CUBAN ARMED FORCES AND THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000501130006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

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Cuban Armed Forces
and the
Soviet Mioli*tary Presence
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1982 addition to Cuban arsenal.
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Cuban Armed Forces and
the Soviet Military Presence
Summary
(:uha has hs fain the most fin nnidahlc n)ilita I N Im.(e
in the Cauihhean basil Ncilh the single exception of the
I'nited SI;atcs. In let Ins of size. its f)r(rs arc larger than ;ens
whet (:entill :Anu?ri(an or Caribbean nation. In all of Latin
AInlt'li(a, only Brazil-a country kith a population 12 1if If cs
that of (:uha-has a Eiger nnilitaus establishment. The
guauntir.atise and gualitatise in1provrnnent of the armed
forces and increasing Soviet-(:uhan nnilitary ties We en-
ahlt'd Cubit to assunIt a far more influential role on the
world scene than its size and It'sour(c.S w()tllcl otIt'rwist'
dictate.
Sin(c I955 the USSR has tuldertaken a major nuxl-
crnization (d all branches of the (:uh;tn ntilitan. a;tnsfoint-
ing it front a hnntc-defense fol(c into the hest equipped
nnilitars establishment in Latin :Alnt'ri(a, one tsith signifi-
cant ofteusist' (apahilitics. F:0lnipnnt'nt dcliycic'd to the
;round foi(cs has cni;un(cd both its nlohilit~ and firepow-
er. The :Air Fore n()5\ is prnhahly the best equipped in
Latin America, possessing sonic `?OO Soviet-supplied \1i(:
jet fighters. I If(- Nasy has acquired two torpedo attack
suhn arint's and at koni-class frigate. all of whi(Ii will he able
to sustain operations thront;hntlt the C;mihht'an Basin and
will enable (:uha to project power far hcyold its shores,
posing a threat to shipping in the Carihheann as well as
intimidating and threatening neighbors.
As at result of this nnoderniz;ttion progrann and (:u-
ha's connhat experience in .Angola and Ethiopia, the Castro)
regime possesses it significant regional interycntion (apa-
hility. I lay;una has increased the size (d its airborne-trained
forces to it current Ieyel of saint' 3,000 to 1,01)1) troops, and
has signifi(aunth impruyed its airlift and scalitt capability as
well. Although this capability is nnodcst by \Vt'sternn Stan
(finds, it is innprt'ssive in the (:entrtl American or Carihhc-
an (ontcxt. This capability would he most effectively cn)-
ployed in aiding an ally in the region against an external
invasion nr in the suppression of internal conflict. Cuha
does not base the wherewithal Io conduct an outright inva-
sion of another nation in the region except fi)r the Carihhe-
an nni(ro-states. I layana dots not bast .stnfiicicnl annphihi-
ousassault landing(raft orair(raft capahleof transporting
heavy equipment.
(;uha has on occasion denu)nstated sane' reckless-
ness in the utilization of its (apahilities. I in' 11()51 r((ent
example occurred %lats 10, 1941), isIn n (:01han .fir Force jut
fighters atta(ked and sank a (lean IN nnarkcd Bahamian pa-
trol vessel inside Bahamian territorial waters in broad day-
light. Four (rewuucnnhers (lied in the attar k. Thu follrnying
(fay, Cuban Nli(;s buzzed fir;t prolonged pcriod a populau-
ed island belonging to the Bahamas. In addition, a (:uhan
helicopter (arrving Cuban troops landed ()If the Sams(' is-
land ill pursuit of the sur Tying (rctcnunil)ers of the sunk-
en patrol vessel.
The Cuban Military
Sin(c the slid-I9i0's, when (anha intt'rsened ill An-
gola on a la ge sale and the Sositt I nion began to nnod-
erni/c Cuba's armed tome's with new equipment, the (:u-
ban nnilitars has (hanged f corm a prcdonlinantly bonne-
dc-tense firct' into a fo rlinidahle p mcr relative to its Latin
American neighbors. The deliveries (d Soviet nnilitamy
equipment that have taken place in recent months ate the
latest in a surge of dehverics to Cuba oycr the past year.
