LEBANESE ARMED FORCES: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001800230013-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2007
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: August 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Secret
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Approved For Releasa2007/05/01 `'Cl'P'fCPP4BQ60~`Ot~9~'
 Approved For Release 2007/05/01: CIA-RDP84B00049R001800230013-9
Approved For Release 2007/05/01 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001800230013-9
 Approved For Release ,2007/{3:5/01 ::CIASRDP84BQQ049R00`'18G02
National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Lebanese Armed Forces:
Problems and Prospects (u)
Information available as of 31 July 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
The author of this assessment il -1
the Office of Political Analysis. of
the Office of Strategic Research contributed to this
paper. Comments and queries are welcome and may
be directed to the Chief, Near East-South Asia
Division, Office of Political Analysis
The paper was coordinated with the Offices of
Economic Research and Strategic Research and
the National Intelligence Officer for Near East-
South Asia. (u)
Secret
PA 81-10316
August 1981
25X1
25X1
 Approved:Far RIs,t0705I01 C4A-.FDP843 0043F06.8OC33001
Key Judgments
Lebanese Armed Forces:
Problems and Prospects (u)
The 23,600-man Lebanese Armed Forces. (LAF) will not become an
effective instrument.of government until a political accord on the country's
future is reached. The LAF is being rebuilt slowly after crumbling during
the civil war of 1975-76, but continues to mirror Lebanon's confessional
and political problems.
The LAF's growth has slowed over the past year because of recruitment
difficulties. The government is unlikely to achieve its goal of 36,000 men
by the end of 1983.
The government has made progress toward more equal representation of
Muslims and Christians in the LAF. Christians still hold a majority of the
officer positions, however, and the composition of units continues to reflect
the confessional orientation of the areas to which they are assigned. LAF
personnel still owe primary allegiance to their religious groups, and the
military would again split along confessional lines in the event of major
fighting between Muslims and Christians.
The LAF has been successfully deployed into some sensitive areas in Beirut
and southern Lebanon, but it cannot act with authority without the
acquiescence of the Syrians, Palestinians, or major Lebanese factions.
The main Christian factions favor an expansion of the LAF's security
responsibilities, particularly if the Army replaces Syrian troops. Muslims,
however, believe that the LAF has a Christian bias and oppose its
widespread use until it is more thoroughly reorganized.
The above information is Confidential.
Secret
PA 81-103/6
August 1981
10
 Approved For Release 2007/05/01 CIA-RDP84B00049R0010002
Lebanese Armed Forces:
Problems and Prospects (u)
Introduction
The Lebanese Government has made rebuilding and
reorganizing the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) a
primary goal since the military split along confession-
al lines during the civil war of 1975-76. The central
government, weak and challenged by other Lebanese
and regional actors, needs a national army that can
extend Beirut's authority throughout the country and
help reestablish its credibility. I
President Sarkis underlined his commitment to the
LAF last year when he included the rebuilding of the
LAF as one of his 14 principles for achieving a
national accord. Rebuilding the Army has become a
central factor in the government's presentation to the
Arab Conciliation Committee' on national political
reconciliation.
For the first few years after the civil war the rebuild-
ing program progressed slowly. Army strength gradu-
ally grew from a few thousand after the war to about
18,000 by mid-1979. New training programs were
initiated, and facilities destroyed or damaged during
the civil war were repaired or replaced. Efforts were
made to restore the Army's presence in outlying
regions=
The Defense Law
The government also tried to remedy the confessional
imbalance in the Army, which had long been a
Muslim grievance and was a major factor in the
Army's dissolution during the civil war. Recruitment
of Muslims was increased in 1977, and a defense law
intended to bring about a more equitable confessional
balance at key command levels, traditionally dorm
ed by Maronite Christians, was enacted in 1979
' The Arab Conciliation Committee (ACC) was founded in 1976 as
part of the Arab League effort to consolidate the cease-fire that
ended the Lebanese civil war. Consisting of the Foreign Ministers
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Syria and the secretary general of the
Arab League, it works under the direction of Lebanon's President.
