REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF MANUSCRIPT FOR PUBLICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 28, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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D/FBIS
DD/IF B!S
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, Directorate of Science and TechmjZQ?V.
VIA: Director, FBIS
Chief, AG
Chief, China Branch
C/P
STAT
FROM: 201
>. , .
SUBJECT:
Request for Approval of Manuscript for Publication
EX E- " I ,.. :.
1. I request approval for publication the attached text titled, "Professional
Military Education in the People's Republic of China."
2. When approved, I intend to submit the manuscript for publication in a
book to be edited by Paul Godwin, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama and published
by Westview Press. An earlier version of this manuscript was approved by DOD for
public presentation at a conference of the Association for Asian Studies in March
1980 while I was still in the armed forces before I became an agency employee.
3. None of the material presented in the manuscript is, to my knowledge,
classified.
4. I am not under cover. I will be identified as an FBIS employee but
will append the standard disclaimer indicating that the views expressed are my
own and not necessarily those of FBIS.
STAT
Attachment: "Professional Military Education in the PRC"--two copies
I have reviewed the attached text, to the best of my knowledge have found it
to be unclassified.
STAT
Director, FBIS
ISd
I have reviewed the attached text, to the best of my knowledge have found it
to be unclassified, and approve it for publication.
Executive Officer --Ta-te
of Science F, Technology
Distribution:
Original and 1
- Executive Officer, DDS&T, w/atts.
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w/
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- DDSET Registry, wo/atts.
1 -
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FBIS Registry
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PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
by
is an analyst of Chinese affairs with the Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service. The views in this chapter are those of the author and are not
necessarily those of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service or any other US
government agency.
STAT
STAT
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PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
During a visit of a delegation representing the military academies of
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to the United States in the fall of 1980, the
head of the delegation, Xiao Ke, Commander of the PLA Military Academy and Vice
Minister of National Defense, informed his guests that the Military Academy was
building new facilities. He also observed that the ages of-the members of his
delegation were quite old; that they had not been able to retire because the
devastation of military academies during the Cultural Revolution had made it
impossible to properly train a generation of younger military leaders. Commander
Xiao's remarks strike at the heart of the key issues for the PLA's professional
military education for the 1980's: technical modernization and ideological change.
Both issues continued to be highly controversial as the decade began..
China's program for economic modernization has experienced dramatic revision and
there has been political instability at the highest levels. It is against this
background that the professional military education system is expected to
produce officers that are "politically conscious, professionally competent,
1
unyielding in work style and physically strong.." This chapter will examine
the structure and function of the Chinese professional military education
system and examine the relationship of this education to the broader questions
posed by modernization.
The objective of professional military education in China cited above
helps to distinguish it from concepts prevalent in the West. While Western
scholars have dwelt on the unique aspects of military professionalism, the
Chinese Communist approach, owing both to Chinese tradition and the revolutionary
2
insurgency experience, ham generally downplayed its uniqueness. This important
dimension will be discussed in greater detail later, but it should be noted here
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as we establish a background for our discussion by briefly outlining the organiza-
tion of the Chinese professional military education system.
First of all, professional military education is pervasive in the PLA.
At the apex are the three academies which correspond to the organization of the
high command; the Military Academy (General Staff Department), Political Academy
(General Political Department) and the Logistical Academy (General Rear Services
Department). All of these are located in Beijing. Below these are service academies
for the Navy and Air Force and specialized academies (e.g. the PLA Advanced Infantry
Academy at Nanjing, Air Force Maintenance Academy) located in various parts of China.
Little is known about the organization of the remainder of the military education
system, however, it is quite clear from the prolific reports of various study and
3
indoctrination efforts in PLA units that the system is extensive.
Secondly, the curriculum of the military education system has been
undergoing rapid change. The amount of time spent in studying "political"
subjects has been reduced in favor of spending more time on "military" subjects.
Military educators are concerned that the curriculum reflect the objective of
military modernization. Besides studying the Soviet tank offensive in Manchuria
in 1945, they are desirous of giving more attention to subjects dealing with
strategy and tactics in a nuclear environoment, the management of combined
operations, and other aspects of modern warfare.
