INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS, 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00003R000300010003-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 23, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

S 8808
more trouble, why do we not stop it
there?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, as a
practical matter, I do not think we will
have a quorum here beyond Wednesday.
Mr. BAKER. I promised the distin-
guished managers of this bill that, so far
as I am concerned, I will do my dead
level best to move this matter along, be-
cause I recognize the absolute necessity
to finish it as soon as possible. I com-
mend both of them for the good job they
have done In bringing this matter to the
Senate floor. I hope we can finish it next
week. -
Mr. STENNIS. That is my point--if we
can finish this matter by Wednesday.
Otherwise, there is no practical remedy.
As I see. it, we will not have a quorum.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I do not think
there will be question about having a
quorum through Wednesday.
As the distinguished minority leader
has pointed out, Senators do have air-
line schedules to meet, and they have
made their arrangements.
However, if the supplemental keeps
the Senate around until the following
week, we will stay on this measure until
the supplemental is passed.
I hope that by having lengthy sessions
on Monday and Tuesday-and Wednes-
day, if necessary-we can complete ac-
tion on this bill. If we will all .try hard
to get time agreements on amendments
as they come up, or on the overall bill, if
possible, it will help.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, beyond
time agreements, if I might inquire of
the distinguished majority leader, will
he do everything he can to convince Sen-
ators who have amendments that they
should bring them up at the earliest op-
portunity? I do not want to be put in the
position of handling a major procure.
ment bill and have that bill put over
until after the recess just because it was
not convenient for someone to bring up
an amendment he wanted to bring up
that might not even be of major propor-
tion.
Mr. STENNIS. That Is correct.
Mr. TOWER. It might not even be of
major proportion but something of inter-
est to him and think that he can delay
the final consideration of the bill to suit
his own convenience.
I hope that notice could be served that
Senators who have amendments to this
bill will present them during the early
hours of its consideration with the
strong suggestion that if we reach late
Wednesday afternoon and Senators are
not forthcoming with amendments we
will go to third reading.
I recognize that we cannot arbitrarily
foreclose Senators but neither can we
permit Senators to filibuster a bill sim-
ply by prevailing on the good nature of
the leadership of the chairman or the
ranking minority member to postpone
consideration of an amendment.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The Senator is
correct. I want to do everything I can
possibly do to encourage Senators to do
that.
Mr. BAKER. As will I, Mr. President.
Mr. STENNIS, I believe we are on the
same track. If we let one Member go off
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE I June 28, 1980
and hold up everything until he gets ba.c .M"s,>ROBERT C. BYRD. Pile them, yes,
I will leave myself.
Mr. ROBErtT C. BYRD. We will just
have third reading. We cannot hold up
this bill until after the July break just
because a Member has an amendment
and is not around to call it up.
Mr. STENNIS. We are on the same
track. -
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I con-
gratulate both the Senator from Texas
and the Senator from Mississippi for
their concern about this measure. I
pledge to both of them that in concert
with the majority leader I will do my
deadlevel best to encourage Members to
offer their amendments, and Members
on this side are on notice as of now that
it will be an urgent request for them
to do so, to offer their amendment's at
the earliest possible moment.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank both Senators
very much.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank Mr.
STENNi3 and Mr. TOWER. And action will
be taken on this side also to notify Mem-
bers to be ready to call up their amend-
ments.
Also I wish for my cloakroom deter-
mine on Monday, and I suggest that
the minority cloakroom also determine
as early as possible who has amend-
ments and the nature of the amend-
ments and how much time Senators who
expect to call up those amendments
would want on the amendment.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I think
that Is a good suggestion. I will ask our
cloakroom personnel to compile an in-
ventory of amendments on this side.and
if the majority leader is agreeable may-
be-we could get together midday or early
afternoon and explore the possibility of
time agreements and a schedule of ac-
tivities so that we can publish that to
our colleagues as soon as possible.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. That is very
agreeable.
Mr. STENNIS. These amendments
could be filed tonight or any time. I am
not going to speak. The Senator from
Texas is not going to speak. We can file
amendments now. ? -
. Mr. TOWER. I just want to associate
myself with what ? my distinguished
chairman said earlier about this bill and
what has been done with it. I, like he,
would withhold my opening statement
until Monday.
I commend him on putting together
one of the best military procurement
bills we have seen around here, I think
in some time, and one that I think is
of sufficient urgency that we should act
on it with dispatch and that we should
bring it to final passage virtually un-
scathed.
We are always willing to consider con-
structive amendments. This is simply an
important bill.
Mr. STE1 NIS. I thank the Senator
from.Texas..He certainly had a big part
putting this bill together.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield a minute?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I do not suggest that Members lay down
amendments tonight.
Mr. STENNIS. File them.
but I not suggest any Member call up an
amendment tonight because there are
Members around who have amendments
and I would not---
Mr. TOWER. I do not think there is
expectation of either of us that they be
called up.
Mr. STENNIS. No.
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS,
1981
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President.
I ask unanimous consent that the pend-
ing measure be temporarily laid aside
for not to exceed 15 minutes and that
the Senate proceed to the consideration
of Calendar Order No. 920. -
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object, and I shall not, the
purpose of the reservation is to advise
the majority leader that this bill, which
is the intelligence authorization bill, is
cleared for passage on this side with the
understanding that there is one amend-
ment and that we are prepared at this
time to waive the 3-day rule and proceed
to its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The bill will be stated by title.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2597) to authorize appropria-
tions for fiscal year 1981 for intelligence ac-
tivities of the United States Government,
the Intelligence- Community Staff, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System, and for other purposes.
The Senate proceeded to consider the
.bill, which had been reported from the
Committee on Armed Services with
amendments.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask that
the committee amendments be consid-
ered and agreed to en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the committee amendments
are considered and agreed to en bloc and
considered as original text.
The committee amendments agreed to
en bloc are as follows:
On page 6, line 17, after "404." Insert "(a)"On page 8, beginning with line. 17, insert
the following:
(b) the amendment made by subsection
(a) shall become effective October 1, 1980.
On page 10, beginning with line 23, insert
the following:
SEC. 407. (a) Part III of subtitle A of title
10, United States Code, Is amended by add-
ing at the end thereof the following new
chapter:
"Chapter 107.-GRANTINQ OF ADVANCED
DEGREES AT DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE SCHOOLS
"Sec.
"2151. Defense Intelligence School: degree.
"# 2151. Defense Intelligence School: degree
"Under regulations prescribed by the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Commandant of the
Defcnse Intelligence School may, upon rec-
ommendation by the faculty of such school,
confer the degree of master of science of
strategic intelligence upon graduates of the
school who have fulfilled the requirements
for that degree.".
(b) The table of chapters at the beginning
of subtitle A and of part III of subtitle A of
such title are each amended by adding at the
end thereof the following:
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June 28, 1980 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
"107. Granting of Advanced Degrees
at Department of Defense
Schools ------------------- 2151.".
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I have the
privilege and honor again this year of
presenting legislation to authorize appro-
priations for U.S. intelligence activities.
Annual authorization for intelligence is
now established practice, and represents
clear evidence that our constitutional
responsibities can be fulfilled in this very
sensitive area, while at the same time
maintaining the confidentiality neces-
sary for an effective intelligence system.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for
fiscal year 1981 authorizes appropriations
for those programs and activities of the
U.S. Government which serve the Intel-
ligence needs of our national policymak-
ers. This includes the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the national intelligence ac-
tivities of the Departments of Defense,
State, Treasury, and Energy, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration.
The committee regards the budget au-
thorization process as a key aspect of
effective. congressional oversight of U.S.
intelligence activities. Thus, again this
year, the Budget Authorization Subcom-
mittee conducted a detailed examination
of the budget request, which carefully
weighed foreign and defense policy needs
against the substantive contribution and
resource requirements of each of the
major intelligence programs. During the
course of this review the subcommittee
conducted some 25 hours. of hearings
which included testimony by the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, key Depart-
ment of Defense officials, and each of the
principal program managers.
The decade of the 1980's will place a
greater burden than ever on the intelli-
gence community to provide timely, rele-
vant, and unambiguous information to
U.S. policymakers. Recent events in the
Near East, Africa, Southwest Asia, and
Latin America provide clear evidence
that events in these and other areas of
the Third World are of growing and
strategic importance to the United
States. Expanding global issues of stra-
tegic significance, such as energy, nu-
clear proliferation, and International
terrorism will also place increasing de-
mands on the intelligence system.
At the same time, there is no indica
tion of any lessening of the need to
maintain a strong intelligence commit-
ment against our principal adversaries.
If anything, competition between the
United States and its adversaries is likely
to grow during the 1980's which will
require an even greater commitment of
intelligence resources to adequately
cover the military, political, and eco-
nomic aspects of this challenge.
In the near term, some shifting of
focus will be required by the intelligence
community in order to be responsive to
the policymakers' diversity of interests.
Over the longer term, however, a robust-
ness in collection and analytic capabili-
ties must be established if the U.S. in-
telligence system is to continue to be
responsive to the broad range of policy
issues with which it will be faced.
Complicating the challenges in the
period ahead are the continually chang-
ing trends In the- target environment
with which the Intelligence system must
keep pace. This will require moderniza-
tion of selected collection and processing
systems that are rapidly becoming obso-
lete or inefficient.
We must also insure a healthy mix of
intelligence capabilities and sufficient re-
dundancy to guard against over-reliance
on individual systems that are easily
compromised, or may be lost unexpect-
edly. -There are also serious shortages of
foreign area specialists and linguists in
the workforce, which must be redressed
to adequately cope with future analy-
tic needs.
During the past decade intelligence
experienced a decline in real dollar
terms, and a substantial retrenchment
in manpower. Most of the major col-
lection systems in being today are
founded on late 1960's technology, and
were placed in operation in the early
1970's. In large measure, the intelligence
system has been sustaining itself from
past capital investments. Manpower has
been stretched extremely thin during
this period, and important data bases
have been allowed to erode. The com-
mittee is recommending major invest-
ments over the next 5 years to insure the
availability of a new generation of sys-
tems that will enable the intelligence
community to cope with policymakers'
needs well into the 1990's. Added invest-
ments have also been recommended to
increase manpower and expand automa-
tion techniques to aid in improving
analytic capabilities throughout the
community. These investments are con-
sidered essential to adequately respond
to policymakers' needs in the coming
years.
Because of the sensitivity of our in-
telligence operations, and the potential
for compromise by our adversaries, I
cannot discuss in open session the de-
tails of the committee's recommenda-
tions. These have been set forth in a
classified committee report which has
been made available to any Member
under the provisions of Senate ResoIu-
In conclusion, Mr. President, the
American people can be assured that the
intelligence community's fiscal year 1981
budget request has been examined just as
scrupulously as any other Government
program. We are convinced that the
budget authority recommended in this
bill represents a reasonable balance be-
tween needed intelligence capabilities
and cost, and that it forms a sound basis
to enable intelligence to meet the-chal-
lenges of the future.
UP AMENDMENT NO. 1361
(Purpose: To strengthen the system of con-
gressional oversight of intelligence activi-
ties of the United States)
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, I
send to the desk an unprinted amend-
ment and ask for its immediate consid-
eration.
S 8809
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLE-
sToN) proposes an unprinted amendment
numbered 1361.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be.dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of the bill insert the fol-
lowing:
SEC. A new section. 407, is added to
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1981
"SEC. 407. Presidential Findings and Con-
gressional Oversight for Intelligence. Activi-
ties.-(a) No funds appropriated under the
authority of this or any other Act may be
expended by or on behalf of the Central In-
telligence Agency for operations in foreign
countries, other than activities intended
solely for obtaining necessary intelligence,
unless and until the President finds that
each such operation is important to the na-
tional security of the United States. Each
such operation shall be considered a signifi-
cant anticipated intelligence activity for the
purposes of subsections (b) through (e)
of this section.
"(b) To the extent consistent with all
applicable authorities and duties, including
those conferred by the Constitution upon
the executive and legislative branches of the
Government. and to the extent consistent
with due regard for the protection front
unauthorized disclosure of classified in-
formation and information relating to in
telligence sources and methods, the Director
of Central Intelligence and the heads of all
departments, agencies, and other entities
of the United States involved in intelligence
activities shall-
"(1) keep the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence of the Senate and the Permanent Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives (hereinafter in this sec-
tion referred to as the 'Select Committees')
fully and currently informed of all intelli-
gence activities which are the responsibility
of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for
or on behalf of, any department, agency, or
entity of the United States, including any
significant anticipated intelligence activity,
except that (A) the foregoing provision shall
not require approval of the Select Commit-
tees as a condition precedent to the initia-
tion of any such anticipated intelligence ac-
tivity, and (B) if the President determines it
is essential to limit prior notice to meet ex-
traordinary circumstances affecting vital in-
terests of the United States, such notice shall
be limited to the chairman and ranking mi-
nority members of the Select Committees, the
Speaker and minority leader of the House of
Representatives, and the majority and mi-
nority leaders of the Senate;
"(2) furnish any information or material
concerning intelligence activities which is
in the possession, custody, or control of any
department, agecy, or entity of the United
States and which is requested by either of
the Select Committee in order to carry out
its authorized responsibilities; and
"(3) report in a timely fashion to the
Select Committee any illegal intelligence ac-
tivity or significant intelligence failure and
any corrective action that has been taken or
is planned to be taken in connection with
such illegal activity or failure.
