ANSWERS TO TWO QUESTIONS FROM HPSCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B01072R000100040041-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 41
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/02/28: CIA-RDP84B01072R000100040041-0
MEMORANDUM FOR: John N. McMahon
Executive Director
FROM R. E. Hineman
Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Answers to Two Questions from HPSCI
1. How likely is Nicaragua to stage attacks against anti-Sandinista
camps in Honduras?
Answer: Although pressures for a retaliatory strike to
destroy anti-Sandinista insurgent camps in Honduras probably
have been building among Nicaraguan leaders, Managua fears
that such a move would provoke a major U.S. military action
against Nicaragua. The Sandinistas, therefore, prefer
instead to retaliate in kind against Tegucigalpa by stepping
up their covert activities in support of violent Honduran
leftist elements.
2. Word has been received by the HPSCI through an unnamed source that
if the U.S. strains relations with Nicaragua they will break diplomatic
ties. Statement should be prepared suggesting the advantages for Nicaragua
not breaking relations with the U.S. and why it's not in their best interest
to do so.
Answer: We believe that the Sandinistas are not likely
to break diplomatic relations with the U.S. One advantage
to avoiding a'rupture is that it enables them to present--
through diplomatic and publicity efforts--a conciliatory and
responsible image abroad. Managua tries to portray itself
as the aggrieved party in relations with Washington. The
Sandinistas are fostering the sentimental image of the
Nicaraguan "David" courageously resisting the U.S. "Goliath"
in the hope that such a tactic will influence American and
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international public opinion against possible U.S. military
actions. Moreover, Managua is likely to follow Cuba's
policy of abstaining from breaking diplomatic ties with any
country--with the sole exception of Israel. In addition,
the Sandinistas fear that a break with the U.S. would lead
to a U.S. trade embargo against Nicaragua. They are heavily
dependent on the U.S. market for both exports and imports,
and foreign trade is vital to Nicaragua's economy. Although
the Sandinistas could eventually expand trade with other
industrialized nations to replace U.S. commerce, they are
concerned with the disrupt' effects of such a shift on the
fragile Nicaraguan economy.
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Approved For Release 2007/02/28: CIA-RDP84B01072R000100040041-0