Finally, the organization appears to be undergoing some revamping. A
conference on military academies in the fall of 1980 attended by China's top
military leaders concluded that military educators.must "emancipate our thinking
and boldly change the content of the training and education programs" in the
4
military education system. Though the conference did not reveal precisely how
the academies were to change to accomplish this objective'it did suggest that
the teachers become more innovative. Consequently, any attempt to analyze
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education
the Chinese military/system must be subject to the caveat that it is undergoing
change and will likely vary in structure and purpose as the PLA advances into
the 1980's.
Rather than focusing upon the institutions which are responsible for
prfoessional military education, I have chosen to examine more closely the issues
and problems with which military education must deal. I believe military
education is a microcasm'&f:Maty-_is-saes which are readily apparent in the other
papers. Inasmuch as military education is an important vehicle for the socializa-
tion of military leaders, such issues as the relationship between ideological
and technical values, the role of the military in society, and the pursuit of
effective national strategy can be readily discerned in its content. The
Chinese are extremely aware of the relationship between military education and
socialization, consequently military education can reveal much about how the
Chinese leaders view these questions as well as how the military responds to
them. In the next few pages I will try to sketch out some of these issues.
Military v. Civilian
The selection of military v. civilian as a principle issue area no doubt
requires some justification, particularly, since Chinese statements from the dawn
of the revolutionary insurgency era have stressed the close relationship between
the Army and the masses. Moreover, because of the insurgent heritage and the
overlap of Party and military responsibilities in Chinese political institutions
since 1949has not led to a sharp dichotomy between the military and other
segments. During the Cultural Revolution, the PLA became directly involved in
political administration in many areas of China, yet it would be mistaken to say
that the military had staged a coup. Persons whose careers have been predominantly
active
in the military may well have constituted a majority of/Politburo membership in the
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late 1960's and early 1970's; yet this high level of military involvement in
political decision making was not akin to the seizure of power by the military that
occurs in many developing countries. The charge that Lin Biao was behind a
"counterrevolutionary coup attempt" in 1971, given lengthy and detailed
examination during the trial of his alleged co-conspirators in late 1980 and
early 1981 suggests that the Chinese consider this kind of intervention to be
particularly odious and repugnant.
However, in recent times a military-civilian dichotomy has become
more apparent. Besides of reports of anti-PLA demonstrations on university
campuses where troops remained in buildings, complaints of demobilized veterans
of discriminatory treatment, and other evidence, recent editorials in the
Liberation Army Daily indicate that a military-civilian cleavage has developed
over other issues. The military has been particularly discontent over agricultural
reforms which discriminated against families with members in the armed forces
by eliminating extra work points designed to compensate for the loss of able
bodied workers (and, therefore, income). A General Political Department
Circular in October called for intensive efforts by the army to study the
6
party's leadership's rural policies. Furthermore, an article in the army
paper on November 20 declared that cadre adherence to the Party's political
and ideological line is "the most fundamental yardstick" in PLA organizational
work and warned that those who had spoken out or worked against the Party line
should not be retained in leadership groups.
Paradoxically, much of the reason for the civilian-military cleavage
appears to stem from the modernization effort. Official military spokesmen have
insisted that the PLA genuine adheres to the principle that military modernization
hinges on the other modernizations, yet there is some evidence that some disagree-
ment has occurred over budgetary priorities. Thus, while military leaders have
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stressed the importance of developing modern and advanced weapons, civilian
leaders have placed great emphasis on staying within the budget; official
figures suggest that the military budget has actually been reduced. But even----,
more important than the issue of budget priorities is the question of professionalism,
9
a key theme of military education.
According to Chinese conceptualizations, there have been two broad
approaches to military professionalism. The first may be referred to as the
"Maoist" approach. This approach was characterized by stressing the importance of
men over machines and the suppression of uniqueness among the armed forces as an
institution. This approach recognized the importance of the military in providing
national defense, but also gave equal emphasis'to its role in society, the Army
being a work force and a production force as well as a fighting force. A close
relationship between the army and the people was an important value, as was the
exemplary nature of military personnel.
The "Maoist" approach was most strongly articulated during the periods
of the anti-Japanese war and Chinese civil war, and during the Cultural Revolution.
It will be recalled that during much of the 1960's the entire country was supposed
to "learn from the PTA" which had correctly embodied Mao's thought. During these
periods, military personnel not only were responsible for national defense, but
for serving as models of such values as sacrifice, selflessness, diligence,
perseverence, hard work, and other "revolutionary ideals."