During 1941, Soviet merchant ships dcliscicd some h(i,00(.)
tons of nnilitars eguipnnelt, as compared with the precious
1O-war annual average of I:',000 tons. The L1gc amount
of weapons (lt'liyercd ill 1941 represents the must signifi-
cant Soviet militars supply effort to Cuba since a record
quarter of a million toils was shipped in 1962 (sec( halt I in
appendix).
There are several reasons for this increase:
the beginning of a new five-year upgrading and rcpla c-
ment cycle;
additional arnns to egllip the new Cuban territorial nnili-
tia, which (:uha claims to he,500,000 Strung but wlni(II Cuha
expects to reach I million:
-increasing military stockpiles. paint (A N\ is passed to
Nicaragua:
-a convincing (letnrntstration of lO5(rny's continuing sup-
port Ii)- the Havana regime.
In addition to nnajor weapons Systems, large quanti-
ties of ammunition, small arnns, spares and support equip
nnernt probably were delivered. Cuba's au-nned fi)rccs (ill-
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rerntly total more tIlint 225,(1(10 personnel--200,(1(18 Art ny.
15,000 :Air Force ,und All Defense, and 10,000 \.n y-in-
clading both those on active duty either in ( .uha or oyer-
seas and those belonging to the reads reserves, subject to
inuncdiate nunbilication. With it populattion of just tattler
tea million. Cuba has by fat the lamest nnilitar force in the
Caribbean Basin and the second l.ugest in Latin :Anncrie1
after Brazil. hit ii has it popunlatiou of more than 120 mil-
lion. Alore than 2 percent of the (:uhan population belongs
to the active-duty military ,nnti ready reserves. (onnpared
kith an average of under 0. 1 percent in other countries in
the Caribbean basin (see (harts 2 and 3). In addition. (:u-
bas large parannilit.uy organizations and reserves would he
available to support the auilitar intern;tlly.
the quantitative and qualitative upgrading of the
armed forces since the mid-1')70's, and their recent combat
experience in Angola ,tad Ethiopia, give the Cuban militar
definite advantages over its neighbors in t.atitn :Annerica.
Cuba is the only county in Latin Anierica to ilia e under-
taken it major nnilitar effort abroad since World \\';r- if.
giving both :Arnie and :fir Force personnel recent combat
experience ill operating mane of the weapons currently in
their inventories. .About 7(1 percent of Cuban troops that
have served in Africa hate been reservists who were called
to active date. Cohan reservists generally spend about la
days per rear on active duty and can he reatlil integrated
into the armed tortes. Cuba has effettiyel used its civilian
enterprises, such as Cuhana Airlines and the nnerch.nnt nna-
rine, to support militar operations. I iayana has dedicated
significant resources to modernize and professionalize its
armed forces and to maintain it well-prepa-ed reserve.
(:uha has demonstrated that, when supported h~ the So\iet
Prior logistically, it has both the (apahility and the will to
deploN large numbers of troops, and can he expected to do
so whenever the Castro governnnent believes it to hr in
Cuba's best interest.
The cost of Soviet arms delivered to Cuba since 14)60
exceeds $2.5 thousand million, and all of the deliveries
have taken place on it grant basis. Soyict arnns deliveries,
puts Cuba's $3 thousand-million annual Soviet economic
subsidy, are tied to Cuba's ongoing nnilitar and political
role abroad in support of Soviet objectives.
Equipment deliserect to the Arnnv since the mid-
14)70's, such as 1-62 tanks, B\IP infantry combat vehicles.
BR1Nt armored reconnaissance vehicles, anti-tack gums,
towed field guns, BNI-21 multiple rocket launchers and
/.SUr-23-.1 self-propelled anti-aircraft gluts, ha e begun to
alleviate cattier deficiencies in Cuba's mechanized capabili-
ty, as well as providing increased firepower. In addition to
its qualitative advantage, the Cuban :Arne has an over-
%dichlning numerical superiority its weapons over all of its
Latin American neighbors.
The Cohan Air Force is one of the largest and prob-
ably the best equipped in all Latin America. Its inycntorv
includes some 200 Soviet-supplied NIiG jet fighters. with
two squadrons of FLOGGERs (exact model of second
squadron recently delivered is not yet (Ietermined). The
1AliG-23s have the capability to reach portions of the south-
eastern United States, most of Central Annerica and most
Caribbean nations (see chart l). Cuban-based aircraft, how-
ever, would be capable of conducting only limiter{ air en-
gagennents in Central :America on it round-trip mission.