The ACC was reconvened this spring as part of a larger effort to
end Syrian-Phalange tensions, to promote national reconciliation in
Lebanon, and to set the stage for a resolution of the Syrian-Israeli
missile crisilI
The law provided for the establishment of a confes-
sionally balanced military council and a nine-member
higher defense council. The military council consists
of the Army commander and members representing
the country's six major religious sects. It fulfills
several duties previously reserved only for the Army
commander-traditionally a Maronite-including the
rights to approve the defense budget, promotions and
transfers of senior officers, and to assign troops for
internal security purposes. The higher defense coun-
cil, which consists of the most senior members of the
government, coordinates and implements defense poli-
cy. It also must concur in senior officer promotions
and assignments. 25X1
The defense law also contains language designed '5X1
restrict the authority of the Lebanese President-
traditionally a Maronite-over the Army, ensuring
that presidential directives to the military are counter-
signed b the Prime Minister-traditionally a Sunni
Muslim 25X1
The law was approved by the Lebanese cabinet early
this year, after more than a year of wrangling and the
resignation of Salim al-Huss as Prime Minister. X1
major disagreement-concerning the status of the
Army's directorate of intelligence-was resolved by a
compromise that left the directorate under the Mar-
onite LAF commander but required it to report to the
chief of staff (a Druze) and limited its responsibilities
solely to military intelligence. In exchange, Prime
Minister Wazzan agreed to support the passage of a
long-stalled promotion list that included Christian
officers who had fought with the Phalange militia
during the civil war.
25X1
Although welcomed by most parties as a basis fo 25X1
r
rebuilding the Army, the defense law has drawbacks.
The councils and the decisionmaking process it estab-
lished are cumbersome and subject to the veto of the
confessional groups. The council process has already
delayed promotions as a result of factional disputes.
25X1
 President-Sarkis reviews honor
guard at Beirut International
Airport. (U)
Moreover, it could be a major stumblingblock should
the government try to purge the senior ranks of pro-
Phalange Christian officers. Finally, in its effort to
provide checks and balances the law created overlap-
ping lines of authority that may hamper the govern-
ment's ability to use the Army in crises.
Mission
The LAF's main mission is to perform internal securi-
ty duties and protect the government's interests
against Lebanon's private militias and the Palestinian
fedayeen. It cannot defend Lebanon from attack by
Syria or Israel.
The lack of an external mission is a source of several
of the LAF's problems. Training and equipment
requirements are still largely tailored to the needs of a
military that expects to field multibattalion units
against similar forces. The LAF's major foes, how-
ever, are not only less conventionally organized and
equipped but are also more familiar with fighting in
an urban milieu-the site of many of Lebanon's
major internal security problems. ^
The LAF is presently no larger than either of the two
major private militias in Lebanon-the Phalange and
Palestinian fedayeen. The various Lebanese leftist
organizations could proba ly muster a force roughly
half the size o t e . espite the Army s a emp s
Major Armed Groups in Lebanon
Lebanese Armed Forces
23,600
Syrian peacekeeping forces
28,000
Christian militias
30,000 a
Muslim militias
10,000 to
12,000
Palestinian fedayeen
20,000 to
30,000,
1 ::1
to upgrade its equipment, the Phalange, the Palestin-
ians, and even some of the smaller leftist militias are
better armed.
Recruitment
The government's goal is to increase the Army's
strength to about 36,000, which it hopes will make it
large enough to overcome its internal rivals. Recruit-
-t however is proving to be a major difficulty.
me
25X
25
, ,
Although national conscription was established by the 25X
defense law, it has never been implemented. Poorer
Shiite Muslims have been attracted to the Army, but
many young Christians have shunned the military or
joined the militias. Moreover, the often better educat-
ed Christians can enter the competing civilian job
 Approved For-Release 2007/05101: CIA-RDP84B00049R0018.00230013-9
Higher Defense
Council -
Minister of
Defense
Commander
LAF/Army
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Equipment
Director of Intelligence
Director of Information
General Secretary
Beirut
Military District
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Personnel
Mt. Lebanon
Military Region
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Planning
Bekaa
Military Region
25X1
Deputy Chief of
(Staff for
pperations
Southern
Military Region
Northern
Military Region
 market more easily than their Muslim counterparts.