"(c) The President shall fully inform the
Select Committees in a timely fashion of
intelligence operations in foreign countries
other than activities intended solely for ob-
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S 8810 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE June 28, 1980
taining necessary intelligence, for which
prior notice was not given under subsection
(b) and shall provide a statement of the
reasons for not giving prior notice.
"(d) The President and the Select Com-
mittees shall each establish such procedures
as may be necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of subsections (b) and (c).
"(e) The House of Representatives and the
Senate. In consultation with the Director of
Central Intelligence, shall each establish by.
rule or resolution of such House, procedures
to protect from unauthorized disclosure all.
classified information and all -Information
relating to intelligence sources and methods
furnished to the Select Committees or to
Members of the Congress under this section.
In accordance with such procedures, each of
the Select Committees shall promptly call
to the attention of its respective House, or
to any appropriate committee or committees
of its respective House, any matter relating
to intelligence activities requiring the at-
tention of such House or such committee or
committees.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President,
this amendment is identical to Senate
bill 2284 which the Senate passed by a
vote of 89 to 1 on June 3 of this year. It
is a bill that establishes the congression-
al oversight procedures dealing with our
intelligence agencies and relieves the in-
telligence agencies of some of its report-
ing requirements under the so-called
Hughes-Ryan amendment.
The reason for putting it on this par-
ticular bill is that given the kind of leg-
islative year that we all know we have
this year this provides a further backup
and assuring that the bill will receive
consideration in the House of Repre-
sentatives and will have an opportunity
to go to conference dnd insure final
passage.
For that reason and because the bill
is identical and to make sure that all of
the understandings that prevailed when
the bill originally passed will be Includ-
ed in this amendment, I also submit for
the RECORD and ask unanimous consent
to have printed in the RECORD the floor
statements and colloquys that were held
during the original discussions of S. 2284
to make sure that all points are clari-
fied in the legislative history of this
particular act.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Mr. JAvrrs. Mr. President, we have heard
from many Members on this issue which is
designed to resolve a difficult situation for
all of us.
I have been here in executive sessions,
closed door sessions, when the ad hoc Com-
mittee on .Intelligence was chaired by Sen-
ator CHuacH, now chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, of which I am the
ranking member, and have shared with my
colleagues some of the grief in the prema-
ture disclosures of highly secret and sensitive
information.
We have all labored over how to deal with
these problems, which are in the so-called
gray or twilight zone of the Constitution,
to wit, there is nothing in the Constitution
that says that the. President has exclusive
possession of intelligence information and
there is nothing in the Constitution that
says we have.
There is nothing in the Constitution-that
says he can classify It, or that says we cannot
obtain it if he does.
So I, first, have a keen appreciation of the
labor which has gone into developing this
particular measure which must still be con-
sidered interim, because the so-called intel-
ligence charter just turned out to have too
many problems to be done with relative cel-
erity, and yet it was necessary to crystallize
in some way the practice of the oversight
committees.
I agree thoroughly with the need for sim-
plifying that practice. There are some seven
committees here that could have had this
wrestling match' with the executive-and
that have had it on many occasions. There
are still plenty of open questions on which
we do wrestle, like executive privilege and
similar matters, with the President.
I have, with the immensely gratifying sup-
port of the Senate and the House, been priv-
ileged to be the author of the war powers
resolution, which dealt with so awesome a
matter as war, and the modern way in which
we are likely to get into war, as shown by our
experience since World War II in dealing
with that particular twilight zone problem.
I think we owe a deep debt of gratitude to
the members of our Intelligence Committee.
Indeed, first, to the leadership for having
simplified in Senate Resolution 400 the prac-
tices which were rather uncontrolled in this
Chamber and in the Senate at large; and,
second, for having developed the committee
system which. they have, and now for the
committee having at least taken the
first step toward a resolution of these great
problems.
My problem arose, also, out of one of those
gray areas because today foreign policy is
composed of military policy, which is in the
hands of the Armed Services Committee, of
economic policy, which is heavily in the
hands of the Finance Committee and the
Banking Committee, and it is also intelli-
gence policy for which we now have a select
committee.
To assume that the President Is going to
decide what we should know and not know
makes it very difficult for the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee to be in at the "takeoffs" as
well as the "landings," which was Arthur
Vander_berg's famous expression for charac-
terizing a bipartisan and, unified foreign
policy.
If we are going to wait for the President to
tell us. and if, when we ask, we face a blank
wall-even if it is only the blank wall of an-
other committee-the foreign policy of the
country will hardly be subject to any great
ministrations from the Foreign Relations
Committee.
So, earlier today, we had a most interesting
discussion with the chairman. Senator BAYH,
and the chairman of the relevant subcom-
mittee, Senator HUDDLEsTON, on this subject.
I was rather disappointed-although it was
the fault of no one, as it turned out-that
the ranking minority member, Senator GOLD-
WATER, who has such rich and ripe experi-
ence in this field, was not with us this morn-
ing. He had other responsibilities of his own
at the time. But I hope that by now-and I
say this to my friend and colleague-he may
have had an opportunity to be apprised of
what has occurred; and I hope he may find it
possible to concur with the solutions at
which we arrived, which will be disclosed
shortly in an agreed-upon colloquy which I
hope to have with whoever on the part of the
committee-I suppose it will be-Senator
? HrDDLESTON-has been properly empowered
in that regard.
Before going into the colloquy, may I say,
Mr. President, that one of the great joys in
this Chamber is the personal friendships one
develops. Notwithstanding how men may
think differently, they build up by experience
a mutual respect and often a mutual trust
which is found among those of the most di-
verse views. It is an enormous satisfaction to
me that I believe I enjoy such a relationship
with the distinguished Senator from Arizona,
a former candidate, of my party, for
President.
The second Is that sometimes you can sit
down, notwithstanding the politics and our
own deeply held views, and have open and
frank discussion of our mutual disquiets and
have the inestimable privilege of ending it by
both parties saying. "I am persuaded."
That Is what this colloquy means.
I believe that the Senators who represented
the intelligence Committee persuaded 'us
that their design was to accommodate fully
our responsibilities In the Foreign Relations
Committee. I believe, from the evidence
which I will present shortly, that we per-
suaded them that, under the circumstances
of the measure which is before the Senate,
plus the way in which the measure was inter-
preted in the committee report, we had rea-
son to be disquieted; because the one thing
we did not wish to do, and which we then
learned-and it was a matter of great satis-
faction-that they did not wish to do, was
to resolve any substantive constitutional
question.
There are some things you cannot resolve.
They will continue to be a wrestling match.
We have a very vivid example of that in the
fact that the President kept to himself the
military operation in Iran, and historians
will have a great time with that' one, not-
withstanding the war powers resolution, not-
withstanding whatever the Intelligence
Committee had a right to expect in disclo-
sures of covert operations or intelligence
gathering or whatever it was that was being
done in Iran.
So we did not try to do that. What we have
tried to do is to perfect-so that we, too,
might be able to do our job-the methodol-
ogy by which they do their work sad we do
ours. -
I am satisfied, and I believe our whole
committee is satisfied, that the method we
now have chosen, which will be evident from
this colloquy, represents a fair, effective,
and objective way In which to accomplish
the results of simplifying the intelligence
relations between the President and Con-
gress-the Senate in this case-and limit-
ing further the opportunities for misad-
venture. premature disclosure, and so forth.
It will' not eliminate them; we know that.
But I believe it will limit them further, and
we will have to go beyond that and beyond
that, considering the sensitivity of what goes
on in the world, yet leaving unresolved the
fundamental struggle which politically must
go on, whatever its ups and downs may be.
I should like to join those colleagues who
addressed themselves to this matter, in the
hope that we always may be able to settle
these affairs ourselves. I believe deeply in
the division of powers among the different
branches, and I hope very much that less
and less will it be necessary for the courts
to be our arbiter.
So I welcome this particular resolution of
this matter as another stone in that arch;
and I hope we always have that profoundly
in mind.
With that before us, Mr. President, I
should like to engage the manager of the
bill in this colloquy.
Mr. President, I am grateful for the op-
portunity to have an exchange of views and
assurances with my colleagues from the In-
telligence Committee on several Issues raised
by S. 2284, the Intelligence Oversight Act of
1980, and its accompanying report language.
In this regard, I direct the Senate's atten-
tion to the preambular language of section
501(a) on lines 12-18 of page 173 of the bill,
which conditions the obligations in the re-
mainder of the bill as applying only,
"To the extent consistent with all appli-
cable authorities and duties, including those
conferred by the Constitution upon the exec-
utive and legislative branches of the Gov-
ernment, and to the extent consistent with
due regard for the protection from unau-
thorized disclosure of classified information
and information relating to intelligence
sources and methods:'
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June 28, 1980
SENATE
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
I then direct the attention of the Senate
to the language on page 4 of the Intelligence
Committee report interpreting this portion
of the legislation, as follows:
"In general terms; subsection (a) requires
the Director of Central Intelligence and the
head of each agency Involved in intelligence
activities to provide information to the two
oversight committees. These obligations,
however, are conditioned by two separate
limitations. The obligations apply: (1) to,
the extent consistent with all applicable
authorities and duties, including those con-
ferred by the Constitution upon the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the Govern-
ment; and. (2) to the extent consistent with
due regard for the protection from unau-
thorized disclosure of classified information
and information relating to Intelligence
sources and methods. Consistent with these
conditions, the two oversight committees are
to be kept fully and currently informed of
intelligence activities, including any signifi-
cant anticipated intelligence activity." .
I should like to confirm the following un
.derstandings with the leadership of the
Intelligence Committee which, to the extent
that it might be inconsistent with the lan-
guage of the report, would supersede such
language.
The first preambular clause-which reads
"(t)o the extent consistent with all appli-
cable authorities and duties, including those
conferred by the Constitution upon the exec-
utive and legislative branches of the Govern-
ment,"-is simply a routine disclaimer that
the bill does not purport to change what-
ever authorities and duties may exist under
the Constitution.
A similar disclaimer appeared in section
8d(1) of the war powers resolution. Its pur-
pose is to state an important but accepted
fact: That Congress does not have the power
to change the Constitution by statute. How-
ever, this language should not be interpreted
as meaning that Congress is herein recogniz-
ing a constitutional basis for the President
to withhold information from Congress. We
have never accepted that he does have that
power, he has never conceded that he does
not under certain circumstances, and the
courts have never definitively resolved the
matter.
But we are leaving that dispute for an-
other day, specifically reserving both of our
positions on this issue, and nothing in this
statute should be interpreted as a change in
that situation. What we are doing Is simply
legislating under the necessary and proper
clause of article I a new arrangement or
modus vivendi for the handling of informa-
tion and consultations between Congress and
the intelligence agencies., with both sides
reserving their positions on the consitutional
Issues.
Is that the correct understanding of the
meaning and intent of this language? I yield
to Senator Huddleston.
Air. HUDDLESTON. Yes, As the Senator from
New York has stated the correct interpreta-
tion and meaning-
Mr. JAVITS. With respect to the second so-
called limitation contained in the pre-
amble to S. 2284, which reads "to the extent
consistent with due regard for the protec-
tion from unauthorized disclosure of classi-
fied information and information relating
to intelligence sources and methods." this
standard simply states an obligation that
applies equally to. both branches, not uni-
quely or in a superceding manner to the ex-
ecutive branch, despite the fact that the
subject of that sentence is specifically the
"Director of Central Intelligence and the
heads of all departments, agencies, and other
entities of the United States involved in in-
telligence activities." That standard refers,.
inter alia, to the need for adequate general
procedures for. the protection of such in-
formation in the course of sharing it between
the executive branch and Congress, as called
for in section 501(c) and (d).
The President and the executive branch
are not the superior judge of "due regard"
for the protection of sensitive information.
The congressional subpena power is not af-
fected by this preambular clause. Where a
subpena is not employed, the statute does
not compel the committees to accept ex-
ecutive branch determinations as to whether
due regard has been afforded. This new
statutory authority to afford "due regard"
is imposed equally upon the executive and
legislative branches.
The legislative branch is not bound by
the definition of "due regard"' adopted by
the executive branch. Information provided
to the committee by the executive may be
provided by the committee- to other com-
mittees subject only to the rules of the Sen-
ate to protect sources and methods.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. These understandings
are correct.
Mr. JAvrrs. i thank my colleague.
In addition to these two matters with re-
spect to the preamble of section 501(x),' I
would like to confirm several other under-
standings as to the intent of the bill. Sec-
tion 501(c) appears to provide for the estab-
lishment of three separate and distinct sets
of procedures for "protecting against the un-
authorized disclosure of classified Informa-
tion"-that is, one set which the President
establishes unilaterally and one set each by
the Senate and House Select Committees.
Moreover, section 501(d) appears to pro-
vide for the establishment of two additional
and possibly distinct, sets of procedures, one
by the full Senate and one by the full House.
In addition, these rules which bind the
full Senate and House have to be drawn
in consultation with the Director of the
Central Intelligence, whereas there is no
reciprocal role for the Congress in the uni-
lateral right of the President to set proce-
dures for the executive branch (which none-
theless govern what can be disclosed in the
first place.)
Does the consultative role of the Director
of Central Intelligence in the framing of
Senate and House procedures give a veto to
the executive over Information that can be
passed on to the full Senate and to other
committees, and does it give the DCI any
role In determining what information irr
the select committee's' possession may "re-
quire the attention of" the full Senate or
another committee, such as the Foreign
Relations Committee?
