NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 30 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000100010098-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 98
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
30 January 1982
Top Secret
CO NIDC 82-025C
Copy 419
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USSR-Angola: Soviet Concern Over Relations . . . . . . . . 1
Lebanon: Presidental Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Western Europe - Turkey: Pressure on Ankara . . . . . . . 3
USSR-Syria: Evacuation of Soviet Dependents . . . . . . . 6
Zambia-USSR: Bartering Cobalt for Arms . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Netherlands: Defense Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Poland: Agricultural Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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USSR-ANGOLA: Soviet Concern Over Relations
The recent visit to Moscow of a high-ZeveZ delegation from
Angola underscores the Soviets' concern about maintaining their
influence in Luanda.
The delegation was given prominent coverage and met wit
Premier Tikhonov and other top officials. A 10-year pro-
gram of economic and technical cooperation and trade was
touted as a major accomplishment of the visit.
The Soviets used the visit to instruct the Angolans
on the dangers of developing ties with the US. An article
in a Soviet weekly, for example, suggested that the US
position on Namibia sought over the long run to undermine
the security of Angola's Marxist regime.
Comment: //Soviet commentary and Tikhonov's assertion
of Soviet preparedness to extend security assistance
reveal Moscow's concern over the interest some Angolan
leaders have in strengthening their ties to the West and
in pursuing a settlement in Namibia. Moscow may be dis-
enchanted with President dos Santos--who may be seeking
a negotiated settlement with Angolan insurgent leader
Savimbi--and maybe wooing hardliners in the government
and military.//
//Despite the emphasis given to the signing of eco-
nomic pacts, they are mainly promises that the two coun-
tries would study further cooperation. Political and
military discussions probably dominated the agenda, but
Moscow may have linked new military aid to Luanda's
firmness on Namibia.//
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LEBANON: Presidential Politics
The presidential election scheduled for next summer is already
shaping up as a contest between the Syrians and the Christian Phalange
Most factions have been unwilling to tip their hand
toward a candidate so early in the campaign. Raymond
Edde, who lost to President Sarkis in 1976 and subse-
quently went into exile in Paris after two attempts on
his life, has emerged as the early favorite of some
Muslim groups hoping to avoid either a Phalange- or a
Syrian-backed candidate. Edde, however, is opposed by
both Bashir Jumayyil and by the Syrians.
Many observers and political figures in Lebanon are
uneasy about the election and believe that the security
situation will deteriorate as the campaign unfolds. They
also fear that the Lebanese Front, unable to prevent the
election of a Syrian candidate, will try to prevent the
vote from being held, leading almost certainly to new
fighting between the Phalange and the Syrians.
Comment: A Shamun candidacy would be widely viewed
as a stalking-horse for the Lebanese Front, which is con-
cerned that the Syrians intend to push for the election
of a pro-Syrian candidate such as former President Sulayman
Franjiyah. In such an event, the Front might "sacrifice"
Shamun in return for a similar gesture by Damascus toward
its hardline candidate.
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//West Europeans will keep up their political and economic
pressure on Ankara despite the decision of the Council of Eu, robe
Parliamentary Assembly on Thursday not to expel Turkey.//
//The Assembly passed a resolution criticizing Turkish
human rights practices, but it rejected expulsion. The
action comes a week after the EC assembly, the European
Parliament, adopted a tough resolution on Turkey. In
addition, OECD Secretary General van Lennep has post-
poned his scheduled trip to Ankara on the advice of EC
government representatives.//
Comment: //Although most West European governments
want to maintain links to Turkey, they feel under increas-
ing pressure to take a stronger stand against military
rule there because of growing domestic criticism and
because of Western condemnation of martial law in Poland.
Scandinavian governments, for example, now are likely to
lodge a complaint against the Turkish Government with
the European Commission on Human Rights. Hearings under-
taken by the Commission probably would last one to two
years and could result in Turkey's expulsion from the
Council of Europe.//
//EC members are not likely to lift the suspension
on $650 million in Community aid to Turkey in the near
term. OECD members so far have kept silent on the
pledging session this spring for aid to Turkey but will
shortly have to take positions on further assistance.