Although this pattern has helped the government to
reduce the confessional imbalance between Muslims
and Christians in the military, the basic capabilities of
the LAF have decreased because the new recruits are
less skilled
The Army may soon be faced with the problem of
having too few noncommissioned officers because over
1,000 are reported to have retired so far this year. A
new noncommissioned officers' school is to be built in
Hammana to replace one in Baalbak that was closed
as a result of the civil war, but it will probably not be
able to relieve the shortage for up to five years
Training
The LAF commander has launched a campaign to
upgrade training by establishing a training directorate
headed by a brigadier general. The program will be
supported in part by an increase in US funding under
the International Military Education and Training
Program in the 1982 fiscal year. The program faces
problems such as a lack of classroom facilities and
training equipment as well as the current shortfall in
recruitment. Moreover, much of the LAF's leadership
has an outdated view of the Army's mission, prefer-
ring old training methods and highly visible weapons
IA-?RDP84.B00049R00:180023001 3_g
In contrast, seven of the nine battalions in the large
Mount Lebanon Military Region, which encompasses
the Christian Maronite heartland, are Christian-
dominated-even at the enlisted level. The region's
officer corps in mid-1980 was 83-percent Christian,
and four of the nine battalions had no Muslim
officers. I
Units in the Beirut Military District are more confes-
sionally balanced than those in the outlying military
regions, largely because the government has made
greatest progress in reorganizing those units most
directly under its control. Among newer units, such as
the mechanized battalions currently deployed along
the "Green Line" separating east and west Beirut,
however, Christians still account for more than 70
percent of the personnel
The general pattern is repeated in the Air Force. The
enlisted ranks are heavily Muslim, but Christian
officers outnumber their Muslim counterparts by
more than two to one. The 300-man Navy is almost
entirely Christian, with fewer than 10 Muslims as-
signed to it. Neither service has a significant role to
play, however, and the central government has paid
little attention to reorganizing them. II
the mundane requirements of internal security. New Internal Security Duties
The Confessional Balance
_ off
BY mid-12N-Muslims comprised some 58 percent
the LAF's personnel-roughly equal to the ercent-
age Lebanese Muslims nationally. Most, however,
were in the lower ranks. The officer cor s is still
Chnstian-dominated-about 55 percent.
The confessional breakdowns vary considerably
among the Army's five geographical sectors-four
military regions and the Beirut Military District. In
the largely Muslim Bekaa Military Region, which
encompasses most of eastern Lebanon, all but one of
five battalions had more Muslim officers than Chris-
tians. Units in the overwhelmingly Muslim Southern-
Military Region were only 25-percent Christian; only
eight of the 68 officers assigned there were Christian.
The officer corps in the Northern Military Region
was divided equally between Christians and Muslims,
but Muslims comprised more than two-thirds of the
enlisted men there
in an
expanded internal security role and in peacekeeping
functions previously carried out by the Syrian-domi-
nated Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF). Deployment into
potential trouble spots has been successful only when
agreed to by all the major parties involved. The initial
attempt to move the Army back into southern Leb-
anon in mid-1978 failed, for example, because militia-
men from the Christian enclave of Israeli-backed
Major Haddad resisted.II
From mid-1979 through 1980 the government's ef-
forts to increase the Army's internal security responsi-
bilities focused largely on Beirut. In June 1979 800
troops were sent into a Christian sector of the city to
stop clashes between rival Christian militias. In
March 1980 the Army began replacing departing
Syrian troops in the Christian suburbs of east Beirut.
Within a few months four army battalions had de-
ployed along the Christian side of the "Green Line" in
the city
25X1
25X1.?
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/01.:.CIA-RDP8.4B00049R0018O023001?.3=:9;:_.
Lebanese Armed Forces
15 Miles
? Kleist
Beirut Region
2 infantry battalions
1 armored battalion
U - z
3 ip entry battalions
1 armored battalion
(Army
Headquarters)
Al Fayyidiyab
w
/
artillery battalion
Ablah f="? Ri
yaq
3 mechanized infant
Hammana
f
T
battalions
1 artillery battalion
1 anti-aircraft battalion
"Beirut
International
Airport
Jazzin-
Israel
35?30'
Southern'.Re
2 infantry" battalir
Wripoli
Northern Region
3 infantry battalions
)-, 1 armored battalion
` -1 artillery_battalion
lam?.
Mt. Lebanon
n
Re i
-5. entryattalions ! ZaR 2 arm ored battalions
2 artillery battalions Baalbek
Bek ion
?Arz n r
~l I
Armise
ti
UNDOF
Zone
Pa' Syria
36?30'
Syria.
