CIA POLYGRAPH PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00263R000100240011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
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CIA POLYGRAPH PROGRAM
Polygraph testing has played a crucial role in the Central
Intelligence Agency's security program for the past 34 years.
The CIA's experience with polygraph involves over 128,000 cases
and close to a million separate polygraph charts. During this
time, we have developed incontrovertible evidence of the value of
this vital procedure.
CIA's use of the polygraph began on an experimental basis in
August 1948 and results were dramatic from the very beginning.
The biggest CIA research program was conducted from 1964 to 1967,
after the Moss Committee hearings had urged an indepth review of
the reliability and validity of our polygraph procedures. It was
found that agreement of examiners on the significance of poly-
graph tracings was as good or better than that found among
cardiologists reading EKG charts or among psychologists inter-
preting Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Test
protocols. Among the conclusions in a 1967 summary report on
this polygraph research were the following:
? The polygraph interview is a very effective
component of the Agency security screening program.
? The polygraph interview has a high level of
reliability.
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? The level of polygraph effectiveness
reliability justifies Agency reliance on the
polygraph.
? The data indicate that the polygraph
interview is a valid procedure.
The CIA polygraph program is closely controlled and managed
by the Agency's Office of Security, following guidelines estab-
lished by the Director of Central Intelligence. A strict quality
control program is designed to ensure that the highest technical
standards are met by all examiners. The value of the polygraph,
indeed its indispensability, is clearly reflected in the fact
that about 80 percent of the security disapproval decisions taken
by the CIA's Director of Security are based on information
developed during the polygraph examination.
The security disapproval statistics are viewed as clear
indicators as to the program's utility, and the percentage
consistently increases over time, with recent figures being
around 90 percent. Substantially all of these 90 percent would
have been cleared for employment in the absence of a polygraph
program; only the remaining 10 percent were detected as
unsuitable by other means. During the 11-year period from 1972
to 1982, approximately 2,800 security risks would have been
employed were it not for technical testing. The following
figures are deemed significant:
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Percent Disapproved
Based on Polygraph Data
1972
64
1973
69
1974
76
1975
72
1976
74
1977
78
1978
89
1979
82
1980
93
1981
91
1982
82
From 1 October 1978 to 31 January 1979, a study was
conducted by the working group of the Director of Central
Intelligence Security Committee in which the effectiveness of
sources of information developing adverse security information
was compared. Among the sources compared were polygraph,
National Agency Check, credit organizations, listed and developed
references, education and employment records and interviews, and
residence and police checks. Polygraph as a source was
responsible for 46.3 percent of the adverse information
obtained. The next largest source of information was the
interview of developed references, which accounted for 7.9
percent of the information.
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The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
completed a detailed study on security clearance procedures in
the Intelligence Agencies in September 1979, at which time there
was a full review of the CIA's polygraph program. The staff
report concluded that the CIA's "security clearance procedures
appear to be the most comprehensive and stringent in the
Intelligene Community."
Our polygraph program reflects an impressive record of
achievement in the identification of individuals whose employment
or affiliation would, by any reasonable standard, jeopardize the
security of the Agency and its operations. With full apprecia-
tion that the polygraph is not infallible and cannot be regarded
as a panacea, the evidence is overwhelming that a polygraph
program featuring well-trained, professional polygraphers
conversant with the state-of-the-art in their field is of
tremendous value in the CIA personnel security arena.
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CIA POLYGRAPH POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND STANDARDS
I. Authority
a. General. The polygraph has been utilized by the CIA
for over 30 years. Historically, the authority to use the poly-
graph derives from the National Security Act of 1947, Section
102 (d)(3). The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is
responsible by law and Executive Order to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Attendant
to this responsibility, the DCI has authorized the Office of
Security to conduct a polygraph program.
b. Competitive Service Personnel. Pursuant to the general
authority of the Director of Security to conduct the polygraph
program of the Agency and in accordance with the provisions of
Appendix D, Chapter 736, Federal Personnel Manual, the Director
of Security is authorized to use polygraph examinations for com-
petitive service applicants and employees who are assigned or
detailed to the Agency and placed in staff positions or who have
staff-like access to Agency facilities or information. These
persons include, but are not limited to:
(1) General Service Administration maintenance
and char force personnel and Federal Protective Ser-
vice officers assigned to work at Agency facilities.