Cuba's fighter aircraft could he effettiyely employed in
either it ground-attack or all superiority role, however. if
based ou(;ent rill :Anueritan soil-a feasible option given the
closeness of Cuban-\itaragu.un relations. :A similar ar-
rangennent would he possible in Grenada once (.tubas
workers complete the construction of ml airf icld with it
2,700-meter runway there. If the MI(;-23s were based in
Nicaragua and (;renada, their (onnhat radios Nvould
he expanded to include all of Central :America, including
the northern tier of South :America.
Cuban defenses have been strengthened hN the ad-
ditions of mobile SA-h missile launchers and radars for that
air defense missile. additional S:A-2 tr ansporters, S:A-2 sus
silo cannisters, new earls warning and height finding radar
stations, and elect onit waif:r e vans.
The Cuban \ayy, with it strength of about 111,111)0
personnel, remains essentially a defensive force, although
its two recently acquired MN I RO I -(lass suhm.uines and
single Koni-class frigate, once fully integrated into the
operational force, will he able to sustain operations
throughout the Caribbean Basin, the (;lilt of \It'xito, and,
to it limited extent, the :Atl;tnti(. The Koni. for example, has
an operating range of 2.00(1 nautical riles without refuel-
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ing or replenishment. The FOX 1 RO I S have it range of
9,000 nautical miles at seven knots per hour and it patrol
duration of 71) days.
I he primary vessels for carrying out the \ayv's ele-
fetsiye missions are ()sit- and Konta-class missile attack
boats whose range can extend well into the C.uihhean.
l hey are armed with SS-X-`? SI\"X ship-to-ship missiles
(see chart 5). Cuba has received, in addition, I III.\ it-class
hydrofoil torpedo boats, A'evgenya-class inshore mine-
sweepers and it Sonya-class ntitesweeper. :Although not
equipped for sustained operations away from its main
bases, the (:than ;Aayy could conduct limited interdiction
missions in the Citibbean. In addition to the Na\\, Cubit
has it 3,001)-mat coast guard organization.
Cuba's capability to intervene in it hostile enyiron-
ment using its indigenous transport assets is molest by
Western standards, but considerably more formidable in
the Central \nterican context. As in I?175, when it single
battalion of Cuban airborne troops airlifted to Luanda at it
critical ntontent played it role far out of proportion to its
size, a battle-tested Cohan force injected quickly into it com-
bat situation it Cenral :America could prose a decisive
factor. !\loreover, since the :Angolan experience, Ilayana
has increased the training of airborne-qualified forces,
which now number some 3,000 to .1,000 hoops and consist
of it Special Troops Contingent and it Lauding and Assault
Brigade. In addition, Cuba has improved its airlift and
sealift capability.
Cuba continues to lack sufficient transport aircraft
that can support long-range, large-scale troop nutvemernts
and would have to turn to the Soviets to achieve such it
capability. Cuba does have the ability to transport large
numbers of troops and supplies within the Caribbean re-
gion, however, using its military and civilian aircraft. Since
l975, the Cuban commercial air fleet has acquired seven
IL-62 long-range jet transport aircraft and some 'IV-154
meditun-to-long-range transport aircraft, each capable of
carrying hill to 2(H) combat-equipped troops. (By comp: i i-
con, Cuba conducted the airlift to Luanda in 1075 with only
five medium-range aircraft, each haying a ntaxintunt ca-
pacity of 100 troops.) Cuba has recently acquired the :\1-
26 short-range transport. The most effective use of this
aircraft from Cuban bases would be in transporting hoops
or supplies to it It iendly country, but it is capable, wit It full
payload, of airdropping hoops on portions of I'lorictt,
Belize, Jamaica. Ilaiti, the Bahamas, utd most of the
Dominican Republic (see chart (i). If based in Nicaragua,
however, the AN-26s would he capable of reaching sirtual-
Iy all of Central :\uterica in either role. It addition, more
than 3)) smaller military and riviliat transport plane,, in-
cluding the aircraft of the :Angola conflict, also could be
used to fly troops and ntttniuons to (:enhal .America.
Introduction of sophisticated Soviet weapons gea ed
toward mobility and offensive missions has improved (;u-
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hall ability to conduct military operations off the island.