Bahay,r`~/
DAMASCUS -, C
Bah,(
Himi
Naval Headquarters
Air Force Bass
^ Military Region Headquarters
-?- Military Region Boundary
36?00'
A separate task force battalion,
directly subordin.-te to the Ministry of Defense,
is attached to ON forces in the south at Arzun
36?30'
5X1
r/
 Approved: Far Release 2007105101 CL -RDP84B0QO49ROO180023001~-9.
The value of the LAF as an instrument of government
authority has been borne out most strongly along the
"Green Line," where army units have survived several
tests of their resolve and have maintained their posi-
tions when attacked. In early 1981, for example, LAF
units repulsed attacks by Syrian-backed Palestine
Liberation Army troops as well as Syrian tank and
artillery fire .I
Old Problems Remain
Despite the progress in rebuilding the LAF since the
civil war of 1975-76, the Army would probably again
divide along confessional lines if major fighting
between Muslims and Christians resumes.II
Many of the conditions that prompted the Army to
fall apart still exist. The senior officers corps is still
dominated by Christians, many of whom openly sym-
pathize with the Phalange. Most units are lopsidedly
Christian or Muslim. Pro-Phalange Christian officers
maintain close contact with the militia leadership and
exchange intelligence and operational information.
Planning exists for contingencies under which Chris-
tian officers and troops would break off from the
Army to aid the militias as well as to deter attempts
by Muslim army members to help their coreligionists.
When the security situation deteriorated this spring,
pro-Phalange officers began transferring army equip-
ment to depots in Christian-held territory.
Lebanese Muslims. Lebanon's Muslims, especially
the leftists, consider the Army to be still Christian-
dominated. They support the defense law as a step
toward a more balanced officer corps but believe these
measures are insufficient. They look upon the status
of the Army's several pro-Phalange officers as a
bellwether of the government's willingness to depoliti-
cize the Army. They will view the deployment of
confessionally balanced LAF units into the Christian
heartland as a further test of the government's deter-
mination. As long as they continue to perceive the
Army as pro-Christian, Muslims will oppose efforts to
deploy it into Muslim-held west Beirut or other
sensitive areas.II
The Palestinians. The Palestinians view efforts to
rebuild the LAF and expand its control as a potential
threat to their position in Lebanon. Politically, how-
ever, they cannot afford open opposition to govern-
ment efforts to expand the LAF's security role. They
are likely to build up and support their largely leftist
Muslim allies in the National Movement 2 to enable
them to be in a better position to oppose government
efforts to expand areas under Army control
25X1
25X1
The Phalange. The Phalange, not surprisingly, is
favorably disposed toward the LAF. The LAF is
generally considered to be an ally against the forces of
the left, the Palestinians, and the Syrians. The Pha- 25X1
lange will in most cases support Army deployments to
replace the Syrians. 25X1
The Phalange woul oppose a orts to dilute the
influence of their supporters in the Army by either
Muslims or "neutral" Christians. It will resist an
extension of LAF authority into areas of Phalange
control. The Phalange will also be suspicious of Syrian
or Lebanese Muslim-supported plans for further reor-
ganization of the LAF or demands that the LAF have
freedom throughout Christian sectors of Lebanon=
Syrian and Israeli Views. The Syrians have long
given formal support to the reorganization of the
Lebanese Army along more confessionally balanced
lines, maintaining that they would be willing to turn' 25X1
over a large part of their security duties in Lebanon to
such a force. Nonetheless, the Syrians have done little
to facilitate the pro ram-indeed they have under-
mined the effort
Syria's mistrust of the LAF stems from the civil war
when many Christian elements broke away to aid the
Phalange militia, taking much of the Army's equip-
ment with them. The Syrians believe that Lebanese
Government efforts to reduce Christian influence and
purge pro-Phalange officers have been insufficienti I 25X1
'The National Movement is a coalition of leftist, largely Muslim
political parties formed in 1976 as a counterweight to the Phalange-
dominated Christian coalition, the Lebanese Front
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/01 ..CIA-RDP84B00049RO01800230013-
The Syrians would like the Lebanese Army to be
bound more closely to the Syrian military through a
formal defense and security arrangement. They have
proposed providing the LAF with advisers and inte-
grating Lebanese officers into their own training
programs. They believe they would thus gain a meas-
ure of long-term influence over the LAF and put an
end to Christian domination
The Israelis believe the Lebanese Army is ineffectual
and will not soon impose government authority over
the Palestinian fedayeen in Lebanon. The Israelis
doubt that progress toward rebuilding the LAF can be
made so long as the Syrians and Lebanese Muslim
leftists oppose granting it wider authority. They also
believe that it will be difficult for the government to
reduce Christian influence markedly in the Army
without alienating the Christian community. They
view efforts by the Syrians and Lebanese Muslims to
induce the government to make the Army more
confessionally balanced as a device to establish Syrian
domination over the military
Israel has shown little concern about the use of the
Army in areas outside southern Lebanon, and is
apparently content to go along with whatever is
acceptable to Tel Aviv's Christian allies. The Israelis,
however, have resisted the Army's deployment into
the area along their northern border controlled by
their Christian ally, Major Haddad. They believe that
the army units sent to the south would consist largely
of pro-Syrian Muslims, pose a threat to Haddad, and
restrict Israel's freedom of maneuver in the zone.)