Mr. HUDDLESTON. The? President has no
statutory authority under sections 501(c)
and (d) or any other reference to proce-
dures to withhold Information on the
grounds that the procedures of the commit-
tees or the Houses are not satisfactory to
the President or to the Director of Central
Intelligence.
The Congress Is required by statute to
consult fully and in detail with the-Director
of Central Intelligence. This is a mandate
to the Congress, and does not imply that
agreement between the Congress and the
executive branch Is required. For example,
such anagreement Is not required for the
procedures governing the final sentence of.
subsection (d).
Mr. JAvxrs. My' next question-
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, if I could
Interrupt my friend, will the Senator yield?
Mr. JAvxrs. I yield.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I am attracted to the
statement on the Senator's page 6.
On page 6 when the Senator states "pro-
tecting against the unauthorized disclosure
of classified information." we are having, as
the Senator knows, problems with. this be-
cause we feel, without any real deep Investi-
gation, but we have reason to believe that
disclosure Is coming more from the execu-
tive branch: than any other side. My ques-
S 8811
tion concerns the responsibility of correc-
tion in this, and I think we have a great
gap In here as to what constitutes correc-
tion when sensitive information Is released
by Members of Congress, the committee,
agencies, or the administration. This is what
troubles us. -
Mr. JAVTTS. Mr. President, If I may reply,
the very purpose of this particular question
and answer was to say that we are, each of
us, in terms of rules and regulations, bound
only by what we do, each of us. according to
our processes and in terms of general law..
Then the law will control each or any of us.
The reason' for this point is that there is
introduced here a consultative role for the
Director of Central Intelligence that does
not mean anything substantive in terms of
what we decide we want to do to protect un-
authorized disclosure, acting as the Senate
or as the House..
I think that is quite consistent with the
point the Senator just made.
Mr. GOLDWATER...I realize that, and the
point of my question was not to raise any
prolonged discussion here but to indicate
that I feel there is a definite need in this
field for substantive and understood legisla-
tion.
Mr. JAvrrs. I thank my colleague and 1.
agree.
Mr. Tso eGAs addressed the Chair..
Mr. JAVrrs. May I go on?
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Yes.
Mr. JAvrrs. Mr. President, my next ques-
tion relates to section 501(b) :
Does information reported to the eight-
man leadership group under section 501 (a)
(1) (B) have to be reported to the select
committee under 501(b)? Is there anything
to prohibit the passing on of information
given to the leadership group under 501 (a)
(1) (B) to the full Senate or, to the Foreign
Relations Committee? If information has
been .withheld from both the select com-
mittee and the leadership group (as section
501(b) envisages), can It be withheld on
any grounds other than "independent con-
stitutional -authority," and, If so, what
grounds? If prior notice has been withheld
on grounds of "Independent constitu-
tional authority" on what basis can the
President be' compelled to report It. subse-
quently under section 501(b)?
Mr. HUDDLESTON. In the case of prior
notice to the eight leaders under section 501
(a) (1) (B),. the intent is that the full over-
sight committees will be fully Informed-at
such time as the eight leaders determine Is
appropriate.' The committee will establish
the procedures for the discharge of this re-
sponsibility under section 501(c)-
Section 501(b)- recognizes that the Presi-
dent may assert constitutional authority to
withhold prior notice of covert operation,
but would not be able to claim the identical
authority to withhold timely notice under
pection 501(b)_ A claim of constitutional
authority is the sole grounds that may be.as-
serted for withholding prior notice of a
covert operation. However, as stated in the,
report, highly senstitive aspects of an op-
eration, such as the identity of an agent.
may be withheld prior to implementation of
such an operation. -
Mr. JAvrrs. My last question will be as-
follows:.
It is my understanding that several
changes will be made. In the language- of the
report to clarify matters agreed. to by the
Intelligence Committee. First, on page 6 of
the report In the sixth paragraph, the words
"or classified information from unauthoried
disclosure" shall be deleted. Second, the last.
sentence In that paragraph shall read: "This
statute does not provide a statutory right to
withhold information from Congress- when
subpenaed by Congress."
Finally, on page 12, the fourt1v full para-
graph shall read:. "The provisions of sub-
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP85-00003R000300010003-7
S 8812 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
section (b) are expressly not conditioned
upon the preambular clauses that apply to
subsection (a)."
Mr. HIIDDLESTON. The Senator is correct.'
I will just say at this point that, speaking
for the committee, we appreciate the inter-
est the Senator has manifested in this legis-
Istion and the suggestions he has made and
his help in working out these changes and
these understandings.
So. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent
that these changes just indicated by the
Senator from New York be made in a star
print of report No. 98-730 on S. 2284.
I also want to state. for the record that
these answers have been reviewed with the
administration, represented by Mr. Lloyd
Cutler, Counsel to the President; Mr. Mn
Silver, General Counsel of the CIA; and Mr.
Frederick Hitz, Legislative Counsel of the
CIA. and that the administration agrees
with each one and with the changes in the
report.
Mr. JAvrrs. Mr. President, r thank my col-
league, and I wish to express to him again
and to Senator BATH and their staffs and to
Senator GOLDWATER my deep satisfaction in
having been able to work this matter out to
our general satisfaction.
The PaEsmrxo OFFICER. Is there -objection
to the star print? the Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered. It needs to be sent to the
desk.
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, will the Senator
yield?
Mr. JAvrrs. I yield to Senator Goldwater.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I want to merely compli.
ment my friend from New York for the usual
perceptive way he has gone into this.
You know, Senators sitting here listening
to this discussion, and knowing of your feel-
ings in these matters. I am going to repeat a
suggestion I have made to you, and I have
made to other Members of this body from
time to time, that maybe we should consider
the fact that the world, with its more rapid
movement, involving the United States more
and more, that the Senate might be wise to
consider the combination of pro forms con-
solidation of several committees, and I am
thinking of Foreign Relations which I cannot
believe can operate completely anymore
without access to intelligence, the Armed
Services Committee Which I cannot believe
can act In a full and proper way without
access to the formation of foreign policy,
and vice versa, and I would like to seriously
suggest once again, as I have done to the
leadership of this body on numerous occa-
sions, that possibly the time has come for
one group to consider all of these things or
at least three groups to act in a concen-
trated way when needed so that we can come
tip with answers faster than having to wait
months and months and months for a col-
loquy to take place on the floor.
Let me end by saying that I say also with
a certain knowledge that we are going to
have to solve these problems ourselves that
come up between the administrative branch
and the legislative branch. The courts have
adequately proven to me down through the
200 years of our history that they are never
going to take that ball. in their own court.
. I merely make these suggestions again'
on the floor of the Senate to my friend from
New York, together with my thanks for hav-
ing thought these important matters
through and to-cause this colloquy.
Mr. JAvrrs. I thank my colleague. I cer-
tainly will give, as I always do, the. most
prayerful consideration to his suggestion,
bearing in mind that we have already
launched an effort with Armed Services to at
long last see what military means it takes to
effectuate our foreign policy..
We all owe a debt of gratitude to Henry
Bellmon and John Glenn for having initiated
that inquiry.
I yield to Senator Bayh 1 minute.
Mr. BAYH. I appreciate the Senator's yield-
ing to me.
I would like to express my appreciation to
him for pointing out the delicacy of writing
legislation like this and for doing so In a
manner that does not send the wrong kind
of signals.
I hope this legislation can result in con-
tinuing the kind of relationship we have had
with the President. I do not need to get into
a long discussion, but I must say that I think
the President would have been better served
If there had not been one exception in his
ordinarily forthcoming policy.
Be that as it may, what we are after here
is to make sure that Congress, in the words
of the Senator from New York and our former
colleague, Senator Vandenberg, should be in
on the takeoff so that we can be in on a bet-
ter landing.
I appreciate the way in which he has
worked with us to ease. his misgivings, in his
spirit of cooperation to move this legislation'
forward, and we are in his debt.
Mr. JAvrrs, I thank my colleague for his
remarks and his friendship.
I yield to Senator Moynihan.
Mr. More IRAN. I thank- my revered col-
league for giving me this moment to express
my admiration and awe at the constitutional
mastery which he has brought to this com-
plex question, and the great mark of experi-
ence which Is the prudential judgment that
we were not going to resolve a constitutional
issue of 2 centuries of pendency, perhaps de-
liberately left unresolvable, but we were go-
ing to make clear what we were not .going
to do as well as what we were going to do.
and he does it with such mastery that it in-
spires my acknowledgement.
I would like to make one small observa-
tion, which is purely obiter. you might say,
with respect to the phenomenon of unau-
thorized disclosure.
I would share his judgment that there
can be no unauthorized disclosure by Con-
gress. We are equal branches. But there Is
a rule of intelligence, which the Senator
knows well from his wartime experience,
which is that you protect sensitive informs=
tion by compartmentation. The more im-
portant that matter is the fewer persons
you want to know about it, and with respect
to an executive branch judgment about what
can be shared with the Congress we could
usefully look at the fact that If only five per-
sons know it. something in the executive
branch, they might wish to disclose It to no
more than eight here. But it 105 do in the
executive branch, adding 15 does not sig-
nificantly widen that circle.
There are almost mathematical principles
upon which you can reach such judgments,
and they ought to be pursued.
I just offer that as a thought, but certainly
I want to say that this Is a better bill be-
cause of the Senator's finding, I mean with
all the other things you have to do. the
energy to do it.
Mr. JAMS. I thank my colleague very
much.
May I say, however, that we are a col-
legial body and, hence, the success which
the Senator has is properly entrusted to the
rulemaking which we now have to do under
this measure when it becomes law, both in
the House and in the Senate.
But that is the problem for us. We are,
all equal and we all have the right to know,
.and that is our duty. .
I thank my colleague very much for his
kind thoughts.
Mr. You=. Mr. President, I have a ques-
tion of the manager of the bill. In the past,
appropriations committees have had to hide
the appropriations for Intelligence agencies.
In order to do that, we have had to have in-
formation about what was being requested.
Are we excluded under this bill from know-
ing the Intended purpose of the money re-
quested and the kinds of operations the
June 28, 1980
various Intelligence agencies are conduct-
ing?
Mr. HUDDLESTON. No, not at all. As a matter
of fact, I think the appropriations process
now is much more extensive than it has
been In previous years.
The Select Committee on Intelligence is.
in effect, the authorizing committee and does
develop the appropriations In conjunction
with the Armed Services Committee and the
Appropriations Committee. The Senator, as
a member of the Appropriations Committee,
is to have access to all information that the
Committee on Intelligence has. As a matter
of fact, the Intelligence Committee has an
affirmative obligation to report to the Sen-
ator's committee information that is re-
quired by the Senator's committee. And the
Senator certainly has, as a member of the
Appropriations Committee, the prerogative
of requesting from. the committee any In-
formation that the Senator deems necessary.
Air. YOUNG. I thank the Senator for that
explanation. We in Appropriations do not
seek oversight, but we do have to know how
the money Is being spent.
Mr. NvNN. On the question of tactical
intelligence which I made reference to in my
remarks, I would like to address a couple
of questions to the Senator from Indiana,
who is very familiar with this subject, and
who, I might add, has been most cooperative
with the Armed Services Committee in iron-
ing out any difficulties that we have had. I
think, in the last 2 years to have a very
smooth working relationship in this area
where there necessarily is some overlap.
I note that the bill does not contain any
definition of "intelligence activities" over
which the bill gives the Intelligence Commit-
tee oversight.
Is It a correct understanding that this bill
is intended to be, in effect, a legislative em-
bodiment of Senate Resolution 400?
Mr. BAYH. That is accurate; the Senator
from Georgia puts his finger right on it. We
have been trying to Incorporate the defini-
tions and the actual means of implemen-
tation of Senate Resolution 400 into the
provisions of this bill.
Mr. NUNN. Is it the view -of the Senator
from Indiana that the definition of Intelli-
gence activities contained in Senate Resolu-
tion 400 is carried over Into this bill and that
the term has the same meaning in this bill
as it does In Senate Resolution 400?
Mr. BAYH. The Senator from Georgia is
accurate.
Mr. NUNN. In other words, there was no
intention on the part of the committee to
change the scope of that definition so as to
include within the meaning of intelligence
activities tactical military intelligence hav-
ing no policymaking function? .
Mr. BAYH. As far as this House goes, that
is accurate, I say to my friend from Georgia.
I would just like to respond to his thought-
ful remarks earlier, if I might, by saying that
I think we have shown that it is possible for
committees and their members to have com-
mon -and sometimes overlapping responsi-
bilities, even.differing views, and where those
responsibilities overlap to work out those
differences. It has been a privilege for our
committee and for the Senator from Indiana
to work with the Senator from Georgia, the
Senator from Mississippi, and other members
of the Armed Services Committee.
I have no question In my mind but we
can continue the same kind of cooperation,
based on the same practices that have existed
in the past, with the passage of this legisla-
tion. .