The EC Ambassadors probably wanted van Lennep to post-
pone his trip to avoid publicity about the question of
future assistance.//
//Despite its initial anger over the Council of
Europe's resolution, the Turkish Government is likely
to continue to emphasize that alleged human rights vio-
lations are vigorously investigated and prosecuted and
that General Evren's New Year speech committed the com-
manders to the restoration of civilian rule by late 1983
or early 1984. The commanders probably would agree to
participate in European human rights hearings but would
withdraw from the Council of Europe voluntarily if it
concluded that Turkey's expulsion were imminent.//
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The state funeral yesterday for Mikhail Suslov pro-
vided further evidence that party Secretary Chernenko
has improved his leadership standing at the expense of
fellow Secretary Kirilenko. Chernenko outranked Kirilenko
in all but one of the leadership appearances during the
proceedings. He usually was placed in the third spot
Suslov had occupied among Politburo members and the
second spot among secretaries. The variance in Kirilenko's
placement makes his precise rank difficult to determine.
Comment: Suslov probably had restrained President
Brezhnev's efforts to push Chernenko forward, and
Chernenko is now likely to assume new responsibilities
within the secretariat. He appears to be the leading
candidate to take over Suslov's portfolio for ideology
and relations with foreign Communist parties. Although
Chernenko is less experienced than Kirilenko in foreign
affairs, he has become increasingly prominent in this
area over the last year. He reportedly will lead the
Soviet delegation to the French Communist Party Congress
next week.
USSR-SYRIA: Evacuation of Soviet Dependents
The Soviet Embassy in Damascus early this month sent
home about 200 schoolchildren because of the continuing
threat of terrorist attacks, according to a Soviet
official in Syria. The decision was taken following the
car bombing in November that killed over 100 persons in
Damascus. The Soviet community in Syria over the past
three years has been the target of numerous terrorist
actions in which at least 16 Soviets have been killed.
These attacks have been attributed primarily to the
Muslim Brotherhood.
Comment: The departure of the schoolchildren
appears to have been the basis for a rumor circulating
in the Middle East that the USSR was evacuating depend-
ents from Damascus, Beirut, and Amman in anticipation of
an Israeli military move into southern Lebanon.
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ZAMBIA-USSR: Bartering Cobalt for Arms
Zambia
is bartering 500 tons of cobalt worth over $12 million
to the USSR to help pay for MIG-21s and other advanced
weapons purchased under an arms agreement worth $200 mil-
lion signed in 1979. The military agreement originally
had called for hard currency payments.
Comment: The deal, apparently concluded in late
1981, comes at a time when Zambia is experiencing severe
foreign payments problems because of depressed mineral
prices for cobalt and copper. The decision to barter
cobalt also may stem from Lusaka's failure last year to
win any bids to supply cobalt for the US stockpile and
the influence of pro-Soviet officials within the Zambian
Government. The transaction will almost triple the USSR's
normal yearly purchase of Zambian cobalt and could pre-
sage similar deals.
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//Parliament next week will consider the defense
budget for 1982. The center-left coalition of Prime
Minister van Agt will propose to increase spending by
about 3 percent in real terms, but Defense and Finance
Ministry spokesmen are pessimistic about meeting the
NATO goal.//
Comment: //The government, which is divided on the
issue of cruise missile basing, is trying to compensate
by adhering to its commitment to NATO's conventional
deterrent. Although it is likely to win approval for
spending levels close to 3 percent, defense appropriations
probably will be cut later this year when the deepening
recession creates additional pressure on the budget.//
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POLAND: Agricultural Problems
The martial law regime has not yet formulated an agricultural
policy that will gain it the support of private farmers and ensure
adequate food supplies. The government has alternated threats of
compulsory deliveries with offers of increased procurement prices
and other incentives. Farmers should begin to make decisions soon
about their production for this year, and the regime must move
quickly if it hopes to encourage them to increase output.
