LETTER TO ADMIRAL B. R. INMAN FROM PETER J. DENNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00552R001000070029-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: February 24, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

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? 1133 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS
NEW YORK, NY 10036
[phone]
Telex: 421686
Agawk,
Cogs 0 N Association for Computing Machinery
PETER J. DENNING
President
F Y.xscutive Rcr~ibtrt '
Reply To: Computer Sciences Department
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907
[phone]
February 24, 1982 I)T3F"'`Y `'`
Admiral B. R. Inman
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
I am writing in regard to the proposed revision of Executive
Order 12065 on National Security Information. Copies of this
order have been circulating and the gist of the changes were
summarized in a recent issue of Science. I have carefully
studied the present and proposed orders. I would like to offer
some general comments in case someone is interested in taking
them into consideration before the final draft is issued.
I know you are aware that this issue is stirring up a
hornet's nest of controversy in the scientific community, that
at least one congressional committee is sympathetic to the view
that through this order the government is moving toward a policy
of secrecy in science, and that the press is unsympathetic to
proposed controls on publication. I know moreover you are aware
that the members of the scientific community who are interested
in a cooperative dialog with the government about national security
are being discouraged by government actions that are apparently
being planned without their input. I therefore will not dwell
on these points.
Tone of the Proposed Order
According to the explanatory materials, the proposed order
takes a "positive attitude" toward classification. This new
attitude shows up throughout the order in many ways. For example:
1. The principle that "when in doubt use the lowest applicable
level" is replaced with "when in doubt, use the highest
applicable level".
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Admiral B. R. Inman
February 24, 1982
Page Two
2. The list of categories is now introduced with "information
may not be considered for classification unless it
concerns" one of the categories. The proposal replaces
this with "information shall be considered for classifica-
tion if it concerns" one of the categories.
3. Scattered throughout the present order are statements of
intent such as "declassification shall be accorded emphasis
equal to classification," and "the need for public
disclosure may outweigh the need for continuing
classification." These statements are all deleted in the
proposed order. The explanatory materials assert that
there is no intent to broaden the categories or the amount
of information classified, yet no such statement of intent
appears in the order itself.
The problem is that the 7000 or so officials who will administer
the policy will interpret the words as broadly as possible. They
will widen the range of material that is classified, they will
classify it at higher levels than has been the custom in the past,
and. they will lengthen the periods of classification. If, as
the explanatory materials assert, the intent is not to broaden
anything, these officials will not act accordingly because they
will not know of this intent. Indeed, the proposed order is so
positive about classification, the enforcement officials will
interpret it as a significant change of intent despite assertions
to the contrary in the explanatory material.
If I may restate this in crass vernacular, bureaucrats tend
to widen their empires as far as the rules can reasonably be
stretched. The proposed order will permit considerably bigger
empires to be built. Ambitious bureaucrats will rise to the
challenge.
If it is the intent of the Executive Branch to permit this,
then why make assertions to the contrary in the explanatory
material? If it is not the intent of the Executive Branch to permit
this, why are no constraints expressed in the proposal?
Removal of Explicit Safeguards Concerning Public Domain Research
In establishing the National Science Foundation as a source
of research funding, Congress intended to promote a certain
amount of research in the public domain. Many defense agencies
also fund research in the public domain because they feel that the
results would thereby stand the greatest chance of turning into
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Admiral B. R. Inman
February 24, 1982
Page Three
products that strengthen the U.S. position of technological
leadership.
The proposed order removes a number of statements explicitly
recognizing this Congressional.intent. Examples:
1. It removes the statement that basic research is not
covered by the order unless it clearly relates to the
national security.
2. It removes the statement that information about products
developed using public information may not be considered
for classification unless the government acquires a
proprietary interest in those products.
3. It removes the requirement that the public good served by
releasing information be explicitly balanced against
the national security interest served by extending
classification.
The explanatory materials state that no change in current policy
is-intended by these deletions. To be perfectly honest, I have
trouble believing that statement.
Moreover, the deletion of the above principles is justified
in the explanatory materials on the grounds they are "self-
evident". I disagree. If one wants the self-evident to be
clearly understood by everyone, especially those charged with
carrying out policy, one must state it explicitly. The U.S.
Constitution follows this principle.
There is one other point. I am not aware of any legislation
that permits removing information from the public domain. Indeed,
many constitutional scholars believe that information cannot be
removed from the public domain. The Atomic Energy Act gets around
this by declaring that Restricted Data is never in the public domain
in the first place. The Export Control laws explicitly recognize
that information must be "captured" before it gets into the public
domain. For this reason, I am not aware of what constitutional
basis the government asserts to reclassify previously declassified
information. Nor am I aware of the government's constitutional
basis for asserting a right to classify information from research
conducted in the public domain. In other words, I foresee serious
problems if the administrators of the new order invade the territory
previously off limits.
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Admiral B. R. Inman
February 24, 1982
Page Four
Expansion of Classifiable Categories
Cryptology is added to the list of classifiable subjects.
Although one can argue that this is implicitly covered by the
current category of intelligence activities, we both understand
that the science of codes is much broader than the application of
that science to intelligence activities. Adding cryptology to
the list of categories not only broadens the range of information
subject to classification, it explicitly adds a science to the
list. No other science is listed. Moreover, the addition of
this category seems to undercut your effort to find methods of
voluntary cooperation between the scientific community and the
government. Is this the intent of the Executive Branch?
I note also that a new, catch-all category is added,
permitting anything having to do with the capabilities or
vulnerabilities of systems pertaining to the national security to
be considered for classification. What is to prevent this from
covering all of computer hardware and software? Telephone
systems? Satellite communications systems?
At the end of the proposed order is a definition of
"national security information." This definition is extended to
include U.S. foreign relations. Under this extension, information
could be classified merely because Japan or Germany might gain a
competitive advantage. Is this the Executive Branch's intent?
It seems moreover that the quantity of information classified
will rise under this order: more categories are included,
administrators are encouraged to classify, no automatic
declassification dates are required, and administrative procedures
to review materials for declassification are discontinued on the
grounds of being too expensive. Is this really the intent of
the Executive Branch?
Summary
In my view, the tone of the proposed order and the deletions
from the current order broaden, both qualitatively and quantitatively,
the range of information that can and will be classified. The
explanatory materials assert that this is not the intent, and yet
none of the intent is stated in the proposed order. I also believe
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Admiral B. R. Inman
February 24, 1982
Page Five
that the proposed order lays claim to territory intended by the
Constitution and by Congress to be in the public domain.
I think it would be prudent that there be public hearings
to obtain input from Congress and the scientific community before
committing this draft to a signed Executive Order.
Sincerely,
rt&
Peter J. Denning
PJD:pp
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