HISTORY OF THE BILL
S. 2284 was introduced on February 8.
1980. as the National Intelligence Act of
1980, by Senator Huddleston, chairman of
the Subcommittee on Charters and Guide-
lines of the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence. The bill was cosponsored by Senator
16: CIA-RDP85-00003R000300010003-7
 r e ease' 116: CIA-RDP85-00003R000300010003-7
June 28, 1980
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 8813
Mathias, vice-chairman of the Subcommittee
on Charters and Guidelines, and by Senator
Bayh and Senator Goldwater, chairman and
vice-chairman of the Select Committee. It
was introduced in the House as H.R. 6588
by Representative Boland. chairman of the
House Permanent Select Committee on In-'
teliigence.
Hearings on the bill began before the
Select Committee on Intelligence on Feb-
ruary 21, 1980. From the outset a principal
Issue was the provision for congressional
oversight of intelligence activities, Including
modification of the Hughes-Ryan Amend-
ment of 1974 requiring reports on CIA covert
operations to as many as eight committees
of the Congress. As Introduced, S. 2284 re-
pealed that requirement- and would have
substituted in its place a general provi-
sion requiring prior notice to the two in-
telligence oversight committees and full ac-
cess by those committees to information
all intelligence activities. The
concernin
g
Administration initially opposed this provi---- Intelligence and the head of each agency-in-
Sion. While strongly urging the repeal of the
Hughes-Ryan reporting requirement. Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner
testified that the Administration desired to
"continue the current reporting standard
under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment by re-
quiring that special activities (covert oper-
ations] be reported 'in a timely fashion."'
In addition to congressional oversight. S.
2284 as introduced would have provided a
comprehensive statutory charter for the in-
telligence community. The Select Commit-
tee had held 13 days of hearings in 1978 on
an earlier version of the charter, S. 2525, in-
troduced by Senator Huddleston and other
Committee members' in the 95th Congress.
During 1980 the Committee held an addi-
tional 9 days of hearings on S. 2284 covering
the full range of charter issues. However, at
meetings of the Committee held May 1, 6
and S. 1980, two weeks after the end of these
hearings, it was decided to locus on the con-
gressional oversight provision of S. 2264,
with other matters tube considered as sepa-
rate legislation.
During the proceding weeks, an amended
version of the congressional consultations
with the Administration. Additional lan-
guage providing for prior notice In ex-
traordinary circumstances to 8 committee
and congressional leaders (section 501(a) (1)
(B), proposed by Senator Inouye) and for
the reporting of significant intelligence
failures (section 501(a) (3), proposed by
'Senator Wallop with modifications by Sena-
tor Moynihan) was adopted by the Commit-
tee on May 6, 1980. S. 2284, as amended,
was approved unanimously by the Commit-
tee on May 8, 1980. as the Intelligence Over-
sight Act of 1980, with a recommendation for
favorable action.
With respect to comprehensive charter
legislation, the chairman of the Select Com-
mittee, Senator Bayh, stated at the May 6
meeting: "There is no question that such a
charter Is essential to place the intelligence
community on the firmest possible constitu-
tional foundation, and the Select Committee
is fully committed to carrying that enterprise'
-forward to completion.
POSITION OF TP.E ADMINISTRATION
The Administration fully supports S. 2284,
as reported by the Select Committee on In-
and from Executive Order 12036, January 26,
1978. The only present statutory provision for
intelligence oversight is the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment of 1974 (Section 662 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), which re-
quires timely reporting of CIA covert opera-
tions to as many as eight congressional com-
mittees. This requirement is repealed by Sec-
tion 2 of this Act, and such operations are
expressly included in the provisions of this
Act for "significant anticipated intelligence
activities."
Section 3 of this Act amends the National
Security Act of 1947 to add a new. Section
501, Congressional Oversight. Section 501
establishes statutory requirements for con-
gressional oversight of the activities of the
intelligence community and for the provision
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence and the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of information neces-
sary for this purpose. In general terms, sub-
section (a) requires the Director of Central
formation to the two oversight committees.
These obligations, however, are conditioned
by two separate limitations. The obligations
apply: (1) to the extent consistent with all
applicable authorities and duties, including
those conferred by the Constitution upon the
executive and legislative branches of the
Government; and (2) to the extent consis-
tent with due regard for the protection from
unauthorized disclosure of classified infor-
mation and information relating to intelli-
gence sources and methods. Consistent with
these conditions, the two oversight commit-
tees are to be kept fully and currently in-
formed of intelligence activities, including
any significant anticipated intelligence
activity.
The separate amendment to Section 662 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides
that each CIA covert operation Is included as
a "significant anticipated intelligence ac-
tivity" to be reported in advance to the two
Intelligence committees. This requirement of
prior notice of significant activities does not
require committee approval. as a condition
precedent to their initiation. Provision is
made for prior notice only to the chairman
and ranking-minority members of the com-
mittees, and to the leaders of each House,
if the President determines such limitation
Is essential to meet extraordinary circum-
stances affecting vital national interests.
Subject to the two conditions under subsec-
tion (a), each committee is also to be fur-
nished any information or material Concern-
ing intelligence activities which it requests
to carry out its authorized responsibilities
and to be informed in a timely fashion of
any Illegal intelligence activity or significant
intelligence failure and any creative action
that has been taken or is planned.
Subsection (b) requires timely notice to
the committees of Intelligence operations in
foreign countries, other than activities in-
tended solely for obtaining necessary intel-
ligence, for which prior notice was not given
under subsection (a), and a statement by
the President of the reasons for not giving
prior notice.
Subsection (c) provides for the establish-
ment of procedures by the President and by
each oversight committee to carry out the
'foregoing provisions. Subsection (d) recog-
telligence with amendments,, and the report "
ensure, by rule or resolution, the protection
th
e
n
itt
f th
S
l
t C
er
.
omm
ee
o
e
e
ec
o
GENERAL STATEMENT
The purpose of this Act is to place In
statute the oversight process that has been
in effect since 1976. It is based on the cumu-
lative experience of successive oversight
bodies since 1947, but primarily on the ex-
perience of the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence since 1976. The language derives from
Section 202 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,
from Senate Resolution 400, May 19, 1976,
from unauthorized disclosure of sensitive in-
formation furnished under this section, and
the responsibility of each oversight commit-
tee under such procedures to bring to the
attention of its respective House, or the ap-
propriate committees, any matter requiring
their attention.
Out of necessity, intelligence activities are
conducted primarily in secret. Because of
that necessary secrecy, they are not subject
to public scrutiny and debate as is the case
for most foreign policy and, defense issues.
Therefore, the Congress, through its intel-
ligence oversight committees, has especially
important duties in overseeing these vital _
activities by the Intelligence agencies of.
the United States. Section 501 Is intended
to authorize the process by which informa-
tion concerning intelligence activities of the
United States is to be shared by the two
branches in order to enable them to fulfill
their respective duties and obligations to
govern Intelligence activities within the
constitutional framework. The Executive
branch and the intelligence oversight com-
mittees have developed over the last four
years a practical relationship based on com-
ity and mutual understanding, without con-
frontation. The purpose of Section 501 is to
carry this working relationship forward into
statute.
SECTION-SY-SECTION ANALYSIS
AMENDMENT TO SECTION 662 OF THE FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961
"Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2422) is amended by strik-
ing out in subsection (a) "and reports, In n-a
timely fashion" and all that follows down
through the period In subsection (b) and
Inserting in lieu thereof a period and the
following: 'Each such operation shall be
considered a significant anticipated intel-
ligence activity for the purposes of section
501 of the National Security Act of 1947.1."
This amendment repeals the congressional
reporting requirement of the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment of 1974 which provides that no
funds may be expended for any CIA covert
operation unless and until the President "re-
ports, in a timely fashion, a description and
scope of such operation to the appropriate
committees of the Congress, Including the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the
United States'Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the United States House of
Representatives." This language Is replaced
by a requirement that each such operation
be considered a "significant anticipated in-
telligence activity" for the purposes of the
new Congressional Oversight provisions. The
effect is to limit reporting to the two intel-
ligence oversight committees, as compared
with the seven committees that now receive
such reports, and also to substitute for
"timely" reporting the procedures for prior
notice discussed below. These is no change in
the Hughes-Ryan requirements for Presiden-'
tial findings. The waiver which applies dur-
ing a period of operations initiated under
"an exercise of powers by the President under
tre War Powers Resolution" is repealed.
Section 501(a)-Preambular clause:
"Authorities and Duties"
"SEc. 501. (a) To the extent consistent
with all applicable authorities and duties,
including those conferred by the Constitu-
tion upon the executive and legislative
branches of the Government ..."
The first preambular clause is intended to
make it clear that the obligations imposed
by subsection (a) are to be carried out to the
exent consistent with all applicable authori-
ties and duties including those conferred by
the Constitution on both the Executive and
Legislative branches, There is a recognition
that such constitutional authorities and
duties of the branches may sometimes come
into conflict with one another. Subsection
(a) does not prescribe hard and fast require-
ments for what may be a gray area result-
ing from the overlap between the constitu-
tional authorities and duties of the branches.
There is no mention in the Constitution of-
intelligence activities. Whatever Constttu-
tional authorities may exist must follow from
other constitutionally conferred duties, such
as the power of the President to act as Com-
mander-In-Chief and to make treaties with,
the advice and consent of the Senate, or the
power of the Legislature to "provide for the
common defense," "to define and punish
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP85-00003R000300010003-7
S 8814 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE June 28, 1980,
piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas, and offenses against the law of nations,"
"to declare war.... and to make rules con-
cerning captures on land and water." "to
make rules for the government and regula-
tion of the land and naval forces," "to make
all.laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying Into execution . all other
powers vested by this Constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any
Department or officer thereof," and to insist
that "no money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in consequence of appropria-
tions made by law."
Nothing in this subsection is intended to,,
expand or to contract or to define whatever
may be the applicable authorities and duties,
including those conferred by the Constitu-'
tion upon the Executive and Legislative
branches.
Section 501 (a) -Preambular clause: "Protee-
-tion from unauthorized disclosure"
"SEC. 501. (a) ... and to the extent con-
sistent with due regard for the protection
from unauthorized disclosure of classified in-
formation and information relating to Intel-
ligence sources and methods.... ..
The clause in Section 501(a) concerning
the protection of classified information and
intelligence sources and methods from unau-
thorized disclosure is intended to recognize.
the shared responsibilities of the Executive
and Legislative branches for such protection.
The Administration recognizes that the in-
telligence oversight committees of the House
and Senate are authorized to receive such in-
formation. However, it is recognized that in
extremely rare circumstances a need to pre-
serve essential secrecy may result In. a deci-
sion not to impart certain sensitive aspects
of operations or collection programs to the
oversight committees in order to protect ex-
tremely sensitive intelligence sources and
methods. This statute does not provide
statutory right to withhold information from
Congress when subpoenaed by Congress.
Subsection (d), discussed below, provides
expressly for the ffuiflllment by each House
of its responsibilities for the protection of
sensitive information from unauthorized
disclosure.
Section 501(a) (1)-Informing the Intelli-
gence Committees
"SEC. 501. (a) .'the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence and the heads of all depart-
ments, agencies, and other entities of the
United States involved in intelligence activi-
ties shall-
(1) keep the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives (hereinafter in this
section referred to as the 'Select Commit-
tees') fully and currently informed of all in-
telligence activities which are the responsi-
bility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out
for or on behalf of, any department, agency,
of entity of the United States, including any
significant anticipated intelligence activity-,
except that (A) the foregoing provision shall
not require approval of the Select Cgmmit-
tees as a condition precedent to the initia-
tion of any such anticipated intelligence ac-
tivity, and (B) If the President determines it
is essential to list prior notice to meet ex-
traordinary circumstances affecting vital in-
terests of the United States. such notice shall
be limited to the chairmen and ranking mi-
nority members of the Select Committees, the
Speaker and minority leader of the House of
Representatives, and the majority and mi-
nority leaders of the Senate:
FVLLY AND CORAENTLY INFORMED
Under Section 501(a) (1), the intelligence
agencies shall have the affirmative duty to
keep the two intelligence committees fully
and currently Informed. The origin of the,
phrase "fully and currently informed" is the,
requirement contained in Section 202 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946.. For over thirty
years .this authority served the information
needs of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy well by assuring it complete and
timely notice of actions and policies of the
Federal government in the field of atomic
energy. The language is also contained in .
Senate Resolution.400, 94th Congress, and
has served the Select Committee well by en-
suring that the Committee Is Informed of in-
telligence activities in such detail-as the com-
mittee may require. The responsibility of the
Executive here is not limited to providing full
and complete Information upon request from
the committees; it also includes an affirma-
tive duty on the part of the head of each
entity to keep the committees fully and cur-
rently informed of all major policies, direc-
tives, and intelligence activities. The refer-
ences to "any" department, agency or entity
In subsection (a) impose obligations upon
officials to report only with respect to activi-
ties under their responsibility, subject to the
procedures established by the President un-
der subsection (c).
SIGNIFICANT ANTICIPATED INTELLIGENCE
- ACTIVITIES
Section 501(a) (1) specifically states that
the committees will be kept "fully and cur-
rently informed ... of significant anticipated
intelligence activities." Such activities in-
clude CIA covert operations and, among
other things, certain collection and counter-
intelligence activities. As was stated in the
legislative history of S. Res. 400, Report of
the Committee on Government Operations,
U.S. Senate, to Accompany S. Res. 400, 1976,
pages 26-27: - . ,
An anticipated activity should be con-
sidered significant if it has policy implca-
tions. This would include, for example, ac-
tivities which are particularly costly finan-
cially, as well as those which are not neces-
sarily costly, but which have ... [significant]
potential for affecting this country's diplo-
matic, political, or military relations with
other countries or groups . . .. It excludes
day-to-day implementation of previously
adopted policies or programs.