The recent So >let military deliveries, specifically, could lilt-
prow the ef,fectiyerness of Cohan forces already abroad. In
Angola the mobile SA-fi surface-to-air missile system oper-
ated by Cubans could provide a valuable complement to
other less effective air defense systems. They also would
enable IIavana to continue assistance to Nicaragua. The
Mi(;-2a and MI(;-21 fighters probably would be most effec-
tive in aiding the Sandinista regime. The cleplovntent of it
few dozen \fi(;s would not seriously reduce Cuba's de-
fenses, and Cuban-piloted Mi(;s would enable Nicaragua to
counter virtually any threat from within the region.
In early 1952 Cuba received some oIi-21 IIIN1)-I)
helicopters. This is the first true assault helicopter in Cuba's
inventory, although Cuba also has \Ii-8 helicopters. I'ri-
marily it gunship, the Ali-21 is also designed to cam it
combat squad of eight nren. It is aruted with it 57 111111
cannon, mini-gun and rocket pools. It will provide Cuba
with improved ground support and offensive combat oper-
ations capabilities.
Cuba's ability to mount an amphibious assault is con-
strained both by the small number of naval infauttrv per-
sonnel and bs a dearth of suitable landing craft. Cuba
would, however, he capable of transporting significant
numbers of troops and supplies-using ships belonging to
the merchant marine and nays-to ports secured by
friendly forces if' the United States did not become in-
volved.
Cuba's Paramilitary Organizations
Cuba's several paramilitary organizations involve
hundreds of thousands of civilian personnel during peace-
time who would be available to support the military during
times of crisis. Although these groups would he far less
combat-capable than any segment of the military, they do
provide at least rudimentary military training and disci-
pline to the civilian population. The printery orientation of
these paramilitary organizations is internal securits and lo-
cal defense (see chart 7).
The extent to which the military is iuyolved in the
civilian sector is further reflected by its activity within the
economic sphere. In addition to unifitrnted personnel, the
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Alinisuv (d tit(- RevOlutionarV :Armed For(e's (A1I\F:AR)
has Dyer :0,1)1)0 ciyillit it workers employed in factories and
repair facilities in Cuba and in building roads and airfields
in Alma. Moan arc eutployees of sll\F:AR's (ventral Ui-
re(toratc fol HoUS1Ilg and Construction whi(Il, ill addition
to military construction, builds housing and afr,trtntent
complexes for ntilitarV .utd ciVili.ut personnel of both NI IN-
FAR and the Ministry of the interior. The Mouth Labor
Arne also contributes to economic development I)y engag-
ing in agricultural, industrial and construction projects.
The Soviet Presence
the Soviet military presence in Cuba includes it
ground forces brigade, a militai s advisory group and an
intelligence collection facility. There are 11,100 to 5,011)) So-
yiet civilian advisors and 2,000 Soviet military advisors in
Cuba. Military deployments to Cuba consist of periodic
Visits by naval reconnaissance aircraft and task groups.
The ground forces brigade, located near Havana,
has approximately 2,600 men and consists of one tank and
three nu)torized rifle battalions, plus Various combat and
service support units. Soviet ground forces have been pres-
ent in Cuba since shortly before the missile crisis in 1962.
Likely missions of the brigade include providing it
small symbolic Soviet commitment to Castro, implying it
readiness to defend Cubit and his regime. and probably
providing security for Soviet personnel and key Soviet fa-
cilities, particularly Lou the Soviets' large intelligence collet
tion operation. The brigade almost certainly would not
have a role as an intervention force, although it is capable
of tactical defense and offensive operations in Cuba. ['If-
like such units as airborne divisions, the brigade is not
structured fits rapid eleployntent, and no transport aircraft
capable of carrying its armed Vehicles and heayV etfuip-
nrent arc stationed in Cuba.
The Soviet Military Advisory Group in Cuba (on-
The Mi-8 helicopter, shown here during
1980 Warsaw Pact maneuvers.
silts of at least 2,000 military personnel, who provide tech-
nical advice in support of weapons such as the Mi(;s, sur-
face-to-air missiles, and the FOX I RO I suhniarirnes: some
are also attached to Cuban grottncl units. 1 he Soviets' intel-
ligence collection facility-their largest outside the 1 SSR-
monitors U.S. military and civilian conununications.