The Maoist approach to professionalism may be contrasted with the
"Pengist" or "Dengist" approach which appears to be closer to Western concepts of
military professionalism. This approach stresses the uniqueness of the armed
forces, its specialization, and its diversity from society. In this approach
the military stresses the importance of modernizing equipment, and of developing
combat expertise over ideological training. The military should concentrate more
on providing national defense, and less on performing other social tasks.
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This approach was particularly evident during the period of the 1950's
when Peng Dehuai as Defense Minister followed the Soviet model in developing
10
professionalism among the Chinese armed forces. More recently, this approach
has been signalled since the death of Mao and the purge of the gang of four. A
host of conferences, reports and articles suggest that the drive for moderniza-
tion is pushing the military toward the approach where "expert" takes precedence
11
over "red." For example, a Red Flag article commemorating the 30th anniversary
of the People's Republic of China in 1979 written by Defense Minister Xu Xianggien
stressed the importance of expertise and demanded that training in the armed
forces be "geared to the needs of actual combat."
Obviously, neither approach has been followed exclusively at any given
time. Also, both approach to military professionalism share common aspects. Both
acknowledge the importance of Party control of the armed forces; both recognize
that the principle role of the military is to provide national defense. I would
also argue that both accept the premise that the legitimacy of the armed forces
is expressed in great measure through ideology. That is, the basis for the
effectiveness of the armed forces is primarily a correct political line. Even
those who stress "expertise" over "redness" do so by saying that "red" is
defined by "expert." Nevertheless, the distinctions are quite apparent. The
Maoist model abolishes ranks, while the "Perig st-Dengist" model encourages them.
The "Maoist" approach says that military education should concentrate more
on ideological study, while the "Pengist-Dengist approach wants more time spent
on combat training.
It has already been pointed out, that in the early 1980's 4-t_wa-s ea-r--
th the Pengist-Dengist approach is once again being favored. This poses the
question of whether or not the inclucation of this concept of professionalism
will create a greater civilian-military cleavage. As the military becomes
increasingly unique and separate from society, will it not find that its interests
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diverge greater from other institutions and sectors in Chinese society? Given
the tone and content of recent statements in the official army newspaper, Chinese
leaders are greatly concerned about this potential.
Consequently, China's present leaders believe that an important
responsibility of military education will be to ensure the adherence of the
military to Party leadership. It is implicitly assumed that as the military
becomes more "expert" it will become more distinct as an interest group and that
the way to deal with this is to ensure Party control. It is not surprising that
the conference on military academies concluded that in the future:
The most important thing is: The cadres trained by military
academies and instututions must have a firm and correct
political orientation, firmly implement the party's line,
principles and policies and resolutely obey the command of
the party Central Committee and its Military Commission.13
Strategy and Doctrine
Strategy and doctrine are covered more completely in other chapters
of this book, however, it is also important that they be examined in the
context of professional military education. The evolution of strategy and
doctrine from "people's war" to "people's war under modern conditions"presumes
that the rising generations of military leaders will be able to comprehend and
apply the new concepts. Yet, it is quite evident that the military education
system is having some difficulties in adjusting its curriculum to explain the
new concepts, perhaps because they are inherently not altogether clear.
This was amply demonstrated during a visit to the PLA Military Academy
when we were informed that the students were expected to master Marxism-Leninism
and Mao's thought in analyzing and solving problems. Military training also
placed emphasis on Mao's teachings on war. Now that the "thought of Mao" has
been redefined to a culmination of the party's collective experience rather
than merely the contributions of one individual1its all-inclusive nature may lend
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itself to proper study as providing some contribution on the nature of modern
warfare. Nevertheless, there are probably also some pitfalls. The leaders
of the military academy seemed to give a good deal of credence to the possibility
of a massive Soviet tank offensive against China, and pay special attention to
the operations of the Soviet Army in Manchuria in 1945. While recognizing that
there are other possible 'oriet military options vis a vis China, they strongly
emphasized the view that, for the Soviet Union, China was to great a problem to
be handled by some kind of limited incursion or selective strike.
