CUBAN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO US INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001604090022-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: November 8, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council 8 November 1982
NOTE FOR: Acting DCI
FROM: NI0/LA
SUBJECT: NSC Review due 10 November 1982
1. As you know, the DCI decided last
Thursday that this Intelligence Assessment
should be formally coordinated by NFIB.
2. The CIA-agreed-upon draft went to
Walt Elder at NFIB tonight for coordination
by 1400 Tuesday, 9 November.
3. You will receive a draft by cob
tomorrow, and it will then be due to
Deputy Secretary of State Dan by cob Wednesday,
10 November.
4. If there are serious NFIB problems,
and we no not expect any, it might be
advisable to have a meeting Wednesday morning
to work these out. In any case, I hope that
you, and I might discuss
this briefly before you sent it to State.
Constantine C. Menges
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Exeautlve Aegistzg
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
IF
8 November 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals
THROUGH: Walter Elder, Executive Secretary
National Foreign Intelligence Board
FROM: Constantine C. Menges
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: .Cuban International Activities Inimical to US Interests
1. The attached draft Intelligence Community y and Assessment
international activities inimical to US interests
actions the Castro government may take in the next year" was written at
the request of the National Security Council. The paper was prepared
under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
and drafted by analysts in the Office of African and Latin American
Analysis, CIA.
2. On Thursday, 4 November 1982, the DCI decided that this paper
should be reviewed by the NFIB Principals. The NIO for Latin America
met with his counterparts in DIA, INR and NSA on Friday, 5 November,
to discuss the preliminary draft.
3. The final paper must be sent to the Acting DCI on 9 November 1982,
for transmittal to the Deputy Secretary of State by the due date of
10 November 1982. For that reason it is requested that you please
ccalI
the Executive Secretary of NFIB (Walt Elder
and coordination by 1400 hours on Tuesday, 9 November. With the exception
of DIA, the comments of NFIB representatives on the preliminary draft
were not received in time to be incorporated into this text- but will be
reflected in the final text. If you have not comment b :1400 hours,
the Executive Secretary will take it that you concur.
Constantine C. Menges
Attachment:
as stated above
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SUBJECT: Cuban International Activities Inimical to US Interests
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - ADCI
1 - C/WIC
1 - Walt Elder (20 copies)
1 - t Kne er (INR)
NSA
6 (DIA)
(with copies for Army - Col. Nevares
Air Force - C. Silva
Marines - Capt. 14. Silver
Navy - T. Pallas)
1 -- (DDI/ALA)
1-NIO/LA
7: SECRET
1-
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CUBAN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO US INTERESTS*
Table of Contents
Page
Summary
PART 1:
Current Cuban International Activities
1
Hostile to the United States
Overview of Geographical Scope and Methods
1
Latin America
3
Africa
5
Middle East
6
Other International Actions
7
PART II:
Possible Additional Cuban International
9
Actions Hostile to US Interests in 1983-1984
Overview
9
Latin America
9
Africa and the Middle East
11
Other areas
12
PART III:
The Military Threat Posed by Cuban
13
and Soviet Military Assets in Cuba
Trends in the Acquisition of Military Equipment
13
ANNEX: Cuban Military Forces
15
TABLES:
Cuban Presence and Activities in Latin America
Cuban Presence and Activities in the Caribbean
Cuban Presence and Activities in Africa
Cuban Presence and Activities in the Middle East
Cuban Presence and Activities in the Far East
*This Intelligence Assessment was requested by the Special
Assistant for National Security, Judge William Clark. It was
prepared under the auspices of the NIO/LA by the Office of
African and Latin American Analysis, CIA.
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Cuban actions inimical to US interests: Summary'
The likelihood of an accommodation with Castro in the next two years
The Castro regime is promoting a broad range of activities designed to
undermine US influence worldwide. We believe these actions will continue as
long as Fidel Castro and his guerrilla veterans remain in power. Only the
intensity varies, determined by the conditions in each country and Cuba's
ability to exploit them. Six former US presidents tried to negotiate Cuba
into accommodation; all failed and the available intelligence information
suggests that.there;is virtually no prospect for a genuine accommodation with
Cuba on major issues in the next two years.
PART 1/Current Cuban international activities hostile, to the US
In overview, Cuba has active subversive and military operations in Latin
America, Africa, and the Middle East while also using diplomacy, propaganda,
and covert action for anti-US purposes world-wide and in Western Europe/Japan.
In Latin America and the Caribbean
--Cuba is directly supporting active insurgencies in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Colombia and is laying the groundwork in Honduras,
Costa Rica, and Chile. Hundreds of Latin American guerrillas have
been trained in Cuba in recent years.
--Havana is heavily engaged in the consolidation of power in
Nicaragua and Grenada.
--Where guerrilla 3trategies are presently non-productive, Havana is
relying on a mixture of diplomacy, propaganda, and non-violent
covert action to undercut US influence.
In Africa:
--Cuba now has over 40,000 military and civilian personnel propping
up Angola and Ethiopia and working in more than a dozen other
countries. Four other African governments are the target of Cuban-
assisted subversive groups (South Africa, Namibia, Zaire, and
Morocco).
In the Middle East:
--Cuba has aligned itself closely with the PLO and the radical Arab
States (Libya and South Yemen).
In Europe:
--Cuba uses political and economic tactics to create and exploit
differences between Washington and its allies.
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PART 2/Possible additional Cuban activities hostile to US interests, in 1983-84
During the coming 12-18 months, these activities will continue and in
certain areas, will expand. The very nature of the Castro regime precludes
anything but an adversary relationship between Havana and Washington. Latin
America will continue to be a priority target.
--Subversion will continue apace, especially in Central America.
--Cuba will try to encourage and take advantage of the leftist drift
in Suriname and Bolivia.
--Concern over change in Panama's orientation could cause Havana to
begin supporting subversive efforts there.
--If the Sandinistas are seriously threatened, Havana would almost
certainly send troops unless deterred by the credible threat of US
military forces. .
--It is not certain, however, that Cuba's promotion of subversion
will steadily increase in all cases. Under certain circumstances,
Castro would be willing to reduce his revolutionary profile
temporarily if convinced it would advance his overall goal of
diminishing US influence in the hemisphere.
--Cuba can be expected to promote strongly the creation of a regional
organization that excludes the US. .. .
--Cuba will probably retaliate strongly with jamming of US domestic
radio and counterbroadcasts if Radio Marti goes on the air; Castro
might also threaten or mount another Mariel-type exodus of refugees
-to the US.
In Africa, Havana will maintain its military support for Angola and
Ethiopia: .
--Cuba's reluctance to withdraw troops from Angola will hinder a
.Namibian settlement.
--A deteriorating situation in Mozambique could bring an increased
Cuban military presence there.
Elsewhere, Cuba is likely to:
--Continue its cooperation with the PLO, Libya, and other radical
Arab states.
--Expand its efforts to create or exacerbate tensions between the US
and its European allies.
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PART 3/The military threat posed by Cuban and Soviet military-related
assets in Cuba.
Cuba has over 250,000 persons in its armed forces, and an air force with
more than 250 MIG fighters.
--During peacetime, Cuba serves as a base for Soviet intelligence
collecting activities against US government, military and
commercial communications.
--In wartime, Cuba could serve as a recovery base for
Soviet bombers while its air force and navy threaten Free
World sea lines of communications and the Panama Canal.
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