CCCT MEETING -- LANDSAT ISSUE (S)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001700060018-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 15, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/03/20: CIA-RDP84B00049RO01700060018-4
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Chief, Interdepartmental Affairs Staff, OPP
SUBJECT: CCCT Meeting -- LANDSAT Issue l
1. Attached is the material provided by the IC Staff for your
background and use at tomorrow's CCCT meeting. This material covers
the LANDSAT issue -- lready have the High Technology material
in a separate book.
2. There are two aspects of the LANDSAT issue -- only the first
is of rediconcern to CIA, as explained in the attached summary. What
seems to be at stake here is obtaining sufficient federal funding to
ensure a viable LANDSAT system. Our people have made the case, as
evidenced by the supporting documentation, that LANDSAT is sufficiently
important to the USG to warrant adequate funding.
777
3. The ICS paper dated 12 November explains CIA's dependence
upon the LANDSAT system for the analysis of various agricultural problems
including Soviet harvest forecasts. This paper already has been given
to some of the agencies (OMB, Commerce, Agriculture, and Interior),
which will be represented at tomorrow's meeting. Other agencies
(State, Defense, and AID) will see copies probably for the first time
at the meeting. (Commerce will pass them out at the meeting.) I1
cc: DDCI
D/OPP
SECRET
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1. The Landsat agenda item for the 16 December meeting.of the
Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade will address two issues. The
first issue was initially phrased by OMB as determining the best mechanism
to expedite the transfer of the Landsat system to the private sector.
In actuality, the key decision to be made here is to first determine the
level of the Administration's fiscal commitment to the Landsat program.
The second issue is to decide whether the Administration should consider
simultaneous transfer to the private sector of both the civil weather
and the land remote sensing (Landsat) systems. 0
2. The CIA recommendation on both issues is for Option 2. This
position essentially agrees with the federal agencies and differs from
OMB, the NSC Staff, and the Council of Economic Advisers.
3. Issue 1. With reference to the issue of determining how best
to transfer Landsat to the private sector, one option provides for a
minimum federal commitment level -- 25X1
that is slightly in excess of the current federal agency 25X1
s of Landsat data. The OMB and NSC Staff rationale for this
approach is that this level more closely reflects the real market value
of Landsat data. The chief argument against is that the minimum level
poses the strong probability of not attracting sufficient private sector
involvement to ensure continuation of the Landsat capability. The
second option is for an enhanced federal commitment to perhaps 25X1
lover a five to ten year period, with the objective o attracting 25X1
a major private sector investment of over the next decade. 25X1
The federal agencies' support for this second op ion is based on the
point that the purchase level criterion developed by OMB is a very poor
index of the actual value of the Landsat derived data to US policymakers
(Tab K provides cases in poi ow policymakers have been served by
such data derived by CIA). 2sx1
4. In the Decision Memorandum, OMB has also taken the position
that Landsat data are not critical or essential because there are other
reliable sources of data. The two key agency users, Agriculture and
CIA, as well as Interior, take issue with this OMB judgment. The CIA
agricultural estimating program does make extensive use of Landsat and
classified reconnaissance system data. We have indicated in paragraphs
5 through 10 of Tab E (which will be made available to the Cabinet
Council principals) that each imaging system has characteristics that
provide unique information about -
tions. 2sxi
5. With reference to the first issue, we do not -- nor does any
other federal agency -- oppose the transfer to the private sector. Such
a transfer might create minor problems of maintaining confidentiality of
our requirements, but such problems could be overcome. The concern is 1I
that the transfer be effected in a manner that will not lead to the
demise of the Landsat program. The continuity of Landsat data collection
provides the CIA with the timely, large area, multi-spectral data
 Approved For Release 2007/g t {ASgI. lEb)P84B00049R001700060018-4
necessary for preparation of grain estimates ofi
- assessments that have in the past provided early warning of
MdJor vents affecting world grain markets and US policy. Your 12 June
1981 letter to the D/OMB (Tab 6) has indicated the belief that continuation
of the Landsat program is in the national interest because it clearly
provides data of intelligence importance, and exemplifies US leadership
in remote sensing technology. u
6. Issue 2. We believe that the Administration should not consider
simultaneous private sector transfer of both civil weather and land
remote sensing systems at this time. The reason for this position is
that, as of now, there does not eppear to be a clear understanding and
identification of the specific civil weather functions that are t b
transferred, or the potential adverse impacts of such transfers.
7. The civil weather program has extensive domestic and international
ramifications which should be identified and thoroughly understood and
evaluated to preclude creating disruptions in the present cost-free flow
of foreign weather data. As the largest user of weather data on a
worldwide basis for agricultural, transportation, and other economic,
military and intelligence activities, the US would be particularly
affected by any disruptions in the flow of data. Precipitous actions to
transfer the civil weather systems to the private sector also pose the
risk of creating situations that are not desirable from the viewpoint of
longer-term national security considerations. We defer to the Department
ense to provide more definitive comments on this particular point.
8. The sequence of activities called for under Option 2 would
provide a better basis for decision making and would also minimize the
necessity for developing amendments to the OMB circular A-76 Statement
of Work. In our judgment, adopting Option 2 does not necessarily rule
out or delay a decision for simultaneous transfer of aspects of both
civil weather and land remote sensing systems. It merely ensures that a
national policy decision on any such transfer is made after consideration
of all the consequent factors that would affect US interests.
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