Without debating the merits of the Chinese view, it does appear that
the PLA leaders are reluctant to modify a strategic image which they have held
for some time. As others have pointed out, the deterrent value of "people's
war" is of more limited utility in projecting foreign policy, as the "defensive
counterattack" against Vietnam in 1979 has suggested. But in spite of the
constant articles and statement calling for "people's war under modern conditions"
there is apparently a bureaucratic tendency to cling to what is known!4 During
our visit to the Military Academy we were told that the curriculum was undergoing
revision so that the principles of modernization could be more fully brought into
play in the program of instruction. When the reciprocal delegation from China
visited the US a year and a half later, we were told the same thing--that the
curriculum was undergoing change in accordance with the demands of moderniza-
tion. This is not to say that curriculums should not be constantly revised and
updated, they quite obviously are in any good system of professional military
education; but it seems in the Chinese case, there is continuing uncertainly
over just what is is you teach in matters of strategy and doctrine in order to
contribute to modernization. There were some hints that the Chinese were coming
to grips with the issue in the fall 1980 discussions when they explained that
they were trying to teach the relationship between diplomacy and military power;
they were also very anxious to know how US military education taught the subject
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of warnings of impending surprise attack. Chinese professional military education,
like other systems of education in China, is trying to impart greater technical
and scientific knowledge. Any of these subjects, depending on how they are
taught could induce momentum away from classical concepts of doctrine and
strategy.
As Chinese military education enters the 1980's, it is still the long
march generation that has ultimate responsibility for what is taught. In spite
of the great attention given to modernization in various speeches and writings,
it will likely be som+ ime before a full transition in strategic and doctrinal
concepts will occur in the professional military education system. Ultimately,
the current mixture of classical aphorisms on people's war, and a good deal of
talk about modern conditions, will give way to a more coherent system of
education in these subjects, but for the time being, there is likely to be a
them
continuing ad hoc character to s.
Generational Change
At a speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of the PLA Military
Academy on January 15, 1981, Xiao Ke identified the central task of the
Military Academy as "to bring up a new generation of middle-ranking and senior
15
commanding personnel." Indeed, this issue is paramount throughout the
professional military education system, that is, the socialization of a new
generation of leaders at all levels of the military command structure. A
primary function of the military education system to to transmit the values
of one group of leaders to the next, and in this the Chinese have a unique situation.
It will be recalled that during his meetings with US military educators,
Xiao Ke noted the age of the Chinese delegation and suggested they could not
retire for a while because of the disruptions created in socialization during the
Cultural Revolution. Yet, this approach involves a paradox in that the long
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march and revolutionary war generation insists on clinging to authority until
can be assured that the newer generations are correctly socialized,
thereby blocking a transition that is almost certainly necessary if the goal of
modernization is to be achieved.
The problem is closely related to the problem of defining professionalism
and strategy and doctrine discussed above. Those in authority in the military
education system at the highest echelons are older veterans for the most part.
Very little, if any "new blood" has been brought into the system. Consequently,
while much lip service is given to modernization, both the curriculuum and
teaching methodology tend toward the "tried and true" system of the past. This
was reflected to a great extent during our visit to various military facilities
and in our disucssions with Chinese leaders.
For example, during our visit to a model division near Tianjin we
were treated to tours and demonstrations illustrating the principle that-the
PLA is "a fighting force, a working force and a production force" (indeed,
one of the things most impressive about Chinese museums and exhibits in
general was their ability to articulate a common theme through organization
and presentation). Thus, we witnessed PLA soldiers engaged in climbing and
descending walls, hand-to-hand combat, and other basic skills. We also
visited the unit's fields, factories (including seeing officers' wives
make vitamins), and other facilities, and were entertained by the Cultural
groups. While it was obvious that this was a showpiece unit designed to
impress foreign visitors, we were surprised that its presentations had changed
little, if any, since the early 1970's when westerners first visited it.
At one point during the tour I asked the1Cadre in charge of political
work who was conducting the tour how modernization would affect all of this.
When he finished his answer, which stressed the importance of modernization,
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the necessity of improvements, and so on, I could not ascertain that there was
any sense of immediate relevance for that particular unit. I was left with
the distinct impression that modernization was something which might incrementally
filter down to various units as time went by. I do not suggest that the same
situation exists in all units. There are numerous reports in the Chinese press
of unit technical innovations which supposedly contribute to modernization, and
of increased time spent in learning technical information. However, there is
a very strong legacy of the way things are to be done that seems to have a
good grip on the vast majority of units.
