WILSON-TERPIL FOLLOW-ON QUESTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00148R000200570019-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: March 19, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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19 MAR
`~ .1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, House Liaison
VIA: Chief, Legislative Liaison
FROM: Charles A. Briggs
Inspector General
SUBJECT: Wilson-Terpil Follow-on Questions
REFERENCES: Your memo, dated 12 February 1982
(EA 82-0063), same subject
U` Xd $ 2-OO63
1. Attached responses, in the format you requested, were
consolidated and edited by my Wilson-Terpil team, coordinated
with OGC representatives, with some further scrubbing by me, as
reflected in the copy of my memo to the General Counsel, which I
have also attached.
2. If Stan does want to suggest changes on Questions 2 or
3, as you see, I have asked him to send them directly to you to
expedite the response to HPSCI. You might then simply inform me
of the fact.
3. The DDCI is aware of the general nature of the
responses, prior to my having taken a hand to theme. Given his
considerable interest in the case, I suggest that you run. the
final package through him prior to transmittal to HPSCI4
Charles A. Brigg
Attachments:
As Stated
All portions are classified
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19
MAR
I
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel.
FROM: Charles. A. Briggs
Inspector General
SUBJECT: Wilson.Terpil Follow-on Questions
%
1. Attached reflects my personal scrubbing of the Agency
responses, and subsequnet detailed consolidation and editing work
by my Wilson/Terpil team and of your office. :j:
have made some changes to the text which Barbara last saw on
Questions 1, 4, 5, 6; 15, 20, 25 and. 28.
2. Given yesterday's ExCom decision on a legislative draft,
you might want to check again the reference made to potential
legislation in responses to Question 2 (second paragraph) and 3
(first paragraph. The conditional phrasing on Question 2 and
factual statement re Question 3 that legislation is more
effective (by definition) than an expansion of the employment
contract, do not seem to conflict with the tenor of the ExCom
meeting. However, if we would not be inclined to encourage
legislation would you want to rephrase the first paragraph,
second sentence, changing "...we question ..."to something like
"...we are not sure how effective such a contract would be in
other than a moral'control context, given the limitations..."
3. I do think it behooves us to respond soonest to HPSCI,
now that we have the factual responses from the comp s, hence
I've D a complete package, with this letter, to
h a
e s
--
o Q
s
e
- _
J/
.. g
t
u
s 1. I o n s e- u r 3, send
them directly to him. If the other scrubbing that I did, noted
in para 1 above, gives you any serious problems, lea's discuss.
Charles A. iggs
Attachments:
As Stated
cc: OEXA w/o att
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l.. What is the charter, the job description of the CIA's
Inspector General?
The Inspector General, on behalf of the Director, directs
and coordinates the.activities of the Inspection Staff and Audit
Staff in conducting special investigations, inspections, and
audits of Agency components and the staff elements of the Office
of the Director, both at headquarters and in the field, and
oversees the Agency-wide grievance handling system. CIA
regulations describing these duties are
attached. a grade o e Inspector General is equivalent to
that of a Deputy Director (SIS-6). The Inspector General has
access to any information within the Agency and the staff
elements of the Office of the Director.
The Executive Order 12036 requirements were modified by
Presidential Executive Order 12333 which was approved on 4
December 1981. Executive Order 12333 requires that senior
members of the Intelligence Community:
"(d) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and
keep the Director of Central Intelligence appropriately
informed, concerning any intelligence activities of
their organization that they have reason to believe may
be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or
Presidential Directive;"
"(h) Instruct their employees to cooperate fully with
the Intelligence Oversight Board;" and
"(1) Insure that the Inspectors General and General
Counsels have access to any information necessary to
perform their. duties assigned by this Order.
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2. What restrictions on ex-employees' employment -- if any -- do
you believe are needed in the wake of Wilson/Terpil?
Current laws as applicable to government employees
generally, restrict certain activities on the. part of former
government employees. For example, the conflict of interest laws
restrict post-employment representational activities as they
pertain to the former agency employee.
The concerns raised by the Wilson and Terpil case apply
equally to personnel in the intelligence, defense and foreign
policy communities. It may be appropriate to place certain
limitations on, or to legislate reporting requirements
concerning, post-government employment throughout the Federal
government, but the development of an equitable text would not he
easy.
Wilson and Terpil have been indicted for numerous violations
of criminal law. It is doubtful whether any contractual or
legislative ban on their activities would have been effective.
In any event, legislation in this area should be balanced and
attempt to deal with systemic problems.
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3. To what extent can CIA employment contracts be utilized to
require ex-employees to register their dealings with foreign
governments after leaving CIA? To limit such employment? Do
you feel such restrictions would be fair?