The Executive branch and the Committee
expect to work together, as we have in the
past, to delineate the matters covered by this
provision.
The Intent Is that the Committee will indi-
cate to the Executive branch those categories
of intelligence activities for which it expects
advance information, and that those cate-
gories will be discussed fully with the Execu-
tive branch. As -required by the separate
amendment to Hughes-Ryan, CIA operations
In a foreign country, other than activities
intended solely for obtaining necessary in-
telligence, are to be considered "significant
intelligence activities" for this purpose. It is
intended that such intelligence operations
abroad by other agencies would also be sub-
ject to the prior notice designation. In addi-
tion, certain intelligence collection and
counterintelligence activities may be in-
cluded if, for example, they are governed by
high-level Executive branch approval re-
quirements 'similar to those that apply to
CIA covert operations. Such collection activi-
ties are not, however, subject to the separate
provisions of subsection (b), discussed below.
for timely notice and a statement of the rea-
sons for withholding prior notice. Any col-
lection activity that has not been designated
by the Committee as "significant" or that is
not governed by the type of approval require-
ments applying to CIA covert operations
would, of course, be subject to the require-
ments to keep the Committee "fully and cur-
rently informed." Special procedures for
handling highly sensitive information in
these areas may also be established by each
committee under subsection (c).
Prior notification of intelligence activities
that affect foreign policy encourages consul-
tation between the.branches and offer,& the
possibility that better decisions might be
made. In testimony on February 21, 1980 be-
fore the Select Committee, Admiral Turner
stated that "the actions of both (intelll-
gencej committees in reviewing these covert
action findings (have) influenced the way in
which we have carried them out." He said
further that the influence had been "abso-
lutely" beneficial. Similarly, former Director
Colby said in testimony on March 24 that
discussion of significant planned activities
"enables the Executive to get a sense of con-
gressional reaction and avoid the rather
clamorous repudiation which has occurred
in certain cases . - , and I think that is a
helpful device:'
The Executive Branch has argued that the
President's "constitutional authorities and
duties," mentioned in the preamble, might
permit a withholding of prior notice through
the exercise of the President's constitutional
authority. The Constitution does not specifi-
cally address the allocation of powers to the
President associated with national security
and foreign policy matters beyond such func-
tions as the duties of the Commander-in-
Chief and the power of the President to ap-
point ambassadors. Congress is given the
powers to declare war, raise and support
armed forces, and make rules and regulations
governing their use, and, in the Senate, give
advice and consent to treaties and the ap-
pointment of ambassadors. Those powers
concerning national security and foreign
policy are in a "zone of twilight" in which
the President and Congress share authority
whose distribution Is uncertain}
Former DIC Colby has given an example
of a rare extraordinary emergency situation
when the President might be required to act
to defend the vital interests of the nation
and there might not be time to provide
notice until the plan had begun. Mr. Colby
stated:
I can conceive of a cable arriving in -the
wee hours of the night which says that you
have an opportunity to do something of vast
importance. It makes a great, deal of sense
but . the return cable has to go out in
a matter of three hours. It will be a little
hard in that situation to be able to go
through the procedure [of notifying Con-
gress) ... but to hold It because you
couldn't get to the Committee at that point
I think would be a mistake.
The requirement to "fully and currently
inform" the oversight committees of "any
significant anticipated Intelligence activity"
is intended to mean that the committees
shall be informed at the time of the Presi-
dential finding that authorizes initiation of
such activity. Arrangements for notice are
to be made forthwith, without delay.
Congress, of course, has the power to
attach the condition of prior notice to
expenditure of funds for intelligence activi-
ties. The preambular clause referring to
authorities under the Constitution is an in-
dication that a broad understanding of these
matters-concerning intelligence activities
can be worked out in a practical manner,
even if the particular exercise of the consti-
tutional authorities of the two branches
cannot be predicted in advance.
Section 501(a) (1) (A)- Approval of com-
mittees not required for anticipated intel-
ligence activity
Section 501(a) (1) (A) states simply that
prior notice is required, but "the forego-
ing provision shall not require approval of
such committees as a condition precedent
to the initiation of any such anticipated in-
telligence activity." This Intent can be
1 U.S. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 567 F 2d
121. 128 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 570, 637-
638 (1952), opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP85-00003R000300010003-7
June 28, 1980 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
traced to S. Res. 400 where it is .expressed
in different terms in Section 11(A). During
debate on the measure, Senator Howard
Baker requested such a priviso to be added:
"to make absolutely clear that the inclusion
of the words 'including any significant an-
ticipated activities' did not constitute a
requirement that the Select Committee
either give its consent or approval before
any covert action or intelligence activity
could be implemented by the Executive
branch. Rather, the intent of [including
those words] is to require prior consultation
between the Committee and the Intelligence
community, but not prior consent or ap-
proval?
Section 501(a) (1) (B) -Limited prior notice
Provision has been made In (a) (1) (B) for
those rare cases in which the President de-
termines it is essential to limit prior notice
to meet extraordinary circumstances affect-
ing the vital interests of the United States.
For these cases, the President shall limit
prior notice to the Chairmen and ranking
minority members of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Speaker and the minority leader of the
House of Representatives, and the majority
and minority leaders of the Senate.
The purpose of this limited prior notice
in extraordinary circumstances is to preserve
the secrecy necessary for very sensitive cases
while providing the President with advance
consultation with the leaders In Congress
and the Chairmen and ranking minority
members who have special expertise and re-
sponsibility In intelligence matters. Such
consultation will ensure strong oversight,
and at the same time, share the President's
burden on difficult decisions concerning sig-
nificant activities. This limited prior notice
calls only for prior consultation, and In no
way suggests prior approval.
Section 501(a)(2)-Access to information
"SEC. 501. (a) ... the Director of Central
Intelligence and the heads of all depart-
ments, agencies, and other entities of the
United States Involved In Intelligence ac-
tivities shall--
(2) furnish any information or material
concerning intelligence activities which is in
the possession, custody or control of any de-
partment, agency or entity of the United
States and which is requested by either of
the Select Committees in order to carry out _
its authorized responsibilities;"
Section 501(a) (2) states that agency heads
are to furnish the committee any document
or information which the agency has in its
possession, custody, or control. The purpose
of this section is to supplement subsection
(a) (1), which requires that the committees
be kept fully and currently informed, by-
per-mitting the committees to obtain informa-
tion upon request that is relevant to Its
authorized responsibilities.
Many of the mandated duties of the Com-
mittee do not require access to sources and
methods, but some do. In the usual course
of the Committee work, the identities of hu-
man sources are not needed, nor have they
been requested. A hypothetical case would
serve to Illustrate the point. An ally of the
United States has a source highly placed in
the cabinet of Ruritania. This ally is willing
to give the information to the United States
provided that the nature of the source is Ws-
closed to the President and the Director of
Central Intelligence only and no one else.
The information is of critical Importance to
the United States. The President therefore
would agree to such a condition. and the
committees would not seek nor expect to re-
ceive the source of such Information. How-
2 Congressional Record, 94th Congress, 2d
session May 13, 1976, V. 122, p. 7261.
,
ever, in the event that the information
turned out to be spurious and was actually
contrived by the Ruritanian government and
caused harm to the United States in some
way, the Intelligence oversight committees
would, in the course of their proper inquiries,
have every right to learn the identity of the
source. This underlines the general approach
of the oversight committee. The right of full
access to any intelligence information implies
some measure of discretion. It does not mean
trucking the entire product of the intelli-
gence community each day to the Committee
.offices. It does mean, however, that should
the Committee believe it necessary, in the
conduct of its mandated duties, all the in-
formation it desires shall be supplied con-
sistent with subsection (a). The occasions
when any information including sources and
methods might be sought are almost always
confined to abuse or misuse situations or in
the case of intelligence failures. The Commit-
tee has exercised this authority on a number
of occasions over the past five years without
any unauthorized disclosure of classified in-
formation or sensitive sources and methods.
Section 501 (a) (3) -Reports on illegal activ-
ities or -significant intelligence failures
"SEC. 501. (a) . The Director of Central
Intelligence and the heads of all depart-
ments, agencies, and other entities of the
United States involved in intelligence activi-
ties shall-,
(3) report in a timely fashion to the Select
Committees any illegal intelligence activity
or significant Intelligence failure and any
corrective action that has been taken or is
planned to be taken in connection with such
illegal activity or failure."
Section 501(a) (3) provides that the head
of each intelligence agency is to report any
intelligence activity that violates any law of
the United States, including violation of any
Executive Order or Presidential Directive, or
significant violation of an entity rule or reg-
ulation issued pursuant to law. A report
would be made to the Intelligence oversight
committees upon confirmation of any viola-
tion, and would include a description of what
corrective action has been taken or is ex-
pected to be taken by the entity with re-
spect to such violations.
This requirement parallels similar lan-
guage in section 11(c) of Senate Resolution
400 for reporting activities which "constitute
violations" and in section 3-403 of Executive
Order 12036 for reporting activities that "are
illegal." It is not intended in any way to
affect or alter the responsibilities and prac-
tices of the Executive branch for reporting
to appropriate authorities, including the At-
torney General, evidence of possible viola-
tions and activities which raise questions of
legality. (See, inter aria.- sections 1-706,
1-709, 3-102, 3-2, and 3-3 of Executive Order
12038.) The Director of Central Intelligence and
the head of each agency are also to report to
the intelligence oversight committees each
significant intelligence failure in the work of
that entity or for which the entity is respon-
sible; - this' report would likewise contain a
description of any corrective actions which
have been taken or which are planned to
ensure that such a failure does not recur.
Significant failures to be reported would in-
clude major errors in analysis and/or predic-
tion, failures In technical collection systems
or other clandestine operations, and failures
to protect sensitive sources and methods in-
formation from unauthorized disclosure.
Section 501(b)-Timely notice
"SEc. 501. (b) The President shall fully in-
form the Select Committees in a timely fash-
ion of intelligenuce operations in foreign
countries, other than activities intended
solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, for
which prior notice was not given under
S 8815
subsection (a) and shall provide a statement
of the reasons for not giving prior notice."
The Senate Select Committee and the
Executive branch and the intelligence agen-
cies have come to an understanding that in
rare extraordinary circumstances if the
President withholds prior notice of covert
operations, he is obliged to inform the two
oversight committees In a timely fashion
of the action and the reasons for withhold-
ing of such prior notice. This requirement
retains In full force the current statutory
obligation under the Hughes-Ryan Amend-
ment for the reporting of covert operations
in a timely fashion to the two oversight
committees (but not to other committees).
The further requirement of a statement of
the President's reasons for not giving prior
notice is intended to permit a thorough as-
sessment by the oversight committee as
to whether legislative measures are required
to whether the President had valid grounds
for withholding prior notice and whether
legislative measures are required to prevent
or limit such action in the future.
The term "intelligence operations in for-
eign countries, other than activities in-
tended solely for obtaining necessary in-
telligence." Is drawn directly from the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment and applies to
covert operations abroad by any depart-
ment, agency, or other entity of the United
States. It does not apply to activities in-
tended solely to collect or otherwise obtain
necessary intelligence. Collection activities
are intended, however, to be covered by the
requirements of subsection (a) for inform-
ing the committees of "significant antic-
ipated intelligence activities"- In the cir-
cumstances described previously, as well as
by the requirements of subsection (a) for
keeping the committees "fully and current.
ly informed of all intelligence activities,!'
for furnishing "any information or mate-
rial concerning Intelligence activities" re-
quested by the committees to carry out their
responsibilities, and for reporting illegal In-
telligence activities and significant intelli-
gence failures. -
The provisions of subsection (b) are ex-
pressly not conditioned upon the pream-
bular clauses that apply to subsection (a).
Section 105(c)-Presidential and committee
procedures
"SEC. 105. (c) The President and the Se-
lect Committee shall each establish such
procedures as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of subsections (a) and
(b)."
The authority for procedures established
by the President is based on Executive Or-
der 12036 and is Intended to apply to the
Executive branch. The President may, for
example, prescribe procedures under which
certain information is to be furnished by '
a designated official. Such procedures shall
ensure that the oversight committees are
fully and currently informed, that they are
furnished requested information, and that
they receive reports of illegal activities and
intelligence failures in accordance with.
subsections (a) and (b).
The authority for procedures established
by the Select Committees is based on the
current practice of the committees in estab-
lishing their own rules. One or both commit-
tees may, for example, adopt procedures
under which designated members are as-
signed responsibilty on behalf of the com-
mittee to receive information in particular
types of circumstances, such as when all
members cannot attend a meeting or when
certain highly sensitive Information Is
Involved.
Section 501 (d) ?Congressional procedures to
protect national security information
"SEC. 501. (d) The House of Representatives
and the Senate, in consultation with the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, shall each
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP85-00003R000300010003-7
S 8816 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--SENATE June 28, 1980
establish by rule or resolution of such House,
procedures to protect from unauthorized dis-
closure all classified Information and all in-
formation relating to intelligence sources
and methods furnished to the Select Com-
mittees or to Members of the Congress under
this section. In accordance with such proce-
dures, each of the Select Committees shall
promptly call to the attention of its respec-
tive House, or to any appropriate committee
or committees of its respective House, any
matter relating to intelligence activities re-
quiring the attention of such House or such
committee or' committees."