This should not be surprising. Given the public relegation of military
modernization to fairly low priority and the fact that traditionalists head
the military education system why should units make dramatic changes in the
way they go about doing things? Thus, there is the very paradoxical situation
of leaders constantly alluding to the need for fresh thinking, innovation,
modernization, while the system itself is strongly wedded to seniority,
tradition, and continuity. While it would be unfair to say that the older
generation is incapable of promoting change, it does seem true that the
pent socialization scheme does not agur well for the kinds of values that
16
the Chinese leaders are saying must be inculcated.
In summary, the military education requires new leadership which
can effectively impart new values and methods if modernization is truly to
become in practice as well as in theory part of the system. As long as present
leaders are dissatisfied with the results of the military education system, as
they have been expressing since the criticism of the Cultural Revolution began,
and are unwilling to surrender control to new and younger personnel (presuming
those with proper technical backgrounds can be found), we can anticipate that
there will be only halting steps toward revamping of the professional military
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education system. Consequently, the generational issue will continue to be
of significance in the 1980s.
The Politics of Modernization
All of the issues discussed above, military v. civilian, strategy and
doctrine, the question of leadership transition are closely related and might
be
conceivably/subsumed in a more broad general issue, that of the politics of
modernization. Modernization, besides being an important slogan in the Chinese
lexicon, has become an intensely political question. Debates over strategies to
achieve modernization resulted in severe political cleavages and leadership
change during the early 1980s, and in many respects professional military education
represented a microcosm of the larger questions under debate.
One of the major questions related to modernization was defining China's
relationship with the west. Much as the self-strengthening movement at the turn
of the century sought to define the Sino-Western relationship, the current leaders
17
of China are considering the impact of both western technology and ideas. This
issue is of great importance to the Chinese military. A greater reliance on
western technology in weapons procurement, for example, would presumably
necessitate greater specialization in military training. With this would almost
certainly come a refinement of the concept of professionalism in the armed
forces. That is, it implies a shift toward the Pengist-Dengist model discussed
earlier.
Increasing specialization and changes in professionalism must
necessarily have a political impact. The bifurcation of Party and military
offices within the military might help to ensure the continued dominance of
the military by the Party, but at the same time, increasingly specialized
military technicians would demand greater influence in decisions over doctrine
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and strategy. Presumably, over an extended period of time, the PLA could
evolve into something akin to the Soviet armed forces, however, given the
heritage of the PLA, this would require some fairly dramatic changes.
Even if it were to be assumed that the Chinese leadership had a clear
. 10
idea of which way they wanted the military to evolve,(which t obviously cannot
be assumed) 1the implications for military education are staggering. The
military education system would somehow be expected to divorce itself from
current practices and to produce a group of loyal adherents to the Party who
are also technically proficient managers (precisely the task that the military
academies are calling for). The military education system would have to
quickly resolve the question of authority between those with seniority and
those with technical expertise.
Also, the whole question of political education, one of the major
components of professional military education, would have to be"addressed.-
In the present system the major political questions have arisen over the
question of political line. Thus, the debates of the 1960's and 70's were
carried over into the content of political education. Shifts in the wind
could be managed by experienced personnel responsible for political education,
although during major upheavals such as occured during the Cultural Revolution
many of these people found themselves on the wrong side (in many instances,
no matter which side they were on). A review of the General Political
Department over the past few years shows many criticisms of political cadres
for not being able to keep up with the correct political line; even the most
adept could not escape blame altogether.
However, the. issue now at stake is infinitely more complex. In
addition to coping with shifts in the political line, the professional military
education system faces a restructuring more profound than was envisioned in the
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Cultural Revolution. The reason for this is that the Maoist citizen-soldier model
must necessarily yield to the modernization model under conditions of increased
technical specialization. In the past when the Maoist model was more closely
adhered to by the PLA, the authority of the command structure was based on close
identification with ideologically specified values. Repeating an observation made
earlier in the paper, while Maoist ideology does not deny modernization, it places
greater emphasis on non-technical values. In many instances, specialization
violated the concept that the soldier must remain close to the masses. If we
assume that technical change will result in increased specialization and that
promotions, awards, recognition and so forth, will be based increasingly on
technical expertise, then on what will command authority be based? Rhetorically
we may answer that it will be based on the expertise of the commander, but as
in the case with other technologically improving military organizations in the
world, not necessarily on specific abilities in weapons systems though, of course,
this skill will be important), but on managerial skills.