We believe such a contractual provision (reasonable as to
scope) would be lawful. However, we question how effective such
a contract would be, given the limitations on enforcement of such
provisions by traditional breach of contract remedies. The type
of activities the contract would address exceed the scope.of
contract enforcement actions. Legislation, naturally, would
present a more formidable and effective means to deal with post-
government employment restrictions.
As posed, the restrictions would be unfair to ex.-employees
of CIA. The restrictions focus only on CIA employees, neglecting
the potential for former employees of other government agencies
to work directly for foreign governments. This is' pertinent
since Wilson was an employee of the Navy after his employment
with the Agency.
The second objection is that it is an across-the--board
restriction that does not discriminate on the type of activity
being undertaken. For example, many Agency employees have skills
that are appealing to the U.S. business-community, and to
universities, foundations, etc. If their right to wort; in these
sectors were abridged by the terms of their employment with CIA,
our ability to recruit new employees and to retain current ones
would be seriously constrained, to say nothing of its being
fundamentally discriminatory.
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4. What do you think of prohibiting and criminalizing all ex-
Government employees, or those who once held security
clearances, from employment with foreign governments
determined by the President to be supporting terrorism?
Under current legislation, commercial relationship with
certain foreign governments are proscribed: e.g., Trading with
the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. ss. 5 under which criminal
penalties may be imposed; e.g., Johnson Debt Default Act, 18
U.S.C. ss. 955. Similar legislation could be adopted with
respect to employment relationships with countries designated by
the President as hostile to United States interests. The
prohibition on employment with those foreign governments should
apply to all U.S. citizens, not merely to former U.S. government
employees, and be concerned with activities specifically defined
as supporting international terrorism.
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5. In restricting post-government employment', or requiring that
it be registered with the Government, how do you treat the
cases of ex-government employees who work for companies which
contract to perform services for foreign governments?
We don't. If we did and if a company has a contract on
which the former government employee could not work directly
because of restrictions imposed by a government regulation, that
employee would have to be quarantined from the contract and not
have a.role in its negotiation or execution.
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6. Do you see objections to a statute which criminalizes
recruiting by anyone for purposes of international terrorism?
We would have no objection to making criminal activities
such as recruitment by private individuals on behalf of a hostile
foreign government or organization for support of. international
terrorism. We note, however, the difficulty encountered to date
in defining "international terrorism,"
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7. Were there in 1971, or have there been at any time
thereafter, any CIA regulations, procedures, or
concerning Agency. and individual employee relations~c-esocial
or Agency related with ex-employees working for or with
foreign governments?
The Agency's policy concerning such relationships is
contained in the Employee Code of Conduct and the regulations
referenced therein. This policy not only mandates arm's length
dealings with former employees working for foreign governments
but also sets forth standards and procedures which
contacts with ex-employees regardless of their curregov
ntern all
activities.
Two Headquarters Notices, one issued by Admiral Turner on 27
June 1977 and one by DCI Casey on 25 June 1981, reminded
employees of the standards and policy which govern their contacts
with former employees.
Copies of the three documents referred to above are attached
for the Committee's review.
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 h'r..y py t'i.t 4, t Y
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urrent Kand dormer CIA'; personnel are expected to . mai ntai n
guided `the conductof.Agency personnel in:.the:;performance of;:their .=
long :been a tradition of 'discipline and loyalty to the'Ajency that hag'
Eanda'rds of5co'nduct consistent ;with the Agencya:misszon.' There has'
re.iy< neaviay on this di sci p1 jne and : loyalty not only. duri
of employment but., of equal importance,: after-employment.
n , - . are. specifically prahibitecf.by law
or regulation. '.These;various prohibitions and other standards of conduct
regulations. and with which- employees must be familiar and are require
:regulations.-.This bulletin summarizes information. contained in
former employees as'a.result of. past or present relationshios'should be'
with.the CIA and at all.times thereafter. On occasion former employees
and others may try, to` exploit their prior and current relationships with
equities.. ?,The-obligation to protect such information from unauthorized
disclosure applies during an individual's employment or other service''
the disclosure of which may adversely affect CIA or national security-
concerning intelligence sources or methods, and other sensitive information
unauthorized disclosure information that is classified, information .,
also are contained in each employee's contract agreement to protect from
honor-.this.trust through their own integrity and conduct in all official.
actions. Because of this special position of trust, certain obligations
are placed , by virtue ;_of::their gency service, employees are expected to
impropriety.";, .,. Given: the special position of. trust in which employees-..
bars the use:,of_public office for private gain, and directs employees-to
things, restricts the receipt of gifts, limits the use of iinsider.information,'
Agency employees by'Executive order 11222. This-order, among other
.to review;annually. -Additional standards of ethical conduct are imposed on
than.other.]ndividualsconducting business with the Agency.
his or her service, that person is not entitled to be.treated any differently
such relationships are not being misused. Once an employee has terminated
avoiued, and Agency personnel constantly must be on guard to ensure that,.
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