Under the preambular clause in subsection
(a), the responsibility of each agency head
to inform the intelligence committees is to
be carried out "to the extent consistent with
due regard for the protection of classified
information and Intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure." The
Congress recognizes that it has a similar re-
sponsibility to that of the Executive branch,
to protect national security secrets from un-
authorized disclosure. Subsection 501(d) re-
quires both the House of Representatives and
the Senate in consultation with the Director
of Central Intelligence to establish proce-
dures to protect national security informa-
tion from unauthorized disclosure. Establish-
ment and implementation of such procedures
is intended to ensure consistency with "due
regard" for protection of such information.
The procedures of both Houses under sub-
section (d), as well as the procedures under
subsection (c), will presumably be worked
out with the Executive branch In the same
healthy spirit of give-and-take that has pre-
vailed since this Committee began its work In
1978. These procedures will not constitute a
"standing subpoena"; In fact, while operat-
ing under the provisions of Senate Resolu-
tion 400 which also used the phrases fully
and currently informed'., "furnish any infor-
mation", and "slgniflcant anticipated ac-
tivities", the Committee has not once found
it necessary to. Issue a subpoena to obtain
Information from the Executive branch.
Both the House of Representatives through
H. Has. 658, 95th Congress, and the Senate
through Senate Resolution 400. 94th Con-
gress, have already established certain pro-
cedures to protect national security infor-
mation or materials provided to them from
unauthorized disclosure as called for in sub-
section (d). The provisions that contribute,
to effective physical security and sound se-
curity practices which would protect against
unauthorized disclosure are contained In
these resolutions and are envisioned by sub-
section (d). Under the procedures required
by subsection (d), the Select Committee is
to call to the attention of the Senate, or any
appropriate Senate Committee, intelligence
matters requiring its attention? This pro-
vision is subject to the security restrictions
In the procedures adopted under subsec-
tion (d). The relevant sections of Senate
Resolution 400 are as follows:
"SEC. 6. No employee of the select com-
mittee or any person engaged by contract
or otherwise to perform services for or at
the request of such committee shall be given
access to any classified information by such
committee unless such employee or person
has (1) agreed in writing and under oath
to be bound by the rules of the Senate (in-
cluding the jurisdiction of the Select Com-
mittee on Standards and Conduct and of
such committee as -to the security of such
information during and after the period of
his employment or contractual agreement
with. such committee; and (2) received an
3Inclusion of this provision was specifi-
cally requested by the Chairman and Rank-
ing Minority Member of the Committee on
Foreign Relations. Letteh from Senator
Church and Senator Javits to Senator Bayh
and Senator Goldwater. Apr. 30. 1980.'
appropriate security clearance as determined
by such committee in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence. The type
of security clearance to be required in the
case of any such employee or person shall,
within the determination of such committee
In consultation with the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, be commensurate with the
sensitivity of the classifed information to
which such employee or person will be given
access by such committee.
"SEC. 7. The select committee shall formu-
late and carry out such rules and procedures
as it deems necessary to prevent the dis-
closure, without the consent of the person or
persons concerned, of information In the pos-
session of such committee which unduly in-
fringes upon the privacy or which violates
the constitutional rights of such person or
persons, Nothing herein shall be construed
to prevent such committee from publicly
disclosing any such information In any case
In which such committee determines the na-
tional Interest in the disclosure of such in-
formation clearly outweighs any infringe-
ment on the privacy of any person or persons.
"SEC. 8. (a) The select committee may,
subject to the provisions of this section,
disclose publicly any information in the
possession of such committee after a deter-
mination by such committee that the public
interest would be served by such disclosure-
Whenever committee action Is required to
disclose any information under this section,
the committee shall meet to vote on the
matter within five days after any member
of the committee requests such a vote. No
member of the select committee shall dis=
close any Information, the disclosure or
which requires a committee- vote, prior to
a vote by the committee on the question of
the disclosure of such information or after
such vote except in accordance with this
section:
"(b) (1) In any case in which the select,
committee votes to disclose publicly any
Information which has been classified under
established security procedures, which has
been submitted to it by the executive
branch, and which the executive branch
requests be kept secret, such committee
shall notify the President of such vote.
"(2) The select committee may disclose
publicly such information after the expira-
tion of a five-day period following the day
on which notice of such vote is transmitted
to the President, unless, prior to the expira-
tion of such five-day period, the President,
personally In writing, notifies the commit-
tee that be objects to the disclosure of such
information, provides his reasons therefor,
-and certifies that the threat to the national
interest of the United States posed by such
disclosure is of such gravity that it out-
weighs any public interest in the disclosure.
"(3) If the President, personally in writ-
ing, notifies 'the select committee of his
objections to the disclosure of such Infor-
mation as provided in paragraph (2), such
committee may, by majority vote, refer the
question of the disclosure of such informa-
tion to the Senate for consideration. The
committee shall not publicly disclose such
information without leave of the Senate. .
"(4) Whenever the select committee votes
to refer the question of disclosure of any
information to the Senate under paragraph
(3), the chairman shall, not later than the
first day on which the Senate is in session
following the day on which the vote occurs,
report the matter to the Senate for its
consideration.
"(5) One hour after the Senate convenes
on the fourth day on which the Senate Is
In session following the day on which any
such matter Is reported to the Senate, or at
such earlier time as the majority leader and
the minority leader of the Senate jointly
agree upon In accordance with section
133(f) of the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946, the Senate shall go into closed ses-
sion and the matter shall be the- pending
business. In considering the matter in closed
session the Senate may-
"(A) approved the public disclosure of all
or any portion of the Information in ques-
tion, in which case the committee shall pub-
licly disclose the information ordered to be
disclosed,
"(B) disapprove the public disclosure of
all or any portion of the information In ques-
tion, in which case the committee shall not
publicly disclose the information ordered not
to be disclosed, or
"(C) refer all or any portion of the matter
back to the committee. In which case the
committee shall make the final determina-
tion with respect to the public disclosure of
the Information in question.
"Upon` conclusion of the consideration of
such matter In closed session, which may
no extend beyond the close of the ninth day
on which the Senate Is in session following'
the day on which such matter was reported
to the Senate, or the close of the fifth day
following the day agreed upon jointly by
the majority and minority leaders in accord.
ante with section 133(f) of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 (whichever the
case may be), the Senate shall Immediately
vote on the disposition of such matter in
open session, without debate, and without
divulging the information with respect to
which the vote is being taken. The Senate
shall vote to dispose of such matter by one
or more of the means specified in clauses
(A), (B), and (C) of the second sentence of
this paragraph. Any vote of the Senate to
disclose any information pursuant to this
paragraph shall be subject to the right of a
Member of the Senate to move for recon-
sideration of the vote within the time and
pursuant to the procedures specified In rule
XIII of the Standing Rules of the Senate.
and the disclosure of such Information shall
be made consistent with that right.
"(c) (1) No information in the possession
of the select committee relating to the law-
ful intelligence activities of any department
or agency of the United States which has
been classified under established security
procedures and which the select committee,
pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this
section, has determined. should not be dis-
closed shall be made available to any per-
son by a Member, officer, or employee of the
Senate except in a closed session of the Sen-
ate or as provided in paragraph (2).
"(2) The select committee may, under such
regulations as the committee shall prescribe
to protect the confidentiality of such in-
formation, make any Information described
in paragraph (1) available to any other com-
mittee or any other Member of the Senate.
Whenever the select committee makes such
information available, the committee shall
keep a written record showing, in the case of
any particular information, which commit-
tee or which Members of the Senate received
such information. No Member of the Senate
who, and no committee which, receives any
information. under this subsection, shall dis-
close such Information except In a closed ses-
sion of the Senate.
"(d) It shall be the duty of the Select
Committee on Standards and Conduct to in-
vestigate any unauthorized disclosure of In-
telligence Information by a Member, officer or
employee of the Senate in violation of sub-
section (c) and to report to the Senate con-
cerning any allegation which it finds to be
substantiated.
"(e) Upon the request of any person who
is subject to any such investigation, the Se-
lect Committee on Standards and Conduct
shall release to such individual at the con-
clusion of its investigation a summary of its
investigation together with Its findings. If, at
the conclusion of its investigation, the Select
Committee on Standards and Conduct de-
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June 28, 1980 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
termines that there has been a significant
breach of confidentiality or unauthorized dis-
closure by a Member, officer, or employee of
the Senate, it shall report its findings to the
Senate and recommend appropriate action
such as censure, removal from committee
membership, or expulsion from the Senate, in
the case of Member, or removal from office or
employment or punishment for contempt. In
the case of an officer or employee." -
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. HUDDLESTON. I yield.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the
Senator just told the Senate what the
vote was on the bill as it passed initially,
89 to 1. 1 was the one who voted against
the bill. I did so without an explanation
at that time to the Senate. I did so, how-
ever, with the very, very strong feeling
that it was a serious mistake. It not only
kills the Hughes-Ryan proposal but
everyone who carefully reads that bill can
see that the reporting to Congress is
entirely within the discretion of the head
of the CIA and the President.
I feel that was an abdication that I
could not possibly accept, but I did not
make a fuss about it, of course, when it
came up before the Senate. It would not
have made any difference, but that was
my position, and it is still my position,
and I oppose the amendment as I did
that time.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I wish to
report that on this afternoon I talked
with the Senator from Arizona (Mr.
(GOLDLVATER), who is the senior Republi-
can on the Intelligence Committee and
its vice chairman. He cannot be present
in the Senate Chamber tonight, and he
asked me to convey to the distinguished
chairman of the committee, the Senator
from Indiana, and -the chairman of the
subcommittee, the Senator from Ken-
tucky, his full concurrence and. agree-
ment with this procedure, including the
amendment which has just been offered
and the insertion of a colloquy as an
explanation.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Indiana yield for
just 1 minute?
Mr. BAYH. Yes.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President,
this amendment is identical to the bill,
intelligence community and insure that
the Congress maintains strong and effec-
tive oversight of necessarily secret in-
telligence activities in accordance with
the Constitution.
Since this amendment incorporates
S. 2284 as passed by the Senate, the leg-
islative history of that bill as found in
the Intelligence Committee's report and
the floor discussions of June 3, 1930,
should be viewed as applicable to this
amendment as well. At the time of its
passage, questions were raised about the
meaning and Intent of certain provisions
in S. 2284, and about the language of the
report which accompanied it.
At that time, a number of clarifica-
tions and assurances were given by the
leadership of the intelligence Committee
in colloquies with Senator JAVITS, Sen-
ator YOUNG, and Senator NUNN. Includ-
ing the assurance of certain changes in
the language of the report which were
incorporated into a star print. Since
both the clarification given on the floor
and the changes made in the report are
an essential part of the Senate's under-
standing and intentions in passing this
legislation, I ask unanimous consent
that the entire text of these June 3 col-
loquies on S. 2284 and of the substantive
portions of the star print of the com-
mittee report (S. Rept. Nc. 98-730) ap-
pear in the RECORD at this point and be
considered as the authoritative legisla-
tive history of this amendment.
I would like to ask unanimous consent
that this amendment, which is identical
to S. 2284, be added to S. 2597, the In-
telligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1981.
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, this is the
fourth annual authorization bill put be-
fore the Senate by the Select Committee
on Intelligence. It provides the authority
for the conduct of intelligence efforts by
the United States throughout the world.
The national intelligence system is our
first line of defense. in conjunction with
our diplomatic efforts, intelligence offers
the best means of enhancing our nation-
al well-being; advancing our Influence in
the world; and of protecting the Nation
from the dangers of attack, war, or
other hostile actions.
S. 2284, the 'Intelligence Oversight Act The moneys that are to be spent for
of 1980, which the Senate passed on June maintaining and improving our Intel-
3 of this year by a vote of 89 to 1. The ligence capabilities have been rigorously
only difference is a matter of form. scrutinized by the committee, particular-
The purpose of the amendment to this ly under the guidance of Senator DANIEL
annual authorization bill for Intelligence K. INouxs, chairman of the select com-
activities is to insure that the Congress mittee Subcommittee on Budget Author-
acts in this session to provide the nec- ization. It is a budget aimed at improving
essary intelligence oversight authorities our ability to collect and analyze infor-
for. the Intelligence Oversight Commit- mation of direct relevance to our foreign
tees to carry out the Senate's mandate policy and defense and to continue to
as expressed in Senate Resolution 400 improve our capability to offset efforts by
and by the Senate on June 3 in its 89-to- hostile powers to weaken the position of
1 vote. These authorities should be the United States in the world.
promptly enacted into law either in this
amendment form or as passed in S. 2284.
The committee has also-undertaken to
add as an amendment to this bill the
It is the expressed, almost unanimous language of S. 2284, the National In-
judgment of the Senate that these prin- telligence Oversight Act of 1980, which
ciples are vital to any legislation that passed the Senate on June 3, by a vote
would seek to clarify the procedures for of 89 to 1. The House Permanent Select
? congressional oversight' of intelligence Committee on Intelligence has reported
activities. There must be comprehensive out a somewhat similar bill. It-is our dP-
and balanced provisions that both en- sire to assure that the Congress acts this
hance the strength and security of our year to provide the statutory authorities
S8817
needed to carry out effective oversight.
This amendment will assist that effort.