One of the regime's main challenges continues to be
satisfying the population's food demands. Before the
imposition of martial law, meat procurements from private
farmers did not cover rationing requirements.
Grain procurements were only one-third of state
needs, even though Poland had an above-average grain
crop last year. The regime was importing meat and grain
to help cover the gap, but still failed at times to meet
its rationing commitments.
A drop in procurements following the imposition of
martial law prompted threats of making deliveries compul-
sory. The government wanted to maintain food supplies
to blunt popular reaction to martial law.
Initially, however, the threats did not have the
intended effect. Some farmers--who may have thought
collectivization would follow forced deliveries--
reportedly killed livestock and buried food supplies
to avoid confiscation.
Moderates in the regime seem to have successfully
argued against collectivization. The government prob-
ably realized that the rapid elimination of the private
sector--which produces about 75 percent of agricultural
production and provides 70 percent of total state
procurements--would severely disrupt food supplies and
provoke prolonged resistance among farmers.
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//Nonetheless, the regime has kept pressure on the
farmers. For the first time, it is threatening legal
action if farmers do not fulfill grain contracts signed
with the state. The government also is refusing to
sell farmers seeds and fertilizers unless they have made
sufficient grain sales to the state.//
The increase in early January in prices of fertil-
izer and tractors probably deepened farmers' mistrust,
even though the regime has promised to compensate by
raising prices paid for agricultural goods when consumer
prices are raised in February. The new prices are part
of an effort to place a more realistic value on agricul-
tural supplies.
The government also has offered inducements, promis-
ing to extend credit to farmers for purchase of supplies
and to make any future increases in livestock and grain
procurement prices retroactive to November. In addition,
it is offering up to a 20-percent premium for the timely
fulfillment of grain contracts. Farmers who deliver
noncontracted grain will receive in payment "grain bonds"
redeemable in 1983-85 at prices in effect at that time,
plus interest.
The regime has attempted to show its support of pri-
vate farmers by submitting to parliament some measures
introduced before martial law. These include bills to
liberalize farm inheritance and pensions and to increase
the maximum allowable farm size.
The martial law regime's combination of threats
and promises has yielded mixed results. The state has
purchased only,63 percent of the grain it will need by
mid-February.
In December, the government had to rely on Soviet
meat deliveries to fill one-fourth of its rationing com-
mitment. Although the regime subsequently claimed that
meat procurements have improved enough to cover completely
its lower rationing commitments in January, the increases
may reflect initial distress slaughtering of chickens
because of fodder shortages or the sale of animals long
overdue for slaughter.
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Threats by the regime also may have helped keep
up livestock procurements. Military operations groups
circulating recently in the countryside apparently put
pressure on farmers to fill their contracts.
The regime's reassurance will not easily dispel
the farmers' apprehensions. Many farmers may take a
wait-and-see attitude, and those who are nervous about
the.future of private agriculture may cut back produc-
tion to cover only the needs of their families and close
friends.
Passive resistance by private farmers would seri-
ously compound the regime's agricultural problems. In
any case, the existing shortages of seeds, fertilizers,
tractor spare parts, and pesticides will limit crop yields
in 1982. The prospect of future downturns will put pres-
sure on the regime to use more forceful methods or to
more sensitive to the farmers' needs and concerns.
Historically, the Polish farmer has responded more
to inducements than threats. The old formula of raising
procurement prices to increase production may not wow
today because of the lack of consumer goods to buy.
If the retail price reform does bring stability to
the marketplace and an increase in the amount of goods
in the countryside, however, the regime may be able to
cajole some farmers into selling at least part of the
reduced quantities that are produced this year. If not,
the regime out of "frustration" could resort to forced
deliveries, which could move it toward adopting other
coercive measures.
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