system
In other words, the military education/will be called upon to provide
skilled managers, not better combat technicians, or political thinkers, or
high level decision-makers. Unfortunately, it does not appear that this has
been fully grasped by the leaders of the military education system. Once again,
however, it must be pointed out that the reason it has not been fully grasped,
is because the Chinese themselves are not certain they are fully committed to a
shift away from the Maoist model in spite of the lip service given to moderniza-
tion. The Chinese professional military education system and its curriculuum
are ample evidence of the tenative committment.
By way of contrast, professional military education in the United
States reflects the results of modernization. At various levels, both the
organization and the curriculuum have historically reflected the perceived
increasing need for training in management skills, leadership, communication
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and other subjects more akin to the social sciences than other scientific and
technical subjects, or subjects uniquely related to combat. Part of this is
due to the fact that officers with college degrees frequently have strong technical
backgrounds upon which to draw, however, the main reason has to do with what is
perceived as necessary for operating modern military forces. During the visit
of the Chinese military educators to Washington in the fall of 1980 the point
was made that the successively higher levels of professional military education
in the United States increasingly reflect emphasis on political subjects. The
curriculuum of the National War College for example stresses international relations,
the development of strategy, budgetary politics, and the operation of the upper
echelons of the national security system.
When the Chinese say that 80o of their curriculuum is military and 20%
is political, they mean that much of their training deals with combat operations
and about 20% of it is indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist theory. Combat operations
are stressed even at the highest level of Chinese professional military education,
the PLA Military Academy. Even though the PLA has historically been heavily
involved in political decision making at the highest levels, there seems to be
little, if any, formal instruction in subjects such as management or public admin-
istration. An attribute of modernization it seems would imply greater attention
to these kinds of subjects.
If we assume that modernization of professional military education will
contribute to specialization and a new definition of professionalism in the PLA,
what will that mean about its political role, an issue mentioned briefly earlier
in this chapter? Past models of the military's political role have stressed that
rc'bS~O~~a~ hvt~~G_Y c c.Afe.1
"the party controls the gun" and present emphasis in suggests that Party
leadership will continue to be important. Iv However, in the past professional military
officers have been involved in the Politburo--the Party's highest decision-making
organ--directly. Since the Tenth Party Congress in 1973 there has been a tendency
toward the reduction of military representation at this level, a tendency which
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will probably continue into the 1980's. The questions becomes whether the
military will be willing to strive for its interests within bureaucratic and
party chapels as it is losing its high level access.
A situation could be envisioned in which the PLA, its access to top-level
decision making curbed, its interests challenged, and its prestige damaged, would
thereby experience tremendous pressures to stage a coup. This would not be a
Lin Biao style coup attempt in which a leader elicits segments of the military
to challenge others for power (although another coup attempt of this type can by
no means be completely ruled out), but one in which the military seizes power
with design to advancing its own organizational interests, a situation which
has arisen in many developing countries facing problems similar to those of China.
Obviously, China's leaders are desirous that such a development not occur.
Therefore, we can expect to see that a problem for professional military education
will be to socialize military leaders in such a manner as to minimize the possibil-
ity that they will want to circumvent normal channels for achieving their political
objectives.
The obvious response to this problem is what the Chinese are already
doing--heavy ideological indoctrination which emphasizes loyalty, discipline and
other values. Nevertheless, to the up-and-coming generation of Chinese military
leaders who have witnessed the vicissitudes of the Cultural Revolution and the
ongoing movement to "deMaoify" Chinese ideology, finding committment in ideological-
ly expressed values must be somewhat difficult. There is already considerable",
evidence that top military leaders question the effort to denigrate Mao,
moreover, there is considerable uncertainty as to where this ideological trend
will lead. Just as other aspects of the political process in China have
reflected turbulence over this question, so must professional military education.
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The primary purpose of this chapter has been to look at professional
military education in the PLA , especially the issues that face it in the coming
decade. It briefly considered the structure and curriculuum of PME as it now
stands, but deals mainly with the issues that will confront it in the future.