. The purpose of the Oversight Act of
1980 was to provide. the framework of
checks and balances and shared respon-
sibility necessary for the exercise of ef-
fective oversight of the intelligence agen-
cies of the United States.
The language of the bill and the iden-
tical language of the amendment offered
to S. 2597 by Senator HUDDLESTON on be-
half of the committee was worked out
in close consultation with the President,
his chief advisers, the intelligence agen-
cies, and the Senate committee. The lan-
guage of the report explaining the pur-
poses of the act was also written jointly.
The wording of the bill is based on Ex-
ecutive Order 12036 and Senate Resolu-
tion 400, by which instruments the Presi-
dent and the Senate provided authorities
to exercise oversight and the experience
of the oversight committees and the ex-
ecutive branch with each other over the
past 4 years. It is intended to provide the
checks and balances' necessary to assure
that the.great powers that our vast In-
telligence system provides remain with-
in the governance of our Constitution.
We are seeking to meet the standard
called for by James Madison, In Feder-
alist 48, by providing "a sufficient guard
against those encroachments which lead
to a tyrannical concentration of all the
powers of government in the same
hands,' and to do this by enabling the re-
spective branches "to be so far connected
and blended as to give each a constitu-
tional control over the others."
The effort to legislate effective means
of oversight that will serve as a constitu-
tional means of checks and balances and
shared responsibility, not unexpectedly,
has met with resistance and obstacles
.have been encountered at every step of
the way.
This is understandable because the
problems that arise In framing authority
for effective oversight all involve the in-
teraction of powers conferred by the
Constitution on respective branches. In
almost every case the powers of the two
branches come into contact, sometimes
collide, and on rare occasions come into
confrontation with one another.
Recognizing this, we have sought to
respect the authorities, powers, duties,
and obligations of the branches and to
devise ways in which solutions may be
obtained rather than to create the cer-
tainty of confrontations.
Working under authorities given to the
committee by the Senate in Senate Res-
olution 400 and under terms very similar
to that of the Intelligence Oversight Act
of 1980, and this amendment over the
past 4 years, the Senate Intelligence
Committee, and I believe that of the
House, have been able to carry out their
duties with full access to information.
-When information has been requested,
it has been supolied and in the degree
-of detail required.
The Senate Intelligence Committee
has not yet been required to issue a sub-
pena to obtain Information. We have
received in almost every case the infor-
mation needed when we want it. -
This has sometimes required discussion
and negotiation but we have never failed
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S 8818 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
to meet, discuss and negotiate when nec-
essary. It is therefore imperative to as-
sure that the means to work out solutions
to difficulties that arise are encouraged.
This was an underlying principle in the
Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.
A recent court case, United States v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977), is in es-
sence the approach the committee has
taken now to deal with conflicts of au-
thority that might arise. This case raised
many issues similar to those encountered
in providing for the authorities of both
branches for the governance of the in-
telligence activities of the United States.
Two pasages from the case are of par-
ticular pertinence:
The framers, rather than attempting to
define and allocate all governmental power
In minute detail, relied, we believe, on the
expectation that where conflicts in scope of
authority arose between .the coordinate
branches, a spirit of dynamic compromise
would promote resolution of the dispute in
the manner most likely to result in efficient
functioning of our governmental system.
Under this view, the coordinate branches do
not exist in an exclusively adversary rela-
tionship to one another when a conflict in
authority arises. Rather, each branch should
take cognizance of an implicit constitutional
mandate to seek optional accommodation
through a realistic evaluation of the needs
of the conflicting branches in the particular
fact situation. This aspect of our constitu-
tional scheme avoids the mischief of polari-
zation of disputes.
The course of negotiations reflects some-
thing of greater moment than the mere de-
gree to which ordinary parties are willing to
compromise. Given our perception that it was
a deliberate feature of the constitutional
scheme to leave the allocation of powers
unclear in certain situations, the resolution
of conflict between the coordinate branches
in these situations must be regarded as an
opportunity for a constructive modus
vivendi, which positively promotes the func-
tioning of our system. The Constitution con-
templates such accommodation. Negotiation
between the two branches should thus be
viewed as a dynamic process affirmatively
furthering the constitutional scheme.
The language of the Oversight Act was
written with these thoughts in mind to
try and avoid the "mischief of polariza-
tion of disputes" and to create the most
favorable circumstances for working out
conflicts of authority through accommo-
dation achieved by "a realistic evaluation
of the needs of the conflicting branches
in the particular fact situation."
Mr. President, I want to commend the
efforts of Vice Chairman Senator BARRY
GOLDWATER, of Senator INouvE and
Senator HUDDLESTON, and of all of the
members of the committee for their de-
termination to make effective oversight
an appropriate application of what was
intended by our constitutional system of
checks and balances.
I would like to offer my congratula-
tions and my deep appreciation to the
first chairman of the Select Committee
on Intelligence, the distinguished Sena-
tor from Hawaii, who has done a profes-
sional job, held lengthy hearings and is
presenting a good bill.
I would also like to express our appre-
ciation to the Senator from Mississippi
for the way in which the Armed Serv-
ices Committee and the Intelligence
Committee in the Senate continue to
work in harmony, as they should, and
without his efforts and the efforts of the
Senator from Hawaii this would not be
the case.
Lastly, I would like to offer my special
word of appreciation to our distinguish-
ed colleague from Kentucky -who has
labored mightily on this whole question
of the charter. We are here, I think, with
all respect to a contrary assessment of
our good friend from Wisconsin, and I
think we are taking a significant step,
not a vital step by any means but a sig-
nificant step, toward making the intel-
ligence community more efficient
through the repeal of Hughes-Ryan on
one side and providing the first recog-
nition of the importance of congres-
sional oversight on the other.
This has beep a very, very frustrating
experience, I do not think I have been
involved in anything which has been so
frustrating. You think you had an agree-
ment and they compromise and then you
start out from where the Senate was and
you move toward where the folks down-,
town were.
Without reliving all of those negotia-
tions, I think this is better than where
we are. It is not where I hope we can. go,
but without the strong leadership of the
Senator from Kentucky, the chairman of
that subcommittee on oversight we
would not be here where we are today,
and I want to express my appreciation
and urge my colleagues to accept this
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from Kentucky.
The amendment (UP No. 1361) was
agreed to.
- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
and to be read a third time.
The bill was. read the third time.
The bill (S. 2597), as amended, was
passed as follows:
S. 2597
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981".
TITLE I-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEc. 101. (a) Funds are hereby authorized
to be appropriated for fiscal year 1981 for the
conduct of intelligence activities of the fol-
lowing departments, agencies, and other ele-
ments of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency and
the Director of Central Intelligence.
(2) The Departmentof Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the De-
partment of the Navy, and the Department
of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion.
(b) The amounts authorized to be appro-
priated under this Act for the conduct of the
intelligence activities of the agencies listed
In subsection (a) are those listed in the clas-
sified Schedule of Authorizations for fiscal
June 28, 1980
year 1981 prepared by the Select Committee
on Intelligence. That Schedule of Author-
izations shall be made available to the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the Presi-
dent. The President shall provide for suit-
able distribution of the Schedule, or of ap-
propriate portions of the Schedule, within
the executive branch.
,,(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall be
deemed to constitute authority for the con-
duct of any intelligence activity which is not
otherwise authorized by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.
TITLE II-INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
STAFF
SEc. 201. (a) There is authorized to be ap-
propriated for the Intelligence Community
Staff for fiscal year 1981 the sum of $18,700,-
000.
(b) For the fiscal year beginning Octo-
ber 1, 1980, the Intelligence Community
Staff is authorized an end strength of two
hundred and forty-five full-time employees.
Such personnel may be permanent em-
ployees of the Intelligence Community Staff
or employees on detail from other elements
of the United States Government.
(c) Any employee who is detailed to the
Intelligence Community Staff from another
element of the United States Government
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis,
except that an employee may be detailed
on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of
less than one year for the performance of
temporary duties as required by the Director
of Central Intelligence. _
(d) Except as provided in subsections (b)
and (c), the activities and personnel of the
Intelligence Community Staff shall be ad-
ministered by the Director of Central Intel-
ligence in accordance with the provisions of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401, et seq.) and the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a-403j).
TITLE III-CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
SEC. 301. There is authorized to be ap-
propiated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for
fiscal year 1981 the sum of $55,300,000.
TITLE IV-GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 401. Appropriations authorized by
this Act for salary, pay, retirement and
other benefits for Federal employees may
be increased by such additional or supple-
mental amounts as may be necessary for in-
creases in such benefits authorized by law.
Sac. 402. Section 5 of the Central Intelli-
gence Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f), is amended
by adding at the end thereof the, following
new subsections:
"(f) Accept, hold, administer, and utilize
for artistic or general employee or depend-
ent welfare, educational, recreational or like
purposes, gifts, bequests, or devises of money,
securities, or other property whenever the
Director determines such action would be
in the interest of the United States to do
so, but may not accept any gift which is
expressly conditioned upon any expenditure
not to be met from such money, securities,
or other property or from the income thereof
unless such expenditure has been approved
by law. Unless otherwise restricted by the
terms of the gift, bequest, or devise, the
Director may sell or exchange, or invest or
reinvest, such property in interest-bearing
obligations of the United States or In obliga-
tions guaranteed as to both principal and
interest by the United States. Gifts, bequests,
and devises of money, securities, and other
Intangible property accepted under the au-
thority of this subsection, and the earnings
and proceeds thereof, shall be deposited in
a separate fund to be called the Central In-
telligence Agency General Gift Fund and
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June 28, 1980 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE S8819,
shall be disbursed upon the order of the of such section, the Director of the National Defense Intelligence School may, upon rec-
Director. For purposes of Federal income, Security Agency may waive the collection of ommendation by the faculty of such school,
estate and gift taxes, all gifts, bequests, and such erroneous payment, except that not confer the degree of master of science of stra-
-devices accepted by the Director shall be more than a total of $50,000 in erroneous tegic intelligence upon graduates of . the
deemed to be to or for the use of the United payments may be waived under this-sub- school who have fulfilled the requirements
States. section.". for that degree.".
"(g) Grant such monetary or other relief (b) the amendment made by subsection (b) The table of chapters at the beginning
as the Director in his sole and unreviewable (a) shall become effective October 1, 1980. of subtitle A and of part III of subtitle A of
discretion deems appropriate whenever an SEC. 405. Section 3 of the Act of June 1. such title are each amended by adding at the
employee or former -employee of the Agency 1948 (40 U.S.C. 318), is amended by insert- end thereof the following:
is found by the Director to have suffered ing "(a)" before "Upon" at the beginning "107. Granting of Advanced Degrees
unjustified negative career development or of such section and by adding at the end of at Department of Defense
an unjustified personnel or administrative such section the following new subsection: Schools _ 2151:1.
action.". "(b) Upon request of the Director of the
SEC. 403. (a) Chapter 4, title 10, United National Security Agency, the Administra- SEC. 408. A new section, section 407, is add-
States Code, is amended by adding at the tor of General Services may detail special to the Intelligence Authorization Act for
end thereof the following new section: policemen appointed under the first section Fiscal Year 1981.
"? 140a. Foreign crytologic support. of this Act to provide protection for instal- SEC. 407. PRESIDENTIAL FINDINGS AND CON-
0
of Defense for Intelligence and cornmunica- euneroi os the iational Security Agency ""?"~'-lal NO Iunos appropriated under
tions purposes may be used to pay expenses without regard to whether the United States the authority of this or any other Act may
has exclusive or concurrent criminal uris- be expended by or on behalf of the Central
of arrangements with foreign countries for Intelligence support. Such funds may be ex- diction over such installations and grounds. Agency for operations in foreign
changed without regard to the prohibition Special policemen detailed to protect such countries, other than activities intended
contained in section 3651 of the Revised installations or buildings shall have the solely for obtaining necessary Intelligence,
same powers as special policemen appointed unless and until the President finds that each
Statutes (31 U.S.C. 543).". under the first section of this Act. The Ad- such operation is important to the national
(b) The table of sections at the beginning
of ministrator of General Services may extend security of the United States. Each such
chapter 4 of such title is amended by the applicability of any regulation Issued operation shall be considered a significant
iteming at the end thereof the following new under section 2 to installations and grounds anticipated intelligence activity for the pur-
described in the first sentence of this sub- poses of subsections (b) through (e) of this
"140a. Foreign cryptologic support.". section and to provide for the appropriate section.