(2) A limited number of Defense Intelligence
Agency competitive service employees who work in
joint Central Intelligence-Defense Intelligence Agency
endeavors.
(3) Certain competitive career employees assigned
to ad hoc panels, study groups, and task forces.
The Director of Security shall annually determine the
necessity of the testing of Competitive Service Personnel. If
it is determined that these procedures are necessary to the ful-
fillment of the Agency's intelligence or counterintelligence
missions, a certification to the effect will be sent to the
General Counsel on or before March 30 of each year. The General
Counsel will, upon receipt of the foregoing certification, re-
quest necessary authorization from the Director, Office of
Personnel Management, as required by Appendix D, Chapter 736,
Federal Personnel Manual.
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II. Purpose and Scope
The purpose for which the polygraph is used within the CIA
is limited. By direction of the DCI, the polygraph is used in
the Agency as an aid to investigations to determine the security
eligibility of all persons employed by, assigned to, or detailed
to the Agency in a staff capacity or whose Agency affiliation
will give them staff-like access to Agency facilities, operations
or information, as well as applicants or candidates for such
positions or affiliation. Thus, all individuals are subject to
the requirement of being polygraphed. Further, the polygraph is
used in operational situations, in connection with periodic
reinvestigations, and in specific instances wherein a clarifying
security interview is required to revalidate continued access to
classified information.
III. Specific Exclusions
It is CIA policy not to utilize the polygraph on any
person:
a. with a serious and diagnosed cardiac problem;
b. with a physical deformity if such a condition
would cause testing to be painful or harmful;
c. known to be experiencing a serious psychological
or emotional problem (in such instances testing
will be deferred);
d. who is pregnant unless such a woman presents
a note from her own doctor authorizing poly-
graph testing;
e. prior to his or her 18th birthday;
f. for the purpose of resolving allegations or sus-
picion of administrative irregularities of a
routine nature;
g. who does not willingly submit to testing.
IV. Polygraph Question Coverage
Polygraph questions to be used in testing persons for em-
ployment or assignment to the Agency, including staff-like access
to Agency installations, will be limited to those questions
necessary to resolve security issues. Periodically, the
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questions used in the various types of Agency polygraph tests
are submitted to the DCI for review and approval.
V. Specific Issue Polygraph
In instances where there are implications of a security
nature or where investigative information requires clarifying
security interviews, a specific issue polygraph examination
may be conducted, but only with the approval of the Director
of Security. Questions essential to resolving the security
issues involved will be defined by the Director of Security.
When information is developed bearing on the security matter
of concern, the examiner will continue questioning to the point
which permits clear understanding of admissions or explanations.
Sufficient detail will be obtained during the interview to
allow the examiner to prepare an accurate synopsis for use by
the adjudicative offices.
VI. Case Adjudication
The role of the polygraph examiner in CIA is strictly
limited to gathering information pertaining to security
issues covered by the approved questions. The examiner has
no role in the adjudicative process. Polygraph examiners
questioned by testees regarding standards for employment or sec-
urity standards will respond by a referral to officials
who are charged with the responsibility.
VII. Pre-Interview Requirements
No polygraph examination shall be conducted unless the
individual voluntarily consents in writing to the test after
being advised that:
He is entitled to timely notification of the date
and time of examination and of the place where it
will be conducted.
b. He is privileged against self-incrimination in
accordance with the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.
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c. He has the right to obtain and consult with legal
counsel of his own choice prior to the polygraph
examination.
d. He may not work at CIA without undergoing a full
background investigation and consenting to a- polygraph
examination. However, information concerning a
refusal to submit to a polygraph examination shall
not be recorded in his personnel file and shall be
protected against unauthorized disclosure.
e. He shall be informed of the characteristics and
nature of the polygraph instrument and examination,
including an explanation of the physical operation
of the instrument, the procedures to be followed
during the examination, the general areas of all
questions to be asked during the examination, and
that any information developed will be protected as
specified in Section X below.
a. An explanation of the nature of the examination
shall be given to the examinee prior to testing.
b. Before the beginning of each test, the examiner
shall review with the examinee all questions to
be asked during the test.
c. Questions asked must have a special relevance to
the subject of the particular inquiry.