Outlook
The Lebanese Army remains largely ineffective as an
instrument of government authority. Its limited suc-
cesses have been achieved mostly with the acquies-
cence of the militias-Palestinian and Lebanese-and
the Syrians. It still must be cautious about engaging
in security activities that might offend these groups.
The prospects for a greater role for the Army are
bleak, and it is likely to be limited to small-scale
internal security actions. It will remain unable to cope
with major intercommunal fightin or to challenge
directly any of the large militia
The Army is likely to become a more effective
government instrument only as part of a larger politi-
cal accord in Lebanon. Until such time, the major
Lebanese parties, the Palestinians, and the Syrians
will be able to block unilateral use of the Army by the
government and to undermine efforts to rebuild it that
do not meet their approval. Their opposition to re-
structuring is likely to increase as the Army gains 25X1
strength because they will see it as a threat to their
own control. Recent arms buildups by the Lebanese
and Palestinian militias, moreover, have given these
groups the firepower and weaponry to challenge the
Army more successfully 25X1
The Army can, nonetheless, make an important con-
tribution to internal security. It can:
? Suppress small violent incidents before they have a
chance to spread.
? Deploy along the confrontation line between the
militias and the Syrians-as on the Sannin Ridge.
? Take on more security duties in Beirut.^ 25X1
25X1
 Approved Fok Release 2007/05/01 CIA-RD P84B00049R0018002300.'1.3.=9
Appendix
Force Structure and Equipment
Army
The Lebanese Army strength now stands at 22,000
men, of which about 15,000 are in combat units and
the remainder in staff positions and support forma-
tions. The combat units are manned at only about 60
percent of authorized strength, however, and much of
their equipment is old and in need of repair. The
Army also officially controls Lebanese air and naval
assetsV l
responsibility
The Lebanese military is seeking to create a new
brigade structure that will facilitate more effective
and larger scale operations.. Plans call for the Army's
29 combat battalions' to be organized into seven
mechanized brigades-a general reserve brigade
headquartered at Army Headquarters in Yarze, two
.brigades in the Mount Lebanon Region and one each
in the remaining four military regions. To date, only
two brigade headquarters have been formed-the 8th
Brigade at Yarze and the 1st Brigade in the Bekaa
Military Region. Because of the lack of armored
vehicles, only the 8th Brigade has been mechanized.
In the four regions that lack a formal brigade struc-
ture, each of the regional headquarters will continue
to command all combat battalions in its area of
E]
Equipment. Under the US security assistance pro-
gram and FMS (Foreign Military Sales) provisions
the Lebanese Armed Forces are receiving armored
personnel carriers (APCs), jeep-mounted 106-mm re-
coilless rifles, small arms, communication equipment,
and various support vehicles. They also are purchas-
ing additional British armored fighting vehicles and
have shown interest in French-built armored person-
nel carriers. The French and Jordanians have offered
tanks, and the Lebanese Government has asked for
US tanks, but no agreements have been worked out
yet.
' Eighteen infantry, five armor, five artillery, and one air defense.