Professional Kilitary education is a microcosm of basic economic, social and
political issues. in China today. The Chinese Communists are committed to the
modernization of China, of which military modernization has been defined as an
important component. Military modernization is seen not only as the acquisition
of new weaponry, but as the increasing specialization and technical expertise of
armed forces personnel. At present, professional military education reflects
primarily past values which are not altogether congruent with modernization and
specialization. For example, little attention is given to public administration,
management, or other similar training as is typical in most higher professional
military education systems in other countries, while a great deal of emphasis
is placed on combat operations. Nevertheless, a good deal of lip service is
given to the rhubric of modernization.
Though the strategy of how to modernize has been constantly undergoing
redefinition in China, and the effort to modernize the armed forces has been
halting at best, it is unlikely that the committment will diminish. The
content of professional military education as expressed in the curriculuum will
change gradually to reflect the demands of specialization. However, the
content must also cope with the changing political role of the PLA, thereby
producing a generation of loyal and technically proficient (in managerial
skills) military leaders. The evidence provided above suggests that this task
will be extremely tortuous. For the most part, the PLA's professional military
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education system seems to have done its work well in the past. At least that
is the opinion of Chinese military leaders, except for their reservations about
what happened during the Cultural Revolution. The next decade may well provide
even greater tests.
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1. XINHUA (New China News Agency), 7 November 1980; Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Daily Report (People's Republic of China) 10 November 1980,
L 4. (This source is hereinafter referred to as DR/PRC).
2. For a discussion of the approach to professionalism in the PLA see
Paul Godwin, "Professionalism and Politics in the PLA: A Reconceptualization"
paper presented before a conference of the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Slavic Studies, October 1976. In this paper Godwin examines professionalism
in the PLA in the context of various theories of professionalism advanced by
Western military sociologists, and also examines the issue of modernization.
3. Most of the standard works on the PLA have had little to say about
professional military education, probably because the Chinese have not had a
great deal to say themselves. For a more extensive discussion of the present
system see William Heaton, "Professional Military Education in China: A Visit to
the Military Academy of the People's Liberation Army," The China Quarterly
(March 1980), pp122-8. Also see my unpublished report on tie meeting of our
delegation--of=the National. Defense University with representatives of the PLA
Air Force Academy on 2 May 1979 in Beijing, and also my unpublished report on
our discussions with a reciprocol delegation of Chinese military educators on
14 October 1980 in Washington, DC.
4. XINHUA, 7 November 1980; DR/PRC, 10 November 1980, L 4.
5. For example see the editorial in RENMIN RIBAO of 26 January 1981
hailing the verdict against the "Lin Biao-Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques.',
which among other things argues that the crimes of the usurpers are so great that
"not even all the water of the Changjiang River is enough to wash away their crimes."
DR/PRC 26 January 1981, L 24-28.
6. XINHUA, 11 October 1980; DR/PRC 14 October 1980, L 26. Also see the
authoritative RENMIN RIBAO Commentator Article, "Further Successfully Carry Out the
Work of Giving Preferential Treatment," 12 November 1980; DR/PRC 20 November 1980,
L 33-34.
7. Portions of a 20 November JIEFANGJUN RAO Commentator article
"Attach Importance to Selecting and Promoting Cadres Who Uphold the Party Line,"
carried on Beijing Radio's domestic service on 24 November 1980; DR/PRC,
25 November 1980, L33-6.
8. PRC Finance Minister Wang Binggian reported to the third session
of the Fifth National People's Congress in August 1980 that the 1979 defense
budget totalled 22.27 billion yuan, 2.04 billion yuan above the.original target,
and said that the budget for 1DT0would be 19.33 billion yuan or a cut of 2.94
billion yuan. XINHUA, 12 September 1980; DR/PRC Supplement, 23 September 1980,
p. 19, 23. The Japanese News Agency KYODO cited Chinese officials as indicating
that Premier Zhao Ziyang had decided to cut defense spending by 1 billion yuan
in 1981, and that cuts may be even greater. Kyodo also said that China has
been reducing the size of its armed forces because of budgetary reasons; DR/PRC,
21 January 1981, L 1.
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9. cf. Godwin's section on conflict over ethics, pp. 18-25.