SEC. 404. (a) The Act of May 29, 1959 (73 enforcement of such regulation. "(b) To the extent consistent with all ap-
Stat. 63) is amended by adding at the end SEC. 406. (a) The Director of Central In-, plicable authority and duties, including
thereof the following new sections: telligence and the Director of the National those conferred by the Constitution upon the
"SEC. 9. (a) Funds of the National Se- Security Agency are authorized to pay a executive and legislative branches of the
curity Agency may be used, with respect to gratuity to the surviving dependent or de- Government, and to the extent consistent
a special limited class of Its civilian and pendents of any officer or employee of their with due regard for the protection from un-
military personnel assigned outside the respective agencies who dies as a result of authorized disclosure of classified informa-
United States, to provide allowances and injuries (excluding disease) sustained out- tion and information relating to intelligence
other benefits comparable to those au- side the United States. The amount of the sources and methods, the Director of Central
thorized for officers and employees of the gratuity in the case of any such officer or Intelligence and the heads of all depart-
Foreign Service under clauses (1), (2), (7), employee shall be an amount equal to one ments, agencies, and other entities of the
(9), (10), and (11) of section 911 and sections year's compensation at the rate such officer United States involved in intelligence ac-
912, 914, 933, 941. 942. and 945 of the Foreign or employee was entitled to receive at the tivities shall-
Service Act of 1946 (22 U.S.C. 1136 (1), (2), time of death. Such a payment shall be made "(1) keep the Select Committee on Intel-
(7), (9), (10), and (11); 1137, 1138a, 1148, only upon a determination of the Director of ligence of the Senate and Permanent Select
1156, 1157, and 1160) ). Central Intelligence in the case of an officer Committee on Intelligence of the House of
"(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of or employee of the Central Intelligence Representatives (hereinafter In this section
section 322 of the Act of June 30, 1932 (40 Agency, or of the Director of the National referred to as the 'Select Committees') fully
U.S.C. 278a), section 2675 of title 10, United Security Agency, that the death of such of- and Currently informed of all intelligence
States Code, or section 5536 of title 5, United ficer or employee (1) resulted from hostile activities which are the responsibility of, are
States Code, the Director of the National or terrorist activities, or (2) occurred in engaged in by, or are carried out for or on
Security Agency may- connection with an intelligence activity hav- behalf of, any department, agency, or entity
"(1) rent or lease, for periods not exceed- ing a substantial element of risk. Any pay- of the United States, including any signifi-
Ing ten years, such buildings and grounds went made under this subsection shall be cant anticipated Intelligence activity, except
outside the United States as may be neces- considered a gift and shall be in addition to that (A) the foregoing provision shall not re-
sary for the use of the National Security any other benefit payable from any source. quire approval of the Select Committees as a
Agency; and (b) A death gratuity payment made under condition precedent to the initiation of any
"(2) use such buildings and grounds to subsection (a) shall be made to the person such anticipated intelligence activity, and
furnish personnel of such agency with living or persons within the following classes and (B) if the President determines it is essential
quarters; heat, light, and household equip- In the order named: to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary
ment, without cost to such personnel, when- (1) To the widow or widower, if living. circumstances affecting vital interests of the
ever the Director of the National Security .(2) If no widow or widower, to the child United States, such notice shall be limited
Agency determines such action Is in the or children in equal shares, if living. to the chairman and ranking minority gnern-
public interest. (3) If no widow, widower, child or chil- hers of the Select Committee, the Speaker
The Director of the National Security Agen- dren, to the dependent parent or dependent and minority leader of the Rouse of Repre-
cy may exercise the authority provided n- parents in equal shares who last bore that sentatives, and the majority and minority
der this subsection only to the extent that relationship, if living. leaders of the Senate;
funds have been appropriated for such pur- (c) As used in this section- "(2) furnish any information or material'
pose. (1) The terms "widow", "widower", "child", concerning intelligence activities which is in
"SEC. 10. (a) In addition to the benefits and "parent" shall have the same meaning the possession, custody or control of any de-
provided in subsection 4109 (a) (2) (B) of given to such terms by sections 8101 of title partment. agency, or entity of the united
p
ti, ole 5, United States Code the Director of 5, United States Code. States and which is requested by either of
the National Security Agency may provide (2) The term "United States" means the the Select Committees in order to carry out
th owan ios and curit benefits g Agency may States and the District of Columbia. Its authorized responsibilities; and
year vide el a(d) The provisions of this section shall "(3) report in a timely fashion to the Se-
assigned s training overseas or one personnel
assign d the same extent and for one apply with respect to deaths occuring after lect Committee any illegal intelligence activ-
es and same June 30, 1974. ity or significant intelligence failure and any
purposes the which such ado the
other benefits are provided employees and SEC. 407. (a) Part III of subtitle A of title corrective action that has been taken or Is
an agency under chapter pr57 of ovided title 5, United 10, United States Code, is amended by adding planned to be taken in connection with such
States Code. at the end thereof the following new chapter: Illegal activity or failure.
"(b) In any case in which an employee "CHAPTER 107.-GRANTING OF AD- "(c) The President shall fully inform the
of tb) n any Security Agency VANCED DEGREES AT DEPARTMENT OF Select Committee in a timely fashion of in-
pavment for training expenses under section d DEFENSE SCHOOLS telligence operations in foreign countries
4100(a) (2) (B) of title 5, United States Code, Sec. other than activities intended solely for ob-
before the date of enactment of this sub- "2151. Defense Intelligence School: degree. taming necessary intelligence, for which prior
section and such payment was subsequently "S 2151. Defense Intelligence School: degree notice was not given under subsection (b) and shall determined to have been improperly made "Under regulations prescribed by the Sec- for not giving provide a statement of the reasons
as the result of an erroneous Interpretation rat prior notice.
ary Of Defense, the Commandant of the " (d) The President and nd the Select Commit-
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP85-00003R000300010003-7
S 8820
tees shall each establish such procedures as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of subsections (b) and (c).
"(e) The House of Representatives and the
Senate, in consultation with the Director of
Central Intelligence, shall each establish by
rule or resolution of such House, procedures
to protect from unauthorized disclosure all
classified Information and all Information
relating to intelligence sources and methods
furnished to the Select Committees or to
Members of the Congress under this section.
In accordance with such procedures, each of
the Select Committees shall promptly call
to the attention of its respective House, or
to any appropriate committee or committees
of its respective House, any matter relating
to intelligence activities requiring the atten-
tion of such House or such committee or
committees. .
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr, President, I
want to make sure, although this was
passed without objection, that I am re-
corded as voting against the amend-
ment.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the bill
was passed.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I move to lay
that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
a
L greed to.
THE CALENDAR
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that the
Senate now proceed to the consideration
of Calendar Orders Nos. 836, 902 and
903.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object, and I will not object,
once again the reservation is for the pur-
pose of advising the majority leader that
all three calendar items identified by
him are cleared on our side.
It Is my understanding that commit-
tee technical amendments are contained
in Calendar Order 836 and I have an
amendment that I wish to offer on be-
half of the Senator from Kansas (Mrs.
KASSEBAUM) and otherwise we have no
objection. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
EMPLOYEE PROTECTION AND RAIL-
ROAD FINANCING MODIFICA-
TION ACT OF 1980
The Senate proceeded to consider the
bill (S. 2530) to improve the fairness and
equity of the protection provided to rail-
road employees under title V of the Re-
gional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973
(45 U.S.C. 701 et seq.), which had been
reported from the Committee on Com-
merce. Science, and Transportation with
an amendment to strike all after the
enacting clause and insert the following:
That this Act may be cited as the "Em-
ployee Protection and Railroad Financing
Modification Act of 1980".
TITLE I-EMPLOYEE PROTECT'ON
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
Sec. 101. (a) The Congress finds that the
original provisions designed to protect rail-
road employees under title V of the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (45 U.S.C.
701 et seq.) against deprivation of employ-
ment and reductions In railroad-related
compensation contain inequities; that these
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
inequities hinder the Consolidated Rail Cor-
poration from achieving improved manage-
ment of certain protected employees in its
work force; and that elimination of these
inequities would help reduce the cost levels
of the Consolidated Rail Corporation, and
thereby Improve the Corporation's ability to
provide carriage of goods in interstate com-
merce.
(b) It is declared to be the purpose of the
Congress in this title to foster fair and
equitable labor protection for certain rail-
road employees; to foster improvements In
the ability of the Consolidated Rail Cor-
poration to manage productively such em-
ployees in Its work force; and to help reduce
the cost levels of the Consolidated Rail Cor-
poration by eliminating the inequities of
the labor protection provisions, thereby im-
proving the Corporation's abaility to provide
carriage of goods In interstate commerce
by-
(1) revising the cash allowances for pro-
tected employees under title V of the Re-
gional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 to
ensure that the employees receive a reason-
able level of protection; and
(2) improving the ability of the Consoli-
dated Rail Corporation to train or retrain
certain protected employees for bona fide
job vacancies.
(c) Nothing in this title is intended to
affect any law, regulation, court order, or
obligation pertaining to equal employment
opportunity.
MONTHLY DISPLACEMENT ALLOWANCE
SEC. 102. Section 505(b) of the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (45 U.S.C.
775(b)) is amended to read as follows:
"(b) MONTHLY DISPLACEMENT ALLOW-'
ANCE.-A protected employee shall be paid
a monthly displacement allowance for any
calendar month within the period identi-
fled In subsection (c) of this section in
which the employee Is deprived of employ-
ment or adversely affected with respect to
his or her compensation, in accordance with
the following:
"(1) PROTECTED 9MPLOYEES OCCUPYING
POSITIONS IN THE NONOPERATING CRAFTS.-
Effective on and after the first day of the
months immediately following the date of
enactment of the Employee Protection and
Railroad Financing Modifiaction Act of 1980,
the protected rate of pay of a protected non-
operating employee (Other than a mainte-
nance-of-way employee) who has been de-
prived of employment or adversely affected
with respect to his or her compensation shall
be based on the rate of pay of the position
held by the employee on September 1, 1979,
or if the employee held no position on that
date, the rate of pay of the last position held
by the employee prior to that date. A guar-
anteed hourly rate of pay will be computed
for each protected employee, based on the
aforesaid rate, and will be the actual hourly
rate for hourly rated employees; the daily
rate divided by'8 for daily rated employees;
and the monthly rate divided by the working
days In the claim month, further divided by
8 in the case of monthly rated employees. For
employees occupying relief positions, the
guarantee shall be computed on the basis of
the weighted average daily rate of the posi-
tion relieved. Extra list employees will be
guaranteed the extra list rate.
"(A) In the event a protected employee's
position is abolished or he or she Is displaced,
and the employee is thereby required to oc-
cupy a position paying a lesser hourly rate
than the employee's guaranteed hourly rate,
the protected employee shall be paid the dif-
ference between the hourly rate of pay of the
position the employee is occupying and his
or her guaranteed hourly rate for all hours
included in the straight-time work schedule
of the employee's position for the month of
claim, less any time lost on account of vol-
untaryabsences other than vacations. Hours
June 28, 1980
worked in excess of the straight-time work
schedule shall be paid in addition to the
guarantee at the rate applicable to the posi-
tion occupied, as provided for in the appli-
cable collective bargaining agreement.
"(B) For any month or portion thereof in
which a protected employee Is deprived of
employment, the protected employee shall be
paid his or her guaranteed hourly rate for the
number of hours the employee would have
worked in the straight-time work schedule
of his or her previously held position.
"(C) Notwithstanding the provision that.
the protected rate shall be the rate of the
position held on or immediately preceding
September 1, 1979, if a protected employee
becomes the permanent Incumbent of a
higher rated position and Is not disqualified
from the higher rate shall become his or her
protected rate.
"(2) PROTECTED EMPLOYEES OCCUPYING POSI-
TIONS IN THE MAINTENANCE-OF-WAY CRAFTS.-
Notwithstanding subsection (b) (1), effec-
tive on and after the first day of the month
Immediately following the date of enactment
of the Employee Protection and Railroad Fi-
nancing Modification Act of 1980, a protected
maintenance-of-way employee shall be af-
forded his or her average monthly compen-
sation computed in accordance with section
505(b) prior to such date (as used In this
subsection. (b), 'average monthly compensa-
tion'). but subject to a 'maximum', which
maximum is defined as the employe's aver-
age monthly compensation divided by his or
her average monthly time paid for, and fur-
ther multiplied by 174 hours, or by his or her
average monthly time paid for, whichever is
less. If the average monthly compensation of
a protected maintenance-of-way employee
exceeds the maximum, the average monthly
compensation of the employee will be re-
duced to the maximum for purposes of com-
puting the employee's monthly displace-
ment allowance, if any. If a protected em-
ployee is deprived of employment or if the
employee's compensation In his or her-cur-
rent position Is less in any month than the
employee's average monthly compensation or
the maximum, whichever is smaller, the em-
ployee shall be paid 75 percent of the differ-
ence between his or her earnings if any and
the smaller figure, less any time lost on
account of voluntary absences other than va-
cations. If, at the close of the calendar year,
the sum of the protected employee's annual
compensation (excluding overtime compen-
sation earned by virtue of actually working
in excess of 2 hours at the punitive rate of
pay on any given day), monthly displace-
ment allowance payments, and offsets appli-
cable pursuant to this title Is less than the
employee's average monthly compensation
subject to the maximum and multiplied by
12, the employee shall receive an additional
payment representing the difference. In the
computation of the monthly and the annual
displacement allowance payments, earnings
shall not include compensation received for
overtime actually worked in excess of 2 hours
at the punitive rate of pay on any given day.
If in the previous calendar year an employee
has received displacement allowance pay-
ments In excess of his or her annual entitle-
ment, the excess payments shall be recov-
ered from any current or future entitlement
to monetary benefits afforded by this title,
exclusive of benefits afforded by section 505
(g) of this title.
- (3) PROTECTED EMPLOYEES OCCUPYING P )SI-
TIONS IN THE OPERATING CRAFTS-Effective on
and after the first day of the month im-
mediately following the date of enactment of
the Employee Protection' and Railroad Fi-
nancing Modification Act of 1980. a pro-
tected operating employee (defined as any
protected employee In ICC. classifications 107
through 128) who has been deprived of em-
ployment or adversely affected with respect
to his or her compensation shall be afford-