Since the naval ship visit program began in 1969, 21
Soviet task groups have been deployed to the (ai ibbe.ut,
virtually all of then) Visiting Cuban ports. The most rcceut
visit occurred in April and \iav 1981 and included the First
by it Kara-class cruiser-the largest Soviet combat ship to
have ever visited the island. Soviet intelligence collection
ships operating off the I_'.S. List Coast regularly call at
Cuba (luring their patrols, as (10 I>drographic research
and space-program support ships operating in the region.
In addition, the Soviet '~ayy keeps a salvage and rescue
ship in Havana for emergency operations.
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Cubans in Africa: Top, Cuban artillery unit in front-line
position in Ethiopia. Below, Soviet-built tank manned by
Cuban troops guards road junction in Luanda, Angola, during
civil war in 1976.
Soviet LL'-4)5 Bear 1) reconnaissance aircraft have
been deployed perioclically to Cuba since 1975. These
aircraft are deployed in pairs and stay in Cuba for several
weeks. The flights use (;ubarn airfields to support Soviet
reconnaissance missions and naval nianettvers in the Atlan-
tic. and to observe U.S. and NATO naval maneuvers and
~. t'?e1 ~; 1'K, "~r_ :~.~JS ~`'iA'~'liG7-Ct i.;. ,`r~..
Soviet naval visits to Cuba began in 1969. Here.
from left, a Kildin-class guided-missile destroyer,
a Kvnda-class guided-missile cruiser and a Kashin-class
guided-missile destroyer at port in Havana.
sea trials. The flights have historically been associated will
periods of increased international tension, sucli as the Att-
golan and Ethiopian wars.
The Soviets apparently sent a signifi ,tnt ntinnber of
pilots to augment (;uha's air defense during two periods-
early 1976 and during 1975 when Cuban pilots were sent
to Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviet pilots filled in tot Cu-
ban pilots deployed abroad, and provided the Cuban All
Force with enough personnel to perti~rnt its primary mis-
sion of air defense of the island.
Threat to Hemispheric Strategic Defense
Cuban military ties with the Soviet I'nion, the Soviet
presence in Cuba, including the presence of a la ge Soviet
intelligence-gathering facility, and the periodic Soviet all
and naval presence pose significant military threats to ['.S.
security interests in the Hemisphere. Because of Cuba's
proximity to vital sea lanes of conununi(ation, the Soviets
orCubans, in wartime, could attempt to interdict the move-
ment of troops, supplies and raw materials in the Gulf of
Mexico and Caribbean Sea, and could strike key military
and civilian facilities in the arca. ^
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 APPENDIX
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Chart 1
ISSR: Seaborne Military Deliveries to Cuba
1961
1966
196-
1`169
19' n
19'i
I'9-J
I9-6
-II
19'9
I9ti')
Chart 3
Relative Military Strength of Selected
Caribbean Basin Nations
~ ~rrniarr?I I il:u ion iu AiIIICJ I ai.r.
7/ 111,
Chart 2
People in Percentage
Country Population Military of Population
(in thousands) (in thousands) in Military
Cuba 9,9(X) 226.5
Argentina 27,(XX) 139.5
Bolivia 5,285 23.8
Brazil 126,000 272.55
Chile 11,200 88.0
Colombia 26,520 65.8
Ecuador 7,9(X) 38.8
Paraguay 3,3(X) 16.0
Peru 17,400 95,5
Uruguay 3,3(X) 30.0
Venezuela 15,4(X) 40.5
Dominican Rep. 5,620 19.0
Guatemala 6,950 14.9
Honduras 3,700 11.3
Mexico 71,5(X) 107.0
.51
.45
.22
.79
.25
.49
.48
55
.91
.26
.34
.21
.31
.15
Chart 4
Optimum High-Altitude Combat Radii
of Cuban Mig-21s and Mig-23s
ri~tw~ V Jv.
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Chart 5
Operating Areas of OSA- and Komar-class Guided Missile Patrol
Boats from Cuban Ports*
1 I/ a n t l r
Organ
Komar Radius:
200nm at 30 kts
1
M. Kcp.
Nicaragua
z~ I!
Panama
l~
1 (supplies)
Bermuda
0
OSA 1/11 Radius:
400nm at 25 kts
Payload
GuIJ JA lrnm
Pa IIir
Ocean
I with
Range
'~ 11'c 1.~i i11~~ ,1 . ,h~i~.n .na h.i,