10. See Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control
in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964 (Cambridge: Harvard East Asian Monographs,
1967). -
11. William Heaton, "China Visit: A Military Asses smen ,' APIW_(November,
1979), pp. 22-7. Also see the chapter by Richard J. Latham on "The Rectiflca
of Work Style in the PLA."
12. Xu Xiangqian, "Strive to Achieve Modernization in National Defense-
In Celebration of the 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Republic of
China," HONGQI No. 10 (October 2, 1979), pp. 28-33. Translated in US Joint
Publications Research Service, China Report #74680 (30 November 1979), pp. 49-50.
13. XINHUA 7 November 1980; DR/PRC 10 November 1980, L 4.
14. For example an article by Yi Li, "What the Afghan War Tells Us"
HONGQI No. 1 (January 1, 1981) contains comments on the strategy of the Afghan
insurgency which reflects the strong influence of Mao's military thinking. The
article at length discusses why it is possible for the Afghan insurgents to fight
against the Soviet Union, a formidable military foe. Among other points:
The Afghan people are able to continue the fight against the
Soviet aggressors because they have adopted correct military tactics.
They have been able to overcome the enemy's superiority--concentrated
forces, strong firepower and good mobility, and have given full play
to the power of people's war. Their troops are scattered and hidden.
They have seized opportunities to make sudden attacks upon the enemy,
to intercept enemy motorcades, to skillfully seize strongholds, to
burn warehouses and to attack the airport. In this way the enemy has
been put into a passive position and has been tired out by too much
moving around. . .
Fighting for the purpose of safeguarding the independence of the
motherland and the survival of the nation and adopting the correct
military tactics are the fundamental reasons why the Afghan people
can and are still fighting in the war.
. The struggle of the Afghan people tells all people in the
world the following truth: Despite their military strength, the
Soviet social imperialists are not irresistible. When a small nation
is invaded, its people can mobilize all patriotic forces and adopt
military tactics which conform with the specific conditions of their
own nation to deal with even such a military superpower like the
Soviet Union. This is an encouragement to all countries which are
being occupied, controlled, suppressed and threatened by the Soviet
Union. . .
15. XINHUA, 15 January 1981; DR/PRC 16 January 1981, L 10-11.
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16. Some of China's current leaderscan certainly be considered innovative,
among them, Deng Xiaoping, who seems quite willing to tinker with political and
social institutions. Nevertheless, for every innovater, there is an army of
recalcitrant bureaucrats ready to wear down any new policy, at least if Chinese
press comment can be believed. Much of the problem is related to what theorists
of political socialization have termed "manifest" and "latent"socialization.
The "manifest" aspects of socialization consisting of numerous speeches, articles,
and policy documents calling for modernization are very prominent. The "latent"
aspects consisting of the organizational structure of the professional military
education system, careerism, promotions and other aspects of "how the system really
works" are not as easily seen, yet have a very real impact on how military
professionals conceive of the military role, and their own role in the military.
17. For example see Chalmers Johnson, "The Failure of Socialism in
China," Issues and Studies (July 1979), pp. 22-33; see especially pp. 28-31.
In the summer of 1980 a -series of articles on the "westernization" movement at
the end of the Qing dynasty appeared in the Chinese press. The allegorical
debate had obvious significance for present issues. Some of the more notable
are Qiao Huantian "Brief Account of the Discussions on Certain Questions Regarding
the Westernization Movement" RENMIN RIBAO (taken from BEIFANG LUNCONG), 14 July
1980; DR/PRC, 30 July, L 19-22; also Qiao's article "A Brief Discussion on How
the Westernization Group Arranged for the Building of Coastal Defenses," GUANGMING
RIBAO, 29 July 1980; DR/PRC 12 August 1980, L 13-15. Qiao generally makes a
positive assessment of the "westernization" movement.
18. See the speech by PLA Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi to the graduating
class of the PLA Military Academy on 23 January 1981. Among other points Yang
made the following:
. . . Every comrade must subordinate himself to the needs of the
revolutionary cause, bring into full play the spirit of waging arduous
struggles, practice strict economy, combat waste, build the army and
run all undertakings with diligence and thrift.
According to the XINHUA account of the speech, Yang "particularly stressed
the importance of strengthening political-ideological work under the new circumstances';
and asked the students to conscientiously carry out the line and policies laid down
by the 3rd plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee. XINHUA 23 January 1981;
DR/PRC, 27 January 1981, L 9.
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