COMMENTS ON LANDSAT ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001700060012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 12, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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1 - UNCLASSIFIED
The Director of Central Intelligence
Intelligence Community Staff
DCI-ICS-3935-81
12 November 1981
Chairman, Working Group on the Private Sector Transfer
of Lands-at Activities
SUBJECT : Comments on Landsat issues
1. The following comments relative to the two Landsat issues identified
by Mr. Ed Harper of OMB are forwarded as you requested.
2. With reference to Issue I, we believe that the Administration
should not consider simultaneous private sector transfer of both civil
weather and land remote sensing systems at this time. The reason for this
position is that, as of now, there does not appear to be a clear understanding
and identification of the specific civil- weather functions that are to be
transferred, or the potential adverse impacts of such transfers.
3. The civil weather program has extensive domestic-and international
ramifications which should be identified and thoroughly understood and
evaluated to preclude creating disruptions in the present cost-free flow of
foreign weather data. As the largest user of weather data on a worldwide
basis for agricultural, transportation, and other economic, military and
intelligence activities, the US would be particularly affected by any
disruptions in the flow of. data. Precipitous actions to transfer the civil
weather systems to the pri-vate sector also pose the risk of creating
situations that are not desirable from the viewpoint of longer-term national
security considerations. We defer to the Department of Defense to provide
more definitive comments on this particular point.
4. The sequence of activities called for under Option 2 would provide
a better basis for decision making and would also minimize the necessity
for developing amendments to the OMB circular A-76 Statement of Work. In
our judgment, adopting Option 2 does not necessarily rule out or delay a
decision for simultaneous transfer of aspects of both civil. weather and
land remote sensing systems. It merely ensures that a national policy
decision on any such transfer is made after consideration of all the consequent
factors that would affect US interests.
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
5. With reference to Issue II -- identifying the best mechanism to
expedite the transfer of the Landsat system to the private sector, we agree
with the Working Group that the central decision is to first determine the
level and timing of the fiscal commitment that the Administration is prepared
to make to the program of Landsat operations. Once a decision on this
point is made, the identification of the specific transfer mechanism can be
relatively quickly narrowed down, and the transfer can be implemented more
rapidly.
6. In reaching this decision on the extent of the federal commitment,
there should be a re-examination of the premises that are currently used to
assess the overall value o -F Landsat program. The assessment a ppr oac
_ _.f ., ~ h
now used by OMB is largely predicated upon the extent to which federa-
agencies are able to programmatically defend their specific expenditures
for purchase of Landsat products. This approach is an attempt to implement
the Adi-ninistration policy of having the users pay for the benefits of
federally provided services, and generally has considerable merit in assessing
statements of needs. However, the current manner of applying this principle
to the Landsat program has a major defect in that it does not focus on the
actual user groups that benefit from the Landsat program or the actual
value to those user groups of the information derived from the Landsat
products.
7. Our comments on this point :are addressed to the uses of Landsat
data by the CIA
but probably also have some relevance to other federal agency remote sensing
activities. The deficiency of the OMB purchase level criterion stems from
the fact that CIA is a "user" agency only in the literal sense of actually
purchasing and working with the Landsat materials. The real users are the
policymakers in the government. The accompanying classified summary outlines
recent CIA uses of Landsat-derived data to support US policymakers.
8. These factors lead us to recommend the Administration's adoption
of Option 2 -- an enhanced federal commitment to the Landsat program. We
recognize that determining where this level of enhancement should be
established will be a difficult task. Some aspects of the benefits can be
quantified with a fair degree of accuracy. Others, especially the aspects
that have foreign policy implications, cannot be, but nevertheless they
are relevant and should be considered.
9. Several additional points appear to be relevant for the Administration
to consider in making the decision on the level of the federal commitment.
The minimum level commitment poses the risk of not attracting sufficient
private sector involvement to ensure continuation of the Landsat capability.
Even if the minimum level does succeed in maintaining the present capability,
there is still the risk of being overcome by the competition of the oncoming
French and Japanese systems with their superior imaging capabilities.
Either event will likely result in many US purchasers obtaining their data
from foreign satellite sources.
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10. An enhanced Federal commitment affords the best opportunity for
attracting sufficient private sector involvement to continue the present
Landsat capability and perhaps even improve it to the point where it could
meet or surpass aggressive foreign competition. The risk here is that the
extent of the future repetitive market for Landsat-type products is not
really known but is probably more limited than currently anticipated --
especially at the higher price levels that will prevail in the future. A
limited market divided among several competing satellite remote sensing
systems poses the prospect of none of the competing systems generating
sufficient revenues to cover operational costs. Like the Concorde situation.
national prestige will be established and/or maintained', but the respective
programs will be viable only as long as the programs receive considerable
national subsidies. Therefore, another relevant consideration is estimating
to what extent such subsidies could be offset by increased sales of remote
sensing processing equipment and services.
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff
UNCLASSIFIED
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Origina
DCI/ICS/
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