IX. Supervision and Review
a. Polygraph examinations shall be conducted only by
personnel certified as polygraph examiners in ac-
cordance with Section XII below, Poly-
graph examiner trainees serving their internship
and other examiners who have not yet completed a
required refresher period of internship shall con-
duct polygraph examinations only under the direct
supervision of a polygraph examiner certified in
accordance with the provisions as specified in
this document.
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b. The conduct of each individual polygraph exam-
ination shall be carefully supervised by the
individual exercising technical supervision over
the polygraph examiner concerned.
c. Determination that more investigation is needed
where a polygraph examination has been undertaken
shall not be made by the polygraph examiner but
rather by a monitoring supervisor.
X. Records and Administration
a. Storage and Retention. The Director of Security or
his designee shall control and determine the location
for the storage and retention of polygraph examination
reports.
(1) Polygraph examination reports shall be
filed separately from all other files.
(2) If a duplicate polygraph report is made
such nonrecord copies shall be destroyed
within three months after completion of
the case.
b. Dissemination Controls. Information obtained in the
course of a polygraph examination shall be strictly
controlled.
(1) Polygraph examination reports shall be
available within the Office of Security
on a strict need to know basis only to
those officials charged with responsi-
bility for determining whether a security
clearance may be issued.
(2) The Director of Security shall release
polygraph-acquired information outside
the Agency only after he has made a
recommendation, which is approved by the
Director or Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, that such a release is
necessary in the interest of national
security.
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(3) The Agency is required by 28 U.S.C. S35 to
report to the Attorney General any informa-
tion, allegation or complaint relating to
violations of Title 18 of the criminal code
involving government officers and employees.
This obligation is reiterated in Executive
Order 12333, which also mandates reporting
of information regarding certain Federal
offenses committed by nonemployees. Specific
guidelines are detailed in Headquarters
Regulations.
(4) In certain circumstances, information may also
be released to either House of Congress, or
pursuant to the order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
XI. Polygraph Instrument Maintenance
a. Polygraphs. Equipment characterized by the Agency as
"lie detecting" or "polygraph recording instruments"
will measure and record, as a minimum, respiration,
galvanic skin reflex, blood volume, and heart rate.
b. Maintenance.
(1) Polygraph instruments shall be properly calibrated.
(2) Calibration techniques shall be established by
the Polygraph Division and the Office of Security
to assure proper and accurate operation of instru-
ments.
XII. Selection, Training, and Supervision of Agency Polygraph Examiners
a. Selection. Candidates selected for the position of
polygraph examiner shall meet the following minimum
requirements:
(1) United States citizenship,.
(2) Graduation from an accredited four-year college
(baccalaureate degree).
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(3
Successfully screened, on the basis of a back-
ground investigation and polygraph examination,
as being a person of high moral character and
sound emotional temperament.
(4) Satisfactorily completed an Agency-approved
course of instruction.
b. Training.
(1) The Director of Security is responsible for es-
tablishing and managing training programs for
Agency polygraph examiners.
(2) These training programs shall be designated to
assure that no person shall be certified as a
qualified Agency polygraph examiner without hav-
ing successfully completed an approved course and
demonstrated an understanding of the appropriate
application of the following:
(a) Methods of interrogation;
(b) The psychology of interrogation;
(c) Constitutional and .other legal considerations;
(d) The physiology of detection of deception;
(e) The functioning of the polygraph, including
its capabilities and limitations; and
(f) Agency regulations concerning use of the
polygraph.
(3) Training described in subparagraph (2) shall be con-
ducted by qualified professional personnel.
(4) Before being certified as a qualified Agency poly-
graph examiner by the Director of Security, each
candidate shall serve a probationary period under
certified examiners. Such probationary period
shall be for a period of not less than six months
nor more than one year following the basic poly-
graph examiner training course. During the proba-
tionary period the candidate shall be required to
demonstrate proficiency in the use of the polygraph
by conducting at least SO.polygraphic examinations
under the supervision of a certified polygraph
examiner.
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(5) Appropriate provision shall be made by the Dir-
ector of Security to assure that polygraph exam-
iners receive refresher training on a periodic
basis.