In addition to these battalions, a 1,200-man contingent (drawn from
units in the various military regions), headquartered at Arzun in
southern Lebanon, operates in corn any and smaller size formations
under the control of UNIFIL.I
Lebanese Army: Major Combat Units
Regional Command
Beirut Military
Region
Headquarters Units
Beirut Two infantry battalions;
Mount Lebanon Fayyadiyah
Military Region
South Lebanon Sidon
Military Region
one armored battalion
Five infantry battalions;
two armored battalions;
two artillery battalions
North Lebanon Tripoli Three infantry battal-
Military Region ions; one armored battal-
ion; one artillery
battalion
Bekaa Military Ablah
Region
Three infantry battal-
ions; one armored battal-
ion; one artillery
battalion
Army Headquarters Yarze Three mechanized infan-
try battalions; one artil-
lery battalion; one anti-
aircraft battalion
a A separate task force, directly subordinate to the Ministry of
Defense, is attached to UN forces in the south at Arzun.
25X1
Training. The main training center for recruits, which
is located at Hammana with smaller facilities at
Fayyadiyah and Amchit, provides nine weeks of basic
training, followed by another nine to 13 weeks of
advanced, branch-oriented instruction. These facili-
ties reportedly are capable of training up to 4,000 men
per year. The new noncommissioned officers' school at
Hammana will be capable of recessing 3,200 men
per year when completed 25X1
The Army will be lucky to achieve 60 percent of its
4,000-man recruitment goal for 1981, as inductions
have fallen considerably. Consequently, Lebanese
units will continue to be seriously under strength. (c)
dr r rnvarl Fnr RGIPSicP 7nn7rnr)rn1 - CIA-RDP84B0004 R001800 . 00
 Approved For. Release 2007/05/01: CIA-RDP84B00049RO01800:30013-9
Major Weapons
46 a
Armored personnel carriers and
armored cars
230
Artillery
36 (122 and 155 mm)
Mortars
237 (60, 81, and 120 mm)
Antitank guided missile launchers
19 (MILAN and TOW)
Recoilless rifles
49 (90 and 106 mm)
Air defense artillery
96 (23 and 30 mm)
Helicopters
32
a Of the 46 tanks, not more than 10 are estimated to be fully
operational.
Major Equipment Deliveries to Lebanon,
by Supplier, 1980-81
Portugal 23 APCs
US 28 APCs
80 trailers
343 trucks (1/4 ton to 5 ton)
17 155-mm howitzers
18 106-mm recoilless rifles
487 TOW missiles
Its fixed-wing inventory includes some old, lightly
armed aircraft at Riyaq Air Base-eight Hawker
Hunters and nine Mirage Ills. Only the Hawker
Hunters are operational, but the Lebanese Govern-
ment is considering signing an agreement with France
to repair the Mirages.^
The Air Force 'has had growing problems with the
overall quality of recruits being inducted, particularly
Muslims. Consequently, its training program has had
to be modified to provide new recruits with more basic
education and skills needed to become qualified pilots.
Navy
Lebanon's 300-man Navy, almost all Christian, be-
longs for all intents and purposes to the Phalange. 25X1
Headquartered in the main Phalange harbor at Jun-
iyah, most of its few small patrol boats are old and
frequently inoperable. The Navy has no real tasks,
and most of its technical personnel have been reas-
signed to perform maintenance tasks for the Army.II 25X1
Internal Security Force (ISF)
The 7,500-man ISF is a police force that performs
security and law enforcement functions in various
parts of Lebanon. Its "emergency action squads" are
capable of limited paramilitary security operations.
The most important of these units, the 400-man
Squad 16, is deployed in company-size formations in
each of Beirut's major suburban districts. ^ 25X1
The ISF has been unable to recruit sufficient quali-
fied personnel to fill existing vacancies. Nevertheless,
it is requesting government permission to increase its
Italy 3 helicopters manning level to 10,000 men by 1985. Equipment is
Navy limited to small arms and 30 wheeled armored person-
UK I patrol boat nel carriers, 20 of which are assigned to Squad 16.
The force reportedly consists of an almost equal
number of Christians and Muslims, and its command-
Air Force
The 1,300-man Air Force, despite having an elite
corps of skilled, professionally motivated officers, is
basically a rotary-wing force, comprising 32 transport
and utility helicopters in two operational squadrons
based at Beirut International Airport. The Air Force
is attempting to develop an airmobile/air assault
capability using these helicopters
er is one of the more capable and respected officers in
the Lebanese Armed Forces.
II