600 men and consists of one tank and
three motorized rifle battalions, plus various combat and
service support units. Soviet ground forces have been pres-
ent in Cuba since shortly before the missile crisis in 1962.
Likely missions of the brigade include providing a
small symbolic Soviet commitment to Castro, implying a
readiness to defend Cuba and his regime, and probably
providing security for Soviet personnel and key Soviet fa-
cilities, particularly for the Soviets' large intelligence collec-
tion operation. The brigade almost certainly would not
have a role as an intervention force, although it is capable
ctical defense and offensive operations in Cuba. Un-
such units as airborne divisions, the brigade is not
structured for rapid deployment, and no transport aircraft
capable of carrying its armed vehicles and heavy equip-
ment are stationed in Cuba.
The Soviet Military Advisory Group in Cuba con-
The Mi-8 helicopter, shown here during
1980 Warsaw Pact maneuvers.
sists of at least 2,000 military personnel, who provide tech-
nical advice in support of weapons such as the MiGs, sur-
face-to-air missiles, and the FOXTROT submarines; some
are also attached to Cuban ground units. The Soviets' intel-
ligence collection facility-their largest outside the USSR-
monitors U.S. military and civilian communications.
Since the naval ship visit program began in 1969, 21
Soviet task groups have been deployed to the Caribbean,
virtually all of them visiting Cuban ports. The most recent
visit occurred in April and May 1981 and included the first
by a Kara-class cruiser-the largest Soviet combat ship to
have ever visited the island. Soviet intelligence collection
ships operating off the U.S. East Coast regularly call at
Cuba during their patrols, as do hydrographic research
and space-program support ships operating in the region.
In addition, the Soviet Navy keeps a salvage and rescue
ship in Havana for emergency operations.
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Cubans in Africa: Top, Cuban artillery unit in front-line
position in Ethiopia. Below, Soviet-built tank manned by
Cuban troops guards road junction in Luanda, Angola, during
civil war in 1976.
Soviet TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft have
been deployed periodically to Cuba since 1975. These
aircraft are deployed in pairs and stay in Cuba for several
weeks. The flights use Cuban airfields to support Soviet
reconnaissance missions and naval maneuvers in the Atlan-
tic, and to observe U.S. and NATO naval maneuvers and
Soviet naval visits to Cuba began in 1969. Here,
from left, a Kildin-class guided-missile destroyer,
a Kynda-class guided-missile cruiser and a Kashin-class
guided-missile destroyer at port in Havana.
sea trials. The flights have historically been associated with
periods of increased international tension, such as the An-
golan and Ethiopian wars.
The Soviets apparently sent a significant number of
pilots to augment Cuba's air defense during two periods-
early 1976 and during 1978-when Cuban pilots were sent
to Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviet pilots filled in for Cu-
ban pilots deployed abroad, and provided the Cuban Air
Force with enough personnel to perform its primary mis-
sion of air defense of the island.
Threat to Hemispheric Strategic Defense
Cuban military ties with the Soviet Union, the Soviet
presence in Cuba, including the presence of a large Soviet
intelligence-gathering facility, and the periodic Soviet air
and naval presence pose significant military threats to U.S.
security interests in the Hemisphere. Because of Cuba's
proximity to vital sea lanes of communication, the Soviets
or Cubans, in wartime, could attempt to interdict the move-
ment of troops, supplies and raw materials in the Gulf of
Mexico and Caribbean Sea, and could strike key military
and civilian facilities in the area. ^
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 APPENDIX
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cart 1
USSR: Seaborne Military Deliveries to Cuba
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
110
1970
110
1971
1 10
1972
110
1973
110
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1 20
1979
1980
1981
Chart 3
Relative Military Strength of Selected
Caribbean Basin Nations
Percentage of Population in Armed Forces
2.5
Chart 2
Country
Population
People in
Military
Percentage
of Population
Cuba
(in thousands)
9,900
(in thousands)
226.5
in Military
2.29
Argentina
27,000
139.5
.51
Bolivia
5,285
23.8
.45
Brazil
126,000
272.55
.22
Chile
11,200
88.0
.79
Colombia
26,520
65.8
.25
Ecuador
7,900
38.8
.49
Paraguay
3,300
16.0
.48
Peru
17,400
95.5
.55
Uruguay
3,300
30.0
.91
Venezuela
15,400
40.5
.26
Dominican Rep.
5,620
19.0
.34
Guatemala
6,950
14.9
.21
Honduras
3,700
11.3
.31
Mexico
71,500
107.0
.15
Chart 4
Optimum High-Altitude Combat Radii
of Cuban Mig-21s and Mig-23s
0 400 800 Miles
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative
0, eV a oaJ Otis ?"'? I
Key: + Mig.21/23 Base
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Chart 5
Operating Areas of OSA- and Komar-class Guided Missile Patrol
Boats from Cuban Ports*
0 400 800 Miles
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative
-Operating areas shown are based on each craft's normal tactical speed, and could be up to 50 percent less if high-speed operations were
being conducted. The maximum speed of the OSA is 35 knots and that of the Komar 40 knots.
Chart 6
Range and Radius of AN-26s from Havana
Pacific Guatemala
(supplies) Honduras
Paraaro
I with o
Payload ro
I Normal ~ {
Ran
t t 1 mexico l ...... Radius
Combat
with with
0 400 800 Kilometers -?
i
BOOorita. ,,
Boundary representation n is is not necessarily authoritative '
-Combat radius is the outbound distance attainable on a flight carrying payload to a destination, with sufficient onboard fuel reserves to
return to point of origin. For a paradrop mission, stated radius allows for sufficient time-on-station to airdrop paratroops. For the
delivery of supplies, stated radius allows for landing and take-off at destination, and assumes that entire payload is delivered before
return. Combat range is the total distance attainable on a one-way flight carrying payload the entire distance.
OSA 1/11 Radius:
400nmat25kts
Atlantic
Ocean
The Bahamas
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?
?
Chart 7
Strength and Missions of Cuba's
Paramilitary Organizations
Organization
Subordination Strength
Youth Labor Army MINFAR
(Ministry of the
Revolutionary
Armed Forces
Territorial Troop MINFAR
Militia
Border Guard
Troops
MININT
(Ministry of the
Interior)
National Revolu- MININT
tionary Police
Department of MININT
State Security
Chart 8
Cuban Advisors
More than 500,000
at present; still
forming
3,000 full-time,
plus unknown
number of civilian
auxiliaries
10,000, plus 52,000
civilian auxiliaries
Total Number (Estimated)
Military
Civilian
Angola
20,000
6,000
Ethiopia
11,000-13,000
600
Nicaragua
1,800
3,500
South Yemen
200-300
100
Grenada
30
300
Civic action force, receiving
little military training in
peacetime. One wartime
mission would be to operate
and protect the railroads.
"Military" units would
assist in providing local
defense; non-military would
provide first aid and
disaster relief.
Regional security/local
defense.
Help guard Cuban
coastline.
Responsible for public
order in peacetime; could
help provide rear area
security during wartime.
Counterintelligence and
prevention of counter-
revolutionary activities.
Photos: Front Cover,
Department of Defense.
2, Department of Defense.
3, top-Gamma-Liaison/
J.P. Quittard;
bottom-Sovfoto.
4, top-U.S. Navy (2);
bottom-Department of
Defense.
5, top-Department of
Defense;
bottom-Camera Press.
6, top left-Gamma-
Liaison/Bernard Couret;
top right-Wide World;
bottom-TASS from
Sovfoto.
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