(6) Should examiners fail to satisfy current profi-
ciency standards, certification shall be promptly
suspended or revoked.
(7) Certifications suspended for failure to meet
minimum requirements may be reissued after suit-
able refresher training or after satisfactorily
demonstrating an acceptable standard of profi-
ciency, as determined by the Director of Security
or his designee.
XIII. Refusal to Take a Polygraph Examination
If an individual required to take a polygraph examination
refuses to take part in the examination, the interview will be
terminated and a memorandum written documenting the refusal.
The memorandum will reflect that the interviewee was advised
that a polygraph examination is required as a condition for
employment or affiliation, or of continued employment or af-
filiation.
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GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIA POLYGRAPH PROGRAM
I. Introduction
The Office of General Counsel has provided the following
guidelines to polygraph examiners to clarify areas of concern
and to answer typical questions.
II. Safeguards to the Subject
The test coverage specified in Phase I.and.Phase II is
standardized in the applicant screening and reinvestigation
cases. The coverage in specific issue polygraph cases must
be approved in advance by the Director of Security.
As an additional precaution to insure compliance with
polygraph policy, each polygraph interview is subject to
monitoring by the Desk Supervisor, Deputy.Chief or Chief of
Polygraph Division. Further., the completed polygraph case
must be reviewed and approved for release by the Desk Super-
visor, Deputy Chief or Chief of the Polygraph Division prior
to forwarding for adjudication.
III. Relevance of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States to the CIA Polygraph Interview
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides, in perti-
nent part, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. An individual being given
a polygraph examination, therefore, may not be compelled to make
statements which might tend to be incriminating and should be so
advised. Should he choose to make such incriminatory statements,
neither the Agency nor its employees will be liable if, in accord-
ance with Executive Order No. 12333, such statements are forwarded
to the Department of Justice.
IV. Invasion of Privacy
"Invasion of privacy" is a legal term of art. As such, it
cannot be given absolute definition but must be defined on a
case-by-case basis with respect to the particular circumstances
of each case. In the context of the polygraph interview, ques-
tions directly relevant to a determination as to the suitability
of an individual for receipt of classified information would not
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be deemed invasion of privacy. On the other hand, questions
asked for the private interest of the examiner or questions which
had no direct bearing on suitability for employment could consti-
tute unwarranted intrusions into a person's private life. There-
fore, there must be some rational connection between the question
and Agency security. Questions asked.'during the polygraph interview
are limited to those necessary to resolve the security issues
covered by Phase Land Phase II coverage. In the case of specific
issue polygraphs, questions are limited to those approved by the
Director of Security to resolve specific security issues.
V. Information Concerning U.S. Citizens Who Are Not Agency Connected
The Office of Security is authorized to conduct a polygraph
program as an aid in gathering information to be used in security
evaluations. The examiner's role in this program is to gather
information which is provided to those who have the responsibility
for making adjudications. The operator is not in a position to
make a judgment concerning the significance-of a particular item
of information in terms of the overall evaluation of the case.
Guidelines have been established outlining what information is
required by the adjudicators and what information is the proper'
subject of polygraphic inquiry. Within- these guidelines, the
operator is obligated to report information in sufficient detail
so that an informed judgment can be made by the adjudicators in
any given case. It is proper for the polygraph examiner to report
to the General Counsel on CIA or non-CIA persons who have been
involved in some type of criminal activity. Information on U.S.
persons who are not Agency connected and which information does
not relate to national security or to criminal activity will be
destroyed.
VI. Liability of the Examiner
A suit. by a polygraph subject against a polygraph examiner
for invasion of privacy or denial of employment would be unlikely
to succeed. Applicants are informed that a polygraph examination,
as well as a full background investigation,-is a condition of
employment.' When the applicant, having been told this, decides
to continue his efforts to obtain employment in a.sensitive govern-
ment position, he is generally in a weak position to assert that
his privacy has been invaded because he has, in effect, waived his
privacy. It is the opinion of the Office of General Counsel that
a suit for denial of employment similarly would fail. First, the
polygraph examiner does not determine whether or not an applicant
should be employed. Second, as far as the discretionary act of
determining whether or not an individual should be employed, it is
a general principle of law that a public official,. acting in his
official capacity and in pursuit of official duties, is immune
from suit for damages.
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